**On the Publication of Defense of** **Japan 2015** ### Gen Nakatani Minister of Defense Defense policy must always be relevant to the constantly changing security environment. And now is precisely when Japan’s defense policy is at a major turning point in our history. Japan faces an increasingly severe security environment. China has increased its defense budget by over 10% for fi ve consecutive years, strengthening its military forces broadly and rapidly. Chinese government ships conduct intermittent incursions into Japan’s territorial waters. China carries out extremely dangerous acts that could cause unintended consequences, such as the fl ying of Chinese military fi ghter jets abnormally close to Self-Defense Force (SDF) aircraft. It has to be said that China lacks transparency on many fronts regarding its military affairs and security issues, including its rising defense budget. North Korea has conducted ballistic missile launches repeatedly, and its nuclear development and enhancement of ballistic missile capabilities constitute a serious and imminent threat to the security of Japan. Turning our attention to the rest of the world, Russia appears to have intervened directly or indirectly in its neighboring country Ukraine. The international terrorist group ISIL has been gaining strength in Syria and Iraq. Tragically, despicable acts of terrorism have occurred that killed or injured Japanese nationals outside of Japan. Domestically, many precious lives were lost as a result of the landslides in Hiroshima Prefecture and the eruption of Mt. Ontake. In Nepal, a massive earthquake took place that caused catastrophic devastation. The Ministry of Defense (MOD) and the SDF are the fi nal bastion in securing Japan’s territorial land, water, and airspace in any situation. In this regard, it is critically important that the MOD and the SDF make ceaseless efforts and steadily improve their response capabilities. At the moment, Diet deliberations are under way on the Peace and Security Legislation, which enables seamless responses to any situations in order to secure the lives and peaceful livelihood of the Japanese people. Furthermore, the Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation was revised for the fi rst time in 18 years after the last revision to further deepen Japan-U.S. defense cooperation in a wide range of areas. Additionally, reforms of the MOD are being ----- undertaken, including the strengthening of the SDF’s integrated operational functions and the new establishment of the Acquisition, Technology and Logistics Agency. Moreover, under Japan’s policy of Proactive Contribution to Peace based on the principle of international cooperation, the MOD and the SDF promote United Nations Peacekeeping Operations (PKO), counter-piracy operations, and defense cooperation with countries mainly in the Minister of Defense Nakatani visiting a “response at collapsed houses” exercise (GSDF Camp Nerima) Asia-Pacific region. We also continue to work to build a Dynamic Joint Defense Force that is necessary for effective deterrence of and response to various situations. As these revisions to the defense policy get under way, every day SDF personnel are steadily performing diverse tasks in difficult conditions across Japan and across the world. These tasks include surveillance, exercises, U.N. PKO, disaster deployments, and logistics support to these missions. For me, as a former SDF personnel who worked on the ground, the ground represents my starting point. I have visited GSDF, MSDF, and ASDF units on the ground as well as South Sudan and Djibouti to offer encouragement to personnel. What I saw there were personnel making tireless efforts in order to live up to the trust placed in them by the Japanese people and the international community, even with the diversification of the SDF’s tasks to adapt to the changing times. Public understanding and support are indispensable for the defense of Japan. In addition, there is much significance to maintaining the transparency of Japanese defense policy for gaining the further understanding and trust of countries. We are pleased to learn that according to the Cabinet Office’s FY2014 Public Opinion Survey on the SDF and Defense Issues, the public maintained an overall high level of interest in defense issues and a positive impression of the SDF, following on from the previous survey in 2012. The Defense of Japan has no doubt contributed to these results. As it happens, the aforementioned important and broad defense policy revisions are being carried out this year, which marks the 70th anniversary of the end of World War II. I believe this year’s Defense of Japan that outlines these revisions takes on added importance compared to previous years’ white papers. It is my sincere hope that this year, once again, the Defense of Japan will be read by as many people as possible, and that they will have a deeper understanding of the MOD and the SDF. ----- **Defense Chronology** July-December 2014 Jul. Aug. Sep. Oct. Nov. Dec. Jul. 1 Cabinet decision on “Development of Seamless Security Legislation to Ensure Japan’s Survival and Protect Its People” Jul. 1 Commencement of construction of the airfield and the Futenma Replacement Facility in the Futenma Replacement Facility construction project Agreement reached on studies on a possible Acquisition and CrossJul. 7 Japan-New Zealand summit meeting (Auckland) Servicing Agreement (ACSA) Signing of Japan-Australia Transfer of Defense Equipment and Jul. 8 Japan-Australia summit meeting (Canberra) Technology Agreement Confirmation of the progress in the review of the Guidelines for JapanJul. 11 Japan-U.S. Defense Ministers’ Meeting (Washington) U.S. Defense Cooperation Jul. 25 Entry into force of the partial revision of the Act for Establishment of the Ministry of Defense (establishment of the post of Defense Councillor) Signing of a statement of intent concerning defense cooperation and Jul. 29 Japan-France Defense Ministers’ Meeting (Tokyo) exchanges Aug. 1 Entry into force of the partial revision of the Act for Establishment of the Ministry of Defense (the authorized number of posts for uniformed SDF personnel in internal subdivisions fixed, organization of the Tactical Fighter Training Group, etc.) Aug. 14 Commencement of offshore work (boring survey) for the Futenma Replacement Facility construction project Aug. 20 Dispatch of disaster relief units on a lifesaving mission in Hiroshima City, Hiroshima Prefecture (through September 11) Aug. 26 Completion of the relocation of KC-130 of the U.S. Armed Forces from Futenma to Iwakuni Signing of a memorandum on Japan-India defense cooperation and Sep. 1 Japan-India summit meeting (Tokyo) exchange Sep. 27 Dispatch of disaster relief units in response to the volcanic eruption of Mount Ontake (through October 16) Sep. 30 Return of part of the land of Sagami General Depot (Approximately 17ha) The first return of land on the mainland based on the Roadmap Exchange of views on promotion of maritime defense cooperation, Oct. 7 Sixth Japan-ASEAN Vice-Ministerial Forum (Yokohama) cooperation in equipment and technology, and capacity-building Agreement to continue studies enhancing Japan-Australia and JapanOct. 16 Japan-Australia Defense Ministers’ Meeting (Tokyo) U.S.-Australia joint exercises Oct. 26 Aviation inspection parade in commemoration of the 60th anniversary of the Ministry of Defense/Self-Defense Forces Oct. 28 Japan-Finland Defense Ministers’ Meeting (Tokyo) Discussion of Japan-ROK defense cooperation and exchange, and Oct. 29 Japan-ROK Defense Vice-Ministerial Meeting (Seoul) explanation of Japan’s security initiatives Signing of a memorandum on Japan-Spain defense cooperation and Nov. 4 Japan-Spain Defense Ministers’ Meeting (Tokyo) exchanges Exchange of views on cooperation in non-traditional security areas, such Nov. 19 First Japan-ASEAN Defense Ministers’ Roundtable (Bagan) as humanitarian assistance/disaster relief and maritime security Nov. 23 Dispatch of disaster relief units in response to an earthquake with an epicenter in northern Nagano Prefecture Nov. 28 Transportation of supplies necessary for international disaster relief activities to respond to the Ebola hemorrhagic fever epidemic in Western Africa (Republic of Ghana, through Dec. 11) Female SDF personnel dispatched as the NATO Secretary General’s Dec. 1 First dispatch of SDF personnel to NATO Special Representative for Women, Peace and Security Dec. 6 Dispatch of disaster relief units in response to heavy snow in Tokushima Prefecture (through December 11) Dec. 19 Joint announcement of Japan-U.S. Security Consultative Committee Decision to deepen discussions toward completion of the review of the (2+2) Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation in the first half of 2015 Dec. 26 Completion of the deployment of U.S. Armed Forces TPY-2 Radar (so-called X-band Radar) at Kyogamisaki Dec. 31 International disaster relief activities for the missing AirAsia plane ----- January-May 2015 Jan. Feb. Mar. Apr. May Jan. 12 Fourth joint working group talks between Japanese and Chinese defense Agreement to strive toward the early commencement of the operation authorities on “Marine and Air Communications Mechanism” (Tokyo) of the “Marine and Air Communications Mechanism” Jan. 15 Dispatch of disaster relief units in response to avian influenza (Okayama Prefecture: January 15 through January 19; Saga Prefecture: January 18 through January 20) Jan. 18 Visit by Defense Minister Nakatani to Djibouti Jan. 19 Visit by Defense Minister Nakatani to South Sudan Jan. 20 Release of video of Japanese nationals detained by ISIL released (subsequent release of videos of the murder of the Japanese nationals on January 24 and February 1) Shared recognition of the need to cooperate between Japan and Jan. 21 Japan-U.K. Defense Ministers’ Meeting, First Japan-U.K. Foreign and U.K. in relation to Japanese nationals detained by ISIL in Syria and Defense Ministerial Meeting (2+2) (London) contribute to the international community’s fight against terrorism Signing of a memorandum of understanding on Japan-Philippines Jan. 29 Japan-Philippines Defense Ministers’ Meeting (Tokyo) defense cooperation and exchange Acceptance of personnel under the agreement reached at the bilateral Feb. 3 Acceptance of Australian Defense Ministry personnel by the Ministry Defense Ministers’ Meeting in 2012 as part of Japan-Australia of Defense cooperation in the area of support for capacity-building Feb. 10 Cabinet decision on the “revision of the Implementation Plans for International Peace Cooperation Assignments in South Sudan” (extension of the dispatch period to the end of August 2015) Signing of a memorandum of understanding on Japan-Qatar defense Feb. 20 Japan-Qatar summit meeting (Tokyo) exchange Signing of an agreement concerning Transfer of Defense Equipment and Mar. 13 Second Japan-France Foreign and Defense Ministers’ Meeting (2+2) Technology between Japan and France Agreement and confirmation that (Tokyo) Japan and France will enhance cooperation in Africa and the Middle East and join the international community in fighting against terrorism Renewed confirmation that both sides will strive toward the Mar. 19 Japan-China security dialogue (Tokyo) early commencement of the operation of the “Maritime and Air Communication Mechanism” Mar. 20 Japan Timor-Leste Defense Ministers’ Meeting Signing of a memorandum on Japan-Indonesia defense cooperation Mar. 23 Japan-Indonesia summit meeting (Tokyo) and exchange Agreement to strive toward early progress in defense equipment Mar. 30 Japan-India Defense Ministers’ Meeting (Tokyo) cooperation and continuation with periodic land and air cooperation, including bilateral naval exercises Mar. 31 Return of West Futenma residential area (approximately 51ha) Apr. 8 Japan-U.S. Defense Ministers’ Meeting (Tokyo) Apr. 27 International disaster relief activities in response to an earthquake in Nepal (through May 22) Apr. 27 Japan-U.S. Security Consultative Committee (2+2) (New York) Approval of new Guidelines Apr. 28 Japan-U.S. summit meeting (Washington) Apr. 28 Japan-U.S. Defense Ministers’ Meeting (Washington) Apr. 30 Promulgation and enforcement of the Act on Special Measures Introduction of long-term contracts enabling cost reductions and stable Concerning Years of Expenditures with Treasury Obligations Related to procurement, thereby realizing the defense buildup in a reliable and Specified Defense Procurement (so-called the Long-Term Contract Act) systematic manner May 14 Cabinet decision on “Legislation for Peace and Security” and the Development of a seamless system for ensuring the peace and security “International Peace Cooperation Bill” of Japan and the international community May 29 Dispatch of disaster relief units in response to a volcanic eruption on Kuchinoerabujima Island (through June 1) May 30 Participation by Defense Minister Nakatani in the 14th Asia Security Summit (IISS Shangri-La Dialogue) (Singapore) (through May 31) Japan-U.S. Defense Ministers’ Meeting (Singapore) Japan-U.S.-Korea Defense Ministers’ Meeting and Japan-U.S.Australia Defense Ministers’ Meeting (Singapore) May 31 Appointment of MSDF personnel as the commander of Combined Task Commander of a multinational force since the foundation of the SDF F 1 1 (CTF 1 1) f i i ----- **Part I Security Environment Surrounding Japan** **Overview** - The security environment surrounding Japan has become increasingly severe, with various challenges and destabilizing factors becoming more tangible and acute. - In the periphery of Japan, there has been a tendency towards an increase in and prolongation of so-called “gray-zone” situations, that is, neither pure peacetime nor contingencies over territory, sovereignty, and maritime economic interests. In addition, there has been a noticeable trend among neighboring countries to modernize and reinforce their military capabilities and to intensify their military activities. In this regard, security challenges and destabilizing factors in the Asia-Pacifi c region are becoming more serious. - In a global security environment, there is a growing risk that unrest or a security problem in a single country or region could Recent Security Related Issues around Japan immediately develop into a challenge or destabilizing factor for the entire international community. The activities of international terrorist organizations, including the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), are gaining momentum and expanding. Russia has attempted to change the status quo by force or coercion in Ukraine (so-called “hybrid warfare”). Cyber attacks have become more sophisticated and complicated. As these examples exemplify, the security challenges and destabilizing factors are complex, diverse, and wide-ranging, and it is becoming ever more diffi cult for a single country to deal with them on its own. - Territorial disputes over the Northern Territories and Takeshima, both of which are inherent parts of the territory of Japan, remain unresolved. Russian military activities intensifying North Korea’s military provocations and rhetoric North Korea’s progress with the development of nuclear weapons and missiles Extensive and rapid strengthening of China’s military power Rapid expansion/intensification of China’s activities in the East China Sea Sea lanes leading to Japan China’s advancements into Changes in the China-Taiwan the Pacific Ocean routinely conducted military balance (increasingly favorable to the Chinese side) Gray zone situations tend Rapid expansion/intensification of to be increased and prolonged China’s activities in the South China Sea Using GTOP030(USGS) and ETOP01(NOAA) ----- **The United States** - As the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq draw to a close, the patterns European Region announced the Defense Innovation Initiative aimed at identifying of U.S. involvement in the world are changing. While faced with innovative ways to offset potentioal adversaries’ capabilities in Army: approx. 29,000 personnel a severe financial situation, the United States is anticipated to Navy: approx. 7,000 personnel order to sustain and expand U.S. military advantages, utilizing continue to play a role in the peace and stability of the world by Air Force: approx. 29,000 personnel limited resources. He expressed his expectation that the initiative U.S. Forces drawing on its world-leading, comprehensive national power.Marines: approx. 1,000 personnel would develop into a third offset strategy.Army: approx. 495,000 personnel Navy: approx. 320,000 personnel - The National Security Strategy (NSS) released in February 2015 Total: approx. 66,000 personnel Air Force: approx. 309,000 personnel (Total in 1987: underscores that the United States would continue to play a approx. 354,000 personnel) Marines: approx. 185,000 personnel leading role in tackling a variety of challenges, such as the threat U.S. European Command Total: approx. 1,310,000 personnel of terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (Total in 1987: approx. 2,170,000 personnel) (WMDs), and cyber attacks, as well as take collective action with its allies and others, while promoting a rules-based international U.S. Central Command **Asia-Pacific Region** order. Furthermore, the NSS maintains that the United States U.S. Northern Command would continue to advance its rebalance to Asia and the Pacific. Army: approx. 44,000 personnel Focus will be on how the changes in the situations in the Middle Navy: approx. 40,000 personnel Air Force: approx. 28,000 personnel East and Ukraine impact these U.S. policies.U.S. Africa Command U.S. Pacific Command Marines: approx. 24,000 personnel - Meanwhile, the government budget mandatory sequestration, Total: approx. 136,000 personnel U.S. SouthernCommand including defense spending, that was initiated in 2013 brought (Total in 1987: various impacts on the U.S. Forces. The QDR also emphasizes the approx. 184,000 personnel) significant risks of sequestration to the U.S. Forces. Much attention will be paid to how the mandatory sequestration cuts in defense spending will impact the defense strategies and security policies. The U.S. Navy’s Aegis destroyer USS Benfold to be deployed to Yokosuka in summer 2015 - In November 2014, then-U.S. Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel [U.S. Navy website] Notes: 1. Source: Documents published by the U.S. Department of Defense (as of December 31, 2014), etc. The Recent Trend of the U.S. Forces in the Asia-Pacific Region2. The number of personnel deployed in the Asia-Pacific region includes personnel deployed in Hawaii and Guam. **[Japan]** **[Republic of Korea]** - Deployment of F-22, MV-22 Ospreys (deployment of CV-22 to Yokota in 2017), P-8, - Maintaining around 28,500 U.S. troops and of Global Hawk stationed in the Republic of Korea - Deployment of second TPY-2 radar - Relocation of III Marine Expeditionary Force (III MEF) and ground troops from Okinawa to Guam and Hawaii, etc. **[Taiwan]** Seoul - Additional one missile cruiser has been deployed (June 2015) - A plan to upgrade the F-16s Taiwan - Additional two Aegis BMD destroyers will be deployed (scheduled for summer 2015 currently owns, etc. (announced in September 2011) ROK Japan - Deployment of F-35 in Iwakuni in 2017 (the Marines’ plan)and 2017) **[Singapore]** Hawaii - Rotational deployment of Littoral Combat Ships (LCS) (announced Okinawa in June 2011; a broad Philippines Guam **[Guam]** agreement reached with the Manila - Relocation of home port for a carrier from - Rotational deployment of submarines government of Singapore in the Atlantic Ocean side to the Pacific - Rotational deployment of bombers June 2012; the first ship started **[Philippines]** Ocean side (in San Diego) (April 2010) - Establishment of a facility for aircraft rotation in April 2013 and the - Transfer of U.S. Coast Guard cutters carrier’s temporary port of call second ship in December 2014) (August 2011, May 2012) - Deployment of unmanned - Signing of the Enhanced Defense Singapore Cooperation Agreement with the reconnaissance aircraft (RQ-4) Indonesia purpose of enhancing the presence of the U.S. Forces, etc. (April 2014) **[Australia]** Jakarta At the November 2011 U.S.-Australia Summit, an agreement was reached on the Darwin following initiatives: - Rotational deployment of the Marines to northern Australia **[Indonesia]** - Increased rotational deployment of U.S. Air Force aircraft in northern Australia - Transfer of 24 F-16s (announced in November 2011) (Reference) Number of Marine Corps troops in the Asia-Pacific Region Australia **Total: Approx. 24,049** In June 2013, U.S. Secretary of Defense Hagel announced a plan to deploy 60% of the Hawaii: 7,677 Australia: 12 assets of the U.S. Navy and Air Force in the Asia-Pacific region as well as proceeding Guam: 15 Republic of Korea: 250 with the rotational deployment in the region and deployment of equipment. Japan: 15,870 Thailand: 215 etc. Canberra Source: Documents published by the U.S. Department of Defense (as of December 31, 2014) and the Military Balance 2015 - A map created by the U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) is used ----- **North Korea** General Situation - North Korea seems to maintain and reinforce its so-called asymmetric military capabilities and repeatedly uses militarily provocative words and actions. Such military trend in North Korea heightens tension in the Korean Peninsula and constitutes a serious destabilizing factor to the security not only of Japan but also of the entire region and the international community. Accordingly, it is necessary for Japan to pay utmost attention to them. Development of Weapons of Mass Destruction and Missiles - In March 2013, North Korea adopted the so-called “new strategic line” policy of simultaneous economic and nuclear development. - With regard to North Korea’s nuclear development, some have argued that it is a so-called brinkmanship policy designed to receive a reward of some sort. However, North Korea is deemed to be developing nuclear weapons as an indispensable deterrent for maintaining the existing regime. - North Korea has conducted three nuclear tests since 2006 and has repeatedly hinted at further nuclear tests since March 2014, raising international concerns. - Taking into account that North Korea has not changed its stance of continuing its nuclear weapons program, it is believed that with the passage of time, there would be a greater risk of North Korea deploying a ballistic missile mounted with a nuclear warhead that includes Japan in its range. In this regard, related developments need to be monitored carefully. - It has been suggested that North Korea is developing a SubmarineLaunched Ballistic Missile (SLBM) and an SLBM-carrying submarine. In May 2015, North Korea announced that it conducted a successful test launch of the SLBM. It is deemed that North Korea intends to diversify its attack capabilities and improve survivability. Furthermore, it has been suggested that North Korea is carrying out significant modification of its rocket launch tower in Tongch’ang-ri district. In the future, North Korea could launch long-range ballistic missiles which are larger compared to the past. - Should North Korea acquire longer-range ballistic missile capability and achieve the miniaturization of nuclear weapons and acquired nuclear warheads, and in turn have a false sense of confidence and recognition that it secured strategic deterrence against the United States, this could lead to increases in and the escalation of military provocations by North Korea in the region and could create situations that are deeply worrying also for Japan. - The ballistic missile launches since 2014 have demonstrated improvements in the operational capabilities of North Korea’s ballistic missile units, including surprise attack capabilities, with several ballistic missiles launched from locations and at timings as North Korea chooses. The North Korean ballistic missile threat is increasing further. - The development of WMDs and missiles by North Korea constitutes, coupled with its provocative words and actions, including missile attacks against Japan, a serious and imminent threat to the security of Japan. Additionally, such development poses a serious challenge to the entire international community with regard to the non-proliferation of weapons, including WMDs. Domestic Affairs - Kim Jong-un, First Chairman of the National Defense Commission, has conducted frequent personnel reshuffles, and individuals selected by First Chairman Kim Jong-un have been assigned to the key party, military, and cabinet posts. It is believed that the First Chairman endeavors to strengthen and consolidate his regime as its sole leader. - In 2014, the North Korean media stopped reporting the activities of Kim Kyong-hui, Secretary of the Korean Workers’ Party and First Chairman Kim Jong-un’s aunt. Meanwhile, the North Korean media began to report the activities of the First Chairman’s younger sister, Kim Yo-jong, as a senior member of the Korean Workers’ Party. It is suggested that a generational change in the leadership may be taking place among the Kim family. - The Kim Jong-un regime appears to be moving on track to a certain degree. However, the chilling effect resulting from the frequent personnel reshuffles, including dismissals, could propel North Korea to turn to military provocative actions without making sufficient diplomatic considerations. In addition, some point to the concern over social control such as the increasing inequality between the rich and the poor and the inflow of information from abroad – a concern which needs to be monitored from the perspective of regime stability. Relations with Other Countries - China is a vital political and economic partner for North Korea and maintains a degree of influence on North Korea. However, North Korea does not necessarily adopt actions which are in line with the position of China over nuclear and ballistic missile issues, and mutual visits of senior officials have decreased. In this light, relations between China and North Korea may be cooling on the political and diplomatic domains. Given such circumstances, North Korea-China relations will continue to be followed. - On the other hand, in 2014, North Korea intensified its diplomacy with Russia. The year saw mutual visits by many senior officials as well as advances in economic cooperation. ----- **China** General Situation Military Affairs - There are high expectations for China to recognize its responsibility - China has strengthened its military forces broadly and rapidly. in the international community, accept and comply with Furthermore, China has rapidly expanded and intensified its international norms, and play an active role in a more cooperative activities at sea and in airspace, including the East China Sea and manner on regional and global issues. South China Sea. Japan has great concerns over such Chinese - While advocating “peaceful development,”China, particullarly over military activities, etc., together with the lack of transparency in maritime issues where its interests conflict with others’,based on its military affairs and security issues, and needs to pay utmost its own assertions incompatible with the existing international attention to them. These activities also raise security concerns for legal order, continues to act in an assertive manner, including the region and the international community. coercive attempts at changing the status quo, and is poised to - China has not disclosed specific information on possession of fulfill its unilateral demands without compromise. China’s actions weapons, procurement goals and past procurements, organization include dangerous acts that may invite unintended consequences, and locations of major units, records of main military operations raising concerns over China’s future direction. and exercises, and a detailed breakdown of the national defense - China has attempted to advance its own initiatives in the security budget. It is hoped that China will increase transparency concerning field. At the Conference on Interaction and Confidence-Building its military affairs by such efforts as disclosing specific information Measures in Asia (CICA), for example, China criticized military pertaining to its defense policies and military capabilities. alliances and proposed “the security of Asia by the people of - China’s announced national defense budget continues to increase at Asia.” In the field of international finance, China established the a rapid pace, recording double-digit annual growth nearly consistently New Development Bank BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and from FY1989 to the present. The nominal size of China’s announced South Africa) and is preparing to establish the Asian Infrastructure national defense budget has grown approximately 41-fold in 27 years Investment Bank (AIIB). since FY1988 and nearly 3.6-fold in 10 years since FY2005. - In China, under the policy of cracking down on both “tigers” and - In order to acquire striking force that will enable penetration of “flies,” “corruption” has been subject to severe charges, including the missile defense shield, China is considered to be developing former prominent leaders of the party and military. During the a hypersonic glide vehicle which is launched by mounting to a fourth plenary session of the 18th Chinese Communist Party ballistic missile. Some analysts point out that China may also be (CCP) Central Committee in October 2014, a decision that makes constructing its first domestic aircraft carrier. Additionally, China reference to advancing the “rule of law” under the guidance of the is developing the J-20 and J-31, which are said to become nextCCP was adopted. Accordingly, it is possible that further steps will generation fighters. be taken to address corruption within the party and military. - China is deemed to have established the “East China Sea Joint - China is believed to be enhancing its asymmetric military Operational Command Center” to jointly operate the Navy and capabilities to deter military forces of other countries from Air Force. In addition, some analysts have stated that the CCP approaching and advancing to China’s surrounding region, and to established the “Central Military Commission Joint Operations inhibit their military activities in the region (so-called “Anti-Access/ Command Center” to carry out decision-making at the highest Area-Denial” [“A2/AD”] capabilities). strategic level. Furthermore, China has recently conducted drills aimed at the development of a joint operational posture. Change in China’s Announced Defense Budget (100 million yuan) (%) 9,000 6,500 6,000 20 5,500 5,000 4,500 15 4,000 3,500 2,500 2,000 1,000 500 Defense Budget (in 100 million yuan) Year-on-year growth rate (%) 89 90 92 94 96 98 00 02 04 06 08 10 12 14 15 (FY) Note: The total defense budget for FY2002 was not disclosed. Discrepancies arise if the disclosed rate and amount of growth are applied to the initial budget of the previous year. Therefore, for FY2002, 168.4 billion yuan was used based on a calculation conducted on the assumption that the disclosed rate and amount of growth represent increases from the actual defense expenditure in FY2001. ----- Situation of Activities in Japan s Surrounding Waters and Airspace - In recent years, China is believed to be aiming to build up capabilities to conduct operations in more distant waters and airspace. Accordingly, China has rapidly expanded its maritime activities based on sea power and air power, both qualitatively and quantitatively. Such activities by China include dangerous acts that could cause unintended consequences and are extremely regrettable. China is urged to act on the basis of the principle of the “rule of law”. - The Chinese government announced that it established the “East China Sea ADIZ” including the Senkaku Islands which China described as if they were a part of China’s “territory,” and that the Chinese Armed Forces would take “defensive emergency measures” in the case where aircraft does not follow the relevant rules set forth by the Chinese Ministry of National Defense. These measures unduly infringe the freedom of overfl ight over the high seas, which is the general principle of international law. Japan is demanding China to revoke any measures that go against the principle of the freedom of overfl ight over the high seas. - The number of Chinese naval surface vessels advancing to the Pacifi c Ocean has increased in recent years, and such advancements are currently conducted routinely. It is understood that China seeks to improve its deployment capabilities to the open ocean. - With regard to the activities of Chinese government vessels, since October 2013, the operations of government vessels intended to intrude into terrirotial waters near the Senkaku Islands have become routinized. In this light, an operations manual or other codes may have been developed. Furthermore, China has striven to develop larger government vessels and is proceeding with the construction of the world’s largest 10,000-ton class patrol vessel. Recent Chinese Activities in Airspace near Japan Flew to the Pacific Ocean through airspace between the main island of Okinawa and Miyako Island Guam - a “Y-8” (airborne early warning) (July 2013) - two “H-6” (bomber) (September 2013) Tokyo - two “Y-8” (airborne early warning) & two “H-6” (bomber) (three consecutive days, October 2013) - a “Y-8” (intelligence-gathering aircraft) & two “H-6” (bomber) November 2013, the establishment of the (March 2014) “East China Sea Air Defense Identification Okinawa - two “Y-8” (airborne early warning), a “Y-9” (intelligence-gathering Zone” was announced aircraft) & two “H-6” (bomber) (December 6, 7, 10, and 11, 2014) - a “Y-9” (intelligence-gathering aircraft) (two consecutive days, East China Sea February 2015) - two “H-6” (bomber) (May 2015) December 2012, fixed wing aircraft, which May and June 2014, over the East China belongs to the State Oceanic Administration, Sea, two “Su-27” (fighter) came near violated the airspace for the first time collision with MSDF’s and ASDF’s aircraft Taipei “Su-30” (fighter), “J-11” (fighter) & “KJ-2000” Ningbo (airborne early warning) etc., flew within the The following aircraft flew: “East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone” - a “Tu-154” (intelligence-gathering aircraft) (two consecutive days, November 2013) (announcement by the Chinese side) - a “Tu-154” (intelligence-gathering aircraft ) & a “Y-8” (intelligence-gathering aircraft) (November 2013) - a “Tu-154” (intelligence-gathering aircraft) (February 2014) The United States National Oceanic and - a “Tu-154” (intelligence-gathering aircraft) (March 2014) Atmospheric Administration: ETOPO1 Qingdao - China has been engaged in oil and gas drilling as well as building facilities and surveying for the drilling in the East China Sea and South China Sea. The Japanese government has confi rmed that in addition to its existing platforms China has been building new - It is thought that one of the objectives of China s maritime activities is to weaken the control of other countries over the islands to which China claims territorial sovereignty, while strengthening the claim of its territorial sovereignty, through various surveillance activities and use of force at sea and in airspace surrounding the islands. - In recent years, China has shown interest in taking steps to avoid and prevent unexpected situations at sea. In April 2014, China, together with other countries such as Japan and the United States, agreed to the Code for Unplanned Encounters at Sea (CUES). Additionally, in January 2015, Japanese and Chinese defense authorities resumed the consultations to swiftly begin the implementation of the Maritime and Air Communication Mechanism. In November 2014, the United States and China announced their agreement on two confi dence-building measures. Situation of Activities in the South China Sea and Indian Ocean - In August 2014, a Chinese fi ghter allegedly fl ew abnormally close to and intercepted a U.S. Navy aircraft in the South China Sea. - China has pressed ahead with rapid and large-scale land reclamation work in seven features in the Spratly Islands. On some of them, it is considered that China is building infrastructure including runways and ports, which has raised concerns among the international community, including the United States. - A Song-class submarine conducted activities in the Indian Ocean from September to October 2014, and is deemed to have called at a port in Colombo, Sri Lanka, twice in the same year. As such examples demonstrate, the Chinese Navy has improved its capacity to execute operations in more distant waters, including the Indian Ocean. Flew to the Pacific Ocean through airspace between the main island of Okinawa and Miyako Island - a “Y-8” (airborne early warning) (July 2013) - two “H-6” (bomber) (September 2013) - two “Y-8” (airborne early warning) & two “H-6” (bomber) (three consecutive days, October 2013) - a “Y-8” (intelligence-gathering aircraft) & two “H-6” (bomber) (March 2014) - two “Y-8” (airborne early warning), a “Y-9” (intelligence-gathering aircraft) & two “H-6” (bomber) (December 6, 7, 10, and 11, 2014) - a “Y-9” (intelligence-gathering aircraft) (two consecutive days, February 2015) - two “H-6” (bomber) (May 2015) December 2012, fixed wing aircraft, which belongs to the State Oceanic Administration, Taipei violated the airspace for the first time The following aircraft flew: - a “Tu-154” (intelligence-gathering aircraft) (two consecutive days, November 2013) - a “Tu-154” (intelligence-gathering aircraft ) & a “Y-8” (intelligence-gathering aircraft) (November 2013) - a “Tu-154” (intelligence-gathering aircraft) (February 2014) - a “Tu-154” (intelligence-gathering aircraft) (March 2014) offshore platforms and other facilities on the Chinese side of the Japan-China median line of the East China Sea since June 2013. Japan has repeatedly lodged protests against China’s unilateral development and demanded the termination of such works etc ----- **Russia** - Russia has made clear its adversarial stance against the West and other countries over Ukraine, which Russia considers is under its sphere of influence. Even in the face of a severe economic situation, Russia has continued to increase its defense budget and modernize the Russian Armed Forces. Recently, Russia has intensified the activities of the Russian Armed Forces not only in the Asia-Pacific, but also in the Arctic, Europe, and areas near the U.S. mainland, and there has been a trend to expand their area of activity. - In the Eastern Military District, including the Far East, the large-scale exercise “Vostok 2014” participated by over 155,000 personnel **Southeast Asia** - In the South China Sea, there are territorial disputes with China, and recently, there has been growing friction with China. Since May 2014, the Philippines and Vietnam have lodged protests over China’s alleged activities, including land reclamation and construction of runways at the reefs of the Spratly Islands. was conducted in September 2014, in which the combat readiness of units was assessed. In addition, an exercise was conducted in the “Kuril Islands” that include the Northern Territories. - In Ukrainian territory, Russia has attempted to change the status quo by force or coercion by engaging in “hybrid warfare,” in which acts of aggression are carried out through methods that cannot be clearly labeled an “armed attack” based on their outward form. Russia’s action is recognized as a global issue that could impact the entire international community, including Asia. - In recent years, Southeast Asian countries have increased their defense spending against the backdrop of economic development and other reasons, and are modernizing their military forces focusing on inducting major equipment of their naval and air forces, such as fourth-generation modern fighters and submarines. The situation of China’s land reclamation work in the Spratly Islands. The top row, from left to right, shows the before and after photos of the reclamation at Johnson South Reef, as well as a close-up of the reclaimed area (photos taken in January 2012 and March 2015). The bottom row shows the situation in Subi Reef (January and March 2015). [CSIS Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative / DigitalGlobe] **Trends in Regional Conflict and** **International Terrorism** - An array of problems is at the root of conflicts occurring in recent years in various parts of the world, including ethnicity, religion, territory, and resources. In many cases, areas where civil wars or regional conflicts have created or expanded a governance vacuum have become a hotbed of the activities of terrorist organizations. Among them are organizations which operate across national borders and regions, which continue to pose imminent security challenges to the international community. The presence of states with weak governance has made it difficult to tackle risks such as the pandemic and spread of infectious diseases. - As a general trend, with the advancement of globalization, transnational terrorist organizations are using social media and other cyber space tools to share information and conspire within their own organizations or with other groups as well as to acquire weapons and funds and recruit fighters. These organizations carry out propaganda using tactical public relations strategies. ISIL has gained strength by seizing the opportunity of the confusion in Syria and Iraq. ISIL has an exceptionally substantial funding source, a powerful military force which can stand face-to-face with a nation, and de facto control of some territory, making ISIL a particularly striking presence. Under these circumstances, organizations that pledge allegiance to ISIL have emerged worldwide. - In developed countries, such as the United States and European countries, there has been a rise in young people who sympathize with the extremism of international terrorist organizations, including ISIL, against the backdrop of dissatisfaction towards estrangement from society, discrimination, poverty, and disparities. In an increasing number of cases these people have joined the ----- activities of international terrorist organizations as fighters and conduct “home-grown” and “lone-wolf” terrorism activities in their countries. Such developments have heightened the risk of terrorism in developed countries, and Japan is not in any way immune from it. - The proliferation of the threat of terrorism has gained momentum. The diversification of its perpetrators, coupled with the growing complexity of regional conflicts, has made it further more difficult to prevent their occurrence. For this reason, international cooperation on counter-terrorism measures has become even more important. **Maritime Trends** - In the East China Sea and the South China Sea, it has become increasingly common for countries to unilaterally assert their rights or take actions, based on their unique assertions which are incompatible with the existing international law and order. This has caused situations of undue infringement upon the principles of “freedom of navigation in the high seas” and “freedom of overflight over the high seas.” - The Arctic states have been more proactively promoting efforts to acquire their interest in resource development and use of **Outer Space and Security** - Major countries make efforts to enhance the capabilities of a variety of satellites and launch them for the purpose of enhancing C[4]ISR* functions. Such satellites include image reconnaissance satellites reconnoitering military facilities and targets, satellites gathering radio wave information for military communications, communication satellites for military communication, and positioning satellites for navigating naval vessels and aircraft and Currently, the international community as a whole is taking various steps, including military actions as well as cutting off the funding sources of terrorist organizations and preventing the international movement of terrorist fighters. - The rapid and vast outbreak of the Ebola virus disease in West Africa threatens the stability of the affected countries, which have weak governance and poor crisis management capabilities, and spread the disease to other countries in the West, shedding light on the risk posed by the spread of infectious diseases seriously. the sea route. The strategic importance of the Arctic Region is thus increasing. - “Open and Stable Seas” constitute the basis for peace and prosperity of the international community as a whole. In this regard, each state has been tackling on its own or with others various issues including piracy, unidentified vessels, illegal dumping, contraband, human smuggling, maritime disasters, and the removal of hazardous substances, for maintaining the stability of sea lanes of communication. enhancing the precision of weapons systems. - Meanwhile, as illustrated by China’s Anti-Satellite Test, the development of anti-satellite weapons and the spread of space debris have been noted as a threat against space assets such as satellites owned by countries. In this regard, the risk to the stable use of outer space has become one of the critical security challenges countries face. - C[4]ISR: Stands for Command, Control, Communication, Computer, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance. **Trends concerning Cyberspace** - For armed forces, information and communications form the foundation of command and control, which extend from central command to ground-level forces. In this regard, information and communications technology (ICT) advancements are further enhancing the dependence of units on information and communication networks. - For this reason, cyber attacks are regarded as an asymmetrical strategy capable of mitigating the strengths of adversaries by exploiting the weaknesses of an adversary’s forces. It is believed that many foreign military forces are developing offensive capabilities in cyberspace. - Cyber attacks have frequently been carried out against the information and communication networks of government organizations and military forces of various countries. It has been suggested that government organizations of China, Russia, North Korea, and other countries have been involved. In addition, cyber attacks have been growing more sophisticated and complicated by the day. Cyber security has become one of the most important security issues for countries. - There has been a movement to establish codes of conduct in cyberspace. It has been suggested, however, that there is disagreement between the countries’ assertions, with countries such as the United States, European countries, and Japan calling for maintaining free and unrestricted cyberspace, while many countries such as Russia, China, and emerging countries call for strengthening the national control of cyberspace. ----- **the Japan-U.S. Alliance** **Outline of the Bill for the Development of** **Legislation for Peace and Security (1)** Key Points regarding the Legislation for Peace and Security Images of Situations and Conditions Transportation of Japanese nationals overseas, etc. Support activities (including logistics support) in situations Response to armed attack situations, etc (Existing) [Self-Defense Forces Law] that will have an important influence on Japan’s peace [Legislation for Responses to Situations] Rescue of Japanese nationals overseas, etc. (New) and security (Expansion) Responses to “situations where an armed attack against a [Law Concerning Measures to Ensure Peace and Security foreign country results in threatening Japan’s survival” of Japan in Situations that will Have an Important (New) Protection of SDF’s weapons/other equipment (Existing) [Self-Defense Forces Law] (Revision of the Law Concerning Measures to Ensure Peace and Influence on Japan’s Peace and Security] ・ “Use of force” permitted under the “Three New Conditions” Protection of weapons/other equipment of the U.S. and Security of Japan in Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan) other countries’ armed forces (New) ・ Clarification of the purpose of the revision（Revision of The “Three New Conditions” Provision of supplies and services to the U.S. Armed the purpose of the Law） (1) When an armed attack against Japan occurs or when an armed attack Forces in peacetime [Self-Defense Forces Law] (Expansion) ・ Support activities for armed forces of foreign countries against a foreign country that is in a close relationship with Japan occurs ・ Expand situations where supplies/services can be provided, such as the guarding of facilities of the U.S. Armed Forces stationed in Japan ・ Expansion of the scope of support activities(not only the U.S.) (2) When there is no other appropriate means available to repel the attack and and as a result threatens Japan’s survival and poses a clear danger to fundamentally overturn people’s right to life, liberty and pursuit of happinessensure Japan’s survival and protect its people Ship Inspection Operations (3) Use of force limited to the minimum extent necessary (Expansion) [Ship Inspection Operations Law] ・ Enable operations for peace and security International Peace Cooperation Activities of the international community [International Peace Cooperation Law] U.N. PKO (Addition) ・ Additional roles by Japanese Corps in operation (e.g. security of specified areas including protection Support activities (including logistics support) to armed of local population) forces of foreign countries in situations that the ・ Review of authority to use weapons (small arms) to international community is collectively addressing for better align with current U.N. standard international peace and security (New) [International Peace Support Law (New)] Internationally coordinated operations for peace and security (Multinational cooperation outside U.N. PKO framework) Reorganizing the Agenda Items of the National Security Council (NSC) [Act for Establishment of the National Security Council] (Note) Cabinet Decisions on accelerating procedures to issue orders for public security operations and maritime security operations in cases of responding to a situation where an infringement that does not amount to an armed attack occurs in areas surrounding remote islands, etc., and police forces are not present nearby (Development of no new legislation) Revision of the Self-Defense Forces Law (Measures to Rescue Japanese Nationals Overseas) Revision of the Self-Defense Forces Law (Use of Weapons to Protect Weapons, etc. of Units of the U.S. Forces, etc.) H Enable uniformed SDF personnel to use weapons to protect the weapons and other equipment of the units of the U.S. Forces, armed forces of other countries and similar organizations that are, in cooperation with the SDF, currently engaged in activities that contribute to the defense of Japan (Article 95-2) [Coverage] H Weapons, etc. of the U.S. Forces, armed forces of other countries and similar organizations’ units H That are, in cooperation with the SDF, currently engaged in activities that contribute to the defense of Japan (*) (*) Including joint exercises but excluding activities where the act of combat is currently being conducted. [Procedures, etc.] H When the request is made by the U.S. Forces, etc. H Only when the Minister of Defense deems it necessary H Uniformed SDF personnel provide guarding (*) Apart from procedures prescribed in SDF Law provisions, the National Security Council plans to deliberate on the operational approach. [Authority to Use Weapons] H When there are adequate grounds to recognize the need to use weapons to protect people or weapons, etc., the use of weapons is permitted to the extent judged to be reasonably necessary depending on the situation. H Causing harm to persons is only allowed for self-defense and aversion of present danger. H Enable the units of the SDF to take measures to rescue Japanese nationals overseas whose lives or bodies could be harmed in emergency situations (Article 84-3). Rescue measures: Guarding, rescue and other measures to protect the lives or bodies of those Japanese nationals, including transportation. [Procedure] Order by the Minister of Defense H Request from the Minister for Foreign Affairs H Consultations between the Minister for Foreign Affairs and the Minister of Defense H Approval by the Prime Minister [Requirements for Implementation] When all of the following are met: (1) It is recognized that in places where rescue measures are taken, the competent authorities of the country concerned are currently maintaining public safety and order, and no act of combat is being conducted; (2) The country concerned consents to the SDF taking the rescue measures; and (3) It is anticipated that coordination and cooperation can be ensured between the units of the SDF and the competent authority of the country concerned in order to carry out the rescue measures as smoothly and safely as possible in response to expected dangers. [Authority to Use Weapons] H So-called “use of weapons for the defense of mandate” are permitted H SDF personnel shall not inflict injury upon any person except in a case of self-defense or overting of present danger. - It is possible to also rescue non-Japanese nationals under certain conditions. ----- **Outline of the Bill for the Development of** **Legislation for Peace and Security (2)** Law Concerning Measures to Ensure Peace and Security of Japan in Situations that will Have an Important Influence on Japan’s Peace and Security (Revision of the Law Concerning Measures to Ensure Peace and Security of Japan in Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan) Purpose The purpose is to ensure peace and security of Japan, strengthening cooperation with foreign countries responding to situations that will have an important influence on Japan’s peace and security, with the contribution to the effective operation of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty at its core, by conducting logistics support, etc. for the U.S. Forces, etc. Situations that will have an important influence on Japan’s peace and security [(Example) Situations that could lead to a direct armed attack against Japan if left unattended] (*) Deleted “in areas surrounding Japan” from the definition Support Targets Avoidance of “Ittaika” The following armed forces etc. responding to the situations H SDF does not conduct acrivities in “the scene where combat (1) The U.S. Forces engaged in activities contributing to the achievement activities are actually being conducted.” of the objectives of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty (*) When the personnel having been lost already been found and rescue (2) Armed forces of other foreign countries engaged in activities operations have commenced, search and rescue activities contributing to the achievement of the objectives of the U.N. Charter concerning them are allowed to continue as long as the safety of the (3) Other similar organizations SDF units is ensured. H The commanding officers etc. of the SDF units order the temporary suspension of activities etc. if combat operations occur or are Response Measures expected to occur at the site of their activities or in the vicinity. H The Minister of Defense designates the area for implementing (1) Logistics support activities (types of goods and services provided by activities, and if it is deemed difficult to implement operations the Ministry of Defense and the SDF) smoothly and safely in the whole or part of that area, must promptly Supply, transportation, repair and maintenance, medical activities, change the designation of the area or order the cessation of the communications, airport and seaport services, and base services, activities being implemented there. lodging, storage, use of facilities, training services (*) Provision of weapons is not included. Provision of ammunition and refueling and maintenance of aircraft ready to take off for combat Diet Approval operations are now allowed. (2) Search and rescue activities H Prior Diet approval, in principle (3) Ship inspection operations (those set forth in the Ship Inspection H Ex-post facto approval allowed in emergency Operations Act) (*) The same as the Law Concerning Measures to Ensure Peace and (4) Other measures necessary to respond to the situations Security of Japan in Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan - Implementation of operations in foreign territories is allowed (only when the foreign country consents) (Not allowed before the revision) - The authority to use weapons limited only to the self-preservation type Revision of the International Peace Cooperation Act United Nations Peacekeeping Operations (Addition) Internationally coordinated operations for peace and security (Not under the control of the U.N.) |H Addition of Tasks Security of specified areas including protection of local population request and tasks at Mission Headquarters have been added, in ad assisting in the establishment and reestablishment of systems of g H Review of the authority to use weapons In implementing protection of local population, etc. as well as secu response to their urgent request, the use of weapons for the defens H Diet approval Prior Diet approval is necessary for ceasefire monitoring and securi by SDF units, in principle (Ex-post facto approval permitted when th H Ensuring the safety of personnel of the International Cooperation C Provide for the development of operational guidelines that set forth temporary suspension of operations to avoid danger and other me Cooperation Corps|, etc. dition overn rity o e of ty of e Di orps pro asur|, protection of individuals related to operations in response to urgent to ceasefire monitoring and relief activities for afflicted people; tasks ance have been expanded. f specified areas and protection of individuals related to operations in mandate is allowed. specified areas including protection of local population, etc. conducted et is in recess or the House of Representatives has been dissolved). of Japan visions for the consideration of safety, the cessation of operations, the es for ensuring the safety of the personnel of the International Peace| |---|---|---| H Five Principles for Participation (underlined portions added) H Requirement: When any of the following is met, in addition to the satisfaction of the Five Principles for Participation (1) Agreement on a ceasefire shall have been reached among the parties to armed conflicts. (1) Based on resolutions adopted by the General Assembly, the (2) Consent for the undertaking of U.N. peacekeeping operations as well Security Council or the Economic and Social Council of the as Japan’s participation in such operations shall have been obtained United Nations from the host countries as well as the parties to armed conflicts. (2) At the request by: (3) The operations shall strictly maintain impartiality, not favoring - The United Nations any of the parties to armed conflicts. - Organizations established by the U.N. Generally Assembly or U.N. (4) Should any of the requirements in the above-mentioned guideline specialized agencies, such as the Office of the U.N. High cease to be satisfied, the Government of Japan may terminate the Commissioner for Refugees or otherwise specified by a Cabinet Order dispatch of the personnel engaged in International Peace - Regional organizations as prescribed in Article 52 of the U.N. Cooperation Assignments. Charter or organizations established by multilateral treaties, (5) The use of weapons shall be limited to the minimum necessary having the actual achievements or expertise pertaining to the for the protection of the lives of the personnel dispatched, in activities of Internationally coordinated operation for peace principle. When the consent of acceptance is deemed to be and security such as the European Union or otherwise consistently maintained, the use of weapons for the defense of specified by a Cabinet Order mandate missions is allowed. (3) At the requests of countries to which the area where those operations are to be conducted belongs (limited to only those supported by any of principal U.N. organizations as prescribed in Article 7 (1) of the U.N. Charter H Addition of Tasks Security of specified areas including protection of local population, etc., protection of individuals related to operations in response to urgent request and tasks at Mission Headquarters have been added, in addition to ceasefire monitoring and relief activities for afflicted people; tasks assisting in the establishment and reestablishment of systems of governance have been expanded. H Review of the authority to use weapons In implementing protection of local population, etc. as well as security of specified areas and protection of individuals related to operations in response to their urgent request, the use of weapons for the defense of mandate is allowed. H Diet approval Prior Diet approval is necessary for ceasefire monitoring and security of specified areas including protection of local population, etc. conducted by SDF units, in principle (Ex-post facto approval permitted when the Diet is in recess or the House of Representatives has been dissolved). H Ensuring the safety of personnel of the International Cooperation Corps of Japan Provide for the development of operational guidelines that set forth provisions for the consideration of safety, the cessation of operations, the temporary suspension of operations to avoid danger and other measures for ensuring the safety of the personnel of the International Peace Cooperation Corps H Other revised matters (1) Dispatching of uniformed SDF personnel (commanding officers, etc.) to the United Nations (2) Waiver of right to claim (3) Provision of supplies or services to the U.S. Forces, etc. for their operation to cope with large-scale disasters (4) Expansion of the scope for cooperation with international election observation operations ----- Revision of Armed Attack Situations Response Act H In order to ensure the peace and independence of Japan and the security of Japan and its people, develop the readiness to respond to armed attack situations, etc. by setting such basic matters as basic principles, the responsibilities of national and local governments, and procedures. [Reference] Armed attack situations, etc. Armed attack situation.....................A situation where an armed attack occurred, or an imminent danger of an armed attack occurring is clearly acknowledged Anticipated armed attack situation....A situation where an armed attack has yet to occur, but circumstances are growing increasingly strained and an armed attack is anticipated Armed attack situations, etc..............Armed attack situation and anticipated armed attack situation [Outline of the Revision] H Responses to “situations of an armed attack against a foreign country resulting in threatening Japan’s survival” added (Purpose) * “Situations of an armed attack against a foreign country resulting in threatening Japan’s survival” added H Develop the readiness to respond to armed attack situations, etc. and survival-threatening situations by setting basic principles, the responsibilities of national and local governments, the cooperation of Japanese people and other basic matters concerning responses to armed attack situations, etc. and survival-threatening situations, and also set matters related to the development of legislation necessary to respond to armed attack situations, etc. to contribute to the ensuring of the peace and independence of Japan and the security of Japan and its people. *deleted (Basic Response Plan) *When an armed attack situation or a situation of an armed attack against a foreign country resulting in threatening Japan’s survival is recognized, reasons why the use of force is necessary should also be described. H The Basic Response Plan should describe matters concerning the following: - Developments in the situation, the confirmation of the situation as an armed attack situation, an anticipated armed attack situation or a survival-threatening situation, and the facts that serve as the premises supporting the confirmation. - When the situation is confirmed as an armed attack situation or a survival-threatening situation, reasons why there is no other appropriate means available to ensure Japan’s survival and protect its people, and use of force is necessary to respond to the situation - An overall plan to respond to pertinent armed attack situations or survival-threatening situations, and important matters related to the response measures [Diet Approval] H When an order is given to the SDF for defense operations to respond to a “survival-threatening situation,” prior Diet approval is required under current provisions (Article 9 of the Armed Attack Situation Response Act). **Outline of the International Peace Support Bill** International Peace Support Law Purpose Situations threatening international peace and security that international community is collectively addressing: (1) Situations that threaten peace and security of the international community, and (2) The international community is collectively addressing the situations in accordance with the objectives of the U.N. Charter to remove the threat, and (3) Japan, as a member of the international community, needs to independently and proactively contribute to these activities. Implement cooperation and support activities, etc. for the armed forces of foreign countries engaged in the activities above Contribute to ensuring the peace and security of the international community Conditions The following U.N. resolutions (by the General Assembly or the Security Council) are required: (1) Resolutions that decide, call upon, recommend or authorize foreign countries subject to Japan’s support conduct operations to respond to situations that threaten the peace and security of the international community (2) In addition to (1), resolutions that regoid the situations as a threat peace or a breach of the peace and call on U.N. member states to respond to the situations concerned Avoidance of “Ittaika” H Japan does not implement support activities in the scene where combat operations are actually being conducted. (*) When the personnel having been lost have already been found and rescue operations have commenced, search and rescue activities concerning them are allowed to continue as long as the safety of the SDF units is ensured. H The commanding officers of the SDF units order a temporary suspension of support activities if combat operations occur or are expected to occur at the site of their activities or in the vicinity. H The Minister of Defense designates the area for implementing activities, and if it is deemed difficult to implement operations smoothly and safely in the whole or part of that area, must promptly change the designation of the area or order the cessation of the activities being implemented there. Response Measures (1) Cooperation and support activities Provision of goods and services to armed forces of foreign countries Supply, transportation, repair and maintenance, medical activities, communications, airport and seaport services, base services, lodging, storage, use of facilities, training services and construction (*) Provision of weapons is not included (2) Search and rescue activities (3) Ship inspection operations (those set forth in the Ship Inspection Operations Law) Diet Approval H Prior Diet approval required without exception H Each house of the Diet has an obligation to make efforts toward decisions within 7 days H Re-approval required in the case of a lapse of more than two years since the commencement of the response measures. In the case of re-approval, ex-post facto approval is permitted when the Diet is in recess or the House of Representatives has been dissolved - The Minister of Defense must give consideration ensuring the safety of SDF units etc ----- **Outline of the National Security Strategy** - The National Security Strategy (NSS) clearly defines the following as Japan’s national interests and national security objectives to achieve its fundamental principle of continuing the path it has followed as a peace-loving nation, and proactive contribution to peace based on the principle of international cooperation: maintaining sovereignty and independence; defending territorial integrity; ensuring the lives, property and safety of citizens; economic development; and maintaining and protecting the international order based on rules and universal values. - The NSS clearly defines the security environment surrounding Japan and national security challenges on a global level as well as in the Asia-Pacific region. - The NSS specifies the strategic approach centering on diplomatic policy and defense policy that Japan should implement, such as the establishment of a comprehensive defense architecture to protect Japan. - Based on the NSS, the National Defense Program Guidelines (NDPG) specify basic policies for Japan’s future defense, the role of its defense capabilities, and objectives for specific SDF equipment. **Outline of the National Defense Program Guidelines** - Based on the NSS, the basic policy consists of the following: (1) Japan’s own efforts; (2) strengthening of the Japan-U.S. Alliance; and (3) active promotion of security cooperation. - The NDPG states that Japan will build up a Dynamic Joint Defense Force by conducting capability assessments based on joint operations to enhance deterrence and response capabilities by pursuing further joint operations, improving the operational standards of defense equipment, and further increasing defense activities, as well as ensuring the necessary and sufficient quality and quantity of defense capabilities underpinning various activities. - As an effective means of deterrence and response to various situations, Japan will achieve intelligence superiority through persistent intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) activities over an extensive area around Japan. In addition, Japan will ensure a posture that emphasizes the following points: (1) ensuring the security of the sea and airspace surrounding Japan; (2) response to an attack on remote islands; (3) response to ballistic missile attacks; (4) responses in outer space and cyberspace; and (5) responses to major disasters. - As part of Japan’s efforts towards the stabilization of the AsiaPacific region and improvement of the global security environment, Japan will conduct persistent ISR in the area surrounding Japan, and implement activities such as training and exercises in a timely and appropriate manner. Moreover, Japan will promote multi-tiered initiatives, including bilateral and multilateral defense cooperation and exchange, joint training and exercises, and capacity building assistance. Japan will actively promote international peace cooperation activities, anti-piracy measures, and capacity building assistance, among other activities. - To ensure that the defense force can function as effectively as possible, Japan will strengthen the foundations underpinning the defense force. The Medium Term Defense Program (MTDP) specifies a maximum budget and the amount of mainstay defense equipment to be acquired over the subsequent five-year period in order to achieve the defense capability targets defined in the NDPG. Relations among NSS, NDPG, MTDP and Annual Budget Basic policy for national security centered around diplomatic and defense policies (approx. 10-year time frame) Prescribe future defense force and target levels of defense force that Japan should achieve (approx. 10-year time frame) Indicate (limits of) five-year total expenditures and quantity of major equipment Examine based on the current situations, appropriate annual budget as necessary NSS based on NSS NDPG achieve target levels of defense force MTDP appropriate budget, develop specific projects annual budget National Defense Program Guidelines Annex Table |Category|Col2|Col3|Present (as of the end of FY2013)|Future| |---|---|---|---|---| |GSDF|Authorized Number of personnel Active-Duty Personnel Reserve-Ready Personnel||approx. 159,000 approx. 151,000 8,000|159,000 151,000 8,000| ||Major units|Rapid Deployment Units|Central Readiness Force 1 armored division|3 rapid deployment divisions 4 rapid deployment brigades 1 armored division 1 airborne brigade 1 amphibious rapid deployment brigade 1 helicopter brigade| |||Regional Deployment Units|8 divisions 6 brigades|5 divisions 2 brigades| |||Surface-to-Ship Guided Missile Units|5 surface-to-ship guided missile regiments|5 surface-to-ship guided missile regiments| |||Surface-to-Air Guided Missile Units|8 anti-aircraft artillery groups/regiments|7 anti-aircraft artillery groups/regiments| |MSDF|Major units|Destroyer Units Submarine Units Minesweeper Units Patrol aircraft Units|4 flotillas (8 divisions) 5 divisions 5 divisions 1 flotilla 9 squadrons|4 flotillas (8 divisions) 6 divisions 6 divisions 1 flotilla 9 squadrons| ||Major equipment|Destroyers (Aegis-Equipped Destroyers) Submarines Combat Aircraft|47 (6) 16 approx.170|54 (8) 22 approx.170| |ASDF|Major units|Air Warning & Control Units Fighter Aircraft Units Air Reconnaissance Units Aerial Refueling/ Transport Units Air Transport Units Surface-to-Air Guided Missile Units|8 warning groups 20 warning squadrons 1 AEW group (2 squadrons) 12 squadrons 1 squadron 1 squadron 3 squadrons 6 groups|28 warning squadrons 1 AEW group (3 squadrons) 13 squadrons — 2 squadrons 3 squadrons 6 groups| ||Major equipment|Combat aircraft Fighters|approx. 340 approx. 260|approx. 360 approx. 280| Notes: 1. The current number of tanks and howitzers/rockets (authorized number as of the end of FY2013) are respectively approx. 700 and approx. 600, which will be reduced respectively to approx. 300 and approx. 300 in the future. 2. Regarding major equipment/units that may also serve for BMD missions, their acquisition/formation will be allowed within the number of Destroyers (Aegis-Equipped Destroyers), Air Warning & Control Units and Surface-to-Air Guided Missile Units specified above. ----- **Outline of the Medium Term Defense Program** - The Medium Term Defense Program (MTDP) stipulates the following points: reorganization of the Major SDF Units; major programs regarding the SDF’s capabilities; measures for the strengthening of the Japan-U.S. Alliance; quantities of major procurement; and expenditures. - Reorganization of the Major SDF Units - Ground Self-Defense Force (GSDF): establishing the Ground Central Command; transforming two divisions and two brigades into two rapid deployment divisions and two rapid deployment brigades; establishing a coast observation unit and area security Annex Table from the Medium Term Defense Program units; and establishing an amphibious rapid deployment brigade. - Maritime Self-Defense Force (MSDF): retaining four escort flotillas mainly consisting of one helicopter destroyer (DDH) and two Aegis-equipped destroyers (DDG), and five escort divisions consisting of other destroyers; increasing the number of submarines. - Air Self-Defense Force (ASDF): relocating one fighter squadron to Naha Air Base; newly organizing one airborne early warning squadron; integrating ASDF units equipped with training support functions. |Service|Equipment|Quantity| |---|---|---| |GSDF|Mobile Combat Vehicles Armored Vehicles Amphibious Vehicles Tilt-Rotor Aircraft Transport Helicopters (CH-47JA) Surface-to-Ship Guided Missiles Mid-Range Surface-to-Air Guided Missiles Tanks Howitzers (excluding mortars)|99 24 52 17 6 9 companies 5 companies 44 31| |MSDF|Destroyers (Aegis-Equipped Destroyers) Submarines Other Ships Total (Tonnage) Fixed-Wing Patrol Aircraft (P-1) Patrol Helicopters (SH-60K) Multipurpose Helicopters (Ship-Based)|5 (2) 5 5 15 (approx. 52,000 t) 23 23 9| |ASDF|New Airborne Early Warning (Control) Aircraft Fighters (F-35A) Fighter Modernization (F-15) New Aerial Refueling/Transport Aircraft Transport Aircraft (C-2) Upgrade of PATRIOT Surface-to-Air Guided Missiles (PAC-3 MSE)|4 28 26 3 10 2 groups & education| |Joint units|Unmanned Aerial Vehicles|3| Note: Acquisition of ship-based unmanned aerial vehicles will be allowed within the number of Patrol Helicopters (SH-60K) specified above. **Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment** **and Technology** - (1) Clarification of cases where transfers are prohibited; (2) limitation to cases where transfers may be permitted as well as strict examination and information disclosure; and (3) ensuring appropriate control regarding extra-purpose use or transfer to third parties. - The Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology clarify the concrete standards, procedures and limitation better than ever and state them clearly and transparently both internally and externally. - Japan will actively cooperate with the United States and other countries in the area of defense equipment and technologies, and more proactively advance the required measures. Four ministers signing the Agreement between the Government of Japan and the Government of France concerning ----- **Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements** - Based on the Japan–U.S. Security Treaty, the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements, together with Japan’s own efforts, constitute the cornerstone for Japan’s security. - The Japan-U.S. Alliance centered on bilateral security arrangements functions as public goods that contribute to the stability and prosperity, not only of Japan but also of the Asia-Pacific region and **Outline of the New Guidelines** Defense Cooperation and the Aim of the Guidelines - The new Guidelines specify the matters to be emphasized in security and defense cooperation. The objectives of the new Guidelines are retained in line with those of the 1997 Guidelines. Strengthened Alliance Coordination - The two governments will establish a standing Alliance Coordination Mechanism, and develop and update bilateral plans. Seamlessly Ensuring Japan’s Peace and Security - This section presents the direction to achieve seamless cooperation, from peacetime to contingencies, in order to ensure Japan’s peace and security, the core of the Guidelines. (A) Cooperative Measures from Peacetime This section specifies ways of cooperation from peacetime to strengthen the deterrence and response capabilities of the Japan-U.S. Alliance. (B) Responses to Emerging Threats to Japan’s Peace and Security This section describes measures to respond to emerging threats to Japan’s peace and security. (C) Actions in Response to an Armed Attack against Japan The new Guidelines maintain the basic idea on roles of Japan and U.S. in of responses to an armed attack against Japan described in the 1997 Guidelines while enhancing the content in view of the expansion and diversification of defense cooperation between Japan and the United States. **Initiatives to Build the Foundation for** **Strengthening the Alliance** - “2+2” Meeting (April 27, 2015) (1) The Ministers announced the approval of “the new Guidelines,” which update the general framework and policy direction for the roles and missions of the two countries, and manifest a strategic vision for a more robust Alliance and greater shared responsibilities by modernizing the Alliance and enhancing its deterrence and response capabilities in all phases, from peace time to contingencies. (2) Both Ministers noted with satisfaction the ongoing progress to strengthen the Alliance’s deterrence and response capabilities. (3) The Ministers highlighted the recent progress in regional and international cooperation. (4) The Ministers underscored their commitment to maintaining a robust and flexible force posture that enhances deterrence by strengthening the capability to respond effectively to future the world at large. - As the security environment surrounding Japan becomes increasingly severe, and the United States, at the same time, maintains and strengthens its engagement and presence in the Asia-Pacific region, it has become more important than ever to strengthen the JapanU.S. Alliance for the security of Japan. (D) Actions in Response to an Armed Attack against a Country other than Japan Newly incorporated in the new Guidelines (E) Cooperation in Response to a Large-scale Disaster in Japan In light of the experience of the Great East Japan Earthquake, the new Guidelines added this section. Cooperation for Regional and Global Peace and Security - The new Guidelines stipulate specific ways of bilateral cooperation for regional and global peace and security, based on experiences from previous activities in this area. Space and Cyberspace Cooperation - The new Guidelines added bilateral cooperation in new strategic domains, such as space and cyberspace. Bilateral Enterprise - The new Guidelines added the following areas as a foundation for defense cooperation to further improve the effectiveness of bilateral cooperation: A. Defense Equipment and Technology Cooperation B. Intelligence Cooperation and Information Security C. Educational and Research Exchanges Processes for Review - The new Guidelines added regular evaluation while maintaining the approach of the 1997 Guidelines. Prime Minister Abe and U.S. President Obama at the Japan-U.S. Summit in Washington in April 2015 (Cabinet Public Relations Office) ----- challenges and threats, while also mitigating the impact of the U.S. Forces on local communities. Japan-U.S. Defense Ministers’ Meeting (May 30, 2015) - The Ministers agreed to oppose any attempts to change the status quo by force in the East China Sea and the South China Sea. They also confirmed that Japan’s legislation for peace and security will help ensure the effectiveness of the new Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation and welcomed that the discussion at the Cyber Defense Policy Working Group (CDPWG) thus far was put together. Furthermore, the Ministers reaffirmed cooperation to mitigate the impact of the U.S. Forces on Okinawa, and U.S. Secretary of Defense Carter stated that the United States would provide Japan with necessary information on the accident involving an Osprey transport aircraft in Hawaii and reiterated efforts to thoroughly ensure the safe operation of the Osprey. Direction of Strengthening the Alliance - Japan and the United States will build the posture for seamless cooperation, including peacetime and various other situations, including cooperation in gray zone situations, while enhancing the Japanese and U.S. presence in the Western Pacific. Japan and the United States will continue to promote joint training and exercises, and the expansion of joint intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) activities, as well as the expansion of joint/ shared use of Japanese and U.S. facilities and areas that serve as the bases for these activities. Deployment Map of the U.S. Forces in Japan The Japanese and U.S. Defense and Foreign Ministers at the Japan-U.S. Security Consultative Committee (2+2) in New York in April 2015 Minister of Defense Nakatani and U.S. Secretary of Defense Carter at the Japan-U.S. Defense Ministers’ Meeting held in Singapore on the occasion of the 14th IISS Shangri-La Dialogue (May 2015) |Misawa|Col2| |---|---| |Misawa Kyogamisaki Shariki U.S. Air Force: 35th Fighter Wing, F-16 fighters U.S. Army: TPY-2 (so-called U.S. Army: TPY-2 (so-called X-Band Radar System) U.S. Navy: P-3C antisubmarine patrol aircraft and others X-Band Radar System) Atsugi Yokota U.S. Navy: Headquarters, U.S. Forces, Japan F/A-18 strike fighters and others U.S. Air Force: Iwakuni (Carrier-based aircraft) Headquarters, Fifth Air Force U.S. Marine Corps: Shariki Misawa 374th Airlift Wing Marine Aircraft Group 12 C-130 transport aircraft F/A-18 strike fighter C-12 transport aircraft AV-8 attackers UH-1 helicopters and others EA-6 electronic warfare aircraft Plan to deploy CV22 Osprey C-12 transport aircraft Zama KC-130 tankers and others Headquarters, U.S. Army, Japan Sasebo U.S. Army: 1st Corps (Forward) Yokota U.S. Navy: Fleet Activities Sasebo Kyogamisaki Atsugi Yokosuka Amphibious assault ships Iwakuni Yokosuka Headquarters, U.S. Naval Forces, Japan Minesweeping ships Sasebo U.S. Navy: Fleet Activities Yokosuka Transport ships Aircraft carrier Cruisers Torii U.S. Marine Corps facilities and areas such as Camp Courtney Destroyers U.S. Army: 1st Battalion, 1st Special U.S. Marine Corps: 3rd Marine Expeditionary Force HQ Amphibious command ship Forces Group (Airborne)/10th Support Group Kadena Schwab U.S. Air Force: 18th Wing U.S. Marine Corps: F-15 fighters Futenma 4th Marine Regiment (infantry) KC-135 tankers U.S. Marine Corps: HH-60 helicopters Marine Aircraft Group 36 E-3 airborne warning and control system Hansen CH-53 helicopters (AWACS) aircraft White Beach Area AH-1 helicopters U.S. Marine Corps: U.S. Navy: P-3C, P-8A patrol aircraft and others UH-1 helicopters U.S. Navy: 12th Marine Regiment (artillery) U.S. Army: 1-1 Air Defense Artillery MV-22 Osprey and others Port facility, POL depot 31st Marine Expeditionary Unit Patriot Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3)|| ||U.S. Air Force: 18th Wing F-15 fighters KC-135 tankers HH-60 helicopters E-3 airborne warning and control system (AWACS) aircraft U.S. Navy: P-3C, P-8A patrol aircraft and others U.S. Army: 1-1 Air Defense Artillery Patriot Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3)| |U.S. Marine Corps: Marine Aircraft Group 36 CH-53 helicopters AH-1 helicopters UH-1 helicopters MV-22 Osprey and others|| ----- **Stationing of the U.S. Forces** - The United States is proceeding with the force posture realignment of the U.S. Forces in Japan in order to mitigate the impact on local communities, such as those in Okinawa, while maintaining the deterrence capabilities of the U.S. Forces. In Okinawa, the United States is taking such measures as the relocation of MCAS Futenma, the transfer of Marines in Okinawa to Guam and the return of land south of Kadena. - The Government of Japan believes that it is imperative not to allow MCAS Futenma to remain indefinitely at its current location, which is in the vicinity of houses and schools in the center of Ginowan City, Okinawa Prefecture. This is believed to be a fundamental idea shared between the Government of Japan and the people of Okinawa. As for the relocation of MCAS Futenma, the Government of Japan has not changed its stance that the current plan to construct the Futenma Replacement facility in the Camp-Schwab Henokosaki area and adjacent waters is the only solution to avoid the continued use of MCAS Futenma. Japan plans to make further efforts to achieve the relocation and return of MCAS Futenma as early as possible and to mitigate the burden on Okinawa in a timely manner. - The relocation of MCAS Futenma holds more significance than merely moving the facility from one location to another. Rather, it also contributes greatly to mitigating the impact on Okinawa. As such, the government will work as one to implement this initiative. - Regarding the Futenma Replacement Facility construction project, in addition to complying with the relevant laws and regulations, including completing the environmental impact assessment and the application for approval of the reclamation of publicly-owned waters, the Government of Japan has devoted ample time to completing all necessary procedures, including soliciting the opinions of the people of Okinawa Prefecture. On that basis, the Government of Japan commenced offshore boring survey work on August 14, 2014. The Geopolitical Positioning of Okinawa and the Significance of the U.S. Marine Corps Stationed in Okinawa **Okinawa holds a position of great** **strategic importance** **1. Reasons for Stationing the U.S. Marine Corps in Okinawa** Compared to locations such as the U.S. mainland, Hawaii and Guam, Okinawa is closer to various regions in East Asia. ⇒ In the event where urgent deployment within this region is required, the U.S. military in Okinawa can respond rapidly. Beijing Seoul Okinawa has the geographic advantage of being located in a place with certain distance from Japan’s neighbors. Access from continental Asia to the Pacific → Expected that passage would be Tokyo Okinawa is in a crucial strategic position in terms of the access through waters surrounding Okinawa to the Eurasian Continent and the Pacific Ocean, as it is Izu Islands located more or less in the center of the Nansei Islands and is close to Japan’s sea lanes. Shanghai 2000km 1000km Adjacent to sea lanes **2. The Significance & Roles of the U.S. Marine Corps** Okinawa **in Okinawa** With their high level of mobility and readiness,* the U.S. Marine Center of Ogasawara Islands Corps in Okinawa plays various roles, including securing the Hong Kong Taipei the Southwest Islands peace and safety of the region through such endeavors as assisting in the defense of Japan and providing support after the Great East Japan Earthquake as well as dealing with the Java earthquake in Indonesia in May 2006 Japan’s sea lanes ⇒ The stationing of USFJ in Okinawa, an area with unique Sea lanes Okinotorishima geographic characteristics, including the Marine corps, Marine transportation routes. which has high-level mobility and readiness to carry out Japan is dependent upon marine transportation for at least 99% of a wide range of duties and to deal with various types of the total volume of its trade. emergencies, makes a significant contribution to the Manila Saipan security of Japan, and to peace and stability in the Asia- Pacific region. Guam - The Marine Corps constantly utilizes all combat elements (land, sea and air) during its drills and deployments, so it is suited to providing a rapid response in the event of all kinds of situations. ----- **Specific Ministry of Defense Reform Initiatives** - Conduct the following reorganization based on the “Direction of the Ministry of Defense Reform” (August 2013) for the purpose of overall optimization of defense capability, strengthening of functions for integrated operations, policy planning, etc. in continuation from FY2014. - Strengthening integrated operational functions < Unification of work relating to actual operations into the Joint Staff Office> - Unify work relating to actual operations of the SDF into the Joint Staff - Discontinue the Operational Policy Bureau, and newly establish the Director General for Operational Policy (Deputy Chief of Joint Staff-level) and the Director for Operation Policy (department director general / division director-level) for civilian officials to conduct coordination with related ministries and agencies, and external communication. - Reorganization of the Internal Bureau < Strengthen the policy planning function and defense capability build-up function> - Transfer functions such as the planning and drafting of laws and Vision of the organization of the new Joint Staff Office |Chief o Joint Sta|f Staff, ff Office| |---|---| |Minister of Defense Chief of Staff, Joint Staff Office Vice Chief of Staff, Deputy Chief of Staff, Joint Staff Offcie Operation Policy General Affairs Operations Defense Plans and C4 System Director, Public Director, Legal Affairs Director, Logistics Department Department Policy Department Department Affairs Operation Policy General|Col2| |---|---| |General Affairs Department|Legal Affairs General| |C4 System Department|Director, Logistics|Director, Public Affairs| |---|---|---| Vision of the organization after the reorganization of the Internal Bureau |Bureau of Operational Policy|Bureau of Personnel and Education| |---|---| |Col1|Col2|Col3| |---|---|---| |FY2014 Bureau of Bureau of Personnel Bureau of Finance and Bureau of Local Minister’s Secretariat Bureau of Defense Policy Operational Policy and Education Equipment Cooperation|FY2014|| |Col1|Col2|Col3| |---|---|---| |FY2015 Bureau of Personnel Bureau of Capability Bureau of Local Minister’s Secretariat Bureau of Defense Policy and Education and Facilities Planning Cooperation|FY2015|| Vision of the organization of the Acquisition, Technology and Logistics Agency regulations relating to operations and the training of units to the Bureau of Defense Policy. - Newly establish the Strategic Planning Division in the Bureau of Defense Policy in order to strengthen the policy planning function. - Newly establish the Bureau of Build-up Planning in order to strengthen the defense capability build-up function. - The new establishment of the Acquisition, Technology and Logistics Agency < Establish a new extra-ministerial organization that brings together and consolidates departments in MOD related to the procurement of equipment (namely the Internal Bureau, the respective Staff Offices, the Technical Research and Development Institute, and the Equipment Procurement and Construction Office)> < Main functions of the Acquisition, Technology and Logistics Agency> Project management function, international equipment and technology cooperation, weapons technology control function, research and development function and equipment acquisition function |Commissioner Technology and|of Acquisition, Logistics Agency| |---|---| Minister of Defense Commissioner of Acquisition, Technology and Logistics Agency Director General for Defence Technology, Research and Development Director General Director General for Equipment Director for Commissioner’s Defense Equipment Project Management Defense Technology Procurement Procurement Inspection and Audit Secretariat Policy Department Department Strategy Department Management Department Operation Department ----- **as well as Securing the Territorial Land, Water and Airspace** **Effective Deterrence and Response** Ensuring Security of Sea and Airspace Surrounding Japan - The SDF persistently engages in warning and surveillance activities in the waters and airspace surrounding Japan in peacetime so that it can respond to various contingencies immediately and seamlessly. - In FY2014, the ASDF aircraft scrambled 943 times, a significant increase by 133 in comparison with the previous fiscal year. This is the second largest number since 1958 when the ASDF started taking strict anti-territory intrusion measures. - In 2014, there were seven incidents of activity by Chinese Navy vessels involving the passage through the southwestern islands, and also another incident of such activities confirmed in waters south of Okinawa. - In December 2012, a fixed-wing aircraft (Y-12) of the Chinese Number of Scrambles since the Period of the Cold War and Its Breakdown (Times) 1,000 800 600 400 State Oceanic Administration intruded into Japan’s territorial airspace in the vicinity of Uotsuri-jima, which is part of Senkaku Islands. In addition, on August 22, 2013, a TU-95 bomber of the Russian Air Force intruded into Japanese airspace in the vicinity of Okinoshima, Fukuoka Prefecture. Moreover, September 9 of the same year, an incident where a presumably unmanned aircraft of unidentified nationality flew over the East China Sea. The ASDF urgently scrambled fighters in response to these incidents. - Even after the establishment of the “East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone” by China in November 2013, the MOD and the SDF have been implementing warning and surveillance activities, in addition to other existing activities, in the East China Sea. The MOD and the SDF have also decided to continue engaging in strict airspace anti-intrusion measures. 943 944 Russia China Taiwan Other countries total 812 810 464 567 415 425 386 306 311 299 96 156 220 237 158 31 38 359 473 264 247 248 193 197 124 1984* 1989 1993 1998 2003 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 (FY) Note: The peak of the cold war Defense of Japan’s Remote Islands - Japan possesses a number of remote islands. In order to respond to attacks on these islands, the SDF will position units and so forth in the area, and will detect signs at an early stage through Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) conducted by the SDF in peacetime. By conducting a joint operation involving the GSDF, ASDF, and MSDF, troops will be expeditiously deployed and concentrated in an area expected to be attacked, and will deter and remove enemy attacks. If, by any chance, islands are captured without any signs detected in advance, the enemy will be brought under control by ground fire from aircraft and vessels, and then tactical operations will be implemented to regain the islands by the landing of SDF forces and taking other initiatives. - The MOD and SDF will strengthen the country’s defense foundation from peacetime, by newly forming a coast observation unit in Yonaguni Island and establish an “Amphibious Rapid Deployment Brigade (provisional name)” equipped with a full function for amphibious operations, and will establish the 9th Air Wing at Naha Air Base. - For the purpose of developing a persistent Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) posture and an immediate response system, acquisition of fixed-wing patrol aircraft (P-1) and aegis equipped destroyers (DDG) will be implemented. - In order to secure capabilities for swift and large-scale transportation and deployment of units, the improvement of Osumi class transport LST (Landing Ship, Tank) and overseas research to review the role of multipurpose vessels will be conducted, and at the same time, V-22 Ospreys will be introduced to enhance rapid deployment capabilities. - In January through March of 2015, the GSDF and US Marine Corps conducted a field training exercise (Iron Fist) in California to improve amphibious operational capabilities. ----- Conceptual Image of Defending Japan’s Remote Islands Overall air defenseOverall air defense Secure and maintain marine superiority and air superiority Aerial refuelingAerial refueling SurfaceSurface Close Air SupportClose Air Support vesselsvessels Maritime air supportMaritime air support Landing by aircraft Anti-surfaceAnti-surface warfarewarfare Landing by amphibious Response in the water Landing vehicle by boat In cases where islands are occupied, operations Anti-submarine warfare will be conducted to recapture them. Submarine Enemy submarines SDF troops will be swiftly deployed and concentrated in an area expected to be attacked ahead of the deployment of enemy units and they will try to intercept and defeat any invasions. GSDF personnel conducting a landing exercise during the Iron Fist 15, a fi eld training exercise LCAC entering into the MSDF transport vessel “Shimokita” ----- Response to Ballistic Missile Attacks - Japan’s BMD is based on an effective multi-tier defense system using Aegis-equipped destroyers and Patriot PAC-3, interconnected and coordinated by the Japan Aerospace Defense Ground Environment (JADGE). - The additional TPY-2 radar was deployed to the U.S. Kyogamisaki Communication Site in December 2014. - North Korea repeatedly engaged in a variety of provocative acts, including an implication of missile launches in both 2014 and 2015. Under such circumstances, the MOD and the SDF continue to be ready to take every necessary measure to protect the lives and properties of the nation in any potential situation. PAC-3 missile test launch Initiatives towards Ensuring Maritime Security - In order to ensure the safety of maritime transport, the MOD and the SDF promote various kinds of initiatives such as implementing counter-piracy activities, providing capacity building assistance to coastal countries, and enhancing joint exercises and practices using a variety of opportunities. Responses in space - From the perspective of further promoting cooperation in the space field between the defense authorities in Japan and the U.S., the “Space Cooperation Working Group (SCWG)” was established based on the instruction given in the Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Talk in April 2015. Making use of this working group, reviews will be further promoted in broader fields such as: 1. promotion of policy-related consultation regarding space, 2. closer information sharing, 3. cooperation for nurturing and securing experts, 4. implementation of tabletop exercises. The Whole-of-Government approach - In March 2014, a “Cyber Defense Group” was established under the SDF C4 (Command, Control, Communication & Computers) Systems Command. - The “Cyber Defense Policy Working Group” (CDPWG) has been set up as a framework between the defense authorities of the U.S. and Japan, under which opinion exchange is conducted by experts regarding various cooperation fields on Japan-U.S. information **Build-Up of Defense Capability in FY2015** - Japan will steadily build up its defense capability during FY2015, which serves as the second fiscal year under the NDPG and new MTDP, to establish a Dynamic Joint Defense Force, based on these programs. - Japan will improve its defense capabilities in order to seamlessly sharing, human resources exchanges, and other themes. In May 2015, the Japan-U.S. joint declaration was issued, indicating the specific direction for future Japan-U.S. cooperation. - In 2013, the “Cyber Defense Council” (CDC) was set up, having around ten companies in the defense industry as its core members, and efforts are being made to improve capacities to counter cyber attacks through joint exercise and other initiatives. Response to Large-Scale Disasters - When disasters such as natural disasters occur, the SDF works in collaboration with municipal governments, engaging in various activities such as the search for and rescue of disaster victims or missing ships or aircraft, controlling floods, offering medical treatment, preventing epidemics, supplying water, and transporting personnel and goods. - In August 2014, a landslide occurred in Hiroshima City in Hiroshima Prefecture due to heavy rain. The SDF conducted lifesaving operations and searches for missing persons deploying approximately 14,970 personnel. In September of the same year, a volcanic eruption occurred on Mount Ontake. In order for the SDF to conduct lifesaving operations and searches for missing persons in cooperation with the municipality, police, fire department, and other relevant organizations, approximately 7,150 personnel were dispatched for disaster relief. GSDF personnel conducting disaster relief mission related to Mount Ontake Eruption Transport of Japanese Nationals Overseas, etc. - The SDF will protect the Japanese nationals and other parties in the destination country of a dispatch operation, and safely guide and transport them to aircraft, ships or vehicles. To this end, the SDF maintains operational readiness, with the GSDF designating helicopter unit and leading transport unit personnel, the MSDF designating vessels such as transport ships (including boarded aircraft), and the ASDF designating airlift units and personnel for dispatch. - The MOD and the SDF participated in the exercise for the transport of Japanese nationals overseas in the annual multinational joint exercise “Cobra Gold” and conducted the first ever overseas ground transport exercises. and dynamically fulfill its defense responsibilities, which include providing an effective deterrence and response to a variety of security situations, and supporting stability in the Asia-Pacific region, as well as improving the global security environment. ----- **Defense-Related Expenditures** - In FY2015, in light of the increasingly harsh security environment, defense-related expenditures were increased for the second consecutive year in a row in order to reinforce preparedness aimed Trend in defense-related expenditures for the past 15 years 50,000 49,000 48,000 47,000 at protecting the lives and property of the people and the nation’s land, sea, and airspace. 46,000 49,385 49,392 49,262 48,760 48,221 48,297 47,903 47,815 47,838 47,426 47,028 46,804 46,826 46,625 46,453 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 (FY) Note: Does not include SACO-related expenses, portion meant to reduce the burden on the local community out of the U.S.forces realignment expenses, and expenses associated with the acquisition of a new government aircraft. The total defense expenditures when including these items are 4,955.0 billion yen for FY2001, 4,955.7 billion yen for FY2002, 4,952.7 billion yen for FY2003, 4,902.6 billion yen for FY2004, 4,856.0 billion yen for FY2005, 4,813.6 billion yen for FY2006, 4,801.3 billion yen for FY2007, 4,779.6 billion yen for FY2008, 4,774.1 billion yen for FY2009, 4,790.3 billion yen for FY2010, 4,775.2 billion yen for FY2011, 4,713.8 billion yen for FY2012, 4,753.8 billion yen for FY2013, 4,848.8 billion yen for FY2014, and 4,980.1 billion yen for FY2015. **Human Foundation and Organization** **that Supports the Defense Force** - In order to exert their defense capabilities with the maximum effectiveness, it is necessary that the MOD and the SDF enhance and reinforce their human foundation. Since the various activities of the MOD and the SDF are only feasible if understanding and cooperation is received from the Japanese people, as well as local authorities, it is necessary to further deepen the mutual trust between the SDF, and local communities and the people. - In January 2015, the MOD formulated the “Action Plan for promoting **Measures on Defense Equipment** The Current Status of Defense Production and Technological Bases, and the Strategy on Defense Production and Technological Bases - In light of the current severe financial situation and the reorganization of European and American enterprises, as well as progress in international joint development, the “Strategy on Defense Production and Technological Bases” was formulated in June 2014. The Strategy included various measures for maintaining and strengthening Japan’s defense production and technological bases, and indicated the current situation and future direction of each defense equipment field. the Active Participation of the Female Employees and Work-Life Balance,” which incorporated three reforms – “Working style reform,” “Reform to realize a successful career with a balanced life between child-rearing and nursing, etc.,” and “Reform for promoting successful female personnel” – in order to promote the work-life balance of the personnel in a unified manner whilst promoting further recruitment and promotion of female personnel. Improvement of the contract system - Following the enactment of the “Bill concerning special measures on the upper limit of acts that incur national debt with respect to specific defense procurement,” the MOD will realize the reduction of procurement costs for equipment and services associated with the introduction of a “long-term contract” as well as stable procurement. - A cross-functional Integrated Project Team (IPT) headed by a Project Manager (PM) has been established for the acquisition of primary defense equipment, and the development of a system in which projects can be managed in a unified way from conception to disposal is in progress. ----- Research and Development - As part of these initiatives, the MOD’s own funding program called “Innovative Science & Technology Initiative for Security” (competitive funding) was newly established in FY2015 to discover creative research conducted by the universities, research institutes and companies etc. that are noted for their application of defense equipment, and to nurture emerging research that is deemed promising. Defense Equipment and Technology Cooperation - Based on the Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology, Japan promotes cooperation in defense equipment and technology with other countries in order to contribute to promoting the maintenance and enhancement of defense production and technological bases, as well as contributing to the promotion of peace and international cooperation. - Since 1992, Japan has implemented 19 joint research projects and 1 joint development project with the U.S. In addition, the Japanese government has been working to enable the involvement of Japanese companies in the manufacturing process of the production of F-35A and to establish upgrading facilities. - In July 2013, Japan launched a joint research project with the U.K., the first country other than the United States in this regard. - Japan and France signed the Japan-France Agreement concerning the Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology in March 2015. **Defense Cooperation and Exchanges** **with Other Countries** The international community today is facing an increasing number of challenges, which are extremely difficult for one country to deal with on its own. Therefore, it is important to strengthen bilateral and multilateral security cooperation, as well as proactively engage in international peace cooperation activities, from the perspective of “proactive contribution to peace” based on the principle of international cooperation. Initiatives under Multilateral Security Framework and Dialogue - Based on the proposal by Prime Minister Abe at the ASEAN-Japan Commemorative Summit in December 2013, the Japan-ASEAN Defense Ministers’ Roundtable Meeting took place in Myanmar in November 2014. At the Shangri-La Dialogue held in May 2015, Minister of Defense Nakatani delivered a speech at the second plenary session. - In order to enthusiastically and actively create stability within the region and improve the global security environment, the MOD is actively working on capacity building assistance. Defense Cooperation and Exchanges with Other Countries - Australia: At the Japan-Australia Summit Meeting in July 2014, Prime Minister Abe described the relationship between the two countries as a “Special Strategic Partnership for the 21st Century ” and signed the Agreement on the Transfer of Defence Equipment and Technology between Japan and Australia. - South Korea: In December 2014, the defense authorities of Japan, the U.S., and the ROK signed the “Japan-U.S.-ROK Information Sharing Agreement among the Defense Authorities,” which has enabled the defense authorities from the three countries to share security secrets regarding the threat of the North Korea’s nuclear weapon and missiles - In May 2015, Japan decided to commence consultations with Australia, together with the participation of companies from the private sector to examine what kind of cooperation Japan can provide for the Australian Future Submarine Program. - With India, three Joint Working Group (JWG) meetings have been held to facilitate bilateral cooperation for the US-2 aircraft. - Between the Association of South-East Asia Nations (ASEAN) and Japan, exchanges of views are taking place regarding defense equipment and technology cooperation in non-traditional security sectors. Japan and India are discussing how to engage in bilateral cooperation in relation to the US-2 amphibian rescue aircraft Japan-ASEAN Round Table Meeting (inaugural) J I d i S i M i [C bi P bli R l i Offi ] ----- - India: In September 2014, Japan and India signed the memorandum of defense cooperation and exchanges, and agreed to cooperate in service-to-service exchanges such as high level exchanges, bilateral maritime training, and consultation between the chiefs of staff, as well as in non-traditional security areas. - China: Consultation between defense authorities to realize the commencement of the early operation of the “Maritime and Air Communication Mechanism ” has been restarted. - Russia: Taking the Ukrainian situation into account, the Government of Japan is taking an appropriate response whilst emphasizing the solidarity of the G7 (Group of Seven). - Southeast Asian Countries: A memorandum regarding defense cooperation and exchange was signed with the Philippines in January 2015 and with Indonesia in March. At the same time, Japan is working to further strengthen and deepen its relations with Southeast Asian countries through capacity building assistance. - United Kingdom: In January 2015, the fi rst Foreign and Defense Ministerial Meeting was held. Opinions were exchanged regarding the strengthening of bilateral cooperation in dealing with the issues related to global security. **Initiatives concerning Issues** **in the International Community** Ensuring maritime security - For Japan, a major maritime state, strengthening order on the seas based on such fundamental principles as the rule of law and the freedom of navigation, as well as ensuring safe maritime transport, is the foundation for its peace and prosperity. For this reason, in cooperation with the relevant countries, Japan will support antipiracy operations, as well as promoting various initiatives including assistance for capacity building in this fi eld for coastal states, and making the most of various opportunities to enhance joint training and exercises in waters other than those in the immediate vicinity SDF’s Counter-Piracy Operations Japan-U.K. Foreign and Defense Ministerial Meeting (“2+2” meeting) - France: In July 2014, a Statement of Intent regarding defense cooperation and exchanges was signed. In March 2015, the second Foreign and Defense Ministerial Meeting was held. of Japan, including participation in the international minesweeping training hosted by the United States. - With regard to counter-piracy measures, from December 2013, for the purpose of conducting more fl exible and effective unit operations, the SDF surface force has been participating in CTF 151 and has carried out zone defense, in addition to the escort missions that it had already been conducting in the past. The ASDF has also been participating in CTF 151 since February 2014. Furthermore, in July 2014, Japan decided on a policy of dispatching CTF 151 commanders and CTF 151 HQ offi cers from the SDF. Activities with deployment of one for escort and one for defense zone as Deploy one a basis. for escort Japan’s original framework is used for escort, while for defense it is implemented by participating in the CTF 151. *The relationship between the CTF 151 Headquarters and participating units is a relationship of coordination. Point C Deploy one for Defense Zone Point B *** Conducting escort between point A** **and point B during the monsoon season** **(June-August, December-February)** Conducting warning and surveillance operations, Djibouti and Information collection and provision - Point A Sharing Gathering Information Information CTF 151 - Established in January 2009 for counter-piracy Merchant ship Escorted ships operations. The United States, Australia, United Kingsom, Turkey, ROK, Pakistan, etc. participated Suspicious vessel Deployed Maritime - Participants are to be engaged in operations Force for Anti- upon liaison coordination on deployment dates, Piracy Operations etc. with the Command. ----- Efforts to Support International Peace Cooperation Activities - United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS) Deployed Engineer Unit (approx. 350 personnel) and Headquarter Staff (four personnel) are conducting various activities in the Republic of South Sudan. - International Disaster Relief Operations for the Outbreak of Ebola Hemorrhagic Fever in West Africa At the request from the UN Mission for Ebola Emergency Response (UNMEER), the SDF transported 20,000 pieces of personal protective equipment by KC-767 aerial refueling/transport aircraft. GSDF personnel conducting ditch construction in South Sudan ASDF personnel who airlifted personnel protection equipment **Collaboration with Local Communities** - The MOD/SDF conducts activities to support the lives of citizens in a range of fields. Such activities help to further deepen the mutual trust between the SDF, and local communities and the people, and contribute significantly to the maintenance and revitalization of the local community. The SDF Marching Festival held at the Nippon Budokan in FY2014 - The International Disaster Relief Operations for the Missing AirAsia Airplane Deployment Surface Force Counter Piracy Enforcement, which was returning to Japan following a counter-piracy activity, was dispatched to conduct search and rescue activities for approximately one week. - International Disaster Relief Activities in Nepal (Earthquake) At the request of the Government of Nepal, the MOD swiftly dispatched a medical assistance unit that conducted medical activities for approximately three weeks. MSDF personnel conducting search and rescue operation for the missing Air Asia airplane GSDF personnel conducting medical service assistance in Nepal - The MOD/SDF conducts activities to widely inform nationals of the current circumstances of the SDF. For example, as part of the commemoration of the SDF anniversary, the SDF Marching Festival is held at Nippon Budokan arena every year. In FY2014, an air review commemorating the 60th anniversary of the MOD/SDF was also held at Hyakuri Base. The Air Review Commemorating the 60th Anniversary of the MOD/SDF ----- #### Security Environment ###### Part #### Surrounding Japan # I **Overview** **Section 1 Trends in the International Community** The security environment surrounding Japan has become increasingly severe, with various challenges and destabilizing factors becoming more tangible and acute. Even after the end of the Cold War, interstate conf icts remain in the periphery of Japan, and as such, this region has not witnessed major changes in the security environment as were observed in Europe. Opaque and uncertain factors such as territorial disputes and reunif cation issues remain. There has been also a tendency towards an increase in and prolongation of so-called “gray-zone” situations, that is, neither pure peacetime nor contingencies over territory, sovereignty, and maritime economic interests[1]. In addition, there has been a noticeable trend among neighboring countries to modernize and reinforce their military capabilities and to intensify their military activities. In this regard, security challenges and destabilizing factors in the Asia-Pacif c region including the area surrounding Japan are becoming more serious. In a global security environment, interdependence among countries has expanded and deepened with globalization and rapid advances in technological innovations. At the same time, there is a growing risk that unrest or a security problem in a single country or region could immediately develop into a challenge or destabilizing factor for the entire international community. Recently, the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL)[2] has gained strength in Iraq and Syria. As illustrated by these developments, there has been a trend in the activities of international terrorist organizations gaining momentum and expanding once again. Furthermore, in Ukraine, Russia has engaged in so-called “hybrid warfare”[3] that is diff cult to identify def nitively as an armed attack by a country, and has attempted to change the status quo by force or coercion. While the international community has strongly condemned and imposed sanctions against Russia, the pre-conf ict situation has still not been restored, leaving challenges for the international response. In addition, the recent spate of cyber attacks has become more sophisticated and complex by the day, with government involvement suggested in various attacks. In this context, there are increasing risks to the stable use of cyberspace. Under these circumstances, the United States, while faced with a diff cult f nancial situation, has made clear that it would continue to pursue the policy of focusing its strategies, including the National Security Strategy, more towards the Asia-Pacif c region, and strengthening its relations with allies in the region (rebalance to the Asia-Pacif c region). In addition, the United States has made a clear commitment to continue playing a leading role in tackling global security challenges, based on the recognition that it is the only country capable of leading the international community. Furthermore, with expanding and deepening interdependence, major countries have a growing shared interest in building a more stable international security environment. For example, they have taken steps to avoid and prevent unforeseen consequences in the maritime domain, implemented coalition-led military activities against ISIL as part of the “War on terror,” and engaged in diplomatic efforts at the summit level to prevent the further escalation of regional conf icts. Increasingly, countries with a shared interest in resolving issues are working together to take proactive responses to achieve regional and global stability. The multi-polarization of the world continues as a result of shifts in the balance of power due to the economic development and extension of political inf uence of So-called “gray-zone” situations concisely describe a broad range of situations, that is, neither pure peacetime nor contingencies. For example, they could involve the following circumstances: 1) Conflicting assertions between states, etc., over territory, sovereignty, economic interests including maritime interests, and other forms of rights and interests; 2) Not relying only on diplomatic negotiation among parties for a party to make its country’s assertions or demands, or to have the other party accept said assertions or demands; and 3) Showing physical presence frequently, or attempting or making changes to the status quo in an area related to the dispute by using armed organizations or other means to the extent that it does not constitute armed attack, in order to appeal a party’s assertion or demand or to force acceptance of it. ISIL stands for Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant. ISIL has become the common term in the documentation of the international community, including United Nations Security Council resolutions. While various explanations have been offered for so-called “hybrid warfare,” in this white paper, the term is used to mean, “aggression conducted by methods that are diffi cult to identify defi nitively as ‘armed attack’ based on their outward appearance, involving a combination of non-military means, such as sabotage and information manipulation, and military means which are utilized covertly.” With regard to the recent situation in Ukraine, the United States and European nations note that there was clear and direct Russian military intervention. Russia, on the other hand, has consistently ----- countries such as China, India and Russia, and the relative change of inf uence of the United States. Increases in demand for natural resources, energy, and food stemming from economic growth in emerging countries and a larger middle class are expected to further intensify the international competition for these resources. Against this backdrop, changes in or denial of the existing regional and international order, or assertions and activities to secure economic interests could become more tangible and acute. This in turn could lead to increases in “gray-zone” situations and regional conf icts in the future. Additionally, the rapid spread of the Internet and ICT networks, including social media – one of the key factors of globalization – have given non-state actors a much greater ability to disseminate their opinions and assertions as well as mobilize supporters, and by extension, have signif cantly increased their inf uence on countries and the international community. For example, criticism of a nation sent out by an individual, or extremism disseminated by an international terrorist organization, have tended to propagate and spread explosively or be transmitted across the world by ICT networks. Controlling these activities have become increasingly challenging even for countries like authoritarian nations with strong control over their people, as well as for the international community that strives to contain the operations of international terrorist organizations. As a result, countries have been forced to pay greater considerations to public opinion on domestic governance and management of state affairs. At the same time, the international community is faced with more complex issues which need to be resolved and which are increasingly diff cult to address. In addition, it is believed that national security decisionmaking is more complex than ever before, as some nations have important economic relationships despite differences in fundamental values and strategic interests, as seen in the case of Europe and Russia with regard to the Ukraine issue in 2014. The security challenges and destabilizing factors in the international community which has these characteristics are complex, diverse, and wide-ranging, and it is becoming ever more diff cult for a single country to deal with them on its own. In this context, it is increasingly important for countries which share interests in regional and global stability to cooperate and actively respond to security challenges. Cross-cutting government efforts are also critical to overcome these challenges. **Section 2 Asia Pacific Security Environment** In the Asia-Pacif c region, alongside the various changes that have taken place with the increase in power of China and other nations, countries in the region have made efforts to enhance and strengthen specif c and practical intra-regional coordination and collaboration with a particular focus on non-traditional security f elds such as humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. In addition, defense authorities in the region have made progress on efforts to avoid and prevent unforeseen consequences in the maritime domain. On the other hand, this region abounds in political, economic, ethnic, and religious diversity, and confrontational relations between countries/regions remain even after the end of the Cold War. In addition, their views on security and threats are different, and therefore, the kinds of major changes in the security environment seen in Europe after the end of the Cold War have yet to emerge, and long-standing issues of territorial rights and reunif cation continue to remain in the region. In the Korean Peninsula, the Korean people have been divided for more than half a century, and the faceoff continues between the military forces of the Republic of Korea (ROK) and North Korea. There are issues concerning Taiwan and the South China Sea. Furthermore, with regard to Japan, territorial disputes over the Northern Territories and Takeshima, both of which are inherent parts of the territory of Japan, remain unresolved. On top of this, recent years have seen a continued tendency towards the prolongation of “gray-zone” situations, raising concerns that they may develop into more serious situations in the absence of a clear path towards the resolution of the situations. In North Korea, following the change of regime that made First Chairman of the National Defense Commission (NDC) Kim Jong-un the leader of the country, many personnel reshuff es have taken place, primarily involving key posts of the party, military, and cabinet. In this way, it is deemed that measures continue to be taken to tighten the regime’s grip and to strengthen the regime to make NDC First Chairman Kim Jong-un the sole leader. North Korea is military-focused and deploys a massive military force. It is also proceeding with the development, deployment, transfer, and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs), including nuclear weapons, and ballistic missiles, and it maintains a large-scale special operations force. Through these activities, North Korea continues to maintain and strengthen asymmetrical military capabilities[4]. In particular, North Korea’s ballistic missile development has presumably entered a new stage as a result of technological improvements through a series of missile launches. In addition, recently, North Korea has engaged in Asymmetrical military capabilities, in this context, refer to means of attack different from those of an opponent with superior conventional military capabilities. Such measures are exploited to ----- not only research and development of ballistic missiles, but has also intensif ed activities to increase their operational capabilities, including surprise attack. As for nuclear weapon development, the Six-Party Talks, which aim at achieving the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, have been suspended since late 2008. North Korea has conducted nuclear tests in def ance of calls of restraint from the international community, so the possibility cannot be ruled out that it has successfully miniaturized nuclear weapons for warheads and enabled them to be equipped on ballistic missiles. With the passage of time, it is considered that there is a growing risk that North Korea would deploy ballistic missiles mounted with a nuclear warhead that have ranges covering Japan. Moreover, there is a possibility that North Korea is developing nuclear weapons using highlyenriched uranium. North Korea has repeated provocative rhetoric and behavior against related countries including Japan, especially in 2013, emphasizing that Japan is within the range of its missiles, referring to specif c Japanese cities. Such North Korean military trends constitute a serious destabilizing factor to the security not only of Japan but of the entire region and the international community. Therefore, Japan needs to pay utmost attention to such activities. North Korea’s abduction of Japanese nationals, a grave issue concerning the sovereignty of Japan and the lives and security of the Japanese people, is yet to be resolved. A solution will require concrete actions by North Korea. Today, China has signif cant inf uence in the international community. Accordingly, China is strongly expected to recognize its responsibility in the international community, accept and comply with international norms, and play an active in a more cooperative manner in regional and global issues. In the meantime, China has been continuously increasing its defense budget at a high level and has been rapidly reinforcing its military in a wide range of areas. As part of such effort, China is believed to be making efforts to strengthen its asymmetrical military capabilities to prevent military activity by other countries in the region by denying access and deployment of foreign militaries to its surrounding areas (so-called “AntiAccess/Area-Denial” [“A2/AD”] capabilities[5], as well as to build its structure for joint operations and enhance combat-oriented military trainings. China has not clearly stated the purposes and goals of the military buildup, and transparency concerning its decision making process on military and security matters is not fully achieved. In addition, China is rapidly expanding and intensifying its activities in the maritime and aerial domains in the region including in the East China Sea and South China Sea. In particular, China has continued to take assertive actions with regard to issues of conf icts of interest in the maritime domain, as exemplif ed by its attempts to change the status quo by coercion, and has signaled its position to realize its unilateral assertions without making any compromises. As for the seas and airspace around Japan, China has intruded into Japanese territorial waters frequently by its government ships, and has engaged in dangerous activities that could cause unforeseen consequences, such as its vessel’s direction of f re control radar at a JMSDF destroyer, the f ight of f ghters abnormally close to JSDF aircraft, and its announcement of establishing the “East China Sea Air Defense Identif cation Zone (ADIZ)” based on its own assertion thereby infringing the freedom of overf ight over the high seas. In the South China Sea, China has also intensif ed friction with countries in the surrounding area by proceeding rapidly with land reclamation projects in multiple reefs, among other activities, based on China’s unilateral assertion of sovereignty. In addition, a Chinese f ghter is alleged to have f own abnormally close to and conducted an intercept of a U.S. Forces aircraft. As Japan has great concern about these Chinese activities, it will need to pay utmost attention to them, as these activities also raise concerns over regional and global security. This is why China is asked to further increase transparency regarding its military and why further strengthening of mutual understanding and trust by promoting dialogue and exchanges with China is an important issue. Against this backdrop, recently, China has begun to actively respond to the calls to take measures to avoid and prevent unforeseen consequences in the maritime domain. It is strongly hoped that progress on these efforts supplements the existing order based on international law and leads to enhancing China’s compliance with international norms. Russia, while perceiving the buildup of an aff uent nation as its task for the present, attaches importance to becoming an inf uential power based on the deployment of its new economic, cultural, and military might. Against the backdrop of its economic development, Russia has promoted the strengthening of the readiness of its Armed Forces and the development and induction of new equipment, while continuing to give priority to its nuclear force. Recently, a confrontational relationship has developed between Russia and such countries as the United States and European nations over Ukraine which Russia deems is part of its sphere of inf uence. Under these circumstances, Russia faces a severe economic situation due to falling crude oil prices, a plunging ruble, and the impacts of EU and U.S. economic sanctions, among other factors. On the other hand, even as expenditure cuts are made in a wide range of areas, Russia has continued to increase defense spending and modernize its Armed Forces. Recently, Russia has intensif ed its military activities not only in the Asia-Pacif c region, but also in the Arctic, Europe, and the periphery Anti-Access (A2) is a concept introduced by the United States and refers to capabilities, usually long-range, designed to prevent an opposing force from entering an operational area. Area-Denial (AD) refers to capabilities, usually of shorter range, designed to limit an opposing force’s freedom of action within the operational area. Weapons used for A2/AD include ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, ----- of mainland United States, and has been expanding the area of activities. In the Far East, the Russian Armed Forces has conducted large-scale exercises. Furthermore, in the territory of Ukraine, Russia has engaged in “hybrid warfare” that is diff cult to identify def nitively as an armed attack by a country, and has attempted to change the status quo by force or coercion. This is recognized as a global issue that could affect the entire international community, including Asia. As seen above, in the Asia-Pacif c region, where the security environment has increasingly grown severe, the presence of the U.S. Forces remains extremely important in order to achieve regional stability. Accordingly, Japan and other countries, such as Australia and the ROK, have established bilateral alliances and partnerships with the United States, and allow the stationing and deployment of U.S. Forces in their territories. In addition, the U.S. Forces have recently taken measures to further strengthen their presence. See Fig. I-0-2-1 (Major Military Forces in the Asia-Pacific Region (Approximate Strength)) Moreover, opportunities for bilateral defense exchanges between countries in the region have increased in recent years. Multilateral security dialogues, including the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), the ASEAN Defense Ministers’ Meeting-Plus (ADMM-Plus), conferences hosted by non-governmental institutions with the participation of relevant defense ministers, and bilateral and multilateral joint exercises are held. Promoting and developing such multi-layered approaches among countries is also important to ensure stability in the region. |North Korea|1,020,000 troops (27) 780 vessels - 560 aircraft 103,000 tons| |---|---| |ROK 520,000 troops (56) 27,000 marines (3) 210 vessels - 197,000 tons 620 aircraft U.S. Forces in the ROK 19,000 troops (5) 60 aircraft|| |U.S. Forces in the ROK|| |19,000 troops (5) 60 aircraft|| |Col1|Japan 140,000 troops (15) 137 vessels - 467,000 tons 410 aircraft| |---|---| |Col1|Taiwan| |---|---| ||200,000 troops (22) 15,000 marines 410 vessels - 201,000 tons 500 aircraft| |he United States Geological Surv|ey: GTOPO30; and the United States| |---|---| 6. The number of U.S. 7th Fleet vessels and aircraft indicates those which are forward-deployed in Japan and Guam. Fig. I-0-2-1 Major Military Forces in the Asia-Pacifi c Region (Approximate Strength) 80,000 troops (12) 250 vessels - 600,000 tons 350 aircraft **Russian Far East** **China** 1,020,000 troops (27) 780 vessels - 560 aircraft **North Korea** 103,000 tons 1,600,000 troops (152) 10,000 marines **ROK** 520,000 troops (56) 870 vessels - 27,000 marines (3) 1,470,000 tons 210 vessels 197,000 tons 620 aircraft 2,620 aircraft **Japan** **U.S. Forces in the ROK** 140,000 troops (15) 19,000 troops (5) 137 vessels 60 aircraft 467,000 tons 410 aircraft **U.S. Forces in Japan** **Taiwan** 18,000 troops (1) 200,000 troops (22) 130 aircraft 15,000 marines **U.S. 7th Fleet** 410 vessels 201,000 tons 20 vessels 347,000 tons 500 aircraft 50 (carrier-based) aircraft The United States Geological Survey: GTOPO30; and the United States National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration: ETOPO1 Notes: 1. Source: The Military Balance 2015, documents published by the U.S. Department of Defense, etc. 2. Figures for Japan indicate the strength of each JSDF as of the end of 2013; the number of combat aircraft is the sum of JASDF aircraft (excluding transport aircraft) and JMSDF aircraft (fixed-wing aircraft only). 3. Figures for the U.S. ground forces in Japan and the ROK are those of the Army and Marine Corps personnel combined. 4. Combat aircraft include Navy and Marine aircraft. 5. Figures in parentheses show the total number of central units, such as divisions and brigades. That of North Korea shows only divisions. That of Taiwan includes military police as well. 7. Figures of combat aircraft of the U.S. Forces, Japan and the U.S. 7th Fleet include only fighters. Legend Ground forces Naval vessels Combat aircraft (200,000 troops) (200,000 tons) (500 aircraft) ----- **Section 3 Global Security Issues** A range of regional conf icts still exists across the globe, which have complex and diverse backgrounds and forms. Especially in the Middle East and Africa, against the backdrop of the turmoil, civil war, and regional conf ict that followed the “Arab Spring,” areas which lack national governance have expanded. In many cases, international terrorist organizations made inroads in these areas, expanded their organizations, and intensif ed their activities. These cases have made regional conf icts more complex, making it increasingly challenging for nations and regional organizations with conf icts in their regions to address and resolve them, as well as for the international community. On the other hand, climate change and competition between sovereign nations to secure resources and energy could become more tangible and cause regional disputes, and in such ways, become a new factor that affects the global security environment. Furthermore, even as the various functions of military forces are utilized more to conduct prompt rescue activities in response to largescale natural disasters and outbreaks of infectious diseases, the presence of countries with weak governance has made it more diff cult to deal with risks such as the explosive outbreak and spread of infectious diseases. The proliferation of WMDs, such as nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) weapons, and ballistic missiles that serve as the means of delivery of WMD is still viewed as a signif cant threat to the international community. In particular, there are continuing concerns about the acquisition and use of WMDs by non-state actors, such as international terrorist organizations. In this regard, under the leadership of the Nuclear Security Summit, the international community continues to pursue efforts to counter terrorism activities that utilize nuclear materials and other radioactive substances. Meanwhile, with regard to Iran’s nuclear program, the United States and the European Union (EU) have strengthened sanctions against Iran, while engaging in discussions with Iran. They agreed on the Joint Plan of Action in 2013 aimed at a comprehensive resolution of the nuclear issue, and continue to hold negotiations to reach a f nal comprehensive agreement. In addition, initiatives which focus on nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament are under way, such as the new Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) entering into force between the United States and Russia in 2011. There has been a growing tendency for the threat of international terrorism to spread rapidly. The diversif cation of actors that carry out acts of terrorism, coupled with the increasing complexity of regional conf icts, have made the prevention of terrorism even more challenging. As the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) demonstrates, terrorist organizations have emerged which, unlike conventional terrorist organizations, are well funded and have powerful and sophisticated military capabilities By making effective use of the Internet and social media for the organizations’ propaganda purposes, they communicate their extremism and gain multiple followers and new members around the world. In addition, the United States, European nations, and elsewhere face concerns over the threat of so-called “home-grown” and “lone-wolf” terrorism – namely, acts of terrorism perpetrated in the home country singlehandedly by those who experienced combat in a conf ict area and returned to their home country, or those who have become inf uenced by extremism, among others. This has increased the risk of terrorism occurring in developed countries. In view of the terrorist incident regarding the murder of Japanese which took place in Syria in early 2015, it cannot be said that Japan is immune from the threat of international terrorism. Securing the stable use of global commons such as sea, air, outer space, and cyberspace is becoming a signif cant security challenge for the international community. The growing attention paid in the f eld of international security to outer space and cyberspace, which cannot be perceived from a conventional geographical perspective, stems from the increasing dependence of social infrastructure and military activities on outer space and cyberspace for various reasons such as further developments in military and science technology and the recent dramatic advances in information and communications technology (ICT). On the other hand, in recent years, concrete initiatives aimed at strengthening an entire country’s response capabilities that include private companies have been under way in various countries, in order to deal with cyber attacks on a range of government and military information and communication networks and key infrastructure, some of which allegedly have the involvement of government agencies. There is also an effort in the international community to establish a code of conduct in cyberspace. With regard to the maritime domain, which has been regarded as a fundamental means for supporting international trade, piracy acts have taken place in various parts of the world, and there have been cases where countries unilaterally assert their rights and take action based on their own assertion that is inconsistent with the existing international maritime law and order, thereby unduly infringing the freedom of navigation on and f ight over the high seas. In response to these situations, the international community has been taking various measures such as continuing to dispatch vessels and other assets to conduct anti-piracy operations in relevant waters including off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden, sharing the view on the importance of international norms including freedom of navigation, and initiatives designed to avoid and prevent unforeseen consequences in the maritime domain. As seen above, the international community today faces diverse, complex, and multilayered security challenges and destabilizing factors These challenges could even occur ----- simultaneously or compound one another. In addition to deterrence and handling of armed conf icts, the roles of military forces in responding to these challenges are becoming so diverse that they include a broad spectrum of activities from conf ict prevention to reconstruction assistance. Moreover, as opportunities for military forces to play such an important role increase, comprehensive responses are required that combine military capacity with other capacities such as diplomacy, law enforcement and justice, intelligence, and the economy. Developments in science and technology, as represented by the great leaps forward in ICT in recent years, have also had spillover effects on the military. The United States and other developed countries put emphasis on research and development of new technologies including those for precision guidance, unmanned vehicles, and stealth capability, while actively seeking international joint development and production to address rising development and production costs and the deterioration of the national f scal situation. On the other hand, states and non-state actors without cutting-edge technology are anticipated to develop and acquire WMDs and asymmetrical means of attack such as cyber attacks, while acquiring the technologies of developed countries in an illicit manner. How these trends in military science and technology will unfold is expected to have signif cant effects on military strategies and military balance in the future. ----- **Chapter** **Defense Policies of Countries** ##### 1 **Section 1 The United States** **1** **Security and Defense Policies** As the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq spanning more than a decade draw to a close, the patterns of U.S. involvement in the world are changing. While faced with a severe f nancial situation, the United States is anticipated to continue to play a role in the peace and stability of the world by drawing on its world-leading, comprehensive national power. In February 2015, President Barack Obama unveiled his administration’s second National Security Strategy (NSS). It presented the U.S. strategic policy for the remaining two years of his presidency. The NSS underscores that the United States would continue to play a leading role in tackling a variety of challenges, such as the threat of terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs), and cyber attacks, as well as advance a rules-based international order and take collective action with its allies and partners, while continuing to pursue the four national interests outlined in the 2010 NSS: (1) The security of the United States, its citizens, and U.S. allies and partners; (2) A strong, innovative, and growing U.S. economy that promotes prosperity; (3) Respect for universal values at home and around the world; and (4) A rules-based international order that promotes peace, security, and opportunity. The NSS maintains that the United States would continue to advance its rebalance to Asia and the Pacif c, one of the priorities identif ed in the new Defense Strategic Guidance[1] released in January 2012 and in the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) released in March 2014. Accordingly, the Obama administration has indicated that the United States would continue to attach importance to this region. Meanwhile, the growing budget def cits of the U.S. government in recent years have called for deep cuts in spending. In January 2012, the Department of Defense (DoD) announced that defense spending would be reduced by about US$487 billion over the 10 years from FY2012 to FY2021[2]. In addition, the government budget sequestration[3], including defense spending, was initiated in March 2013, bringing various impacts on the U.S. Forces including suspension of training, delayed deployment of aircraft carriers, and grounding of air squadrons. Although the Bipartisan Budget Act of the Democratic and Republican parties mitigated the sequestration spending cuts for FY2014 and FY2015, the QDR emphasizes that the risks to the U.S. Forces would increase considerably if sequester-level cuts return in FY2016. Much attention will be paid to how the mandatory sequestration cuts in defense spending will impact the U.S. defense strategies and security policies outlined in the QDR and other documents. In response to the attacks in Iraq and Syria since 2014 by the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), the United States, since August 2014, has led Operation Inherent Resolve (OIR), a military operation against ISIL that includes airstrikes. In addition, in response to the growing tension over the recent situation in Ukraine, the United States has shifted away from the “reset” diplomacy of the past aimed at improving U.S.-Russia relations, and is undertaking a major review of the bilateral relationship. Focus will be on how these changes in the situations in the Middle East and Ukraine impact U.S. policies, including the policy of rebalancing to the Asia-Pacif c region. U.S. Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter, nominated as a replacement for former Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel [White House photo] The formal title of the document is “Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense.” According to a document published by the DoD concerning the FY2013 budget request that was submitted to Congress in February 2012, “the amount of reduction” refers to the difference between the total DoD base budget for 10 years estimated at the time of the FY2012 budget request (submitted to Congress in February 2011) and the total DoD base budget for 10 years estimated at the time of the FY2013 budget request. ----- (2) Build security globally: Continue a strong U.S. commitment to shaping world events in order to deter and prevent conf ict and to assure the allies and partners of the shared security. (3) Project power and win decisively: The U.S. Forces deter acts of aggression in one or more theaters by remaining capable of decisively defeating adversaries, while projecting power to provide humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. The QDR states that across the three pillars, the U.S. Forces are capable of simultaneously implementing the following undertakings, and if deterrence fails at any given time, the U.S. Forces could defeat a regional adversary in a large-scale multi-phased campaign, and deny the objectives of—or imposing unacceptable costs on—another aggressor in another region[4]. 1) Defending homeland 2) Conducting sustained, distributed counterterrorist operations 3) Deterring aggression and assuring allies through forward presence and engagement in multiple regions. Furthermore, in order to achieve the three pillars, the DoD seeks innovative approaches to how it f ghts, how it postures its force, and how it leverages its asymmetric strengths and technological advantages. More specif cally, the QDR mentions positioning additional forwarddeployed naval forces in critical areas, such as the AsiaPacif c region, and deploying new combinations of ships, aviation assets, and crisis response forces. The QDR also makes reference to rebalancing the Joint Force. Given the changes in the security environment surrounding the United States, including geopolitical changes, changes in modern warfare, and changes in the f scal environment, the QDR states that the Joint Force would: rebalance for a broad spectrum of conf ict; rebalance and sustain its presence and posture abroad; rebalance capability, capacity, and readiness; and equip itself with advanced capabilities and readiness while scaling back the U.S. Forces. The QDR states that even as budget and other resource cuts are made, the DoD would give priority to the following capability areas that are in close alignment with the pillars of the defense strategy: (1) Missile defense; (2) Nuclear deterrence; (3) Cyber; (4) Space; (5) Air/ **1** **Understanding of Security** In the NSS released in February 2015, President Obama outlined that today the United States and the international community face challenges, including a rising risk of attacks on the United States and its allies due to violent extremism and the terrorist threat, escalating challenges to cybersecurity, aggression by Russia, and the outbreak of infectious diseases. President Obama went on to state that the United States has a unique capability to mobilize and lead the international community to meet these challenges, and that strong and sustained U.S. leadership will safeguard U.S. security interests. At the same time, the NSS notes that whether or not the international community is able to respond effectively to the risks depends on the behaviors of major powers, and that the steadfastness of allies and the cooperation of other emerging powers are essential for making progress. The QDR released in March 2014 states that the future international security environment remains uncertain and complicated due to the shifting international balance of power; the greater interaction between states, non-state entities, and private citizens; the proliferation of technology; and the rapidly accelerating spread of information. In addressing this challenging environment, the QDR states that the United States would collaborate with allies and partners and invest in the technological and human capital strengths of the U.S. Forces to accomplish a wide range of goals. **2** **Defense Strategy** The QDR states that the following three pillars, which are interrelated and mutually reinforcing, would be emphasized in order to embody priorities outlined in the Defense Strategic Guidance including rebalancing to the Asia-Pacif c region and maintaining a strong commitment to stability in Europe and the Middle East. (1) Protect the homeland: Maintain the capability to deter and defeat attacks on the United States. Protection of the homeland includes assisting U.S. civil authorities in protecting U.S. airspace, shores, and borders, and in responding effectively to domestic disasters. The 2010 QDR stated that the U.S. Forces possess the capability of countering attacks by two countries while also being able to conduct a wide range of operations. The 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance states that the United States maintains forces that are able to fully deny a capable state’s aggressive objectives in one region while being capable of denying the objectives of – or imposing ----- sea; (6) Precision strike; (7) Intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR); (8) Counter terror and special operations; and (9) Resilience[5]. However, the QDR emphasizes that if sequester-level cuts return in FY2016, risks to the U.S. Forces posed by shifts in the security environment would grow signif cantly[6]. areas in Northern Australia, which would offer greater opportunities for joint training and exercises. The joint initiatives are described as part of the efforts to embody the basic concept of the force posture of the U.S. Forces presence in the Asia-Pacif c region, which intends to pursue “a more geographically distributed, operationally resilient, and politically sustainable military presence.” Other examples include the rotational deployment of up to four Littoral Combat Ships (LCS)[8] to Singapore announced by then-U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates in June 2011. LCS started the f rst rotation in April 2013 and the second rotation in December 2014. Also, the United States repeatedly conducted joint military exercises with and provided military technologies and assistance to Southeast Asian countries in an effort to build up trusting relationships and strengthen the readiness of the countries. With regard to Japan, the United States deployed P-8 patrol aircraft to Kadena Air Base, temporarily assigned unmanned reconnaissance aircraft Global Hawk to Misawa Air Base, and deployed a second TPY-2 radar[9] in Japan to the Kyogamisaki Communications Site. In addition, in April 2014, then-U.S. Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel announced that two more Aegis ballistic missile defense ships would be deployed to Japan by 2017[10]. Furthermore, apart from the two aforementioned ships, the U.S. Navy deployed an Aegis cruiser to Yokosuka in June 2015. The United States has been expressing its stance to emphasize the Asia-Pacif c region not only to its allies and partners but also to China. The 2014 QDR states that the United States would sustain dialogue with China to improve the ability to cooperate in practical areas such as counterpiracy, peacekeeping, and humanitarian assistance/disaster relief operations. At the same time, the United States would manage the competitive aspects of U.S.-China relations in ways that improve regional peace and stability consistent with international norms and principles. **3** **Rebalance to the Asia-Pacific Region** As indicated by the Defense Strategic Guidance, the QDR, and the NSS, the United States places emphasis on the Asia-Pacif c region and is continuing a policy to enhance its presence in the region. In November 2011, U.S. President Obama delivered a speech to the Australian Parliament, clearly stating, for the f rst time, that he would give top priority to the U.S. presence and mission in the Asia-Pacif c region. The President indicated that the United States would maintain its strong presence in Japan and the Republic of Korea (ROK), while enhancing its presence in Southeast Asia. Furthermore, the QDR states that the centerpiece of the DoD commitment to the rebalance to the Asia-Pacif c region is to update and enhance security initiatives with its allies in the region, including Japan. Additionally, the QDR notes that by 2020, the U.S. Forces would station 60% of the assets of the Navy and Air Force in the Asia-Pacif c region. Concrete examples of the enhancement of U.S. Forces’ presence in the Asia-Pacif c region include enhanced presence of the U.S. Forces in Australia. In November 2011, U.S. President Obama and then-Australian Prime Minister Julia Gillard jointly announced U.S.-Australia force posture initiatives, which include: (1) the rotational deployment of U.S. Marines to Darwin and other areas in Northern Australia for around six months every year where they would conduct exercises and training with the Australian Defence Force (ADF)[7]; and (2) increased access of U.S. Air Force aircraft to ADF facilities and The capability areas constitute primarily of the following: (1) Missile defense: Increasing the number of Ground-Based Interceptors, deploying an additional radar in Japan, increasing the reliability, effi ciency, and discrimination capabilities of interceptors, studying the best location for deploying Ground-Based Interceptors (2) Nuclear deterrence: Continuing to invest in modernizing delivery systems; warheads; command and control; and nuclear weapon infrastructure (3) Cyber: Forming the Cyber Mission Force by 2016, integrating and migrating information systems (4) Space: Diversifying and expanding the coverage of Space Situational Awareness, accelerating initiatives to counter adversary space capabilities including ISR and precision strike (5) Air/sea: Countering A2/AD threats by investing in combat aircraft, including fi ghters and long-range strike, survivable persistent surveillance, resilient architectures, and undersea warfare (6) Precision strike: Procuring advanced air-to-surface missiles and a long-range anti-ship cruise missile to improve the joint ability of U.S. Forces to attack airspace defended by the adversary (7) ISR: Making focused investments in systems that will function effectively in airspace defended by the adversary and areas that the U.S. Forces are denied entry or free maneuver, expanding use of space ISR systems (8) Counter terror and special operations: Increasing the Special Operations Forces (SOF) to 69,700 personnel, mobilizing more SOF to support the Joint Force to counter a range of challenges across the globe (9) Resilience: Improving the ability to maintain and restore the functions of air, naval, ground, space, and missile-defense capabilities against attacks, dispersing land and naval expeditionary forces, investing in capabilities to repair runways more quickly Some of the implications anticipated in the case of the return of the sequester-level cuts include a reduction in end strength of active Army to 420,000, retirement of the USS George Washington aircraft carrier (10 aircraft carriers), a reduction in end strength of Marine Corps to 175,000, a further retirement of Air Force aircraft, and a slowdown of purchases of F-35 aircraft. The initial deployment consisted of a company of about 200 U.S. Marines. The aim is to eventually establish a rotational presence of up to a 2,500-person Marine Air-Ground Task Force including aircraft, ground vehicles, and artilleries over a few years. In 2014, about 1,150 Marines, including the Marine Helicopter Squadron, were deployed, marking a signifi cant increase from the deployment of about 250 U.S. Marines in the previous fi scal year. Fast and agile vessels designed to defeat asymmetrical threats with A2 capability in near-shore environments. Radar whose purpose is to detect and track ballistic missiles (also called “X-band radar” as it operates in the “X-band” frequency). The United States notes that the additional deployment of this radar to Japan would provide enhanced early warning and tracking capability of any missile launched from North Korea. ----- be required for multiple opponents, including advanced countries like Russia and China, regional states like Iran and North Korea, and non-state actors with advanced capabilities. In addition, the competitive environments have changed signif cantly due to innovations in commercial technologies. In order to follow and make use of commercial technologies, the United States must work more closely with the private sector. Furthermore, Deputy Secretary Work notes that the proliferation of technology could cause superiority to be lost in a short timeframe. The DoD maintains that to achieve the initiative, the following should be promoted: development of leadership; a new Long-Range Research and Development Planning Program; reinvigoration of war-gaming approaches; new operational concepts; and increased eff ciency of business practices. In particular, under the Long-Range Research and Development Planning Program, the DoD will identify, develop, and operate technologies and systems which have the potential to f eld breakthroughs that will be key to maintaining and strengthening U.S. military capabilities – from technology f elds such as autonomous systems, robotics, miniaturization, big data, advanced manufacturing, and dispersed network systems. To this end, under the leadership of the U.S. Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, f ve working groups – (1) space technology, (2) undersea technology, (3) air dominance and strike technology, (4) air and missile defense technology, and (5) technology-driven working groups – will be established, as well as one integrated group to supervise and coordinate these working groups. The FY2016 budget request sets forth the advancement of this initiative. The budget request identif es that the priority technology areas are: assured positioning, navigation, and timing; high speed strike weapons; an aerospace innovation initiative; railgun development; and high energy laser technology[12]. U.S. Navy’s Aegis destroyer USS Benfold to be deployed to Yokosuka in summer 2015 [U.S. Navy website] **4** **Defense Innovation Initiative** In November 2014, then-U.S. Secretary of Defense Hagel announced the Defense Innovation Initiative and expressed his expectation that it would develop into a third offset strategy. Since the 1950s, the United States has invested in the development of military technologies in new f elds in which adversaries do not have capabilities. Through a strategy of acquiring asymmetrical means to offset an opponent’s capabilities[11], the United States has maintained military operational and technological superiority. However, today, such U.S. superiority is gradually eroding as a result of potential adversaries modernizing their military forces and acquiring advanced military capabilities, and with technologies proliferating. The United States notes that this initiative was established to newly identify innovative ways to sustain and expand U.S. superiority, utilizing limited resources. U.S. Deputy Secretary of Defense Bob Work, who is leading the work of establishing this initiative, states that its formulation is more challenging than the earlier offset strategies. The reasons are that different strategies will 11 Secretary Hagel stated that the previous two “offset strategies” were as follows: (1) In the 1950s, the United States offset the conventional capacity of the former Soviet Union by using the nuclear deterrent; and (2) In the 1970s, while the nuclear capabilities of the former Soviet Union achieved parity with those of the United States, the United States gained superiority over the former Soviet Union by acquiring new systems, such as extended-range precision-guided missiles, stealth aircraft, and ISR platforms. 12 The FY2016 budget request allocates approximately US$12.3 billion for science and technology, including US$2.1 billion for basic research and US$3.0 billion for the Defense Advanced Research ----- personnel engaged in nuclear forces of the Air Force and Navy, improve the inspections regime, and improve career management, among other activities. See Part I, Chapter 2, Section 2-1 (Nuclear Weapons) **5** **Nuclear Strategy** While U.S. President Obama aims to realize a world without nuclear weapons, he notes that this will not be realized in the near future, and indicates the need to maintain a nuclear deterrent as long as nuclear weapons exist. The Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), which was released in April 2010, indicates that the nuclear security environment is changing and nuclear terrorism and nuclear proliferation are an imminent threat today. Furthermore, it points to the necessity of working on the issue of ensuring strategic stability with existing nuclear powers, in particular Russia and China. The NPR presents f ve key objectives based on awareness of this security environment: (1) preventing nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism; (2) reducing the role of U.S. nuclear weapons; (3) maintaining strategic deterrence and stability at reduced nuclear force levels; (4) strengthening regional deterrence and reassuring U.S. allies and partners; and (5) sustaining a safe, secure, and effective nuclear arsenal. In June 2013, U.S. President Obama delivered a speech on the reduction of nuclear weapons in Berlin, which was followed by the release of the Report on Nuclear Employment Strategy by the DoD on the same day. In the speech and report, the United States announced that it would negotiate with Russia to pursue up to a one-third reduction in U.S. deployed strategic nuclear weapons. In February 2014, following missteps by nuclear missile launch off cers including possession of illegal drugs and misconduct related to prof ciency tests, thenU.S. Secretary of Defense Hagel instructed an internal and external review of the entire DoD Nuclear Enterprise (Nuclear Enterprise Review [NER]). In November 2014, Secretary Hagel announced the results of the NER, in the form of a summary of an internal study report and a report of an external study conducted by retired military personnel and other reviewers. The NER found that while the existing nuclear forces of the U.S. Forces are meeting the demands of their mission, signif cant improvements are required to ensure the safety and effectiveness of the force in the future. The two reports made recommendations focusing around areas, such as improving oversight and management issues, increasing investment in the nuclear deterrent enterprise, and personnel and training including boosting morale. Based on these recommendations, the DoD decided to prioritize funding on actions that improve the security, ensure modernization of the force, and address shortfalls. The DoD will work to increase the number of **6** **FY2016 Budget** As the budget def cit of the U.S. government is deepening in recent years, the Budget Control Act enacted in August 2011 established a deep cut in government spending by FY2021. In January 2012, the DoD announced that the reduction in defense spending in light of the act would amount to about US$487 billion over the 10 years from FY2012 to FY2021 (about US$259 billion over the f ve years from FY2013 to FY2017). In March 2013, the mandatory sequestration of government spending including defense spending started based on the provisions of the Budget Control Act. Mandatory sequestration for the FY2014 and FY2015 budgets was eased as a result of the Bipartisan Budget Act of the Democratic and Republican parties passed in December 2013. However, the President and Congress have yet to reach an agreement on the handling of mandatory sequestration in FY2016 and beyond. For the FY2016 DoD budget request, the DoD allocated US$534.3 billion[13] for the base budget. For the overseas contingency operations budget, the DoD allocated US$50.9 billion, which is US$13.3 billion less than the FY2015 enacted budget level, based on the completion of the U.S. Forces’ combat mission in Afghanistan in late 2014 and the progress made towards their withdrawal in late 2016. The key principles of the defense budget are as follows: (1) Seek a balanced force; (2) Manage enduring readiness challenges; (3) Continue to focus on institutional reform; (4) Pursue investments in military capabilities; (5) Provide for the people; and (6) Support overseas operations. On this basis, the DoD has decided to: decrease the Army’s end strength to 475,000 active soldiers from the FY2015 level of 490,000 active soldiers; continue to fund the overhaul/life extension of the USS George Washington of the Navy, following on from the previous f scal year, and maintain 11 aircraft carriers; keep the F-35, the KC-46, and the Long-Range Strike Bomber (LRS-B) as the Air Force’s top three modernization programs; and once again plan to retire the A-10 aircraft that was not realized during the previous year due to opposition from Congress. The DoD’s requested amount exceeds the FY2016 sequestration spending cap by about US$36 billion, contending that at sequester-level funding, the DoD cannot achieve its goal of restoring readiness and execute the defense strategy[14]. 13 An increase of about US$38.2 billion from the FY2015 enacted budget level. 14 The QDR states that the levels in the FY2015 budget request of the President will allow the U.S. Forces to manage the risks imposed on them by the changes in the security environment, but that the ----- The Impact of Budget Sequestration on the Defense Fig. I-1-1-1 Budget (Base budget: $1 billion) 610 550 530 510 490 470 500 FY2013 budget request FY2016 budget request Sequester-level 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 (FY) Created based on the FY2016 budget request of the U.S. Department of Defense. Fig. I-1-1-2 Shifts in the U.S. Defense Budget Defense expenditures ($1 million) Year-on-year growth rate (%) 700.000 15 600.000 10 500.000 300.000 0 200.000 –5 100.000 11 12 13 14 15 (FY) Notes: 1. Figures shown are narrowly defi ned expenses based on Historical Tables, Budget of the United States Government, FY2015. 2. The amount for FY2015 is an estimate. See Fig. I-1-1-1 (The Impact of Budget Sequestration on the Defense Budget); Fig. I-1-1-2 (Shifts in the U.S. Defense Budget) Nevertheless, this budget will be diff cult to realize unless allowances are made, such as an agreement on a new budget proposal by Congress and the President. Attention will be paid to future trends in sequestration of government spending including defense spending. **2** **Military Posture** 2012, the United States announced that it would continue investments in MD programs in its homeland and Europe while reducing the spending for deployable regional MD systems with a view to increasing reliance on its allies and partners in the future. Further, in March 2013, the United States announced that it would additionally deploy groundbased interceptors in the U.S. homeland and mobile radars for Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) in Japan in order to bolster homeland security in response to North Korea’s nuclear test and the advancement of its long-range ballistic missile development, while restructuring the program of the standard missile (SM-3) Block IIB scheduled for deployment in Europe. The operation of the U.S. Forces is not controlled by the individual branches of the broader armed forces, rather it is operated under the leadership of the Unif ed Combatant Commands, comprising leaders from multiple branches of the armed forces. The Unif ed Combatant Commands consist of three commands with functional responsibilities and six commands with regional responsibilities. The U.S. ground forces consist of about 490,000 Army soldiers and about 180,000 Marines, which are forward **1** **General Situation** In regard to strategic offensive weapons including nuclear force, the United States is moving ahead with its reduction based on a new Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty that came into force in February 2011. In April 2015, it announced that its deployed strategic warheads[15] stood at 1,597, while its deployed delivery platforms stood at 785[16]. The United States is studying the concept of a Conventional Prompt Global Strike (CPGS), as an effort contributing to the nation’s new ability to reduce reliance on nuclear weapons[17]. In regard to Missile Defense (MD), the United States announced the Ballistic Missile Defense Review (BMDR) in February 2010. On homeland defense, the review noted that the United States would use ground-based interceptors to respond to Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs) from North Korea and Iran, and that in regard to regional defense, the United States would expand investments in MD systems while taking a phased adaptive approach (PAA) that is tailored to each region and improve the MD capabilities step by step, working with partner countries and properly sharing the burden. However, in January 15 Warheads that have been equipped in deployed ICBMs and Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles (SLBMs) and nuclear warheads equipped in heavy bombers (a deployed heavy bomber is counted as one nuclear warhead). 16 The figure as of March 1, 2015. ----- deployed in Germany, the ROK, and Japan, among other countries. As described in the Defense Strategic Guidance, the Army continues its transition to a smaller yet capable force fully prepared to conduct a full range of operations worldwide. The Marine Corps aims to acquire forces capable of responding to any threat as a “middleweight force,” bridging the seam between smaller special operations forces and larger heavy conventional forces. In January 2012, the DoD announced that it would reduce the number of active duty Marines to 182,000 and in February 2014 the number of active duty Army soldiers to 440,000 – 450,000, with further reductions to both in the future. The U.S. maritime forces consist of about 950 vessels (including about 70 submarines) totaling about 6.20 million tons. The 6th Fleet is deployed in the East Atlantic Ocean, the Mediterranean Sea, and Africa; the 5th Fleet in the Persian Gulf, Red Sea, and northwest Indian Ocean; the 3rd Fleet in the eastern Pacif c; the 4th Fleet in South America and the Caribbean Sea; and the 7th Fleet in the western Pacif c and Indian Ocean. The U.S. air forces consist of roughly 3,600 combat aircraft across the Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps. In addition to carrier-based aircraft deployed at sea, part of the tactical air force is forward-deployed in Germany, the United Kingdom, Japan, and the ROK. Moreover, in addressing the increasing threats in cyberspace, the U.S. Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM) was founded in order to oversee operations in cyberspace. The U.S. Cyber Command attained Initial Operational Capability (IOC) in May 2010 and commended full capability in November in the same year[18]. See Fig. I-1-1-3 (Structure of the Unified Combatant Command) **2** **Current Military Posture in the Asia-Pacific Region** The United States, a Pacif c nation, continues to play an important role in ensuring the peace and stability of the Asia-Pacif c region by placing the Pacif c Command, a joint command consisting of the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps, in the region. The Pacif c Command is a command with regional responsibilities for the largest geographical area, and its component commands include U.S. Forces Japan and U.S. Forces Korea. In order to broaden the perspective of the U.S. Forces and promote better understanding of the U.S. Forces from allies, the Pacif c Command headquarters accept personnel from allies in the region. Under this scheme, personnel from Canada and Australia are currently serving in the Pacif c Command as deputy director level-off cials. The Pacif c Command consists of the U.S. Army Pacif c, U.S. Pacif c Fleet, U.S. Marine Forces Pacif c, and U.S. Pacif c Air Forces, which are all headquartered in Hawaii[19]. The Army Pacif c’s subordinate commands include the 25th Infantry Division in Hawaii, the 8th U.S. Army in the ROK, which is the Army component of the U.S. Forces in the ROK, and the U.S. Army Alaska. In addition, the Army Pacif c assigns approximately 2,400 personnel to commands, such as I Corps Forward and the U.S. Army Japan Command in Japan[20]. The U.S. Pacif c Fleet consists of the Seventh Fleet, which is responsible for the Western Pacif c and the Indian Ocean, and the Third Fleet, responsible for the East Pacif c and Bering Sea. The U.S. Pacif c Fleet in total controls about 180 vessels. The Seventh Fleet is centered on a carrier strike group with main stationing locations in Japan and Guam. Their mission is to defend territorial lands, people, sea lines of communication, and the critical national interests of the United States and its allies. The f eet consists of aircraft carriers, amphibious ships, and the Aegis combat system. The U.S. Pacif c Marine Corps deploys one Marine Expeditionary Force each in the U.S. mainland and Japan. Of this force, about 16,000 personnel are in the 3rd Marine Division and the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing, which are equipped with F/A-18 f ghters and other aircraft, in Japan. In addition, maritime pre-positioning ships loaded with heavy equipment and others are deployed in the Western Pacif c. The U.S. Pacif c Air Force has three air forces, of which three air wings (equipped with F-16 f ghters and C-130 transport aircraft) are deployed to the 5th Air Force stationed in Japan and two air wings (equipped with F-16 f ghters) to the 7th Air Force stationed in the ROK. See Fig. I-1-1-4 (U.S. Forces Deployment Status and the Recent Trend of the U.S. Forces in the Asia-Pacific Region) |U.S. Se of De|cretary fense| |---|---| |Structure of the Unifi ed Combatant Command Fig. I-1-1-3|mbatant Command|Col3| |---|---|---| |President : Functional basis command : Geographic basis command U.S. Secretary of Defense Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff U.S. Special U.S. Strategic U.S. Transportation Operation Command Command Command U.S. Africa U.S. Central U.S. European U.S. Northern U.S. Pacific U.S. Southern Command Command Command Command Command Command|: Functional basis command : Geographic basis command|| |U.S. Africa Command||U.S. Southern Command| |U.S. European Command|U.S. Northern Command|U.S. Pacific Command| |---|---|---| 18 As cyber-related units, Army Cyber Command (ARCYBER), Fleet Cyber Command (FLTCYBERCOM), 24th Air Force/Air Force Cyber Command (AFCYBER), and Marine Corps Forces Cyber Command (MARFORCYBER) have been newly formed. 19 In 2013, the U.S. Army Pacifi c upgraded the rank of its Commander from lieutenant general to general, and thus the commanders of the Army Pacifi c, Pacifi c Fleet, and Pacifi c Air Forces have all become four stars. 20 The fi gures of the U.S. Forces mentioned in this paragraph are the numbers of active personnel recorded in the published sources of the U.S. DoD (as of December 31, 2014), and could change ----- |U.S. Forces Army: approx. 495,000 personnel Navy: approx. 320,000 personnel Air Force: approx. 309,000 personnel Marines: approx. 185,000 personnel|Col2| |---|---| |Total: approx. 1,310,000 per (Total in 1987: approx. 2,170,000 per|sonnel sonnel)| Fig. I-1-1-4 U.S. Forces Deployment Status and the Recent Trend of the U.S. Forces in the Asia-Pacifi c Region **European Region** Army: approx. 29,000 personnel Navy: approx. 7,000 personnel Air Force: approx. 29,000 personnel U.S. Forces Marines: approx. 1,000 personnel Army: approx. 495,000 personnel Navy: approx. 320,000 personnel Total: approx. 66,000 personnel Air Force: approx. 309,000 personnel (Total in 1987: Marines: approx. 185,000 personnel approx. 354,000 personnel) U.S. European Command Total: approx. 1,310,000 personnel (Total in 1987: approx. 2,170,000 personnel) U.S. Central Command **Asia-Pacific Region** U.S. Northern Command Army: approx. 44,000 personnel Navy: approx. 40,000 personnel Air Force: approx. 28,000 personnel U.S. Africa Command U.S. Pacific Command Marines: approx. 24,000 personnel Total: approx. 136,000 personnel U.S. SouthernCommand (Total in 1987: approx. 184,000 personnel) Notes: 1. Source: Documents published by the U.S. Department of Defense (as of December 31, 2014), etc. 2. The number of personnel deployed in the Asia-Pacific region includes personnel deployed in Hawaii and Guam. **[Japan]** **[Republic of Korea]** - Deployment of F-22, MV-22 Ospreys (deployment of CV-22 to Yokota in 2017), P-8, - Maintaining around 28,500 U.S. troops and of Global Hawk stationed in the Republic of Korea - Deployment of second TPY-2 radar - Relocation of III Marine Expeditionary Force (III MEF) and ground troops from Okinawa to Guam and Hawaii, etc. **[Taiwan]** Seoul - Additional one missile cruiser has been deployed (June 2015) - A plan to upgrade the F-16s Taiwan - Additional two Aegis BMD destroyers will be deployed (scheduled for summer 2015 currently owns, etc. (announced in September 2011) ROK Japan - Deployment of F-35 in Iwakuni in 2017 (the Marines’ plan)and 2017) **[Singapore]** Hawaii - Rotational deployment of Littoral Combat Ships (LCS) (announced Okinawa in June 2011; a broad Philippines Guam **[Guam]** agreement reached with the Manila - Relocation of home port for a carrier from - Rotational deployment of submarines government of Singapore in the Atlantic Ocean side to the Pacific - Rotational deployment of bombers June 2012; the first ship started **[Philippines]** Ocean side (in San Diego) (April 2010) - Establishment of a facility for aircraft rotation in April 2013 and the - Transfer of U.S. Coast Guard cutters carrier’s temporary port of call second ship in December 2014) (August 2011, May 2012) - Deployment of unmanned - Signing of the Enhanced Defense Singapore Cooperation Agreement with the reconnaissance aircraft (RQ-4) Indonesia purpose of enhancing the presence Jakarta of the U.S. Forces, etc. (April 2014) **[Australia]At the November 2011 U.S.-Australia Summit, an agreement was reached on the** Darwin following initiatives: - Rotational deployment of the Marines to northern Australia **[Indonesia]** - Increased rotational deployment of U.S. Air Force aircraft in northern Australia - Transfer of 24 F-16s (announced in November 2011) (Reference) Number of Marine Corps troops in the Asia-Pacific Region Australia **Total: Approx. 24,049** In June 2013, U.S. Secretary of Defense Hagel announced a plan to deploy 60% of the Hawaii: 7,677 Australia: 12 assets of the U.S. Navy and Air Force in the Asia-Pacific region as well as proceeding Guam: 15 Republic of Korea: 250 with the rotational deployment in the region and deployment of equipment. Japan: 15,870 Thailand: 215 etc. Canberra Source: Documents published by the U.S. Department of Defense (as of December 31, 2014) and the Military Balance 2015 - A map created by the U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) is used ----- **Section 3 China** **1** **General Situation** China, the world’s most populous country, has a vast landmass surrounded by a long borderline shared with 14 countries as well as a long coastline. China is also a nation with various races, religions, and languages. Most of its ethnic minorities populate the borderlands often with the same ethnic groups living across the borders. China, with a long history, has been shaping and maintaining a distinct culture and civilization. China’s pride in its unique history and semi-colonial experience in and after the 19th century is driving its desire for a strong nation and fueling its nationalism. In recent years, China has increased its presence in the international community. For example, China has played a def nite role in non-traditional security areas. It actively sends personnel to U.N. peacekeeping operations (PKO) and has been sending its ships continuously for counter-piracy activities off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden. Furthermore, China has participated proactively in humanitarian assistance and disaster relief activities, including dispatching a hospital ship to the Philippines which sustained damages from a typhoon, as well as dispatching vessels and other assets for the search of a missing Malaysian airliner. These activities have been highly appreciated by the international community. There are high expectations for China to recognize its responsibility in the international community, accept and comply with international norms, and play an active role in a more cooperative manner on regional and global issues. Yet, at the same time, there are disputes between China and other countries on issues such as trade imbalances, currency rates, and human rights. While advocating “peaceful development”[1], China, particularly over maritime issues where its interests conf ict with others’, based on its own assertions incompatible with the existing international legal order[2], continues to act in an assertive manner, including coercive attempts at changing the status quo, and is poised to fulf ll its unilateral demands without compromise[3]. China’s actions include dangerous acts that may invite unintended consequences, raising concerns over China’s future direction. Against this backdrop, China has attempted to advance its own initiatives in the security f eld. At the Conference on Interaction and Conf denceBuilding Measures in Asia (CICA), for example, China criticized military alliances and proposed “the security of Asia by the people of Asia”[4]. On the other hand, in the f eld of international f nance, China established the New Development Bank BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) and is preparing to establish the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB). In addition, China faces various problems domestically. The spread of bribery and corruption among the central and local leadership of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has become a signif cant political problem. Furthermore, China’s rapid economic growth has brought with it emerging problems such as regional disparities between urban-rural and coastal-inland regions, the issue of the tax system that facilitates these disparities, wealth gaps among urban residents, inf ation, environmental pollution, and lack of agricultural and industrial water. Moreover, issues associated with the rapid aging of the population are forecasted to arise in the future, including pension and other issues related to the social security system. The Chinese government is expected to tighten its control over society as these potentially destabilizing factors to the government administration expand and diversify. However, analysts point out that controlling the activities of the masses will become increasingly diff cult with the spread of the Internet, coupled with other factors. Additionally, China confronts issues involving ethnic minorities in the country, with protests being staged by ethnic minorities in the Tibet Autonomous Region, the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, and elsewhere. Some ethnic minorities undertake campaigns in pursuit of separation and independence. Against this background, during the third plenary session of the 18th CCP Central Committee in November 2013, the session adopted the “Decision on Major Issues concerning Comprehensively Deepening Reforms” regarding reforms in a wide range of areas, such as economics, politics, culture, society, environment, and national defense and the military. The way by which China substantiates these The term China’s “peaceful development” began to come into formal use in around 2004. According to a paper then-State Councilor Dai Bingguo presented on March 11, 2011, “peaceful development” is thought to refer to China’s development whose nature is (1) peaceful, (2) independent, (3) scientifi c, (4) cooperative, and (5) common with other countries. China makes its own assertion about the Senkaku Islands, which are an inherent territory of Japan. In addition, in May 2013, a newspaper of the CCP carried an article which seemingly calls into question the fact that Okinawa is part of Japan, stating for example that, “It may be time to revisit the unresolved historical issue of the Ryukyu Islands.” The Chinese government explained that the article was written by researchers in their personal capacity. China strongly urges Japan, the United States, and other countries to respect China’s “core interests.” “Core interests” include “national sovereignty,” “national security,” “territorial integrity,” “national reunifi cation,” “national political system and social stability,” and “basic safeguards for ensuring sustainable economic and social development.” In particular, “territory” refers to Taiwan, Tibet, and Xinjiang. Some analysts suggest that China’s territorial claims in the East China Sea and South China Sea are also included. In May 2014, in his address at CICA, President Xi Jinping proposed the “new Asian security concept” and underscored that “to beef up and entrench a military alliance targeted at a third party is not ----- reforms will be a point to watch out for. In China, under the policy of cracking down on both “tigers” and “f ies”[5], “corruption” has been subject to severe charges, including former prominent leaders of the party and military such as Zhou Yongkang, former Politburo Standing Committee member, and Xu Caihou, former Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission. During the fourth plenary session of the 18th CCP Central Committee in October 2014, a decision that makes reference to advancing the “rule of law” under the guidance of the CCP was adopted[6]. Accordingly, it is possible that further steps will be taken to address corruption within the party and military. On the diplomatic f eld, it is believed that, in order to maintain national stability, China strives to maintain stability in the strategic international environment by sustaining good relations with major powers such as the United States and Russia, while deepening relations with neighboring countries, and is strengthening cooperation with developing countries. In addition, China seeks to promote multipolarization of the world through building China-led multilateral mechanisms and to secure interests necessary for economic development such as natural resources and energy supply. On the military front, for over a quarter decade, China has strengthened its military forces broadly and rapidly by sustaining large increases in its defense budget. In particular, China gives priority to the Taiwan issue as an issue pertaining to the “core” interest of national sovereignty. It is deemed that China is strengthening its military forces for the time being with the aim of improving military capabilities to prevent Taiwan’s independence. As part of such efforts, China is believed to be enhancing its asymmetric military capabilities to deter military forces of other countries from approaching and advancing to China’s surrounding region, and to inhibit their military activities in the region (so-called “Anti-Access/Area-Denial” [“A2/ AD”] capabilities[7]). Additionally, China has made active efforts to acquire capabilities for missions other than for dealing with the Taiwan issue. With China now having considerable inf uence in the international community not only politically and economically but also militarily, other countries are closely watching China’s military trends. **2** **Military Affairs** forces; and to protect the stability and peace of the world[8]. China has a policy to actively promote “Revolution in Military Affairs with Chinese Characteristics,” which mainly aims to encourage the mechanization and informatization of its military power, based on its military strategy to win local wars under informatized conditions, in response to global trends in military developments observed in the Gulf War, the Kosovo War, the Iraq War, and other wars. It is believed that China emphasizes not only physical means but also non-physical means in military **1** **Defense Policies** China positions the buildup of strong defense capabilities and powerful military forces that match national security and interests of development as the strategic mission to modernize the state. China considers the main goal and mission of national defense policies as: to defend the sovereignty, security, and interests of development of the state; to protect the harmony and stability of the society; to promote modernization of national defense and the military On January 22, 2013, General Secretary Xi Jinping stated during the second plenary session of the 18th Central Commission for Discipline Inspection that the party needs to crack down on “tigers” and “fl ies” at the same time to punish corruption. At the fourth plenary session of the 18th CCP Central Committee, the “CCP Central Committee Decision on Major Issues concerning Comprehensively Advancing Rule of Law” was adopted. For a definition of A2/AD capabilities, see Part I Overview, Section 2, Footnote 5. According to China’s National Defense in 2010. In China’s Peaceful Development white paper released in September 2011, China explained that it pursues “peaceful development” but “never seeks hegemony,” and stated that it is firm in upholding its “core interests” which include: “national sovereignty”; “national security”; “territorial integrity”; “national reunification”; “China’s political system ----- affairs and warfare, and incorporated the concept of “Three Warfares” — “Media Warfare,” “Psychological Warfare,” and “Legal Warfare” — into the tasks of the political work of the military[9]. In addition, China has set forth a policy of close coordination between military struggle and political, diplomatic, economic, cultural, and legal endeavors. China is believed to be strengthening its military forces by being mindful of its top priority, namely, dealing with the Taiwan issue, more specif cally, improving China’s capabilities to hinder the independence of Taiwan and foreign military support for the independence of Taiwan. Furthermore, in recent years, China is working actively to acquire capabilities for missions other than dealing with the Taiwan issue, and stresses the use of the military in non-traditional security areas. With regard to China’s military strengthening, China proclaims that it would “realize the basic mechanization and achieve major progress in construction of informatization by 2020” and “by focusing on the capability to win local wars under informationized conditions, it will improve the abilities to accomplish diversif ed military missions and thoroughly complete the historical military missions in a new phase of the new century,”[10] suggesting that China’s military forces will be developed in tandem with the enhancement of its national strength. China has sustained large increases in its defense spending and broadly and rapidly reinforced its military forces, mainly its nuclear and missile force as well as its Navy and Air Force. As part of such efforts, it is understood that China is strengthening its so-called “A2/ AD” capabilities. In addition, China is working to improve joint operational capabilities, enhance capabilities for extended-range power projection, conduct practical exercises, cultivate and acquire highly-capable personnel for administering operations of informatized forces, improve the foundation of its domestic defense industry, and ensure law-based military governance. Furthermore, China has rapidly expanded and intensif ed its activities at sea and in airspace, including the East China Sea and South China Sea. China, particularly over maritime issues where its interests conf ict with others’, continues to act in an assertive manner, including coercive attempts at changing the status quo, and is poised to fulf ll its unilateral demands without compromise. Japan has great concerns over such Chinese military activities, etc., together with the lack of transparency in its military affairs and security issues, and needs to pay utmost attention to them. These activities also raise security concerns for the region and the international community. **2** **Military Transparency** China has not disclosed specif c information on possession of weapons, procurement goals and past procurements, organization and locations of major units, records of main military operations and exercises, and a detailed breakdown of the national defense budget. Moreover, China has neither set out a clear and specif c future vision of its military strengthening, nor ensured adequate transparency of its decision-making process in relation to military and security affairs. China has released defense white papers including China’s National Defense every two years since 1998. China also conducts numerous dialogues with national defense authorities of other countries. Furthermore, in August 2007, China expressed its wish to return to the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms and to participate in the United Nations Instrument for Reporting Military Expenditures, and has submitted annual reports based on each framework. The Chinese Ministry of National Defense has been giving monthly press conferences by a spokesperson since April 2011. In addition, in November 2013, the position of spokesperson was newly established at seven departments, including the Navy and Air Force[11]. Such moves by China can be perceived on the one hand as efforts that contribute to the improvement of the transparency of military forces, and on the other as efforts to strengthen “Media Warfare.” However, with regard to national defense spending, China has not provided a detailed breakdown of the procurement expenses of major equipment and other details. In the past, China disclosed the total amounts and general purposes for the following three categories: personnel; training and maintenance; and equipment[12]. Nonetheless, such explanations have not been offered in recent years. Moreover, in China’s defense white paper 9 China amended the Regulations of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) on the Political Work in 2003 to add Media, Psychological, and Legal Warfares to the PLA’s political work. The U.S. DoD’s “Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China” (August 2011) explains these warfares as follows: - Media Warfare is aimed at influencing domestic and international public opinion to build public and international support for China’s military actions and to dissuade an adversary from pursuing policies perceived to be adverse to China’s interests. - Psychological Warfare seeks to undermine an enemy’s ability to conduct combat operations through psychological operations aimed at deterring, shocking, and demoralizing enemy military personnel and supporting civilian populations. - Legal Warfare uses international and domestic laws to gain international support and manage possible political repercussions of China’s military actions. 10 China’s National Defense in 2008 also states the following target: “by and large reach the goal of modernization of national defense and armed forces by the mid-21st century.” 11 The seven departments are: PLA General Political Department; PLA General Logistics Department; PLA General Armaments Department; PLA Navy; PLA Air Force; PLA Second Artillery Corps; and People’s Armed Police. 12 China’s National Defense in 2008 and 2010 provided a breakdown of personnel expenses, training and maintenance costs, and equipment costs for the active force, reserve force, and militia, limited ----- titled, “The Diversif ed Employment of China’s Armed Forces,” released in April 2013 as well as the defense white paper titled, “China’s Military Strategy,” released in May 2015, the contents were limited to selective topics. While on some topics they gave more details than in the past, the papers make no reference to national defense spending that was described in previous defense white papers. Additionally, the overall volume of text has decreased. In this respect, transparency is declining in regard to national defense spending, and China has not yet achieved the levels of transparency expected of a responsible nation in the international community. Incidents have been occurring that incite concerns over China’s military decision-making and actions, including Chinese explanations that are contrary to the truth. For example, details have yet to be disclosed regarding the causes of the Chinese nuclear-powered submarine’s submerged navigation in Japan’s territorial waters in November 2004, although it constitutes a breach of international law. Furthermore, with respect to the incident of a Chinese naval vessel directing its f re-control radar at a JMSDF destroyer (January 2013), among other incidents, both the Chinese Ministry of National Defense and Ministry of Foreign Affairs gave explanations which were inconsistent with the facts, such as denying the use of the radar itself. With regard to the incident in which Chinese f ghters f ew abnormally close to aircraft of the JMSDF and JASDF (May and June 2014), the Chinese Ministry of National Defense gave explanations that were contrary to the truth, namely that Japanese aircraft “entered the airspace for the Chinese drills without reporting to China and conducted dangerous acts.” When a Chinese f ghter allegedly f ew abnormally close to and intercepted U.S. Forces aircraft (August 2014), the Chinese Ministry of National Defense provided an explanation that differed from the United States’, stating that “the operations made by the Chinese pilot were professional and the Chinese jet kept a safe distance from the U.S. planes.” In recent years, amid the signif cant changes in the environment surrounding the military, including advancement in military specialization and diversif cation of missions associated with military strengthening, some see that relations between the CCP leadership and the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) have become increasingly complex. Others opine that the degree of military inf uence on foreign policy decisions has been changing[13]. Such situations are also a point to watch out for in terms of crisis management. Another point to watch out for is the relationship between the National Security Commission, which was established at the third plenary session of the 18th CCP Central Committee and which China announced was tasked with the unif ed planning and coordination of important national security matters, and the Central Military Commission that has been instructing and commanding the PLA and the PLA itself. China’s inf uence in the international community has risen not only politically and economically but also militarily, and other countries are closely following China’s moves. In order to allay other countries’ concerns over China, it is becoming more important for China itself to improve the transparency of its national defense policy and military capabilities. It is hoped that China will increase transparency concerning its military affairs by such efforts as disclosing specif c information pertaining to its defense policies and military capabilities. **3** **National Defense Budget** China announced that its national defense budget for FY2015 was approximately 886.9 billion yuan[14, 15]. However, this amount excludes some expenses which were included through the previous f scal year, such as expenses associated with the relocation to the regions. Their addition brings the total to approximately 889.6 billion yuan. This initial budget amount represented a growth of approximately 10.1% (approximately 81.4 billion yuan)[16] compared to the initial budget amount for the previous f scal year. China’s announced national defense budget thus continues to increase at a rapid pace, recording double-digit annual growth nearly consistently from FY1989 to the present[17]. The nominal size of China’s announced national defense budget has grown approximately 41-fold in 27 years since FY1988 and nearly 3.6-fold in 10 years since FY2005. China positions the buildup of defense capabilities as important a task as economic development. It is believed that China continues to invest resources in the improvement of its defense capabilities in tandem with its economic development. 13 For example, some point out that there are an increasing number of cases in which the PLA expresses its position on security issues concerning national sovereignty or maritime interests. On the other hand, others point out that the extent of the military’s involvement in the party’s decision-making process is limited because the number of PLA representatives to key decision-making bodies of the CCP is fewer than in the past. Meanwhile, the PLA has repeatedly stressed “absolute instruction of the forces by the party.” 14 National defense budget within central budgetary expenditures. 15 Converting national defense budgets of foreign countries into another currency simply by applying currency exchange rates does not necessarily reflect an accurate value due to differences in price level. If, hypothetically, China’s national defense budget for FY2015 was converted at a rate of 18 yen per yuan (FY2015 rate that the Japanese government uses for official purposes), this would result in approximately 15,964.2 billion yen. The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) estimates that China’s military expenditures for 2014 were approximately US$191 billion, ranking it second place in the world behind the United States. 16 China announced that the rate of growth for its FY2015 national defense budget is “an increase of approximately 10.1% compared to the previous year.” This is the growth rate calculated by comparing the spending of FY2014 with the initial budget of FY2015. ----- Fig. I-1-3-1 Change in China’s Announced Defense Budget (100 million yuan) (%) 9,000 6,500 6,000 20 5,500 5,000 4,500 15 4,000 3,500 2,500 2,000 1,000 500 Defense Budget (in 100 million yuan) Year-on-year growth rate (%) 89 90 92 94 96 98 00 02 04 06 08 10 12 14 15 (FY) Note: The total defense budget for FY2002 was not disclosed. Discrepancies arise if the disclosed rate and amount of growth are applied to the initial budget of the previous year. Therefore, for FY2002, 168.4 billion yuan was used based on a calculation conducted on the assumption that the disclosed rate and amount of growth represent increases from the actual defense expenditure in FY2001. In addition, it must be noted that the amount of the defense budget announced by China is considered to be only a part of its actual military expenditures[18]. For example, it is believed that the announced defense budget does not include all the equipment procurement costs and research and development (R&D) expenses. See Fig. I-1-3-1 (Change in China’s Announced Defense Budget) bodies would be optimized, that the system of instruction and management of forces would be perfected, that the Central Military Commission’s command structure for joint operations and command system for joint operations in theaters would be developed, and that reforms of joint operation trainings and logistical support mechanisms would be promoted. It is believed that these reforms are aimed at developing a more practical PLA through improving its joint operational capabilities and logistical support capabilities. Although how these reforms will take shape is currently unclear, the developments to come, such as the reforms’ impact on the security of the region including Japan, will be a point to watch out for. **(1) Nuclear and Missile Forces** China has made independent efforts to develop nuclear capabilities and ballistic missile forces since the mid1950s, seemingly with a view to ensuring deterrence, supplementing its conventional forces, and maintaining its voice in the international community. With regard to **4** **Military Posture** China’s military forces are composed of the PLA, the People’s Armed Police Force (PAP)[19], and the militia[20]. It is provided that these bodies be instructed and commanded by the Central Military Commission[21]. The PLA is def ned as a people’s army created and led by the CCP, comprising the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and the Second Artillery Corps (strategic missile force). During the third plenary session of the 18th CCP Central Committee, it was decided that the functions and organizations of the Central Military Commission and other 18 The U.S. DoD’s “Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China” (May 2015) estimates China’s military-related defense spending as having been at least US$165 billion in FY2014. The same report indicates that China’s announced defense budget (US$136 billion) does not include major categories of expenditure such as foreign procurement and R&D expenses. 19 Missions of the PAP include security of party and government, border security, social projects, and firefighting activities. According to China’s National Defense in 2002, “it is to maintain state security and social stability, and assist the PLA in wartime in defense operations.” 20 The militia engages in economic development in peacetime and other activities and has a duty to provide logistical support for combat operations in wartime. China’s National Defense in 2002 explains, “[u]nder the command of military organs, the militia in wartime helps the standing army in its military operations, conducts independent operations and provides combat support and manpower replenishment for the standing army. In peacetime, it undertakes the tasks of performing combat readiness support, taking part in disaster relief efforts, and maintaining social order.” According to a PLA Daily article dated October 9, 2012, “China now has six million primary militia members” as of 2010. 21 Formally, there are two Central Military Commissions—one for the CCP and another for the state. However, both commissions basically consist of the same membership, and both are essentially ----- the nuclear strategy, it is recognized that China employs a strategy where it can deter a nuclear attack on its land by maintaining a nuclear force structure able to conduct retaliatory nuclear attacks on a small number of targets such as cities in the adversary’s country[22]. China possesses various types and ranges of ballistic missiles: intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM); submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM); intermediate-range ballistic missile/medium-range ballistic missile (IRBM/MRBM); and short-range ballistic missile (SRBM). The update of China’s ballistic missile forces from a liquid propellant system to a solid propellant system is improving their survivability and readiness[23]. Moreover, it is believed that China is working to increase performance by extending ranges, improving accuracy, mounting warheads, and by other means. China’s main ICBM strategic nuclear asset had been the f xed-site liquid-fuel DF-5[24]. However, China has deployed the DF-31, which is a mobile type ICBM with a solid propellant system mounted onto a transportererector-launcher (TEL), and the DF-31A, a model of the DF-31 with extended range. According to some analysts, China has already deployed the DF-31A and will increase its numbers[25]. Regarding SLBM, China currently appears to be deploying Jin-class nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) to carry the JL-2, whose range is believed to be approximately 8,000 km, which is currently under development. Once the JL-2 reaches a level of practical use, it is believed that China’s strategic nuclear capabilities will improve by a great margin[26]. As for the IRBM/MRBM covering the Asia-Pacif c region including Japan, China has deployed the solidpropellant DF-21, which can be transported and operated on a TEL, in addition to the liquid-propellant DF-3 missiles. These missiles are capable of carrying nuclear warheads. It is believed that China possesses conventional ballistic missiles with high targeting accuracy based on the DF-21[27], and it has been pointed out that China has deployed conventional anti-ship ballistic missiles (ASBMs), which could be used to attack ships at sea including aircraft carriers. In addition to IRBM/MRBM, China possesses the DH-10 (CJ-10), a cruise missile with a range of at least 1,500 km, as well as the H-6 (Tu-16), bombers that are capable of carrying nuclear weapons and cruise missiles. It is deemed that these missiles will complement ballistic missile forces, covering the Asia-Pacif c region including Japan[28]. Concerning SRBM, China possesses a large number of solid-propellant DF-16, DF-15, and DF-11, and they are believed to be deployed facing Taiwan[29]. It is believed that their ranges cover also a part of the Southwestern Islands including the Senkaku Islands, which are inherent territories of Japan. Furthermore, in order to acquire striking force that will enable penetration of the missile defense shield, China is considered to be developing a hypersonic glide vehicle which is launched by mounting to a ballistic missile. Attention will be paid to the relevant developments[30]. China announced that it had conducted tests on midcourse missile interception technology in January 2010 and 2013. Attention will be paid to China’s future trends in ballistic missile defense[31]. See Fig. I-1-3-2 (Range of Ballistic Missiles from China (Beijing)) 22 The defense white paper “China’s Military Strategy” (May 2015) states that “China has always pursued the policy of no fi rst use of nuclear weapons and adhered to a self-defensive nuclear strategy that is defensive in nature. China...will never enter into a nuclear arms race with any other country.” On the other hand, the U.S. DoD’s “Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China” (May 2015) states that there is some ambiguity over the conditions under which China’s “no first use” policy would or would not apply. 23 For differences between the liquid-propellant system and solid-propellant system, see Part I, Chapter 1, Section 2, Footnote 30. 24 The DF-5 is thought to carry multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles (MIRVs). 25 The U.S. DoD’s “Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China” (May 2015) indicates that China is developing a new road mobile ICBM known as “DF-41,” possibly capable of carrying MIRVs. 26 The annual report (November 2014) of the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission (a bipartisan advisory body established at U.S. Congress to monitor, investigate, and submit a report on U.S. security implications of the trade and economic relationship between the United States and China) states that the JL-2 has already reached initial operational capability allowing for deployment, and that by the end of 2014, a JIN-class SSBN carrying the JL-2 is set to conduct its fi rst patrol. Furthermore, the U.S. DoD’s ”Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China” (May 2015) states that JIN-class SSBNs carrying the JL-2 are expected to conduct nuclear deterrence patrols in 2015. 27 According to the defense white paper “China’s Military Strategy” (May 2015), China identifi es “possessing both nuclear and conventional missiles” as one of the strategies for enhancing the military capabilities of the Second Artillery Force. 28 In its Annual Report of November 2010, the U.S.-China Economic Security Review Commission pointed out, among other items, that China could attack five out of the six main U.S. Air Force bases in East Asia with its normal missiles (ballistic missiles and ground-launched cruise missiles), and also has the ability to target air bases in Guam by enhancing the capability of its bombers. 29 The U.S. DoD’s “Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China” (May 2015) states that as of late 2014, China possessed at least 1,200 SRBMs, including the DF-16. 30 In January, August, and December 2014 (total: 3 times), China reportedly conducted fl ight tests of the hypersonic glide vehicle “WU-14,” which is deemed to travel at ultra-high speed and be diffi cult to intercept by a missile. ----- Fig. I-1-3-2 Range of Ballistic Missiles from China (Beijing) Washington, D.C. London San Francisco North Pole Moscow Hawaii Beijing **2,500 km** New Delhi **2,800 km** Guam **5,400 km** Jakarta **7,200 km** Canberra **11,200 km** **12,000 km** **13,000 km** 1,750–2,500 km Maximum range of DF-21, DF-21A/B/C 2,400–2,800 km Maximum range of DF-3, DF-3A 5,400 km Maximum range of DF-4 7,200–11,200 km Maximum range of DF-31, DF-31A 12,000–13,000 km Maximum range of DF-5, DF-5A Note: The above image shows a simplifi ed indication of the potential reach of each type of missile taking Beijing as a central point. **(2) Ground Forces** The size of the Chinese ground forces is the largest in the world with approximately 1.6 million personnel. Since 1985, China has continuously sought to modernize its armed forces by curtailing the number of personnel and streamlining organizations and systems in order to improve eff ciency. China aims to develop highly capable military forces, while reducing units inferior in equipment and technologies. Specif cally, it is improving mobility by such measures as switching from the past regional-defense model to a nationwide-mobile model, working to motorize and mechanize its infantry. In addition, China is believed to be strengthening its airborne troops (belonging to the Air Force), amphibious forces, and special operations forces and helicopter units. China undertakes efforts to make its military units multifunctional, to build a command system for improvement of its joint operational capabilities and eff cient operations, and carries out reforms to improve its logistical support capabilities. Since “Stride 2009” was conf rmed in 2009, China has carried out “Mission Action” from 2010 through 2013 and “Stride 2014” and “Firepower 2014” in 2014. As such, China has annually conducted mobile exercises that cut across multiple military regions aimed at verifying and improving capabilities necessary for deployment of Army units to distant areas, such as the Army’s longrange maneuvering capabilities[32] and logistical support capabilities, including mobilization of militia and public transportation. Furthermore, the Navy and Air Force reportedly took part in “Mission Action 2013,” suggesting that such exercises are also intended to improve joint operational capabilities. See Fig. I-1-3-3 (Deployment and Strength of the People’s Liberation Army) ----- |Deployment and Strength of the People’s Liberation Army -3-3|Col2|Col3|Col4| |---|---|---|---| |Jinan Military Region Beijing Military Region (Headquarters: Jinan) (Headquarters: Beijing) Lanzhou Military Region (Headquarters: Lanzhou) Shenyang Military Region (Headquarters: Shenyang) 16 Chengdu Military Region 65 (Headquarters: Chengdu) 40 39 38 27 26 North Sea Fleet 21 47 54 20 (Headquarters: 12 Qingdao) 15 1 East Sea Fleet 13 (Headquarters: Ningbo) 14 31 41 Nanjing Military Region Guangzhou Military Region 42 (Headquarters: Nanjing) (Headquarters: Guangzhou) South Sea Fleet (Headquarters: Zhanjiang) Example 1 : First Group Army|Jinan Militar (Headquarter||y Region s: Jinan)| ||||| ||Shenyang Mi (Headquarter|litar s: Sh|y Region enyang)| ||||| Fig. I-1-3-3 Notes: Army and Air Force Military Regions are identical. A Group Army consists of several divisions and brigades and has tens of thousands of personnel. Military Region Fleet Group Army (Army) Airborne Corps (Air Force) headquarters headquarters headquarters headquarters |Col1|Col2|China|Taiwan (Reference)| |---|---|---|---| |Total military forces||Approx. 2.3 million troops|Approx. 290,000 troops| |Ground forces|Group troops|Approx. 1.6 million troops|Approx. 200,000 troops| ||Tanks, etc.|Type-99/A, Type-98/A, Type-96/A, Type-88A/B and others Approx. 7,300 vehicles|M-60, M-48A/H and others Approx. 1,200 vehicles| |Maritime forces|Warships|Approx. 870 vessels / 1,470 thousand tons A|pprox. 410 vessels / 201 thousand tons| ||Destroyers & frigates|Approx. 70 vessels|Approx. 30 vessels| ||Submarines|Approx. 60 vessels|4 vessels| ||Marines|Approx. 10,000 troops|Approx. 15,000 troops| |Air forces|Combat aircraft|Approx. 2,620 aircraft|Approx. 500 aircraft| ||Modern fighters aircraft|J-10 x 294 Su-27/J-11 x 340 Su-30 x 97 (Fourth-generation fighters (total): 731) (|Mirage 2000 x 56 F-16 x 145 F-CK-1 (IDF) x 128 Fourth-generation fighters (total): 329)| |Reference|Population|Approx. 1.370 billion|Approx. 23 million| ||Term of service|2 years|1 year| Source: The Military Balance (2015), etc. **(3) Naval Forces** The naval forces consist of three f eets—the North Sea, East Sea, and South Sea Fleets. The Chinese Navy has approximately 870 ships (including approximately 60 submarines), with a total displacement of approximately 1.47 million tons. The Navy is in charge of maritime national defense and protection of the sovereignty of territorial waters and maritime rights and interests. The Chinese Navy mass produces the indigenous state-of-theart Yuan-class submarines[33], as well as surface combatant ships[34] with improved air defense and anti-ship attack capabilities. In addition, the Navy is increasing the number 33 These submarines are believed to be superior in quietness and to be equipped with an air independent propulsion (AIP) system. By carrying the necessary oxygen in advance, this system allows these submarines to remain submerged underwater for longer periods than previous submarines without accessing atmospheric oxygen by surfacing or other means. 34 For example, in recent years, China is considered to have signifi cantly increased the number of: the Luyang III-class destroyer, a fl eet air defense ship called the “Chinese Aegis” with reinforced radars and a new model of vertical launch system (VLS) that fi res multiple missiles; the Jiangkai II-class frigate called the “mini-Aegis” equipped with VLS, and the Jiangdao-class corvette which is a “light ----- of large landing ships and supply ships. It commissioned a large hospital ship in October 2008. With regard to aircraft carriers, China has renovated the Varyag, an incomplete Kuznetsov-class aircraft carrier purchased from Ukraine. China began trial navigations in August 2011, and named the carrier “Liaoning” and put it into commission in September 2012[35]. Even after the carrier was commissioned, China is thought to be continuing the training of carrier-based aircraft pilots and R&D of necessary technologies, including the development of a domestic carrier based f ghter, J-15, such as takeoff and landing tests on the “Liaoning.” In November 2013, the carrier sailed in the South China Sea for the f rst time and conducted sea trials in this sea area[36]. Some analysts point out that China may also be constructing its f rst domestic aircraft carrier[37]. In view of these developments concerning the strengthening of the naval forces, China likely aims to build capabilities for conducting operations in more distant waters in addition to near sea defense[38]. It is necessary to continue to monitor the development of the Chinese naval forces[39]. **(4) Air Forces** The Chinese Air Force and Navy have approximately 2,620 combat aircraft in total. The number of fourth generation modern f ghters is rising steadily. China imported from Russia and produced under license the Su-27 f ghters, and imported from Russia the Su-30 f ghters equipped with anti-surface and anti-ship attack capabilities. China is also mass-producing the J-11B f ghter, which is allegedly an imitation of the Su-27 f ghter, as well as the domestic J-10 f ghter. Additionally, China is developing the J-20 and J-31, which are said to become next-generation f ghters[40]. China is also making continuous efforts to improve capabilities which are essential for operations of modern air forces by introducing the H-6U tanker and KJ-2000 Airborne Early Warning and Control system. Furthermore, it is reported that China is developing a new Y-20 large cargo aircraft[41] in order to improve its transportation capability. In addition to domestically developing, producing and deploying a variety of aircraft and introducing them from Russia, China is deemed to be domestically developing a variety of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV)[42], including those capable of long-hour f ights at high altitude for reconnaissance and other purposes and those capable of carrying missiles and other weapons for attack purposes. China also appears to be producing and deploying some of these unmanned aircraft. Judging from the modernization of the air forces, it is believed that China is not only improving its air defense capabilities for its national territory, but also aiming to build up capabilities for air superiority and anti-surface and anti-ship attacks in areas which are further distant from China, and improving long-range transportation capabilities[43]. Further attention needs to be paid to these activities conducted by the Chinese air forces. 35 The U.S. DoD’s “Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China” (May 2015) expresses the view that the aircraft carrier “Liaoning” will not enable long-range power projection compared to U.S. aircraft carriers, and will continue to play a role in training. It also notes that the air wing is not expected to embark the carrier until 2015 at the earliest or later. 36 In May 2013, it was reported that the first carrier air wing was officially established in China. 37 The U.S. DoD’s “Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China” (May 2015) states that China will likely build multiple indigenous aircraft carriers over the next 15 years. 38 The U.S. DoD’s “Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China” (May 2015) states that the Navy’s primary area of activity is gradually shifting from the “near seas” to the “far seas.” China’s defense white paper “China’s Military Strategy” (May 2015) also identifi es “offshore waters defense and open seas protection” as a strategy for enhancing the military capabilities of the Navy. 39 According to the defense white paper “China’s Military Strategy” (May 2015), “the traditional mentality that land outweighs sea must be abandoned” and China will aim to “develop a modern maritime military force structure.” As implied by these references, it is deemed that China attaches importance to its maritime strategy. 40 In his testimony at the U.S. Senate Armed Services Committee in February 2011, then-Secretary of Defense Robert Gates stated his view that China had the potential to deploy 50 next-generation fighters equipped with stealth capability by 2020 and 200 fighters by 2025. In January 2011, China successfully conducted its first flight test of the J-20 prototype and created a total of four prototypes by late 2014. A prototype of J-31 was confi rmed at the Zhuhai Airshow in November 2014. 41 On January 26, 2013, the Ministry of National Defense of China announced that for the fi rst time it succeeded in a trial fl ight of the Y-20 large cargo aircraft developed by China. It is believed that since then China has continued to conduct related tests and trial fl ights. 42 During the counter-terrorism joint exercise “Peace Mission 2014” in August 2014, a CH-4 (Cai Hong-4 or Rainbow-4) medium-sized UAV conducted a demonstration bombardment. 43 In April 2014, Xi Jinping, Chairman of the Central Military Commission, visited an Air Force organization and referred to establishing an air force that “builds air-space capabilities and conducts offensive and defensive operations.” The defense white paper “China’s Military Strategy” (May 2015) identifi es “building air-space capabilities and conducting offensive and defensive operations” as ----- **(6) Establishment of Joint Operational Posture** The command structure of the PLA is centered on the Army. In recent years, however, organizational reform has been under way to improve integrated and combined operations capability among the military services. For example, the third plenary session of the 18th CCP Central Committee in November 2013 proposed a government policy to “enhance joint operations capability and reform the command system and organization.” As part of this, in November 2013, China is deemed to have established the “East China Sea Joint Operational Command Center” to jointly operate the Navy and Air Force for such purposes as the effective surveillance of the “East China Sea Air Defense Identif cation Zone”[44]. Some analysts have stated that the CCP also established the “Central Military Commission Joint Operations Command Center” to carry out decision-making at the highest strategic level. Furthermore, China has recently conducted drills aimed at the development of a joint operational posture, as demonstrated by the long-distance mobile exercises which cut across military regions such as “Stride,” as well as the joint exercises conducted among the Army, Navy, Air Force, and other units such as “Mission Action 2013.” It is perceived that the establishment of joint operational command centers, along with the above drills, is intended to further facilitate coordination among the different military services as well as investments across military regions. The relevant developments will be a point to watch out for. **(5) Military Use of Space and Cyber Warfare Capabilities** China is said to have developed its space program the fastest in the world, and may be utilizing space for military purposes. China is considered to be developing directed-energy weapons and satellite jammers in order to restrict and interfere with the use of space-based assets by adversaries in wartime. In addition, China has interest in cyber space. Some have speculated that China is reinforcing its A2/AD capabilities by using cyber attacks to destroy an adversary’s network in the entire region. This can be attributed to the fact that information gathering and command and communication in the military sector, which are vital for swift and eff cient exercise of military strength, increasingly rely on satellites and computer networks. See Part I, Chapter 2, Section 4 (Outer Space and Security); Part I, Chapter 2, Section 5 (Trends in Cyberspace) **5** **Maritime Activities** **(1) General Situation** In recent years, China is believed to be aiming to build up capabilities to conduct operations in more distant waters and airspace. Accordingly, China has rapidly expanded its maritime activities based on sea power and air power, both qualitatively and quantitatively. With regard to its activity in the sea areas and airspace surrounding Japan, Chinese naval vessels[45] and navy and air force aircraft have been observed conducting training exercises, such as carrierbased helicopter f ights and f eet formation and maneuver exercises, as well as information gathering activities. A large number of Chinese government ships and aircraft belonging to maritime law-enforcement agencies[46] have 44 During his regular press conference on July 31, 2014, the spokesperson of the Ministry of National Defense of China was asked whether the “East China Sea Joint Operational Command Center” had been established, and he responded that “Setting up a joint operational command system is the inevitable requirement of joint operations under informationized conditions,” de facto confi rming the Center’s establishment. 45 Examples of the activities of Chinese naval vessels are: a submerged Chinese nuclear-powered submarine navigated in Japan’s territorial waters in breach of international law in November 2004; it was confirmed that a total of five Chinese naval vessels, including one Sovremenny-class destroyer, were sailing near the Kashi gas field (Tianwaitian in Chinese) in the East China Sea and some of them circled around said gas field in September 2005. 46 Surveillance and other activities at sea used to be conducted by “Maritime Police” (Haijing) of the Ministry of Public Security, “China Maritime Surveillance” (Haijian) of the State Oceanic Administration of the Ministry of Land and Resources, “China Fisheries Law Enforcement Command” (Yuzheng) of the Bureau of Fisheries of the Ministry of Agriculture, “Maritime Safety Administration (Haixun)” of the Ministry of Transport, and the maritime anti-smuggling force of the General Administration of Customs, all of which were under the State Council. In March 2013, China decided to reorganize the four agencies, excluding “Maritime Safety Administration” into the new “State Oceanic Administration” and that the new organization would carry out surveillance and other activities under the name of “China Coast Guard (Zhongguo Haijing)” under the guidance of the Ministry of Public Security. In July of that year, the China Coast Guard was formally launched. It is believed that the State Committee of Border and Coastal Defense, under the guidance of the State Council and the Central Military Commission, is coordinating maritime activities by these maritime law-enforcement agencies and the ----- been observed engaging in monitoring activities for the protection of its maritime rights and interests[47]. Such activities by China include those that involve intermittent incursions into Japan’s territorial waters, intrusion into Japan’s airspace, and dangerous acts that could cause unintended consequences, including a Chinese vessel’s direction of a f re control radar at a JMSDF destroyer, the f ight of Chinese military f ghter jets abnormally close to JSDF aircraft, and activities that could infringe upon the freedom of overf ight over the high seas, such as the establishment of the “East China Sea Air Defense Identif cation Zone.” These activities are extremely regrettable, and China is urged to act on the basis of the principle of the “rule of law.” See Part I, Chapter 2, Section3 (Maritime Trends) **(2) Situation of Activities in Japan’s Surrounding** **Sea Areas** Regarding the activities of naval forces, the number of Chinese naval surface vessels advancing to the Pacif c Ocean has increased in recent years, and such advancements are currently conducted routinely. Every year since 2008, Chinese naval f eets have been passing the sea area between the main island of Okinawa and Miyako Island. However, in April 2012, a naval f eet passed the Osumi Strait eastward for the f rst time, and in October of the same year, they navigated the sea area between Yonaguni Island and Nakanokami Island near Iriomote Island northward for the f rst time. In July 2013, Chinese naval f eets passed the Soya Strait eastward for the f rst time. In March 2015, naval f eets navigated the sea area between Amamioshima Island and Yokoatejima Island westward. As such, the Chinese naval f eets’ advancement and homing routes between the East China Sea and the Pacif c Ocean continue to become diverse by incorporating the areas north of Japan, and it is understood that China seeks to improve its deployment capabilities to the open ocean. Furthermore, in October 2013, China conducted “Maneuver 5,” the f rst joint exercise by its three naval f eets in the western Pacif c Ocean. In December 2014, a similar joint exercise involving the three f eets[48] was reportedly conducted. Subsequently, some of the vessels that participated in the exercise transited the Soya and Tsushima Straits to circle Japan. In addition, Chinese naval vessels appear to routinely conduct operations in the East China Sea[49]. After referring to its own position regarding the Senkaku Islands, China alleges that patrols by Chinese naval vessels in the sea areas under its jurisdiction are completely justif able and lawful. In January 2013, a Chinese naval vessel directed f re-control radar at a JMSDF destroyer and is suspected to have directed f re-control radar at a helicopter based on the JMSDF destroyer[50]. With regard to the activities of Chinese government vessels, in December 2008, “China Maritime Surveillance” vessels belonging to the State Oceanic Administration (SOA) of the Ministry of Land and Resources of China hovered and drifted inside Japan’s territorial waters near the Senkaku Islands – operations which are not permitted under international law. In September 2010, Japan Coast Guard patrol vessels and a Chinese f shing trawler collided in Japan’s territorial sea surrounding the Senkaku Islands. Subsequently, in August 2011 as well as in March and July 2012, “China Maritime Surveillance” vessels and “China Fisheries Law Enforcement Command” vessels belonging to then-Bureau of Fisheries of the Ministry of Agriculture of China intruded into Japan’s aforementioned territorial waters[51]. As these examples demonstrate, “China Maritime Surveillance” and “China Fisheries Law Enforcement Command” vessels have gradually intensif ed their activities in Japan’s territorial waters in recent years. Such activities intensif ed considerably and Chinese government vessels began to intrude into the aforementioned territorial waters intermittently after September 2012, when the Japanese government acquired property rights to and ownership of three of the Senkaku Islands (Uotsuri Island, Kitakojima Island, and Minamikojima Island). In April and September 2013, eight Chinese government vessels intruded into the aforementioned territorial waters simultaneously. Since October 2013, the operations of government vessels intended to intrude into territorial waters have become routinized. In this light, an operations manual or other codes may have been developed. China has deployed increasingly larger government vessels to waters near the Senkaku Islands. In February 2015, three over 3,000-ton-class government vessels intruded into Japan’s territorial waters simultaneously for the first time. Additionally, China is proceeding with the construction of the world’s largest 10,000-ton-class patrol vessel. Sovremenny II-class missile destroyer navigating between Amamioshima Island and Yokoatejima Island southwestward (March 2015) 47 Concerning the PLA, there is a view that by turning exception into normality through uniform peacetime and wartime force deployment and exceeding traditional activity spaces, China intends to desensitize the alertness of others and make the international community tolerate and accept changes in the situation (Taiwan’s 2009 National Defense Report). 48 Some news reports call this exercise as “Maneuver 6.” 49 For example, a PLA Daily article dated February 19, 2014 reported that in recent years, the average number of days in a year that a unit in the East Sea Fleet of the Chinese Navy conducted operations exceeded 190 days. 50 See Part I, Chapter 2, Section 3-1 (Trends Related to the “Principle of the Freedom of the High Seas” in the East China Sea and South China Sea) 51 In February 2012, a survey vessel of the Japan Coast Guard conducting a marine survey in Japan’s EEZ was demanded to stop the activity by two “China Maritime Surveillance” ships that belong to ----- Fig. I-1-3-4 Recent Chinese Activities in Waters near Japan (The wakes shown are an illustration) and “China Fisheries Law Enforcement Command” April 2010: 10 vessels including Kilo-class submarines and Sovremenny-class The following Chinese Navy vessels sailed to the Pacific Ocean through destroyers sailed through the waters off the west coast of Okinotori Island waters between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Guam - Four vessels (November 2008) - Six vessels (March 2010) June 2009: Five vessels including a Luzhou-class destroyer sailed - Two vessels (July 2010) - Eleven vessels (June 2011) through the waters off the northeast coast of Okinotori Island - Six vessels (November 2011) - Four vessels (February 2012) - Seven vessels (October 2012) - Four vessels (November 2012) Vessels sailed through the Osumi Strait - Three vessels (January 2013) - Three vessels (May 2013) - Three in an eastward direction (April 2012) - Two vessels (August 2013) - Five vessels (October 2013) - Three in an eastward direction (June 2012) - Three vessels (March 2014) - Two vessels (May 2014) - Two in a westward direction (June 2013) - Three vessels (June 2014) - Two vessels (February 2015) - Three in an eastward direction (August 2013) - Three in a westward direction (June 2014) - Five vessels (May 2012) - Four vessels (March 2013) - Five in an eastward direction (December 2014) Okinotori - Three vessels (December 2013) - Three vessels (March 2014) October 2008: Four vessels including a Island - Seven vessels in a northward direction (October 2012) Sovremenny-class destroyer sailed through the - Four vessels in a north-eastward direction (December 2012) Tsugaru Strait and then took a southward direction - Two vessels in a south-eastward direction (May 2013) through the Pacific Ocean and circled around Japan - Two vessels in a north-eastward direction (October 2013) - Four vessels in a north-eastward direction (March 2014) January 19, 2013: A Jiangkai-I class frigate is suspected to have directed fire-control radar at a The following incidents also occurred in helicopter based on the JMSDF destroyer in the the South China Sea: East China SeaJanuary 30, 2013: A Jiangwei-II class frigate directed its fire-control radar at a JMSDF destroyer Tokyo Okinawa April-June 2012: Chinese and Filipinoships confronted each otherMay-July 2014: Chinese and Vietnamese ships confronted each other July 2013: Five vessels including Luzhou-class destroyers sailed through the Soya Strait Taipei South China Sea December 2014: Four vessels including Luzhou-class destroyers navigated the Soya Strait westward Sea of Japan East China Sea Around the Senkaku IslandsSince December 2008, Chinese law enforcement agencies’ ships have intruded into Japan’s territorial waters Since September 2012, the ships mentioned above have intermittently intruded into Japan’s territorial waters In March 2015, two vessels including a Sovremenny-class Ningbo destroyer advanced in a southwestward direction, transiting Amami Oshima Island and Yokoatejima Island Zhanjiang Qingdao The United States National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration: ETOPO1 In October 2012, vessels of the East Sea Fleet of the Change in the Number of Scrambles against Chinese Navy, along with “China Maritime Surveillance” Fig. I-1-3-5 Chinese Aircraft vessels, conducted a joint exercise with a focus on maintaining and defending China’s territorial sovereignty and maritime interests. Furthermore, the Navy is believed to be supporting maritime law enforcement agencies both in terms of operation and equipment. For example, the Navy is thought to have handed over retired Navy vessels to the China Coast Guard[52] that was formally launched in July 2013. In 2014, the Navy and the China Coast Guard conducted a coordinated drill. Also, the Navy and the Maritime Safety Administration conducted the joint drill “Poseidon 2014.” See Fig. I-1-3-4 (Recent Chinese Activities in Waters near Japan) **(3) Situation of Activities in Japan’s Surrounding** **Airspace** In recent years, activities by Chinese Navy and Air Force aircraft, which appear to be activities for gathering information about Japan of some form, have been observed frequently. The number of scrambles by the JASDF against Chinese aircraft is also increasing dramatically[53]. With regard to the activities of air forces in the airspace above the East China Sea, Chinese aircraft have been diversifying their f ight patterns. Multiple H-6 bombers (Times) 500 450 400 350 300 250 200 150 100 50 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 (FY) in September 2007 and a Y-8 early warning aircraft in March 2010 f ew into Japan’s Air Defense Identif cation Zone (ADIZ) above the East China Sea and advanced near the Japan-China median line. In March 2011, a Y-8 patrol aircraft and Y-8 intelligence gathering aircraft crossed the Japan-China median line and approached within approximately 50 km of Japan’s airspace near the Senkaku 52 See Part I, Chapter 1, Section 3, Footnote 46 ----- Fig. I-1-3-6 Recent Chinese Activities in Airspace near Japan (The fl ight paths shown are an illustration) Flew to the Pacific Ocean through airspace between the main island of Okinawa and Miyako Island Guam - a “Y-8” (airborne early warning) (July 2013) - two “H-6” (bomber) (September 2013) Tokyo - two “Y-8” (airborne early warning) & two “H-6” (bomber) (three consecutive days, October 2013) - a “Y-8” (intelligence-gathering aircraft) & two “H-6” (bomber) November 2013, the establishment of the (March 2014) “East China Sea Air Defense Identification Okinawa - two “Y-8” (airborne early warning), a “Y-9” (intelligence-gathering Zone” was announced aircraft) & two “H-6” (bomber) (December 6, 7, 10, and 11, 2014) - a “Y-9” (intelligence-gathering aircraft) (two consecutive days, East China Sea February 2015) - two “H-6” (bomber) (May 2015) December 2012, fixed wing aircraft, which May and June 2014, over the East China belongs to the State Oceanic Administration, Sea, two “Su-27” (fighter) came near violated the airspace for the first time collision with MSDF’s and ASDF’s aircraft Taipei “Su-30” (fighter), “J-11” (fighter) & “KJ-2000” Ningbo (airborne early warning) etc., flew within the The following aircraft flew: “East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone” - a “Tu-154” (intelligence-gathering aircraft) (two consecutive days, November 2013) (announcement by the Chinese side) - a “Tu-154” (intelligence-gathering aircraft ) & a “Y-8” (intelligence-gathering aircraft) (November 2013) - a “Tu-154” (intelligence-gathering aircraft) (February 2014) The United States National Oceanic and - a “Tu-154” (intelligence-gathering aircraft) (March 2014) Atmospheric Administration: ETOPO1 Qingdao Islands. In 2012, China intensif ed the activities of its aircraft, including f ghters. In January 2013, the Chinese Ministry of National Defense made public the fact that Chinese military aircraft regularly conducted warning and surveillance activities and that Chinese f ghters conducted activities believed to be Combat Air Patrols (CAP) in the East China Sea. In addition, in the same Chinese defense white paper, the phrase “air vigilance and patrols at sea” was added for the f rst time. On November 23, 2013, the Chinese government announced that it established the “East China Sea ADIZ” including the Senkaku Islands which China described as if they were a part of China’s “territory,” and that the Chinese Armed Forces would take “defensive emergency measures” in the case where aircraft does not follow the relevant rules set forth by the Chinese Ministry of National Defense[54]. On the same day, a Tu-154 intelligence gathering aircraft and a Y-8 intelligence gathering aircraft f ew over the East China Sea, respectively. The Chinese Air Force announced that it conducted its f rst patrol f ight since the establishment of the ADIZ. Subsequently, the Chinese Armed Forces announced on November 28 that its KJ-2000 Airborne Early Warning and Control system and Su-30 and J-11 f ghters conducted patrol f ights in the ADIZ, and announced on the following day that its Su-30 and J-11 f ghters scrambled. On December 26, 2013, the Chinese Armed Forces announced that in the one month that passed since the establishment of the ADIZ, a total of 87 reconnaissance aircraft, early warning aircraft and f ghters were mobilized to the relevant airspace. In March and April 2011 and in April 2012, Chinese helicopters and other aircraft that appeared to belong to the SOA f ew close to JMSDF destroyers which were engaged in monitoring and surveillance in the East China Sea[55]. Further still, in May and June 2014, two Su-27 f ghters of China f ew abnormally close to the aircraft of JMSDF and JASDF that were conducting routine monitoring and surveillance activities in the East China Sea[56]. The Chinese Ministry of National Defense announced that JSDF aircraft conducted dangerous acts against Chinese aircraft. However, the operations of JSDF aircraft were legitimate activities in compliance with the international law. There is no truth to the Chinese assertion that JSDF aircraft carried out dangerous acts. With respect to air forces’ advancement into the Pacif c Ocean, it was conf rmed for the f rst time by the JASDF’s scrambling f ghters that a Y-8 early warning aircraft and a H-6 bomber f ew through the airspace between the main island of Okinawa and Miyako Island and advanced to the Pacif c Ocean in July and September 2013, respectively. Similar f ights were conducted by two Y-8 early warning aircraft and two H-6 bombers (total: four aircraft) on three consecutive days in October of the same year, by one Y-8 intelligence gathering aircraft and two H-6 bombers (total: three aircraft) in March 2014, by two Y-8 early warning aircraft, one Y-9 intelligence gathering aircraft, and two H-6 bombers (total: f ve 54 See Part 1, Chapter 2, Section 3-1 (Trends Related to the “Principle of the Freedom of the High Seas” in the East China Sea and South China Sea) 55 For example, on March 7 2011, a Chinese Z-9 helicopter believed to belong to the SOA flew as close as approximately 70 m and as low as approximately 40 m above the water around the Japanese destroyer Samidare, which was patrolling the waters in the central area of the East China Sea. On April 12, 2012, an incident occurred in which a Y-12 aircraft, believed to belong to the SOA flew as close as approximately 50 m and as low as approximately 50 m above the water around the destroyer Asayuki. ----- aircraft) on December 6, 7, 10, and 11, 2014, by one Y-9 intelligence gathering aircraft on two consecutive days in February 2015, and by two H-6 bombers in May 2015. As such activities demonstrate, China has been further intensifying the activities of its aircraft[57]. Regarding Japan’s airspace over and around the Senkaku Islands, in December 2012, a Chinese aircraft, namely, a f xed-wing aircraft belonging to the SOA, violated this territorial airspace for the f rst time. Since then, f xed-wing aircraft belonging to the SOA have been frequently observed f ying near the airspace[58]. See Fig. I-1-3-5 (Change in the Number of Scrambles against Chinese Aircraft); Fig. I-1-3-6 (Recent Chinese Activities in Airspace near Japan) Y-9 intelligence gathering aircraft fl ying through the airspace between the main island of Okinawa and Miyako Island and advancing to the Pacifi c Ocean (December 2014) Note: This photo has been enlarged for better viewing. vessel navigating in the South China Sea. In August 2014, a PLA f ghter is alleged to have f own abnormally close to and intercepted a U.S. Forces aircraft. It is also reported that Chinese naval vessels f red warning shots at f shing boats of neighboring countries. Furthermore, in recent years, there has been growing friction between China and its neighboring countries over the South China Sea, as illustrated by protests by Vietnam and the Philippines against China’s activities in these waters, including land reclamation on the features. China has pressed ahead with rapid and large-scale land reclamation works in seven features in the Spratly Islands[59, 60]. On some of them, it is considered that China is building infrastructure including runways and ports, which has raised concerns among the international community, including the United States[61]. Among them, Fiery Cross Reef has become the largest feature in the Spratly Islands, surpassing Itu Aba Island that was formerly the largest feature. Presently, China is thought to be building a 3,000 m-long runway there. Furthermore, on Subi Reef where China started large-scale land reclamation work in early 2015, analysts have speculated that reclaimed land has already become large enough to accommodate another runway as of April 2015. See Part I, Chapter 1, Section 6 (Southeast Asia); Part I, Chapter 2, Section 3 (Maritime Trends) Additionally, Chinese naval vessels have advanced into the Indian Ocean. Since December 2008, Chinese naval vessels have been navigating in the Indian Ocean and advanced into the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden to take part in international anti-piracy efforts. In 2010 and 2013, a Chinese Navy’s hospital ship carried out “Mission Harmony,” a medical service mission, to assist countries, including countries off the coast of the Indian Ocean. Furthermore, from the end of 2013 to the beginning of 2014, the Chinese Navy’s Shang-class nuclear submarine reportedly conducted operations in the Indian Ocean. **(4) Situation of Activities in the South China Sea and** **Indian Ocean** China has also been intensifying its activities in the South China Sea, including waters around the Spratly Islands and the Paracel Islands, over which territorial disputes exist with neighbors, including some ASEAN member states. In March 2009 and December 2013, a Chinese naval vessel and other vessels approached and intercepted a U.S. Navy 57 On March 30, 2015, the spokesperson of the PLA Air Force announced that Air Force aircraft transited the Bashi Channel, between Taiwan and the Philippines, and conducted their fi rst training in airspace over the West Pacifi c. On May 21, 2015, the same spokesperson announced that for the fi rst time PLA Air Force aircraft fl ew through the airspace between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island and conducted training in airspace over the West Pacifi c. 58 There are also reports that China is constructing a heliport and radar installations on the Nanji Islands facing the East China Sea. 59 The seven features are: Johnson South Reef; Cuarteron Reef; Gaven Reefs; Hughes Reef; Fiery Cross Reef; Mischief Reef; and Subi Reef. 60 The U.S. DoD’s “Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China” (May 2015) states that “[a]s of late December 2014, China had reclaimed about 500 acres (about 2 km[2]) of land” and that China may build “harbors, communications and surveillance systems, logistics support, and...airfi eld.” At the time of this annual report’s release, a U.S. DoD offi cial noted that the area of land reclaimed by China totals about 2,000 acres (about 8 km[2]). This would mean that the size of the reclaimed area nearly quadrupled in roughly four months. On April 29, 2015, in regard to a comment concerning rising international concern over China’s land reclamation, the spokesperson of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China stated that a few ASEAN countries such as the Philippines and Vietnam have illegally occupied the islands of the Spratly Islands and are undertaking large-scale construction work to build airports and other fi xed facilities. Indeed, according to the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) of the United States, Vietnam carried out land reclamation in two locations in the South China Sea from 2010 to April 2015, stating that Vietnam added about 65,000 m[2] to West London Reef and about 21,000 m[2] to Sand Cay. However, as U.S. Vice President Biden noted in his address at the commencement of the U.S. Naval Academy on May 22, 2015, China’s land reclamation is not nearly on the scale comparable to what other countries are doing. 61 As regards U.S. concerns, for example, in March 2015, then-U.S. Pacifi c Fleet Commander Harry Harris expressed concern, referring to China’s land reclamation in the South China Sea as “a great wall of sand.” On May 16, 2015, U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry held talks with Minister of Foreign Affairs Wang Yi of China and stated “we are concerned about the pace and scope of China’s land reclamation in the South China Sea.” On May 30, at the 14th Shangri-La Dialogue (Asia Security Summit), U.S. Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter stated that the United States was “deeply concerned” about China’s land reclamation, saying it has generated tension in the region, and called for “an immediate halt” to land reclamation. At the same meeting, Sun Jianguo, Deputy Chief of General Staff of the PLA stated that such land reclamation on the features in the South China Sea falls “well within the scope of China’s sovereignty “ and that these activities meet the “necessary defense needs” in addition to such objectives as maritime search and rescue and disaster prevention and relief. In addition, the Deputy Chief asserted that “the situation in the South China Sea is on the whole peaceful and stable, and there has never been an issue with the freedom of navigation in the South China Sea.” As regards the concerns of the international community, for example, the ASEAN Chairman’s Statement adopted in April 2015 states, “we share the serious concerns,” on the land reclamation being undertaken on the features in the South China Sea. On May 26, 2015, EU President Donald Tusk criticized China over its land reclamation on the features in the South China Sea, stating that “construction activities on the sea” “will make it much more diffi cult to solve the problem” in the region. Furthermore, at the G7 Summit held in Elmau, Germany on June 7-8, 2015, a Leaders’ Declaration was released stating that, “[w]e strongly oppose...any unilateral actions ----- Fiery Cross Reef where reclamation work is progressing quickly (left: as of August 14, 2014; right: as of March 18, 2015) [CSIS Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative/DigitalGlobe] From September to October 2014, a Song-class submarine conducted operations in the Indian Ocean and is deemed to have called at a port in Colombo, Sri Lanka, twice in the same year. This marked the f rst time that a Chinese submarine entered port abroad[62]. Also in 2014, a Chinese naval vessel is said to have advanced into the Indian Ocean from the Sunda Strait and conducted trainings. As such examples demonstrate, the Chinese Navy has improved its capacity to execute operations in more distant waters, including the Indian Ocean. **(5) Objectives of Maritime Activities** Taking into consideration such factors as the situation of the development of Chinese naval and air forces, situation of activities in sea areas and airspace, statements in defense white papers, China’s geographical location and economic globalization, the maritime activities of the Chinese Navy, Air Force and other organizations are considered to have the following objectives. The f rst one is to intercept operations by adversaries in waters and airspace as far as possible from China in order to defend its territory, territorial waters and territorial airspace. Behind this objective is an increase in effectiveness of long-range attacks due to recent progress in science and technology. The second objective is to develop military capabilities to deter and prevent Taiwan’s independence. China maintains that it will not allow any foreign intervention in solving the Taiwan issue and realizing the unif cation of China. In order for China to try to prevent foreign intervention into Taiwan surrounded by the sea in all directions through China’s use of force, it needs to enhance its military operational capabilities at sea and airspace. The third objective is to weaken the control of other countries over the islands to which China claims territorial sovereignty, while strengthening the claim of its territorial sovereignty, through various surveillance activities and use of force at sea and in airspace surrounding the islands. The fourth objective is to acquire, maintain, and protect its maritime rights and interests. China is engaged in oil and gas drilling as well as building facilities and surveying for the drilling in the East China Sea and South China Sea. The government has conf rmed that in addition to its existing platforms, China has been building a new offshore platform on the Chinese side of the Japan-China median line of the East China Sea since June 2013. Japan has repeatedly lodged protests against China’s unilateral development and demanded the termination of such work[63]. The f fth objective is to defend its sea lanes of communications. In the background is the fact that its sea lanes of communications, including its crude oil transportation routes from the Middle East, are extremely important for the globalizing Chinese economy. The question of which parts of its sea lanes of communication the Chinese Navy deems it should defend depends on such factors as the international situation at the time. However, given the recent strengthening of the Chinese Navy and Air Force, it is believed that they will develop a capacity to 62 On September 25, 2014, the spokesperson of the Ministry of National Defense of China formally admitted for the fi rst time that a Chinese submarine called at a port in Colombo, Sri Lanka. 63 With regard to resource development in the East China Sea, in September 2010, China unilaterally announced postponement of the negotiation to conclude an international agreement with Japan for implementing the so-called “June 2008 Agreement.” While the negotiation has not been resumed yet, it is pointed out that China is highly likely carrying out gas production in the Kashi gas field ----- defend areas going beyond the waters near China. Given these objectives and recent trends in China’s activities in sea areas and airspace, it is believed that China plans to further expand the sphere of its maritime activities, and further intensify its operations in waters surrounding Japan, including the East China Sea and the Pacif c Ocean, as well as the South China Sea and the airspaces over these seas areas. Therefore, more attention needs to be paid to activities such as operations of naval vessels as well as Navy and Air Force aircraft, various surveillance operations near Japan, developments of facilities that serve as bases for these activities[64], and evolution of China’s interpretation regarding the nature and scope of rights in China’s exclusive economic zones (EEZs) and other areas[65]. Meanwhile, in recent years, China has shown interest in taking steps to avoid and prevent unexpected situations at sea. For example, in April 2014, China, together with other countries such as Japan and the United States, agreed to the Code for Unplanned Encounters at Sea (CUES), which sets forth the standards of behavior in the case that the naval vessels or aircraft of the Western Pacif c Naval Symposium (WPNS) member states have unexpected encounters. In September 2014, Japanese and Chinese defense authorities agreed in principle to resume consultations to swiftly begin the implementation of the Maritime and Air Communication Mechanism, which China had not agreed to since September 2012. Based on the achievements made at the Japan-China Summit Meeting in November 2014, the fourth Joint Working Group meeting was held in January 2015[66]. In November 2014, President Obama and President Xi Jinping announced that they agreed on two conf dencebuilding measures[67] in order to lower the risk of unintended incidents between the United States and China. promote its national interests overseas, as well as China’s intent to raise its stature by demonstrating its will to fulf ll its responsibilities to the international community. China states that it consistently supports and actively participates in U.N. PKO. According to the Ministry of National Defense of China, it has sent more than 30,000 military personnel to U.N. PKO. According to the U.N., as of late April 2015, China has deployed a total of 2,899 personnel, civilian police off cers, and military observers to U.N. PKO, including the United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS). Thus, China demonstrates certain presence in U.N. PKO. It is deemed that China’s proactive attitude towards U.N. PKO is partly due to China’s wish to strengthen its relations with the regions where PKO is conducted, particular with African nations, through these activities. Furthermore, as its f rst mission in distant waters, the Chinese Navy has dispatched vessels to the coast of Somalia and the Gulf of Aden since December 2008 in order to escort Chinese and other ships. The Chinese Navy is hence improving its capacity to continuously execute naval operations in more distant waters, demonstrating that China is placing a greater emphasis on protecting its sea lanes of transportation. In view of the deteriorating situation in Libya, China carried out an evacuation operation of Chinese nationals from the country from February through March 2011. In this operation, China dispatched a naval frigate and transportation aircraft of the Air Force to Libya in addition to private chartered aircraft. This is the military’s f rst participation in an evacuation operation of Chinese nationals living overseas. In addition, from November to December 2013, China dispatched a hospital ship to conduct medical relief activities in the Philippines. From March to September 2014, China dispatched a Navy vessel, Air Force transport aircraft, among other assets for the search of the Malaysian airliner that went missing in March 2014. In December 2014, a Chinese Navy vessel helped supply water in Malé, the capital city of the Maldives. In response to the Ebola virus disease outbreak in West Africa, China conducted assistance centered on medical assistance, including the dispatch of units to Sierra Leone and Liberia to help f ght Ebola[68]. Furthermore, from March to April 2015, based on the worsening situation in Yemen, **6** **International Military Activities** In recent years, the PLA has begun emphasizing nontraditional security missions such as peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, and anti-piracy. In order to carry out these missions, it has actively dispatched its units overseas. It is believed that in the background of the PLA’s stance on international military activities is the expansion of China’s national interests beyond its national borders, which in turn increased its necessity to protect and 64 China is reportedly constructing a large-scale naval base that has underground tunnels for nuclear-powered submarines in the city of Sanya located in the southern tip of Hainan island. Experts point out that the base is in a strategically important location that secures access to the South China Sea, as well as the western Pacific, and that China is advancing construction work in order for the base to play a role as a major hub of the South Sea Fleet, including for the deployment of aircraft carrier. 65 It is pointed out that, in recent years, China aims to limit military activities of other countries in coastal areas of China’s EEZs by employing its own interpretations of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). For instance, the Chinese government announced in a statement by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on November 26, 2010 that it is opposed to unsanctioned military activities by any country in coastal areas of China’s EEZs. 66 Since 2008, Japanese and Chinese defense authorities have conducted three rounds of consultations. In June 2012, the two sides agreed to hold regular meetings, set up a hotline, and establish a “maritime communication mechanism” to allow for direct communication between vessels and aircraft. The purpose was to deepen mutual understanding and mutual trust, strengthen defense cooperation, avoid unexpected incidents, and prevent unexpected situations at sea and in airspace from developing into military confrontations or political issues. At the fourth Joint Working Group meeting, the two sides agreed to change the name of the mechanism to “Maritime and Air Communication Mechanism” to clarify that aircraft are included. 67 The fi rst measure concerns mutual notifi cation of military activities, and the second measure concerns rules of behavior to avoid incidents at sea and in airspace. 68 China’s assistance for the Ebola response has garnered international praise. Meanwhile, some note that China is manufacturing the generic of the anti-infl uenza drug Avigan tablet that is hoped to ----- the Chinese Navy’s counter-piracy forces docked at the ports of Aden, Al Hudaydah, and elsewhere, and engaged in operations for the evacuation of Chinese nationals and foreign nationals, including one Japanese national, living in Yemen. It has been pointed out that through such activities, China aims to build a pacif st and humanitarian image of its military forces and to demonstrate, both domestically and internationally, its intent to place priority on military operations other than war, as well as its desire to prove the ability to project its military power to distant locations. other than war (MOOTW), education in knowledge and expertise required for informatization, simulated training of high-tech weapons and equipment, network training, and training in complex electromagnetic environments where electronic interference occurs, in addition to joint exercises by different services. In the education spectrum, the PLA aims to develop military personnel versed in science and technology. In 2003, it launched a human resource strategy project to develop human resources capable of directing joint operations/ informatized operations and of building informatized armed forces. The project has a goal of achieving a big leap in the development of military personnel to 2020. In recent years, the PLA appears to be increasing its wage standards. It is believed that its objective is to secure highly capable human resources. Moreover, in 2000, in order to recruit highly capable and highly educated people, the military started a system where it provides scholarships for civilian college students and then allows them to enter the military as commissioned off cers after graduation. On the other hand, in recent years, a variety of issues have been raised in relation to benef ts, including remuneration, the personnel development system, and the treatment of veterans[70]. China has been developing a mobilization system with a view to effective use of civilian resources in the case of war and other emergencies. In February 2010, China enacted the National Defense Mobilization Law, which is the basic law for wartime mobilization, and in July of the same year, put the law into effect. In November 2014, China enacted and immediately entered into force the Counter-Espionage Law, which is the revised National Security Law, in order to strengthen China’s counter-espionage arrangements. China is also expected to develop other legislation, such as the CounterTerrorism Law currently in deliberation. Attention will be paid to the specif c steps that advance the “rule of law” presented at the fourth plenary session of the 18th CCP Central Committee in 2014. **7** **Education and Training** In recent years, the PLA has conducted practical exercises including large-scale exercises such as joint exercises of the Army, Navy, and Air Force, actual troop confrontation exercises, landing exercises, and exercises that cut across military regions, as well as night-time exercises and joint exercises with other countries in order to strengthen its operational capabilities. The goal of “being able to f ght and winning battles” was repeatedly mentioned in statements addressed to the military by General Secretary Xi Jinping as well as in the military training instructions given by the general staff. This is construed as evidence that the military is promoting implementation of more practical exercises[69]. The whole PLA military training conference in 2006 emphasized promotion of a shift from military training under the conditions of mechanization to military training under the conditions of informatization. The new Outline of Military Training and Evaluation, in effect since 2009, highlights training for military operations **8** **National Defense Industry Sector** While China imports highly sophisticated military equipment and parts that it cannot produce domestically from other countries such as Russia, China is believed to place emphasis on their indigenous production. The country manufactures much of its military equipment domestically 69 The 2015 military training instructions continued to promote practical trainings. In addition, they pursued the realization of military governance based on law, showing that the “rule of law” element presented at the fourth plenary session of the 18th CCP Central Committee in 2014 was refl ected. 70 The report “China’s Incomplete Military Transformation” (February 2015) by the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission and the RAND Corporation identifi es the weaknesses of the PLA as the following: (1) Organizational structure (e.g., party-military relations); (2) Organizational culture (e.g., corruption); (3) Force structure (size of the PLA, recruitment system, veteran’s benefi ts); ----- and actively carries out R&D of new equipment. China’s national defense industry sector appears to be making advances due to the improvement of private industry infrastructures accompanying economic growth, use of dual technologies, the absorption of foreign technologies, as well as its own efforts. The sector serves the role of supporting the strengthening of Chinese military forces[71]. Growth in the Chinese defense industry was once hindered by ineff ciency caused by excessive secrecy and other factors. However, in recent years, reform of the defense industry has progressed. Under the State Administration of Science, Technology and Industry for National Defense (SASTIND) of the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology, a department of the State Council, China has formed ten corporations to develop and produce nuclear weapons, missiles, rockets, aircraft, vessels, and other conventional weapons. In doing so, China promotes, in particular, two-way technological exchanges where military technologies are utilized for developing the national economy, and, in turn, civilian technologies are absorbed for a buildup of national defense. As a result, specif cally, the technologies of the defense industry have contributed to the development of civilian space exploration, the aviation industry, and the shipbuilding industry. Furthermore, China encourages and supports international cooperation and competition in dual-use industries. China is thus thought to have interest in absorbing foreign technologies through dual-use industries. **3** **Relations with Other Countries** are thought to include alleviating other countries’ concerns regarding China by strengthening its relations with these countries, creating a favorable security environment for China, enhancing China’s inf uence in the international community, securing stable supplies of natural resources and energy, and building foreign bases. China is believed to consider military exchanges as a strategic means to safeguard its national interests, and as such, to position military exchanges as an element in China’s overall diplomatic strategy. Moreover, in the f eld of international f nance, China has established the New Development Bank BRICS and is preparing to establish AIIB. **1** **General Situation** China, particularly over maritime issues where its interests conf ict with others’, continues to act in an assertive manner, including coercive attempts at changing the status quo, and is poised to fulf ll its unilateral demands without compromise. In addition, China has acted to create its unique international order. In May 2014, President Xi Jinping criticized military alliances and proposed “the security of Asia by the people of Asia” at CICA. Furthermore, China has proposed to build a “New Model of Major-Country Relations” with the United States[72], and calls on the United States to respect China’s “core interests.” Some have speculated that through this concept, China attempts to have the United States accept the partitioning of U.S. and Chinese interests in the Asia-Pacif c. On the other hand, China recognizes that a peaceful and stable international environment is necessary for maintaining sustainable economic development and enhancing China’s overall national power. Based on such recognition, in its relationships with other countries, China proactively carries out military exchanges including reciprocal visits by senior military off cials and joint military exercises. In recent years, China has been engaged in dynamic military exchanges not only with major powers such as the United States and Russia and with its neighboring countries including Southeast Asian countries, but also with countries in Africa and Latin America. At the same time, the objectives of China’s promotion of military exchanges **2** **Relations with Taiwan** China upholds the principle that Taiwan is a part of China, and that the Taiwan issue is therefore a domestic issue. The country maintains that the “one-China” principle is the underlying premise and foundation for discussions between China and Taiwan. China also claims that it would never abandon its efforts for peaceful unif cation, and expresses that it would take up policies and measures to solve issues of Taiwanese people’s interest and to protect their due authority. Meanwhile, China is strongly opposed to any foreign intervention in the unif cation of China as well as any move towards the independence of Taiwan, and on this basis, has repeatedly stated that it has not renounced the use of force. The Anti-Secession Law, enacted in March 2005, clearly lays out the non-renunciation of the use of 71 The U.S. DoD’s “Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China” (May 2015) states that China’s advanced technology acquisition strategy continues to rely on the acquisition of advanced and Western dual-use technology, components, equipment, and know-how. 72 “New Model of Major-Country Relations” dates back to 2012, when then-Vice President Xi Jinping visited the United States and utilized the term during his talks with President Obama. China explains ----- military force by China[73]. Ma Ying-jeou (Kuomintang), re-elected in the presidential election in January 2012, continues to advocate, in his second term, a policy of pursuing Taiwanese economic development by expanding economic exchanges with China and the status quo rather than independence. As exemplif ed by the entry into force of the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA), the bilateral relationship is deepening primarily along the economic realm. In February 2014, the Minister of the Taiwan Affairs Off ce of the State Council of China and the Minister of the Mainland Affairs Council of Taiwan held the f rst ministerial meeting between China and Taiwan in Nanjing. However, the Kuomintang suffered a crushing defeat in the nine-in-one local elections in November 2014, and this may have implications on China-Taiwan relations. On the security front, while China urges that the two countries make contact and hold exchanges over military issues at an appropriate time in order to explore the creation of mechanisms for building mutual trust over military security, Taiwan has shown a cautious stance, stating that the conditions are not yet met[74]. Regarding the Senkaku Islands, China and Taiwan have their own assertions[75], and Taiwan has expressed reluctance to work with China. Attention will be paid to trends of political dialogues, including on military affairs, as well as to trends in the future relations between China and Taiwan in the lead-up to the next presidential election in 2016. the two countries. At the same time, the United States calls on China to uphold international rules and norms on global issues, including maritime security, international trade, and human rights, and states that it would continue to closely monitor China’s military modernization and expanding presence in Asia[76]. Conversely, China seeks to establish what it calls a “New Model of MajorCountry Relations” based on mutual respect and “winwin” cooperation. However, the United States and China have not necessarily reached a consensus on what this relationship exactly entails[77]. Regarding the Senkaku Islands, the United States has reiterated that the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty applies to the islands[78]. China protested, stating that it would never accept any word or deed that includes the islands within the scope of the treaty (statement by a spokesperson of China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 2010). With regard to the issues over the South China Sea, the United States has noted on various occasions that it would take action to settle the dispute fairly and peacefully and to safeguard the principle of freedom of navigation in the high seas[79]. China and the United States have deepened military exchanges and conducted various policy dialogues. China has dispatched observers to U.S. military exercises, and joint drills have been conducted between the Chinese and U.S. navies on mutual port visits. A military hotline between the defense departments of the two countries was set up in April 2008. In November 2013, the U.S. and Chinese armies conducted a humanitarian assistance and disaster relief exercise. In addition, from June 2014, Chinese navy vessels participated in the Rim of the Pacif c Exercise (RIMPAC) for the f rst time. However, while China wishes to develop relations between the Chinese and U.S. militaries, it asserts that there are a number of issues that must be resolved in order to realize the sound development of the relations. The issues include U.S. arms sales to Taiwan, activities of U.S. military vessels and aircraft within China’s EEZs, legal hurdles in mutual military exchanges, and a lack of strategic trust in China on the part of the United States[80]. In addition, some unstable facets have been observed in **3** **Relations with the United States** There are various outstanding issues between the United States and China, such as human rights in China, the Taiwan issue, and trade issues. However, since a stable U.S.-China relationship is essential for China to develop its economy, it is believed that China will continue to aspire to maintain stable relations with the United States. The United States states that it welcomes the rise of a stable, peaceful, and prosperous China, and that it will continue to further deepen cooperative relations between 73 The law stipulates, “[in] the event that the ‘Taiwan independence’ secessionist forces should act under any name or by any means to cause the fact of Taiwan’s secession from China, or that major incidents entailing Taiwan’s secession from China should occur, or that possibilities for a peaceful reunification should be completely exhausted, the state shall employ non-peaceful means and other necessary measures to protect China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity.” 74 For China’s stance, see the remarks made by then-CCP General Secretary Hu Jintao at the discussion on December 31, 2008, commemorating the 30th anniversary of the announcement of the Message to Compatriots in Taiwan. For Taiwan’s stance, see the “Quadrennial Defense Review” (QDR) released by the Ministry of National Defense of Taiwan on March 13, 2013. 75 Taiwanese authority vessels intruded into Japan’s territorial waters near the Senkaku Islands three times in 2012. 76 U.S. National Security Strategy (February 2015) 77 The United States is cautious on the concept of the “(New Model of) Major-Country Relations” that describes the United States and China as having an “equal” and “special” relationship. The United States has shown intent not to utilize the term “core interests” and align itself with China’s unilateral assertions. 78 In April 2014, President Obama became the fi rst U.S. President in history to clearly state that Article 5 of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty applied to the Senkaku Islands. 79 For example, on May 22, 2015, U.S. Vice President Biden stated the following in his address at the commencement ceremony of the U.S. Naval Academy: “In the disputed waters of the South China Sea, the United States does not privilege the claims of one nation over another. But we do – unapologetically – stand up for the equitable and peaceful resolution of disputes and for the freedom of navigation.” 80 According to remarks by then-Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission (CMC) Xu Caihou in a meeting with then-U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates (October 2009). Deputy Chief of the PLA General Staff Department Ma Xiaotian stated at the 11th round of the U.S.-China Defense Consultative Talks held in December 2010 that U.S. arms sales to Taiwan, U.S. laws that impose restrictions on contacts between the military forces of the two countries, and the frequent military reconnaissance operations conducted by U.S. naval vessels and aircraft in coastal areas of China’s ----- military exchanges of the two countries. For example, China notif ed suspensions of the major military exchanges with the United States when the U.S. DoD notif ed Congress of possible arms sales to Taiwan in October 2008 and January 2010. On the other hand, the United States maintains that China’s military development, lack of transparency of the decision-making process, and other issues raise questions about its future conduct and intentions. It asserts that U.S.-China relations must be undergirded by a process of enhancing conf dence and reducing misunderstanding. For this reason, with regard to military exchanges, it is believed that the aim of the United States is to improve the current situation, wherein such exchanges are frequently suspended once problems arise, and to build relations that are capable of maintaining more stable channels of decision-making for mutual understanding. In recent years, for instance, Strategic Security Dialogues have been established in 2011 in the U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogues, and these dialogues have been held annually. **4** **Relations with Russia** Since the China-Soviet confrontation ended in 1989, both countries have placed importance on their bilateral relationship. The deepening of the “strategic partnership” between China and Russia, which was established in the mid-1990s, has been emphasized. In 2001, the ChinaRussia Treaty of Good-Neighborliness and Friendly Cooperation[81] was concluded. Subsequently, in 2004, the long-standing issue of border demarcation between the two countries came to a settlement. The two countries have a common view on promoting the multipolarization of the world and the establishment of a new international order. In addition, economic motives including their currency swap agreement, collaboration on high-speed railway, multiple investment framework agreements, and natural resource and energy supply through the construction of a natural gas pipeline have further deepened the relations between them in recent years. On the military front, since the 1990s, China has purchased modern weapons from Russia, including f ghters, destroyers, and submarines. Russia is currently the largest supplier of weapons to China. Meanwhile, some point out that their trade amounts have been on the decline in recent years due to the advancement of indigenous weapon production in China. However, China has reportedly shown strong interest in continuing to import advanced equipment, such as Russia’s Su-35 f ghter and S-400 surface-to-air missile[82]. It is also pointed out that Russia, which shares a land border with China, has a policy of not supplying sophisticated weapons to China that would cause a threat to Russia. Furthermore, Russia is said to have concerns about competing with China in arms exports. China and Ukraine have deep ties in the f eld of arms procurement, as indicated by China’s purchase from Ukraine its unf nished Kuznetsov-class aircraft carrier “Varyag,” which became the basis of the aircraft carrier “Liaoning.” In this regard, attention will also be paid to the situation in Ukraine. China-Russia military exchanges include regular visits by senior military off cials. In addition, joint military 81 Regarding the military field, this treaty mentions military confidence building or strengthening of mutual troop reductions in border areas, military cooperation such as military technical cooperation, and holding discussions in the event that there is awareness of any threat to peace. 82 China and Russia reportedly reached an agreement on S-400 surface-to-air missile imports. Meanwhile, China is alleged to be plagiarizing and copying Russia’s military and science technology, including uniquely redesigning the J-11B fi ghter based on the Russian-made Su-27 fi ghter. Some suggest that Russia harbors deep dissatisfaction and concerns over China, and is cautious about ----- exercises are conducted, such as the large-scale joint naval exercise, “Naval Interaction,” in the Yellow Sea, the Sea of Japan off the coast of Vladivostok, northern East China Sea, and the Mediterranean Sea in April 2012, July 2013, May 2014, and May 2015, respectively[83]. It is believed that through these exchanges the two countries can deepen mutual understanding and build conf dence between their military forces, and China can learn operational methods of Russian weapons and military operational doctrines. In 2015, an agreement was reached that the leaders of both countries would attend each other’s events commemorating the 70th anniversary of World War II victory[84]. In May, President Xi Jinping attended the ceremony marking the 70th anniversary of Russia’s victory in the Great Patriotic War held in Moscow, and the PLA participated in the military parade. visited Brunei, Thailand and Vietnam. While China has deepened its economic and cultural cooperation with ASEAN member states through diplomatic forums, more recently, it has proactively advanced cooperation in the area of national security by enhancing exchanges of military personnel such as mutual visits of their senior military off cials and exchanges and cooperation between military departments. **(2) Relations with Central Asian Countries** The Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, located in the western part of China, is situated next to Central Asia. It shares borders with the three countries of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan, and has ethnic minorities settled in the areas straddling borders. Naturally, the region hosts lively exchanges between the people of those countries. Therefore, China is deeply concerned about the political stability and security situations in Central Asian states such as terrorism by Islamic extremists. Chinese engagement in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), which was established in June 2001, is viewed as an indication of China’s concerns in such areas. Moreover, China is strongly interested in the abundant energy and natural resources of Central Asia, with a view to diversifying its supply source and procurement methods of these resources. China promotes cooperation in the energy f eld with Central Asian countries, such as the construction of oil and natural gas pipelines between China and Central Asian nations. **5** **Relations with Other Countries** **(1) Relations with Southeast Asian Countries** As for its relations with countries in Southeast Asia, China has continuously developed bilateral relations with the countries through active mutual top-level visits and other means. For example, China has had good relations with Myanmar and has assisted in developing Myanmar’s infrastructure such as pipelines for petroleum or natural gas, ports, and railroads. It also has supplied key military equipment. Some point out that this close relationship is associated with Myanmar’s location which provides China the shortest access to the Indian Ocean[85]. Meanwhile, China’s drilling in the oil and gas f elds in the Paracel Islands in May 2014 has escalated tension between China and Vietnam. Similarly, China and the Philippines have ongoing disputes over the Scarborough Shoal, Second Thomas Shoal, and other areas. Some ASEAN countries have shown alarm over China’s advancements in the South China Sea. China is actively involved in multilateral frameworks such as ASEAN Plus One (China), ASEAN Plus Three (Japan, China and the ROK), and the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). In October 2013, President Xi Jinping visited Indonesia and Malaysia, and Premier Li Keqiang **(3) Relations with South Asian Countries** China has traditionally maintained an extremely close relationship with Pakistan, and mutual visits by their leaders take place frequently[86]. It is believed that, as illustrated by the joint development of the JF-17 f ghter, their cooperation in the military sector, including exporting weapons and military technology transfer, is also deepening. As the importance of sea lanes increases for the globalizing Chinese economy, it is believed that the importance of Pakistan is rising for China. This is partly because of the geopolitical features of Pakistan, namely, it faces the Indian Ocean. China and India have an unsettled border, and it is 83 China and Russia conducted their fi rst large-scale joint military exercise in China’s Shandong Peninsula and other locations in August 2005. In addition, the counter-terrorism joint exercise Peace Mission was carried out among SCO member states in August 2007, July 2009, September 2010, June 2012, July to August 2013, and August 2014. 84 The announcement was made by the spokesperson of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China during a regular press conference on February 6, 2015. 85 Some observers also believe that Myanmar is attempting to end its excessive dependence on China in terms of diplomacy. 86 In April 2015, Xi Jinping made the fi rst offi cial visit to Pakistan as a Chinese President in nearly nine years. During the summit meeting, Xi Jinping underscored China’s intention to build a ChinaPakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) and strengthen their security cooperation. China identifi es CPEC, which starts from the port of Gwadar in Pakistan, as a fl agship project of the “One Belt, One Road” ----- deemed that “problems” over this area have arisen between the two countries even in recent years[87]. On the other hand, China has recently striven to improve its relationship with India, while also paying consideration to maintaining balance with Pakistan. Identifying China’s relationship with India as a strategic partnership, the leaders of the two countries actively conduct mutual visits. It is believed that the deepening of bilateral relations is attributed to the importance China places on the economic growth of both countries as well as China’s response to strengthening U.S.-India relations. In recent years, China has also proceeded to deepen its relations with Sri Lanka. China constructed a deep sea port in Hambantota. In addition, the Chinese and Sri Lankan governments are jointly carrying out a port city development project in Sri Lanka’s major city of Colombo. However, President Maithripala Sirisena who won the election in January 2015 criticized excessive dependence on China and noted on strengthening relations with Japan, the United States, India, among other countries. Sri Lanka is thus expected to pursue balanced foreign relations, and attention will be on the future of China-Sri Lanka relations. Regarding military exchanges, China has conducted a variety of joint exercises with Pakistan and India since 2003, including joint naval search and rescue exercises. **(4) Relations with EU Countries** For China, the European Union (EU) countries are now as important a partner as Japan and the United States, especially in the economic f eld. China, through diplomatic opportunities, strongly requests EU countries to lift their arms embargoes against China which have been imposed since the Tiananmen Square incident in 1989[88]. Regarding information technology, avionics, and air independent propulsion (AIP) systems for submarines and other areas, EU member countries possess more advanced technologies than China or Russia which exports weapons to China. Therefore, if the EU arms embargo on China were lifted, the weapons and military technologies of EU countries would transfer to China and would be utilized as a bargaining chip to gain the edge in weapons transactions with Russia. For this reason, Japan has consistently expressed to the EU its objection to the lifting of the arms embargo on China, as well as requested EU member states to carry out more rigorous management of the exports of arms, dual-use goods, and their technologies to China. Continuous attention will need to be paid to future discussions within the EU. **(5) Relations with Middle East and African Countries,** **Pacific Islands, and Central and South American** **Countries** China has been enhancing its relations with Middle Eastern and African nations in the economic realm, including providing active assistance for their infrastructure development and investment in their resource and energy development, and has been further expanding its inf uence in the region. In recent years, not only interactions among state leaders and senior military off cials but also arms exports and exchanges between military forces are actively conducted[89]. Behind these moves, some see China’s intention to ensure a stable supply of energy and natural resources and to secure overseas hubs in the future[90]. Furthermore, China has strengthened its engagement in the region, actively sending personnel to U.N. PKO missions in Africa and dispatching a group of public health experts to Sierra Leone and Liberia to respond to the Ebola virus disease outbreak. China has also been boosting its relations with the Pacif c islands. It has been developing oil, natural gas, and cobalt mines in Papua New Guinea and has signed an agreement on military cooperation with the country. Proactive and continual economic assistance has also been implemented to other islands. Furthermore, military exchanges are being promoted with Fiji and Tonga[91]. China has striven to further deepen its relations with Central and South American countries. Chinese senior military off cials have continuously visited countries, such as Argentina and Brazil. In 2011, the Chinese Navy’s hospital ship conducted a medical service mission in this region. In January 2015, China and the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC) held their f rst ministerial meeting. 87 According to a press conference by the spokesperson of the Ministry of National Defense of China in August 2013. In September 2014, when President Xi Jinping visited India, Prime Minister Modi expressed concern over the PLA’s cross-border activities in this area and underscored the need for the resolution of the issue. 88 For example, in November 2010, then-Chinese President Hu Jintao visited France, and on this occasion, China and France announced a joint statement that included text supporting the lifting of the arms embargoes against China. It is deemed that some EU countries have positive opinions about the lifting of their arms embargoes against China. 89 On February 6, 2015, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China announced the establishment of a permanent mission to the African Union (AU). 90 In May 2015, President Ismail Omar Guelleh of Djibouti revealed that the country and China were negotiating on the establishment of a Chinese military base in the port of Djibouti. ----- including Venezuela and Bolivia. Some experts claim that China transfers weapons in order to strengthen its strategic relationships with allies, enhance its inf uence in the international community, and secure energy and natural resources. Some observers point out that China supplies weapons to countries that struggle with democracy or have human rights problems[92]. Attention will be paid to whether China will increase the transparency of international weapons transfer in response to the concerns of the international community. **4** **Military Capabilities of Taiwan** reportedly stated that the transformation into all-volunteer forces would not be feasible until 2016. At the same time, the Taiwanese armed forces attribute importance to the introduction of advanced technologies and improvement of joint operational capabilities. Additionally, in light of the serious damage that occurred from the typhoon in August 2009, the Taiwanese armed forces identify disaster prevention and relief as one of their major missions. With regard to Taiwan’s military power, at present, ground forces, including the Navy Marine Corps, have a total of approximately 215,000 personnel. In addition, it is believed that approximately 1.66 million reserve personnel of the air, naval, and ground forces would be available in case of war. Regarding naval capabilities, in addition to Kidd-class destroyers which were imported from the United States, Taiwan possesses relatively modern frigates and other vessels. Regarding air capabilities, Taiwan possesses F-16 A/B f ghters, Mirage 2000 f ghters, Chingkuo f ghters, among other assets. **6** **International Transfer of Weapons** China’s arms export total has surpassed its arms import total since 2010. China has expanded provision of weapons such as small arms, tanks, and aircraft to developing countries in Asia, Africa, and other areas. Specif cally, it is reported that the main recipients are Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Myanmar, while weapons are also being exported to African countries such as Morocco, Tanzania, Nigeria, and Egypt as well as Central and South American countries **1** **Relations with China** Under President Ma Ying-jeou, based on the basic policy of “no unif cation, no independence, and no use of force,” Taiwan has made clear that it would not advocate independence and has adopted a collaborative stance towards China. In particular, Taiwan and China have seen their economic relations deepen. However, from March to April 2014, students against the approval of the Cross-Strait Service Trade Agreement staged the Sunf ower Student Movement and occupied the Legislative Yuan. Amid rising dissatisfaction with the government, the ruling party Kuomintang suffered a crushing defeat to the Democratic Progressive Party in the nine-in-one local elections in November 2014. In the lead-up to the next presidential election in 2016, attention will be paid to the outcome of Taiwan-China relations. **2** **Military Capabilities of Taiwan** Taiwan, under the guidance of building the “hard rock” defense advocated by President Ma Ying-jeou, identif es prevention of war, homeland defense, response to contingencies, deterrence of conf ict, and regional stability as the strategic objectives, and takes the military strategy of “resolute defense and credible deterrence.” Taiwan, for improved expertise of its military personnel and other purposes, aims to transform its armed forces currently consisting of drafted personnel and volunteers into all-volunteer forces, while reducing the total forces from 275,000 to 215,000 personnel by the end of 2014. However, the Ministry of National Defense **3** **Military Balance between China and Taiwan** While China has continued to increase its defense budget by a signif cant margin, Taiwan’s defense budget has remained mostly unchanged for nearly 20 years. As of 2014, China’s announced defense budget was roughly 13 times larger than Taiwan’s defense budget[93]. In view of the fact that the PLA is enhancing its missile, naval, and air forces, the Taiwanese military believes it still needs to modernize its equipment. The U.S. DoD has notif ed Congress of possible arms sales to Taiwan based on the Taiwan Relations Act[94]. However, Taiwan also wishes 92 It has been confi rmed that Chinese-made equipment (FN-6 portable air defense missile system) were among the weapons utilized by ISIL. 93 This fi gure was obtained by comparing China’s announced FY2014 defense budget of approximately 808.2 billion yuan and Taiwan’s announced FY2014 defense budget of approximately 311.1 Taiwan dollars by converting them into U.S. dollars using the exchange rate for FY2014 released by the Central Bank of Taiwan (US$1 = 6.1434 yuan = 30.368 Taiwan dollars). China’s actual defense budget is reportedly larger than the amount announced, and therefore, the actual difference in the defense budgets of China and Taiwan could be greater. 94 Recently, the U.S. DoD notifi ed Congress of possible sales to Taiwan of Patriot PAC-3 surface-to-air missiles and AH-64D attack helicopters in October 2008, possible sales of PAC-3 missiles, UH-60 helicopters, Osprey-class mine hunters, and other assets in January 2010, possible arms sales including equipment necessary to upgrade F-16A/B fi ghter aircraft in September 2011, and possible ----- to purchase the F-16C/D f ghter, conventional-powered submarine, and other arms from the United States, and attention will be paid to the future developments. Taiwan also promotes the independent development of military equipment. The Tien Kung II surface-to-air missiles and Hsiung Feng II anti-ship missiles are deployed, and it is believed that the Hsiung Feng IIE cruise missiles are being developed in order to acquire long-range attack capabilities, while the Tien Kung III surface-to-air missiles are being developed in order to ensure the capabilities to deal with ballistic missiles. Furthermore, in order to counter large vessels, including aircraft carriers, Taiwan is moving to induct a new model of indigenous stealth high-speed missile ships mounted with Hsiung Feng II supersonic antiship missiles. The military capabilities of China and Taiwan are generally characterized as follows: 1) Regarding ground forces, China possesses an overwhelming number of troops; however, their capability of landing on and invading the island of Taiwan is limited. Nevertheless, China is making efforts to improve its landing and invasion capabilities in recent years, such as building large landing ships. 2) Regarding naval and air forces, China, which overwhelms Taiwan in terms of quantity, has also been steadily strengthening its naval and air forces in recent years in terms of quality, where Taiwan had superiority over China[95]. 3) Regarding missile attack capabilities, Taiwan has been strengthening its ballistic missile defense, including upgrading PAC-2 to PAC-3 and newly inducting PAC-3. China possesses numerous short-range ballistic missiles and other assets with a range that covers Taiwan. Taiwan is deemed to have few effective countermeasures. In addition to the size of forces and performance and quantity of military equipment, a comparison of military capabilities should take into account various factors such as the objectives and characteristics of envisioned military operations, the operational posture, prof ciency in military personnel, and logistics. Nevertheless, as China is rapidly strengthening its military power, the overall military balance between China and Taiwan is shifting in favor of China. Attention must be paid to the strengthening of both the Chinese and Taiwanese military capabilities and U.S. weapon sales to Taiwan. See Fig. I-1-3-7 (Changes in Taiwan’s Defense Budget); Fig. I-1-3-8 (Changes in Modern Fighter Aircraft of China and Taiwan) Fig. I-1-3-7 Changes in Taiwan’s Defense Budget Changes in Modern Fighter Aircraft of China Fig. I-1-3-8 and Taiwan China (Su-27/J-11, Su-30, J-10) Taiwan (Ching-kuo, F-16, Mirage2000) (Number of Aircraft) 750 700 650 600 550 500 450 400 350 300 250 200 150 100 50 0 91 93 95 97 99 01 03 05 07 09 11 12 13 (100 million Taiwan dollars) 4,000 3,500 3,000 2,500 2,000 1,500 1,000 500 (%) 30 25 20 15 10 5 0 –5 –10 Defense Budget (in 100 million Taiwan dollars) Year-on-year growth rate (%) 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15 (FY) Source: “National Defense Reports,” Ministry of National Defense of Taiwan, etc. 14 15 (Year) Source: Military Balance (of respective years) 95 China has 731 fourth-generation fi ghters, whereas Taiwan has 329. In addition, China has about 70 destroyers and frigates and about 60 submarines, whereas Taiwan has about 30 and 4, ----- **Section 4 Russia** **1** **General Situation** Under President Vladimir Putin who reassumed off ce in May 2012, Russia, having allegedly completed the phase of revival and strengthening, sets an agenda of constructing a prosperous Russia, and at the same time, attaches importance to becoming an inf uential power underpinned by its new position of economic, cultural, and military power[1]. “The collapse of the Soviet Union was a major geopolitical disaster of the 20th century”[2]. President Putin, who made this remark, aims to realize the concept of the Eurasian Union[3] encompassing the areas of the former Soviet Union. The President has made clear Russia’s adversarial stance against the West, noting that the West is responsible for the crisis in Ukraine, and that the West exercises inf uence directly or indirectly on the former Soviet Union countries that Russia considers are under its sphere of inf uence[4]. In response to the increasingly tense situation in Ukraine since February 2014, President Putin instructed the mobilization of the Russian Armed Forces on the pretext of guarding their facilities in Crimea and other purposes. Russia asserts the legitimacy of its position, stating that the “annexation” of Crimea in March 2014 was a decision made by the Autonomous Republic of Crimea through a “referendum” and was “fully legal”[5]. These unilateral acts by Russia had the effect of boosting the approval rating of the President. In regard to the situation in eastern Ukraine where confrontations have continued between the Ukrainian forces and separatist armed groups since April 2014, Western and other countries have noted that there was clear and direct intervention by the Russian Armed Forces, whereas Russia has consistently denied the presence of the Russian Armed Forces in eastern Ukraine. At the same time, Russia faces a severe economic situation due to the effects of the falling prices of crude oil – Russia’s key export, as well as the depreciation of Russia’s currency the ruble, and the economic sanctions by the West and other countries in response to the situation in Ukraine. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, Ukraine is thought to have collaborated on the development of Russia’s intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM). Analysts have suggested that the suspension of Ukraine’s technical support following the deterioration of bilateral relations may impair the operations of Russian equipment which rely heavily on Ukraine. Under these circumstances, attention is on how President Putin, while maintaining his power base, will deal with Russia’s diplomatic isolation and economic hardships as well as promote economic structural reforms and measures aimed at the modernization of Russia’s military forces[6]. **2** **Security and Defense Policies** interests of Russia, and Russia expresses vigilance over the U.S. plan to deploy a missile defense system (MD) in Europe as well as the movement of NATO’s military infrastructure closer to the Russian border. As for national defense, Russia cites as challenges a shift to a new military structure by increasing the number of permanent readiness units[7] and improving organizational and military alignment, while maintaining the capabilities of its strategic nuclear forces. The Russian Federation Military Doctrine, established in February 2010 as a document substantiating the principles **1** **Basic Posture** Approved in May 2009, the “National Security Strategy of the Russian Federation until 2020” sets out the objectives and strategic priorities of domestic and foreign policies. The National Security Strategy construes that Russia’s inf uence has been strengthened by a policy of promoting the multipolarization of the world and using the latent capabilities of Russia. The unilateral approach to the use of force and confrontation of major countries in international relations are listed as having a negative impact on the Annual State of the Nation Address by President Putin (December 2012). Annual State of the Nation Address by President Putin (April 2005). In an article in the Izvestia dated October 4, 2011, then-Prime Minister Putin proposed the creation of a “Eurasian Union” that would strengthen intraregional economic partnerships founded on the Customs Union and the Common Economic Space. Annual State of the Nation Address by President Putin (December 2014). Annual State of the Nation Address by President Putin (December 2014). In an interview with the Russian media in March 2015, President Putin stated that he instructed the Ministry of Defence to mobilize special operation forces, the naval infantry, and the airborne troops in Crimea on the pretext of strengthening the security of the Russian Armed Forces’ facilities in Crimea. In his campaign platform papers published after January 2012, then-Prime Minister Putin listed his policies: expanding the public’s participation in politics; prevention of corruption; strengthening of domestic industries by exiting the resource-dependent economy to modernize the economy; and development of a middle class that plays a leading role in the society. The permanent readiness units have been created by reorganizing troops in the midst of a military forces reduction after the launch of the Russian Armed Forces. By concentrating personnel, combat ----- of the National Security Strategy in the military sphere, was revised in December 2014 against the backdrop of foreign policy factors, including the increasingly tense situation in Ukraine. The new military doctrine states the existing view that while the probability of an outbreak of a large-scale war is decreasing, military risks to Russia are increasing, including the expansion of NATO, the movement of NATO’s military infrastructure closer to Russia’s borders, and the establishment and deployment of strategic MD systems. In addition, the doctrine expresses growing alarm, def ning the following as new military risks: NATO’s military buildup; the realization of the U.S. Global Strike concept; rise of global extremism (terrorism); inauguration of governments in neighboring countries that carry out policies threatening Russia’s interests; and the incitement of ethnic, social, and religious confrontations in Russia. The doctrine continues to regard nuclear weapons as an essential component for preventing the outbreak of nuclear wars and wars that use conventional weapons. It claims that Russia maintains a suff cient level of nuclear deterrent capacity and reserves the right to use nuclear weapons in response to an event where nuclear or other weapons of mass destruction are to be used against it or its allies or under circumstances wherein conventional weapons have been used against it and where the survival of the country itself is imperiled. Furthermore, defending Russian interests in the Arctic was newly added as one of the military’s tasks in peacetime. the country aims to achieve troop reduction in order to maintain an adequate troop level of one million personnel by 2016[9]. Since December 2010, Russia reorganized its six military districts into four military districts (Western, Southern, Central and Eastern Districts). On this basis, Russia established a joint strategic command in each military district and is carrying out integrated operations of its entire military forces, such as the ground force, naval force, and air force under the control of the Military District Commander. In December 2014, the new Joint Strategic Command in charge of the Arctic became operational[10]. Regarding the modernization of the military forces, based on the State Armaments Program (GPV: Gosudarstvennaya Programma Vooruzheniya) 2011-2020 that appeared to have been approved by the President by the end of 2010, Russia intends to further modernize its equipment and invest about 20 trillion rubles (about 46 trillion yen) to increase its percentage of new equipment up to 70%[11] by 2020. Regarding the professionalization of the military forces, in order to make the combat readiness of the permanent readiness units effective, Russia promotes the introduction of a contract service system which selects personnel through contracts from the conscripted military personnel. However, further review has been under way due to the diff culties in securing personnel because of such problems as high turnover rate and f nancial constraints[12]. Russia has continued to increase its defense budget, even as spending cuts are made across the board due to **2** **Military Reform** Russia has implemented full-scale military reform since 1997 by presenting the three pillars of reform: downsizing; modernization; and professionalization. Moreover, based on the policy statement, “Future Outlook of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation,” that was approved by then-President Dmitry Medvedev in September 2008, Russia is advancing measures to modernize the Russian Armed Forces, including troop reductions, structural reforms (from the division-based command structure to a brigade-based one[8]), strengthening of combat readiness, and the development and introduction of new equipment. Regarding the downsizing of the military forces, 8 The command structure is reorganized from the four-tiered structure of military district–army–division–regiment, to a three-tiered structure of military district– operational command–brigade. This was supposed to be completed in December 2009, but in May 2013 the Guards Tamanskaya Motorized Rifle Division and the Guards Kantemirovskaya Tank Division, which had supposedly been reorganized into brigades under Minister of Defence Anatoliy Serdyukov, were restored and participated in a victory parade. 9 It was decided that the total military force would be limited to 1 million people as of 2016 by an executive order in December 2008 (about 1.13 million people as of 2008). 10 While Joint Strategic Command had been established in each military district, the new Joint Strategic Command was formed on the basis of the Northern Fleet and does not entail the creation of a new military district. 11 In his campaign platform paper on national defense policy published in February 2012, then-Prime Minister Putin indicated that he would strengthen military power, including nuclear force, aerospace defense, and naval power by spending about 23 trillion rubles (about 43 trillion yen) in ten years. 12 Reasons behind the promotion of the contract service system may include a decrease of the population suitable for military service and the shortening of the conscription period (from January 2008, the conscription period has been shortened to 12 months). At the Expanded Meeting of the Defence Ministry Board in December 2014, Minister of Defence Sergei Shoigu stated that personnel adequacy was 90.5% and contracted soldiers totaled about 295,000. The Regulation on the Military Service was amended in January 2015, enabling nationals who are not citizens of countries as ----- the recent severe economic situation. Russia is expected to continue its efforts to build up the capacity of conventional forces and maintain the strategic deterrence capability provided by nuclear weapons, at least for the time being[13]. See Fig. I-1-4-1 (Russia’s Defense Budget) **3** **Military Posture and Trends** Russia’s military force is derived not only from the Russian Armed Forces, but also from forces such as the Border Troops of the Border Service of the Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation (FSB) and the Interior Troops of the Ministry of the Interior of the Russian Federation. The Russian Armed Forces have three services (forces) and three independent corps (units): ground force; naval force; air force; strategic-rocket unit; aerospace defense forces[14]; and airborne unit[15]. See Fig. I-1-4-2 (Location and Strength of Russian Military) Fig. I-1-4-1 Russia’s Defense Budget 30 25 20 15 10 30,000 25,000 20,000 15,000 10,000 5,000 |lion rubles)|Col2|Col3| |---|---|---| |Defense Budget (in 100 million rubles)||| ||Defense Budget (in 100 million rubles)|| ||Year-on-year growth rate|| |||| |||| |||| |||| |||| 11 12 13 14 15 (FY) Note: Offi cial fi gures announced by the Russian government pursuant to the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty concluded with the United States[16]. Russia is working to accelerate the development and introduction of new weapons following the policy to prioritize the modernization of nuclear forces based on its GPV. In March 2011, Russia started the deployment of the RS-24, which is thought to be a multi-warhead version of the Topol-M ICBM[17]. In January 2013, “Yuri Dolgoruky,” the f rst of the Borey-class nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBN), which are believed to carry the new-type SLBM Bulava, was delivered to the Northern Fleet. “Alexander Nevsky,” the second of the SSBNs, and “Vladimir Monomakh,” the third of the SSBNs, were delivered to the Pacif c Fleet in December 2013 and December 2014, respectively. These SSBNs are scheduled to be brought to the Pacif c Ocean in the near future[18]. In October 2013, a surprise inspection designed to validate the combat readiness of strategic nuclear units was implemented under the control of President Putin, involving two ICBMs, two SLBMs, and live f ring of three air-launched cruise missiles (ALCMs) from long-range bombers. In May 2014 also, a f eld training exercise was conducted including one ICBM and two SLBMs as well as live f ring of six ALCMs[19]. **1** **Nuclear Forces** Russia emphasizes its nuclear forces to secure its global position, to strike a balance with the nuclear forces of the United States and to supplement its inferiority in conventional forces. It is thus believed that Russia is working to maintain the immediate readiness of its nuclear force unit. Russia still possesses ICBM, submarine launched ballistic missiles (SLBM), and long range bombers (Tu-95 Bears and Tu-160 Blackjacks) following only the United States in scale. Russia is obligated to reduce strategic nuclear arms 13 According to the FY2015-2017 budget plan of the Russian Federation which President Putin signed in December 2014, the FY2015 defense budget increased 33% from the previous fi scal year to 3.2868 trillion rubles. In January 2015, Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry Rogozin stated that the GPV 2016-2025 expenditures may be similar to or slightly lower than that for the GPV 2011-2020. The FY2015 defense budget approved by the Federal Assembly is 3.1168 trillion rubles. 14 At the Expanded Meeting of the Defence Ministry Board in December 2014, Minister of Defence Shoigu identifi ed the creation of aerospace forces as one of the priority tasks to be executed in 2015. 15 Three Air Assault Brigades which belonged to the ground forces were incorporated into the airborne unit in November 2013. 16 In April 2010, Russia and the United States signed the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty to replace the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty I (START I), and the treaty came into force in February 2011. Each side is obligated to reduce deployed strategic warheads to 1,550 and their deployed delivery platforms to 700 within seven years after the entry into force of the treaty. In April 2015, the United States announced that Russia’s deployed strategic warheads was 1,582 and their deployed delivery platforms was 515 as of March 1, 2015. 17 In March 2011, the fi rst regiment of RS-24 missiles was operationally deployed in the division in Teykovo, Ivanovo oblast in northeast Moscow. At the Expanded Meeting of the Defence Ministry Board in December 2014, Minister of Defence Shoigu stated that three rocket regiments equipped with RS-24 were put on combat duty in 2014. In addition, it is believed that Russia is developing a new heavy ICBM that can destroy robust ICBM launch sites and mount a large number of warheads, the light-weight mobile solid-fuel RS-26 Rubezh ICBM, as well as new warheads aimed at enhancing the capability to penetrate missile defense. Rubezh is scheduled to be deployed to Irkutsk in 2015. 18 Eight Borey-class SSBNs plan to be built by 2020. The test launches of the Bulava started in September 2005. Through November 2014, 22 test launches have been conducted, 14 of which have been successful. While the test launch of the Bulava from “Alexander Nevsky” in September 2013 is deemed to have failed due to problems with the missile’s nozzle, the same test launch was conducted successfully in September 2014. 19 Under the leadership of President Putin, an exercise of strategic nuclear units, said to be the largest in recent years, took place in October 2012. The objective of the exercise was to assess the automated communication management system and the new command algorithms for strategic nuclear forces through the integrated action of all the components of strategic nuclear systems. The exercise involved one ICBM and one SLBM and the firing of four ALCMs. Surprise inspections are exercises designed to assess the combat readiness of the various service commands by ordering ----- |Location and Strength of Russian Military Fig. I-1-4-2|Col2| |---|---| |Fig. I-1-4-2 Location and Strength of Russian Military|| |Northern Joint Baltic Fleet Kaliningrad Northen Flee Severomorsk Black Sea Fleet Sevastopol (in Ukraine) Western Military (Western Joint Strategic (HQ: Saint Petersb Caspian Flotilla Astrankhan Centra (Central J (H Southern Military District (Southern Joint Strategic Command) (HQ: Rostov-on-Don) The United States Geological Survey: GTOP30; and the United States|Strategic Command t District Command) urg) Eastern Military District (Eastern Joint Strategic Command) (HQ: Khabarovsk) l Military District oint Strategic Command) Q: Yekaterinbung) Pacific Flotilla Vladivostok National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, National Geophysical Data Center: ETOP01| Russia Total military forces Approx. 770,000 troops Ground troops Approx. 260,000 troops Ground T-90, T-80, T-72, etc. Approx. 2,600 forces Tanks (Not including mothballed tanks. Approx. 20,100 including mothballed tanks) Warships Approx. 960 vessels Approx. 1,968,000 tons Aircraft carriers 1 vessel Cruisers 5 vessels Maritime Destroyers 14 vessels forces Frigates 31 vessels Submarines 64 vessels Marines Approx. 20,000 troops Combat aircraft Approx. 1,410 aircraft 188 MiG-29 aircraft 32 Su-30 aircraft 150 MiG-31 aircraft 18 Su-33 aircraft Modern fighter aircraft 220 Su-25 aircraft 46 Su-34 aircraft 199 Su-27 aircraft 25 Su-35 aircraft Air forces (4th generation fighter aircraft: Total 878) 16 Tu-160 aircraft Bombers 62 Tu-95 aircraft 63 Tu-22M aircraft Population Approx. 142.50 million Reference Term of service 1year (In addition to conscription, there is a contract service system) Source: The Military Balance 2015, etc. ----- As for non-strategic nuclear forces, Russia scrapped ground-launched short- and intermediate-range missiles with a range of between 500 and 5,500 km by 1991 in accordance with the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty with the United States, and removed tactical nuclear weapons from naval vessels and stored them in onshore missile silos in the following year. Russia, however, still possesses a broad array of nuclear forces. Under such circumstances, in July 2014, the U.S. government concluded that Russia possesses ground-launched cruise missiles (GLCM) in violation of the INF Treaty and notif ed the Russian government. The Russian side denies this. continued to participate in the counter-piracy operations off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden since 2008, and maintained deployment of vessels in the Mediterranean Sea[24]. In September 2013, a Kirov-class missile cruiser was deployed to the eastern Arctic for the f rst time, where it conducted military exercises. In September 2014, the f otilla of the Northern Fleet transported equipment and supplies to the New Siberian Islands in the eastern Arctic to build a facility[25]. In June and September 2014, the Tu-95 long-range bombers approached the airspaces of U.S. mainland and Canada[26]. Furthermore, in October 2014, Russian aircraft, including the Tu-95 long-range bomber, conducted largescale military exercises over the Baltic Sea, the North Sea, the Atlantic Ocean, and the Black Sea[27]. From October to November 2014, vessels of the Pacif c and the Black Sea Fleets entered the South Pacif c Ocean, and the vessels of the Baltic Fleet entered the South China Sea[28]. The Russian Armed Forces have thus intensif ed activities not only in the Asia-Pacif c, but also in the Arctic, Europe, and areas near the U.S. mainland. In particular, Russia’s vessels and aircraft have tended to expand their area of activity[29]. As for the future Russian military forces, since there are uncertain elements which may be inf uenced by Russia’s future economic and social development and trends in Russia’s diplomatic relations with European and other countries, it is necessary to continue to follow future developments. **2** **Conventional Forces and Other Issues** It is assumed that Russia is developing and procuring conventional forces in accordance with its GPV. There is a need to pay close attention to Russia’s development, procurement, and deployment of new equipment in addition to the introduction of Su-35 f ghters, which includes the so-called f fth generation f ghters[20] and the Mistral-class amphibious assault ships[21]. In addition to carrying out a range of exercises[22], since February 2013, the Russian Armed Forces have been conducting surprise inspections designed to validate the combat readiness of the military districts and independent corps for the f rst time since the collapse of the Soviet Union[23]. Outside of Russia, the Russian Armed Forces have 20 According to media reports, in January 2015, President Yury Slusar of Russia’s United Aircraft Corporation stated that Russia’s PAK FA (Future Air Complex for Tactical Air Forces) fi fth generation fi ghters have begun to be delivered to the Air Force for test fl ights. In March 2013, Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force Viktor Bondarev stated that PAK FA will enter service in 2016. 21 In December 2010, Russia decided to purchase two ships from a consortium with France. Their construction contract was signed in June 2011, and the launching ceremony of the fi rst ship, Vladivostok, was held in October 2013 at a French shipyard. In November 2014, based on the increasingly tense situation in Ukraine, France announced the postponement of the handover of the Vladivostok to Russia. As a result, its crew who were undergoing operational training for the ship in France returned to Russia in December 2014. 22 As it proceeds with its military reform, Russia has conducted large-scale exercises for verification and other purposes in recent years. Exercises involving field training at the level of military district and above include “Center 2011” in the Central Military District, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan in September 2011. “Caucasus 2012” was carried out in the Southern Military District in September 2012. In addition, “Zapado 2013” was carried out in the Western Military District and in the territories of Belarus in September 2013 and “Vostok 2014” in the Eastern Military District in September 2014. 23 Surprise inspections were conducted at the Central and Southern Military Districts in February 2013, Southern Military District in March 2013, Western Military District in May 2013, Eastern and Central Military Districts in July 2013, strategic nuclear units in October 2013, and Western and Central Military Districts from February to March 2014. In September 2014, a surprise inspection of the Eastern Military District was conducted in the form of transitioning to the Vostok 2014 large-scale exercise. 24 Russia’s naval fleet in the Mediterranean, for which formation was completed on June 1, 2013, is positioned as a permanent operational force. 25 The Temp Airport on the New Siberian Islands (Novosibirsk) located in the Eastern Arctic, has been closed since 1993, but in October 2013, was restored to operation with the support of the Northern Fleet. 26 On June 9, 2014, four Tu-95 long-range bombers fl ew in the airspace near Alaska and northern California. Two of these bombers fl ew within 50 miles off the coast of California. On September 17, 2014, six aircraft – two Tu-95 long-range bombers, two MiG-31 fi ghters, and two Il-78 air-to-air refueling aircraft – entered the U.S. Air Defense Identifi cation Zone. On September 18, two Tu-95 long-range bombers entered the Canadian Air Defense Identifi cation Zone. 27 According to NATO’s Allied Command Operations, NATO detected and monitored four groups of Russian military aircraft conducting signifi cant military maneuvers in European airspace over the Baltic Sea, the North Sea, the Atlantic Ocean, and the Black Sea on October 28 and 29, 2014. These sizable Russian fl ights are said to represent an unusual level of air activity over European airspace. 28 The vessels included the Pacifi c Fleet’s fl agship Slava-class guided missile cruiser Varyag and the Black Sea Fleet’s fl agship Slava-class guided missile cruise Moskva. Varyag was deployed off the coast of Australia, and Moskva in the Philippine Sea. On November 15-16, 2014, the G20 Summit was held in Brisbane, Australia, which was attended by President Putin. 29 It is deemed that the Russian Armed Forces aim to maintain and enhance their combat readiness, keep the West and other countries in check in connection with the situation in Ukraine, and expand ----- **4** **Russian Forces in the Vicinity of Japan** **1** **General Situation** Russia newly established the Eastern Military District and the Eastern Joint Strategic Command in 2010[30]. Ground Forces, the Pacif c Fleet, the Air Force, and Air Defense Units have been placed under the control of the Military District Commander, who has unif ed the control over each of these services. The current presence of the Russian Armed Forces in the Far East region is signif cantly smaller than it was at its peak. However, a considerable scale of military forces, including nuclear forces, still remains in the region. Russian military operations in the vicinity of Japan appear to be increasingly active. Given that the Russian Armed Forces set their basis of operation on maintaining the combat readiness of their strategic nuclear units and dealing with conf icts through the inter-theater mobility of its round-the-clock readiness units, it is necessary to continue paying attention to the positioning and trends of the Russian Armed Forces in the Far East region while also keeping in mind the movement of units in other regions. combat forces into permanent readiness units. The Eastern Military District now consists of eleven brigades and one division with about 80,000 personnel in total. In addition, it has a naval infantry brigade equipped with amphibious operations capability, and therefore, has amphibious operations capability. The Eastern Military District has inducted new equipment, such as the Iskander surfaceto-surface missile system and the S-400 surface-to-air missile system. **(3) Naval Forces** The Pacif c Fleet is stationed and deployed from its main bases in Vladivostok and Petropavlovsk. The f eet comprises about 250 ships with a total displacement in the region of about 600,000 tons, including about 20 major surface ships and about 20 submarines (about 15 of which are nuclear powered submarines) with a total displacement of about 300,000 tons. **(4) Air Forces** In the Eastern Military District, Russia deploys about 350 combat aircraft from its Air Force and Navy combined. Existing models are being refurbished and new models, such as the Su-35 f ghters, are being introduced[32] to improve their capabilities. **(1) Nuclear Forces** As for strategic nuclear forces in the Far East region, ICBMs, such as SS-25s and about 30 Tu-95 long-range bombers are deployed mainly along the Trans-Siberian Railway. In addition, the Delta III-class SSBNs carrying SLBMs are deployed in and around the Sea of Okhotsk. By and large strategic nuclear units are believed to maintain readiness posture. In a surprise inspection conducted in October 2013 and a f eld training exercise conducted in May 2014 for the strategic nuclear unit, the Delta III-class SSBNs launched SLBMs in the Sea of Okhotsk. The second of the Borey-class SSBNs Alexander Nevsky was deployed to the Pacif c Fleet in December 2013 and the third of the SSBNs Vladimir Monomakh in December 2014[31]. **(2) Ground Forces** As part of its military reforms, Russia is thought to be reorganizing the command structure from a divisionbased to a brigade-based one, while also shifting all of its **2** **Russian Forces in Japan’s Northern Territories** Since 1978 during the former Soviet Union era, Russia has redeployed ground troops on Kunashiri, Etorofu, and Shikotan Islands of the Northern Territories, which are inherent territories of Japan. While the Russian troop strength is thought to be far less than that at peak times, one division with mainly defensive duties is still stationed. Furthermore, tanks, armored vehicles, various types of artillery, and anti-air missiles are deployed[33]. In August 2014, an exercise was conducted with the participation of over 1,000 troops from the Eastern Military District on the Northern Territories and the Chishima Islands. After then-President Medvedev visited Kunashiri Island[34] for the f rst time as head of state in November 2010, 30 The Eastern Military District’s headquarters is in Khabarovsk. 31 At the Expanded Meeting of the Defence Ministry Board in December 2014, Minister of Defence Shoigu stated that the second of the Borey-class SSBNs Alexander Nevsky and the third SSBN Vladimir Monomakh would be brought to the Pacifi c and join the formation of the permanent readiness units in 2015. 32 In February 2014, 12 Su-35 fighters entered service with the 23rd Fighter Regiment based in Khabarovsk. 33 The 18th Machine Gun and Artillery Division, which comprises two regiments, is Russia’s only machine gun and artillery division amid the military’s reforms to turn divisions into brigades, and is stationed on Etorofu Island and Kunashiri Island. The Division aims to prevent landings, and participated in surprise inspections conducted in the Eastern Military District and elsewhere in July 2013. 34 After the visit, Kunashiri Island and Etorofu Island were visited by First Deputy Prime Minister Shuvalov in December 2010, by then-Regional Development Minister Basargin in January to February 2011, followed by then-Deputy Prime Minister Ivanov in May 2011. Furthermore, Security Council Secretary Patrushev visited Kunashiri Island and Suisho Island of the Habomai Islands in September 2011. In addition, in January 2011, Deputy Minister of Defence Bulgakov, and in February 2011, then-Minister of Defence Serdyukov visited Kunashiri Island and Etorofu Island and inspected the ----- Russia started replacement of equipment and construction of facilities, among other measures, to ensure the security of the “Kuril” Islands. The number of Russian military personnel stationed in this region in 1991 was about 9,500. At the Japan-Russia Defense Ministerial Meeting held in 1997, then-Russian Defence Minister Rodionov made known that the troops stationed in the Northern Territories had been reduced to 3,500 personnel by 1995. In July 2005, when then-Russian Defence Minister Ivanov visited the Northern Territories, he declared that Russia would neither increase nor decrease the troops stationed on the four islands, clarifying Russia’s intention to maintain the status quo[35]. As mentioned above, Russian troops continue to be stationed in the Northern Territories, which are inherent territories of Japan, and it is hoped that the issue will be resolved at an early date. mobilization postures of the units in the Far East strategic front, including the Arctic. The exercise included units from not only the Eastern Military District, but also the Western and Central Military Districts. The various units conducted long-distance maneuvers covering a distance of 12,000 km at most. Furthermore, the exercise improved coordination among the Ministry of Defence and other ministries, agencies, and local governments. The number of exercises carried out by the Russian Ground Forces in the areas adjacent to Japan has decreased from the peak. However, some activities seem to be on the rise. With regard to naval vessels, their activities seem to be on the rise in recent years. For example, joint exercises and counter-piracy operations have been carried out involving long voyages of the vessels of the Pacif c Fleet, and nuclear submarines are carrying out patrols[38]. In September 2011, 24 naval vessels including a Slava-class guided missile cruiser passed through the Soya Strait one after another. This was the f rst time since the end of the Cold War that such a major transit of Russian naval vessels through this strait has been conf rmed[39]. Prior to the holding of the large-scale exercise “Vostok 2014” in September 2014, ten vessels passed through the Soya Strait in August 2014. In October of the same year, eight vessels successively passed through the Tsushima Strait **3** **Operations in the Vicinity of Japan** Activities by the Russian Armed Forces in the vicinity of Japan including exercises and drills that are believed to have objectives such as verif cation of the results of the military reform are on the rise. In the large-scale military exercise “Vostok 2010” that was conducted from June to July 2010, it is thought that Russia verif ed its ability to respond to conf icts under its new command structure and also its ability to manage units from different services in an integrated manner. In addition, by mobilizing troops that are not stationed in this region to the Far East exercises, it is considered that Russia verif ed its ability to deploy forces in regions far from where they are stationed[36]. In September 2014, the large-scale exercise “Vostok 2014,” considered to be the largest and the most important Russian Armed Forces’ exercises and drills conducted that year, was carried out in the Eastern Military District. Over 155,000 personnel, over 4,000 combat vehicles, about 80 vessels, and about 630 aircraft participated in the exercise[37]. Its purpose was likely to verify the combat readiness and 35 During the 1998 visit to Russia by Japan’s Administrative Vice-Minister of Defense, then-Russian Minister of Defence Sergeyev commented that the number of Russian troops stationed in the Northern Territories was being steadily decreased. In February 2011, a senior official of the General Staff stated that troops on the “Kuril Islands” would be maintained at around 3,500 personnel, within the process of reorganizing the division into a brigade. In May 2014, Commander Surovikin of the Eastern Military District announced the buildup of military facilities on the Northern Territories. In August 2014, Russia opened a new airport in Etorofu Island. Through such measures, Russia has stepped up its activities to reinforce its claims to the Northern Territories. 36 In September 2011, a large-scale exercise was held involving anti-vessel and anti-aircraft live fire drills and landing drills in eastern Kamchatka Peninsula. More than 10,000 personnel, 50 naval vessels, and 50 aircraft participated in the exercise. Furthermore, between June and July 2012, various exercises, including landing drills, were conducted in Sakhalin involving about 7,000 personnel, 40 naval vessels, and 60 aircraft. Through these drills and exercises, the units trained and improved ability to cope with various situations. Moreover, the large-scale exercise “Vostok 2014” was held in the Eastern Military District in September 2014. 37 The large-scale exercise “Vostok 2014” was conducted over a vast area extending from the Arctic to the coastal area. In the Kamchatka Peninsula, ALCM launches were carried out from long-range bombers, as well as launches of submarine-launched cruise missiles (SLCMs) from Oscar II-class nuclear-powered guided missile submarines (SSGN). In Wrangel Island in the Arctic, evening parachute landings and survival drills were conducted. In the Sakhalin, the Naval Infantry conducted landing drills as well as drills to prevent the landings of opposing forces. In the coastal and inland areas, drills were conducted of the launches of short-range ballistic missiles and GLCMs using the Iskander surface-to-surface missile system, as well as drills that made use of private infrastructure, such as takeoff and landing drills of the Su-25 attack aircraft using roads for motor vehicles. 38 The number of cases of the Russian naval fl eet passing through the three international straits (Soya, Tsugaru, and Tsushima) of Japan that have been identifi ed and disclosed in FY2014 is as follows: 10 cases in the Soya Strait (6 in FY2012, 11 in FY2013); 1 case in the Tsugaru Strait (2 in FY2012, 1 in FY2013); and 8 cases in the Tsushima Strait (5 in FY2012, 4 in FY2013). ----- and entered the South Pacif c Ocean. Regarding aircraft, since the resumption of the patrol activities by its strategic aviation units in 2007, Russia has been increasing f ights by long-range bombers and carrying out f ights of Tu-95 long-range bombers and Tu-160 long-range bombers which are refueled in midf ight and supported by A-50 early warning aircraft and Su-27 f ghters[40]. Moreover, due to an upturn in its fuel situation, among other factors, the pilot training time is on an upward trend. Activities such as f ights close to Japan’s airspace and exercises and trainings have tended to increase[41], as exemplif ed by the abnormal f ights of Russian aircraft Slava-class guided missile cruiser passing through the Tsushima Strait (October 25, 2014) detected on seven consecutive days and the f ights by six individual Tu-95 long-range bombers on a single day between March and April 2014[42]. See Fig. I-1-4-3 (Changes in the Number of Scrambles against Russian Aircraft) Changes in the Number of Scrambles against Fig. I-1-4-3 Russian Aircraft (Times) 500 450 400 350 300 250 200 150 100 50 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 (FY) **5** **Relations with Other Countries** perspective of modernizing the country[46]. On the other hand, Russian efforts to strengthen cooperative relations with the Western countries aimed at modernization face challenges following the series of events which have given rise to the increasingly tense situation in Ukraine. Attention will be on how Russia balances the posture it takes towards other countries, which is economic-centered and benef t-focused in order to realize the country’s modernization, and Russia’s politics and diplomacy which include the security domain. In addition, attention will be on how Russia develops its relations with other countries. **1** **General Situation** Recognizing that, amid the trend towards multi-polarity, Russia’s international position as one of the poles of inf uence is being strengthened, Russia sets out its basic foreign policy to achieve its national interests[43]. Moreover, stating that its diplomacy is to be conducted based on the national security that serves the interests of its people, Russia aims to have a practical diplomacy conducive to solving issues towards modernizing the country’s economy[44]. For this reason, Russia has been working to deepen its economic partnerships with the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS)[45]. Furthermore, Russia aspires to deepen its relations with the Asia-Pacif c countries from the 40 The Russian Ministry of Defence announced in January 2014 that surveillance flights of two Tu-95 long-range bombers took place with the assistance of Su-27 fighters and A-50 airborne early warning and control aircraft. 41 When Tu-95 long-range bombers took a route that circled the area encompassing Japan in September 2011, they were refueled in mid-flight by an IL-78 air tanker in the temporary danger zone set by Russia. In addition, when Tu-95 long-range bombers flew in the vicinity of Japan in February 2012 and February 2014, other aircraft such as A-50 Early Warning Aircraft flew with them. Two Su-27 fighters and two Tu-95 long-range bombers invaded Japanese airspace in February 2013 and August 2013 respectively. 42 In April 2014, Deputy Minister of Defence Antonov stated that “Russian Air Force aircraft operated in strict compliance with the international law.” The Deputy Minister also asked the Japanese Ministry of Defense to “alter its attitude towards cooperation with the Russian Ministry of Defence.” 43 The Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation (July 2008). 44 According to the speech by then-President Medvedev at the Meeting with Russian Ambassadors and Permanent Representatives to International Organizations (July 2010) and the Annual State of the Nation Address (November 2009, November 2010, and December 2011). In his campaign platform paper on foreign policy published in February 2012, then-Prime Minister Putin presented his stance of ensuring Russia’s security and interests while developing mutually-beneficial cooperative relationships with other countries. 45 In October 2011, eight CIS countries (Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Ukraine, Moldova, and Armenia) signed the CIS Free Trade Zone Agreement in the same month. 46 According to the speech by then-President Medvedev at the Meeting with Russian Ambassadors and Permanent Representatives to International Organizations (July 2010) and the Annual State of ----- states that it will develop mutually benef cial cooperation and is intensifying its approach in many f elds including politics, economy and security. **2** **Relations with Asian Countries** Russia recognizes that the signif cance of the Asia-Pacif c region is increasing within its multi-pronged foreign policy, and the relationship with Asian countries is also important from the viewpoint of economic development in Siberia and the Far East[47], counter-terrorism, and security[48]. In the executive order concerning foreign policy issued in May 2012, President Putin held up his policy to participate in the integration process of the Asia-Pacif c region in order to accelerate socioeconomic development in the East Siberia and Far East regions, and stated that Russia would work to develop relationships with Japan, the Republic of Korea, and other countries, in addition to China[49], India, and Vietnam[50]. Under this policy, Russia has participated in various frameworks in the Asia-Pacif c region[51]. The Asia-Pacif c Economic Cooperation (APEC) Summit was held in Vladivostok in September 2012. Among these different countries, Russia and India maintain a close relationship under a strategic partnership, with the leaders of both countries paying mutual visits. In October 2013, President Putin held talks with then-Prime Minister Singh when he visited Russia, during which they reached an agreement on enhanced military cooperation including arms exports. In December 2014, President Putin, during his visit to India, held talks with Prime Minister Modi, and the two sides agreed to build a new Russian-made nuclear power plant, among other matters. In January 2015, Minister of Defence Shoigu, during his visit to India, held talks with Minister of Defence Parrikar, and the two sides discussed military and military technology cooperation between the two countries. Both countries are strengthening their military technology cooperation, including the joint development of the f fth generation PAK FA f ghter jet and the BrahMos supersonic cruise missile. Additionally, since 2003 Russia and India have been conducting INDRA antiterrorism exercises involving the Armies and Navies of both countries. Regarding the relationship with Japan, Russia **3** **Situation in Ukraine** Following the political upheaval in Ukraine in February 2014, the Yanukovych government collapsed and was replaced by an interim government led by the opposition party. At the same time, in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea in southern Ukraine, armed forces, believed to be Russian forces, occupied the Council of Ministers Building and the Parliamentary Building. In addition, the military forces took control of airports, arterial roads that travel through the rest of Ukraine, and the major facilities of the Ukrainian military forces. In March 2014, Russia, which took de facto control of Crimea, “annexed” Crimea based on the results of the “referendum” on whether or not Crimea should be “annexed” into Russia[52]. Meanwhile, in April 2014, in eastern and southern Ukraine, separatist armed groups believed to be ethnic Russian nationals stepped up their protests and attacks against the interim Ukrainian government and occupied buildings, including the Council of Ministers Building. In response, the interim Ukrainian government condemned Russia over its alleged involvement and mobilized military forces in an attempt to expel the occupying forces. This, however, did not lead to the resolution of the situation. In May 2014, in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts in eastern Ukraine, a “referendum” was conducted under the control of separatist armed groups on whether or not autonomy should be expanded[53]. President Petro Poroshenko who assumed presidency in June 2014 following the presidential election in Ukraine announced a temporary ceasef re with separatist armed groups and unveiled a peace plan[54]. Nonetheless, the negotiations with separatist armed groups failed to reach a breakthrough, and the Ukrainian forces resumed their mop-up operation against separatist armed groups 47 Russia is currently developing resources in Siberia and Sakhalin. 48 The Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation (released in July 2008). In his campaign platform paper on foreign policy published in February 2012, then-Prime Minister Putin expressed his recognition that the importance of the whole Asia-Pacific region was rising. 49 See Part I, Chapter 1, Section 3-3 for the relationship with China 50 President Putin made an official visit to Vietnam and the ROK in November 2013. 51 Russia has participated in regional frameworks, such as the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), and the East Asia Summit (EAS since 2011). 52 The West and Japan condemn and do not acknowledge the “annexation,” which violate the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine as well as the international law, including the United Nations Charter. The West and Japan express the view that Russia’s act of changing of the status quo by force or coercion is a global issue that impacts the entire international community, including Asia. 53 President Putin urged separatist armed groups in Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts to postpone the referendum. While around 90% of the residents are said to have voted in favor in the election, many misconducts have been reportedly observed. 54 President Putin endorsed President Poroshenko’s decision on the ceasefi re in southeastern Ukraine, and expressed support for President Poroshenko’s announcement of intent to take a series of concrete measures aimed at the realization of peace. ----- in July 2014. The attacks by Ukrainian forces fragmented and decreased the areas under the control of separatist armed groups, and the groups fell into a perilous situation. Since August 2014, separatist armed groups, receiving various supports from Russia that are deemed to be direct intervention[55], regained lost territory and acquired the power base to be able to sustain the confrontations with Ukrainian forces. In September 2014, partially owing to the calls made by President Putin[56], the Ukrainian government and separatist armed groups agreed to a ceasef re and signed a 12-point document aimed at the realization of peace[57]. However, agreement failed to be reached thereafter on the ceasef re line, among other matters, and small-scale confrontations continued. In early 2015, following the intensif cation of f ghting once again between the Ukrainian forces and separatist armed groups, the leaders of Germany, France, Russia, and Ukraine held talks and agreed on 13 items, including the ceasef re, in February 2015[58]. Throughout the crisis in Ukraine, Western and other countries have pointed clearly to Russia’s direct military intervention[59] and have strongly condemned Russia’s direct or indirect intervention. The countries contend that Russia used a combination of diverse non-military tactics, such as sabotage and information manipulation, and military tactics utilized in secrecy, conducting acts of aggression through methods that cannot be clearly labeled an “armed attack” based on their outward form, i.e., “hybrid warfare”[60]. The countries invoked severe sanction measures on Russia[61]. Despite the international community’s strong condemnation and sanction measures, Russia’s attempt to change the status quo by force or coercion could not be stopped. The international community is facing challenges in dealing with “hybrid warfare.” 55 In the crisis in Ukraine, it is believed that Russia developed a separatist armed group that nearly integrates such groups in Ukraine as ethnic Russian nationals and the Russian special operation forces. While using the media to carry out propaganda warfare, Russia successively mobilized the paramilitary forces that have vague legal statuses, such as Cossacks, and ultimately had regular military forces make invasions. Since August 2014, the intrusion of Russian humanitarian assistance supply trucks into Ukrainian territory has been reported, and the activities of airborne units which are deemed to be Russian forces and the activities of T-72 tank, self-propelled artillery, and other units on Ukrainian territory. Meanwhile, Russia has consistently maintained the position that the Russian forces have no presence in Ukraine. 56 On August 29, 2014, President Putin released a statement. The President commented that separatist armed groups have achieved a major success, and called on the Ukrainian government to stop military actions and sit down at the negotiating table with “Donbass representatives.” 57 The items of the agreement document consisted of the following: (1) Immediate suspension of the use of weapons by both sides; (2) Monitoring by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) of the suspension of the use of weapons; (3) Adoption of the law on the special status of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts; (4) Creation of a security zone between Ukraine and Russia and monitoring by OSCE; (5) Immediate release of all hostages; (6) Ban on the prosecution and punishment of persons in connection with the events that have taken place in Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts; (7) Continuation of inclusive national dialogue; (8) Implementation of measures to improve the humanitarian situation in Donbas (eastern Ukraine); (9) Early elections in Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts; (10) Withdrawal of the illegal armed groups, fi ghters, and mercenaries from Ukrainian territory; (11) Designing of a program for economic recovery and the rehabilitation of social life in Donbas; and (12) Guarantee of personal security for the participants in the consultations. 58 The items of the agreement document consisted of the following: (1) Ceasefi re from February 15, 2015, 12 am (local time); (2) Withdrawal of heavy weapons to create a security zone that is 50-140 km wide; (3) Monitoring by OSCE of the ceasefi re; (4) Launch of dialogue that grants autonomy to areas controlled by separatist armed groups; (5) Pardon of detainees; (6) Release of all hostages; (7) Provision of humanitarian assistance; (8) Resumption of socioeconomic systems in the east, including pensions and living subsidies; (9) Control of the border with Russia by the government of Ukraine throughout the confl ict area; (10) Withdrawal of foreign armed formations, weapons, and mercenaries from Ukraine; (11) Entry into force of a new constitution by the end of 2015 that expands local autonomy; (12) Discussions on local elections in areas controlled by separatist armed groups; and (13) Strengthening of cooperation among Ukraine, Russia, and OSCE. 59 In August 2014, NATO released satellite images that are thought to show Russian combat forces engaged in military operations inside the territory of Ukraine. 60 An article published on the website of NATO’s Allied Command Operations in August 2014, co-authored by NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen and Supreme Allied Commander Europe Philip Breedlove, stated that Russia should withdraw its troops from Ukraine, stop using hybrid warfare tactics, and engage with the international community and the Ukrainian government to fi nd a political solution to the crisis. 61 The West imposes sanctions, such as asset freezes and travel bans to Russia on senior Russian government offi cials. The countries have gradually added more individuals and organizations to the ----- **4** **Relations with Other Commonwealth of** **Independent States** Russia positions the development of bilateral and multilateral cooperation with the CIS as the top foreign policy priority. Russia considers that its vital interests are concentrated in the territories of the CIS[62], and has dispatched troops to be stationed in Ukraine (Crimea), Moldova (Transdniester[63]), Armenia, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Georgia (South Ossetia, Abkhazia), which left the CIS in August 2009[64]. In November 2014, Russia and Abkhazia concluded an alliance and strategic partnership treaty[65]. In such ways, Russia has worked to maintain its military inf uence[66]. With increasing activities by Islamic armed insurgents in Central Asia and the Caucasus, Russia has been pursuing military cooperation centered on counter-terrorism measures in the region, and organized the Collective Rapid Deployment Force in May 2001 within the framework of the CIS Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO)[67]. Furthermore, in June 2009, a permanent joint rapid reaction force was established to strengthen the functions of the CIS Collective Rapid Deployment Force[68]. In addition, out of concern that the worsening security in Afghanistan could lead to the destabilization of Central Asia, Russia and Central Asian countries support Afghanistan while considering measures to strengthen the security of borders with Afghanistan[69]. **5** **Relations with the United States** President Putin has striven to deepen cooperative relations with the United States in the economic domain, and on the other hand, has retaliated against the United States on any action Russia considers as “a U.S. attempt to encroach on Russia’s strategic interests.” Meanwhile, in response to the recent increasingly tense situation in Ukraine, the Obama administration has strongly condemned Russia’s violation of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine and has imposed severe economic sanctions on Russia[70]. U.S.Russia relations have deteriorated from the time of the inauguration of the Obama administration. Russia strongly opposed the deployment plan of the MD system in Europe by the United States, stating that it would have a negative impact on Russia’s nuclear deterrent capabilities. In September 2009, the United States announced that it was reviewing the proposed deployment of the MD system in Europe[71], which was cautiously welcomed by Russia. However, Russia’s understanding is that the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) effective from February 2011 would be invalidated if the United States developed, both quantitatively and qualitatively, its MD capabilities and threatened Russia’s potential strategic nuclear strength[72]. Russia has striven to keep the United States in check in response to the recent progress of the U.S. MD plan in Europe, indicating that Russia would withdraw from the New START[73]. 62 In August 2008, following the confl ict with Georgia, then-President Medvedev indicated that one of the five principles of Russia’s foreign policy was that there are regions in which Russia has privileged interests. 63 In Transnistria, located on the eastern side of the Dniester River, ethnic Russian residents declared separation and independence from Moldova in 1990, but was never recognized as such by the international community. Following the annexation of Crimea into Russia, in March 2014 the Parliament of Transnistria urged Russia to also incorporate the region. Moreover, during a telephone conference between President Putin and President Barack Obama in March 2014, President Putin pointed out that Transnistria was experiencing a blockade. A Russian unit of about 1,500 troops is currently stationed in Transnistria. 64 After the conflict with Russia in August 2008, Georgia withdrew from the CIS in August 2009, but Russia unilaterally recognized the independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia in the Georgian territory and continues to have troops stationed in the regions. In the parliamentary election in October 2012 “Georgian Dream,” an opposition alliance with a campaign promise of improving GeorgiaRussia relations, defeated the ruling “United National Movement” that adopts an anti-Russian policy. In the presidential election of October 2013, Giorgi Margvelashvili, backed by “Georgian Dream,” was elected and became president in November of the same year. In his inauguration speech, President Margvelashvili stated that he was ready to deepen the dialogue with Russia, expressing his intention to continue with pro-Euro, pro-U.S. lines while pursuing improvement of the relationship with Russia. 65 Russia’s “Military Doctrine” revised in December 2014 states that Russia would promote cooperation with the Republic of Abkhazia and the Republic of South Ossetia aimed at shared defense and security. 66 While some CIS countries continue to prioritize their relations with Russia, such as Belarus and Kazakhstan, others attempt to maintain a distance from Russia. Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, and Moldova have taken mostly pro-Western policies to reduce their security and economic dependence on Russia. In September 2012, Kyrgyzstan and Russia agreed on a 15-year extension of the period of the use of Russian military bases in Kyrgyzstan, which otherwise would end in 2017. In October 2012, Tajikistan and Russia agreed to extend the lease of the base of Russia’s 201st Motor Rifle Division in Tajikistan until 2042. In December 2013, Su-27 fighters of the Russian naval force were deployed in Belarus for the first time. 67 In May 1992, leaders of six countries (Armenia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan) signed the Collective Security Treaty (CST) in Toshkent, Uzbekistan. In 1993, Azerbaijan, Georgia and Belarus joined the treaty, which came into effect in April 1994. However, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Uzbekistan withdrew from the treaty in 1999 without renewing it. In May 2002, CST was reorganized into the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO). Uzbekistan returned to CST in August 2006 but gave notice of suspension of participation in CSTO in June 2012, effectively withdrawing from the organization. 68 Learning from the fact that CSTO could not sufficiently respond to the request by Kyrgyzstan for the peace-keeping activities at the time of the ethnic conflict in the southern part of Kyrgyzstan in June 2010, CSTO has been discussing improvement in the efficiency of its crisis response system. The CSTO Summit Meeting in December 2011 warned against the foreign forces’ stationing in a member state by requiring the consent of all member states when any member state builds a base of a third country. CSTO joint exercises, “Vzaimodeistvie” (cooperative operation), were implemented in Kazakhstan in October 2009 and October 2010, in Armenia in September 2012, and in Belarus in September 2013. 69 During the December 2013 Expanded Meeting of the Russian Defence Ministry Board, President Putin said that the withdrawal of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) from Afghanistan in 2014 would be a destabilizing element to not only Afghanistan but also the wider Central Asia and could pose a threat to the national interests and security of Russia. 70 The United States has gradually expanded the list of Russian individuals and companies subject to asset freezes and entry bans. In addition, the United States has expanded the targets of its loan suspensions and asset freezes to include key industry sectors, including fi nance, energy companies, state-owned banks, and state-owned defense technology companies. 71 See Part I, Chapter 1, Section 1-2 for the U.S. deployment plan of the MD system in Europe. 72 Statement by the Russian Federation concerning missile defense (April 8, 2010) 73 Russia has demanded a legal guarantee that the MD plan of the United States is not targeted at Russia, and claimed that the United States is not considering Russia’s concerns. Russia issued an executive statement in November 2011, mentioning countermeasures such as fielding of the early-warning radars and the possibility of its withdrawal from the New START. In addition, in November ----- With regard to the military exchanges with the United States, Russia was thought to be wishing to establish cooperative relations with the United States to some extent, as exemplif ed from Russian vessels’ participation in RIMPAC in waters around Hawaii for the f rst time in July 2012. However, following Russia’s moves in connection with the situation in Ukraine, the United States announced the suspension of the military exchanges with Russia in March 2014[74]. In addition, the United States dispatched a missile destroyer to the Black Sea and provided non-lethal weapons to the Ukrainian government[75]. With the situation remaining tense in eastern Ukraine, the United States has stepped up its activities to keep Russia in check, including hinting at the provision of lethal weapons to the Ukrainian government in February 2015. At the NRC summit held in Lisbon in November 2010, Russia and NATO stated that both sides would work towards building a true and modernized strategic partnership. They are now searching for possibilities of dialogue and cooperation in f elds such as MD, Afghanistan, cooperation on counter-terrorism, and anti-piracy measures. With regard to MD cooperation, no progress was made on RussiaNATO relations. For example, the talks at the meeting of NRC defense ministers held in June 2011 highlighted the difference in position between NATO advocating MD cooperation in which only information and data would be exchanged under the two independent systems of NATO and Russia, and the position of Russia aiming at “sector MD” in which both sides operate integrally by setting zones for each country’s responsibility under a unif ed MD system of NATO and Russia. Meanwhile, there remains the unsolved issue between Russia and NATO regarding the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) agreement[77]. Furthermore, the increasingly tense situation in Ukraine has presented a threat to NATO’s eastern border for the f rst time since the Cold War. Consequently, some of NATO’s member states in Eastern Europe and the Baltic harbor national security concerns. For this and other reasons, NATO continues to take steps to ensure the effectiveness of its collective defense[78]. Meanwhile, Russia has actively conducted the air activity that can be deemed provocative in Europe, especially near the Baltic countries[79]. **6** **Relations with Europe and NATO** Through the framework of the NATO-Russia Council (NRC), Russia has worked with NATO as an equal partner on the areas of mutual interest, such as by participating in certain decision-making processes. However, following the recent increasingly tense situation in Ukraine, NATO and European countries suspended their practical cooperation with Russia, including in the military domain, except for the NRC’s ambassador-level meetings[76]. Additionally, NATO and European countries have maintained a severe diplomatic stance towards Russia while working with the Ukrainian government. 74 Following the occupation of the Crimean Peninsula by Russia, then-U.S. Department of Defense Spokesperson Kirby announced in March 2014 that the United States would cease all military exchange with Russia, including joint exercises with Russian forces, consultations, and port calls. 75 The United States provided to Ukraine non-lethal weapons such as body armor, helmets, vehicles, night and thermal vision devices, heavy engineering equipment, advanced radios, patrol boats, rations, tents, counter-mortar radars, uniforms, fi rst aid equipment, and other related items. 76 NATO issued a statement condemning Russia over the situation in Ukraine, and has deployed additional military forces to countries in Eastern Europe and the Baltic. However, there are discrepancies among NATO’s member states in their responses to Russia. The United Kingdom has announced its intention to suspend equipment exports to Russia and to deploy fi ghters to bolster patrols of the airspace over the Baltic countries, in addition to suspending military cooperation with Russia. Germany has announced the suspension of equipment exports to Russia. 77 At the 1999 Istanbul summit of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), an agreement was reached on changing the troop ceilings set formerly by blocks to those set by country and territory and on complying with the current CFE Treaty until the adapted CFE Treaty comes into effect. Russia was dissatisfied with the fact that despite its ratifi cation of the adapted CFE Treaty, NATO member states refused to ratify the Treaty on the grounds that Russian forces were not withdrawing from Georgia and Moldova. Therefore, in December 2007, Russia suspended the implementation of the CFE Treaty and halted inspections based on this treaty. Presently, only four countries have ratified the adapted CFE Treaty—Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine—and it has not yet come into effect. In addition, Russia has proposed dissolving the existing security framework that has NATO at its center and creating a new European security treaty that would provide new fundamental principles for security in Europe and the Atlantic region. 78 At NATO’s Wales Summit in September 2014, the Readiness Action Plan (RAP) was adopted as a measure to strengthen NATO’s collective defense. The RAP includes the creation of the Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF) as an initial response force of the NATO Response Force (NRF), a command and control presence on the territories of eastern Allies to facilitate the rapid increase of troops, the development of host facilities, the advance deployment of equipment and supplies, and the enhancement of exercise plans focused on collective defense. Bulgaria, the Baltic countries, Poland, and Romania have expressed their intention to provide facilities. 79 In October 2014, NATO announced that the Russian Air Force conducted signifi cant military maneuvers over the Baltic Sea, North Sea, Atlantic Ocean, and Black Sea on October 28 and 29. NATO ----- of its ongoing initiatives to improve its export system. In addition, Russia regards its military industry as an integral part of the nation’s military organization and is committed to improving and further developing the military industry by such measures as promoting the integration of aircraft companies such as Sukhoi, MiG, and Tupolev. Russia has exported its f ghters and warships to countries including India, ASEAN member countries, China, Algeria, and Venezuela[81]. **1** **General Situation** coalition[1]. No signif cant differences are thought to exist between the security and defense policies of the Abbott administration and the policies of previous Australian administrations. However, on the budget front, the Abbott administration has criticized the defense spending cuts of the previous administration, and has signaled its intention to actively make investments which are deemed necessary for building a stronger defense force. With regard to Australia’s relations with other countries, the administration continues to work to deepen relations with the countries in the Indo-Pacif c region and proactively contribute to global peace and stability through the overseas deployment of the Australian Defence Force (ADF), among other activities. **7** **Exportation of Arms** Russia seems to actively promote the export of arms not only to maintain the infrastructure of its military industry and to make economic prof t, but also to help promote better foreign policy. The country’s export value has been increasing in recent years[80]. In January 2007, the Russian government granted the exclusive right to export arms to the Rosoboron Export State Corporation as part **Section 5 Australia** **1** **General Situation** Australia shares universal values with Japan, such as respect for freedom and human rights, and democracy; and is allied with the United States, as are Japan and the Republic of Korea (ROK). Based on the awareness that Australia’s security environment will be signif cantly inf uenced by how the Indo-Pacif c, connecting the Indian and Pacif c Oceans through Southeast Asia, and its security framework evolve, Australia is adjusting its main strategic focus to the region. In Australia, a federal election was held in September 2013. Tony Abbott, the head of the Liberal Party of the conservative coalition which won control of the lower house, took off ce as Prime Minister, resulting in a change of government from the Labor Party to the conservative **2** **Security and Defense Policies** The Australian government launched its f rst National Security Strategy (the Strategy) in January 2013[2]. The Strategy provides a blueprint for national security over the next decade, presenting the recognition that responding to the economic and strategic changes in the Asia-Pacif c region is vital to the national security of Australia. The Strategy def nes four objectives for the country’s national security: (1) to ensure a safe and resilient population; (2) to protect and strengthen Australia’s sovereignty; (3) to secure Australia’s assets, infrastructure and institutions; and (4) to promote a favorable international environment. On this basis, the Strategy outlines the following priorities for the next f ve years: (1) enhanced engagement in the AsiaPacif c region[3]; (2) integrated cyber policy and operations[4]; and (3) effective partnerships[5]. In May 2013, the Australian government released 80 According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), Russian arms exports between 2010 and 2014 increased by 37% compared to the period between 2005 and 2009. 81 Russia concluded sales contracts with Indonesia for the Su-27 and Su-30 fighters in 2003 and 2007, and with Malaysia and Vietnam for the Su-30 fighters in 2003, and has delivered the fighters to these countries. There are also reports of a sales contract with Vietnam in 2009 for the Su-30 fighters and Kilo-class submarines. In January 2014, the first of the Kilo-class submarines, “Hanoi,” arrived in Vietnam. With regard to India, aircraft carrier “Admiral Gorshkov,” which had been refurbished in Severodvinsk, was delivered to India, renamed as INS Vikramaditya, which arrived in India in January 2014. Moreover, in 2006, Russia concluded sales contracts with Algeria and Venezuela for arms, including Su-30 fighters, and has delivered some of these arms. Russia’s exports to China have included Su-27 and Su-30 fighters, Sovremenny-class destroyers, and Kilo-class submarines. Against the backdrop of the advancement of indigenous weapon production in China, some point out that the value of Russian exports to China has been declining in recent years. Nevertheless, Russia has continued to export equipment such as aircraft engines for repair purposes. Russia and China are also reportedly in talks on exporting the Su-35 fi ghter and the “S-400” surface-to-air missile. 1 In this election, the conservative coalition comprised of the Liberal, National, and other parties won 90 out of the 150 lower house seats. As a result, Tony Abbott, the head of the Liberal Party, which had the most seats among the member parties of the conservative coalition that secured a majority in the lower house, was inaugurated as the 28th Prime Minister of Australia. 2 This strategy is based on the National Security Statement, announced in December 2008, which articulated Australia’s national security agenda and set in motion reforms to strengthen the National Security Community. The national security strategy is scheduled to be revised every five years. 3 This includes: deepening the Australia-U.S. alliance; enhancing bilateral cooperation with infl uential regional countries such as China, Indonesia, Japan, the ROK, and India; and promoting the superiority and effectiveness of multilateral forums. 4 The Australian Cyber Security Centre (ACSC) integrates the capabilities of Australia’s Department of Defence, Attorney-General’s Department, and Federal Police and the cyber-related personnel of the Australian Crime Commission. ----- of its ongoing initiatives to improve its export system. In addition, Russia regards its military industry as an integral part of the nation’s military organization and is committed to improving and further developing the military industry by such measures as promoting the integration of aircraft companies such as Sukhoi, MiG, and Tupolev. Russia has exported its f ghters and warships to countries including India, ASEAN member countries, China, Algeria, and Venezuela[81]. **1** **General Situation** coalition[1]. No signif cant differences are thought to exist between the security and defense policies of the Abbott administration and the policies of previous Australian administrations. However, on the budget front, the Abbott administration has criticized the defense spending cuts of the previous administration, and has signaled its intention to actively make investments which are deemed necessary for building a stronger defense force. With regard to Australia’s relations with other countries, the administration continues to work to deepen relations with the countries in the Indo-Pacif c region and proactively contribute to global peace and stability through the overseas deployment of the Australian Defence Force (ADF), among other activities. **7** **Exportation of Arms** Russia seems to actively promote the export of arms not only to maintain the infrastructure of its military industry and to make economic prof t, but also to help promote better foreign policy. The country’s export value has been increasing in recent years[80]. In January 2007, the Russian government granted the exclusive right to export arms to the Rosoboron Export State Corporation as part **Section 5 Australia** **1** **General Situation** Australia shares universal values with Japan, such as respect for freedom and human rights, and democracy; and is allied with the United States, as are Japan and the Republic of Korea (ROK). Based on the awareness that Australia’s security environment will be signif cantly inf uenced by how the Indo-Pacif c, connecting the Indian and Pacif c Oceans through Southeast Asia, and its security framework evolve, Australia is adjusting its main strategic focus to the region. In Australia, a federal election was held in September 2013. Tony Abbott, the head of the Liberal Party of the conservative coalition which won control of the lower house, took off ce as Prime Minister, resulting in a change of government from the Labor Party to the conservative **2** **Security and Defense Policies** The Australian government launched its f rst National Security Strategy (the Strategy) in January 2013[2]. The Strategy provides a blueprint for national security over the next decade, presenting the recognition that responding to the economic and strategic changes in the Asia-Pacif c region is vital to the national security of Australia. The Strategy def nes four objectives for the country’s national security: (1) to ensure a safe and resilient population; (2) to protect and strengthen Australia’s sovereignty; (3) to secure Australia’s assets, infrastructure and institutions; and (4) to promote a favorable international environment. On this basis, the Strategy outlines the following priorities for the next f ve years: (1) enhanced engagement in the AsiaPacif c region[3]; (2) integrated cyber policy and operations[4]; and (3) effective partnerships[5]. In May 2013, the Australian government released 80 According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), Russian arms exports between 2010 and 2014 increased by 37% compared to the period between 2005 and 2009. 81 Russia concluded sales contracts with Indonesia for the Su-27 and Su-30 fighters in 2003 and 2007, and with Malaysia and Vietnam for the Su-30 fighters in 2003, and has delivered the fighters to these countries. There are also reports of a sales contract with Vietnam in 2009 for the Su-30 fighters and Kilo-class submarines. In January 2014, the first of the Kilo-class submarines, “Hanoi,” arrived in Vietnam. With regard to India, aircraft carrier “Admiral Gorshkov,” which had been refurbished in Severodvinsk, was delivered to India, renamed as INS Vikramaditya, which arrived in India in January 2014. Moreover, in 2006, Russia concluded sales contracts with Algeria and Venezuela for arms, including Su-30 fighters, and has delivered some of these arms. Russia’s exports to China have included Su-27 and Su-30 fighters, Sovremenny-class destroyers, and Kilo-class submarines. Against the backdrop of the advancement of indigenous weapon production in China, some point out that the value of Russian exports to China has been declining in recent years. Nevertheless, Russia has continued to export equipment such as aircraft engines for repair purposes. Russia and China are also reportedly in talks on exporting the Su-35 fi ghter and the “S-400” surface-to-air missile. 1 In this election, the conservative coalition comprised of the Liberal, National, and other parties won 90 out of the 150 lower house seats. As a result, Tony Abbott, the head of the Liberal Party, which had the most seats among the member parties of the conservative coalition that secured a majority in the lower house, was inaugurated as the 28th Prime Minister of Australia. 2 This strategy is based on the National Security Statement, announced in December 2008, which articulated Australia’s national security agenda and set in motion reforms to strengthen the National Security Community. The national security strategy is scheduled to be revised every five years. 3 This includes: deepening the Australia-U.S. alliance; enhancing bilateral cooperation with infl uential regional countries such as China, Indonesia, Japan, the ROK, and India; and promoting the superiority and effectiveness of multilateral forums. 4 The Australian Cyber Security Centre (ACSC) integrates the capabilities of Australia’s Department of Defence, Attorney-General’s Department, and Federal Police and the cyber-related personnel of the Australian Crime Commission. ----- a new Defence White Paper[6] that covers the key changes in the domestic and overseas strategic environments since the previous Defence White Paper was published in May 2009[7], which inf uence Australia’s national security and defense capability build-up. The White Paper states that the U.S.-China relationship will, more than any other single factor, determine Australia’s strategic environment over the coming decades, and that a new Indo-Pacif c arc is beginning to emerge. Based on this recognition, the White Paper notes that Australia’s strategic interests are (1) a secure Australia, (2) a secure South Pacif c and TimorLeste, (3) a stable Indo-Pacif c, and (4) a stable, rules-based global order, and on this basis, outlines tasks for the ADF and its asset build-up[8]. In September 2013, the Abbott administration was formed. No major differences are believed to exist between the administration’s overall defense policies and the policies of the previous Labor Party administration[9]. However, on the f nancial front, the Abbott administration strongly criticizes the defense budget cuts of the previous administration, and has indicated its intention to contrive funds through the streamlining of bloated government defense organizations and other means to actively invest in areas deemed necessary for building a strong defense force. Under this policy, the administration has signif cantly increased the defense budget in 2014 and 2015[10], and continues to pursue the acquisition of highpriced equipment, such as a new submarine, air warfare destroyer, amphibious assault ship[11], and the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF)[12]. The concrete defense policies of the Abbott administration are expected to be outlined in the administration’s f rst Defence White Paper to be published in 2015. Australia’s fi rst Canberra-class amphibious assault ship, HAMS Canberra, commissioned [Australian Department of Defence] 6 The Defence White Paper of Australia presents the government’s future plan and measures for national defense. It was previously published in 1976 (Fraser Liberal Party administration), 1987 (Hawke Labor Party administration), 1994 (Keating Labor Party administration), 2000 (Howard Liberal Party administration), 2009 (Rudd Labor Party administration), and 2013 (Gillard Labor Party administration), a total of six times. 7 (1) Economic, strategic, and military shift to the Indo-Pacifi c; (2) The ADF’s operational drawdown from Afghanistan, Timor-Leste, and Solomon Islands; (3) The U.S. re-balance to the Asia-Pacifi c; (4) Australia’s substantially enhanced practical cooperation with the United States pursuant to Australia’s Alliance relationship; and (5) The ongoing Global Financial Crisis, which have seen a signifi cant deleterious impact on the global economy, domestic fi scal circumstances, and defense funding. 8 The White Paper identifi es tasks for the ADF in priority order as follows: (1) deter and defeat armed attacks on Australia; (2) contribute to stability and security in the South Pacifi c and Timor-Leste; (3) contribute to military contingencies in the Indo-Pacifi c region, with priority given to Southeast Asia; and (4) contribute to military contingencies in support of global security. With regard to ADF asset build-up, the White Paper states that maintaining an appropriate mix of high-end ADF capabilities is essential to defend Australia and its strategic interests, and that maintaining credible high-end ADF capabilities enables Australia to act decisively when required, deter would-be adversaries, and strengthen its regional infl uence. The White Paper notes that accordingly, Australia will continue to seek the acquisition of key equipment. 9 In the campaign policy prior to its inauguration, the Abbott administration made clear its position to support the defense policy objectives that the Howard administration of the same conservative coalition presented in 2000 in the Defence White Paper published at the time. These defense policy objectives are: (1) Ensure the defense of Australia and its direct approaches; (2) Foster the security and stability of its immediate neighborhood; (3) Support strategic stability in the wider Asia Pacifi c region; and (4) Support global security. The administration maintains that these must remain the basic defense policy objectives of Australia. These defense policy objectives are considered to be generally in alignment with the concept of “strategic interests” that constituted the core of the defense policies of the previous Labor Party administration. 10 In May 2014, the Abbott administration disclosed the FY2014-FY2015 federal budget, the fi rst budget that was established under the administration. Of this amount, the defense budget disclosed by Australia’s Department of Defence was 29.3 billion AUD, about 15.2% more than the initial budget of the previous fi scal year. The Abbott administration intends to increase the defense budget’s share from about 1.6% of GDP as of 2013, to 2% within the coming decade. 11 In November 2014, the fi rst ship HMAS Canberra (displacement: 27,000 tons) was commissioned. The ship is capable of embarking 1,000 amphibious troops, as well as landing craft and helicopters to transport the troops. The Royal Australian Navy aims to induct two amphibious assault ships. The second ship is expected to be commissioned in 2016. 12 In April 2014, the Abbott administration approved the additional acquisition of 58 F-35 JSFs. This brings the total number to be acquired to 72 JSFs, combining the 14 JSFs that have already been approved in 2009. In January 2015, training by Royal Australian Air Force pilots began in the United States. The aircraft is expected to be relocated to Australia sequentially from 2018 and start partial ----- **3** **Relations with Other Countries** Australia outlines in its Defence White Paper that as regional countries strengthen their military capabilities, Australia would build deeper strategic partnerships and contribute positively to the region’s security and stability – while at the same time managing strategic uncertainty. Specif cally, it states that recognizing the importance of seizing opportunities to build deeper partnerships in the Indo-Pacif c region, Australia would enhance its relationships with other countries on the defense front for the time being. In addition, the White Paper states that Australia would attach importance to building effective mechanisms to manage security issues and risks arising from rivalries and the possibilities of miscalculation. It notes that Australia’s contribution to regional security is not restricted to deploying forces in a conf ict or crisis, and that its efforts would be focused on reducing the risk of conf ict through building trust and partnerships through regular interaction with other nations. It is deemed that the Abbott administration will continue to generally uphold this policy[13]. See Part III, Chapter 3, Section 1-4-1 (Japan-Australia Defense Cooperation and Exchanges) convening the Australia-United States Ministerial Consultations (AUSMIN) to discuss major diplomatic and security issues. On the operational front, the two countries have made efforts to increase interoperability through joint exercises, including Exercise Talisman Saber[15]. Since April 2012, the U.S. Marine Corps have conducted rotational deployments to northern Australia[16]. On the equipment front, the two countries have been simplifying the export procedures associated with equipment deals pursuant to the Australia-U.S. Defence Trade Cooperation Treaty that entered into force in May 2013. In addition, the two countries are examining the joint development of the F-35 JSF and missile defense cooperation[17]. Furthermore, bilateral cooperation is being advanced in areas, such as intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), space[18], and cyber[19]. Since the Abbott administration came into power, Australia has continued to pursue the further deepening of bilateral relations. At the 29th AUSMIN held in August 2014, the two sides signed the Force Posture Agreement which provides a legal framework for the rotational deployment of the U.S. Marine Corps. From October 2014, the ADF has been participating in the combat mission of the U.S.-led operation against the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). **1** **Relations with the United States** The Australia-U.S. Alliance based on the Security Treaty between Australia, New Zealand, and the United States of America (ANZUS)[14] is Australia’s most important defense relationship, and Australia attaches great importance to this alliance as a pillar of its national strategy and security arrangements. The Defence White Paper states that the United States would continue to be the world’s strongest military power and the most infuential strategic actor in Australia’s region for the foreseeable future. Moreover, it asserts that a U.S. presence in the region would continue to be important amidst the Indo-Pacifc’s rapidly changing strategic environment, and that Australia welcomes the shift in U.S. strategic focus towards the region and the U.S. commitment to maintain its strong diplomatic, economic, and security presence. Since 1985, the two countries have been regularly **2** **Relations with China** Australia’s Defence White Paper states that China’s economic growth is a major contributor to global strategic weight shifting to the Indo-Pacif c. In addition, it asserts that Australia welcomes China’s rise and does not approach China as an adversary; rather, its policy is aimed at encouraging China’s peaceful rise and ensuring that strategic competition in the region does not lead to conf ict. It also states that the growth of China’s defense capabilities and the modernization of its military is a natural and legitimate outcome of its economic growth. Moreover, Australia sees China as an important partner in the region, and is committed to developing strong and positive defense relations with China through dialogue and practical activities. Under these policies, 13 The Abbott administration announced in its campaign policy that it would prioritize the Asia-Pacifi c and Indian Ocean regions, similar to the previous administration. In particular, the administration has committed to focusing diplomatic, development, trade, and security efforts in parts of the Indian Ocean Rim that have the capacity to advance Australia’s interests. The administration has also indicated that it would operate with its allies, particularly the United States, in the wider world when and where it judges that it is in its national interest. 14 A trilateral security treaty among Australia, New Zealand, and the United States, which went into effect in 1952. Since 1986, the United States has suspended its obligation to defend New Zealand due to its adoption of a non-nuclear policy. The treaty is thus effective only between Australia and the United States and between Australia and New Zealand. 15 Exercise Talisman Saber, started in 2005, is a biennial combined Australia-U.S. training activity, designed to improve combat readiness and interoperability. About 21,000 U.S. Forces personnel and about 7,000 ADF personnel participated in this training from July through August 2013. The exercise is scheduled to be conducted in July 2015. 16 See Part I, Chapter 1, Section 1-1-3 17 At the AUSMIN held in August 2014, Australia and the United States agreed to continue to work together to counter the growing threat of ballistic missiles in the Asia-Pacifi c region. As a concrete example of cooperation, the two countries gave the establishment of a working group to examine options for potential Australian contributions. 18 Since signing the Space Situational Awareness Partnership in November 2010, Australia and the United States have promoted space cooperation, including the relocation of the U.S. C-band groundbased radar system and the Space Surveillance Telescope to Australia. 19 At the AUSMIN in September 2011, the two nations signed a joint statement on cyberspace and confirmed that, mindful of their longstanding defense relationship and the ANZUS Treaty, the two would consult together and determine appropriate options to address threats in the event of a cyber attack that threatens the territorial integrity, political independence, or security of either Australia or the ----- Australia continuously carries out dialogues between defense authorities with China[20] and conducts exchanges to develop cooperative relations between Australian and Chinese forces, through joint exercises, mutual visits of military ships, among other activities[21]. In October 2014, northern Australia hosted KOWARI 2014, the f rst survival exercise conducted by the land forces of the United States, China, and Australia[22]. Meanwhile, the Abbott administration has been intent on clearly communicating its concerns about China. In a joint statement of the ministerial strategic dialogue by ministers of defense of Japan, the United States, and Australia in October 2013, and a Joint Communique of AUSMIN in November 2013, the administration expressed its stance that it opposes any coercive or unilateral actions that could change the status quo in the East China Sea, and that it thinks it is necessary for ASEAN and China to agree on a Code of Conduct regarding the South China Sea[23]. In addition, on China’s announcement of the establishment of an Air Defense Identif cation Zone in the East China Sea in November 2013, Minister for Foreign Affairs Julie Bishop released a statement stating that Australia makes clear its opposition to any coercive or unilateral actions to change the status quo in the East China Sea. “KOWARI 2014,” the fi rst trilateral enviromental survival training exercise conducted by the United States Army, China’s People’s Liberation Army, and the Australian Army [Australian Department of Defence] **3** **Relations with India** Australia states in its Defence White Paper that it prioritizes the Indo-Pacif c region against the backdrop of India’s emergence as an important strategic, diplomatic, and economic actor and greater engagement in regional frameworks. On this basis, Australia notes that it would deepen its relations with India, with which it has a shared interest in helping to address the strategic changes that are occurring in the region. The Australia-India relationship was elevated to strategic partnership in November 2009, and the two countries have regularly conducted strategic dialogues, mutual visits by senior military off cers, interactions among military services, and mutual dispatches of students to military educational organizations. More recently, in September 2014, Prime Minister Abbott visited India, and a nuclear cooperation agreement that enables uranium exports to India was signed[24]. In November 2014, Prime Minister of India Narendra Modi visited Australia also for the purpose of attending the G20 Summit, marking the f rst visit to Australia by an Indian Prime Minister in 28 years. The two leaders agreed to extend defense cooperation to cover research, development, and industry engagement, to hold regular meetings at the level of Defense Minister and conduct regular maritime exercises[25], and to convene talks between each of their military services. See Part I, Chapter 1, Section 7-1-2 (Military Affairs) 20 In July 2014, Fan Changlong, Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission of the Communist Party of China visited Australia, and held talks with Prime Minister Abbott, Minister for Defence David Johnston, and others. The two sides agreed to hold a U.S.-China-Australia trilateral joint exercise. In addition, Australia and China have regularly convened the Defence Strategic Dialogue since 1997. At the 17th Dialogue held in China in December 2014, discussion took place on the plan for service engagement between the ADF and China’s People’s Liberation Army, among other matters. 21 In August 2013, Australia, the United States, China, and New Zealand conducted their fi rst humanitarian assistance and disaster relief joint exercise in Christchurch, New Zealand. In October 2013, a Chinese naval vessel participated in the International Fleet Review held in Sydney. 22 In October 2014, KOWARI 2014 was held in northern Australia with the participation of ten U.S. Forces personnel, ten China’s People’s Liberation Army personnel, ten ADF personnel, and about 100 Australian support personnel. The exercise is said to have included activities for deepening understanding of the basic principles, procedures, techniques, and equipment that can enhance survival prospects in a harsh natural environment. 23 The AUSMIN Joint Communiqué of August 2014 expresses opposition to unilateral attempts to change facts on the ground or water through the threat or use of force or coercion. 24 Australia restricts uranium exports to countries with which it has concluded a nuclear cooperation agreement in order to prevent the diversion of uranium for military purposes. Given that India conducted nuclear tests and was not a member of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), Australia had not allowed the export of its uranium to India. 25 The Royal Australian Navy deployed one of its patrol boats to Milan 2014, a multinational naval exercise that the Indian Navy conducted in Andaman and Nicobar Islands in February 2014. The two ----- Subsequently, in 2014, their leaders made mutual visits, and in August, their foreign ministers signed a code of conduct on intelligence cooperation[28]. By November, their relations had recovered to the point of resuming high-level exchanges between their military forces[29]. With Malaysia and Singapore, Australia carries out regular joint combined exercises in the South China Sea and other areas[30] under the framework of the Five Power Defence Arrangements[31]. Australia stations the ADF in Royal Malaysian Air Force (RMAF) Base Butterworth, and contributes to maintaining regional security and stability through patrol activities in the South China Sea and the northern Indian Ocean. Australia plays a leading role in assisting Papua New Guinea, Timor-Leste, and the South Pacif c countries in f elds such as security maintenance, coping with natural disasters, and maritime patrol[32]. In particular, in the f eld of maritime patrol, Australia still regularly deploys ADF assets to the South Pacif c to assist with patrol activities. In addition, in June 2014, Australia unveiled a plan to replace the 22 patrol vessels it provided to these countries in the past. With New Zealand, Australia has an alliance pursuant to the ANZUS Treaty. The two countries hold regular meetings by their leaders and defense ministers, and have maintained close cooperative relations in the security and defense f elds through joint exercises and joint activities in the region. See Part I, Chapter 1, Section 6-2 (Security and Defense Policies of Each Country) **4** **Relations with Southeast Asia and South Pacifi c** **Countries** The Defence White Paper notes that Australia has an enduring strategic interest in the stability of the Indo-Pacif c, particularly Southeast Asia and the maritime environment. Given that major sea lanes that are critical to Australian trade pass through Southeast Asia, which sit astride the northern approaches to the country, there would be cause for concern if potentially hostile powers established a presence in Southeast Asia that could be used to project military power against Australia. From this perspective, Australia perceives the stability and security of Indonesia, its largest neighbor, to be of singular importance, and believes that it benef ts from having a strong and cohesive Indonesia as a partner. Australia has been deepening its relations with Indonesia in the security and defense f elds following the signing of the Lombok Treaty in November 2006, the elevation of their relationship to strategic partnership in March 2010, and the conclusion of the Defence Cooperation Arrangement in September 2012[26]. Since the beginning of his administration, Prime Minister Abbott had prioritized Australia-Indonesia relations, selecting Indonesia as the destination of his f rst overseas visit in September 2013. However, issues emerged, including differences in their responses to stowaways from Indonesia and the case of wiretapping of the Indonesian President and others by Australia’s intelligence agency[27]. Consequently, cooperative relations in the security and defense f elds were temporarily stalled between the two countries. 26 The Lombok Treaty is a security cooperation framework that espouses wide-ranging cooperation in the defense fi eld. It entered into force in February 2008. The Defense Cooperation Arrangement covers strengthened cooperation in counter-terrorism and maritime security. 27 To deal with the increasing number of stowaways from Indonesia, the Abbott administration has taken responses, such as turning them away at sea prior to their landing in Australia. This has prompted backlash from the Indonesian government. In November 2013, it was reported that an Australian intelligence agency wiretapped the telephone calls of Indonesia’s previous President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, Mrs. Yudhoyono, ministers, and others. The Indonesian government lodged strong protests, including summoning the Australian Ambassador to Indonesia and demanding an apology to the Australian government. The government also announced the suspension of military exchanges and intelligence cooperation with Australia. 28 Provisions were incorporated into the code of conduct, such as prohibition of intelligence activities that would harm the interests of the other party and promotion of intelligence exchanges. 29 The Commander of the Indonesian National Armed Forces visited Australia and held the Second Australia-Indonesia High Level Committee Meeting with the Chief of the Australian Defence Force. The First Committee Meeting was held in April 2013. 30 In November 2013, Exercise Bersama Lima was held in the South China Sea and the Malay Peninsula, in which approximately 400 personnel, vessels, F/A-18 and other aircraft of the ADF participated. In Exercise Bersama Lima held in the South China Sea, Malaysia, and Singapore in October 2014, about 500 personnel, vessels, and AP-3C and other aircraft of the ADF participated. 31 See Part I, Chapter 1, Section 6-2, Footnote 8 32 Australia has extended proactive assistance for the political and social stability of Timor-Leste since 1999, when the momentum for independence heightened in Timor-Leste. The ADF led the International Stabilization Force (ISF) since 2006, and with the stabilization of the security situation in Timor-Leste, the withdrawal of the ADF was completed in March 2013. In the Solomon Islands, the ADF extended assistance for their stabilization since July 2003 through the Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands (RAMSI). The ADF withdrew from the country in August 2013, when ----- engaged in assistance in the United Arab Emirates), six F/A-18 f ghter/attack aircraft, one E-7A early warning and control aircraft, one KC-30A refueling aircraft, among other assets are executing this mission. In Afghanistan, since October 2001, approximately 1,550 ADF personnel on average have engaged annually in reconstruction assistance activities and the trainings of the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), under the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). With the completion of ISAF’s activities in the end of 2014, about 400 ADF personnel now train, advise, and assist ANSF and other units. In addition, for the search of the Malaysian airliner that vanished in March 2014, the ADF led the search activities by hosting search units of various countries in Perth, western Australia. The ADF also deployed a search unit in the wake of an AirAsia crash in December 2014. **1** **General Situation** are incidents such as piracy by which the safe passage of ships is obstructed. Furthermore, in recent years, there is a concern about nationals embarking to Iraq and Syria for the purpose of joining the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) and engaging in terrorism after returning to their countries[1]. In order to cope with these issues, the countries in Southeast Asia are working to build military forces for national defense and maintenance of domestic public security, as well as for addressing new security issues such as terrorism and piracy. In recent years, against the backdrop of economic development, the countries have been modernizing their military forces, particularly their naval and air forces, as well as strengthening their maritime law enforcement capacities. See Fig. I-1-6-1 (Comparison of Forces Strength and Defense Budget between Southeast Asia and Japan/China/ROK 2015) **5** **Overseas Activities** Australia identif es in the Defence White Paper “a stable, rules-based global order” as its fourth strategic interest. Accordingly, on occasion, Australia will utilize the ADF to assist the international community in dealing with risks and threats. Based on this policy, as of late May, about 2,250 of Australia’s approximately 56,750 force strength[33] are deployed and are conducting activities overseas. In Iraq, to support the airstrikes conducted by the U.S. Forces against ISIL in northern Iraq, Australia began air-dropping humanitarian supplies in August 2014 and participating in combat missions such as airstrikes from October 2014. In addition, Australia’s Special Operations Task Group is advising and assisting the Iraqi Security Forces on the military front. As of late May, about 900 personnel (of which approximately 400 personnel are **Section 6 Southeast Asia** **1** **General Situation** Southeast Asia occupies a strategic position for traff c, linking the Pacif c and the Indian Oceans, such as the Straits of Malacca and the South China Sea. It is an important region for Japan which relies on maritime transport for many of the supplies needed for economic activities and the lives of the Japanese people. The countries in Southeast Asia are making efforts to achieve political stability and steady economic growth, and lately have realized overall economic development to varying degrees. Such economic development has deepened interdependence within the region and with countries outside the region. However, this region still has destabilizing factors, including the territorial disputes over the South China Sea, ethnic minority issues, separatist and independence movements, and Islamic extremist groups. Moreover, there 33 According to “Military Balance (2015).” The breakdown by service is as follows: Approx. 29,000 Army personnel; Approx. 13,550 Navy personnel; and Approx. 14,050 Air Force personnel. ----- engaged in assistance in the United Arab Emirates), six F/A-18 f ghter/attack aircraft, one E-7A early warning and control aircraft, one KC-30A refueling aircraft, among other assets are executing this mission. In Afghanistan, since October 2001, approximately 1,550 ADF personnel on average have engaged annually in reconstruction assistance activities and the trainings of the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), under the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). With the completion of ISAF’s activities in the end of 2014, about 400 ADF personnel now train, advise, and assist ANSF and other units. In addition, for the search of the Malaysian airliner that vanished in March 2014, the ADF led the search activities by hosting search units of various countries in Perth, western Australia. The ADF also deployed a search unit in the wake of an AirAsia crash in December 2014. **1** **General Situation** are incidents such as piracy by which the safe passage of ships is obstructed. Furthermore, in recent years, there is a concern about nationals embarking to Iraq and Syria for the purpose of joining the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) and engaging in terrorism after returning to their countries[1]. In order to cope with these issues, the countries in Southeast Asia are working to build military forces for national defense and maintenance of domestic public security, as well as for addressing new security issues such as terrorism and piracy. In recent years, against the backdrop of economic development, the countries have been modernizing their military forces, particularly their naval and air forces, as well as strengthening their maritime law enforcement capacities. See Fig. I-1-6-1 (Comparison of Forces Strength and Defense Budget between Southeast Asia and Japan/China/ROK 2015) **5** **Overseas Activities** Australia identif es in the Defence White Paper “a stable, rules-based global order” as its fourth strategic interest. Accordingly, on occasion, Australia will utilize the ADF to assist the international community in dealing with risks and threats. Based on this policy, as of late May, about 2,250 of Australia’s approximately 56,750 force strength[33] are deployed and are conducting activities overseas. In Iraq, to support the airstrikes conducted by the U.S. Forces against ISIL in northern Iraq, Australia began air-dropping humanitarian supplies in August 2014 and participating in combat missions such as airstrikes from October 2014. In addition, Australia’s Special Operations Task Group is advising and assisting the Iraqi Security Forces on the military front. As of late May, about 900 personnel (of which approximately 400 personnel are **Section 6 Southeast Asia** **1** **General Situation** Southeast Asia occupies a strategic position for traff c, linking the Pacif c and the Indian Oceans, such as the Straits of Malacca and the South China Sea. It is an important region for Japan which relies on maritime transport for many of the supplies needed for economic activities and the lives of the Japanese people. The countries in Southeast Asia are making efforts to achieve political stability and steady economic growth, and lately have realized overall economic development to varying degrees. Such economic development has deepened interdependence within the region and with countries outside the region. However, this region still has destabilizing factors, including the territorial disputes over the South China Sea, ethnic minority issues, separatist and independence movements, and Islamic extremist groups. Moreover, there 33 According to “Military Balance (2015).” The breakdown by service is as follows: Approx. 29,000 Army personnel; Approx. 13,550 Navy personnel; and Approx. 14,050 Air Force personnel. ----- Fig. I-1-6-1 Comparison of Forces Strength and Defense Budget between Southeast Asia and Japan/China/ROK 2015 **ROK** Ground forces 1.6 million troops Combat aircraft Ground forces approx. 2,620 aircraft 520,000 troops Combat aircraft approx. 620 aircraft Vessels National Defense Budget 197,000 tons approx. U.S.$ 34.1 bn Vessels National Defense Budget (37.5000 trillion won) 1.470 milliontons approx. U.S.$ 145.6 bn(889.6 billion yuan) **China** Ground Combat forces aircraft 140,000 approx. troops 410 aircraft Vessels National Defense Budget **All of Southeast Asia** 467,000 approx. U.S.$ 43.8 bn tons (4.8221 trillion yen) (137 vessels) 1.654 million troopsGround forces **Japan** Combat aircraft approx. 840 aircraft National Defense Budget Vessels approx. U.S.$ 37.7 bn 605,000 tons Notes: 1. Source: The Military Balance 2015, etc. The size of each block indicates relative size using Japan as the base size. There are limits to the comparisons of national defense budgets which have simply been converted into U.S. dollars when the different elements are taken into consideration, such as each country’s exchange rate fl uctuations and price levels. However, as the purchasing power parities of Southeast Asian countries are not published by Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) (except Indonesia), this fi gure intentionally represents the national defense budgets of Japan and other countries that have been converted into U.S. dollars using the exchange rate published by the Ministry of Finance of Japan. 2. For Japan, the force strength shows the actual strength of each SDF as of the end of FY2014; the number of combat aircraft is the sum of the number of combat aircraft of the ASDF (excluding transport aircraft) and that of the MSDF (fi xed-wing aircraft only). The Japanese national defense budget is the initial budget excluding the cost of the SACO, the share of the U.S. forces realignment costs. The Japanese national defense expenditures are the initial budget excluding SACO-related expenses (4.6 billion yen), excluding the portion meant to reduce the burden on the local community (142.6 billion yen) out of the U.S. forces realignment expenses and expenses associated with the acquisition of new government aircraft. 3. The national defense budget of China is from the Finance Minister’s Budget Report to the National People’s congress in 2015. 4. The national defense budget of the ROK is from the ROK National Defense White Paper 2015. 5. The national defense budget for all of Southeast Asia represents the sum of the 2014 fi gures for each country according to the Military Balance 2015. 6. The national defense budget of China and the ROK is expressed in U.S. dollars and is calculated using the FY2015 Ministry of Finance exchange rates of 110 yen to 1 dollar, 18 yen to 1 yuan, and 100 yen to 1,000 won. 7. The Japanese national defense budget is expressed in U.S. dollars converting 2015 fi gures using the FY2015 Ministry of Finance exchange rate of 110 yen to 1 dollar. **2** **Security and Defense Policies of Each Country** In October 2014, Joko Widodo, the winner of the July 2014 presidential election, was inaugurated as the seventh President of Indonesia, replacing the sixth President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono. Under the banner of his maritime nation concept, President Joko strives to revive maritime culture, deal with territorial disputes through maritime diplomacy, and strengthen maritime defense capabilities. In addition, President Joko has announced that he would increase defense spending[2]. On the other hand, as part of military reform, **1** **Indonesia** Indonesia is a country of importance in Southeast Asia with the world’s largest Muslim population, vast land and territorial waters, and strategic importance for maritime traff c. Although Indonesia does not confront any immediate external military threats, it faces internal concerns, including the activities of Islamic extremists, such as Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), and secession and independence movements in Papua Province. ----- See Part I, Chapter 1, Section 5-3 (Relations with Other Countries) Part III, Chapter 3, Section 1-4-6 ((1) Indonesia) **2** **Malaysia** Malaysia, which is located at the center of Southeast Asia, considers itself to have common strategic interests with its neighboring countries. Although Malaysia does not acknowledge any imminent external threats at present, it believes that its forces should maintain a level of readiness that enables them to deal with all military threats, and therefore, places importance on “Independence,” “Total Defence,” “Commitment to the Rule of the Five Power Defence Arrangements (FPDA)[8],” “Cooperation to the U.N. for World Peace,” “Measures against Terrorism,” and “Defence Diplomacy” in its defense policy. Moreover, as part of “Defence Diplomacy,” Malaysia undertakes bilateral joint exercises such as the “CARAT” and “SEACAT” exercises with the United States, which is not a FPDA country, and thereby, promotes military cooperation. Despite conf icting assertions over the sovereignty of the South China Sea and other matters, Malaysia and China have strong ties, especially their economic relationship, and the dignitaries of both countries often make mutual visits. In December 2014, Malaysia and China conducted their f rst bilateral joint tabletop exercise “Peace and Friendship 2014” in Kuala Lumpur. When a Malaysian airliner disappeared in March 2014, China deployed its Air Force’s transport aircraft and its Navy’s vessel, among other assets, to participate in the search activity. Despite the recent navigation of Chinese government vessels around the James Shoal and the South Luconia Shoal over which Malaysia claims sovereignty, Malaysia has not lodged any visible protests. In May 2014, Prime Minister Najib Razak visited China, and during his talks with President Xi Jinping, allegedly stated that the South China Sea dispute should be handled through direct dialogue. Meanwhile, in October 2013, Malaysia announced that it would construct a new naval base in Bintulu close to the James Shoal and the South Luconia Shoal. In recent years, Malaysia has striven to deepen maritime defense capabilities. See Part III, Chapter 3, Section 1-4-6 ((7) Other Southeast Asian Countries) Indonesia aims to achieve the requirements for minimum defense capabilities – what it calls Minimum Essential Force (MEF), and build the MEF in the next four years. However, Indonesia has indicated that its maritime defense capabilities, in particular, are still very much inadequate[3]. Indonesia emphasizes cooperation with other Southeast Asian countries[4], and practices an independent and active foreign policy. It is strengthening its cooperative relationship with the United States in such f elds as military education and training, and military equipment procurement[5], and is involved in joint training with the United States. These include the “CARAT (Cooperation Af oat Readiness and Training)”[6] and the “SEACAT (Southeast Asia Cooperation Against Terrorism)”[7] exercises. In 2010, President Barack Obama visited Indonesia, and the two countries concluded a bilateral comprehensive partnership. Since then, a bilateral foreign ministers’ meeting has been held annually in accordance with said partnership. With China, the counter-terrorism training “Sharp Knife” has been held among the special operation forces of the two countries since 2011, and “Sharp Knife Airborne” among the airborne units of the air forces of the two countries since 2013. In November 2014, Minister of Foreign Affairs Wang Yi visited Indonesia and held talks with President Joko on maritime development cooperation. In March 2015, President Joko visited China as a state guest, and aff rmed with President Xi Jinping that they would deepen bilateral relations under the framework of comprehensive strategic partnership. In October 2014, Commander of the Indonesian National Armed Forces Moeldoko commented that the country had only yet reached 38% of the target to achieve MEF in the next four years. Chief of Staff of the Indonesian Navy Marsetio has stated that the country’s maritime defense capabilities are very much inadequate, and that 12 submarines and 16 frigates are necessary. At the ASEAN Foreign Ministers’ Meeting in July 2012, member states were divided over the content of the joint statement, and the joint statement was ultimately not adopted. However, after the meeting, Minister of Foreign Affairs Marty Natalegawa of Indonesia held successive talks with the foreign ministers from the respective member states, and “ASEAN’s Six-Point Principles on the South China Sea” was established. The United States suspended International Military Education and Training (IMET) for Indonesian military personnel in 1992 over the issue of Timor-Leste. IMET provides opportunities for studying and training at U.S. military educational institutions. Though the restriction was partially lifted in 1995, the United States suspended IMET again in 1999. Later, in 2005, the United States resumed IMET and decided to resume arms exports to Indonesia. A general term that refers to a series of bilateral exercises that the United States conducts with Bangladesh, Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Timor-Leste. A general term that refers to counter-terrorism joint exercises that the United States conducts with Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand. Entered into force in 1971. This agreement states that Australia, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom will discuss what response should be adopted in the event of aggression towards or the threat ----- **3** **Myanmar** Myanmar shares borders with China and India, which are leading actors in the changes of balance of power in the international community, and is also located on the border of South Asia and Southeast Asia. In light of these factors, Myanmar is noted for its strategic signif cance. Following the collapse of its socialist regime in 1988, the armed forces seized power in Myanmar, and the United States and European countries imposed economic sanctions in response to the military junta’s suppression of pro-democracy movements. Against the backdrop of its economic slowdown as a result of the economic sanctions and isolation from the international community, Myanmar issued a road map to democracy in 2003[9]. After a general election in 2010, Thein Sein was elected as president in February 2011. The road map to democracy was completed in March 2011 with the launch of the new administration. Since the launch of the new administration, the government of Myanmar has actively taken steps toward democratization, including the release of political prisoners and ceasef re agreements with ethnic minorities[10]. The international community to a certain extent has commended Myanmar for these steps, with the United States and European countries successively easing economic sanctions on Myanmar. In 2013, President Thein Sein made the f rst visit to the United States by a leader of Myanmar in almost 50 years, and held talks with President Obama. General Sir Richards, Chief of the Defence Staff of the British Armed Forces, made the f rst visit to Myanmar by a senior military off cial from the West since the commencement of Myanmar’s reform process. At the same time, Myanmar has taken steps to reach a ceasef re with ethnic minorities. In January 2015, President Thein Sein requested the leaders of ethnic minority armed groups to hold talks with the government on the country’s Union Day (February 12), with a view to reaching a nationwide ceasef re agreement. However, the talks were not attended by some ethnic minority leaders. In the northern region, sporadic f ghting has broken out between the country’s military and ethnic minority armed groups. In February 2015, the President declared a 90-day state of emergency in the Kokang Self-Administered Zone in Shan State where the f ghting took place[11], and promulgated a military administrative order[12]. Under these circumstances, in March 2015, the government of Myanmar announced that the ethnic minority leaders who did not attend the previous talks on a ceasef re agreement participated in the talks, and a basic agreement was reached on the content of the National Ceasef re Agreement. On the other hand, concerns about nuclear issues and military ties with North Korea have been pointed out[13]. The international community has growing concerns over the impact on democratization of the conf icts which have emerged since 2012 between Rohingya Muslim ethnic minorities and Buddhists. With regard to foreign policy, Myanmar upholds the principle of independence and non-alignment. On the other hand, China is thought to be an especially important partner to Myanmar since its period of military rule. Myanmar receives economic support from China. In October 2013, a gas pipeline connecting the two 9 Consists of seven steps: reconvening of the National Assembly; stepwise implementation of processes necessary for democratization; drafting a new constitution; a national referendum on the constitution; general election; convening of the House of Representatives; and the establishment of a new government. 10 About 30% of Myanmar’s population is ethnic minorities, some of which demand secession or greater autonomy for their regions. In the 1960s, the government of Myanmar implemented oppressive policies involving human rights violations such as forced labor and forced migration, which led to armed conflicts with armed groups of ethnic minorities. 11 A state of emergency is issued as a presidential decree in situations such as when a state of emergency occurs that places the lives, housing, and property of the people in danger. For the purpose of maintaining public security, the decree may designate regions and deadlines and restrict or suspend the basic rights of the people as necessary. 12 Pursuant to the promulgation of this order, the administrative and judicial powers and duties related to maintaining social order are conferred to the Commander-in-Chief of Defence Services. 13 It is reported that at talks with then-President Lee Myung-bak of the Republic of Korea in May 2012, President Thein Sein admitted that some weapons trading took place with North Korea in the past 20 years and indicated that the country would not engage in such trade in the future. He denied cooperation with North Korea on nuclear development. Moreover, it has been reported that, at the 11th Shangri-La Dialogue (Asia Security Summit) held in June the same year, then-Defence Minister Hla Min disclosed that while the previous government attempted to start academic research ----- countries was completed and became fully operational. Port construction has also begun. On the military front, China is regarded as a major supplier of equipment. In June 2014, President Thein Sein visited China, and the two sides agreed to deepen cooperation in such areas as defense practices, law enforcement, and security. Myanmar is also strengthening its cooperative relationship with India both in the economic and military areas. Myanmar participates in the multinational naval exercise “Milan” hosted by India. In January 2015, President Pranab Mukherjee of India committed to extending US$5 million in assistance over the next f ve years to Myanmar for developing a border between the two countries. Myanmar was the Chair of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in 2014, and attention was paid to Myanmar’s leadership in ASEAN-related international meetings. Myanmar played a certain level of role, as exemplif ed by the release of joint statements at the ASEAN-related international meetings Myanmar chaired[14]. See Part III, Chapter 3, Section 1-4-6 ((7) Other Southeast Asian Countries) the Comprehensive Agreement on the Bangsamoro[17]. On the other hand, in January 2015, military clashes occurred between the government army and National Police, and armed groups of the MILF and other armed forces opposing the peace talks[18]. It is deemed that time will be required to achieve practical peace. The Philippines and the United States, with a historically close relationship, consider that the U.S.Philippines alliance is a lynchpin for the peace, stability, and prosperity of the Asia-Pacif c region. The two countries have maintained a cooperative relationship under their mutual defense treaty and military assistance agreement, even after the withdrawal of the U.S. Forces in 1992[19]. The two countries have conducted the large-scale military exercise “Balikatan” every year since 2000 as well as the “CARAT” and “SEACAT” joint exercises. In addition, the United States dispatched the Joint Special Operations Task Force-Philippines (JSOTF-P) to southern Philippines to support the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) in their campaign against Muslim extremist groups, such as the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG)[20]. In December 2013, U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry visited the Philippines and announced support of US$40 million in three years in order **4** **The Philippines** The Philippines perceives that it confronts new security challenges, including non-traditional threats, such as transnational crime. At the same time, it identif es that long-standing issues, such as the territorial disputes over the South China Sea and terrorism perpetrated by domestic anti-government armed groups, constitute major security concerns. In particular, the government of the Philippines was engaged in repeated armed conf icts with the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) for approximately 40 years. With the support of the activities of the International Monitoring Team (IMT)[15], progress was made in the peace process, and the Framework Agreement for the realization of a f nal agreement on the Mindanao peace process was signed in October 2012. In January 2014, the government of the Philippines and the MILF jointly signed the Annex on Normalization[16], and in March of the same year, they signed 14 At the ASEAN Foreign Ministers’ Meeting in July 2012 chaired by Cambodia, opinion was divided among member states on the content of the joint statement, and consequently, a joint statement was not adopted. 15 Malaysia, Brunei, Indonesia, Japan, Norway, and the EU are the member states of the IMT (as of March 2015). 16 After the Framework Agreement was concluded in 2012, of the four Annexes that had been continuously reviewed by the Philippine government and the MILF, agreements were already reached on items related to transitional arrangements and modalities, revenue generation and wealth sharing, and power sharing. Consultations on normalization were left for last. 17 The goal of this agreement is to launch an autonomous government in 2016 after formulating the Bangsamoro Basic Law, holding a referendum in order to demarcate a jurisdictional domain, abolishing the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM), and establishing the Bangsamoro Transition Authority (BTA). 18 In January 2015, in Mindanao, an exchange of fi re occurred between the Philippine National Police that were mobilized to arrest Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) suspects, and the MILF and Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters (BIFF). This incident reportedly left casualties on both sides. 19 In 1947, a military base agreement was concluded that allows the U.S. Forces to use Clark Air Base and Subic Bay Naval Station for 99 years. A military assistance agreement was also concluded in 1947, followed by the mutual defense treaty in 1951. With the revision of the 1966 military base agreement, the time limit for the stationing of U.S. military bases in the Philippines was set for 1991. Clark Air Base and Subic Bay Naval Station were returned in 1991 and 1992, respectively. Subsequently, the two countries concluded the Visiting Forces Agreement in 1998, establishing the legal status of U.S. Forces personnel visiting for joint military exercises in the Philippines. 20 With the aim of building a Muslim nation, ASG conducts activities such as terrorist bombings, assassinations, and abductions in the southern Philippines. It is designated as a terrorist organization by the United States. In October 2014, ASG reportedly demanded the German government to pay ransom in exchange for two male and female German nationals it took as hostages, as well as not to ----- to enhance coast guard and counter-terrorism capabilities. In April 2014, the two countries signed the U.S.Philippines Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement[21] aimed at strengthening bilateral cooperation in such areas as maritime security, capacity-building of the AFP through expanded joint exercises, and disaster relief. The Agreement enables the U.S. Forces to utilize and improve facilities in the Philippines, as well as preposition equipment, supplies, and material. Attention will be on the relevant activities as they relate to the strengthening of the presence of the U.S. Forces in the Philippines. The Philippines and China have conf icting territorial claims over the Spratly Islands and the Scarborough Shoal in the South China Sea. In recent years, the two countries have stepped up their activities to assert their sovereignty, with both countries lodging protests against the other’s actions and assertions. See Part I, Chapter 1, Section 6-4 (Trends concerning Sovereignty Over the South China Sea) See Part III, Chapter 3, Section 1-4-6 ((4) The Philippines) relations with ASEAN and the FPDA[22], and has concluded defense cooperation agreements with countries within and outside the region. With the aim of contributing to peace and stability in the region, Singapore supports U.S. presence in the Asia-Pacif c and permits it to use military facilities in Singapore. Singapore and the United States have agreed that a maximum of four U.S. littoral combat ships (LCSs) would be rotationally deployed to Singapore after 2013. Deployment began in April 2013[23]. In addition, Singapore conducted joint exercises with the United States, such as “CARAT” and “SEACAT.” With China, in November 2014, Singapore conducted the joint counter-terrorism exercise “Cooperation,” which was carried out in 2009 and 2010. In addition, active mutual visits have taken place between their dignitaries. In November, Minister of Defence Ng Eng Hen visited China. During his talks with Minister of National Defense Chang Wanquan, the two sides agreed to develop their defense cooperation and promote joint training. In May 2015, the two countries conducted their f rst bilateral naval joint exercise “China-Singapore Cooperation 2015.” See Part III, Chapter 3, Section 1-4-6 ((3) Singapore) **5** **Singapore** Given its limited land area, population, and resources, Singapore’s existence and development depend on the peace and stability of the region in a globalized economy. Singapore gives high priority to national defense, with defense spending accounting for about one-f fth of its national budget. Singapore identif es deterrence and diplomacy as twin pillars of its national defense policy. Deterrence is provided by a robust national army and stable national defense spending, and diplomacy is established by strong and friendly relations with the defense institutions of other countries. Singapore is undertaking efforts to improve the capability and modernize the Singapore Armed Forces (SAF) in order to defend the nation against direct threats and to respond to transnational security issues, such as terrorism and piracy in peacetime. Due to its small land area, the SAF uses the training facilities of other countries, such as the United States and Australia, and continuously dispatches units there for training. Singapore emphasizes the importance of cooperative **6** **Thailand** Thailand’s defense policy includes: strengthening defense cooperation through ASEAN, international organizations, and other entities; defense that makes comprehensive use of political, economic, and other national strengths; and effective defense aimed at increasing the readiness of the Royal Thai Armed Forces (RTAF) and developing the defense industry. Attacks and bombing incidents by Islamic extremists seeking secession and independence have become a frequent occurrence in southern Thailand. The government identif es the swift restoration of peace and security of the lives and property of the people in southern Thailand as an urgent task. In August 2013, the submission of an amnesty bill[24] by opposition parties to the House of Representatives sparked large-scale anti-government demonstrations, mainly in the capital city of Bangkok. The House was dissolved in December 2013, and a declaration of a state of emergency 21 The Agreement states that the military bases in the Philippines to be utilized by the U.S. Forces shall be determined through consultations following the conclusion of the Agreement and set out in an annex to the Agreement. However, petitions were fi led in the Philippines over the unconstitutionality of the Agreement, suspending consultations on the annex. 22 See Part I, Chapter 1, Section 6-2, Footnote 8 23 In December 2014, LCS USS Fort Worth arrived in Singapore for the second deployment. 24 The bill gives amnesty to those who were arrested in the political upheaval since the military coup d’état in 2006. It is deemed that the bill would allow former Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra, who ----- was issued in January 2014[25]. While a general election of the House of Representatives was held in February 2014, a series of polling stations cancelled voting due to demonstrator interferences. As a result, in March 2014, the Constitutional Court ruled that the general election of the House of Representatives violated the Constitution and was invalid. In May 2014, the Constitutional Court ruled that the Cabinet’s reshuff e of off cials in the past was unconstitutional. Then-Prime Minister Yingluck Shinawatra and Cabinet members were instantly dismissed[26]. That same month, following the declaration of martial law nationwide, forces led by the RTAF launched a coup d’état and seized power over the nation. Subsequently, then-Commander-in-Chief Prayuth Chan-o-Cha of the Royal Thai Army established the National Council for Peace and Order that he chairs. In August 2014, he was elected interim Prime Minister pursuant to the designation of the National Legislative Assembly formed by the interim constitution enacted in July 2014[27]. The King issued a decree appointing the members of the interim Cabinet which was formed by the Prime Minister. In September 2014, the Prayuth interim administration was formally inaugurated. This administration aims to hold a general election under the new Constitution and make the transition to a new administration by September 2016 at the latest. Thailand has the issue of non-demarcated borders with neighboring countries, such as Myanmar and Cambodia. Thailand has a border dispute with Cambodia over the nondemarcated border area near the Preah Vihear Temple[28], and intermittent armed conf ict between the military forces of the two countries had broken out in the area since 2008. In November 2013, the International Court of Justice declared the temple and a part of the surrounding area to be Cambodian territory. Under its f exible omni-directional diplomatic policy, Thailand pursues cooperation with other Southeast Asian countries and coordination with major countries, including Japan, the United States, and China. Since the conclusion of the Military Assistance Agreement in 1950, Thailand and its ally[29], the United States, have maintained a cooperative relationship. They have conducted the multinational joint exercise “Cobra Gold” since 1982, as well as the “CARAT” and “SEACAT” joint exercises. However, in May 2014, the United States froze its military assistance in response to the coup[30]. Thailand promotes military exchanges with China; for example, their marine forces hold a joint military training program codenamed “Blue Assault.” In addition, Thailand and China agreed on the joint development of a multiple rocket launcher system in April 2012. In February 2015, Minister of National Defense Chang Wanquan visited Thailand. During his talks with interim Prime Minister Prayuth, the two sides agreed to enhance their joint exercises. See Part III, Chapter 3, Section 1-4-6 ((5) Thailand) **7** **Vietnam** Vietnam perceives that it confronts diverse and complex security challenges. It considers that the issues in the South China Sea have serious impacts on the maritime activities of Vietnam, and non-traditional threats, such as piracy and terrorism, are matters of concern. During the Cold War era, the former Soviet Union was the largest donor of assistance to Vietnam. Until 2002, Russia owned a naval base in Cam Ranh Bay. After the collapse of the former Soviet Union, Vietnam rapidly expanded its diplomatic relations, including establishing diplomatic ties with the United States. At present, Vietnam pursues an omni-directional diplomatic policy and states that it would actively participate in international and regional cooperation in order to build friendly relations with all countries. In May 2013, Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung announced the Vietnam People’s Army’s (VPA) f rst participation in peacekeeping operations. Since June 2014, Vietnam has deployed military observers to the United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS)[31]. Furthermore, in May 2014, a PKO Center was established at the Foreign Relations Department of the Vietnamese Ministry of National Defence. As such efforts exemplify, Vietnam is committed to making contributions to the international community. In recent years, Vietnam has strengthened its relationship with the United States in the military area 25 In November 2013, the ruling party abandoned the passage of the bill. However, anti-government forces shifted the objective of the demonstrations to “overthrowing the current government” and continued the demonstrations. 26 The Constitutional Court ruled that the transfer of then-National Security Council chief to a sinecure position in September 2011 was conducted for political purposes to promote a relative of thenPrime Minister Yingluck to a higher position. The Court ruled that this was unconstitutional as it infringes the provisions of the Constitution which prohibit state ministers from intervening unjustifiably in public servant appointments. The Prime Minister who was responsible for the reshuffle and relevant ministers were instantly dismissed on the grounds that the reshuffle constituted reason for dismissal provided for in the Constitution. 27 As the National Council for Peace and Order continues to exist even after the inauguration of the interim administration, Prayuth concurrently serves as Council Chair and interim Prime Minister. 28 A Hindu temple located on the border between Cambodia and Thailand. The International Court of Justice ruled in 1962 that the temple was situated in territory under the sovereignty of Cambodia; however, the border of the area around the temple had not been demarcated. The 2013 ruling did not clarify the attribution of the remaining disputed region. Nevertheless, both countries accepted the ruling, and a joint committee comprised of working-level offi cials will be holding talks on the ruling’s content. 29 Thailand and the United States have an alliance based on the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty, or Manila Pact, of 1954 and the Rusk-Thanat communiqué of 1962. 30 Co-organized by the U.S. Forces and the RTAF and held annually in Thailand, the multinational joint exercise Cobra Gold 15 was held in February 2015. ----- through joint exercises with the U.S. Navy and U.S. Navy ships’ calling at Vietnam. In December 2013, U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry visited Vietnam and announced support of US$18 million in the f eld of maritime security. In October 2014, the United States announced the lifting of its embargo on providing lethal weapons related to maritime security to Vietnam[32]. Vietnam and Russia elevated their bilateral relationship to a comprehensive strategic partnership in 2012, and continue to strengthen cooperation in the area of national defense. In March 2013, Minister of Defence Sergey Shoygu visited Vietnam, and the two sides agreed to jointly construct vessel replenishment facilities along Cam Ranh Bay. Furthermore, when President Vladimir Putin visited Vietnam in November of the same year, he agreed that Russia would provide support for training Vietnam’s Ground Forces and Navy. In 2014, Russian IL-78 aerial refueling tankers landed at Cam Ranh International Airport for the f rst time for the refueling f ights for Russia’s Tu-95MS strategic bombers[33]. As these examples demonstrate, the two countries have been carrying out new military cooperation. In recent years, the two countries have also promoted cooperation in the energy sector, such as nuclear power generation. Vietnam is nearly dependent on Russia for its defense equipment. See Part I, Chapter 1, Section 4-5-2 (Relations with Asian Countries) Vietnam and China, under their comprehensive strategic cooperation partnership relations, proactively conduct exchanges among their senior government off cials. However, the two countries have conf icting assertions over issues such as sovereignty over the South China Sea. In recent years, both countries have stepped up their activities to assert their territorial sovereignty, and have lodged protests against the other country’s activities and assertions. In August 2014, Le Hong Anh, Standing Secretary of the Secretariat of the Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV), visited China as a special envoy of the CPV General Secretary. During his talks with President Xi Jinping, the two sides agreed to execute the basic principles[34] agreed upon in 2011 with regard to the South China Sea dispute. In October 2014, Minister of National Defence Phung Quang Thanh visited China. During his talks with Minister of National Defense Chang Wanquan, both ministers signed an MOU on establishing a hotline between the two defense ministries. Furthermore, in April 2015, CPV General Secretary Nguyen Phu Trong visited China for the f rst time in three and a half years. Following his talks with President Xi Jinping, the two sides issued a joint statement[35] on strengthening exchanges and cooperation between their military forces and managing the differences in opinion to prevent their development into disputes, among other matters. Vietnam and India upgraded their relationship to a strategic partnership in 2007 and have been deepening their cooperative relationship in a broad range of areas, including security and economy. In the area of defense cooperation, it is noted that the Indian Armed Forces support the training of Vietnam’s Navy submarine personnel and Air Force pilots. In addition, Indian Navy vessels make friendly visits to Vietnam. Furthermore, in September 2014, India signed an MOU on a US$100 million credit offering for Vietnam[36]. When Minister of National Defense Phung Quang Thanh visited India in May 2015, the two sides signed the Joint Vision Statement on Defence Cooperation for the period 2015-2020[37]. Cooperation in the area of energy between India and Vietnam is also deepening, with a joint development program for oil and natural gas in the South China Sea. See Part I, Chapter 1, Section 6-4 (Trends concerning Sovereignty Over the South China Sea) See Part III, Chapter 3, Section 1-4-6 ((2) Vietnam) 32 In 1984, the United States invoked an arms embargo against Vietnam on the grounds of its human rights issue. In 2007, the arms embargo was lifted excluding lethal weapons. Based on the latest decision, Vietnam is reportedly considering the purchase of U.S.-made P-3 maritime patrol aircraft. 33 In March 2015, it was reported that U.S. Department of Defense authorities, while stating the relevant facts, requested Vietnam to prevent the recurrence of this activity. In addition, a senior offi cial of the U.S. Pacifi c Command allegedly stated that the Russian military aircraft that received refueling from the aerial refueling tankers arriving from the Cam Ranh base conducted provocative fl ights. In January 2015, the Russian Ministry of Defence announced that Russian aerial refueling tankers (IL-78) used Cam Ranh Bay in 2014, enabling the refueling of strategic fi ghters. 34 The agreement on basic principles was signed in October 2011 between then-President Hu Jintao and CPV General Secretary Nguyen Phu Trong who was visiting China. The two countries agreed to maintain friendly dialogue and negotiations for the settlement of maritime issues, strive to settle maritime disputes which are acceptable to both sides while respecting legal grounds, and hold regular meetings as well as establish a hotline between the two governments. 35 The joint statement’s references to the military fi eld include maintaining high-level contacts and military and security dialogue between the two countries, strengthening friendly exchanges between their border patrol forces, properly dealing with differences in opinion, exchanging military experiences with party and political tasks, deepening cooperation on personnel training, and continuing joint patrols in the Gulf of Tonkin and vessel exchanges. In the joint statement, with regard to the South China Sea dispute, the two sides also affi rmed the importance of executing the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DOC) and swiftly establishing the Code of the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (COC). 36 This was agreed upon in November 2013 when CPV General Secretary Nguyen Phu Trong visited India and held talks with then-Prime Minister Manmohan Singh of India. It is reported that the credit will be used to purchase patrol vessels of the VPA. 37 The statement was agreed upon in May 2015, when Minister of National Defense Phung Quang Thanh of Vietnam visited India and held talks with Defence Minister Manohar Parrikar of India. While the content of the Joint Vision Statement has not been disclosed, it is said to cover the period 2015-2020, with maritime security cooperation constituting the main pillar. On the same day, the two ----- **3** **Military Modernization in the Region** In recent years, Southeast Asian countries have increased their defense spending against the backdrop of economic development and other reasons, and are modernizing their military forces focusing on inducting equipment such as submarines and f ghters including fourth-generation modern f ghters. The underlying factors noted are increases in defense spending, the relationship between Southeast Asian countries in the sense that they react to neighboring states’ development of military strength, response to the expansion of China’s inf uence, and the inadequate role of regional security organizations to nurture relationships of trust[38]. Many Southeast Asian countries procure much of their defense equipment from a wide range of countries. As such, there are perceived diff culties in achieving consistent operations and maintenance in the respective countries. Indonesia has introduced a total of 16 Russian Su-27 f ghters and Su-30 f ghters by 2013. In 2011, an agreement was reached regarding the U.S. provision of 24 F-16 f ghters, three of which were delivered in July 2014. In 2013, Indonesia agreed to purchase 8 AH-64 attack helicopters. With the Republic of Korea (ROK), Indonesia concluded an agreement in December 2011 to purchase three 209-class submarines. The two countries started joint development of the KF-X f ghter, and in October 2014, concluded a basic agreement which sets forth the details of their cost sharing and bilateral cooperation. Indonesia plans to refurbish its F-5 f ghter and is in the process of selecting its successor. In addition, it is building in Indonesia two frigates based on the Dutch Sigma-class vessel. In 2009, Malaysia introduced two Scorpène-class submarines (jointly developed by France and Spain) as its f rst submarines. In November 2014, Malaysia reportedly concluded an agreement to purchase six corvettes from the ROK. Furthermore, Malaysia announced a plan to build six indigenous LCSs and started building one of them. It also introduced 18 Russian-made Su-30 f ghters by 2009 and is selecting a successor to its Mig-29 f ghters that are scheduled to be decommissioned in 2015. The Philippines has taken steps in recent years to modernize its defense equipment against the backdrop of conf icts over territorial rights in the South China Sea. As it does not currently own any submarines or f ghters, the Philippines concluded an agreement with the ROK to purchase 12 FA-50 light combat aircraft in 2014. As for naval forces, the Philippines received two Hamiltonclass frigates from the United States in 2011 and 2012. In June 2014, it was reported that the ROK would provide decommissioned Pohang-class corvettes. By January 2015, seven Italian AW109 multi-purpose helicopters tailored to wide-ranging naval missions, such as maritime patrol, have been delivered. In addition, the Philippines has announced plans to procure equipment, such as attack helicopter, long-range maritime patrol aircraft, transport vessel, and amphibious vehicle. Singapore has the largest defense budget among Southeast Asian countries and is actively striving to modernize its forces. By 2012, Singapore introduced two Archer-class (Västergötland-class) submarines from Sweden. In December 2013, Singapore concluded an agreement to purchase two German 218SG-class submarines, and announced a plan to build eight indigenous patrol vessels. With regard to f ghters, Singapore inducted U.S.-made F-15 f ghters and participates in the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) Program. Thailand has an aircraft carrier but does not own submarines. In July 2014, Thailand opened the Submarine Squadron Headquarters, and has started the evaluation work to procure new submarines. In September 2012, the Cabinet approved a plan to introduce two frigates, and concluded an agreement to purchase a ROK-made frigate for the f rst frigate. In addition, by 2013, Thailand has introduced 12 Swedish JAS-39 Gripen f ghters. In December 2009, Vietnam concluded a contract to purchase six Russian Kilo-class submarines and introduced three of them by December 2014. In 2013, it was reported that Vietnam concluded a contract to purchase two Dutch Sigma-class corvettes. Furthermore, in August 2014, it was agreed that Japan would supply six used vessels to Vietnam, the f rst of which was delivered in February 2015. Vietnam reportedly concluded a contract to purchase 24 Russian Su-30 f ghters during the years 2009 through 2011, and concluded a contract to additionally purchase 12 of the same f ghter by 2013. Following the United States’ lifting of the embargo against lethal weapons related to maritime security, attention will be paid to the trends in the equipment that Vietnam introduces from the United States, primarily as they relate to strengthening Vietnam’s maritime defense capabilities. ----- **4** **Trends concerning Sovereignty Over the South China Sea** In the South China Sea, there are territorial disputes between ASEAN countries and China over such areas as the Spratly Islands[39] and the Paracel Islands[40]. In addition, there has been growing concern among the international community over issues such as the freedom of navigation in the sea. With a desire to promote the peaceful resolution of maritime territorial disputes in the South China Sea, ASEAN and China signed the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DOC)[41] in 2002. This declaration is a political statement with reference to principles of dispute resolution related to the South China Sea, but with no legally binding obligations. At the ASEAN-China Foreign Ministers’ Meeting held in July 2011, the Guidelines for the Implementation of the DOC of Parties in the South China Sea was adopted to pave the way for effective implementation of the Declaration. Currently, the concerned countries have conf rmed their commitment to the formulation of the Code of the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (COC), which will provide more specif c guidance than the DOC and will have legally binding obligations. By October 2014, three rounds of off cial consultations have been held for the formulation of the COC[42]. In the meantime, the countries are increasing their activities in the South China Sea in support of their territorial claims. China enacted the Act on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone of the People’s Republic of China in 1992, in which it made clear claims to the territorial rights of the Spratly Islands and the Paracel Islands. It attached the so-called “ninedotted line” map to a verbal note addressed to the United Nations in 2009, in which it made claims to the parts of the South China Sea that purportedly came under China’s sovereignty, sovereign rights, and jurisdiction. There were objections to the ambiguity behind the justif cations to this “nine-dotted line” under international law, and this has given rise to territorial conf icts over the South China Sea with Southeast Asian countries. In recent years, Chinese naval vessels and government vessels aff liated with maritime law enforcement agencies have been operating around the Scarborough Shoal and the Second Thomas Shoal, close to the Philippines, as well as the James Shoal and the South Luconia Shoal areas close to Malaysia. Furthermore, in June 2012, China announced the establishment of Sansha City in Hainan Province, which claims to have jurisdiction over the Spratly Islands, the Paracel Islands, the Macclesf eld Bank, and their surrounding waters. In November 2013, Hainan Province amended its regulation on the implementation of China’s f shing law to stipulate that foreign f shing vessels that wish to carry out f shing activities in waters under the jurisdiction of Hainan Province are required to obtain permission from the relevant departments under China’s State Council. From April to June 2012, government vessels of Chinese maritime law enforcement agencies and Philippine vessels, including Philippine Navy vessels, faced off against each other in the sea area surrounding the Scarborough Shoal. In June 2012, Vietnam adopted the Maritime Law (effective January 2013), which asserts sovereignty over the Spratly and the Paracel Islands. In March 2013, Chinese vessels reportedly f red at Vietnamese f shing vessels. Furthermore, according to reports, in May 2014, China’s unilateral commencement of oil drilling in waters near the Paracel Islands triggered confrontations between Chinese and Vietnamese vessels, and many vessels sustained damages due to collisions[43]. The countries involved have reportedly resorted to the use of force on one another’s vessels, including seizing vessels and f ring warning shots[44], in this manner, and the concerned countries have mutually lodged protests against these actions. More recently, in January 2015, Vietnamese f shing vessels were reportedly tracked by Chinese vessels, causing damages to communication and other equipment. In February 2015, the Philippine government delivered a letter of protest to the Chinese government, saying that a Chinese authority vessel crashed into a Philippine f shing vessel near the Scarborough Shoal. In May 2014, the Philippine government released chronological photos showing China’s land reclamation at Johnson South Reef and lodged a protest against China. In addition, the Vietnamese government has lodged protests claiming that China is building runways and conducting 39 The area surrounding the Spratly Islands is expected to have offshore resources such as oil and natural gas. In addition, the area is a maritime transport hub and is blessed with rich fishery resources. 40 China, Taiwan, Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, and Brunei claim sovereignty over the Spratly Islands. China, Taiwan, and Vietnam claim sovereignty over the Paracel Islands. 41 It includes provisions that all concerned parties should resolve territorial disputes in a peaceful manner in accordance with the principles of international law, that the adoption of the Code of Conduct will further promote peace and stability of the region, and that efforts should be made to this end. 42 An agreement was reached to work towards the establishment of a “wise men’s committee” consisting of experts and others to support the official consultations. In addition, in October 2014, an agreement was reached on early harvest measures, such as setting up a hotline platform among the search and rescue agencies of China and ASEAN and conducting a tabletop exercise on search and rescue. 43 In Vietnam, demonstrations and riots have broken out against China’s unilateral oil drilling activities, causing deaths and injuries. 44 It is reported that in 2010, Indonesia seized a Chinese fishing vessel, and in the same year, the Malaysia navy fleet and aircraft tracked a Chinese fi shing patrol ship. It has been reported that Chinese authority ships and Chinese fishing boats cut the investigation cable of a Vietnamese resource exploration vessel in May 2011 and November 2012, respectively. It has also been reported that in February 2011, a Chinese naval vessel fired warnings shots at a Philippine fishing boat. Moreover, reports also indicate that a Chinese authority ship in May 2011 and a Chinese naval vessel in February 2012 fired upon a Vietnamese fishing boat in separate incidents. According to a spokesperson of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, in April 2015, a Chinese vessel fl ashed powerful lights towards a Philippine Air Force aircraft that was conducting a routine patrol fl ight near the Subi Reef and requested the aircraft to withdraw from the area. In connection with this incident, in May 2015, Philippine Secretary of National Defense Voltaire Gazmin reportedly stated that China acts like there is an air defense identifi cation zone (ADIZ), while revealing that China had twice before requested ----- The situation of China’s reclamation work in the Spratly Islands. The top row, from left to right, shows the before and after photos of the reclamation at Johnson South Reef, as well as a close-up of the reclaimed area (photos taken in January 2012 and March 2015). The bottom row shows the situation in Subi Reef (January and March 2015). [CSIS Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative/DigitalGlobe] other activities at Woody Island and Fiery Cross Reef[45]. In January 2013, the Philippines f led an arbitration procedure based on the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea concerning China’s claims and activities in the South China Sea. See Part I, Chapter 2, Section 3-3 (8 Southeast Asia) In addition, in November 2013, a spokesperson of the Chinese Ministry of National Defense declared that China would establish other air defense identif cation zones (ADIZ) in the future, in addition to the East China Sea ADIZ that it established. In relation to this, in December of the same year, U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry expressed the view that China should refrain from taking unilateral measures, including the establishment of ADIZs in Asia, particularly in the airspace above the South China Sea. The issues surrounding the South China Sea have been discussed repeatedly at ASEAN-related meetings and other fora, with a view to achieving their peaceful resolution. However, as exemplif ed by the unprecedented situation in which an ASEAN joint statement failed to be adopted in the past, there have been instances of lack of consensus among the member states. Nevertheless, there were also instances in which ASEAN adopted a unif ed response. For example, “serious concerns” over the confrontations between Chinese and Vietnamese vessels in the South China Sea were expressed at the ASEAN Summit and Foreign Ministers’ Meeting in May 2014. Furthermore, at both the ASEAN Foreign Minister’s Meeting in August 2014 and the Summit in November, members expressed that they remained concerned over recent developments which increased tensions in the South China Sea. At the ASEAN Summit in April 2015, members expressed that they “share the serious concerns” on the land reclamation to be undertaken in the Spratly Islands. The issues surrounding the South China Sea are a matter of concern for the whole international community, and are directly related to the peace and stability of the Asia-Pacif c region. As such, attention will continue to be paid to trends in the countries concerned, as well as the direction of dialogues aimed at the resolution of the issues. See Part I, Chapter 2, Section 3-1 (Trends Related to the “Principle of the Freedom of the High Seas” in the East China Sea and South China Sea); Part III, Chapter 3, Section 1 (Defense Cooperation and Exchanges with Other Countries and Regions) 45 In addition to Woody Island and Fiery Cross Reef, China conducts land reclamation at Johnson South Reef, Gaven Reefs, Hughes Reef, Cuarteron Reef, Subi Reef, and Mischief Reef. Of the features where land reclamation is being carried out, observers note that facilities deemed to be a runway and an apron are being constructed at Fiery Cross Reef. At Subi Reef, observers note that the largescale land reclamation is large enough to enable the construction of a second runway. On April 20, 2015, the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines stated that China’s land reclamation has “created tensions among the countries around the world.” On May 27, 2015, Philippine Secretary of National Defense Voltaire Gazmin, during his visit to Hawaii, held talks with U.S. Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter. It is believed that the two sides shared the recognition that all countries involved should seek a peaceful resolution of disputes in the South China Sea and immediately halt ----- **5** **Regional Cooperation** ASEAN member states utilize ASEAN as a multilateral security framework of the region. ASEAN holds the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and the ASEAN Defense Ministers’ Meeting (ADMM), which provide opportunities for dialogue on security issues. Furthermore, ASEAN makes efforts to improve the security environment in the region and promote mutual trust, for example, by holding the ASEAN Militaries’ Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief Table-Top Exercise (AHR) in July 2011, ASEAN’s f rst military exercise. In addition, ASEAN member states are working to achieve their goal of establishing the ASEAN Community[46] by the end of 2015. At the informal ASEAN Foreign Ministers’ Meeting in January 2015, members requested countries to make efforts to complete the remaining work ahead of the Community’s establishment by the end of the year, and decided that the ASEAN Summit to be held in November 2015 would adopt a long-term plan for the **Section 7 South Asia** period following the Community’s establishment. ASEAN places importance on developing relations with non-ASEAN member states. The ADMM Plus, an expanded version of the ASEAN Defense Ministers’ Meeting, comprising ADMM members and eight nonASEAN countries, including Japan, was established in 2010[47]. The second ADMM Plus meeting was held in Brunei in August 2013. In addition, in June of the same year, the f rst f eld exercise, the ADMM Plus Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief/Military Medicine Exercise, was held, and in September of the same year, the f rst counter terrorism exercise and maritime security f eld exercises were held. In November 2011, the United States and Russia became off cial members of the East Asia Summit (EAS), comprising ASEAN members and six nonASEAN countries. In May 2015, the fourth ARF Disaster Relief Exercise was conducted in Malaysia[48]. See Part I, Chapter 2, Section 3-3 (8 Southeast Asia) **1** **India** general election held due to the expiration of the term of the Lok Sabha (lower house), won 282 seats, more than a majority of the seats. As a result, Narendra Modi took off ce as the new Prime Minister. The BJP’s election manifesto refers to policies, such as the promotion of military modernization, strengthening of cross-border counterterrorism measures, and the revision of India’s nuclear doctrine[2]. As attention continues to be paid to the materialization of defense and other policies, on the diplomatic front, Prime Minister Modi has promoted the neighbors f rst policy that deepens India’s relations with South Asian countries. On the defense front, the Prime Minister has worked to expand foreign companies’ direct investment in India’s defense industry under the “Make in India” initiative, promote the domestic production of equipment by enhancing technological cooperation with other countries, and deepen collaboration with other countries to strengthen maritime security cooperation. **1** **General Situation** With a population of more than 1.2 billion on its vast land, India is the world’s largest democratic country. It has achieved steady economic growth in recent years, and has signif cant inf uence in the South Asian region. Also, it is located in the middle of the Indian Ocean, which is of strategic and geopolitical importance in terms of sea lines of communication, connecting the Asia-Pacif c region with the Middle East and Europe. India shares borders with many countries, and has non-demarcated border issues with China and Pakistan. India has multiple ethnic groups, religions, cultures, and languages[1], and there are concerns about the activities of ultra-leftists and secession and independence movements, as well as the movements of Islamic extremists stationed across the India-Pakistan border. In May 2014, the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) (Indian People’s Party), which was the opposition party in the 46 The establishment of the Community was proposed at the second informal ASEAN Summit in 1997. ASEAN aims to achieve regional integration by forming three communities: the Political-Security Community; the Economic Community; and the Socio-Cultural Community. 47 In addition to the framework of the ADMM Plus, defense ministers’ meetings are held between the United States and ASEAN, China and ASEAN, and Japan and ASEAN. In April 2014, a U.S.-ASEAN defense ministers’ meeting was held in the United States for the first time. 48 The Fourth ASEAN Regional Forum Disaster Relief Exercise (ARF-DiREx2015) was conducted from May 25 to 28, 2015 in Alor Setar, Malaysia. More than 2,000 people participated from Japan, the co-organizing countries Malaysia and China, the United States, Australia, and ARF member states including ASEAN countries. 1 The country has a Muslim population exceeding 100 million, although the majority of the country’s population is Hindu. 2 With regard to “revision of India’s nuclear doctrine,” it is reported that following domestic and international criticism, Prime Minister Modi subsequently announced that he has no intention of revising ----- **5** **Regional Cooperation** ASEAN member states utilize ASEAN as a multilateral security framework of the region. ASEAN holds the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and the ASEAN Defense Ministers’ Meeting (ADMM), which provide opportunities for dialogue on security issues. Furthermore, ASEAN makes efforts to improve the security environment in the region and promote mutual trust, for example, by holding the ASEAN Militaries’ Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief Table-Top Exercise (AHR) in July 2011, ASEAN’s f rst military exercise. In addition, ASEAN member states are working to achieve their goal of establishing the ASEAN Community[46] by the end of 2015. At the informal ASEAN Foreign Ministers’ Meeting in January 2015, members requested countries to make efforts to complete the remaining work ahead of the Community’s establishment by the end of the year, and decided that the ASEAN Summit to be held in November 2015 would adopt a long-term plan for the **Section 7 South Asia** period following the Community’s establishment. ASEAN places importance on developing relations with non-ASEAN member states. The ADMM Plus, an expanded version of the ASEAN Defense Ministers’ Meeting, comprising ADMM members and eight nonASEAN countries, including Japan, was established in 2010[47]. The second ADMM Plus meeting was held in Brunei in August 2013. In addition, in June of the same year, the f rst f eld exercise, the ADMM Plus Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief/Military Medicine Exercise, was held, and in September of the same year, the f rst counter terrorism exercise and maritime security f eld exercises were held. In November 2011, the United States and Russia became off cial members of the East Asia Summit (EAS), comprising ASEAN members and six nonASEAN countries. In May 2015, the fourth ARF Disaster Relief Exercise was conducted in Malaysia[48]. See Part I, Chapter 2, Section 3-3 (8 Southeast Asia) **1** **India** general election held due to the expiration of the term of the Lok Sabha (lower house), won 282 seats, more than a majority of the seats. As a result, Narendra Modi took off ce as the new Prime Minister. The BJP’s election manifesto refers to policies, such as the promotion of military modernization, strengthening of cross-border counterterrorism measures, and the revision of India’s nuclear doctrine[2]. As attention continues to be paid to the materialization of defense and other policies, on the diplomatic front, Prime Minister Modi has promoted the neighbors f rst policy that deepens India’s relations with South Asian countries. On the defense front, the Prime Minister has worked to expand foreign companies’ direct investment in India’s defense industry under the “Make in India” initiative, promote the domestic production of equipment by enhancing technological cooperation with other countries, and deepen collaboration with other countries to strengthen maritime security cooperation. **1** **General Situation** With a population of more than 1.2 billion on its vast land, India is the world’s largest democratic country. It has achieved steady economic growth in recent years, and has signif cant inf uence in the South Asian region. Also, it is located in the middle of the Indian Ocean, which is of strategic and geopolitical importance in terms of sea lines of communication, connecting the Asia-Pacif c region with the Middle East and Europe. India shares borders with many countries, and has non-demarcated border issues with China and Pakistan. India has multiple ethnic groups, religions, cultures, and languages[1], and there are concerns about the activities of ultra-leftists and secession and independence movements, as well as the movements of Islamic extremists stationed across the India-Pakistan border. In May 2014, the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) (Indian People’s Party), which was the opposition party in the 46 The establishment of the Community was proposed at the second informal ASEAN Summit in 1997. ASEAN aims to achieve regional integration by forming three communities: the Political-Security Community; the Economic Community; and the Socio-Cultural Community. 47 In addition to the framework of the ADMM Plus, defense ministers’ meetings are held between the United States and ASEAN, China and ASEAN, and Japan and ASEAN. In April 2014, a U.S.-ASEAN defense ministers’ meeting was held in the United States for the first time. 48 The Fourth ASEAN Regional Forum Disaster Relief Exercise (ARF-DiREx2015) was conducted from May 25 to 28, 2015 in Alor Setar, Malaysia. More than 2,000 people participated from Japan, the co-organizing countries Malaysia and China, the United States, Australia, and ARF member states including ASEAN countries. 1 The country has a Muslim population exceeding 100 million, although the majority of the country’s population is Hindu. 2 With regard to “revision of India’s nuclear doctrine,” it is reported that following domestic and international criticism, Prime Minister Modi subsequently announced that he has no intention of revising ----- carrier Vikrant. With regard to submarines, India acquired one Russian-built Akula-class nuclear-powered attack submarine, INS Chakra, in April 2012 under a lease arrangement. In December 2014, India commenced sea trials of its f rst indigenous nuclear submarine INS Arihant. Furthermore, in 2009, India concluded an agreement with the United States to purchase eight P-8 patrol aircraft. By November 2014, India has inducted six of these aircraft. As for its air force, in addition to remodeling its existing f ghters, India has been conducting a competition since 2007 to select its multirole f ghter (126 f ghters), and in January 2012, decided on the French Rafale[6]. With Russia, India has concluded an agreement in December 2012 to purchase 42 additional Su-30 f ghters. India has also been deepening military technological cooperation with Russia, including the joint development of the Fifth Generation Fighter Aircraft based on the PAK FA being developed by Russia. With the United States, India has concluded an agreement in 2010 to purchase ten C-17 transport aircraft and has inducted nine of these aircraft by 2014. In addition to aircraft carriers and nuclear submarines, India undertakes the development and indigenous production of tanks and light combat aircraft. However, delays in their development present challenges for India’s domestic production of equipment. See Fig. I-1-7-1 (Military Forces of India and Pakistan (approximate)) Fig. I-1-7-1 Military Forces of India and Pakistan (approximate) Approx. 550,000 troops Approx. 60 vessels Approx. 97,000 tons Approx. 460 aircraft Pakistan Approx. 1.15 million troops Approx. 220 vessels Approx. 472,000 tons Approx. 960 aircraft India [Legend:] Ground forces (200,000 troops) The United States Geological Survey: Naval vessels (100,000 tons) GTOPO30; and the United States National Combat aircraft (200 aircraft) Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration: ETOPO1 Notes: 1. Figures based on the Military Balance 2015, etc. 2. Combat aircraft include naval aircraft. **2** **Military Affairs** India’s security environment is directly linked to its neighboring countries and the regions of West Asia, Central Asia, Southeast Asia, East Asia, and the Indian Ocean; and India recognizes that strategic-economic factors impose upon them an increasingly larger responsibility. In view of the multifaceted security concerns and the global dimensions of the challenges, India has strengthened cooperative relations with other countries and has long been actively participating in UN Peacekeeping Operations (PKO). In order to respond rapidly and effectively to diversif ed security issues, the government and defense forces remain fully prepared to tackle all challenges. Based on the nuclear doctrine of 2003, India adheres to the following policies: minimum nuclear deterrence, the no-f rst-use nuclear policy, no use against non-nuclear weapon nations, and maintaining the unilateral moratorium on nuclear tests that it announced immediately after the nuclear test in 1998. India promotes the development and deployment of various ballistic missiles. Launch tests were successfully carried out of: “Prithvi 2” (range about 350 km) in January and November 2014; “Agni 1” (range about 1,250 km) in April 2014; and “Agni 4” (range about 4,000 km) in December 2014. Furthermore, in January 2015, the military successfully conducted a test that launched “Agni 5” (range about 5,000-8,000 km) for the f rst time from a canister. In addition, it is reported that India started developing “Agni 6” (range about 8,00010,000 km)[3]. It is deemed that the country aspires to improve the performance of its ballistic missiles, including the extension of their ranges. In regard to cruise missiles, India jointly develops “BrahMos” (range about 300 km) with Russia, deploying these to the army and navy. India is also developing a ballistic missile defense system, and an interception test was successfully carried out in April 2014. In recent years, India has been injecting efforts into modernizing its naval and air forces in particular. As a part of these efforts, it is expanding procurement of equipment from foreign countries as well as joint development with them, and has emerged as the world’s largest arms importer[4]. With respect to its naval capabilities, India has introduced one British-built aircraft carrier, Viraat, and in November 2013, the Russian-built aircraft carrier INS Vikramaditya[5]. It is also building one domestic aircraft The ranges of each missile are referenced from “Jane’s Strategic Weapon Systems (2013)” and other sources. It has been reported that: “Prithvi 2” is a mobile ballistic missile, liquid-fuelled; “Agni 3” is a mobile two-stage ballistic missile, solid-fuelled; “Agni 4” is a mobile two-stage ballistic missile, solid-fuelled; “Agni 5” is a mobile three-stage ballistic missile, solid-fuelled; “Agni 6” is a threestage ballistic missile, solid/liquid-fuelled; and “BrahMos” is a solid-fuelled ramjet supersonic cruise missile. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), “Trends in International Arms Transfers, 2014” (March, 2015) India has concluded an agreement to purchase 45 MiG-29 fi ghters from Russia to be operated from aircraft carriers. By February 2015, 23 of these aircraft have been inducted. It is deemed that the negotiations are ongoing regarding the details of the agreement to purchase Rafale’s multirole fi ghter. In April 2015, Prime Minister Modi visited France, and during his talks with ----- Prime Minister Modi visited the United States. During his talks with U.S. President Barack Obama, the leaders agreed to enhance technology cooperation by the U.S. Forces for India’s Navy, as well as to hold consultations to extend the U.S.-India military cooperation framework set to expire in 2015 by another ten years. In January 2015, President Obama visited India to attend its Republic Day celebrations as Chief Guest. The leaders agreed that they would expand technology cooperation to include co-development and co-production of equipment. In addition, the leaders aff rmed that they would deepen cooperation in the f eld of maritime security, and agreed that cooperation between their navies would be expanded, including upgrading their bilateral naval exercise “Malabar” that is conducted between the two countries. In such ways, their cooperation in the f eld of security has expanded. **(3) Relations with China** See Part I, Chapter 1, Section 3-3-5 ((3) Relations with South Asian Countries) **3** **Relations with Other Countries** **(1) Relations with Pakistan** India and Pakistan have disputes over the sovereignty of Kashmir[7], and have had three armed conf icts of signif cant scope. The territorial dispute over Kashmir has long been in contention between India and Pakistan, with dialogues repeatedly resuming and suspending. Dialogue between the two countries was suspended due to the Mumbai terror attack in 2008, but it resumed following the February 2011 talks by their Vice-Ministers of Foreign Affairs. In 2011, both countries aff rmed the importance of peacefully settling all outstanding issues between the two countries through dialogue. Pakistan then decided to grant India mostfavored nation status. Subsequently, Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif of Pakistan was invited to Prime Minister Modi’s swearing-in ceremony in May 2014, and a summit meeting was held. While both countries had demonstrated readiness to improve their bilateral relations, a Vice Foreign Ministerlevel meeting between the two countries scheduled for August 2014 was cancelled[8]. While the Vice Minister-level meeting was held in Islamabad, Pakistan in March 2015, it is unclear whether dialogue between the two countries would take place continuously. Armed clashes between the two militaries have repeatedly taken place in the Kahsmir region. It is reported that the large-scale armed clashes which took place in October 2014 left civilians dead and injured. This has led both countries to protest against each other, and the Kashmir issue still remains a concern for both countries. **(4) Relations with Russia** See Part I, Chapter 1, Section 4-5-2 (Relations with Asian Countries) **(2) Relations with the United States** India is actively striving to strengthen bilateral relations with the United States. The United States is also promoting engagement with India in line with the expansion of the relationship derived from the economic growth of India. The two countries conduct joint exercises, such as “Malabar”[9], on a regular basis. In addition, in recent years, the United States has become one of India’s major equipment procurement destinations[10]. In September 2014, 7 India asserts the accession of Kashmir to India, based on the Instrument of Accession document by which the ruler of Kashmir acceded to India at the time of Pakistan’s independence, and contends that this matter should be resolved through bilateral negotiations on the basis of the 1972 Simla Agreement (an agreement on the peaceful resolution of disputes and the withdrawal of their military forces that was reached following a summit meeting held in Simla in northern India). On the other hand, Pakistan declares that this should be decided through a referendum, in line with a 1948 UN resolution. The two countries have taken a significantly different fundamental stance toward the resolution of the dispute. 8 In December 2014, Minister of State for External Affairs Vijay Kumar Singh attributed the cancellation of the meeting to the meeting between Pakistan’s High Commissioner and Kashmiri leaders of organizations which seek Kashmir’s secession from India. 9 The “Malabar” was initially a bilateral naval exercise between the United States and India. Then, Japan, Australia, and Singapore joined “Malabar 07-2,” and Japan participated in “Malabar 09” and “Malabar 14.” 10 According to SIPRI, “Trends in International Arms Transfers, 2014” (March, 2015), the share of India’s arms imports from the United States was 0.3% in 2008 and 26.8% in 2014. The United States ----- **2** **Pakistan** Minister, who holds up a policy of dialogue with Islamic extremists. In February 2014, peace consultation with Islamic extremists was conducted for the f rst time. However, since then, these Islamic extremists committed a series of terrorist attacks, and in June of the same year, the Pakistan Armed Forces launched a military operation against these Islamic extremists. In December 2014, following a school attack in Peshawar in northwestern Pakistan by Islamic insurgents[11], Prime Minister Sharif strongly condemned the insurgents, revised the Constitution and developed the National Action Plan that includes establishing a special military tribunal to try terrorist suspects, and announced that the Armed Forces would continue with and step up its mop-up operation. **1** **General Situation** Wedged between the powerful South Asian nation of India and politically-unstable Afghanistan, and sharing borders with China and Iran, Pakistan is placed in a geopolitically signif cant and complex position. In particular, Islamic extremists conduct activities across the PakistanAfghanistan border, and Pakistan’s attitude towards the war against terrorism draws much attention from the international community. While supporting the United States’ war against terrorism in Afghanistan, the government of Pakistan has been struggling as its domestic security situation has worsened, with issues such as growing anti-U.S. sentiment and retaliatory terrorism by Islamic extremists. As a result of the 2013 general election conducted in May 2013 at the House of Parliament, Nawaz Sharif was elected Prime **2** **Military Affairs** Pakistan claims that maintaining nuclear deterrence against the nuclear threat posed by India is essential to ensure national security and self-defense. In the past, the so-called Khan network was involved in the proliferation of nuclearrelated materials and technologies[12]. Pakistan has been actively proceeding with the development of ballistic missiles and cruise missiles capable of carrying nuclear warheads, and has conducted a number of test launches in recent years. In 2014 and 2015, Pakistan conducted test launches of the ballistic missile “Ghaznavi,” “Shaheen 3,” and “Ghauri” and cruise missile “Raad.” It is deemed that Pakistan has steadily increased the military capabilities of its ballistic and cruise missiles[13]. Pakistan is the world’s f fth largest importer of weapons, importing most of its weapons from China and the United States[14]. Pakistan concluded a contract to purchase four Sword-class frigates from China, which have already been delivered. Pakistan jointly develops the JF-17 f ghter aircraft with China and has inducted 49 aircraft through indigenous production. Pakistan has inducted 18 F-16C/D f ghter jets by 2011 from the United States. 11 In December 2014, armed fi ghters of Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) broke into and attacked a military-operated school in Peshawar in northwestern Pakistan, using explosives and fi ring indiscriminately. According to reports, 148 people were killed including students, and more than 120 people were injured. 12 Pakistan is believed to have started its nuclear program in the 1970s and conducted its first nuclear test near the Changai District of the Balochistan Province in 1998. In 2004, it came to light that nuclear-related technologies, including uranium enrichment technology, had been transferred to North Korea, Iran, and Libya by Dr. Khan and other scientists, who had led the nuclear program in Pakistan. 13 Regarding missiles that Pakistan possesses, the following have been indicated: “Nasr” (Hatf 9): a mobile, single-stage solid-fuelled ballistic missile with a range of about 60 km “Ghaznavi” (Hatf 3): a mobile, single-stage solid-fuelled ballistic missile with a range of about 290 km “Shaheen 1” (Hatf 4): a mobile, single-stage solid-fuelled ballistic missile with a range of about 750 km “Ghauri” (Hatf 5): a mobile, single-stage liquid-fuelled ballistic missile with a range of about 1,300 km “Shaheen 3” (Hatf 6): a mobile, two-stage solid-fuelled ballistic missile with a range of about 2,750 km “Raad” (Hatf 8): a cruise missile with a range of about 350 km “Babur” (Hatf 7): a cruise missile with a range of about 750 km ----- the f rst time in three years. This dialogue was held again in January 2015. During his visit to Pakistan, Secretary Kerry welcomed the mop-up operation conducted by Pakistan’s Armed Forces against insurgents, and announced the provision of about US$250 million to assist temporary displaced persons (TDPs). Meanwhile, Pakistan urges the United States to immediately end its drone attacks on Islamic extremists in Pakistani territory, and the Pakistan government has protested repeatedly[15]. Furthermore, at an all-party conference organized by the leaders of the ruling and opposition parties in September 2013, the government adopted a resolution asserting that the U.S. drone attacks were a clear violation of international law. The United States, on the other hand, condemns Pakistan for providing safe zones to Islamic extremists in Afghanistan, which poses threats to the United States. Attention will be paid to developments related to the relationship between the two countries, including their stance on the war on terror. **(3) Relations with China** See Part I, Chapter 1, Section 3-3-5 ((3) Relations with South Asian Countries) **3** **Relations with Other Countries** **(1) Relations with India** See Part I, Chapter 1, Section 7-1-3 ((1) Relations with Pakistan) **(2) Relations with the United States** Besides supporting the activities of the U.S. Forces in Afghanistan, Pakistan cooperates with the war on terror by launching mop-up operations against Islamic extremists in the Pakistan-Afghanistan border area. Recognizing the efforts of Pakistan, the United States designated it as a “major non-NATO ally” in 2004. The two countries conducted strategic dialogues since 2010, and the United States provided Pakistan with military support. However, these were suspended after U.S.Pakistan relations deteriorated as a consequence of the Osama Bin Laden mop-up operation conducted by the U.S. Forces in the territory of Pakistan in May 2011. In October 2013, dialogue was resumed after summit meetings were held between U.S. President Obama and Prime Minister Sharif of Pakistan. In January 2014, a strategic dialogue was held between U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry and Advisor to the Prime Minister of Pakistan Sartaj Aziz for 15 In November 2011, NATO forces conducted airstrikes on border posts in Pakistan, causing casualties to Pakistani soldiers. Pakistan strongly condemned this action and retaliated by closing the ground supply route for the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). In response to the apology made by then-U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton about airstrikes against Pakistani patrol posts, ----- **Section 8 Europe** **1** **General Situation** With the end of the Cold War, while many European countries now recognize that the threat of large-scale invasion by other countries has disappeared, diverse security challenges have emerged, such as outbreaks of regional conf ict within and around Europe, the rise of terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), and increasing numbers of cyberspace threats. With regard to terrorism in particular, the outbreak of incidents of “homegrown” and “lone-wolf” terrorism domestically has made counter-terrorism efforts an urgent task[1]. In addition, in recent years, the increasingly severe f nancial situation has had a great impact on the security and defense policy of each country. Under these circumstances, the growing tense situation in Ukraine has made it imperative that countries reexamine their existing strategies and design new concepts to deal with Russia’s attempts to change the status quo by force or coercion and with “hybrid warfare.” To respond to such challenges and situations, Europe has sought to further strengthen and expand multilateral frameworks, such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the European Union (EU)[2]. At the same time, it is working to contribute to the security and stability of the international community by proactively participating in activities outside the European region. Moreover, initiatives are made at the national level for reviewing security and defense strategies, reforming national defense systems, and strengthening bilateral[3] and multilateral[4] defense and security cooperation. See Fig. I-1-8-1 (Expansion Situation of the NATO/EU Member States) Fig. I-1-8-1 Expansion Situation of NATO/EU Member States **Current members** **Expansion situation of the member states** |Col1|Col2|Col3| |---|---|---| ||NATO (28 countries)|| |Col1|Joined the EU in May 2004 U in July 2013 82 Joined NATO in 1999 April 2009| |---|---| |Original EU members Joined the EU by 1995 Joined the EU in January 2007 Joined the E Original NATO members Joined NATO by 19 Joined NATO in March 2004 Joined NATO in|| **NATO (28 countries)** UK France Germany Italy Belgium Netherlands the U.S. Austria Luxembourg Canada Finland Spain Portugal Norway Sweden Greek Czech Republic Iceland Ireland Hungary Poland Turkey Malta Denmark Slovakia Albania Cyprus Lithuania Estonia Latvia Romania Bulgaria Slovenia Croatia **EU (28 countries)** (*As of March 2015) For example, Belgium, France, and Denmark are reviewing their security arrangements and strengthening their immigration control, due to acts or attempted acts of terrorism that occurred in those countries. See Part I, Chapter 2, Section 1. NATO has continued expanding toward Central and Eastern Europe with the aim of stabilizing the entire European and Atlantic regions. Currently, three countries—Macedonia, Montenegro, and Bosnia and Herzegovina—have been approved to participate in the Membership Action Plan (MAP), which is a program that provides support to future member states in their preparation to enter NATO (conditionally for Bosnia and Herzegovina). The participation in the MAP of six other countries—Ukraine, Georgia, Azerbaijan, Armenia, Kazakhstan, and Moldova—is currently undecided, as these countries support initiatives for integration into the European and Atlantic regions through frameworks such as the Individual Partnership Action Plan (IPAP), which is a program offered to countries that have the intent to deepen political cooperative relationships with NATO. For example, the United Kingdom and France signed treaties relating to bilateral defense and security cooperation, and on the shared use of nuclear facilities, at a summit meeting held in November 2010. In addition, at a U.K.-France summit meeting held in January 2014, the Declaration on Security and Defence was adopted, and the two countries agreed on conducting joint development of anti-ship missiles and joint research on unmanned combat air vehicles, as well as on aiming to begin deploying a Combined Joint Expeditionary Force by 2016. With regard to unmanned combat air vehicles, in November 2014, the U.K. and French governments reached agreement on contracts related to the development of unmanned combat air systems. For example, in September 2010, the four European countries of France, Germany, the Netherlands, and Belgium established the European Air Transport Command (EATC) to jointly deploy transport ----- **2** **Enhancement of Multinational Security Frameworks** Forces Initiative (CFI) was set up[10]. CFI is intended to provide a framework for conducting joint exercises and drills among member states. Furthermore, it is designed to strengthen joint drills among member states and with partner countries, enhance interoperability, and make use of advanced technology. CFI is considered to be aimed at maintaining NATO’s readiness and military capacity by combining the concepts of Smart Defence and CFI in reducing defense budgets in each country. Following Russia’s “hybrid warfare” over Ukraine as well as the frequent “abnormal f ights” of Russian Armed Force aircraft over the European front, including the Baltic states, NATO and member states reaff rmed the threat posed by Russia. In April 2014, they suspended practical cooperation with Russia and took other steps, including expanding its Baltic air policing mission. Furthermore, at the NATO Summit held in Wales in September 2014, leaders adopted a joint declaration demanding Russia to retract its “annexation” of Crimea and adopted the Readiness Action Plan (RAP) for enhancing existing readiness forces[11]. Meanwhile, differences are observed in how member states regard Russia. While Nordic and Baltic states geographically close to Russia strive to strengthen their national defense systems, countries in Southern Europe and other regions call on NATO to not have a bias towards collective defense that prioritizes Eastern Europe and attach importance also to tasks outside the NATO region, such as North Africa. With regard to ISIL, while no military action has been taken under the NATO framework, the Wales Summit Declaration strongly condemned ISIL’s violent acts and aff rmed that NATO would activate its collective defense if any Ally were attacked by ISIL. The EU tries to enhance its initiatives in security **1** **Security and Defense Policy of NATO/EU** Founded for the core task of collective defense among member countries, NATO has expanded the scope of its activities to conf ict prevention and crisis management since the end of the Cold War. In the NATO Summit Meeting held in Lisbon in November 2010, NATO adopted a new Strategic Concept[5] for the f rst time in 11 years to propose a guideline for the next decade for the creation of a more eff cient and f exible alliance. The document created by NATO lists the proliferation of WMDs and ballistic missiles, terrorism, instability and conf ict beyond NATO borders, and cyber attacks as examples of major threats, def ning three items as the core tasks of NATO: (1) collective defense in accordance with Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, which forms the basis of NATO; (2) management of developing crises before they escalate into conf icts and to help consolidate stability and reconstruction in post-conf ict situations; and (3) cooperative security including active contribution to arms control, non-proliferation, and disarmament. In recent years, NATO has been promoting the concept of Smart Defence[6] as the national defense budgets of member states are declining and gaps in military capability are widening among member states, in particular between European countries and the United States[7]. This is the concept with the objective of building greater security with fewer resources through multinational coordination with the following three pillars: (1) Prioritization: selection of prioritized areas to be invested in[8]; (2) Specialization: specialization in areas where members have strength[9]; and (3) Multinational cooperation: promotion of joint procurement and joint operation of equipment. At the Chicago NATO Summit held in May 2012, the Connected 5 The Strategic Concept is an official document defining the objectives, characteristics, and basic national security responsibilities of NATO. The document has so far been formulated seven times (1949, 1952, 1957, 1968, 1991, 1999, and 2010). 6 As regards concrete efforts undertaken under this concept, at the NATO Summit held in Chicago in May 2012, leaders declared that NATO gained an interim missile defense capability to defend the people and the territory of NATO against ballistic missile attacks by linking together interceptor missiles and radars of the member states under NATO’s command and control. In addition, 13 member states of NATO signed a procurement contract for fi ve Global Hawks (RQ-4), which will constitute the core of the Alliance Ground Surveillance (AGS) system that uses unmanned aircraft. 7 At present, the United States accounts for about 70% of the total defense spending of all NATO member states. NATO guidelines set forth that member states shall spend at least 2% of their GDP on defense. Nonetheless, in 2013, only 4 (United States, United Kingdom, Greece, and Estonia) out of 28 member states fulfi lled this criterion. 8 At the NATO Summit held in Lisbon in November 2010, the allies committed to focus their investment on 11 prioritized areas, including missile defense, cyber defense, medical assistance, and intelligence activities. 9 It indicates that every member state does not necessarily need to possess all defense capabilities, but that each nation specializes in areas where it has strength, and shares it among the allied nations. As an example already in practice is that the Baltic states depend on air policing operations by NATO allies and make certain contributions to the Resolute Support Mission (RSM) in Afghanistan, instead of abandoning the investment in procurement and maintenance of expensive aircraft. 10 As regards concrete specifi c efforts undertaken based on this concept, at the NATO Summit held in Wales in September 2014, leaders approved a Readiness Action Plan (RAP). It was unveiled to respond to the impacts of Russia’s strategies as well as the threats emanating from the Middle East and North Africa. RAP presented that NATO forces would have continued presence in eastern allies, that the response capabilities of the existing multinational NATO Response Force (NRF) would be enhanced signifi cantly, and that the Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF) that can be mobilized in two to three days would be created. In addition, at the NATO Defense Ministers Meeting in February 2015, ministers decided that NRF would be expanded from about 13,000 troops to about 30,000 troops and that VJTF would consist of one brigade (of around 5,000 troops). In April 2015, VJTF’s fi rst military exercises were conducted in the Czech Republic and the Netherlands. ----- under the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP)[12]. The f rst security strategy document adopted in 2003, “A Secure Europe in a Better World,” states that the EU aims to enhance its capabilities to deal with new threats, would make a contribution to its security through involvement in its immediate neighborhood, and would play a leading role in building an international order based on effective multilateralism by working with the United States, other partner countries, and international organizations including the United Nations. Triggered by the reduction of defense expenditure in EU countries and the capacity gap among members[13], the concept of “pooling and sharing” has been promoted, in which member states jointly manage and use more military capacities. In specif c terms, cooperation has been promoted in the areas of air-to-air refueling, unmanned aerial vehicle, satellite communication, and cyber defense. The EU intends to make sure all the initiatives within this concept will complement, rather than interfere with, the activities covered by the NATO framework such as the Smart Defence initiative. At the European Council Meeting (EU Summit) held in December 2013, CSDP was taken up as the main topic of discussion for the f rst time in f ve years, and a resolution about strengthening CSDP was adopted. Following this, in June 2014, the European Council adopted the EU Maritime Security Strategy[14]. At the EU Foreign Affairs Council meeting in November 2014, the EU Cyber Defence Policy Framework[15] was adopted. In response to the crisis in Ukraine, the EU has condemned the military responses of Russia and implemented economic sanctions against Russia[16]. In addition, to support the economic and political reforms in Ukraine, the EU continues its engagement in non-military affairs, including the provision of large-scale f nancial assistance to Ukraine[17]. To counter the threat of ISIL, the EU extends funds to carry out humanitarian assistance for Syria and Iraq. Additionally, the EU works with countries in regions such as the Middle East and North Africa to provide capacitybuilding assistance in counter-terrorism measures, among other activities. Press conference following the NATO Summit (September 2014) [NATO website] **2** **NATO/EU’s Activities Outside the Region[18]** Since August 2003, NATO had been leading the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan. Its mission was completed in December 2014. In place of this mission, since January 2015, NATO has been leading the Resolute Support Mission (RSM), whose primary tasks are to provide training, advice, and assistance to the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF). The Kosovo Force (KFOR) has continued to implement its missions within its framework, such as maintaining security since June 1999 in Kosovo, which declared independence in February 2008[19]. In 2003, the EU led peacekeeping operations for the f rst time in Macedonia by using NATO’s equipment and 12 The EU, although it has a property of non-binding multilateral cooperation, introduced the CFSP, which covers all areas of foreign and security policy based on the Treaty of Maastricht, which took effect in 1993. In June 1999, the European Council decided to implement the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) to offer peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance activities in conflict areas, as a part of the CFSP framework. The Treaty of Lisbon, made effective in 2009, renamed the ESDP to CSDP and clearly positioned it as an integral part of the CFSP. 13 The European Defence Agency (EDA), an organization established to improve the EU’s defense capabilities, reports that the military operations in Libya and elsewhere revealed the EU’s lack of air-to-air refueling capability and precision-guided weapons and its dependency on the United States. 14 See Part I, Chapter 2, Section 3-3-3 15 Its purpose is to implement the Cybersecurity Strategy that the European Commission released in February 2013. The Framework places focus on namely: (1) supporting the development of member states’ cyber defense capabilities; (2) promotion of civil-military cooperation; and (3) improved education and training opportunities. 16 The EU takes measures, such as capital regulations and ban on exports of equipment and dual use goods, in addition to asset freezes and travel bans. 17 The EU will extend 11 billion euros of assistance between 2014 and 2020. In addition, in response to a request for assistance from the Ukrainian government, the EU has decided to provide additional assistance of 1.8 billion euros between 2015 and 2016. 18 While NATO has mainly focused on leading military operations, the EU has undertaken a number of civilian missions. Meanwhile, the EU keeps the EU Battle Groups on standby on a rotating schedule in order to lead peacekeeping missions when NATO is not involved (the number of countries on duty varies by the size of their forces). The division of roles between NATO and the EU is to be defi ned on a case-by-case basis. ----- capabilities. Since then, it has been actively committed to the operations in crisis management and maintenance of peace and order[20] by, for example, sending troops to BosniaHerzegovina, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Chad, and Central Africa. Since February 2013, the EU has been implementing a training mission to support training Malian troops and realignment in Mali, where Islamic guerrillas and others pose serious threats. Also, in January 2014, the EU decided to dispatch security forces to Central Africa, where the situation has been of constant tumult. The forces commenced operations in April of the same year. In addition, NATO and the EU have actively been engaged in anti-piracy operations off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden. Since October 2008, NATO has deployed ships of the Standing NATO Maritime Group (SNMG), comprised of the navies of member states, to these waters for anti-piracy operations. In Operation Ocean Shield which NATO has been conducting since August 2009, it has the task of carrying out anti-piracy operations by ship, as well as helping requesting countries develop their capacities to combat piracy. Since December 2008, the EU has been engaged in the anti-piracy campaign, Operation Atalanta, in these waters, its f rst maritime mission. The vessels and aircraft dispatched from member states are engaged in escorting ships and surveillance activities in the waters[21]. **3** **Security / Defense Policies of European Countries** then def ned four items as risks of the highest priority: international terrorism; attacks upon cyberspace; major accidents or natural hazards; and international military crises[25]. The SDSR would decrease the number of military personnel and major equipment, and review its procurement plan due to increasing pressure to reduce the defense budget. At the same time, it aims to convert forces into specialized, f exible, and modernized war potential through preferential allocation of resources to new threats, such as attacks in cyberspace and terrorism[26]. Work is ongoing to review the existing NSS and to formulate the next SDSR. They are expected for release in 2015 or 2016. In July 2012, “Army 2020,” an army reorganization plan, was released. The plan presents that the United Kingdom would promote the integration of Regulars and Reserves in view of the completion of combat missions in Afghanistan, assigning Reserves a wide range of tasks, such as overseas engagements, United Nations missions, and enduring stabilization operations. While the number of **1** **The United Kingdom** After the end of the Cold War, the United Kingdom, perceiving that there is no direct military threat against the country, has advanced national defense reform with particular focus on improving its overseas deployment capability and readiness, in order to deal with new threats such as international terrorism and the proliferation of WMDs. Against the backdrop of the fatigue of its military organizations due to prolonged operations particularly in Afghanistan, and the pressure to reduce its defense budget[22] due to the deteriorating f nancial situation, the Cameron administration, formed in May 2010, released the National Security Strategy (NSS) and the Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR)[23] in October 2010 under the newly established National Security Council (NSC)[24]. The NSS evaluated the full range of potential risks, which might materialize over a 5 to 20-year horizon, from the perspective of their probability and impact; and 20 These are called Petersberg tasks. They consist of: 1) humanitarian assistance and rescue operations; 2) peacekeeping mission; and 3) tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking. 21 To tackle piracy in this area, the EU has undertaken “European Union Training Mission to Somalia” and “Regional Maritime Capacity Building Mission for the Horn of Africa and the Western Indian Ocean” in addition to “Operation Atalanta.” Based on a comprehensive approach, the EU not only implements piracy countermeasures, but is also working to develop and strengthen its coastal policing and judicial system capabilities. 22 “Spending Review 2010,” published by the Treasury Department in October 2010 following the NSS and SDSR, plans to reduce the defense budget by 8% in real terms by 2014-2015, including saving at least 4.3 billion pounds for the country’s non-frontline activities costs, except for what is required for operations in Afghanistan. 23 The Cameron administration leveraged the new NSS to analyze the strategic background surrounding the United Kingdom and to define the strategic objectives of the country. In the SDSR, it defined policies and measures required to achieve the goals specified by the NSS, so that the comprehensive national strategy related to defense and security could be formed. It also stipulates that a new NSS and SDSR are to be produced and published every five years, based on periodical readjustments to be done by the NSC. 24 The NSC is chaired by the Prime Minister and attended by major ministers related to national security and, if required, by the Chief of the Defense Staff, heads of intelligence agencies, and other senior officials. The newly-created National Security Adviser (NSA) coordinates the whole proceedings. The NSC will be responsible for coordinating responses to dangers the United Kingdom faces by integrating at the highest level the work of the foreign, defense, energy, and international development departments, and all other arms of government contributing to national security; and proposing high-level strategic guidelines to the departments involved. 25 Analyzing the strategic background in this way, the existing NSS defined two strategic objectives comprising: (1) ensuring a secure and resilient United Kingdom; and (2) shaping a stable world. In addition, it specified eight National Security Tasks, including tackling the root causes of instability and working in cooperation with alliances and partnerships as required. 26 The SDSR has decided to reduce the Royal Navy, the Army, and the Royal Air Force personnel by 5,000, 7,000, and 5,000, respectively, by 2015. It also plans to reduce the holdings of main tanks by 40%, among other items. According to Military Balance 2011 and 2015, the U.K. has gone ahead with the reductions, including the reduction of the Royal Navy, the Army, and the Royal Air Force ----- Regulars is to be reduced in this plan, the number and the role of Reserves are to be expanded, and more attention should be paid to future developments[27]. Since September 2014, the United Kingdom has conducted airstrikes against ISIL in Iraq. In addition, it carries out ISR activities using unmanned aerial vehicles, provides education and training to forces engaged in ground war such as the Iraqi Security Forces and Peshmerga, a military organization of the Kurdistan Regional Government, as well as extends humanitarian assistance to refugees, in alignment with the efforts of the U.S.-led Global Coalition to Counter ISIL. important instrument of the strategic partnership between the two sides of the Atlantic; and (3) a common framework for military action in dealing with threats and crisis. On the other hand, with regard to the EU, the White Paper clearly stipulated France’s leadership role in strengthening defense and security capabilities, and aimed to drive forward the CSDP in a practical and realistic manner. Moreover, against the background of f nancial constraints, the White Paper stipulated that, in addition to the cuts announced previously, the government would cut military jobs by 2019[29] and achieve cost reductions via multilateral cooperation. In December 2013, the Parliament enacted the 2014-2019 Military Programming Law, in order to implement plans laid out in the White Paper for realizing a national security strategy for the next 15 years. This law stipulated a larger budget for equipment, the maintenance of defense industry capabilities, among other items. France has conducted airstrikes against ISIL in Iraq since September 2014. Following the acts of terrorism in France, it deployed aircraft carrier Charles de Gaulle to the Persian Gulf to enhance its posture in February 2015. In addition, France provides education and training to the Iraqi Security Forces and Peshmerga, as well as extends humanitarian assistance to refugees, in alignment with the efforts of the U.S.-led Global Coalition to Counter ISIL. French aircraft carrier “Charles de Gaulle” (back) and U.K. frigate “HMS Kent” (front), which were deployed to the Persian Gulf [U.K. Ministry of Defence] **2** **France** Since the end of the Cold War, France has focused on maintaining independence of its defense policies, while having led initiatives to enhance the defense structure and capability in Europe. It has worked on the development of its military capacity by reducing military personnel and integrating military bases, dealing with operational requirements to strengthen its defense capability, as well as enhancing its intelligence capabilities and modernizing equipment required in the future. In the White Paper on Defence and National Security published in April 2013 for the f rst time in f ve years, it was laid out that although the country does not face any direct military threats through direct and clear conventional war potential, there is growing diversity in the types of threats it faces as a result of globalization. These include international terrorism, cyber threats, organized crime, and the proliferation of WMDs. It continued to position (1) intelligence, (2) nuclear deterrence, (3) protection, (4) prevention, and (5) deployment[28] as the f ve key mechanisms of the national security strategy, and states that France would use a combination of these mechanisms to respond to changes in the strategic environment over the coming 15 years. Regarding France’s foreign relations, it positioned NATO’s functions as follows: (1) means of securing collective defense of member states; (2) an 27 In the army reorganization plan “Army 2020,” it is stated that the Army’s Regular personnel would be reduced from 102,000 to 82,000 by 2020, while the Reserve personnel would be increased from 15,000 to 30,000 by 2018. 28 In its White Paper on Defence and National Security released in April 2013, France identifi ed the following regions as priority regions: (1) the periphery of Europe; (2) the Mediterranean basin; (3) part of Africa (from Saharan Africa to Equatorial Africa); (4) the Persian Gulf; and (5) the Indian Ocean. In these regions, France will maintain independent or multinational operational capabilities. In Saharan Africa, the French forces are singlehandedly engaged in a particularly large military operation called Operation Barkhane, which has its command center in Chad’s capital city of N’Djamena. 29 The White Paper on Defence and National Security presented that military personnel would be reduced by 24,000. On this basis, the government planned to cut 25,800 military jobs between 2015 and 2019. However, following the acts of terrorism against Charlie Hebdo in January 2015, that same month President Francois Hollande held a Defense Council meeting and decided to scrap the loss of 7,500 jobs. In May 2015, the Council of Ministers decided on the 2015-2019 military programming proposal whose main components include: (1) the long-term deployment of 7,000 military ----- promotion of military collaboration standardization and mutual operability within the NATO and EU framework is essential, in addition to taking cross-government measures. The amended Military Law, which was enacted in April 2011, stipulates the suspension of conscription for basic military service and the reduction of total personnel from 250,000 to 185,000, while it also aims for the sustainable deployment of military personnel and thereby, enable the continuous deployment of up to 10,000 personnel. Work on the next defense white paper, expected for completion in 2014, has been postponed in order to re-examine the crisis in Ukraine, the rise of ISIL, and the equipment procurement of the Bundeswehr. In February 2015, Germany announced that it started working on the white paper. It is expected to be released in summer 2016. In Iraq, Germany provides education and training to the Iraqi Security Forces and Peshmerga, supplies equipment and ammunition, and extends f nancial assistance for humanitarian assistance. It also conducts training of Kurdish troops in Germany. **3** **Germany** While Germany has been implementing a large-scale reduction of its military personnel since the end of the Cold War, it has been gradually expanding the dispatch of its federal forces overseas. At the same time, Germany has advanced the reform of its defense forces to enable them to execute multiple responsibilities encompassing conf ict prevention and risk management in the context of multilateral organizations, including NATO, the EU, and the United Nations[30]. The Verteidigungspolitischen Richtlinien (VPR) (Defense Policy Guidelines), formulated in 2011 for the f rst time in eight years, states that the possibility of attacks on Germany by conventional forces remains low, and that risks and threats would come from failed states, international terrorism, natural disasters, cyberattacks, and proliferation of WMDs. It then indicates Germany’s active participation in the prevention and containment of crisis and conf ict, and takes cross-governmental measures. It also states that 30 Germany decreased its military personnel from more than 500,000 at the time of its reunification to 250,000 by 2010. In July 1994, the Federal Constitutional Court judged that dispatching the federal forces to international missions implemented under multilateral frameworks such as the United Nations and NATO is constitutional, which has further prompted it to gradually expand the dispatch of its federal forces to participate in various international operations, including security maintenance and reconstruction activities in the Balkan Peninsula and Afghanistan, and anti-piracy ----- **Chapter** **Issues in the International Community** ##### 2 **Section 1 Trends in Regional Confl ict and International Terrorism** **(With a Focus on the Middle East and Africa)** **1** **General Situation** In a global security environment, there is a growing risk that unrest or a security problem in a single country or region could immediately develop into a security challenge or destabilizing factor for the entire international community. The conf icts occurring in recent years in various parts of the world are not necessarily of the same nature. An array of problems is at the root of conf icts, including ethnicity, religion, territory, and resources. The impacts of climate change and other global issues have also been suggested as causes of conf icts[1]. Conf icts can take diverse forms, from armed conf icts, to the continuation of military standoffs. Furthermore, human rights violations, refugees, hunger, poverty, and other consequences of conf icts can have impacts affecting not only the countries in the conf ict but also a wider area. In many cases, areas where civil wars or regional conf icts have created or expanded a governance vacuum have become a hotbed of the activities of terrorist organizations. Among them are organizations which operate across national borders and regions, which continue to pose imminent security challenges to the international community. The presence of states with weak governance has made it diff cult to tackle risks such as the explosive outbreak and spread of infectious diseases. In these circumstances, especially in states with unstable political situations and weak governance, which are often found in the Middle East and Africa, border control is inadequate, and the cross-border movement of terrorist organization members, weapons, as well as narcotics that are a funding source for terrorist organizations present threats to the region. Furthermore, this region has seen renewed f ghting even after a temporary ceasef re is achieved pursuant to a peace agreement or other arrangements between the parties in conf ict. The “Arab Spring”[2], which grew into a full-scale movement in 2011, encouraged transitions to democratic systems in countries in the Middle East and North Africa. However, political turmoil associated with the change in government created clashes between tribes, religions, and political parties, and these clashes have still not ended in some countries. The underlying factors are deemed to include public dissatisfaction, especially among young people, with economic and social disparities as well as with high unemployment rates. Furthermore, in developed countries, such as the United States and European countries, there has been a rise in young people who sympathize with the extremism of international terrorist organizations, including the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL)[3] that has gained strength in Iraq and Syria, against the backdrop of dissatisfaction towards estrangement from society, discrimination, poverty, and disparities. In an increasing number of cases, these people have joined the activities of international terrorist organizations as f ghters and conduct “home-grown” and “lone-wolf”[4] terrorism activities in their countries, which in turn have heightened the risk of terrorism in developed countries. In countries, such as Mali, Central African Republic, and the Democratic Republic of Congo, the people’s dissatisfaction with politics and economics under their weak governance systems as well as clashes over territories and resources have caused conf icts. The rapid and vast outbreak of the Ebola virus disease in West Africa in 2014 threatened the stability of the affected countries and spread the disease to other countries including the West, shedding light on the seriousness of the risk posed by the spread of infectious diseases. It has become increasingly important for the international community to examine the shape of tailored international frameworks and involvement measures, and seek out appropriate responses for addressing these complicated and diverse destabilizing factors. The end of the Cold War was accompanied by rising expectations for peacekeeping efforts, and, as a result, many U.N. peacekeeping operations (PKOs) were established. Their missions has recently come to include a wide range The Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) released by the U.S. Department of Defense in March 2014 regards climate change as one of key factors that will shape the future security environment. It claims that climate change may accelerate instability and conflict by causing water scarcity, sharp increases in food costs, and other effects. In addition, the Summary for Policymakers in the Working Group II report on impacts, adaptation, and vulnerability of the Fifth Assessment Report which the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) published in the same month described that climate change may indirectly increase the risk of conflict by exacerbating poverty and other causes of conflict. The Arab Spring is a term generally used to refer to the series of democratization movements that were undertaken on a full-fledged basis in Middle Eastern and North African countries starting in early 2011, causing political regime changes in Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya. In 2011, Tunisia held National Constituent Assembly elections for creating a new constitution, which was adopted by the assembly in January 2014. In December, Beji Caid Essebsi took offi ce as President following the election results. Libya held General National Congress elections for the establishment of a new constitution in July 2012, but its democratization process including formulation of a new constitution still faces a variety of challenges. ISIL is an outgrowth of Al-Qaida in Iraq (AQI), an Al-Qaeda terrorist organization which was established in 2004 in Iraq. ----- of activities including those by civilians and police, encompassing such traditional roles as the monitoring of a ceasef re or military withdrawal as well as the monitoring of disarmament, the reform of the security sector, the monitoring of elections and administrative activities, and humanitarian assistance (e.g. return of refugees to their homeland). In this situation, the importance of the roles related to the protection of civilians and peace-building increases, leading to activities with greater authorization granted by Chapter 7 of the U.N. Charter[5]. At the same time U.N. PKO, faces challenges including the availability of required equipment, the protection of personnel safety, and the improvement of troop capabilities[6]. See Fig. I-2-1-1 (List of Peacekeeping Operations) In addition to the U.N. PKO framework, multinational forces and regional organizations authorized by the U.N. Security Council engage in conf ict prevention, peacekeeping, and peace-building. In Africa, such regional organizations as the African Union (AU)[7] roll out their activities based on resolutions by the U.N. Security Council and their activities are sometimes handed over to U.N. PKO later. The international community also offers recommendations and training assistance and supplies equipment from a long-term perspective, prompting African nations to help themselves so that they can enhance local governance organizations and improve the capabilities of their military and security organizations[8]. Furthermore, the entire international community is undertaking various efforts in response to the rise of ISIL, including the adoption of a U.N. Security Council resolution to prevent the international movement of terrorist f ghters, military actions such as the United States-led Coalition’s airstrikes on ISIL, and humanitarian assistance by partner countries that support the counter-terrorism effort. **2** **Current Situation of Regional Confl icts and the International Response** hand, opposed military action and asserted that Syria’s chemical weapons be transferred to the control of the international community. The Syrian government accepted Russia’s proposal. In September 2013, following negotiations between U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry and Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergey Lavrov of Russia, the United States and Russia agreed on a framework which demanded that the Syrian government declare its chemical weapons stockpiles as well as accept international inspections, aimed at the complete destruction of Syria’s chemical weapons. The Syrian government submitted a list of its chemical weapons stockpile to the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) and took responses which were set out in the framework, including accession to the Chemical Weapons Convention. Due to these responses, military action by the United States and other countries against the Assad administration was averted. Pursuant to OPCW decisions and related U.N. Security Council resolution, international efforts were **1** **Situation in Syria and Iraq** **(1) Political Turmoil and Chemical Weapons Issue in Syria** In Syria, since March 2011, the government has mobilized military and security forces in multiple cities as a result of the outbreak of anti-government demonstrations across the country calling for democratization and the resignation of President Assad. The clashes between the military and the opposition parties continue to take place throughout the country[9]. Under these circumstances, in August 2013, chemical weapons were used in the suburbs of Syria’s capital city Damascus, which killed many civilians. Following this attack, U.S. President Barack Obama who had stated previously that the use of chemical weapons would cross a red line, assessed that the Syrian government used chemical weapons[10]. The President stated he decided that military action should be taken against the Assad administration, further heightening military tension. Russia, on the other 5 As of the end of March 2015, 16 U.N. PKOs have been established globally, involving about 107,000 military and police personnel and about 17,000 civilian personnel from 120 countries. Out of these PKOs, there are 12 operations in the Middle East and Africa. Ten U.N. PKOs are granted robust authority by Chapter 7 of the U.N. Charter. (See Fig. I-2-1-1) 6 “A New Partnership Agenda Charting a New Horizon For U.N. Peacekeeping” was published in July 2009 to evaluate major policy and strategic dilemmas faced by U.N. PKOs and discuss solutions among stakeholders. 7 The world’s largest regional organization comprised of 54 countries and regions in Africa. It was established in July 2002 by reorganizing the Organization of African Unity (OAU) (established in May 1963). Its objectives include achieving the integration and solidarity of African nations and people, accelerating political, economic, and social integration of Africa, and promoting peace, security, and stability in Africa. 8 For example, organizations such as the United Nations and the European Union are implementing initiatives in countries including Somalia and Mali. 9 According to an announcement by the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights in August 2014, the clashes in Syria killed more than 191,000 people. Some estimates have said that more than 310,000 people have been killed as of May 2015. Since the start of the Syrian civil war, over 10 million people have become refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs). 10 In August 2013, the United States assessed with “high confi dence” that the Assad administration carried out a chemical weapons attack, on the basis of all-source analyses based on human ----- Fig. I-2-1-1 List of Peacekeeping Operations 15 12 14 11 13 10 16 1 8 4 6 2 3 9 7 5 Notes: According to the United Nations (as of the end of February 2015) **Africa** **Middle East** |Col1|Mission|Date Established| |---|---|---| |10|United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO)|May 1948| |11|United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF)|Jun 1974| |12|United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL)|Mar 1978| |Asia|Col2|Col3| |---|---|---| ||Mission|Date Established| |13|United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP)|Jan 1949| **Europe/CIS** |Col1|Mission|Date Established| |---|---|---| |14|United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP)|Mar 1964| |15|United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK)|Jun 1999| **The Americas** |Col1|Mission|Date Established| |---|---|---| |1|United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO)|Apr 1991| |2|United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL)|Sep 2003| |3|United Nations Operation in Côte d’lvoire (UNOCI)|Apr 2004| |4|African Union/United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID)|Jul 2007| |5|United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO)|Jul 2010| |6|United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA)|Jun 2011| |7|United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS)|Jul 2011| |8|United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA)|Apr 2013| |9|United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA)|Apr 2014| |Col1|Mission|Date Established| |---|---|---| |16|United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH)|Jun 2004| ----- made to destroy Syria’s chemical weapons[11]. The work to destroy the weapons, which was carried out on the U.S. government’s transport vessel Cape Ray, was completed in August 2014[12]. However, the United States, the European Union (EU), and other countries are requesting President Assad to step down and are imposing successive sanctions against Syria, including an oil embargo. Although these countries have expressed support for the Syrian National Coalition established as an opposition party in November 2012, no strides have been made in the dialogue between the Syrian government and the opposition parties. In January 2014, while the f rst direct peace talks between the Assad administration and the opposition parties were held under the mediation of the U.N., the talks achieved no concrete progress. Although President Assad won a landslide victory in the June 2014 presidential election, the United States and European countries have criticized that the reelection of President Assad interfered with the settlement of the conf ict. In January 2015, peace talks on Syria were convened for the f rst time in nearly one year with the mediation of Russia. However, the Syrian National Coalition and other groups did not participate, and the talks merely conf rmed the basic principles and failed to achieve concrete progress. In May 2015, individual talks between Staffan de Mistura, U.N. SecretaryGeneral’s Special Envoy for Syria, and relevant countries commenced in Geneva. While both the Assad government and the opposition parties are participating to realize a political settlement to the conf ict, the outcome of the talks is uncertain. **(2) The Rise of ISIL** In Syria, opposition parties that do not join the Syria National Coalition, ISIL and al-Nusrah Front which is designated as a terrorist organization due to its relations with Al-Qaeda, gained strength by making use of the politically unstable situation. In this context, in April 2013, ISIL announced unilaterally that it would absorb and merge with al-Nusrah Front. Following protests from al-Nusrah Front, the Al-Qaeda core conducted mediation. However, ISIL did not comply with the mediation, and its relations with the Al-Qaeda core have deteriorated[13]. Meanwhile, following the withdrawal of U.S. Forces in December 2011, the security situation in Iraq deteriorated rapidly against the backdrop of political feuds and religious confrontations. In January 2014, ISIL, which had increasingly gained strength from its stronghold in Syria, seized the unstable situation in Iraq to begin invading areas in western Iraq, and occupied Fallujah, a city west of the capital city of Baghdad. In June 2014, ISIL took control of the second largest city, Mosul, in northern Iraq. Following this, ISIL’s leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, a self-proclaimed “caliph”[14], unilaterally declared the establishment of the “Islamic State” and has called on Islam followers throughout the world to pledge their allegiance to him. **(3) The Characteristics of ISIL** ISIL, unlike traditional terrorist organizations, is said to be characterized by its substantial funding, powerful and accomplished military forces, and established organizational structure[15]. In addition, it is deemed that ISIL’s membership includes Ba’ath Party members from the former Iraqi regime as well as former Iraqi military off cers, 11 In November 2013, OPCW decided with respect to Syrian chemical weapons: (1) for unfi lled munitions: destruction on Syrian territory not later than January 31, 2014; (2) for mustard agent and the key binaries (chemical components) of sarin and VX: removal from Syrian territory not later than December 31, 2013; (3) for other chemicals: removal from Syrian territory not later than February 5, 2014; and (4) for the residual mustard agent in containers previously containing mustard agent: destruction not later than March 1, 2014; among other items. With respect to the schedule for the destruction of chemical weapons outside Syrian territory, OPCW decided: (1) for mustard agent and the key binaries of sarin and VX: beginning of destruction as soon as possible with destruction not later than March 31, 2014, and destruction of any resulting reaction mass by a date to be agreed by the Council, based on the Director-General’s recommendation; and (2) for all other chemicals: beginning of destruction as soon as possible with completion of destruction not later than June 30, 2014; among other items. In February 2015, OPCW announced that the destruction of 98% of Syria’s declared chemicals was completed. 12 See Part I, Chapter 2, Section 2-2 for the destruction of chemical weapons in Syria 13 On February 2, 2014, Al-Qaeda’s leader Ayman al Zawahiri released a statement on the Internet declaring that Al-Qaeda severed ties with ISIL: “ISIL is not a branch of the Al-Qaeda group...does not have an organizational relationship with it and (Al-Qaeda) is not the group responsible for their actions.” 14 The term means “successor” in Arabic. After Prophet Muhammad died, the term has been used to refer to those who led the Islamic community. Since then, a number of the heads of hereditary dynasties, including the Umayyad and Abbasid dynasties, utilized this title. 15 According to a U.N. report, ISIL’s estimated revenue from crude oil ranges from US$846,000 to US$1,645,000 per day (approx. 100 to 200 million yen). The report notes that ISIL’s revenue sources also include unilaterally-imposed levies, including ransom from kidnapping and taxation (U.N. Security Council Al-Qaida Sanctions Committee report [November 14, 2014]). Amid speculations that revenue from crude oil is becoming no longer a major source of ISIL’s funding due to the Coalition’s airstrikes and fl uctuations in crude oil prices, some have indicated that ISIL has diversifi ed its revenue sources by increasing the taxes levied on residents and companies in the areas under ISIL’s control. Some also suggest that ISIL earns profi ts from asset management made through its ----- along with numerous foreign f ghters. Having an adept public relations strategy[16], about 25,000 people including 3,400 people from the West are said to be participating in ISIL’s activities[17]. Since launching the invasion of Iraq, ISIL has: utilized equipment seized from the Iraqi Security Forces and other forces; has successively taken control of key cities, oil f eld areas, and military facilities in Iraq and Syria; and thereby, expanded its area of control. ISIL gives priority to maintaining the areas under its control. At the same time, ISIL encourages terrorist attacks against the West and elsewhere. The risk of terrorist attacks by ISIL f ghters who have returned to their countries from conf ict areas, such as Iraq and Syria, is a cause for concern among the states[18]. **(4) The International Response to ISIL** In August 2014, ISIL launched an offensive against the Kurdish Autonomous Region in northern Iraq, and made advances towards Erbil where the U.S. Consulate and other facilities are located. Based on this situation, the United States and other countries[19] began airstrikes on ISIL in order to protect U.S. citizens in Iraq, among other purposes[20]. In an address on the U.S. strategy for ISIL delivered in September 2014, President Obama stated that the military action would be extended to include Syria to degrade and ultimately destroy ISIL. President Obama announced that the United States would not only lead a broad coalition to conduct airstrikes, but also provide military supports to the Iraqi Security Forces f ghting a ground war and to the moderate opposition party in Syria. The Coalition’s military action in Iraq includes offering education, training, and providing equipment[21], as well as extending military supports, such as operation assessments and advice, to the forces f ghting the ground war, including the Iraqi Security Forces and the Kurdistan regional government’s military organization known as Peshmerga. At the same time, in coordination with its own airstrikes and relevant forces, the Coalition works to thwart the advancement of ISIL and recapture some of the strategic areas[22]. However, the Iraqi Security Forces face problems, such as weak command functions and low morale[23], as well as shortage of personnel. Without foreign support, it is said that the Iraqi Security Forces can neither defend against external threats, nor sustain military action domestically[24]. In contrast, the Peshmerga has experience with the Iraq War. The Peshmerga is considered to have relatively advanced training and a functioning chain of command, and plays a critical role in the military action against ISIL. In April 2015, with the support of Shiite militias and others, the Iraqi Security Forces succeeded in recapturing Tikrit, a key area that continues onto Mosul. However, following the recapture, backlash from local Sunnis has increased following the forage and plundering by Shiite militias, signaling sectarian struggle. Furthermore, ever since ISIL seized control of Ramadi in western Iraq in May 2015, the United States has been forced to review its strategy of prioritizing the recapture of Mosul. In this regard, the Coalition and Iraqi forces conduct seesaw offense and defense. As regards the military action in Syria, in September 2014, the U.S. Forces and the Middle Eastern Coalition members[25] conducted airstrikes on ISIL in Syria[26]. In addition, starting on the same month, an intense battle was raged between Kurdish forces and ISIL over Ayn al-Arab 16 ISIL uses the Internet and social media to recruit young people as fi ghters. According to a U.N. report in May 2015, the international community is called on to cooperate in efforts to address the issue of women joining terrorist organizations. See Part I, Chapter 2, Section 1, Paragraph 3, “The Spread of International Terrorism.” 17 Munich Security Report 2015 (January 2015) 18 See Part I, Chapter 2, Section 1-3, “The Spread of International Terrorism.” 19 The United States has simultaneously announced airstrikes for humanitarian purposes, namely, to release the minority Yazidi sect who have been subject to ISIL’s persecution. According to the Combined Joint Task Force, as of May 26, 2015, Coalition forces as a whole have executed over 4,100 airstrikes. 20 In addition to the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Australia, Canada, Denmark, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Jordan participate in the airstrikes against ISIL in Iraq. 21 In 2014, the United States provided over 1,500 Hellfi re missiles to the Iraqi government. In 2015, the United States provided 250 MRAP (including the distribution to the Kurdish Autonomous Region) and several tens of thousands of small arms and ammunition, among other assets. In May 2015, the United States decided to provide 2,000 anti-tank rockets. 22 Thus far, the Iraqi forces, Peshmerga, and other forces have recaptured the following strategic areas from ISIL. In Iraq, the Mosul dam was recaptured in August 2014, the city Baiji in central Iraq in November 2014, and Diyala province in central Iraq in January 2015. In Syria, Ayn al-Arab was recaptured in January 2015 and Tikrit in May 2015. In addition, the forces have recaptured 13,00017,000 km2 of the 55,000 km[2] area held by ISIL in Iraq (April 2015 U.S. Central Command announcement). 23 In May 2015, U.S. Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter responded in an interview with CNN that “the Iraqi forces just showed no will to fi ght,” whereas U.S. Vice President Joe Biden stated that the Iraqi forces have made “enormous sacrifi ce and (shown) bravery.” 24 U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency, “Worldwide Threat Assessment 2015” (January 2015) 25 In the military action against ISIL, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, and Jordan conduct airstrikes in Syria, and Qatar provides supports to these countries. ----- The Reality of ISIL’s Governance and the Features **Commentary** of the New Terrorist Organization ISIL continues to push its way in dynamic Way mainly in the Middle East and North Africa and rules a vast territory across Iraq and Syria, self-proclaiming to be a “Caliphate.” ISIL controls the territory tactically through a carrot-and-stick approach as well as making use of the opposition against Iraq’s central government and pro-Shiite parties. Under its rule, ISIL has reportedly repaired destroyed roads and provided services such as electricity and food rations which had not adequately reached the whole population. Meanwhile, ISIL reportedly keeps the people under strict control, with religious police implementing patrols and crackdowns. Anyone who engages in activities which go against the religion, whether it be alcohol consumption or smoking, are subject to public execution through brutal methods, such as gundown and beheading[1]. ISIL’s pre-modern brutal acts, including the restoration of slavery of ethnic minorities in northern Iraq, are subject to strong condemnation from many Islamic scholars and religious authorities. The international community recognizes ISIL’s capability to send out messages using the Internet as major threat. In the past, AQAP[2] has disclosed bomb-making instructions in its magazine and has called on its followers to stage terrorist attacks in the West and elsewhere. ISIL has made gains by sending out messages skillfully on social media using hash tags, along with circulating high-quality videos that make use of digital technology and music, for advertising the organization, recruiting fi ghters, and encouraging terrorism. Further still, ISIL undertakes a global marketing campaign, such as translating its messages into multiple languages and distributing its magazine (DABIQ) on the Internet. ISIL’s methods of terror attack can also be distinguished from other groups’. Past terrorist organizations have primarily used suicide bombings and improvised explosive devices to attack shopping centers or other such facilities where there is minimum security and civilians are gathered. ISIL, on the other hand, has a membership that includes many military offi cers from the former Hussein regime. This is said to have enabled ISIL to stage systematic combat operations using heavy equipment like tanks that were seized from the Iraqi and other forces. Contrary to past international terrorist organizations, ISIL, which has at their disposal, powerful military capability, abundant fi nancing, tactical governance, and ability to manipulate the media, has taken control of vast territory and attracted many foreign fi ghters. ISIL is indeed a new type of international terrorist organization. 1 According to media reports, young people who watched an Asian Cup football match were publicly gunned down by ISIL for violating the sharia law. 2 AQAP: Al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula (Kurdish name: Kobani), a city in northern Syria close to the border with southern Turkey[27]. As a result of the Coalition’s airstrikes and the Kurdish forces’ ground war, Kurdish groups eliminated ISIL groups from Ayn al-Arab in January 2015. However, in 2015, ISIL has closed in on the nerve center of the Assad administration, occupying a part of a Palestinian refugee camp in the capital city, Damascus. In May 2015, ISIL took control of Palmyra in central Syria. ISIL thus continues to gain strength in Syria. Moderate opposition parties such as the Free Syrian Army that are expected to engage in the ground war in Syria have just started taking the Coalition’s training, and more time is deemed necessary to make full-scale advances to recapture the strategic areas. ISIL has also been gaining strength in countries other than Iraq and Syria[28]. Among these countries, in Afghanistan, Algeria, Egypt[29], and Libya[30], ISIL is deemed to be working to establish bases mostly in areas where there is insuff cient national governance, coordinating with local terrorist organizations[31]. The announced outcomes of the Coalition’s military action against ISIL led by the United States include the fragmentation of ISIL’s command and control functions, decline of morale of the organization’s members, decrease 27 In response to ISIL’s attacks, Peshmerga, the military organization of the Kurdistan regional government, arrived in Ayn al-Arab via Turkey. In addition, forces opposed to the Syrian regime, such as the Free Syrian Army, reportedly participated in the operation against ISIL in Ayn al-Arab. 28 For example, in January 2015, ISIL announced that armed groups in Afghanistan and Pakistan swore allegiance to ISIL and that it would name this region ISIL Khorasan Province. 29 In Egypt, Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis operates actively in the Sinai Peninsula. See Part I, Chapter 2, Section 1-2-6 “Situation in Egypt.” 30 The Tripoli branch of ISIL is said to be operating in Libya’s capital city of Tripoli. See Part I, Chapter 2, Section 1-2-4 “Situation in Libya.” ----- in crude oil revenues, and the deaths of many f ghters including commanders. In this regard, the military action is deemed to have prevented ISIL’s further advances and made strides in recapturing some of the strategic areas. However, the Iraqi Security Forces and the moderate opposition parties that are f ghting the ground war have inadequate capacity, both in quality and quantity, and require long-term training. Without the mobilization of large-scale ground war assets by the United States and other countries, analysts note that the operation could become protracted. In the United States, there are estimates that at least three years will be needed to ultimately eliminate ISIL from Iraq and Syria. The future outlook related to ISIL hence remains uncertain[32]. as the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) for the support mission in Afghanistan led by NATO forces in 2015 and beyond. In November, the agreements were approved at both the upper and lower houses of Afghanistan’s parliament. In December 2014, ISAF’s combat mission had been completed. In January 2015, the Resolute Support Mission (RSM)[35] was launched, which primarily provides education, training, and advice under the leadership of NATO. Approximately 13,000 personnel participate in the mission. The RSM, based in Kabul, carries out activities in f ve locations in Afghanistan[36]. Additionally, the U.S. Forces, while providing training to Afghan forces as a member of NATO, implements Operation Freedom Sentinel (OFS). In May 2014, U.S. President Obama announced that the U.S. troop strength in Afghanistan would be reduced to about 9,800 personnel by early 2015, and that all troops would ultimately be withdrawn except the security assistance component of the U.S. embassy by the end of 2016. However, in December 2014, thenSecretary of Defense Hagel revised the initial plan, stating that an additional 1,000 personnel or 10,800 personnel of the U.S. Forces would be deployed in Afghanistan from the start of 2015, due to delays in the deployment of troops by NATO member states. Secretary Hagel announced that there was no change to the future withdrawal plan. In March 2015, President Ghani visited the United States. The Joint Statement of President Ghani and President Obama presented that based on Afghanistan’s request, the United States would maintain its posture of 9,800 troops through the end of 2015, retracting the initial plan to halve the U.S. troop strength in the end of 2015. With regard to the international community’s support for Afghanistan, at the NATO Chicago Summit held in May 2012, commitment to Afghan security beyond the end of 2014 was reaff rmed. In addition, at the Tokyo Conference on Afghanistan in July 2012, the international community, including Japan, announced the provision of over US$16 billion in f nancial aid. Moreover, countries such as the United States, the United Kingdom, and France concluded a Strategic Partnership Agreement with Afghanistan[37], which called for continued support beyond 2014. The responsibilities for security in Afghanistan have been transferred sequentially from ISAF to ANDSF since 2011. Since January 2015, ANDSF has assumed full responsibility for security in Afghanistan. Despite **2** **Situation in Afghanistan** In Afghanistan, following the so-called 9.11 terrorist attacks in the United States, Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) that the U.S. Forces launched in November 2001 has been engaged in the mop-up operation of the Taliban and other groups. Furthermore, the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF) have conducted security duties. Nevertheless, the security situation in many parts of Afghanistan continues to warrant close attention. In November 2014, a suicide bombing in the capital city of Kabul caused damage to a U.K. embassy vehicle, killing or injuring three people. The security situation in the eastern, southern, and southwestern areas of Afghanistan which border Pakistan also remains a cause for concern. Although the Taliban’s attack capability is diminishing because of the activities of the ISAF and ANDSF, the group is presumed to have maintained capabilities for intermittent attacks on city areas, while securing safe havens in northwest Pakistan and other areas, and conduct terrorism activities in Afghanistan astride the borders[33]. In September 2014, the Ghani administration was inaugurated based on the results of the presidential elections in Afghanistan in April and June 2014. Subsequently, the agreements that the previous Karzai administration had continued to postpone were signed, namely, the Bilateral Security Agreement (BSA) between the United States and Afghanistan, which sets forth the legal framework of the stationing of the U.S. Forces in 2015 and beyond[34], as well 32 U.S. Secretary of State Kerry underscored the achievements of the airstrikes, saying, “We are taking out Daesh’s fi ghters in the thousands thus far – single digits, but thousands. Their commanders – 50% of the top command has been eliminated. Hundreds of vehicles and tanks, which they captured, have been destroyed. Nearly 200 oil and gas facilities that they were using have been eliminated... as well as more than a thousand fi ghting positions, checkpoints, building, barracks” (January 22, 2015, Press conference by U.S. State Secretary Kerry). U.S. Secretary of Defense Carter stated that the United States cannot commit to completing the military action against ISIL in three years (March 11, 2015, U.S. Defense Secretary Carter’s testimony to the Senate). 33 Based on sources including the “Report on Progress Towards Security and Stability in Afghanistan” (November 2013) by the U.S. Department of Defense. As for the relationship between Pakistan and the United States with regard to the situation in Afghanistan, see Part I, Chapter 1, Section 7-2. 34 The BSA sets forth provisions on the activities of the U.S. Forces in Afghanistan and their rights to use facilities in 2015 and beyond. 35 See Chapter 1, Section 8 for NATO’s tasks for RSM. 36 In addition to Kabul, the RSM carries out activities in Mazar-e Sharif, Herat, Kandahar, and Laghman. ----- the challenges raised with regard to the capabilities of ANDSF, it is assessed to have some capacity to maintain security in terms of establishing operational plans and suppressing armed groups, as evidenced from the absence of large-scale terrorist attacks and other events during the presidential election in June 2014. In August 2014, the Ministry of Defense established a new national military strategy. The strategy def ned such priority goals as the organizational strengthening of the Defense Ministry and the national forces, and the increased professionalism of the forces. In addition, to improve the literacy rate, which has posed as a challenge, efforts are under way including the implementation of various curriculums. Afghanistan faces not only security problems but also a plethora of challenges related to reconstruction, including preventing corruption, enhancing the rule of law, strengthening the crackdown on narcotics traff cking, and promoting regional development. Ensuring peace and stability in Afghanistan is a common challenge of the international community, which requires continuing engagement with the country. at the strong urging of the United States. Nevertheless, the peace talks had to be discontinued in March to April 2014 owing to various developments, including Israel’s suspension of the release of Palestinian prisoners, Palestine’s international treaty accession applications, and the agreement reached between the PLO dominated by the Fatah[39] and the Islamic fundamentalist organization Hamas that has effective rule over Palestine and the Gaza Strip[40] to form a national unity cabinet. In this context, in June to July 2014, murders of Israeli and Palestinian boys took place, heightening the tension on both sides. In July 2014, rockets were f red at Israeli territory from the Gaza Strip intermittently. In response to the outbreak of clashes on both sides, in August 2014, Israeli forces launched a ground operation. These clashes are thought to have killed at least 2,133 Palestinians in the Gaza Strip[41]. In the same month, the two sides accepted Egypt’s request and agreed to a ceasef re[42]. Meanwhile, in Europe, national parliaments have begun to call for the recognition of a Palestinian state since October 2014[43]. Furthermore, in January 2015, the International Criminal Court (ICC)[44] released a statement saying that upon the acceptance of Palestine’s application to accede to the ICC in the same month, it opened a preliminary examination into whether or not Palestine conducted war crimes[45]. Israel has protested such moves by the international community. Israel has yet to sign peace treaties with Syria and Lebanon. Israel and Syria disagree on the return of the Golan Heights which Israel has occupied since the 1967 Arab-Israel War. The United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) has been deployed in the Golan Heights region to observe the implementation of the ceasef re and military disengagement between the two parties[46]. Concerning Israel and Lebanon, the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) increased its presence following the 2006 clash between Israel and Hezbollah, a Shiite Muslim organization. **3** **Situation of the Middle East Peace Efforts** In the Middle East, there have been wars between Israel and Arab countries four times since the foundation of Israel in 1948. Between Israel and Palestine, the Oslo Agreement concluded in 1993 marked the beginning of a peace process through comprehensive negotiations. In 2003, the Israelis and the Palestinians agreed on a “Roadmap” that laid out a course leading to the establishment of a Middle East peace initiative based on the principle of the peaceful coexistence between the two nations. However, the Roadmap has yet to be implemented. Subsequently, large-scale f ghting occurred twice through 2012[38]. In both cases, a ceasef re agreement was reached through the mediation of Egypt and other parties. In July 2013, Middle East peace talks between Israel and Palestine resumed for the f rst time in nearly three years 38 Following rocket attacks on Israel from the Gaza Strip, Israeli forces launched a large-scale military action from the end of 2008 to early 2009 that included airstrikes on the Gaza Strip and the mobilization of ground forces. In November 2012, Israeli forces again conducted airstrikes on the Gaza Strip. 39 In these peace talks, Hamas, the dominant faction, conducted negotiations with Israel. 40 Hamas does not recognize Israel. 41 According to the U.N. Offi ce for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs report (August 2014). 42 The main components of the ceasefi re agreement are: (1) Opening of the crossings between the Gaza Strip and Israel; (2) Speedy entry of humanitarian assistance supplies, relief supplies, and supplies necessary for reconstruction; (3) Fishing permissions from six nautical miles; and (4) Indirect negotiations between the two parties over other topics (e.g., construction of an airport and seaport in the Gaza Strip, disarmament of Hamas) in one month’s time after ceasefi re is ensured. However, the consultations in (4) have remained at a standstill. 43 In Sweden, the United Kingdom, France, and Spain, actions were taken, such as the adoption of resolutions seeking the recognition of a Palestinian state. 44 The International Criminal Court is the fi rst permanent international criminal judicial body in history to prosecute and punish, based on international law, individuals who committed the most serious crimes of concern to the whole international community (genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and crimes of aggression). 45 In the preliminary examination, the ICC collects evidence on war crimes, conducts hearings with relevant stakeholders of both parties, among other activities. No deadlines for the preliminary examination are provided in the ICC Rome Statute. ----- maintenance capabilities of the Libyan government as well as to dispatch a military advisory team[51]. In December 2014, the U.S. Africa Command noted that an ISIL training camp exists in eastern Libya and revealed that the U.S. Forces were monitoring the camp. In January 2015, an armed group thought to be aff liated with ISIL[52] attacked an upscale hotel in the capital city of Tripoli, killing at least 13 people. In February 2015, an extremist organization that has sworn allegiance to ISIL posted a video on the Internet of what is believed to be the murder of 21 Egyptian Coptic Christians. As a retaliatory measure, the Egyptian government conducted airstrikes together with the Libyan government. Amid this situation, many refugees from North Africa including Libya have landed in Europe on smugglers’ boats. Some have suggested that ISIL f ghters have slipped in among these refugees. European countries are thus faced with numerous issues, including the issue of accepting many refugees, preventing the entry of ISIL f ghters, cracking down on migrant smuggling boats, and providing relief to passengers on migrant smuggling boats that have capsized in the Mediterranean Sea. **4** **Situation in Libya** The anti-government demonstrations that erupted in February 2011 spread nationwide, leading the Gaddaf regime to crush the demonstrations by force. That same month, the U.N. Security Council adopted a resolution on sanctions against Libya that included a total arms embargo[47], and in March 2011, a resolution allowing for an array of measures to establish a no-f y zone and to protect civilians[48]. Following the resolutions, a multinational force led by the United States, United Kingdom, and France commenced military action. In October 2011, the National Transitional Council consisting of anti-Gaddaf forces announced the death of Colonel Gaddaf and declared the liberation of all of Libya. In July 2012, elections for a General National Congress were held. However, progress has not been made in the rehabilitation of the military and public security[49]. Militia and tribal leaders exert strong inf uence[50], and while receiving their support, secular and Islamic groups struggle for power. In March 2014, a no-conf dence motion was passed against Prime Minister Zeidan. In June 2014, elections for the Council of Representatives were held. Nonetheless, confrontation between Islamic and secular groups intensif ed. Consequently, Libya has become fragmented with two assemblies existing in parallel – the Islamic groups’ General National Congress based in the capital city of Tripoli and the secular groups’ Council of Representatives based in Tobruk in eastern Libya which has the support of the United States and other countries. Under these politically unstable circumstances, Islamic extremist groups are said to be gaining strength in Libya. In September 2012, an Islamic extremist group attacked the U.S. Consulate in Benghazi, killing four Americans, including the Ambassador. In January 2014, the U.S. Department of State designated Ansar al-Sharia, an offshoot of Al-Qaeda that is deemed to have been involved in this incident, as a terrorist organization. The United States and NATO have announced their intentions to provide military training to increase the security **5** **Situation in Yemen** Starting in February 2011, anti-government demonstrations calling for the resignation of the long-time ruler President Ali Abdullah Saleh gained traction in Yemen. In April 2011, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)[53] brokered the GCC Initiative[54]. President Saleh signed the Initiative in November 2011 in the face of increasing pressure from the international community, including the United Nations. Vice President Abdo Rabbo Mansour Hadi was elected President following a presidential election in February 2012, and the transition of power was conducted peacefully. President Hadi implemented the national dialogue process. Nevertheless, from August 2014, demonstrations led by the opposition insurgent group the Houthis[55] occurred in the capital city of Sana’a[56]. The Houthis, based in northern Yemen, have long and repeatedly clashed 47 U.N. Security Council Resolution 1970 (adopted on February 26, 2011) 48 U.N. Security Council Resolution 1973 (adopted on March 17, 2011) 49 According to The Military Balance 2011 and 2014, the troop strength has decreased from 76,000 before the Arab Spring to 7,000 as of 2014. 50 In the eastern coastal area, a militia organization seeking to expand autonomous rule occupied oil-related facilities for nearly a year (nine months). 51 In October 2013, NATO Secretary General Rasmussen announced the dispatch of a military advisory team to Libya. In November 2013, the U.S. Department of Defense announced that it would provide training for 5,000-8,000 Libyan personnel in Bulgaria. 52 The ISIL branch in Tripoli issued a statement claiming responsibility for this incident. 53 The GCC was established in 1981 by Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Oman, Qatar, and Kuwait. Headquartered in Saudi Arabia’s capital city of Riyadh, the GCC aims to effect coordination, integration, and cooperation between the member states in all fi elds, including defense and economy. 54 The Initiative included clauses which provided that immunity would be granted to the President in exchange for the expeditious transfer of power to the Vice President. 55 The Houthis are followers of the Zaydi branch of Shiite Islam and are based in Saada governorate in northern Yemen. In 2004, the Houthis staged an armed uprising as an anti-government group, and an armed confl ict broke out with the Yemeni military. 56 In 2007, the Southern Movement was formed to assert secession from the north. After President Saleh resigned as a consequence of the Arab Spring, the Movement has taken an anti-government ----- with the government over rising fuel prices. Initially, the demonstrations remained peaceful. However, in September 2014, clashes broke out between the Houthi militia and Yemeni public security forces, and this led to the Houthis’ occupation of key government buildings in the city. Following the armed conf ict that occurred in January 2015, President Hadi and others submitted their letters of resignation, and the situation intensif ed further. In February 2015, the Houthis forced the dissolution of the parliament and announced the establishment of a transitional national council and a presidential council. Based on the circumstances, countries, especially Western nations, began to close their embassies, citing the deterioration of the security situation as the reason[57]. Later, President Hadi withdrew his resignation and based his government in Aden in southern Yemen. Meanwhile, the Houthis advanced into the Red Sea’s coastal areas and key cities between the capital city of Sana’a and Aden. The Houthis seized a military base in Taiz and invaded Aden city. In response to this situation, President Hadi’s faction requested the support of Arab countries. Then, in March 2015, a Saudi Arabianled coalition launched airstrikes against the Houthis – the so-called “Operation Decisive Storm.” Saudi Arabia claims that this operation conducted airstrikes against the bases of the Houthis and the Yemeni military that support the Houthis, as well as destroyed ballistic missiles and other assets. Nonetheless, there were casualties including civilian casualties in Yemen and near the Saudi Arabian border, allegedly attributed to their involvement in the exchange of rocket f re and airstrikes, prompting the international community to express strong concerns to both parties. In April 2015, “Operation Renewal of Hope” was launched with the aim of setting the conf ict through political dialogue. In addition, the U.N. Security Council adopted Resolution 2216, which set forth provisions on the Houthis’ withdrawal from the government institutions they occupied and return of the weapons of the Yemeni military, as well as an arms embargo and asset freezes, in an effort to bring the situation to a close. Nevertheless, Saudi Arabia and other countries, which have been attacked by the Houthis, have continued to conduct airstrikes against the Houthis. Although a f ve-day ceasef re was implemented for humanitarian assistance purposes in May 2015, airstrikes have continued following the end of the ceasef re. In that same month, peace talks were scheduled to be held with the participation of all parties but were postponed, citing lack of preparation as the reason. At the same time, Yemen is also the base of operations of international terrorist organizations. In October 2010, explosives were discovered in multiple air cargoes that were headed for the United States. It was revealed that these cargoes had been shipped from Yemen. These incidents are deemed to have been perpetrated mainly by Al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) based in southern Yemen. AQAP is considered to have been involved also in the terrorism incidents in January 2015, including the assault on the head off ce of a French weekly newspaper over the caricature of Prophet Muhammad. In February 2015, Islamic extremists reportedly overran a Yemeni military base, amid the unstable political situation caused by the Houthis’ seizure of power. While the United States has launched a mop-up operation using drones against these international terrorist organizations that are operating in Yemen, it is feared that AQAP and other organizations would further gain in strength due to the declining presence of the United States in Yemen[58]. **6** **Situation in Egypt** In January 2011, democratization movements triggered by “the Arab Spring”[59] spread to Egypt, where large-scale anti-government demonstrations occurred and President Mubarak, who had controlled the country as a despotic leader for 30 years, resigned. Mr. Mursi from the Muslim Brotherhood[60], was elected as the new president through the presidential election in June 2012, but large-scale demonstrations demanding resignation of President Mursi occurred in June 2013 due to an economic impasse and the chasm between Islamic groups and liberal, secular groups, which resulted in a large number of victims from clashes between some demonstrators and groups supporting the President. While this sort of disorder spread in the country, 57 At least ten countries including Japan have temporarily closed their embassies and evacuated their embassy personnel (further closures are possible). 58 The United States has temporarily closed its embassy in Yemen based on the unstable public security situation in Sana’a. In addition, the United States has withdrawn its personnel from Al Anad Air Base. 59 See Part I, Chapter 2, Section 1-1, Footnote 2 60 A Sunni political organization established in Egypt in 1928 as an organization targeting the general public to “revive Islam.” In the 1950s, it became a target of a clampdown for plotting the assassination of President Gamal Abdel Nasser. However, by the 1970s, the organization became moderate to the extent of conducting political activities through parliament. Meanwhile, extremist ----- the national forces intervened in July 2013 and dismissed President Mursi, establishing a provisional government by temporarily setting the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court as President. In May 2014, a presidential election was held in line with the roadmap drafted by the provisional government, which addresses the comprehensive democratization process for national reconciliation, and former Defense Minister Abdel-Fattah el-Sisi was elected. As the democratically-elected Egyptian administration collapsed through the intervention of national forces, the United States prompted the provisional government to proceed further with democratization initiatives by freezing some military assistance to Egypt in October 2013. Meanwhile, in the Sinai Peninsula, terrorist attacks by Islamic extremist groups have been a cause for concern. Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis[61], which is said to have pledged allegiance to ISIL, has staged attacks against the Egyptian government, leading the Egyptian military forces to carry out operations to gain control of the area. assisted by the mediation of the international community including the AU. The two countries signed a series of agreements regarding security measures in the border area, oil production, and other issues in September 2012 as well as a document specifying an agreement implementation schedule in March 2013. The President of South Sudan dismissed the Vice President in July 2013, bringing to the surface a political conf ict between the two groups. In December of the same year, f ghting broke out among the President’s security forces in the capital city of Juba, which evolved into clashes between the pro-President faction (government) and pro-Vice President faction (anti-government group). Subsequently, following an outbreak of clashes between the South Sudanese government and the anti-government group, f ghting and violent acts targeting specif c ethnic groups spread to different areas, resulting in a large number of casualties, refugees, and internally displaced persons (IDPs). Under these circumstances, on December 24, the U.N. Security Council adopted Resolution 2132 and decided to enhance the UNMISS by increasing the maximum military personnel by 5,500. In addition, the “Intergovernmental Authority on Development” (IGAD)[65] assisted by the U.N. and the AU initiated efforts to start dialogues among South Sudanese leaders and enable reconciliation. The IGAD helped both parties to sign an agreement in Ethiopia in January 2014 on ceasing hostile activities in South Sudan. Even now, the IGAD continues to conduct mediation to establish a unif ed transitional government[66]. Furthermore, in May 2014, the U.N. Security Council adopted Resolution 2155, which stipulated that the mandate of the UNMISS would be restricted to the four areas of the protection of civilians, monitoring and investigating human rights, creating the conditions for delivery of humanitarian assistance, and supporting the implementation of the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement. In May 2015, the U.N. Security Council adopted Resolution 2223 that extended the mandate of the UNMISS by six months. Since around 2003, the Darfur region in the west of Sudan has experienced heightened conf icts between the **7** **Situation in Sudan and South Sudan** The North-South civil war that continued since 1983 between the government of Sudan, composed of Arab Muslims in the north, and the anti-government group, composed of African Christians in the south, concluded with the establishment of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in 2005 under the mediation of neighboring countries, the United States, and others. As a result of a referendum in accordance with the rules of the CPA in January 2011, the Republic of South Sudan gained independence on July 9, 2011. On the same day, the United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS) was established based on Resolution 1996 adopted by the U.N. Security Council in order to support the establishment of an environment contributing to maintaining peace and stability and helping South Sudan to develop further[62]. After the independence of this state, negotiations between Sudan and South Sudan have been going on regarding issues, which include the def nition of the national border (e.g. the treatment of the Abyei area[63]) and the prof t allocation of oil production[64], 61 An Islamic extremist organization based in the Sinai Peninsula that aims to overthrow Israel. It is deemed that the organization intensifi ed its terrorism activities targeting Egyptian security authorities following the collapse of the Morsi government in July 2013. 62 The initial mandate period was one year with up to 7,000 military personnel and up to 900 police personnel. Specifically, the mandate of UNMISS is as follows: (1) support for peace consolidation and thereby fostering long-term state building and economic development; (2) support the government of the Republic of South Sudan in exercising its responsibilities for conflict prevention, mitigation, and resolution and protect civilians; and (3) support the government of the Republic of South Sudan in developing its capacity to provide security, to establish rule of law, and to strengthen the security and justice sectors. 63 The Abyei area was one of the bloodiest battlefields during the North-South civil war. Both the North and the South claim sovereignty over the area due to its abundant oil resources. Whether the area belongs to the North or the South remains uncertain, as a referendum that will settle the territorial issue has not yet been held. In May 2011, immediately before the independence of South Sudan, a battle began between the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) and Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA), which was a major military organization in southern Sudan. In June 2011, the Security Council established under its Resolution 1990 the United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA) in the region. 64 A vast majority of oil wells are located in South Sudan, while most pipelines and ports for export are located in Sudan. 65 The IGAD was established in 1996. Its members are East African nations including Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan, and Uganda. ----- Arab Sudanese government and African anti-government groups. In response to the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) entered between the government and some antigovernment groups in 2006, the U.N. Security Council adopted Resolution 1769 in order to establish the African Union/United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) in 2007. In 2011, the government and an antigovernment group, “Liberation and Justice Movement” (LJM), signed the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur (DDPD). However, other anti-government groups rejecting the implementation of this document still continue to f ght against the government forces. of the country, is considered to include bases for pirates who are active off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden. The international community is implementing a series of initiatives to enhance the security capabilities of Somalia based on the perception that instability of Somalia triggers the piracy issues[70]. Somalia saw the end of transitional governance period of the TFG as of August 2012 and convened a new federal assembly. A new president was elected in September 2012 and a new cabinet was formed in November 2012. This newly-integrated government established for the f rst time in 21 years aims to stabilize the situation in the country. **8** **Situation in Somalia** **9** **Situation in Mali** Somalia has been in a state of anarchy since its government collapsed in 1991[67]. In 2005, the “Transitional Federal Government” (TFG) was established based on the mediation of neighboring countries, but f ghting was escalated with such groups as the “Union of Islamic Courts” (UIC) denying this framework. In 2006, Ethiopian forces intervened with assistance from the United States and drove away the UIC. In 2007, the African Union Mission to Somalia (AMISOM)[68] was established based on the approval of United Nations. On the other hand, Al-Qaeda-related extremist insurgents derived from the UIC, “Al-Shabaab”[69], gained strength in the central and southern parts of the country and resisted the TFG. In response to this, neighboring countries dispatched troops to the AMISOM and other organizations and seized Kismayo, a major stronghold of Al-Shabaab, in October 2012. In August 2014, AMISOM launched Operation Indian Ocean and succeeded in recapturing some of the cities in the central and southern areas which had served as the bases of Al-Shabaab. In the following month, Al-Shabaab‘s leader Godane was killed by the attacks of the U.S. Forces. Meanwhile, Al-Shabaab frequently stages terrorist attacks against AMISOM’s member states. In particular, cross-border terrorist attacks against Kenya have increased since 2014. In addition, Somalia, especially the northeastern part In Mali, an anti-government Tuareg[71] insurgent group, the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA), triggered a riot in January 2012, joined by other groups including “Ansar Dine”[72], an Islamic extremist group. The MNLA conquered northern cities and declared the independence of the northern region in April 2012. Subsequently, Islamic extremist groups including Ansar Dine that expelled the MNLA, “Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa” (MUJAO), and “Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb” (AQIM), governed the country based on the sharia law, aggravating the humanitarian and security situations in northern Mali. In response to this situation, in December 2012, the U.N. Security Council adopted Resolution 2085 and approved the deployment of the African-led International Support Mission to Mali (AFISMA)[73], whose tasks included revitalizing the capabilities of Malian troops and security organizations and helping Malian authorities. In January 2013, France dispatched its troops to the country based on a request from the Malian provisional government following the invasion of central and southern regions by terrorists including Ansar Dine. Subsequently, the Malian provisional government recaptured its major cities in the northern part of the country, assisted by the deployment of AFISMA. In April 2013, the U.N. Security Council adopted Resolution 67 “Somaliland” located in the Northwest declared its independence in 1991. “Puntland” located in the Northeast declared the establishment of an autonomous government in 1998. 68 The AMISOM is composed mainly of troops from Uganda, Burundi, Djibouti, Kenya, and Sierra Leone, joined by Ethiopia in January 2013. Resolution 2124 decided to increase the number of troops from 17,731 to 22,126. 69 See Part I, Chapter 2, Section 1-3 70 See Part III, Chapter 3, Section 2 for counter-piracy initiatives implemented by the MOD and the SDF and other countries. 71 The Tuareg Tribe is a nomadic ethnic minority in the Sahara Desert. It is pointed out that the tribe has been in conflict with the government of Mali seeking for autonomy in northern Mali. 72 See Part I, Chapter 2, Section 1-3 ----- 2100 to determine the establishment of the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA)[74], whose tasks include the stabilization of densely-populated areas and the reconstruction of national capabilities throughout Mali. Based on this resolution, MINUSMA, which had its authority delegated by AFISMA, became operational in July 2013. With the support of MINUSMA, a presidential election was held in a peaceful manner, and a new government was established in September of the same year[75]. Later, large-scale clashes broke out between Malian troops and MNLA in May 2014. However, in the same month, a ceasef re agreement was established between the two parties with the mediation of the AU. In July 2014, with the mediation of the U.N., Algeria and other parties, peace talks commenced between the Malian government and the Tuareg insurgent group, including MNLA. Their talks over the autonomy of the northern area are ongoing. Nonetheless, with the Malian government losing most of its governance over the northern area of Mali, AQIM and other groups have conducted intermittent attacks against MINUSMA units and the situation in the region has destabilized. In August 2014, French troops integrated and reorganized its units in Mali, Chad, and Niger in order to deal effectively with the expanding threat of terrorism across the whole Sahel region, including Mali[76], and launched Operation Barkhane covering the entire region. French troops are currently working with MINUSMA and the troops of the countries in the region to stabilize the Sahel region, including northern Mali[77]. on their dissatisfaction over the execution status of an agreement signed in 2008 with the government. In January 2013, the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS)[79] and other organizations helped the Central African Republic government and Seleka to reach a peace agreement. However, Seleka recommenced their attacks in March 2013 based on its assertion that the government failed in conforming to the agreement, and conquered the capital city of Bangui. Subsequently, the country’s security and humanitarian situations were rapidly aggravated, as murders and looting of citizens by multiple insurgent groups, including Seleka and “Anti-balaka,” a mostly Christian vigilante group established to counter Seleka, became widespread. In July 2014, a ceasef re agreement was concluded between Seleka and Anti-balaka. However, the interim government has limited inf uence, and the situation in the country remains unstable with clashes continuing between Seleka and Anti-balaka. Meanwhile, the U.N. Security Council adopted Resolution 2127 in December 2013 and approved the dispatch of the African-led International Support Mission to the Central African Republic (MISCA) led by the AU and the enhancement of French troops supporting this mission. This resolution also requested the authority of the Mission for the consolidation of peace in Central African Republic (MICOPAX), a mission implemented in the country by the leadership of the ECCAS, to be transferred to the MISCA, and suggested that the MISCA would eventually shift to a U.N. PKO. In April 2014, the U.N. Security Council adopted Resolution 2149 and decided to establish the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA), whose tasks included protecting civilians[80]. In September 2014, MISCA was formally transitioned to MINUSCA. Moreover, the EU decided to dispatch its security forces in January 2014, and the forces commenced operations in April of the same year[81]. Furthermore In January 2015, the EU decided to dispatch a military advisory mission in the form of succeeding the activities of the security forces. **10** **Situation in the Central African Republic** The Central African Republic has been facing political turmoil since its independence in 1960, aff icted by successive military coups and activities by antigovernment insurgents. In December 2012, Seleka[78], an anti-government Islamic insurgent group, conquered several cities in the northeastern part of the country, based 74 The initial mandate period of MINUSMA is one year from July 2013. The mission is implemented by a maximum of 11,200 military personnel and a maximum of 1,440 policing personnel. In case MINUSMA is exposed to imminent danger, based on a request from the U.N. Secretary-General, French forces are given authorization to intervene for the purpose of assisting the mission. 75 In June 2013, the provisional government and MNLA reached an agreement on such issues as allowing the northern area to participate in the presidential election and approving the dispatch of Mali troops to northern cities. 76 The Sahel region refers to the southern edge of the Sahara Desert. The countries in the Sahel region include Mauritania, Senegal, Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, and Chad. 77 Operation Barkhane consists of a total of around 3,000 personnel. The Operation’s headquarters are in Chad, and it has bases in Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso. The operation is executed through the swift deployment of units to various areas. In northern Mali, French troops collaborate with MINUSMA units, and in other areas, collaborate with the military forces of the countries in the region. The Operation mainly conducts mop-ups of terrorists and joint patrol. 78 Seleka means “alliance” in the local language. The organization was created by combining two major anti-government groups and other anti-government groups in December 2012. Its stronghold is located in the northeastern part of the country where diamond mines are concentrated. 79 The ECCAS was established in December 1981. Its member states are Angola, Gabon, Cameroon, the Republic of the Congo, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, São Tomé and Principé, Equatorial Guinea, Chad, the Central African Republic, and Burundi. 80 The initial mandate period was set to one year, with the maximum dispatch level set for 10,000 military personnel and 1,800 police personnel. ----- **3** **Trends in the Spread of International Terrorism** While the command and control capabilities of Al-Qaeda’s leadership have been declining, Al-Qaeda’s af¬f liates that include “Al-Qaeda” in their name have reportedly gained strength and are perpetrating terrorism from their bases mainly in North Africa and the Middle East[86]. While being based mainly in the Middle East and North Africa, organizations which are said to be af¬f liated with Al-Qaeda and ISIL[87] as well as other Islamic extremist groups are thought to have the capability to cross insuf¬f ciently-controlled national borders and to conduct terrorist attacks even in the areas outside of the countries where they have bases of activity. The organizations have allegedly acquired a large quantity of weapons which proliferated when the Gadha¬f regime of Libya collapsed. In particular, ISIL is said to have seized a vast quantity of weapons, including advanced equipment, from troops such as the Syrian forces and the Iraqi security forces during their combat in Syria and Iraq. Recent years have seen cases in which individuals and groups that have no particular relations with Al-Qaeda or ISIL but were inspired by their extremism become perpetrators of terrorism, giving rise to concerns about the threat of “home-grown” terrorism. European countries and the United States share concern that their nationals would conduct terrorist attacks upon experiencing combat in conf ict-torn regions such as Iraq and Syria[88] and returning to their countries, or upon becoming indoctrinated into extremism and returning to their countries[89]. In recent years, “lone-wolf” terrorism is also seen as a threat. Such acts of terrorism are planned and executed by people acting alone or in small groups. It is therefore diff cult to detect their signs in advance and prevent their occurrence. In connection with Japan, in early 2015, when there was a terrorist incident involving the murder of Japanese nationals in Syria[90], ISIL declared clearly that its acts of terrorism would target Japanese nationals. In this light, Japan is not in any way immune from the threat of international terrorism. **1** **Characteristics of Recent International Terrorism** The objectives and capabilities of transnational terrorist organizations are deemed to vary by organization[82]. As a general trend, the advancement of globalization has increased terrorist organizations’ use of social media and other cyber space tools to share information and conspire within their own organizations or with other groups, as well as to acquire weapons and funds. Some of these organizations are considered to have sophisticated publicity strategies[83]. Furthermore, it has been suggested that terrorist organizations may be perpetrators of cyber attacks. In January 2015, a cyber attack was lodged against the U.S. Central Command’s Twitter account, and an Islamic extremist group is suspected have been involved in the incident. These terrorist organizations move into and establish bases of operations in states and regions with weak or failed governance structures. Among the various terrorist organizations, ISIL has gained strength by seizing the opportunity of the confusion in Syria and Iraq[84]. ISIL has an exceptionally large funding source, powerful military capability which can stand face-to-face with a nation, and de facto control of some territory, making ISIL a particularly striking presence. ISIL renounces the traditional state governance structure in the region, and prioritizes the pursuit of its unique political and religious order, including the establishment of an Islamic community[85]. In this regard, ISIL has traits different from terrorist organizations such as Al-Qaeda, which attaches importance to the “global jihad,” including attacks against U.S. and European mainland. With regard to Al-Qaeda that is believed to have directed the 9/11 attacks in 2001, Osama Bin Laden, the group’s leader who was hiding in Pakistan, was killed in a U.S. operation in May 2011. Some analysts have noted that in light of the losses it has incurred, the Al-Qaeda core now places importance on the survival of the organization. Nonetheless, the possibility of Al-Qaeda attacks has not disappeared. 82 U.S. Department of State, “Country Reports on Terrorism 2012” (May 2013) 83 Issue 7 of Dabiq published by ISIL in February 2015 described the murder of two Japanese nationals and reiterated its calls for terrorist attacks targeting Japanese nationals and their interests. In addition, Issue 1 of Inspire published by AQAP in July 2010 introduces easy directions for bomb-making. 84 According to the “Worldwide Threat Assessment 2015” released by U.S. Director of National Intelligence James Clapper in February 2015, more than 20,000 foreign fi ghters are estimated to have gone to Syria from more than 90 countries. 85 Represented as “ummah” in Arabic. Its meaning is strongly associated with a community of members with ethnic or blood ties. Ummah is believed to be formed by hijrah (emigration). The fi rst ummah was created by the over 70 people who emigrated with Muhammad and the group of over 70 people in Medina who helped them. 86 U.S. Director of National Intelligence, “Worldwide Threat Assessment” (January 2014) 87 According to the U.S. think tank Intel Center, as of May 2015, a total of 35 organizations have been confi rmed: Middle East and North Africa (21 organizations); Sub-Saharan Africa (3 organization); South Asia (6 organizations); and Southeast Asia (5 organizations). 88 See Part I, Chapter 2, Section 1-2 for the situation in Iraq and Syria 89 Remarks by U.S. Secretary of Homeland Security (February 7, 2014) 90 The number of people killed by each terrorist and extremist group in 2014 was the highest for ISIL (24%: 4,230 people), followed by Al-Qaeda-affi liated organizations (22%: 3,949 people). These two ----- The proliferation of the threat of terrorism has gained momentum. The diversif cation of its perpetrators, coupled with the growing complexity of regional conf icts, has made it further diff cult to prevent their occurrence. For this reason, international cooperation on counter-terrorism measures has become even more important. Currently, the international community as a whole is taking various steps, including military actions as well as cutting off the funding sources of terrorist organizations and preventing the international movement of terrorist f ghters. allegedly joined an Islamic extremist group in Syria opened f re at the Jewish Museum in Belgium, killing four people. In January 2015, French nationals with origins in Algeria and elsewhere who are deemed to have been inspired by Islamic extremism were involved in shooting attacks, including at the head off ce of the French weekly newspaper Charlie Hebdo in central Paris and a Jewish grocery store[93]. Following this incident, the French government has remained on high alert, deploying nearly 10,000 French forces personnel nationwide. In Denmark, in February 2015, shootings occurred at an event titled “Art, blasphemy and the freedom of expression” held at a café in Copenhagen as well as near a Jewish synagogue, killing two people. **(2) Islamic Extremist Terrorism** In the Middle East, Islamic extremists, such as ISIL which has gained strength in Iraq and Syria as well as the Al-Qaedaaff liated organizations, continue to stage acts of terrorism. In May 2015, multiple suicide bombings targeting Shiite mosques occurred in eastern Saudi Arabia, after which ISIL released a statement claiming responsibility for the attack. In North Africa, it is deemed that ISIL-related organizations and the Al-Qaeda-aff liated organizations operate in Libya, Egypt, and Algeria. In Tunisia, in March 2015, a group thought to be an Islamic extremist organization carried out a shooting attack at the Bardo National Museum in Tunis, killing 21 foreign tourists and others, including three Japanese nationals. In Algeria, in January 2013, an Islamic extremist group that is believed to have seceded from AQIM, which, until then had carried out kidnappings targeting Algerian nationals and Westerners, conducted shooting attacks at a natural gas plant in In Aménas in southeastern Algeria, killing many people including ten Japanese nationals. In June 2013, gunf re erupted between the Algerian forces and armed groups near the border with Mali and Libya. As these examples demonstrate, terrorism remains a threat in Algeria. In Kenya, terrorist incidents that Al-Shabaab is believed to be behind have taken place. In September 2013, an armed group conducted a shooting **2** **Trends in Global Terrorism** **(1) “Home-Grown” and “Lone-Wolf” Terrorism** In recent years, home-grown and lone-wolf terrorism have become a growing concern in the West. In particular, there has been a spate of terrorism incidents perpetrated by people who are deemed to have been inspired by the adept public relations strategies of extremist groups (e.g., solicitation via social media and websites) and people who have returned to their countries from Syria and other conf ict areas. Accordingly, countries are taking steps, including strengthening border control[91] and exposing plans of terrorist attacks prior to their execution. In the Americas, in April 2013, an explosion occurred at the venue of the Boston marathon in the United States, killing three people and injuring many. In Canada, a male convert to Islam, who is believed to have sympathized with the extremism of ISIL, shot and killed a soldier of the Canadian forces in front of the Parliament in Ottawa in October 2014. In Australia, in December 2014, a man of Iranian origin who is believed to have sympathized with the extremism of ISIL took 18 people as hostages at a café in central Sydney, resulting in the deaths of three people, including the criminal, following gunf re between him and local police off cers. In September 2014, the national level of alert in Australia was elevated[92]. All of these incidents are considered to be “homegrown” or “lone-wolf” terrorism. In Europe, in May 2014, a French national who 91 In September 2014, the U.N. Security Council adopted Resolution 2178 on the issue of foreign terrorist fi ghters. The Resolution requested member states to make exits from their countries for the purpose of executing acts of terrorism punishable under domestic laws. The Resolution also includes measures obligating member states to prevent entry or transit through their territories of any individual about whom that state had credible information which demonstrates reasonable grounds for believing that the individual is attempting to enter or transit through its territory for the purpose of participating in acts of terrorism. In addition, at the G7 Summit held in Germany in June 2015, the leaders reaffi rmed their commitment to effectively implement the established international framework for the freezing of terrorists’ assets. 92 The Australian government assesses the terrorist threat to Australia on a scale of four levels – Extreme, High, Medium, and Low – and discloses the alert level for terrorism. As of March 2015, the level of alert is raised to High (terrorist attack is likely). 93 Of the two brothers who were behind the shooting attack at the Charlie Hebdo head offi ce, one is known to have received training at an AQAP camp. In addition, AQAP released a statement saying it had issued instructions directly to the brothers. While no clear relevance has been confi rmed, Amedy Coulibaly who was behind the shooting attack at a Jewish grocery store is believed to have ----- attack at an upscale shopping center in Nairobi, leaving 67 people dead. In April 2015, an armed group carried out a shooting attack at a university in Garissa in northeastern Kenya, leaving at least 148 people dead. In Sub-Saharan Africa, Islamic extremists have gained strength in countries such as Mali, Somalia[94], and Nigeria. In particular, in Nigeria, Boko Haram, which aims to create an Islamic state, has stepped up its activities since 2009, repeatedly carrying out acts of terrorism in retaliation against crackdowns by police and other authorities. In April 2014, Boko Haram abducted over 200 female students in Borno State in northeastern Nigeria. In response, the international community took steps. For example the United States dispatched drones and other assets to support the search activities of the Nigerian government. In addition, the U.N. Security Council Sanctions Committee added Boko Haram to its sanctions list. Recently, Boko Haram has reportedly repeated suicide bombings using women and girls who are less likely to raise alarm. Furthermore, Boko Haram has been expanding its activities to areas outside of Nigeria, conducting a shooting attack in a village along the Nigerian border in Diffa Region in southeastern Niger in February 2015. In March 2015, Boko Haram swore allegiance to ISIL and appears to be gaining strength. However, neighboring countries are undertaking a **4** **International Response to the Ebola Outbreak** Since the Ebola virus was f rst discovered in Sudan and the Democratic Republic of the Congo in 1976, multiple outbreaks of the Ebola virus disease (EVD) have occurred mainly in Central Africa, killing tens to hundreds of people. In March 2014, multiple cases of EVD were conf rmed in Guinea for the f rst time in West Africa, and the infection spread to neighboring Sierra Leone and Liberia. Factors such as the weak health systems and people’s lack of knowledge about sanitation in the affected countries[99], combined with their burial practices and the inf ux of infected people into capital cities contributed to the rising number of deaths from EVD[100]. In August 2014, the World Health Organization (WHO) declared the outbreak a public health emergency of international concern. The spread of infection has had adverse effects on the national economies and societies of the main affected countries – Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Guinea. Furthermore, the infection spread by the movement of people through air travel and other means, mop-up operation against Boko Haram, and consequently, the area under its control has not rapidly expanded. In South Asia, acts of terrorism have occurred frequently from before. In particular, Pakistan has had a spate of terrorism attacks targeted at religious facilities and government agencies, which have been perpetrated by organizations such as Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and Al-Qaeda. In December 2014, TTP was involved in a shooting incident at a military school in Peshawar in northwestern Pakistan, which killed over 141 people. In September 2014, Al-Qaeda’s leader Ayman al Zawahiri announced the establishment of a new branch in India[95]. In addition, ISIL has reportedly unilaterally established Khorasan Province in Afghanistan and Pakistan[96]. The intensif cation of the acts of terrorism by Islamic extremists is a cause for concern. In Southeast Asia, while some progress has been observed, including with the crackdown on terrorist organizations[97], the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) in the Philippines has allegedly sworn allegiance and provided funding to ISIL. In addition, young people from Indonesia and other countries have reportedly gone to Iraq and Syria as foreign f ghters and pose a new threat in the region[98]. See Fig. I-2-1-2 (Major Terrorist Groups Based in Africa and the Middle East Regions) with cases conf rmed not only in other African countries, including Nigeria, Senegal, and Mali, but also in the United States in September 2014, Spain in October, and the United Kingdom in December. This unprecedented outbreak of EVD is a pressing issue for the international community, one in which a single country cannot deal with on its own. Under these circumstances, in September 2014, the U.N. Security Council adopted Resolution 2177, which requested U.N. member states to provide assistance to the affected countries to contain EVD. In the same month, the United Nations Mission for Ebola Emergency Response (UNMEER) was established and started conducting activities in the f eld. The international response also included the provision of assistance by various military forces. In September 2014, President Obama announced the deployment of U.S. Forces to West Africa centered in Liberia in order to contain EVD. In December 2014, the number of deployed U.S. units reached 94 In February 2015, Al-Shabaab called on Islamic followers in the United States, United Kingdom, France, and Canada to conduct attacks at shopping centers and business districts in these countries. 95 Al-Qaeda’s leader Ayman al Zawahiri has stated that the goal of the Al-Qaida in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS) is to free Muslim followers who are oppressed in Bangladesh, India, Myanmar, and Sri Lanka. 96 ISIL’s spokesperson Abu Mohammed al-Adnani announced that Hafi z Saeed Khan, former TTP commander, would be appointed governor of Khorasan Province. 97 It is pointed out that the terrorist organizations have weakened in the Philippines, such as the Islamic extremist terrorist organization ASG, which have been the foremost security concern in the country. See Part I, Chapter 1, Section 6-2 for the situation in the Philippines. 98 In Indonesia, the government banned participation in ISIL in August 2014. Under the existing legal system, however, it is said that authorities do not have the authority to arrest ISIL supporters unless there is evidence of their clear involvement in terrorism activities. 99 A WHO report cites underlying factors, including damaged public health infrastructures due to civil war, as well as the entry into society of young people with no education. ----- Fig. I-2-1-2 Major Terrorist Groups Based in Africa and the Middle East Regions Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Islamic State of Iraq Al-Qaeda Al-Nusrah Front Maghreb (AQIM) and the Levant (ISIL) Taliban ISIL Tripoli ISIL Barqa Hizballah Branch Branch SyriaSyria Hamas LebanonLebanon IraqIraq AfghanistanAfghanistan PalestinePalestine ISIL Khorasan AlgeriaAlgeria Branch PakistanPakistan LibyaLibya EgyptEgypt Saudi ArabiaSaudi Arabia ISIL Algeria Branch Tenrik-e Taliban Pakistan MaliMali Al-Mulathamun Battalion (AMB) ISIL Sinai Branch Movement for Unity and Jihad YemenYemen in West Africa (MUJAO) ISIL Yemen Branch ISIL Saudi Arabia Branch NigeriaNigeria SomaliaSomalia Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) Ansar al-Dine Boko Haram : ISIL-related groups Al-Shabaab : Al-Qaeda Affiliate : Groups whose relation with Al-Qaeda has been pointed out : Other major Islamic extremist terrorist groups Source: Created based on The Worldwide Threat Assessment (February 26, 2015) roughly 2,900 personnel. In Liberia, the U.S. Forces are engaged mainly in the construction of treatment facilities, the establishment of facilities to train health workers, and transport. In October 2014, the United Kingdom announced its intention to deploy units primarily to Sierra Leone. In December 2014, the number of deployed U.K. units reached roughly 800 personnel. The British Armed Forces are engaged in the construction of treatment facilities, the provision of training supports for health workers, and the transport of personnel by helicopter. In addition, France, Germany, China, and other countries dispatched military personnel in order to contain Ebola. These forces are involved mainly in medical activities, the transport of medical supplies, and the education and training of local public health off cials, with the purpose of providing effective supports for the local containment effort. While the WHO declared Liberia free of Ebola in May 2015, these efforts of the international community are still ongoing. U.S. Forces training for health workers [U.S. Army website] ----- **Section 2 Transfer and Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction** The transfer and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs), such as nuclear, biological and chemical (NBC) weapons, and ballistic missiles that deliver such weapons, have been recognized as a signif cant **1** **Nuclear Weapons** During the Cold War, the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962 raised awareness of the danger of a full-scale nuclear war between the United States and the Soviet Union. The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) that took effect in 1970 prohibited countries other than those that exploded a nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device in or before 1966[1] from having nuclear weapons, and provided that arms control and disarmament of nuclear forces would be pursued through two-way negotiations[2]. The NPT is currently signed by 191 countries and regions[3]. While some countries that had previously possessed nuclear weapons became signatories of this treaty as non-nuclear weapon states by abandoning these weapons[4], India, Israel, and Pakistan still refuse to accede to this treaty as non-nuclear weapon states. There are other countries that have declared the development and possession of nuclear weapons, such as North Korea, which announced that it conducted nuclear tests in October 2006, May 2009, and February 2013[5]. U.S. President Barack Obama’s speech in April 2009 in which he expressed his hopes for a world without nuclear weapons demonstrated U.S. determination to take concrete steps towards this world, specif cally: the reduction of the role of nuclear weapons in U.S. national security while maintaining nuclear deterrence; the signing of a new treaty to replace the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty I (START I) between the United States and Russia; and pursuit of threat since the end of the Cold War. In particular, there still remain strong concerns that non-state actors, including terrorists, against which traditional deterrence works less effectively, could acquire and use WMDs. ratif cation of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT)[6] by the U.S. government. This in turn encouraged the international community to take initiatives towards nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. In April 2010, the presidents of the United States and Russia signed the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) to replace START I, which was put into effect in February 2011[7]. In addition, in June 2013, President Obama made a speech in Berlin in which he announced his intention to negotiate with Russia on the reduction of the number of U.S. deployed strategic nuclear weapons by up to one-third, among other cuts[8]. The United Kingdom also stated in the Strategic Defense and Security Review (SDSR) in October 2010 that the country would decrease the number of its nuclear warheads. In the area of “nuclear security” which addresses terrorism activities that utilize nuclear and other radioactive materials, in April 2010, the f rst Nuclear Security Summit was held in Washington, D.C. The Summit adopted a Communiqué stating that measures should be taken to secure all vulnerable nuclear material in four years to reduce the threat of nuclear terrorism, among other matters. The second Nuclear Security Summit that was convened in Seoul in March 2012 adopted the Seoul Communiqué, which incorporates issues to be addressed by the international community to achieve nuclear security, such as the management, transportation, and illicit traff cking of The United States, the former Soviet Union (now Russia), the United Kingdom, France, and China. France and China acceded to the NPT in 1992. Article 6 of the NPT sets out the obligation of signatory countries to negotiate nuclear disarmament in good faith. As of February 2015 South Africa, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Belarus After North Korea announced its withdrawal from the NPT in 1993, it pledged that it would remain a contracting state to the NPT. However, North Korea again declared its withdrawal from the NPT in January 2003. In the Joint Statement of the Six-Party Talks adopted in September 2005, North Korea pledged to return to the NPT at an early date. Nonetheless, North Korea subsequently announced the implementation of three nuclear tests. North Korea’s nuclear tests constitute a major challenge to the NPT. Adopted in 1996, this treaty bans all nuclear test explosions regardless of the location. Of the 44 nations that are required to ratify it for the treaty to enter into force, 8 nations have not yet ratifi ed the treaty (United States, China, India, Pakistan, Iran, Israel, Egypt, and North Korea). Indonesia ratified the CTBT in February 2012. The United States participated in the Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the CTBT in September 2011, following on from 2009 which marked the first time in 10 years that the United States participated in the Conference. The treaty stipulates that both countries would reduce the number of deployed strategic warheads to 1,550 and the number of deployed delivery vehicles to 700 by seven years following the treaty’s entry into force. In April 2015, the United States reported that it had 1,597 deployed strategic nuclear warheads and 785 deployed delivery vehicles, while Russia reported that it had 1,582 deployed strategic nuclear warheads and 515 deployed delivery vehicles. These numbers are as of March 1, 2015. Regarding this proposal, Russia explained its position that all elements impacting strategic stability including missile defense, space weapons, and non-nuclear strategic weapons need to be taken ----- nuclear materials, as well as nuclear forensics[9]. The third Nuclear Security Summit that was held in The Hague in March 2014 adopted a Communiqué, which included a statement that went so far as to say that the leaders encourage countries to minimize their stocks of highly enriched uranium and to keep their stockpile of separated plutonium to the minimum level, both as consistent with national requirements. The fact that the international community has begun to **2** **Biological and Chemical Weapons** Biological and chemical weapons are easy to manufacture at relatively low cost and are easy to disguise as most materials, equipment, and technology needed to manufacture these weapons can be used for both military and civilian purposes. For example, water purif cation equipment used to desalinate sea water can be exploited to extract bacteria for the production of biological weapons, and sodium cyanide used for the process of metal coating can be abused for the production of chemical weapons[11]. Accordingly, biological and chemical weapons are attractive to states and non-state actors, such as terrorists, seeking asymmetric means of attack[12]. Biological weapons have the following characteristics: (1) manufacturing is easy and inexpensive; (2) there is usually an incubation period of a few days between exposure and onset; (3) their use is hard to detect; (4) even the threat of use can create great psychological effects; and (5) they can cause mass casualties and injuries depending on the circumstances of use and the type of weapon[13]. As has been pointed out, advancements in life science could be misused or abused for the development of biological weapons. In view of these concerns, in November 2009, the United States established guidelines[14] on responding to the proliferation of biological weapons and their use by terrorists. The guidelines set out that the make steady and major strides toward nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation contributes to improving the international security environment, and is a welcome development. In contrast, China is deemed to have increased its inventory of nuclear warheads as well as developed and deployed their means of delivery[10], and thereby, continued to enhance the capability of its nuclear forces. It has been pointed out that initiatives for reducing nuclear weapons involving China will be needed in the future. United States would take measures to ensure the thorough management of pathogens and toxins[15]. As for chemical weapons, Iraq repeatedly used mustard gas, tabun, and sarin[16] in the Iran-Iraq War. In the late 1980s, Iraq used chemical weapons to suppress Iraqi Kurds[17]. It is believed that other chemical weapons[18] that were used included VX, a highly toxic nerve agent, and easy-to-manage binary rounds[19]. In August 2013, sarin was used in the suburbs of Damascus, Syria, where Syrian troops clashed with antigovernment groups[20]. The Syrian government denied using chemical weapons, but entered into the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) in line with an agreement between the United States and Russia. Subsequently, international efforts have been underway for the overseas transfer of chemical agents and other measures based on the decisions made by the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW)[21] and a U.N. Security Council resolution[22]. In August 2014, the operation to destroy Syria’s chemical weapons on the U.S. Navy transport vessel Cape Ray was completed[23]. Furthermore, OPCW has indicated that ISIL[24], which is gaining strength in Iraq and Syria, may have utilized chlorine gas against Iraqi forces[25]. North Korea is an example of a country that is still presumed to possess these chemical weapons and which 9 Nuclear forensics aims to provide evidence for the prosecution of perpetrators of illicit traffi cking or malicious use, through identification of the source of detected nuclear and other radioactive materials. 10 See Part I, Chapter 1, Section 3-2 for China’s ballistic missile development 11 The export of related dual-use items and technologies that can be used to develop and produce these biological and chemical weapons is controlled by the domestic laws of member states, including Japan, pursuant to an agreement of the Australia Group, a framework for international export control. 12 Means of attack to strike the opponent’s vulnerable points. At the same time, they are not conventional means. They include WMDs, ballistic missiles, terrorist attacks, and cyber attacks. 13 Then-Japan Defense Agency, “Basic Concept for Dealing with Biological Weapons” (January 2002) 14 In November 2009, the National Strategy for Countering Biological Threats was released. It presents guidelines on responding to the proliferation of biological weapons and their use by terrorists. In the State of the Union Address in January 2010, President Obama said that the United States was launching a new initiative to respond promptly and effectively to bioterrorism and infectious diseases. 15 U.S. Executive Order (July 2, 2010) 16 Mustard gas is a slow-acting blister agent. Tabun and sarin are fast-acting nerve agents. 17 It has been reported that a chemical weapons attack against a Kurdish village in 1988 killed several thousand people at once. 18 Iraq joined the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) in February 2009. 19 A weapon in which two types of relatively harmless chemicals that serve as ingredients for a chemical agent are contained separately within the weapon. It was devised so that the impact of the fi ring of the weapon or other action mixes the chemical materials in the warhead, causing a chemical reaction and thereby synthesis of the chemical agent. Binary rounds are easier to store and handle than weapons containing chemical agents from the outset. 20 “United Nations Mission to Investigate Allegations of the Use of Chemical Weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic: Final Report” (December 12, 2013) 21 (The 33rd and 34th) meetings of the Executive Council of OPCW. 22 U.N. Security Council Resolution 2118 23 According to the OPCW, 600 tons of Category 1 extremely toxic chemical materials, including sarin and VX gas, were disposed of (August 19, 2014, Statement by the OPCW Director-General). In addition, U.N. Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon reported to the Security Council that 97.8% of Syria’s chemical weapons have been disposed of as of October 22, 2014 (Letter dated October 27, 2014 from the U.N. Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council). 24 See Part I, Chapter 2, Section 1 for ISIL 25 On February 10, 2015, OPCW Director-General Ahmet Üzümcü formally acknowledged that Iraqi authorities had notifi ed the OPCW of ISIL’s use of chlorine gas against Iraqi soldiers in October 2014. ----- has not entered into the CWC. Furthermore, the Tokyo subway sarin attack in 1995, as well as incidents of bacillus anthracis being contained in mail items in the United States in 2001 and that of ricin being contained in a mail item in **3** **Ballistic Missiles** Ballistic missiles enable the projection of heavy payloads over long distances and can be used as a means of delivering WMDs, such as nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons. Once launched, ballistic missiles follow an orbital f ight trajectory and fall at a steep angle at high speed. As such, effectively countering them requires a highly advanced interceptor missile system. The deployment of ballistic missiles in a region where armed conf ict is under way runs the risk of intensifying or expanding the conf ict. Additionally, it has the risk of further heightening tension in a region where military confrontation is ongoing, leading to the destabilization of that region. Furthermore, ballistic missiles are used as a means of attacking from a distance or threatening another country that has superior conventional forces. February 2004, have shown that the threat of the use of WMDs by terrorists is real and that these weapons could cause serious damage if used in cities. In recent years, in addition to the threat of ballistic missiles, analysts have pointed to the threat of cruise missiles as a weapon which is comparatively easy for terrorists and other non-state actors to acquire and which has the potential for proliferation[26]. Because cruise missiles are cheaper to produce compared to ballistic missiles and are easy to maintain and train with, many countries either produce or modify cruise missiles. At the same time, it is said that cruise missiles have a higher degree of target accuracy and that they are diff cult to detect while in f ight[27]. Moreover, because they are smaller than ballistic missiles, cruise missiles can be concealed on a ship to secretly approach a target, and present a serious threat if they carry WMDs in their warheads[28]. **4** **Growing Concerns about Transfer and Proliferation of WMDs and Other Technologies** Even weapons that were purchased or developed for selfdefense purposes could easily be exported or transferred once domestic manufacturing becomes successful. For example, certain states that do not heed political risks have transferred WMDs and related technologies to other states that cannot afford to invest resources in conventional forces and attempt to offset this with WMDs. Some of these states that seek WMDs do not hesitate to put their land and people at risk, and furthermore, due to their weak governance, terrorist organizations are active in their countries. Therefore, it is conceivable that in general, the possibility of actual use of WMDs would increase. In addition, since there is a concern that such states may not be able to effectively manage the related technology and materials, the high likelihood that chemical or nuclear substances will be transferred or smuggled out from these states has become a cause for concern. For example, there is a danger that even terrorists who do not possess related technologies would use a dirty bomb[29] as a means of terrorist attack so long as they gain access to radioactive materials. Nations across the world share concerns regarding the acquisition and use of WMDs by terrorists and other non-state actors[30]. The proliferation of WMDs and other related 26 In the July 2006 conflict between Israel and Lebanon, it is believed that Hezbollah used a cruise missile to attack an Israeli naval vessel. Israel announced in March 2011 that it had uncovered six anti-ship cruise missiles among other items on cargo ships subject to inspection. 27 United States Congressional Research Service, “Cruise Missile Proliferation” (July 28, 2005) 28 The United States is concerned that the development and deployment of ballistic and cruise missiles by countries including China and Iran could pose a threat to U.S. forward-deployed forces. 29 Dirty bombs are intended to cause radioactive contamination by spreading radioactive materials. 30 With these concerns, the U.N. Security Council adopted Resolution 1540 in April 2004, which sets forth the decision that all U.N. member states would refrain from providing support to non-state actors that attempt to develop, acquire, manufacture, possess, transport, transfer, or use WMDs and their means of delivery, as well as adopt and enforce laws that are appropriate and effective for ----- technologies has been noted in numerous instances. For example, in February 2004, it came to light that nuclear-related technologies, mainly uranium enrichment technology, had been transferred to North Korea, Iran, and Libya by Dr. A.Q. Khan and other scientists in Pakistan. It has also been suggested that North Korea supported Syria’s secret nuclear activities[31]. Furthermore, there has been signif cant transfer and proliferation of ballistic missiles that serve as the means of delivery of WMDs. The former Soviet Union and other countries exported Scud-Bs to many countries and regions, including Iraq, North Korea, and Afghanistan. China and North Korea also exported DF-3 (CSS-2) and Scud missiles, respectively. As a result, a considerable number of countries now possess ballistic missiles. In addition, Pakistan’s Ghauri and Iran’s Shahab-3 missiles are believed to be based on North Korea’s Nodong missiles. The international community’s uncompromising and **5** **Iran’s Nuclear Issues** Since the 1970s, Iran has been pursuing a nuclear power plant construction project with cooperation from abroad, claiming that its nuclear-related activities are for peaceful purposes in accordance with the NPT. In 2002, however, Iran’s covert construction of facilities including a largescale uranium enrichment plant was exposed by a group of dissidents. Subsequent IAEA inspection revealed that Iran, without notifying the IAEA, had been engaged for a long time in uranium enrichment and other activities potentially leading to the development of nuclear weapons. In September 2005, the IAEA Board of Governors recognized Iran’s breach of compliance with the NPT Safeguards Agreement. In September 2009, it was revealed that Iran had failed to abide by the reporting duties based on the Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA and was constructing a new decisive stance against the transfer and proliferation of WMDs and other technologies has put signif cant pressure on countries engaged in related activities, leading some of them to accept inspections by international organizations or abandon their WMD and other programs altogether[32]. Meanwhile, it is pointed out that, in recent years, states of proliferation concern have sustained their proliferation activities by averting international monitoring, through illicitly exporting WMDs and other technologies overseas by falsifying documentation, diversifying transport routes, and utilizing multiple front companies and intermediaries. Furthermore, intangible transfer of technology has arisen as a cause for concern. Namely, states of proliferation concern have obtained advanced technologies which could be adapted for the development and manufacturing of WMDs and other technologies via their nationals – researchers and students who have been dispatched to leading companies and academic institutions in developed countries. uranium enrichment plant near Qom in central Iran. Moreover, in February 2010, Iran began enriching uranium to increase the enrichment level from below 5% to up to around 20%, saying that the reason was to supply fuel to a research reactor for medical isotope production. In December 2011, Iran started the enrichment process at the above-mentioned new enrichment plant[33]. The IAEA has expressed concerns that these Iranian nuclear activities may have military dimensions including those related to the development of a nuclear payload for a missile[34]. The IAEA notes that it has been unable to obtain conf rmation that the activities are for peaceful use purposes since Iran has not permitted IAEA personnel to access military facilities, which are suspected to have been involved in the experiments using high explosives, and has not offered other necessary cooperation to dispel these concerns. 31 DNI “Worldwide Threat Assessment” from January 2014 states, “North Korea’s assistance to Syria in the construction of a nuclear reactor (destroyed in 2007) illustrates the reach of the North’s proliferation activities.” The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) report of May 2011 states that the destroyed reactor was very likely a nuclear reactor that Syria should have declared to the IAEA. 32 Extensive behind-the-scenes negotiations began in March 2003 between Libya and the United States and the United Kingdom. In December 2003, Libya agreed to dismantle all of its WMDs and to allow an international organization to carry out inspections. Later, in August 2006, Libya ratified the IAEA Additional Protocol. Meanwhile, after the military activity against Libya by a multinational force, in March 2011, North Korea denounced the military attacks against Libya, saying that attacking after disarmament was an “armed invasion.” 33 The IAEA Director General estimated in a report published in February 2014 that Iran had so far produced a total 447 kg of enriched uranium with a concentration of around 20%, out of which the country had stored 160 kg in the form of uranium hexafluoride. Furthermore, the IAEA Report by the Director General released in May of the same year contend that in accordance with the first step measures elaborated later, Iran diluted to less than 5%, or converted into oxide, a total of approximately 409 kg of uranium hexafluoride enriched up to 20%. Uranium 235 with a concentration of 20% or more is defined as highly enriched uranium, which is generally used for research purposes. If this substance is used for weapons, a concentration ratio is usually 90% or greater. ----- The international community expresses strong concerns, saying that there lacks concrete proof of Iran’s claim that it had no intent to develop nuclear weapons and that all of its nuclear activities were for peaceful use purposes. The international community has demanded that Iran suspend all of its enrichment-related and reprocessing activities through a series of U.N. Security Council resolutions[35] and IAEA Board of Governors resolutions. Regarding this issue, the United States and the European Union (EU) have taken individual measures to strengthen sanctions against Iran. In December 2011, the United States enacted a bill that would prohibit foreign f nancial institutions, which conduct signif cant transactions with the Central Bank of Iran or other Iranian f nancial institutions, from opening or maintaining bank accounts in the United States. The EU started to ban imports of Iranian crude oil and petrochemical products in January 2012. Iran, meanwhile, started negotiations with the IAEA toward resolving pending problems. In April 2012, Iran resumed talks with the EU3+3 (United Kingdom, France, Germany, United States, China, and Russia) on its nuclear program, but no major progress was made under the former Ahmadinezhad administration. However, with Hassan Rouhani winning the presidential election in Iran in June 2013, the discussions with the EU3+3 were advanced under the new administration with the consent of the supreme leader, Ali Hosseini Khamenei. This resulted in the announcement of the Joint Plan of Action (JPOA) towards the comprehensive resolution of nuclear issues in November 2013. The execution of the f rst step measures of the JPOA commenced in January 2014[36]. In regard to this, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu of Israel has expressed strong opposition to the relaxation of sanctions against Iran, stating in November 2013 that an agreement allowing Iran to enrich uranium is a “historic mistake.” Although the aim was to reach an agreement on the comprehensive measures including the f nal step by July 20, 2014 – the last day of the six-month period for the execution of the f rst step measures, signif cant gaps between the two sides on core issues resulted in failure to reach an agreement[37]. It was agreed that the negotiations would be extended by four months to November 24, 2014. In this process, the United States has expressed concerns over the number of centrifuges in Iran’s possession[38], while the Iranian side has presented its view that it needed to signif cantly increase its uranium enrichment capabilities[39]. It is said that the scale of Iran’s permitted uranium enrichment capacity has remained one of the core points of contention in subsequent consultations. In November 2014, the EU3+3 and Iran aff rmed that they would continue to execute the JPOA on uranium enrichment agreed upon in November 2013, and announced that the negotiations to reach the f nal comprehensive agreement would be re-extended through June 30, 2015. Subsequently, on April 2, 2015, the EU3+3 announced that the key parameters of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) were agreed upon as an outcome of the consultations held in Lausanne, Switzerland. It was agreed that work would be under way to draft the JCPOA, including the technical details, through June 30. 35 U.N. Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1696 adopted in July 2006, UNSCR 1737 in December 2006, UNSCR 1747 in March 2007, UNSCR 1803 in March 2008, and UNSCR 1929 in June 2010. 36 First step measures include the limited relaxation of sanctions by the EU3+3, provided that for six months, Iran: (1) retains half of its current inventory of enriched uranium with a concentration of approximately 20% as oxide and dilutes the remaining half to less than 5%; (2) does not enrich uranium to a level of 5% or greater; (3) does not make any further advances of its activities conducted in uranium enrichment facilities and heavy-water reactors; and (4) accepts enhanced monitoring by the IAEA and so on. 37 On July 18, 2014, a statement was released at the joint press conference held by EU High Representative Catherine Ashton and Minister of Foreign Affairs Mohammad Javad Zarif of Iran saying that, “While we have made tangible progress on some of the issues and have worked together on a text for a Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, there are still signifi cant gaps on some core issues which will require more time and effort.” On the same day, U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry stated that, “On all these issues there is still work to do and differences to resolve, but we have made real progress. Still, there are very real gaps on issues such as enrichment capacity at the Natanz enrichment facility. This issue is an absolutely critical component of any potential comprehensive agreement.” 38 On July 15, 2014, Secretary of State Kerry stated, “We have made it crystal clear that the 19,000 (centrifuges) that are currently part of their program is too many...And so all I will say to you is that we will continue to press.” 39 Iran’s supreme leader Khamenei, upon noting that the West’s aim is to make Iran accept capacity equivalent to 10,000 centrifuges of the older type, asserted, “Our offi cials say we need capacity ----- **Section 3 Maritime Trends** Maritime security is of critical importance to Japan, a maritime nation surrounded by sea. For example, Japan relies on sea transport to import energy resources. Accordingly, ensuring secure sea lanes is vital for the survival of the nation. Securing the stable use of one of the global commons, the “seas,” is a key security issue for the international community. In recent years, maritime trends in the countries concerned are drawing attention, including their compliance with relevant international norms[1]. **1** **Trends Related to the “Principle of the Freedom of the High Seas” in the East China Sea and South China Sea** On November 23, 2013, the Chinese government announced that it established “the East China Sea Air Defense Identif cation Zone (ADIZ)” including the Senkaku Islands which China described as if they were a part of China’s “territory,” that it obligated aircraft f ying in the said zone to abide by the rules set forth by the Chinese Ministry of National Defense, and that the PLA would take “defensive emergency measures” in the case where such aircraft does not follow the instructed procedures. Japan is deeply concerned about such measures, which are profoundly dangerous acts that unilaterally change the status quo in the East China Sea, escalating the situation, and that could cause unintended consequences in the East China Sea. Furthermore, the measures unduly infringe the freedom of overf ight over the high seas, which is the general principle of international law. Japan is demanding China to revoke any measures that could go against the principle of freedom of overf ight over the high seas. The United States, the Republic of Korea (ROK), Australia, and the European Union (EU) have expressed concern about China’s establishment of such zone. The South China Sea has also seen many similar acts. In March 2009, Chinese ships, including a naval vessel, a maritime research ship of the SOA, a Bureau of Maritime Fisheries’ patrol ship, and trawlers, approached a U.S. Navy acoustic research ship operating in the South China Sea to obstruct its operations. In addition, in December 2013, a The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) provides for the principles of “freedom of navigation in the high seas” and “freedom of overf ight over the high seas”[2]. Nevertheless, in the waters and airspace in the periphery of Japan, especially the East China Sea and the South China Sea, it has become increasingly common for countries to unilaterally assert their rights or take actions, based on their unique assertions which are incompatible with the existing international law and order. This has caused situations of undue infringement upon such principles. The East China Sea has recently seen numerous cases of acts which go against the principles of freedom of navigation in the high seas and freedom of overf ight over the high seas. In March and April 2011 and in April 2012, Chinese helicopters and other aircraft that appeared to belong to the State Oceanic Administration (SOA) f ew close to Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) destroyers which were engaged in monitoring and surveillance in the East China Sea. In January 2013, a Chinese naval vessel directed f re-control radar at a JMSDF destroyer navigating in the East China Sea and is suspected to have directed f re-control radar at a helicopter carried onboard a JMSDF destroyer. In May and June 2014, f ghters of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) of China f ew abnormally close to aircraft of the JMSDF and of the Japan Air Self-Defense Force which were f ying over the East China Sea. For example, the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) comprehensively sets forth the rights and obligations under international law related to the use and development of the oceans and their regulations. UNCLOS was adopted in 1982 and entered into force in 1994 (Japan ratifi ed it in 1996). ----- Chinese naval vessel cut across the bow of a U.S. Navy cruiser operating in the South China Sea at point blank range. In August 2014, a Chinese f ghter is speculated to have f own abnormally close to and obstructed a U.S. Navy patrol aircraft over the South China Sea[3]. These cases go against the principles of freedom of navigation in the high seas and freedom of overf ight over the high seas, and are dangerous acts that could cause unintended consequences[4]. In addition, friction between China and ASEAN member states and other countries has surfaced over issues including the sovereignty of islands and other features. Against this backdrop, China, on the grounds of the so-called “nine-dash line”[5] whose validity under international law has been described as ambiguous, has asserted sovereignty over the Spratly Islands, among other areas. On this basis, China has proceeded with land reclamation and other development work in some land features on a rapid and massive scale, as well as obstructed f shing and other vessels of countries approaching the features, etc. by f ring warning shots and water cannons at the vessels. Contesting states – the Philippines and Vietnam – as well as the United States and other countries have expressed concern over China’s assertive and dangerous acts that could cause unintended consequences. Despite these numerous acts that could pose risks **2** **Trends in the Arctic Ocean** The Arctic Ocean, which covers most of the Arctic Region, borders Russia, the United States, Canada, Denmark, and Norway[8]. In recent years, decreases in sea ice have increased potential for the uses of the Northern Sea Route and the exploration of natural resources. For these reasons, the Arctic states have been more proactively promoting efforts to acquire their interest in resource development and use of the sea route. On the other hand, there exist unresolved issues among the Arctic states over the demarcation of maritime boundaries based on UNCLOS and extension of the continental shelf. It is considered that some of these to securing the stable use of oceans, in recent years progress has been made on efforts to avert and prevent unintended consequences in the sea. In April 2014, navies of participating countries of the Western Pacif c Naval Symposium (WPNS), including Japan, the United States, and China, reached agreement on the Code for Unplanned Encounters at Sea (CUES)[6]. CUES sets forth a code of conduct for unexpected encounters by vessels or aircraft of the navies of each country. In November 2014, the United States and China agreed on measures pertaining to mutual notif cation of military activities, as well as on rules of behavior to avert collisions in waters and airspace in accordance with UNCLOS, CUES, and other frameworks. In January 2015, the Fourth Joint Working Group Consultation was held with a view to implementing the “Maritime and Aerial Communication Mechanism between Japan-China Defense Authorities”[7] for averting incidental collisions between Japan and China. It is strongly hoped that these initiatives designed to avert and prevent unintended consequences in the seas and skies will supplement the existing international law and order, and that the countries concerned, including China, refrain from unilateral actions that heighten tension and act on the basis of the principle of the “rule of law.” See Part I, Chapter 1, Section 3 (China); Part I, Chapter 1, Section 6 (Southeast Asia) Arctic states including Russia are promoting efforts to deploy new military capabilities for the purpose of securing their interest and defending their territories. Traditionally, the Arctic Region has been used for the deployment of strategic nuclear forces and as their transit route. In addition, due to the decrease of sea ice, surface ships can navigate for longer periods of time and in wider areas than before. In this regard, the region could be used for deploying maritime forces or maneuvering military forces using the maritime transport capabilities of military forces in the future. The strategic importance of the region is thus increasing. Some analysts have noted that these incidents occur as many countries including the United States treat an exclusive economic zone (EEZ) the same as high seas based on UNCLOS from the perspective of freedom of navigation, whereas China treats EEZ as being similar to territorial waters. It is considered that the United States respects the provisions of UNCLOS while it has not concluded the convention. According to the written testimony of U.S. Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asian and Pacifi c Security Affairs David Shear before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations dated May 13, 2015, the United States has enhanced its presence in and around the South China Sea to protect U.S. national interests in the South China Sea, such as peaceful resolution of disputes, freedom of navigation in the high seas, and freedom of overfl ight over the high seas. For example, U.S. military forces are conducting port calls of naval vessels, carrying out ISR activities, and exercising with neighboring countries. In addition, the U.S. Navy has announced that the littoral combat ship (LCS) USS Fort Worth, which has been rotationally deployed to Singapore since December 2014, conducted patrol in waters near the Spratly Islands in May 2015, which marked the fi rst time an LCS operated in these waters. See Part I, Chapter 1, Section 6-4 (Trends concerning Sovereignty Over the South China Sea) CUES sets forth safety procedures and notifi cation methods for unplanned encounters at sea by the naval vessels and air force aircraft of participating countries of the WPNS. CUES is not legally binding and does not supersede the annexes of the Convention on International Civil Aviation and other international treaties. During the Fourth Joint Working Group Consultation, the two sides agreed to coordinate on the mechanism’s naming to “Maritime and Aerial Communication Mechanism” in order to clarify its coverage of aircraft. The Arctic Region is the area north of the latitude line of 66 degrees 33 minutes north latitude. There are eight countries in the Arctic Region – the fi ve countries that border the Arctic Ocean and Finland, Sweden, and Iceland that do not border it. In 1996, the Arctic Council was established, which aims to promote cooperation, coordination, and interaction among the Arctic states, with the ----- **3** **Maritime Security Efforts of Countries** With regard to oceans, not only for economic development but also for the national security of each country, it has become even more important to promote appropriate rule-making and to make concerted efforts by the international community to address risks and ensure freedom of navigation while respecting such rules. “Open and Stable Seas” constitute the basis for peace and prosperity of the international community as a whole. In this regard, each state has been tackling on its own or with others various issues including piracy, unidentified vessels, illegal dumping, contraband, human smuggling, maritime disasters, and the removal of hazardous substances, for maintaining the stability of sea lanes of communication. 2014, President Barack Obama unveiled the “United States Counter Piracy and Maritime Security Action Plan,” by which he presented the guidelines to strengthen maritime security as it relates to counter piracy. In accordance with the National Strategy for Maritime Security established in 2005[11], this Action Plan sets forth the policy for the repression of piracy and related maritime crime. It then outlines the guidelines for implementing tasks under the leadership of an interagency policy committee, covering the areas of prevention of attacks, response to acts of maritime crime, and enhancing maritime security and governance. In addition, the Action Plan sets out frameworks for combating piracy and enhancing maritime security off the Horn of Africa and in the Gulf of Guinea[12]. Furthermore, Furthermore, “A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower,” jointly released by the U.S. Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard in March 2015, expresses the view that U.S. forward naval presence is essential to accomplishing missions including protecting the maritime commons, and that by operating jointly with allies and partners, naval forces can effectively address the threats to maritime security. **1** **United States** The United States deems that its safety and economic security depend upon the secure use of the world’s oceans, and that the United States has a vital interest in maritime security. Based on this recognition, the United States leads the Combined Maritime Forces (CMF)[9] to counter piracy and advance maritime safety, including tackling terrorism in waters surrounding the Middle East and Africa, such as the Gulf of Aden, the Persian Gulf, and the Indian Ocean. In waters surrounding Central America, the United States conducts operations to counter illicit traff cking, primarily drug traff cking with European and Western Hemisphere countries[10]. The United States thus dispatches vessels to the various sea areas of the world and takes actions to combat piracy, organized crime, terrorism, and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs). The U.S. National Security Strategy, released in February 2015, states that the United States has an enduring interest in freedom of navigation as well as the safety and sustainability of the maritime environment, and that it would therefore maintain the capability to ensure the free f ow of commerce, to respond quickly to those in need, and to deter those who might contemplate aggression. In June **2** **NATO** NATO has the Standing NATO Maritime Groups, which are a multinational, integrated force made up of vessels from member countries. Through the Groups’ routine exercises and maintenance of rapid deployment capability, NATO has provided deterrence in the sea to member countries. To combat the threat of piracy, NATO has deployed vessels of the Standing NATO Maritime Groups to off the coast of Somalia and the Gulf of Aden to engage in counterpiracy activities. In Operation Ocean Shield that NATO has been conducting since August 2009, NATO’s mission is to carry out counter-piracy activities by boat, as well as to help countries that requested it build up their capacities to counter piracy. Furthermore, NATO identif es acts of terrorism as a threat to its member countries. Following 9 CMF is a multinational force, which operates to promote maritime security, stability, and prosperity, under the U.S. Central Command. Forces from 30 countries participate in CMF, and the CMF Commander concurrently serves as the Commander of the U.S. Fifth Fleet. CMF is comprised of three combined task forces: Combined Task Force 150 (CTF-150), which is tasked with maritime security operations; Combined Task Force 151 (CTF-151) with counter piracy operations; and Combined Task Force 152 (CTF-152) with maritime security operations in the Persian Gulf. The Japan Self-Defense Forces deploy units to CTF-151. 10 Fourteen European and Western Hemisphere countries, including the United States, conduct Operation Martillo to combat illicit traffi cking, including the traffi cking of narcotics, precursor chemicals, bulk cash, and weapons, as well as organized crime along the sea areas surrounding Central America. From the U.S. Forces, Joint Interagency Task Force South under the U.S. Southern Command carries out the operation. According to a report by the U.S. Southern Command to the House Armed Services Committee, the Operation’s accomplishments included the disruption of about 132 tons of cocaine in FY2013. 11 A comprehensive national strategy for maritime security to integrate Department-level strategies related to maritime security and ensure their effective and effi cient implementation. This strategy identifi es today’s threats to maritime security as: nation-state threats; terrorist threats; transnational criminal and piracy threats; environmental destruction; and illegal seaborne immigration. To address these threats, the strategy states that the United States needs to enhance international cooperation, strengthen maritime intelligence capabilities, embed security into commercial practices, integrate government and private sector efforts, and assure continuity of the marine transportation system. 12 Framework for Combating Piracy and Enhancing Maritime Security off the Horn of Africa: Recognizing that piracy off the coast of Somalia has grave impact on global maritime transport, this framework states that the United States would promote measures, such as provision of persistent interdiction-capable presence at sea off the Horn of Africa, strengthening of international counter-piracy frameworks, and appropriate law enforcement exercises. Framework for Combating Piracy and Enhancing Maritime Security in the Gulf of Guinea: Recognizing that the Gulf of Guinea suffers from factors, including weak governance in neighboring countries, lack of appropriate naval and law enforcement forces, and government corruption, which make the issue of piracy and maritime crime more complex and serious, this framework states that the United States would promote measures, such as strengthening of regional maritime capacity through the provision of training and equipment, expansion of combined operations with African partners, and ----- the 2001 terrorist attacks in the United States, NATO has conducted Operation Active Endeavour since October 2001 and has been implementing counter-terrorism activities, including maritime patrols in the Mediterranean Sea, as part of the collective defense pursuant to Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty. In January 2011, NATO unveiled the “Alliance Maritime Strategy.” The advancement of globalization has facilitated terrorism and the proliferation of WMDs. Based on this recognition, the Strategy outlines NATO’s intention to carry out efforts to ensure its contribution to deterrence, crisis management, collective defense, maritime security, among other areas. These efforts include: (1) deepening cooperative relations with appropriate countries and international actors, such as the EU and the United Nations; and (2) developing fully capable, f exible, rapidly deployable, interoperable, and sustainable maritime forces. In addition, the Wales Summit Declaration adopted at the NATO Summit in September 2014 states that NATO would continue to intensify and expand its implementation of the measures outlined in the Strategy, and further enhance the Alliance’s effectiveness in the maritime domain. NATO forces participating in the counterpiracy mission, Operation Ocean Shield [NATO website] **3** **EU** With many of its member states facing the ocean, the EU has high maritime traff c and economic activity in the sea. To date, the EU has actively engaged in counter-piracy activities off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden in order to maintain maritime stability[13]. In June 2014, the European Council adopted the “EU Maritime Security Strategy,” for purposes including presenting the EU’s framework for the development of the maritime policies of EU member states and protecting the strategic maritime interests of the countries. The Strategy construes piracy, terrorism, the proliferation of WMDs, and restrictions to the freedom of navigation as threats. It sets forth comprehensive, cross-sectoral, coherent, and eff cient approaches to maritime security, including: (1) Promote rules-based good governance at sea; (2) Promote coordination amongst member states and with other international organizations and partners; and (3) Enhance the role of the EU as an actor that conducts conf ict prevention, crisis response, and management of maritime interests. **4** **United Kingdom** The United Kingdom is an island nation surrounded by sea, and has a heritage of engaging actively in maritime activities, including maritime trade. The United Kingdom still possesses many overseas territories and has an exclusive economic zone (EEZ) which extends about 25 times the U.K. terrestrial extent. Due to these factors, the United Kingdom proactively deploys its forces to NATOand EU-led multinational forces[14] in order to ensure the maritime security of the sea areas surrounding the United Kingdom, including its overseas territories, and by extension, the seas of its neighboring countries. In May 2014, the U.K. government released “The UK National Strategy for Maritime Security”[15]. The United Kingdom considers that ensuring maritime security is 13 The EU has conducted the counter-piracy operation Operation Atalanta in this sea area, which became the EU’s fi rst maritime mission, since December 2008. Vessels and aircraft that countries deploy escort ships, conduct patrols in these waters, among other activities. 14 The United Kingdom rotationally deploys forces to Operation Ocean Shield organized by NATO and Operation Atalanta organized by the EU. The headquarters of both operations are located at the Northwood Maritime Command Headquarters in the United Kingdom. The United Kingdom also deploys forces to CMF-led operations. ----- synonymous with the advancement and protection of the United Kingdom’s national interests, at home and abroad. Based on this recognition, the Strategy identif es objectives, such as promoting a secure international maritime domain and upholding international maritime norms, developing the maritime governance capacity and capabilities of states in areas of strategic maritime importance, and assuring the security of vital maritime trade and energy transportation routes. To these ends, the Strategy lists measures, including: (1) attain a comprehensive understanding of the maritime domain through the use of information resources across departments and agencies, among other means; (2) work closely with maritime partners through championing regional initiatives as a proponent of freedom of navigation; (3) share information with partners and support capacity-building efforts in areas of strategic importance; and (4) coordinate joint operations between maritime departments and agencies and seek to procure common equipment. **6** **Australia** Australia is a maritime nation surrounded by ocean, and much of the country’s trade relies on sea transport[19]. Under these circumstances, Australia’s security largely hinges on regional maritime security. In light of the above, Australia sets out the “IndoPacif c” concept and presents its commitment to prioritizing the stability of this region in its Defence White Paper published in 2013. In particular, in order to prevent adversary forces from establishing a presence in Southeast Asia and in other neighboring regions, and to maintain stable sea lanes on which Australia depends, the Australian Defence Force (ADF) carries out patrol activities in the Indian Ocean, the South China Sea, and the South Pacif c Ocean. In addition, the ADF provides patrol vessels to South Pacif c countries[20] and mobilizes ADF assets to guard the coasts. **7** **China** China also relies on sea transport for over 90% of its trade cargo[21]. Accordingly, ensuring the security of China’s sea lanes constitutes a critical part of the “basic safeguards for ensuring sustainable economic and social development”[22], one of China’s “core interests.” Therefore, as a member of the Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP)[23], China shares information and participates in cooperative arrangements related to piracy in Southeast Asia. Since December 2008, China has deployed naval vessels to off the coast of Somalia and the Gulf of Aden and has been involved in international efforts to repress piracy. Through such activities, China has contributed to ensuring maritime security. Meanwhile, in the South China Sea, China and ASEAN member states have conf icting assertions over the sovereignty of such areas as the Spratly Islands[24] **5** **France** France, with its many overseas territories, is deemed to have the second largest EEZ in the world. About 62% of this EEZ is in the Pacif c region, and about 24% is in the Indian Ocean. France attaches importance to its maritime strategy in the Asia-Pacif c, identifying itself as “a sovereign power and a player in the security of the Indian Ocean and the Pacif c”[16]. The French Armed Forces station their units in French territories, including Polynesia and New Caledonia, and deploy frigates, landing ships, and other equipment. “France and Security in the Asia-Pacif c,” which the Ministry of Defense released in April 2014, underscores that France is a maritime nation and has participated in various regional cooperation forums on maritime issues[17]. It then outlines France’s intention to build strong partnership relations with Asia-Pacif c countries[18]. 16 France identifi es itself as “a sovereign power and a player in the security of the Indian Ocean and the Pacifi c” in the French White Paper. 17 France has actively taken part in such forums as the IISS Asia Security Summit (Shangri-La Dialogue), the Indian Ocean Naval Symposium, and the South Pacifi c Defence Ministers’ Meeting. 18 For example, France and India have established a strategic partnership. They conduct joint exercises among their land, naval, and air forces, respectively, and have equipment cooperation. In addition, France carries out close political dialogue with Malaysia and extends cooperation, including capacity-building support for the submarine unit of the Malaysian Armed Forces. 19 According to the Australian Department of Infrastructure and Regional Development, between July 2012 and June 2013, Australia’s exports and imports transported by sea amounted to AUD 405.7 billion. According to the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Australia’s exports and imports of goods in 2012 totaled AUD 510.2 billion. 20 See Part I, Chapter 1, Section 5-3-4 21 According to the website of the Central People’s Government of China, over 90% of China’s export and import cargo, such as crude oil, iron ore, food, and container, are transported by sea. 22 Then-State Councilor Dai Bingguo, “China will unswervingly follow path of peaceful development” (December 7, 2010, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China website) 23 As of May 2015, the contracting parties to ReCAAP are the following 20 countries: Australia; Bangladesh; Brunei; Cambodia; China; Denmark; India; Japan; the ROK; Laos; Myanmar; the Netherlands; Norway; the Philippines; Singapore; Sri Lanka; Thailand; United Kingdom; United States; and Vietnam. ----- and the Paracel Islands[25]. In recent years, the countries concerned, including China, have stepped up their activities to assert their sovereignty. Developments associated with the freedom of navigation in the sea have been subject to increasing international concern. In January 2013, the Philippines instituted arbitral proceedings pursuant to UNCLOS for the dispute between the Philippines and China over its assertions and actions in the South China Sea. In response, in February 2013, China issued a notif cation to the Philippines stressing that the issue be settled bilaterally and that China would not agree to arbitral proceedings[27]. In December 2014, China released a paper alleging that the arbitral tribunal does not have jurisdiction over this case. That same month, Vietnam, another contesting state, requested the arbitral tribunal to take into consideration Vietnam’s assertions over the South China Sea. In this regard, there has been a trend among some countries concerned to work towards a peaceful solution of the issue in accordance with international law. In the Southeast Asia region, multilateral cooperation has also made progress to deal with wide-ranging security issues, including piracy and other transnational issues. With regard to counter-piracy measures, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand conduct the Malacca Strait Patrols[28]. In addition, efforts have been under way to share information related to piracy and build a cooperation arrangement in accordance with ReCAAP. **1** **Outer Space and Security** In major countries, military forces are actively involved in outer space activities and utilize a variety of satellites. There is no concept of national borders in outer space, meaning that the utilization of satellites enables the observation of, communication at, and positioning on any area on Earth. Thus, major countries make efforts to enhance the capabilities of a variety of satellites and launch them for the purpose of enhancing C[4]ISR functions[2]. Such satellites include image reconnaissance satellites reconnoitering military facilities and targets, satellites gathering radio wave information for military communications, communication satellites for military communication, and positioning satellites for navigating naval vessels and aircraft and enhancing the precision of **8** **Southeast Asia** Southeast Asia is located at the crossroads of traff c, linking the Pacif c and the Indian Oceans, such as the Straits of Malacca and the South China Sea. This region, however, has maritime security issues, including disputes over the sovereignty of the South China Sea and piracy. In 2002, ASEAN and China signed the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DOC)[26] aimed at peacefully setting the issues over the South China Sea. Currently, off cial consultations are held with a view to establishing the Code of the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (COC). The COC is deemed to contain more specif c content than the DOC and be legally binding. In addition, there have been developments related to settling issues through arbitral proceedings set out in UNCLOS. **Section 4 Outer Space and Security** Nearly 60 years have passed since a satellite was launched into outer space for the f rst time in the history of mankind. In recent years, technology leveraging outer space has been applied to various areas. No state is allowed to own outer space, and it is freely available to all nations. Major countries thus make proactive efforts to use outer space[1]. For example, meteorological and observation satellites are used to observe weather as well as land and waters; communication and broadcasting satellites are used for the Internet and broadcasting; and positioning satellites are used to navigate aircraft and ships. These satellites have widely prevailed in social, economic, scientif c, and other areas as essential infrastructure for the public and private sectors. 25 China, Taiwan, Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, and Brunei assert sovereignty over the Spratly Islands. China, Taiwan, and Vietnam assert sovereignty over the Paracel Islands. 26 See Part I, Chapter 1, Section 6-4, Footnote 41 27 In the case of the arbitral tribunal in accordance with UNCLOS, even if either party to a dispute does not agree to bring the case before the arbitral tribunal, the tribunal may continue the proceedings and make its award, at the request of the other party to the dispute. 28 The Malacca Strait Patrols are comprised of: the Malacca Strait Sea Patrols which commenced in 2004 by the navies of Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore to monitor piracy and other activities in the Malacca-Singapore Strait (Thailand participated in 2008); aircraft patrol activities which commenced in 2005; and information sharing activities which commenced in 2006. 1 The Outer Space Treaty (The Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies) that came into force in October 1967 defines such matters as the use of the Moon and other celestial bodies for peaceful purposes, the freedom in principle of exploration and use of outer space, and the prohibition of ownership. However, no clear international agreement has been reached on the definition of outer space, though according to one of the concepts, outer space is considered space located 100 km or further away from the Earth’s surface. 2 The term “C[4]ISR” stands for command, control, communication, computer, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance. The 1991 Gulf War is considered “the first high-tech war conducted in outer space in the history of mankind.” ----- and the Paracel Islands[25]. In recent years, the countries concerned, including China, have stepped up their activities to assert their sovereignty. Developments associated with the freedom of navigation in the sea have been subject to increasing international concern. In January 2013, the Philippines instituted arbitral proceedings pursuant to UNCLOS for the dispute between the Philippines and China over its assertions and actions in the South China Sea. In response, in February 2013, China issued a notif cation to the Philippines stressing that the issue be settled bilaterally and that China would not agree to arbitral proceedings[27]. In December 2014, China released a paper alleging that the arbitral tribunal does not have jurisdiction over this case. That same month, Vietnam, another contesting state, requested the arbitral tribunal to take into consideration Vietnam’s assertions over the South China Sea. In this regard, there has been a trend among some countries concerned to work towards a peaceful solution of the issue in accordance with international law. In the Southeast Asia region, multilateral cooperation has also made progress to deal with wide-ranging security issues, including piracy and other transnational issues. With regard to counter-piracy measures, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand conduct the Malacca Strait Patrols[28]. In addition, efforts have been under way to share information related to piracy and build a cooperation arrangement in accordance with ReCAAP. **1** **Outer Space and Security** In major countries, military forces are actively involved in outer space activities and utilize a variety of satellites. There is no concept of national borders in outer space, meaning that the utilization of satellites enables the observation of, communication at, and positioning on any area on Earth. Thus, major countries make efforts to enhance the capabilities of a variety of satellites and launch them for the purpose of enhancing C[4]ISR functions[2]. Such satellites include image reconnaissance satellites reconnoitering military facilities and targets, satellites gathering radio wave information for military communications, communication satellites for military communication, and positioning satellites for navigating naval vessels and aircraft and enhancing the precision of **8** **Southeast Asia** Southeast Asia is located at the crossroads of traff c, linking the Pacif c and the Indian Oceans, such as the Straits of Malacca and the South China Sea. This region, however, has maritime security issues, including disputes over the sovereignty of the South China Sea and piracy. In 2002, ASEAN and China signed the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DOC)[26] aimed at peacefully setting the issues over the South China Sea. Currently, off cial consultations are held with a view to establishing the Code of the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (COC). The COC is deemed to contain more specif c content than the DOC and be legally binding. In addition, there have been developments related to settling issues through arbitral proceedings set out in UNCLOS. **Section 4 Outer Space and Security** Nearly 60 years have passed since a satellite was launched into outer space for the f rst time in the history of mankind. In recent years, technology leveraging outer space has been applied to various areas. No state is allowed to own outer space, and it is freely available to all nations. Major countries thus make proactive efforts to use outer space[1]. For example, meteorological and observation satellites are used to observe weather as well as land and waters; communication and broadcasting satellites are used for the Internet and broadcasting; and positioning satellites are used to navigate aircraft and ships. These satellites have widely prevailed in social, economic, scientif c, and other areas as essential infrastructure for the public and private sectors. 25 China, Taiwan, Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, and Brunei assert sovereignty over the Spratly Islands. China, Taiwan, and Vietnam assert sovereignty over the Paracel Islands. 26 See Part I, Chapter 1, Section 6-4, Footnote 41 27 In the case of the arbitral tribunal in accordance with UNCLOS, even if either party to a dispute does not agree to bring the case before the arbitral tribunal, the tribunal may continue the proceedings and make its award, at the request of the other party to the dispute. 28 The Malacca Strait Patrols are comprised of: the Malacca Strait Sea Patrols which commenced in 2004 by the navies of Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore to monitor piracy and other activities in the Malacca-Singapore Strait (Thailand participated in 2008); aircraft patrol activities which commenced in 2005; and information sharing activities which commenced in 2006. 1 The Outer Space Treaty (The Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies) that came into force in October 1967 defines such matters as the use of the Moon and other celestial bodies for peaceful purposes, the freedom in principle of exploration and use of outer space, and the prohibition of ownership. However, no clear international agreement has been reached on the definition of outer space, though according to one of the concepts, outer space is considered space located 100 km or further away from the Earth’s surface. 2 The term “C[4]ISR” stands for command, control, communication, computer, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance. The 1991 Gulf War is considered “the first high-tech war conducted in outer space in the history of mankind.” ----- weapons systems. On the other hand, in January 2007, China conducted an Anti-Satellite (ASAT) test to destroy its aging satellite with a missile launched from the Earth’s surface. The resulting space debris[3] spread across the satellite’s orbit, which was noted as a threat against space assets such as satellites owned by countries. Since existing frameworks, including the “Outer Space Treaty” that prescribes the exploration and use of outer space, do not have provisions on avoiding the destruction of space objects and actions triggering debris, international efforts have been under way recently for the creation of the “International Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities”[4] proposed by the European Union (EU) and the guidelines for “Long-term Sustainability of Outer Space Activities”[5] of the Scientif c and Technical Subcommittee of the United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS) which address such matters. Moreover, countries are working on the Space Situational Awareness (SSA)[6] by monitoring the impact of accelerated solar activity on satellites, electronic equipment on Earth and threats caused by meteors reaching the Earth, in addition to threats posed by anti-satellite weapons and space debris on space assets. All of this shows that the risk to the stable use of outer space has become one of the critical security challenges countries face. See Part III, Chapter 1, Section 1-5 (Responses in space) **2** **Trends in the Use of Space by Countries for Security Objectives** countries. Based on this understanding, the NSSS identif es that the U.S. strategic objectives for outer space are to: (1) strengthen safety, stability, and security in outer space; (2) maintain and enhance the strategic national security advantages afforded to the United States by outer space; and (3) energize the space industrial base that supports U.S. national security. To meet these objectives, the NSSS states that the country will pursue the strategic approaches of (1) promoting responsible, peaceful, and safe use of outer space, (2) providing improved U.S. outer space capabilities, (3) partnering with responsible nations, international organizations, and commercial f rms, (4) preventing and deterring aggression against space infrastructure that supports U.S. national security, and (5) preparing to defeat attacks and to operate in a degraded environment. From an organizational perspective, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) is responsible for non-military space development in the United States, while the U.S. Department of Defense works on space development from a national security perspective. Recently, NASA and the U.S. Air Force announced cooperation in areas such as aircraft design and materials development. Major satellites used for military purposes include satellites for image reconnaissance, early warning, gathering radio wave information, communication, and positioning, and their operations are wide-ranging. **1** **United States** The United States launched its f rst satellite, Explorer 1, in January 1958, following the satellite launches by the former Soviet Union. The country has since then proceeded with a variety of space activities in f elds including military, science, and resource exploration, such as launching the world’s f rst reconnaissance satellite and landing on the Moon. Today, the United States is the world’s leading space power. Its activities cover a wide spectrum of areas including military, social, and economic aspects, benef ting the United States as well as the entire world[7]. In addition, U.S. forces clearly recognize the importance of outer space for their actions, and in this regard, actively utilize outer space for security purposes. In June 2010, the United States released the “National Space Policy” that presents the country’s basic guidelines for space policy, including its objectives and principles. It specif ed guidelines on security space, civil space, commercial space, and international cooperation, among other sectors. In February 2011, the country also released the “National Security Space Strategy” (NSSS) as the security guideline regarding outer space, explaining that the current and future outer space environment is driven by three trends: (1) congestion caused by artif cial objects including satellites; (2) contestation by potential adversaries; and (3) increasing competition with other Unnecessary artifacts orbiting around the Earth, including satellites no longer in use, upper stages of rockets, parts, and fragments. In 2008, the EU formulated a draft and started bilateral discussions with major countries. Discussions have been made multilateral since 2012 and have been ongoing with a view towards its adoption. In 2007, the chairperson of the United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (U.N. COPUOS) proposed to discuss “the long-term sustainability of outer space activities” in relation to civil space activities, for the purpose of defining risk reduction for long-term sustainable activities and equal access to outer space. Based on this proposal, the Scientific and Technical Subcommittee of U.N. COPUOS set up a working group, which carries out ongoing discussions for establishing the guidelines. In May 2014, Gen. William L. Shelton, Commander of the U.S. Air Force Space Command, stated, “Currently, we track more than 23,000 objects in space—10 centimeters in size and larger. However, our sensors cannot see the estimated 500,000 pieces of debris between 1 and 10 centimeters in size,” and contends that space monitoring capabilities need to be strengthened. ----- Russian Aerospace Defense Force[9] conducts actual space activities for military purposes, manages facilities for launching satellites, among other activities. Major satellites launched by Russia are satellites for image reconnaissance, early warning, gathering radio wave information, communication, positioning, and others, all of which are presumed to be used for security purposes. Currently, Russia is developing a new Angara carrier rocket[10], along with building a new launch site in Vostochny in the Far East[11]. **2** **Russia** Russia’s space activities have been continuing since the former Soviet Union era. The former Soviet Union successively launched multiple satellites after it launched the f rst satellite in the history of mankind, “Sputnik 1,” in October 1957, and had the largest number of launched satellites in the world by the end of the collapse of the former Soviet Union. The satellites included many military satellites, which enabled the country to compete against the United States for military expansion in outer space. Russia’s space activities have declined since the former Soviet Union collapsed in 1991. However, the country has recently started to expand its activities once again against the backdrop of its economic recovery. Regarding the country’s trends in security, the “National Security Strategy of the Russian Federation until 2020,” approved in May 2009, states that threats to Russia’s military security include the policies of developed countries aiming for the militarization of outer space and interference with Russia’s space control systems. “The Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation,” a document created in February 2010 to specif cally def ne the principles of the “National Security Strategy” in the military f eld[8], says that securing supremacy in outer space is one of the decisive factors in achieving the objectives of its armed forces. It also states that the tasks of the armed forces include providing timely warning to the Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation of an air or space attack and deploying and maintaining space systems supporting the activities of the Russian armed forces. In addition, it refers to the need to establish air-space defense organizations. From an organizational perspective, the Russian Federal Space Agency (FSA, commonly called “Roscosmos”) works on space activities related to Russia’s scientif c and economic areas, while the Russian Ministry of Defense is involved in space activities for security purposes. The **3** **Europe** Regarding European outer space activities, France succeeded in launching its own satellite for the f rst time in 1965, following the former Soviet Union and the United States, and the United Kingdom succeeded in launching its own satellite for the f rst time in 1971. Italy and Germany used rockets developed by the United States to own satellites in December 1964 and July 1965, respectively. On the other hand, the European Space Agency (ESA)[12] Convention signed in May 1975 established the ESA, which launched a satellite in 1979. In Europe, the EU, the ESA, and European countries are promoting their own unique space activities and are helping each other to implement space activities[13]. The ESA signed a “framework agreement” with the EU in May 2004 to specify that they will collaborate to proceed with space development and hold regular ministerlevel council meetings. The joint council meeting held by the ESA and the EU in May 2007 approved the “European Space Policy” to improve synergy effects between civil and defense space activities, implement space activities based on coordinated efforts among member states, and ensure an internationally-competitive space industry. The ESA has thus far focused on Earth observation satellites used mainly for civil purposes, among others, based on the contribution of funds made by ESA member 8 “The Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation” was revised in December 2014. 9 Valery Gerasimov, Chief of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces, announced that the “Aerospace Force” would be formed in 2015 by merging the Aerospace Defense Force with the Air Force. 10 In July 2014, the fi rst launch of Angara-1.2PP was conducted successfully. In December 2014, Angara-A5 successfully put a dummy satellite into orbit for the fi rst time. The Angara rocket is considered the fi rst large rocket that Russia developed following the collapse of the Soviet Union. It is expected that the rocket will be launching commercial satellites and satellites for military purposes into orbit. 11 The new launch site is being built to replace the Russian-leased Baikonur Cosmodrome in Kazakhstan. Russia aims to complete the site by 2020. 12 The ESA was established in May 1975 based on the ESA Convention targeting to establish a single European space organization focusing on the peaceful use of space research, technology, and application areas. The organization was formally established in October 1980. 13 In the past, the European Commission (EC) and the ESA created the European Space Strategy in September 2000 to progress Europe’s integrated and effective space activities. The strategy specified ----- states. France also provided a launch site for rockets to the ESA. On the other hand, European countries including France, Germany, Italy, and the United Kingdom have their own outer space policy and space development organizations to launch their unique reconnaissance, communication, and other satellites for security purposes. It is thought that in the future, “Galileo,” a satellite positioning system planned by the EU and the ESA; “Copernicus,” a global-level environment and security monitoring program; and the Multinational Space-based Imaging System (MUSIS)[14], a reconnaissance satellite project implemented by the European Defence Agency[15], will be utilized for security in Europe. by China in December 2011, clarif es the country’s major challenges, policies, and international cooperation projects for the coming f ve years and emphasizes the peaceful use of space. With regard to the organizational setup, the State Administration for Science, Technology and Industry for National Defense, under the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology of the State Council, oversees industries related to space, nuclear technology, aviation, ships, and weapons. The China National Space Administration enforces the administrative control of the space area for civil and commercial purposes and represents the Chinese Government externally. At the same time, it is presumed that China also uses space for information gathering, communication, and navigationn[19] for military purposes. The Air Force has recently indicated that it would actively pursue the use of spacen[20]. Furthermore, “China’s National Defense in 2010,” a national defense white paper published by China in March 2011, specif es that the country protects its security interests in outer space in addition to its marine interests and electromagnetic space. The white paper also states that China will develop its defense industrial technology for its peaceful use in the f elds of aviation and spacef ight. In addition, China is developing new models of its “Long March” carrier rocket series[21], and is building a new launch site in Wenchang, Hainan Province which will become China’s fourth launch center[22]. The launch center under construction faces the ocean contrary to China’s other launch sites and is located furthest south. In this regard, some observers note that the launch site allows launches to be conducted with a high degree of freedom[23]. Carrier rockets are developed and manufactured by Chinese state-owned enterprises, which are thought to be also developing and manufacturing ballistic missiles. It is expected that China will pursue space development through close collaboration between the public sector, military, and private sector. **4** **China** China began work on space development in the 1950s. In April 1970, the county launched its f rst satellite “Dong Fang Hong I,” mounted on the transportation rocket “Long March 1,” using technology enhanced through its missile development. China has thus far conducted manned spacef ight and launched satellites orbiting around the Moon. According to some observers, China’s space development is intended to enhance national prestige and develop space resources. China’s space development is also referred to in “China’s Five-Year Plan for National Economic and Social Development”[16] that is reviewed every f ve years. The latest “12th Five-Year Plan” mentions enhanced militarycivilian collaboration in the aviation and space area. In addition, “the National Medium- and Long-Term Program for Science and Technology Development” published by the State Council positions manned spacef ight[17], moon exploration[18], and high-resolution Earth observation systems as specif c critical projects in the aerospace area. Along with these medium- and long-term plans, “China’s Space Activities in 2011,” a space white paper published 14 The MUSIS was started by Belgium, Germany, Greece, France, Italy, and Spain. The organization was joined later by Poland in December 2010. This is a joint project succeeding such projects as Helios 2 (a French military reconnaissance satellite), Pleiades (a French Earth imaging satellite used for military and civilian purposes), SAR-Lupe (a German group of military radar satellites), and COSMO-SkyMed (an Italian constellation of Earth observation satellites). 15 The EDA was established in 2004 to improve Europe’s defense capabilities for crisis management purposes and to execute and maintain security and defense policies. 16 The latest plan is the 12th Five-Year Plan covering the period between 2011 and 2015 (published in March 2011). 17 China recently launched “Tiangong-1,” a space laboratory, in September 2011 and succeeded in docking it with an unmanned spacecraft, “Shenzhou 8,” in November 2011 and with the manned spacecraft “Shenzhou 9” and “Shenzhou 10” in June 2012 and June 2013, respectively. In this regard, China is considered to have acquired the technologies needed for its space station construction project. 18 The State Administration for Science, Technology and Industry for National Defense landed the lunar explorer “Chang’e-3” on the moon in December 2013. 19 By December 2012, the BeiDou Navigation Satellite System offi cially started its services covering most of the Asia-Pacifi c region. It is reported that the BeiDou system has already started to be mounted on navy vessels, government vessels belonging to maritime law enforcement agencies, fi shing boats, among other vessels. BeiDou offers not only positioning services but also interactive short message features. It is suggested that these features make it possible to centrally capture and share, in real time, the position and other data related to vessels of other countries that Chinese navy vessels have detected, and improve information gathering capabilities on the ocean and other areas. 20 In April 2014, Xi Jinping, Chairman of the Central Military Commission, inspected an Air Force agency and made reference to building an air force that “integrates air and space capabilities and balances offensive and defensive operations.” 21 China is developing Long March-5 (for launching large satellites), Long March-6 (for launching small satellites), and Long March-7 (for launching “Shenzhou”). It is deemed that China also has plans to develop Long March-9 (for launching ultra-large satellites) and Long March-11 (for launching small satellites). 22 In September 2014, China announced that the launch center was already ready for launching vehicles. It is deemed that the facility under construction will be able to launch larger rockets (e.g., Long March-5) than the launch sites in China’s inland areas. 23 The launch center enables discarded stages of the rocket, such as the fi rst stage rocket, to fall into sea rather than into Chinese or other countries’ territories. It is thus suggested that the launch center eliminates the restrictions on launches. In addition, latitudes close to the equator at which a rocket can take advantage of the force of the Earth’s rotation are generally considered favorable ----- China also continues to develop anti-satellite weapons. In January 2007, the country conducted a test to destroy one of its satellites using ballistic missile technology. In July 2014, China conducted a test not involving the destruction of a satellite[24]. Additionally, the country is allegedly developing equipment that uses laser beams to interfere with satellite capabilities. to launch positioning satellites, implement planetary explorations, and conduct manned spacef ight[27]. In September 2014, India’s f rst Mars orbiter was successfully inserted into Mars orbit. **6** **Republic of Korea** The Republic of Korea (ROK) is considered to have started full-scale space development by creating the f rst “Midand Long-Term Basic Plan for Space Development (19962015)” in 1996. The country has recently been promoting space development projects in accordance with the Space Development Promotion Act (enacted in May 2005)[28]. In January 2013, the country succeeded in launching “Naro (KSLV-1),” a rocket developed through a technology cooperation agreement signed with Russia. In November 2013, the country created three key plans, including the “Mid- and Long-Term Plan for Space Development (2014-2040)”[29], which plans to move up the f rst launch of rockets manufactured by the ROK to June 2020; the “Space Technology Industrialization Strategy,” which prompts the whole industry to lead space development; and the “Modif cation of Korean-made rocket development plan,” which leverages Korean-made rockets and develops planetary and space exploration satellites and high orbit satellites on its own. On the security front, the ROK’s Defense White Paper published in December 2012 states that the ROK would secure a space surveillance system and other mechanisms for developing the Air Force into an aerospace force, and establish a Satellite Surveillance Control Group in order to secure air and space operational capabilities. On the organizational front, the ROK has the National Space Committee, which deliberates major issues related to space development under the leadership of the President; and the Korea Aerospace Research Institute, which leads research and development as an implementation agency. Furthermore, the Korea Agency for Defense Development is engaged in the development and use of various satellites. Major satellites launched by the country include image reconnaissance and communication satellites launched using foreign rockets. **5** **India** India’s space development promotes space programs aimed at social and economic development in line with the 5-year national plan. The country’s latest 12th FiveYear Plan[25] focuses on non-military projects including communication, positioning, Earth observation (e.g., disaster monitoring, resource exploration, and weather observation), transportation systems, space science, and spinoff promotions. The Indian Space Commission (ISC) determines the country’s space policy under the leadership of the Prime Minister and assumes responsibility for preparing space development budgets and implementing space development programs. The Department of Space, managed by the ISC, oversees the Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO), which implements space development policy, develops and launches rockets, and develops and manufactures satellites. India reportedly launches remote sensing[26] satellites also for security purposes. In addition, the country plans 24 The February 2015 “Worldwide Threat Assessment” of the U.S. Director of National Intelligence notes that in July 2014, China conducted a non-destructive ASAT test. In addition, it states that China has satellite jamming capabilities and other means of interfering with satellite functions. 25 The 12th Five-Year Plan covers the period between April 2012 and March 2017. 26 Technology enabling the observation of the size, shape, and nature of an object from a distance without making physical contact with the object. 27 In December 2014, the ISRO succeeded in the test launch of a large rocket carrying an unmanned capsule. 28 The Act stipulates that the country creates a mid- and long-term basic plan every five years and an execution plan for each fiscal year, and establishes the National Space Committee. Based on this Act, the country established the “1st Basic Space Development Promotion Plan” and the “2nd Basic Space Development Promotion Plan” in June 2007 and December 2011, respectively. ----- **Section 5 Trends in Cyberspace** **1** **Cyberspace and Security** Owing to the advancement of information and communications technology (ICT) in recent years, information and communication networks such as the Internet have become essential components across all facets of life. Meanwhile, cyber attacks[1] against critical infrastructures, namely, information and communication networks, have the potential to seriously impact the lives of individuals. As regards the types of cyber attacks, they include functional interference, data falsif cation, and data theft caused by unauthorized access to information and communication networks or through the transmission of viruses via e-mail, as well as functional impairment of the networks through simultaneous transmission of large quantities of data. Internet-related technologies are constantly evolving, with cyber attacks growing more sophisticated and complicated by the day. The characteristics of cyber attacks[2] include the following. 1) Diversity: Diversity of attackers, methods, purposes, and circumstances of attacks 2) Anonymity: Easiness for attackers to hide or disguise their identity 3) Stealth: Diff culty of detecting the presence of attacks or even recognizing the occurrence of damage 4) Offensive dominance: Easiness to obtain means of attack and diff culty of completely eliminating software vulnerabilities 5) The diff culties of deterrence: Limited deterrence effects gained through the threat of retaliatory attacks and defense measures For military forces, information and communications form the foundation of command and control, which extend from central command to ground-level forces. In this regard, ICT advancements are further enhancing the dependence of units on information and communication networks. Furthermore, military forces rely on various social infrastructures, including electricity, to execute their missions. Accordingly, cyber attacks against such social infrastructures could become a major impediment to their missions. For this reason, cyber attacks are regarded as an asymmetrical strategy capable of mitigating the strengths of adversaries by exploiting the weaknesses of an adversary’s forces. It is believed that many foreign military forces are developing offensive capabilities in cyberspace. In addition, it is said that the information and communication networks of countries are being compromised for the purpose of gathering intelligence. As such, cyber security has become one of the most important security issues for countries. **2** **Threats in Cyberspace** People’s Liberation Army (PLA), intelligence and security agencies, private hackers’ groups, and companies have been involved[4]. China is presumed to be strongly interested in cyberspace[5]. It has been pointed out that the PLA has organized and is training a cyber unit, and that the PLA and security agencies are hiring IT companies’ employees Under such circumstances, cyber attacks have frequently been carried out against the information and communication networks of government organizations and military forces of various countries[3]. With regard to some of those attacks, it has been pointed out that Chinese organizations, including the The targets of cyber attacks are wide-ranging. Beginning with large targets, they range from: global-level targets, including interstate targets; state-level targets, including nations and government institutions; societal-level targets, including local communities; sectoral-level targets, including business communities and infrastructure; industry-level targets, including companies and groups; and down to minimum-level target of individuals. As such, it is said that measures to counter cyber attacks need to be optimal relative to the size of the target. Ministry of Defense Japan, “Toward Stable and Effective Use of Cyberspace,” September 2012. According to a statement made by the Chairman of the U.S. House Committee on Homeland Security (November 2014), the United States Computer Emergency Readiness Team (US-CERT) reports that the number of cyber attacks against the U.S. government in 2013 was 46,605. Furthermore, US-CERT responded to a total of 228,700 cyber attacks, including those against federal agencies and companies, which was more than double the number in 2009. In addition, the February 2015 “Worldwide Threat Assessment” of the U.S. Director of National Intelligence states that cyber espionage targets the U.S. government, military, and companies on a daily basis. The report presents the view that “attackers” include: (1) nation states with highly sophisticated cyber programs (such as Russia or China); (2) nations with lesser technical capabilities but possibly more disruptive intent (such as Iran or North Korea); (3) profi t-motivated criminals; and (4) ideologically motivated hackers or extremists. The annual report of the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission of November 2014 states that the Chinese government has conducted large-scale cyber espionage against the United States since at least the mid-2000s, and that China has compromised a range of U.S. networks, including those of the Department of Defense, defense contractors, and private enterprises. In addition, the U.S. Department of Defense’s “Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China” of June 2014 states that the PLA continues to invest in offensive cyber capabilities. In a report delivered at the 18th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), then-CCP General Secretary Hu Jintao remarked that China would give serious consideration to maritime, ----- and hackers[6]. For example, a report published in February 2013 by a U.S. information security company concluded that a unit belonging to the PLA had carried out cyber attacks on companies in the United States and other countries since 2006[7]. In May 2014, the U.S. Department of Justice announced that it indicted off cers in Unit 61398, the Chinese PLA’s cyber attack unit, and others for conducting cyber attacks against U.S. companies[8]. In July 2014, the Canadian government stated that it was a victim of cyber attacks by China, referring to China by name for the f rst time[9]. In October 2014, the White House’s unclassif ed information system was hacked. Russian involvement in this incident has been suggested[10]. It has been pointed out that the Russian military, intelligence and security agencies, and other organizations are involved in cyber attacks[11]. Furthermore, the Russian military is presumed to be considering the creation of a cyber command and recruiting hackers[12]. In March 2013, cyber attacks hit broadcasting stations and f nancial institutions in the Republic of Korea (ROK). In June and July 2013, cyber attacks hit the ROK President’s Off ce, government agencies, broadcasting stations, and newspaper companies. The ROK government has stated that the tactics used in these incidents were the same as those used in past cyber attacks by North Korea[13]. Furthermore, from November to December 2014, a U.S. f lm company was hit with cyber attacks. In December 2014, the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) announced that there was suff cient evidence to conclude that the North Korean government was responsible for these cyber attacks[14]. It has been pointed out that North Korean government organizations are involved in such cyber attacks[15] and that North Korea is training personnel on a national scale[16]. Stuxnet, an advanced malware with a complex structure, was discovered in June 2010[17], followed by discoveries of the advanced malware on multiple occasions. Cyber attacks on the information and communication networks of governments and militaries[18], as well as on critical infrastructure signif cantly affect national security. As there have been allegations of involvement of government organizations, Japan must continue to pay close attention to developments related to threats in cyberspace. In September 2011, computers at Japanese private companies producing defense equipment were found to be infected with malware. According to the National 6 An annual report released in 2009 by the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission stated that the PLA was hiring personnel with specialized skills in computers from private companies and the academia, established an information warfare militia, and was conducting exercises using cyberspace. The report also stated that the PLA may be hiring personnel from the hacker community. 7 “APT 1: Exposing One of China’s Cyber Espionage Units,” released in February 2013 by Mandiant, a U.S. information security company, concluded that the most active cyber attack group targeting the United States and other countries was Unit 61398 under the PLA General Staff Department Third Department. 8 On May 19, 2014, James Comey, FBI Director, stated that, “For too long, the Chinese government has blatantly sought to use cyber-espionage to obtain economic advantage for its state-owned industries.” On the same day, the Spokesperson of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China announced that the United States “fabricated facts” and that China has decided to suspend the activities of the Cyber Working Group established under the framework of the U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue. 9 According to a Canadian government release dated July 2014. 10 In October 2014, the Washington Post reported that hackers with alleged Russian government involvement conducted the cyber attack. 11 “Cyberwarfare: An Analysis of the Means and Motivations of Selected Nation States,” released in November 2004 by Dartmouth College’s Institute for Security, Technology, and Society (currently the Institute for Security, Technology, and Society), pointed out the possible involvement of the Russian military, intelligence, and security agencies in cyber attacks. 12 In 2013, the online version of the Russian newspaper Izvestia quoted a senior Russian military official saying that the Minister of Defense had issued an order for preparing to establish a cyber command. In October 2012, the Voice of Russia reported that the Russian Ministry of Defense had started recruiting hackers. 13 The ROK Ministry of Science, ICT and Future Planning (MSIP) announced in its press releases in April and July 2013 the result of an investigation made by the joint response team of public-privatemilitary collaboration (composed of 18 organizations including the MSIP, the Ministry of National Defense, the National Intelligence Service, and domestic security companies). MSIP is a central government agency overseeing administration related to science and technology policies and ICT. This agency was established in March 2013 by transferring science and technology tasks handled by the Ministry of Education, Science and Technology, and part of the tasks handled by the Korea Communications Commission and the Ministry of Knowledge Economy. 14 The FBI presented the following three items as evidence. (1) The malware used in this cyber attack was similar to malware that North Korean actors previously used. (2) North Korean Internet protocol (IP) addresses were hardcoded into the data deletion malware. (3) The tools used in the attack had similarities to a cyber attack in March 2013 against ROK broadcasting stations and fi nancial institutions, which was carried out by North Korea. 15 In November 2013, ROK media outlets reported that the ROK National Intelligence Service made revelations about North Korean cyber warfare capabilities in the national audit of the Information Committee of the National Assembly, and that Kim Jong-un, First Chairman of the National Defense Commission of North Korea, stated that, “Cyber attacks are omnipotent swords with their power paralleled with nuclear power and missiles.” In the U.S. Department of Defense’s “2013 Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea” published in March 2014, it is stated that North Korea probably has a military offensive cyber operations capability. The 2014 Defense White Paper published by the ROK in January 2015 notes that North Korea has concentrated on boosting its cyber unit to nearly 6,000 personnel. 16 For example, a North Korean defector association in the ROK, “NK Intellectual Solidarity,” held a seminar entitled “Emergency seminar on cyber terrorism by North Korea 2011” in June 2011, and presented material entitled “North Korea’s cyber terrorism capabilities,” explaining that North Korean organizations conducting cyber attacks were supported by government agencies employing superior human resources from all over the country, giving them special training to develop their cyber attack capabilities. 17 Stuxnet was the first virus program confirmed to target control systems with specific software and hardware incorporated. It is also pointed out that it has abilities to access targeted systems without being detected and to steal information or alter systems. The discovery of various malware has also been reported: “Duqu,” discovered in October 2011; “Flame” in May 2012; “Gauss” in June 2012; and “Shamoon” in August 2012. 18 CyberBerkut, a Ukrainian pro-Russian group, carried out cyber attacks against multiple websites of NATO in March 2014 and against the websites of the German government and the German parliament, the Bundestag, in January 2015. In October 2014, in the midst of the large-scale demonstrations led by the pro-democracy camp in Hong Kong, the international hacker group “Anonymous” declared that it would conduct cyber attacks against the Chinese and Hong Kong governments. Multiple websites of both governments were hit with cyber attacks. Furthermore, in January 2015, the hacker “Cyber Caliphate,” which appears to endorse Islamic extremism, is alleged to have made fraudulent posts on the offi cial Twitter account of the U.S. Central Command, in addition to hacking nearly 20,000 websites, including the websites of French domestic forces and private companies. As these examples demonstrate, hacker groups have carried out numerous ----- Police Agency, after the Japanese government made a cabinet decision concerning the acquisition of three of the islands of the Senkaku Islands in September 2012, cyber attacks occurred and caused damage to at least 19 websites of Japanese courts, administrative organizations, and university hospitals for several days. In addition, supply chain risks, such as companies supplying products embedded with deliberately and illegally altered programs, have been also pointed out[19]. **3** **Initiatives against Cyber Attacks** Given these growing threats in cyberspace, various initiatives are under way at the overall government level and the ministry level, including defense ministries[20]. Analysts have raised a number of issues that need to be dealt with to allow for an effective response to cyber attacks, which have become a new security challenge in recent years. For instance, there is no broad consensus on norms related to the conduct of states in cyberspace as well as on international cooperation. Based on this awareness of the issues, there has been a movement to establish some codes of conduct in cyberspace pursuant to international consensus[21]. It has been suggested, however, that countries have conf icting assertions, with countries such as the United States, European countries, and Japan calling for maintaining free and unrestricted cyberspace, while many countries such as Russia, China, and emerging countries call for strengthening the national control of cyberspace. See Part III, Chapter 1, Section 1-6 (Response to Cyber Attacks) **1** **The United States** The International Strategy for Cyberspace released in May 2011 outlines the U.S. vision for the future of cyberspace, and sets an agenda for partnership with other nations and people to realize this vision. The Strategy also points out seven policy priorities. These priorities are the economy, protection of national networks, law enforcement, military, Internet governance, international capacity development, and Internet freedom. In the United States, the Department of Homeland Security is responsible for protecting Federal government networks and critical infrastructure against cyber attacks, and the Department’s Off ce of Cybersecurity and Communications (CS&C) works to protect the networks of government agencies. In the National Security Strategy (NSS) which was released in February 2015, the United States identif es cyber attacks as one of today’s major threats. As regards the Department of Defense’s (DoD) efforts, the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) published in March 2014 describes that cyber threats, which pose risks to U.S. national interests, are composed of the activities of a variety of actors, including individuals, organizations, and countries, and that unauthorized access to the DoD and industry networks and infrastructure threatens the critical infrastructure of the United States, its allies, and partners. Based on this understanding, the report designated the 19 In October 2012, the U.S. House Information Special Committee published an investigation report, entitled “Investigative Report on the U.S. National Security Issues Posed by Chinese Telecommunications Companies Huawei and ZTE.” The report advised that products manufactured by Huawei Technologies and Zhong Xing Telecommunication Equipment (ZTE) (major Chinese communications equipment manufacturers) should not be used, due to their threats to national security based on strong concerns over China’s cyber attack capabilities and intentions targeting critical U.S. infrastructure, as well as opaque relations between Chinese major IT companies and the central government, the CCP, and the PLA augmenting supply chain risks. A similar move has been taken by other countries, including France, Australia, Canada, India, and Taiwan. Some countries, including the United Kingdom and the ROK, have issued warnings. 20 Generally, the trends at the governmental level are thought to include the following: (1) organizations related to cyber security that are spread over multiple departments and agencies are being integrated, and their operational units are being centralized; (2) policy and research units are being enhanced by establishing specialized posts, creating new research divisions and enhancing such functions; (3) the roles of intelligence agencies in responding to cyber attacks are being expanded; and (4) more emphasis is being given to international cooperation. At the level of the defense ministry, various measures have been taken, such as establishing a new agency to supervise cyberspace military operations and positioning the effort to deal with cyber attacks as an important strategic objective. 21 The United Nations Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) on Cyber Issues has continued to hold consultations since 2004, with the participation of experts from a total of 15 countries (a total of 20 countries since the July 2014 meeting), including Japan, the United States, Russia, and China. The GGE’s June 2013 report to the U.N. General Assembly recommends that international law, and in ----- cyber warfare capabilities of the U.S. Forces as a critical element to be maintained for the defense of the homeland, and spells out that the United States continues to retain and develop the required human resources and enhance cyber forces. With regard to cyber threats, “The DoD Cyber Strategy” released in April 2015 expresses the view that the United States faces serious cyber threats, noting that state[22] and non-state actors intend to carry out destructive cyber attacks against U.S. networks, as well as steal U.S. military technology information. In this light, the DoD has set out the following three primary missions in cyberspace: (1) Defend the DoD networks, systems, and information; (2) Defend the United States and its interests against cyber attacks of signif cant consequence; and (3) Provide integrated cyber capabilities to support military operations. Furthermore, the DoD states that the aforementioned cyber capabilities include cyber operations to disrupt an adversary’s military-related systems. In order to execute these missions in cyber space, the DoD presents the following f ve strategic concepts: (1) Build and maintain ready forces and capabilities to conduct cyberspace operations; (2) Defend the DoD information network and data, and mitigate risks to DoD missions; (3) Establish arrangements to defend the United States and its interests from cyber attacks of signif cant consequence through collaboration with relevant departments and companies; (4) Use cyber options to control conf ict; and (5) Build close cooperative relations with allies and partners. From an organizational perspective, U.S. Cyber Command, a sub-unif ed command of U.S. Strategic Command, oversees the cyber forces of the U.S. Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps, and manages operations in cyber space. Cyber Command has expanded along with the expansion of its missions, and has already established the “Cyber Protection Force” that operates and defends the information infrastructure of the DoD. In addition, Cyber Command has created the “Cyber National Mission Force” to support U.S. defense against national-level threats, and the “Cyber Combat Mission Force” that supports the operations conducted by the Unif ed Command on the cyber front. These three forces are collectively referred to as the “Cyber Mission Force.” Multiple teams are thought to belong to these three forces, with over ten teams currently in operation. Furthermore, Cyber Command has stated that 133 teams consisting of 6,200 personnel would be created by September 2018, using National Guard and reserve personnel[23]. **2** **NATO** The new NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) Policy on Cyber Defence, and its action plan, which were adopted in June 2011: (1) clarify the political and operational mechanisms of NATO’s response to cyber attacks; (2) clarify that NATO would provide assistance to member states to develop their cyber defense, and provide assistance to member states if they are subject to cyber attacks; and (3) set out principles on cooperation with partners. Furthermore, at the NATO Summit in September 2014, agreement was reached that NATO’s collective defense applies to cyber attacks against member states. As for its organization, the North Atlantic Council (NAC) provides political oversight on policies and operations concerned with NATO’s cyber defense. In addition, the Emerging Security Challenges Division formulates policy and action plans concerning cyber defense. Furthermore, the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence (CCD COE) was authorized to serve as NATO’s cyber defense-related research and training institution. CCD COE organizes the International Conference on Cyber Conf ict annually, as well as carries out other activities, including commissioning experts to compile the Tallinn Manual[24]. Since 2008, NATO has been conducting cyber defense exercises on an annual basis to boost cyber defense capabilities. 22 “The DoD Cyber Strategy” states that Russia and China have acquired advanced cyber capabilities and strategies. It goes on to say that Russian activities are carried out stealthily and their intentions are diffi cult to discern. The Strategy notes that China steals intellectual property to benefi t Chinese companies. Furthermore, it states that while Iran and North Korea do not have developed cyber capabilities, they have displayed an overt level of hostile intent towards the United States and U.S. interests. 23 Based on a statement made in April 2015 by the U.S. Cyber Command Commander to the U.S. Senate Committee on Armed Services. 24 In June 2013, the NATO Defense Ministers’ Meeting placed cyber attacks at the top of the agenda for the first time. They agreed to establish an emergency response team and to implement a cyber ----- **3** **The United Kingdom** In November 2011, the United Kingdom announced a new Cyber Security Strategy, which set goals for the period until 2015 and specif ed action plans for capability enhancement, establishment of norms, cooperation with other countries, and personnel training. In terms of organization, the Off ce of Cyber Security and Information Assurance (OCSIA) was established within the Cabinet Off ce to form and coordinate cyber security strategy for the overall government, as well as the Cyber Security Operations Centre (CSOC) under the Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) to monitor cyberspace. The Defence Cyber Operations Group (DCOG), which unif es cyber activities within the Ministry of Defence, was established in April 2012 as a provisional measure. It is scheduled to acquire full operational capability by March 2015[25]. In January 2015, Prime Minister David Cameron and President Barack Obama agreed to strengthen cooperation in the area of cyber defense[26]. In such ways, the United Kingdom is working to deepen its collaboration with other countries. **4** **Australia** In January 2013, Australia published its f rst National Security Strategy, which positions integrated cyber policies and operations as one of the top national security priorities. In terms of organization, the Cyber Policy Group (CPG), which coordinates and supervises the cyber security policies of the whole government, was established under the Cyber Policy Coordinator (CPC). The Australian Cyber Security Centre (ACSC) of the Australian Signals Directorate (ASD) responds to major cybersecurity issues on governmental agencies and critical infrastructures[27]. **5** **Republic of Korea** The ROK formulated the National Cyber Security Master Plan in August 2011, which clarif es the supervisory functions of the National Intelligence Service[28] in responding to cyber attacks. It places particular emphasis on strengthening the following f ve areas: prevention, detection, response[29], systems, and security base. In the national defense sector, the Cyberspace Command was established in January 2010 to carry out planning, implementation, training, and research and development for its cyberspace operations, and currently serves as the division under the direct control of the Ministry of National Defense[30]. **Section 6 Trends Concerning Military Science and Technology as** **well as Defense Production and Technological Bases** **1** **Military Science and Technological Trends** Recent developments in science and technology, as represented by the dramatic advancement of Information and Communication Technology (ICT), has impacted a variety of areas, triggering signif cant and revolutionary changes in many areas such as economy, society, and lifestyle. The military is no exception. Developed countries, including the United States, consider that transformations driven by advances in ICT can dramatically improve combat and other capabilities, and therefore, continue to pursue a variety of ICT research and policies. For example, if information on enemy forces collected using information-gathering systems, including reconnaissance satellites and unmanned aircraft, is shared on a network, command and control can be exercised immediately, even from remote headquarters. By extension, offensive power can be directed swiftly, precisely, and f exibly against targets. Major countries with sophisticated and modernized military forces, including the United States, engage in research and development related to improving the destructive capabilities of weapons, precision guidance technology, information-related technology including 25 In addition, the U.K. Ministry of Defence announced in September 2013 that it would recruit hundreds of computer experts as reserves working on the front line of British cyber defence, and approved the establishment of the Joint Cyber Reserves. 26 According to a White House release, the U.K. GCHQ and Security Service (SS) and the U.S. National Security Agency (NSA) and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) will work together closely on cyber security and cyber defense. In addition, the U.K. and U.S. Governments announced that they would conduct their fi rst joint exercise in the second half of 2015 to test their ability to defend against cyber attacks on critical infrastructure. 27 ACSC, comprised of staff from the Australian Crime Commission, the Australian Federal Police, the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation, the Department of Defence, and the Attorney-General’s Department, analyzes threats in cyber space and responds to both public and private sector incidents. 28 Under the Director of the National Intelligence Service, the National Cybersecurity Strategy Council has been established to deliberate on important issues, including establishing and improving a national cybersecurity structure, coordinating related policies and roles among institutions, and deliberating measures and policies related to presidential orders. 29 In February 2014, it was reported that the ROK Ministry of National Defense briefed the National Assembly that it planned to develop cyber weapons for attacking other countries. 30 The basic plan for national defense reform (2012-2030) that was submitted to the President in August 2012 by the Ministry of National Defense proposed significant enhancement of cyber warfare ----- **3** **The United Kingdom** In November 2011, the United Kingdom announced a new Cyber Security Strategy, which set goals for the period until 2015 and specif ed action plans for capability enhancement, establishment of norms, cooperation with other countries, and personnel training. In terms of organization, the Off ce of Cyber Security and Information Assurance (OCSIA) was established within the Cabinet Off ce to form and coordinate cyber security strategy for the overall government, as well as the Cyber Security Operations Centre (CSOC) under the Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) to monitor cyberspace. The Defence Cyber Operations Group (DCOG), which unif es cyber activities within the Ministry of Defence, was established in April 2012 as a provisional measure. It is scheduled to acquire full operational capability by March 2015[25]. In January 2015, Prime Minister David Cameron and President Barack Obama agreed to strengthen cooperation in the area of cyber defense[26]. In such ways, the United Kingdom is working to deepen its collaboration with other countries. **4** **Australia** In January 2013, Australia published its f rst National Security Strategy, which positions integrated cyber policies and operations as one of the top national security priorities. In terms of organization, the Cyber Policy Group (CPG), which coordinates and supervises the cyber security policies of the whole government, was established under the Cyber Policy Coordinator (CPC). The Australian Cyber Security Centre (ACSC) of the Australian Signals Directorate (ASD) responds to major cybersecurity issues on governmental agencies and critical infrastructures[27]. **5** **Republic of Korea** The ROK formulated the National Cyber Security Master Plan in August 2011, which clarif es the supervisory functions of the National Intelligence Service[28] in responding to cyber attacks. It places particular emphasis on strengthening the following f ve areas: prevention, detection, response[29], systems, and security base. In the national defense sector, the Cyberspace Command was established in January 2010 to carry out planning, implementation, training, and research and development for its cyberspace operations, and currently serves as the division under the direct control of the Ministry of National Defense[30]. **Section 6 Trends Concerning Military Science and Technology as** **well as Defense Production and Technological Bases** **1** **Military Science and Technological Trends** Recent developments in science and technology, as represented by the dramatic advancement of Information and Communication Technology (ICT), has impacted a variety of areas, triggering signif cant and revolutionary changes in many areas such as economy, society, and lifestyle. The military is no exception. Developed countries, including the United States, consider that transformations driven by advances in ICT can dramatically improve combat and other capabilities, and therefore, continue to pursue a variety of ICT research and policies. For example, if information on enemy forces collected using information-gathering systems, including reconnaissance satellites and unmanned aircraft, is shared on a network, command and control can be exercised immediately, even from remote headquarters. By extension, offensive power can be directed swiftly, precisely, and f exibly against targets. Major countries with sophisticated and modernized military forces, including the United States, engage in research and development related to improving the destructive capabilities of weapons, precision guidance technology, information-related technology including 25 In addition, the U.K. Ministry of Defence announced in September 2013 that it would recruit hundreds of computer experts as reserves working on the front line of British cyber defence, and approved the establishment of the Joint Cyber Reserves. 26 According to a White House release, the U.K. GCHQ and Security Service (SS) and the U.S. National Security Agency (NSA) and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) will work together closely on cyber security and cyber defense. In addition, the U.K. and U.S. Governments announced that they would conduct their fi rst joint exercise in the second half of 2015 to test their ability to defend against cyber attacks on critical infrastructure. 27 ACSC, comprised of staff from the Australian Crime Commission, the Australian Federal Police, the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation, the Department of Defence, and the Attorney-General’s Department, analyzes threats in cyber space and responds to both public and private sector incidents. 28 Under the Director of the National Intelligence Service, the National Cybersecurity Strategy Council has been established to deliberate on important issues, including establishing and improving a national cybersecurity structure, coordinating related policies and roles among institutions, and deliberating measures and policies related to presidential orders. 29 In February 2014, it was reported that the ROK Ministry of National Defense briefed the National Assembly that it planned to develop cyber weapons for attacking other countries. 30 The basic plan for national defense reform (2012-2030) that was submitted to the President in August 2012 by the Ministry of National Defense proposed significant enhancement of cyber warfare ----- C[4]ISR, and unmanned technology (e.g. drones[1]) to be able to carry out more precise and effective attacks. To this end, these countries also place emphasis on R&D activities related to stealth technology for reducing the risk of attrition of military power as a result of increased preemptive attacks due to improvements in stealth capacity, and as a result of improved survivability, and nanotechnology used for parts and materials related to these technologies. Recently, reports have been published of successful tests of railguns[2] and high energy laser weapons[3] that are expected to provide effective f repower compared to existing weapons, such as artillery, in terms of their cost per f ring, range, precision, promptness, among other aspects. Furthermore, there have been reports about the development of high speed strike weapons (HSSW) that can strike even long-range targets with conventional weapons, quickly and with pinpoint accuracy[4]. The Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), published by the U.S. Department of Defense in March 2014, states that the proliferation of state-of-the-art technologies[5] will transform the mode of warfare. Recent advancements in military science and technology[6] are also largely attributed to the advancement of civil technology. In recent years, as the capabilities of existing equipment are improved and new equipment is developed, spin-on and dual-use technology[7] based on civil technology have been leveraged frequently. In particular, ICT-related civil technology has been applied to a variety of equipments on a larger scale. On the other hand, it is expected that countries having diff culty possessing high-tech forces for technological and economic reasons as well as non-state actors including terrorist organizations will carry out research and development on weapons and other equipment that will enable them to gain superiority in f ghting against countries with state-of-the-art technology, and illegitimately obtain technology through ICT or other means. In short, these countries and organizations tend to focus on asymmetrical means of attack that can be developed or obtained with relatively low cost, enabling them to attack their opponents’ vulnerability without using conventional military capabilities. These asymmetrical means of attack include weapons of mass destruction, such as nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons; ballistic missiles; terrorist attacks; and cyber attacks. As asymmetrical means of attack may spread throughout the world, the research and development of technology[8] that responds to these asymmetrical threats is also recognized as an important challenge. Electromagnetic railgun under development at the U.S. Offi ce of Naval Research (ONR) [ONR] Drones for military use which have been developed include unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV), unmanned ground vehicle (UGV), unmanned maritime vehicle (UMV), unmanned surface vehicle (USV), and unmanned undersea vehicle (UUV). It is suggested that these drones could shift from human-operated types to fully autonomous types, as known as Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems (LAWS). In May 2014, an informal meeting of the United Nations Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) discussed for the fi rst time the humanitarian, legal, and other issues related to the operation of LAWS that automatically kill an enemy without human judgment. These issues were again discussed at a meeting of the high contracting parties to the Convention in November 2014. A railgun is a weapon that fi res bullets by using the magnetic fi eld generated from electric energy instead of gunpowder. The U.S. Forces have developed a railgun with a range of about 370km, or about ten times that of the existing 5-inch (127mm) ammunition. A single railgun shot reportedly costs 1/20th to 1/60th the price of a missile. The U.S. Forces are developing laser weapons to defend against small boats and strengthen low-altitude air defense capabilities, including defense against drones. From September to November 2014, a laser was test fi red onboard the USS Ponce. Observers suggest that high energy laser weapons systems would be miniaturized, with a view to placing the weapons also on light mobility vehicles. The cost of a laser shot is reported to be less than US$1. The goal of the HSSW is to considerably shorten the time required for attack with a conventional weapon. The HSSW is deemed to travel at a low trajectory that is clearly different from the trajectory of ballistic missiles. According to observers, the United States and China are developing HSSWs. The QDR describes that such technologies include “counter-stealth technology” that used to require large budgets, “automated and autonomous systems as well as robotics” that already have a wide range of commercial and military applications, “low-cost three-dimensional printers” that could revolutionize weapons manufacturing and logistics related to warfare, and “biotechnology breakthroughs” that could make new ways of developing weapons of mass destruction possible. The report notes that it remains unclear how these technologies will manifest on the battlefield. In November 2014, then-U.S. Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel unveiled the Defense Innovation Initiative (as known as the “Third Offset Strategy”). This initiative is designed to offset an enemy’s military superiority, such as A2/AD, with cutting-edge technology and operational concepts in which the United States has superiority. See Part I, Chapter 1, Section 1-1-4. In the field of military technology, “spin-on” generally means applying civil technology to military technology, “spin-off” means the reverse, and “dual-use technology” means technology available for use in both areas. ----- **2** **Trends Concerning Defense Production and Technological Bases** Recently, Western countries in particular have continued to face diff culties in signif cantly increasing defense budgets. On the other hand, the sophistication of military science and technology and the greater complexity of equipment, as explained in 1 above, have escalated development and production costs and raised unit prices for procurement, resulting in a reduced number of procured units. Under these circumstances, many countries are working on a variety of initiatives in order to maintain and enhance their national defense production and technological bases. Western countries have set a target to increase competitiveness through realignment of their defense industry, based on the aforementioned situation related to national defense budgets. The United States has seen repeated mergers and integrations among domestic corporations, while Europe has experienced cross-border mergers and integrations of the defense industry, especially in Germany, France, the United Kingdom, and Italy[9]. In response to escalating development and production costs, Western countries are also promoting joint development and production and technological cooperation related to defense equipment among their allies and partners. This move can be attributed to such factors as (1) splitting development and production costs, (2) expanding demands in all countries participating in joint development and production, (3) mutual complementarity of technologies, and (4) raising domestic technology levels by obtaining the latest technology. Furthermore, an international logistic support system called “Autonomic Logistics Global Sustainment” (ALGS) was adopted for the maintenance of the F-35 f ghter aircraft, with the aircraft having been developed through international collaboration. This system enables all F-35 user countries to share its parts and components globally. The establishment of such international frameworks for logistic support and the progress of international joint development and production need to be observed closely. See Part III, Chapter 2, Section 4 (Defense Equipment and Technology Cooperation) Countries have been exporting defense equipment overseas since the Cold War era, and even in recent years, many countries have been promoting a policy of overseas exporting. As defense equipment has faced a dramatic increase in its development and production costs, countries aim to maintain and strengthen their domestic defense industry by expanding demands in foreign markets through overseas exports. Furthermore, it is considered that countries leverage exports as a diplomatic tool for expanding their inf uence in the export destination countries. In addition, countries such as China and the Republic of Korea have established the infrastructure required to manufacture weapons through their past imports of defense equipment and their improved capabilities in science and technology, enabling them to attain the status of an export country of affordable defense equipment and to increase their export volumes. In recent years, defense equipment exports to the Asia-Pacif c region have increased. The underlying factors suggested include the economic growth of the AsiaPacif c region, the greater inf uence of China, disputes over territorial sovereignty, and addressing the enhanced military capabilities of neighboring countries. See Fig. I-2-6-1 (Top Ranking Countries in Major Conventional Arms Export (2010–2014)) |Country|Col2|Global shares in defense equipment export (%), 2010–2014|Comparison with 2005–2009 export values (%)| |---|---|---|---| |1|United States|31%|+23%| |2|Russia|27%|+37%| |3|China|5%|+143%| |4|Germany|5%|–43%| |5|France|5%|–27%| |6|United Kingdom|4%|+23%| |7|Spain|3%|+32%| |8|Italy|3%|+37%| |9|Ukraine|3%|+73%| |10|Israel|2%|+33%| |11|Sweden|2%|+23%| |12|The Netherlands|2%|–32%| |13|Canada|1%|+16%| |14|Switzerland|1%|–12%| |15|Republic of Korea|1%|+14%| |16|Norway|1%|+110%| |17|Turkey|1%|+149%| Top Ranking Countries in Major Conventional Arms Fig. I-2-6-1 Export (2010–2014) Note: Created based on “SIPRI Arms Transfer Database.” Countries with 1% or more share are listed (decimals are rounded). Large corporations involved with the defense industry of Western countries have high defense business ratios in their total revenues. In particular, the United States and the United Kingdom have large ----- **Defense Policy and** ###### Part the Japan-U.S. Alliance # II **Chapter** **Basic Concepts of Japan’s Security and Defense** ##### 1 **Section 1 Measures to Ensure Japan’s Security** The independent state of a nation must be protected in order for it to determine its own direction in politics, economy, and society, as well as maintaining its culture, tradition, and sense of values. However, peace, safety, and independence cannot be secured by simply wishing for them. The essence of national security can be found in creating an international environment that is stable and predictable, while preventing the emergence of threats before they occur, through diplomacy. The reality of the current international community suggests that it is not necessarily possible to prevent invasions from the outside by employing only nonmilitary means such as diplomatic efforts, and in the event that the nation were to be invaded it would not be able to remove such a threat. Defense capabilities are the nation’s ultimate guarantee of security, expressing its will and capacity to eliminate foreign invasions, and they cannot be replaced by any other means. For this reason, Japan is striving to develop appropriate defense capabilities to protect the life and properties of its nationals and to defend the territorial land, sea, and airspace of Japan. At the same time, it is strengthening the Japan–U.S. Alliance[1] with the United States, which shares basic values and interests with Japan. The peace and security of Japan is ensured through developing seamless defense measures by coupling Japan’s own defense capabilities with the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements. In addition, Japan also works domestically to enrich the backbone of the people, which is characterized by ensuring stable lives of the people and protecting the country, while also working to establish a security foundation by implementing various measures in such sectors as the economy and education so as not to allow the chance of an invasion. Moreover, from the perspective of improving the security environment surrounding Japan and preventing the emergence of threats to Japan, the importance of the role played by defense capabilities is increasing in cooperative efforts as a member of the Asia-Pacif c region and the international community. Upon recognizing the role of defense capabilities, Japan aims to ensure national security as well as bringing peace and safety to the Asia-Pacif c region, and eventually to the entire world through making its utmost efforts in a variety of f elds. Prime Minister Shinzo Abe inspecting an air review In general, this refers to the relationship, based on the Japan-U.S. Security System, whereby both nations, as countries sharing fundamental values and interests, coordinate and cooperate closely in ----- **Section 2 Constitution and the Basis of Defense Policy** **1** **Constitution and the Right of Self-Defense** Since the end of World War II, Japan made a decision not to repeat the ravages of war and has worked hard, aiming to build a peace-loving nation. The Japanese people desire lasting peace, and the principle of pacif sm is enshrined in the Constitution, of which Article 9 prescribes the renunciation of war, the possession of war potential, and the right of belligerency by the state. Of course, since Japan is an independent nation, these provisions do not deny Japan’s inherent right of self-defense as a sovereign state. Since the right of self-defense is not denied, the Japanese Government interprets this to mean that the Constitution allows Japan to possess the minimum level of armed force needed to exercise that right. Therefore, Japan, under the Constitution, maintains the Self-Defense Forces (SDF) as an armed organization, holding its exclusively national defense-oriented policy as its basic strategy of defense, and continues to keep it equipped and ready for operations. **2** **The Government’s View on Article 9 of the Constitution** maintain its peace and security and to ensure its survival. Such measures for self-defense are permitted only when they are inevitable for dealing with imminent unlawful situations where the people’s right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness is fundamentally overturned due to an armed attack by a foreign country, and for safeguarding these rights of the people. Hence, “use of force” to the minimum extent necessary to that end is permitted. This is the basis, or so-called the basic logic, of the view consistently expressed by the Government to date with regard to “use of force” exceptionally permitted under Article 9 of the Constitution, and clearly shown in the document “Relationship between the Right of Collective Self-Defense and the Constitution” submitted by the Government to the Committee on Audit of the House of Councillors on October 14, 1972. This basic logic must be maintained under Article 9 of the Constitution. To date, the Government has considered that “use of force” under this basic logic is permitted only when an “armed attack” against Japan occurs. However, in light of the situation in which the security environment surrounding Japan has been fundamentally transformed and continuously evolving by shifts in the global power balance, the rapid progress of technological innovation, and threats such as weapons of mass destruction, etc., in the future, even an armed attack occurring against a foreign country could actually threaten Japan’s survival, depending on its purpose, scale and manner, etc. Japan, as a matter of course, will make the utmost diplomatic efforts, should a dispute occur, for its peaceful settlement and take all necessary responses in accordance with the existing domestic laws and regulations developed based upon the constitutional interpretation to date. It is still required, however, to make all necessary preparations in order to ensure Japan’s survival and protect its people. Under such recognition and as a result of careful examination in light of the current security environment, it has been concluded that not only when an armed attack against Japan occurs but also when an armed attack against **1** **Permitted Self-Defense Capability** Under the Constitution, Japan is permitted to possess the minimum necessary level of self-defense capability. The specif c limit is subject to change relative to the prevailing international situation, the level of military technologies, and various other factors, and it is discussed and decided through annual budget deliberations and other factors by the Diet on behalf of the people. Whether such capability constitutes a “war potential” that is prohibited by Article 9, Paragraph 2 of the Constitution must be considered within the context of Japan’s overall military strength. Therefore, whether the SDF should be allowed to possess certain armaments depends on whether such possession would cause its total military strength to exceed the constitutional limit. The possession of armaments deemed to be offensive weapons designed to be used only for the mass destruction of another country, which would, by def nition, exceed the minimum necessary level, is not permissible under any circumstances. For example, the SDF is not allowed to possess intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM), longrange strategic bombers, or attack aircraft carriers. **2** **Measures for Self-Defense Permitted under** **Article 9 of the Constitution** In the cabinet decision (described in the next section) made on July 1 2014, measures for self-defense permitted under Article 9 of the Constitution were def ned as follows; The language of Article 9 of the Constitution appears to prohibit “use of force” in international relations in all forms. However, when considered in light of “the right (of the people) to live in peace” as recognized in the Preamble of the Constitution and the purpose of Article 13 of the Constitution which stipulates, “their (all the people’s) right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness” shall be the supreme consideration in governmental affairs, Article 9 of the Constitution cannot possibly be interpreted to prohibit Japan from taking measures of self defense necessary to ----- a foreign country that is in a close relationship with Japan occurs and as a result threatens Japan’s survival and poses a clear danger to fundamentally overturn people’s right to life, liberty and pursuit of happiness, and when there is no other appropriate means available to repel the attack and ensure Japan’s survival and protect its people, use of force to the minimum extent necessary should be interpreted to be permitted under the Constitution as measures for self-defense in accordance with the basic logic of the Government’s view to date. As a matter of course, Japan’s “use of force” must be carried out while observing international law. At the same time, a legal basis in international law and constitutional interpretation need to be understood separately. In certain situations, the aforementioned “use of force” permitted under the Constitution is, under international law, based on the right of collective self-defense. The Government has reached a conclusion that although this “use of force” includes those which are triggered by an armed attack occurring against a foreign country, they are permitted under the Constitution only when they are taken as measures for self-defense which are inevitable for ensuring Japan’s survival and protecting its people, in other words, for defending Japan. See Fig. II-1-2-1 (“Three new conditions” for the “use of force” as measures for self-defense permitted under Article 9 of the Constitution) Fig. II-1-2-1 “Three new conditions” for the “use of force” as measures for self-defense permitted under Article 9 of the Constitution H When an armed attack against Japan has occurred, or when an armed attack against a foreign country that is in a close relationship with Japan occurs and as a result threatens Japan’s survival and poses a clear danger to fundamentally overturn people’s right to life, liberty and pursuit of happiness. H When there is no appropriate means available to repel the attack and ensure Japan’s survival and protect its people. H Use of force to the minimum extent necessary. **3** **Basic policy** Under the Constitution, Japan will eff ciently build a highly effective and joint defense force in line with the basic principles of maintaining an exclusively defenseoriented policy and not becoming a military power that poses a threat to other countries, while f rmly maintaining the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements and adhering to the principle of civilian control of the military, observing the Three Non-Nuclear Principles. **3** **Geographic Boundaries within which the Right** **of Self-Defense may be Exercised** The use of the minimum necessary force to defend Japan under the right of self-defense is not necessarily conf ned to the geographic boundaries of Japanese territory, territorial waters, and airspace. However, it is diff cult to give a general def nition of the actual extent to which it may be used, as this would vary with the situation. Nevertheless, the Government interprets that, as a general rule, the Constitution does not permit armed troops to be dispatched to the land, sea, or airspace of other countries with the aim of using force; such overseas deployment of troops would exceed the def nition of the minimum necessary level of self-defense. **4** **Right of Belligerency** Article 9, Paragraph 2 of the Constitution prescribes that “the right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized.” However, the “right of belligerency” does not mean the right to engage in battle; rather, it is a general term for various rights that a belligerent nation has under international law, including the authority to inf ict casualties and damage upon the enemy’s military force and to occupy enemy territory. On the other hand, Japan may of course use the minimum level of force necessary to defend itself. For example, if Japan inf icts casualties and damage upon the enemy’s military force in exercising its right of self-defense, this is conceptually distinguished from the exercise of the right of belligerency, even though those actions do not appear to be different. Occupation of enemy territory, however, would exceed the minimum necessary level of self-defense and is not permissible. **1** **Exclusively Defense-Oriented Policy** The exclusively defense-oriented policy means that defensive force is used only in the event of an attack, that the extent of the use of defensive force is kept to the minimum necessary for self-defense, and that the defense capabilities to be possessed and maintained by Japan are limited to the minimum necessary for self-defense. The policy including these matters refers to the posture of a passive defense strategy in accordance with the spirit of the Constitution. ----- Prime Minister and other Ministers of State who constitute the Cabinet be civilians. The Prime Minister, on behalf of the whole Cabinet, holds the authority of supreme command and supervision of the SDF. The Minister of Defense, who is exclusively in charge of national defense, exercises general control and supervision over the SDF duties. In addition, the National Security Council of Japan under the Cabinet deliberates important matters on national security. At the Ministry of Defense, the Minister of Defense is responsible for issues concerning national defense, and as the head of the Ministry of Defense also controls and manages the SDF. The Minister of Defense is assisted in policy planning and political affairs by the State Minister of Defense, Parliamentary Vice-Ministers (two) and the Senior Adviser to the Minister of Defense[4]. In addition, Special Advisers to the Minister of Defense provide the Minister of Defense with advice on important issues under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Defense based on their expertise and experience. The Defense Council consisting of political appointees, civilian off cials and uniformed SDF personnel of the Ministry of Defense deliberates on basic principles concerning administrative affairs under the Ministry’s jurisdiction. Through these ways, the Ministry of Defense aims to further enhance the operation of the civilian control system. As mentioned above, the civilian control system is well established. However, it is necessary to continue making operational efforts in both political and administrative aspects, along with a deep interest in defense taken by the people, to ensure the system achieves good results. **2** **Not Becoming a Military Power** There is no established def nition for the concept of a military power. For Japan, however, not becoming a military power that could threaten other countries means that Japan will not possess and maintain a military capability strong enough to pose a threat to other countries, beyond the minimum necessary for self-defense. **3** **Three Non-Nuclear Principles** The Three Non-Nuclear Principles refers to those of not possessing nuclear weapons, not producing them, and not allowing them to be brought into Japan. Japan adheres to the Three Non-Nuclear Principles as a f xed line of national policy. Japan is also prohibited from manufacturing and possessing nuclear weapons under the Atomic Energy Basic Law[1]. In addition, Japan ratif ed the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), and as a nonnuclear weapons state, has an obligation not to manufacture and acquire nuclear weapons[2]. **4** **Securing Civilian Control** Civilian control refers to the priority of politics to the military or democratic political control of military strength in a democratic state. Japan has, by giving serious ref ection to the regrettable state of affairs that happened until the end of World War II, adopted the following strict civilian control system that is entirely different from the one under the former Constitution[3]. Civilian control aims to ensure that the SDF is maintained and operated in accordance with the will of the people. The Diet, which represents Japanese nationals, makes legislative and budgetary decisions on such matters as the allotted number of the SDF personnel and main organizations of the MOD and the SDF. It also issues approval for defense operations of the SDF. The function of national defense, as a general administrative function, entirely falls under the executive power of the Cabinet. The Constitution requires that the Minister of Defense Nakatani inspecting the honor guard ceremony carried out by the Special Guard of Honor Article 2 of the Atomic Energy Basic Law states that “The research, development and utilization of atomic energy shall be limited to peaceful purposes, aimed at ensuring safety and performed independently under democratic management.” Article 2 of the NPT states that “Each non-nuclear weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes....not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices...” The Cabinet’s control over military matters was limited. As a part of the Reform of National Public Offi cers’ Systems, the position of Senior Adviser was newly established in each ministry, for which one offi cial may be assigned, when particularly necessary. ----- **Section 3 Development of Legislation for Peace and Security** **1** **Background to the Review and Outline of the Cabinet Decision** to the peace and stability of the international community, and measures for self-defense permitted under Article 9 of the Constitution. See Fig. II-1-3-1 (Outline of the Cabinet Decision) Reference 5 (Development of Seamless Security Legislation to Ensure Japan’s Survival and Protect its People) **1** **Background to the Review** As the security environment surrounding Japan is becoming increasingly severe, Prime Minister Abe resumed the Advisory Panel on Reconstruction of the Legal Basis for Security[1] in February 2013. The Panel was instructed to reexamine the legal basis for security, what Japan should do in order to maintain the peace and security of Japan, including for the most effective operation of the Japan-U.S. security arrangements, taking into account the changes over the past four and a half years as well as potential changes in the security environment in the future. Following a total of seven meetings, in May 2014, the report was submitted to Prime Minister Abe. Following the Panel’s report and in accordance with the basic orientation for the ways in which further deliberation will take place as presented by Prime Minister Abe, discussions had been held in the ruling parties and examination had also been conducted by the Government. Following this, in July 2014, a cabinet decision was made on “Development of Seamless Security Legislation to Ensure Japan’s Survival and Protect its People.” This cabinet decision shows the basic policy for the development of new security legislation, and has a historical signif cance in further ensuring peace and security of Japan through enhancing the deterrence and making more proactive contributions to peace and stability of the region and the international community. **3** **Deliberation of Legislation Development** In making the cabinet decision, Prime Minister Abe provided the instruction that work must be undertaken immediately for the development of security legislation. Based on the instructions, a legislation drafting team was launched under the National Security Secretariat in the Cabinet Secretariat. In addition to this, the Ministry of Defense and the SDF established “The Study Committee on the Development of Security Legislation” with the Minister of Defense as its Chairman, in order to f rmly fulf ll the role expected by the Japanese nationals, and also conducted the deliberation towards the development of security legislation. The deliberations in the Government were conducted based on the discussions in the ruling parties. A total of 25 meetings were held for discussions in the ruling parties since May 2014, and in the course of these discussions, the “basic direction for the development of security legislation” was presented on March 20, 2015. Based on further discussions in the ruling parties, the Government conducted its own deliberations and, on May 14, 2015, made cabinet decisions on two bills, the Bill for the Development of Legislation for Peace and Security[2] and the International Peace Support Bill[3]. The two bills were submitted them to the 189th ordinary session of the Diet on May 15. On May 19, the House of Representatives decided to establish a Special Committee on Legislation for Peace and Security of Japan and the International Community for deliberation on these bills. See Appendix 3 (Matrix of the Legislation for Peace and Security) **2** **Outline of the Cabinet Decision** The cabinet decision states that it is necessary to develop domestic legislation that enables seamless responses in order to resolutely secure the lives and peaceful livelihood of its people under any situation and contribute even more proactively to the peace and stability of the international community under the policy of “Proactive Contribution to Peace” based on the principle of international cooperation. The decision also sets the basic policies, as shown in Reference 6, regarding response to an infringement that does not amount to an armed attack, further contributions The Panel submitted its report to then Prime Minister Fukuda in June 2008. The report submitted in June 2008 examined four cases ((1) Defense of U.S. vessels on the high seas; (2) Interception of ballistic missiles that may be on their way to the U.S.; (3) Use of weapons in international peace operations; and (4) Logistic support for the operations of other countries participating in the same PKO). In this report, it was proposed the view that the previous offi cial interpretation of Article 9 of the Constitution was becoming no longer applicable in light of the radically changing international situation and the international status of Japan, and that Article 9 of the Constitution should be interpreted as it would not prohibit either the right of individual self-defense, the right of collective self-defense and participation in the United Nation’s Collective Security measures. Bill for Partial Amendments to the Self-Defense Forces Law and Other Existing Laws for Ensuring Peace and Security of Japan and the International Community. ----- |1. Response to an Infringement that Does Not Amount to an Armed Attack H Under the basic policy that relevant agencies including the police and Japan Coast Guard are to respond in close cooperation in accordance with their respective duties and authorities, the Government will further strengthen necessary measures in all areas, including enhancing the respective agency’s response capabilities and strengthening collaboration among agencies. In cases of responding to a situation where police forces are not present nearby or police agencies cannot respond immediately, the Government will consider measures for issuing orders swiftly and accelerating procedures for public security operations or maritime security operations. H The Government will develop legislation that enables the SDF to carry out very passive and limited “use of weapons” to the minimum extent necessary to protect weapons and other equipment of the units of the United States Armed Forces, if they are, in cooperation with the SDF, currently engaged in activities that contribute to the defense of Japan (including joint exercises), in line with the provisions of Article 95 of the SDF Act, premised on request or consent by the United States.|Col2|Legislation Development| |---|---|---| ||H Under the basic policy that relevant agencies including the police and Japan Coast Guard are to respond in close cooperation in accordance with their respective duties and authorities, the Government will further strengthen necessary measures in all areas, including enhancing the respective agency’s response capabilities and strengthening collaboration among agencies. In cases of responding to a situation where police forces are not present nearby or police agencies cannot respond immediately, the Government will consider measures for issuing orders swiftly and accelerating procedures for public security operations or maritime security operations. H The Government will develop legislation that enables the SDF to carry out very passive and limited “use of weapons” to the minimum extent necessary to protect weapons and other equipment of the units of the United States Armed Forces, if they are, in cooperation with the SDF, currently engaged in activities that contribute to the defense of Japan (including joint exercises), in line with the provisions of Article 95 of the SDF Act, premised on request or consent by the United States.|→ Acceleration of procedures to issue orders for public security operations/maritime security operations → Revision of the SDF Act (Protection of weapons and other equipment of the units of the U.S. Armed Forces)| |2. Further Contributions to the Peace and Stability of the International Community A. So-called Logistics Support and “Ittaika with the Use of Force” (*1) H The Government takes the recognition that Japan’s support activities such as supply and transportation conducted at a place which is not “the scene where combat activities are actually being conducted” by a foreign country are not regarded as “ittaika with the use of force” by that country. From the viewpoint of the following positions which is based on that recognition, the Government will proceed with developing legislation which enables necessary support activities for the armed forces of foreign countries engaging in activities for ensuring Japan’s security or for the peace and stability of the international community. H Japan does not conduct support activities in “the scene where combat activities are actually being conducted” by armed forces of a foreign country to which Japan provides support. H Japan will immediately pause or cease support activities if the place where Japan is conducting support activities becomes “the scene where combat operations are actually being conducted” due to changes of the situation. B. Use of Weapons Associated with International Peace Cooperation Activities The Government will proceed with developing legislation based on the following positions in order to enable the SDF’s use of weapons associated with so-called “kaketsuke-keigo” and the “use of weapons for the defense of mandate” in international peace cooperation activities that do not invoke “use of force” including U.N. peacekeeping operations as well as police-like activities that do not invoke “use of force” including the rescuing of Japanese nationals with a consent from the territorial State. H As for U.N. peacekeeping operations, etc., under the framework of the Five Principles for PKOs, “a quasi-state organization” (*2) other than parties to the confl ict who have given consent of acceptance is, in principle, not expected to appear as an adversary. H When the SDF units conduct police-like activities that do not involve “use of force” including the rescuing of Japanese nationals in a foreign country based on the consent of the territorial State’s Government, it is natural that the activities be conducted in the area within which the consent of the territorial State’s Government is valid, i.e. the area within which its authority is maintained. This means that no “quasi-state organization” exists in that area. H The Cabinet will make a decision on whether the consent of acceptance is stably maintained or the area within which the consent of the territorial State’s Government is valid, etc. based on deliberations etc. at the National Security Council.||| ||A. So-called Logistics Support and “Ittaika with the Use of Force” (*1) H The Government takes the recognition that Japan’s support activities such as supply and transportation conducted at a place which is not “the scene where combat activities are actually being conducted” by a foreign country are not regarded as “ittaika with the use of force” by that country. From the viewpoint of the following positions which is based on that recognition, the Government will proceed with developing legislation which enables necessary support activities for the armed forces of foreign countries engaging in activities for ensuring Japan’s security or for the peace and stability of the international community. H Japan does not conduct support activities in “the scene where combat activities are actually being conducted” by armed forces of a foreign country to which Japan provides support. H Japan will immediately pause or cease support activities if the place where Japan is conducting support activities becomes “the scene where combat operations are actually being conducted” due to changes of the situation. B. Use of Weapons Associated with International Peace Cooperation Activities The Government will proceed with developing legislation based on the following positions in order to enable the SDF’s use of weapons associated with so-called “kaketsuke-keigo” and the “use of weapons for the defense of mandate” in international peace cooperation activities that do not invoke “use of force” including U.N. peacekeeping operations as well as police-like activities that do not invoke “use of force” including the rescuing of Japanese nationals with a consent from the territorial State. H As for U.N. peacekeeping operations, etc., under the framework of the Five Principles for PKOs, “a quasi-state organization” (*2) other than parties to the confl ict who have given consent of acceptance is, in principle, not expected to appear as an adversary. H When the SDF units conduct police-like activities that do not involve “use of force” including the rescuing of Japanese nationals in a foreign country based on the consent of the territorial State’s Government, it is natural that the activities be conducted in the area within which the consent of the territorial State’s Government is valid, i.e. the area within which its authority is maintained. This means that no “quasi-state organization” exists in that area. H The Cabinet will make a decision on whether the consent of acceptance is stably maintained or the area within which the consent of the territorial State’s Government is valid, etc. based on deliberations etc. at the National Security Council.|→ The Act Concerning the Measures for the Peace and Security of Japan in Situations That Will Have an Important Infl uence on Japan’s Peace and Security (Revision of the Act Concerning the Measures for the Peace and Security of Japan in Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan), Revision of the Ship Inspection Operations Act, the International Peace Support Bill → Revision of the International Peace Cooperation Act, revision of the SDF Act (Protection measures for Japanese nationals overseas)| |3. Measures for Self-Defense Permitted under Article 9 of the Constitution H The Government believes that not only when an armed attack against Japan occurs but also when an armed attack against a foreign country that is in a close relationship with Japan occurs and as a result threatens Japan’s survival and poses a clear danger to fundamentally overturn people’s right to life, liberty and pursuit of happiness, and when there is no other appropriate means available to repel the attack and ensure Japan’s survival and protect its people, use of force to the minimum extent necessary should be interpreted to be permitted under the Constitution as measures for self-defense in accordance with the basic logic of the Government’s view to date. H The aforementioned “use of force” permitted under the Constitution is, under international law, based on the right of collective self-defense. Although this “use of force” includes those which are triggered by an armed attack occurring against a foreign country, they are permitted under the Constitution only when they are taken as measures for self-defense which are inevitable for ensuring Japan’s survival and protecting its people, in other words for defending Japan. H The Government will stipulate in the draft legislation that the prior approval of the Diet is in principle required upon issuing orders for operations to the SDF for carrying out “use of force” permitted under the Constitution when an armed attack occurs not against Japan but against a foreign country, in the same manner as the procedures related to defense operations stipulated in the current laws and regulations.||| ||H The Government believes that not only when an armed attack against Japan occurs but also when an armed attack against a foreign country that is in a close relationship with Japan occurs and as a result threatens Japan’s survival and poses a clear danger to fundamentally overturn people’s right to life, liberty and pursuit of happiness, and when there is no other appropriate means available to repel the attack and ensure Japan’s survival and protect its people, use of force to the minimum extent necessary should be interpreted to be permitted under the Constitution as measures for self-defense in accordance with the basic logic of the Government’s view to date. H The aforementioned “use of force” permitted under the Constitution is, under international law, based on the right of collective self-defense. Although this “use of force” includes those which are triggered by an armed attack occurring against a foreign country, they are permitted under the Constitution only when they are taken as measures for self-defense which are inevitable for ensuring Japan’s survival and protecting its people, in other words for defending Japan. H The Government will stipulate in the draft legislation that the prior approval of the Diet is in principle required upon issuing orders for operations to the SDF for carrying out “use of force” permitted under the Constitution when an armed attack occurs not against Japan but against a foreign country, in the same manner as the procedures related to defense operations stipulated in the current laws and regulations.|→ Revision of Legislation for Responses to Armed Attack Situations, revision of the SDF Law (Development of provisions concerning defense operations)| Fig. II -1-3-1 Outline of the Cabinet Decision Notes: 1. As for Japan’s support activities, however, legal frameworks limiting the area of such activities to “rear area” or so-called “non-combat area,” etc. have been established in past legislations to ensure that the issue of “ittaika with the use of force” (forming an “integral part” of the use of force) does not arise, in relation to Article 9 of the Constitution. This is intended to avoid Japan from being legally evaluated as carrying out by itself the “use of force” which is not permitted under the Constitution because its support activities would form an “integral part” of the use of force (“ittaika with the use of force”) by other countries. 2. Use of weapons associated with so-called “kaketsuke-keigo” (coming to the aid of geographically distant units or personnel under attack) or “use of weapons for the purpose of the execution of missions” could constitute the “use of force” prohibited by Article 9 of the Constitution, if such use of weapons is directed against “a state or a quasi-state organization.” Th St d C itt th D l t f S it L i l ti ----- **2** **Outline of the Bill for the Development of Legislation for Peace and Security** The Bill for the Development of Legislation for Peace and Security, which was adopted by a cabinet decision on May 14, 2015, and then submitted to the Diet, is outlined below: See Reference 6 (Summary of the Bill for Partial Amendments to the SelfDefense Forces Law and Other Existing Laws for Ensuring Peace and Security of Japan and the International Community) **3** **Revision of the Ship Inspection Operations Law** Among the key items of the Ship Inspection Operations Law to be revised, the bill includes revisions in accordance with the revision of the Law to Ensure Security for Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan and the establishment of provisions for ship inspection operations for Situations threatening the International Peace and Security which Armed Forces of Foreign Countries Collectively Address[5] prescribed in the International Peace Support Law. See Fig. II-1-3-6 (Revision of the Ship Inspection Operations Law) **1** **Revision of the Self-Defense Forces Law** Among the key items of the Self-Defense Forces Law to be revised, the bill includes the development of provisions concerning defense operations (described below), the establishment of provisions for measures to rescue Japanese nationals overseas and protect weapons and other equipment of military units of the U.S. and other countries’ forces, expansion of the provision of supplies and services to the U.S. Armed Forces, and the establishment of provisions for the punishment of those who commit crimes overseas. See Fig. II-1-3-2 (Outline of Measures to Rescue Japanese Nationals Overseas) Fig. II-1-3-3 (Use of Weapons to Protect Weapons of Military Units of the U.S. and Other Countries’ Forces) Fig. II-1-3-4 (Provision of Supplies and Services to the U.S. Armed Forces) **2** **The Law Concerning Measures to Ensure Peace** **and Security of Japan in Situations that Will** **Have an Important Infl uence on Japan’s Peace** **and Security (Revision of the Law Concerning** **Measures to Ensure Peace and Security of** **Japan in Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan)** Among the key items of the Law Concerning Measures to Ensure Peace and Security of Japan in Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan to be revised, the bill includes reviewing the Law’s purpose, including the deletion of “in areas surrounding Japan” from the def nition of the situations and renaming it “Situations that will Have an Important Inf uence on Japan’s Peace and Security”[4]; enabling the provision of support activities to the U.S. Armed Forces undertaking activities that contribute to the attainment of the objective of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty as well as military forces of other countries; and expansion of the scope of the support activities. See Fig. II-1-3-5 (Law Concerning Measures to Ensure Peace and Security of Japan in Situations that Will Have an Important Infl uence on Japan’s Peace and Security (Revision of the Law Concerning Measures to Ensure Peace and Security of Japan in Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan)) **4** **Amendment to the International Peace Cooperation Act** Among the key items of the International Peace Cooperation Act to be amended, the bill include the addition of tasks that can be implemented during U.N. peacekeeping operations and other operations*; a review of the authorization criteria in situations requiring the use of weapons; and inclusion of operations in humanitarian and protection tasks not conducted by the United Nations in the International Cooperation Assignments (internationally coordinated operations for peace and security). - Tasks of: Monitoring, stationing, patrol, inspection at checkpoint and security escort and protection for the purpose of security of specifi ed areas including prevention and suppression of injury or harm against lives, bodies and property of local population, Affl icted People and other populations requiring protection; and protection of lives and bodies of individuals engaging in the United Nations Peacekeeping Operations, Internationally Coordinated Operations for Peace and Security or International Humanitarian Relief Operations or providing support for those Operations, in response to urgent request when unexpected dangers to lives or bodies of such individuals related to operations occur or are imminent, while implementing tasks. See Fig. II-1-3-7 (Amendment to the International Peace Cooperation Act) **5** **Revision of Legislation for Responses to Armed** **Attack Situations** The bills for amending the Armed Attack Situation Response Act and other legislations related to responses to the situation, and the Self-Defense Forces Law include the following key items for revision: H The naming and def nition of situations where an armed attack against a foreign country results in threatening Japan’s survival[6] and the development of appropriate procedures (Legislation for Responses to Armed Attack Situations)[7] H Revision of provisions concerning a mission, an action, and authority etc. of the Self-Defense Forces responding to situations where an armed attack against a foreign country results in threatening Japan’s survival and poses a clear danger to fundamentally overturn people’s right In association with the rename of the defi nition of the situations, the title of the Law is proposed to be amended from the “Law Concerning Measures to Ensure Peace and Security of Japan in Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan” to the “Law Concerning Measures to Ensure Peace and Security of Japan in Situations that will Have an Important Infl uence on Japan’s Peace and Security.” Situations where the international peace and security is threatened, and where international community collectively undertakes operations in order to eliminate such a threat in accordance with the purpose of the Charter of the United Nations, and where Japan independently and proactively needs to contribute to such activities as a member of the international community. Situations where an armed attack against a foreign country that is in a close relationship with Japan occurs and as a result threatens Japan’s survival and poses a clear danger to fundamentally overturn people’s right to life, liberty and pursuit of happiness. In accordance with its application to situations where an armed attack against a foreign country results in threatening Japan’s survival, the title of the Act was revised from the “Act on the Peace and Independence of Japan and Maintenance of the Nation and the People’s Security in Armed Attack Situations etc.” to the “Act on the Peace and Independence of Japan and Maintenance of the Nation ----- Outline of Measures to Rescue Japanese Nationals Fig. II-1-3-2 Overseas Use of Weapons to Protect Weapons of Military Fig. II-1-3-3 Units of the U.S. and Other Countries’ Forces H Enable uniformed SDF personnel to use weapons to protect the weapons and other equipment of the units of the U.S. Forces, armed forces of other countries and similar organizations that are, in cooperation with the SDF, currently engaged in activities that contribute to the defense of Japan (Article 95-2) [Coverage] H Weapons, etc. of the U.S. Forces, armed forces of other countries and similar organizations’ units H That are, in cooperation with the SDF, currently engaged in activities that contribute to the defense of Japan (*) (*) Including joint exercises but excluding activities where the act of combat is currently being conducted. [Procedures, etc.] H When the request is made by the U.S. Forces, etc. H Only when the Minister of Defense deems it necessary H Uniformed SDF personnel provide guarding (*) Apart from procedures prescribed in SDF Law provisions, the National Security Council plans to deliberate on the operational approach. [Authority to Use Weapons] H When there are adequate grounds to recognize the need to use weapons to protect people or weapons, etc., the use of weapons is permitted to the extent judged to be reasonably necessary depending on the situation. H Causing harm to persons is only allowed for self-defense and aversion of present danger. H Enable the units of the SDF to take measures to rescue Japanese nationals overseas whose lives or bodies could be harmed in emergency situations (Article 84-3). Rescue measures: Guarding, rescue and other measures to protect the lives or bodies of those Japanese nationals, including transportation. [Procedure] Order by the Minister of Defense H Request from the Minister for Foreign Affairs H Consultations between the Minister for Foreign Affairs and the Minister of Defense H Approval by the Prime Minister [Requirements for Implementation] When all of the following are met: (1) It is recognized that in places where rescue measures are taken, the competent authorities of the country concerned are currently maintaining public safety and order, and no act of combat is being conducted; (2) The country concerned consents to the SDF taking the rescue measures; and (3) It is anticipated that coordination and cooperation can be ensured between the units of the SDF and the competent authority of the country concerned in order to carry out the rescue measures as smoothly and safely as possible in response to expected dangers. [Authority to Use Weapons] H So-called “use of weapons for the defense of mandate” are permitted H SDF personnel shall not inflict injury upon any person except in a case of self-defense or overting of present danger. - It is possible to also rescue non-Japanese nationals under certain conditions. Fig. II-1-3-4 Provision of Supplies and Services to the U.S. Armed Forces Provision of Supplies and Services to the U.S. Forces (Article 100-6) H Enabling the provision of supplies or services to the U.S. Forces, that are on field sites along with the units of the SDF carrying out the following actions or activities and are engaged in similar activities to the SDF units. (1) Guarding of facilities and areas set forth in Article 81-2, Paragraph 1, Item 2 (Guarding operations) of the SDF Act (*Covering the U.S. Forces conducting guarding activities within facilities and areas) (2) Counter-piracy operations (3) Operations necessary to take measures to destroy ballistic missiles, etc. (4) Removal and disposal of mines and other explosive objects (5) Protection measures or transportation of Japanese nationals, etc. in emergency situations in foreign countries (6) Activities to collect information by ships or aircraft about the movements of the armed forces of foreign countries and other information that contributes to the defense of Japan 【Other Revised Matters】 (1) The coverage extended from only the U.S. Forces participating in Japan-U.S. bilateral exercises previously to the U.S. Forces participating in multilateral exercises of three or more countries, including Japan and the U.S. (2) The coverage extended to the U.S. Forces that are in field sites along with SDF units temporarily staying at facilities of the U.S. Forces for day-to-day operations, in addition to the U.S. Forces temporarily staying at SDF facilities (3) Ammunition to be included in supplies to be provided Development of Provisions for the Punishment of Those Who Commit Crimes Overseas (Article 122-2) H Develop provisions for the punishment of those who commit crimes overseas concerning the following penalties (1) Concerted defiance of superiors’ official orders and unlawful command of units (2) Defiance of and disobedience to superiors’ orders by those given defense operation orders ----- Law Concerning Measures to Ensure Peace and Security of Japan in Situations that Will Have an Important Infl uence on Japan’s Peace and Fig. II-1-3-5 Security (Revision of the Law Concerning Measures to Ensure Peace and Security of Japan in Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan) Purpose The purpose is to ensure peace and security of Japan, strengthening cooperation with foreign countries responding to situations that will have an important influence on Japan’s peace and security, with the contribution to the effective operation of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty at its core, by conducting logistics support, etc. for the U.S. Forces, etc. Situations that will have an important influence on Japan’s peace and security [(Example) Situations that could lead to a direct armed attack against Japan if left unattended] (*) Deleted “in areas surrounding Japan” from the definition Support Targets Avoidance of “Ittaika” The following armed forces etc. responding to the situations H SDF does not conduct acrivities in “the scene where combat (1) The U.S. Forces engaged in activities contributing to the achievement activities are actually being conducted.” of the objectives of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty (*) When the personnel having been lost already been found and rescue (2) Armed forces of other foreign countries engaged in activities operations have commenced, search and rescue activities contributing to the achievement of the objectives of the U.N. Charter concerning them are allowed to continue as long as the safety of the (3) Other similar organizations SDF units is ensured. H The commanding officers etc. of the SDF units order the temporary suspension of activities etc. if combat operations occur or are Response Measures expected to occur at the site of their activities or in the vicinity. H The Minister of Defense designates the area for implementing (1) Logistics support activities (types of goods and services provided by activities, and if it is deemed difficult to implement operations the Ministry of Defense and the SDF) smoothly and safely in the whole or part of that area, must promptly Supply, transportation, repair and maintenance, medical activities, change the designation of the area or order the cessation of the communications, airport and seaport services, and base services, activities being implemented there. lodging, storage, use of facilities, training services (*) Provision of weapons is not included. Provision of ammunition and refueling and maintenance of aircraft ready to take off for combat Diet Approval operations are now allowed. (2) Search and rescue activities H Prior Diet approval, in principle (3) Ship inspection operations (those set forth in the Ship Inspection H Ex-post facto approval allowed in emergency Operations Act) (*) The same as the Law Concerning Measures to Ensure Peace and (4) Other measures necessary to respond to the situations Security of Japan in Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan - Implementation of operations in foreign territories is allowed (only when the foreign country consents) (Not allowed before the revision) - The authority to use weapons limited only to the self-preservation type Fig. II-1-3-6 Revision of the Ship Inspection Operations Law |The ship captain’s consent to boarding inspection|So-called no mixture requirement|The authority to use weapons of “self- preservation type”| |---|---|---| |Col1|Col2|Col3|The Peace and Security of| |---|---|---|---| |||the International Community|the International Community| ||The existing Ship Inspection Operations Act Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan The ship captain’s The authority to use So-called no mixture consent to boarding weapons of “self- requirement inspection preservation type” In the interna H The changing security environment surrounding Japan implemented fo mass destructi H Proactive contribution to peace personnel and H Realization of legislation allowing seamless responses (Example: CTF-|At the time of the Act’s enactment, the implementation of ship inspection operations in cases other than situations in areas surrounding Japan was considered as a future. (Minister of Foreign Affairs Kono’s reply at the House of Councillors Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee on November 28, 2000) tional community, ship inspection operations are being r the purpose of dealing with the proliferation of weapons of on and ballistic missiles, and cross-border movements of weapons, etc. of international terrorist organizations. 150)|| ||||| |H It is effective to conduct ship inspection operations in addition to cooperation and support activities in order to contribute to “ensuring the peace and security of the international community.”|||| Revision of the Ship Inspection Operations Act (1) The Peace and Security of Japan: Revision associated with the review of “Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan” (corresponding to the purpose of the Law Concerning Measures to Ensure Peace and Security of Japan in Situations that will Have an Important Influence on Japan’s Peace and Security) (2) The Peace and Security of the International Community: Implementation of operations in international peace joint response situations (corresponding to the purpose of the International Peace Support Act) |The ship captain’s consent to boarding inspection|So-called no mixture requirement|The authority to use weapons within the limit of “self-preservation type”|Enable the consent-based implementation of operations in foreign territories| |---|---|---|---| |||(Addition of “under own control”)|| ----- Fig. II-1-3-7 Amendment to the International Peace Cooperation Act United Nations Peacekeeping Operations (Addition) Internationally coordinated operations for peace and security (Not under the control of the U.N.) |H Addition of Tasks Security of specified areas including protection of local population request and tasks at Mission Headquarters have been added, in ad assisting in the establishment and reestablishment of systems of g H Review of the authority to use weapons In implementing protection of local population, etc. as well as secu response to their urgent request, the use of weapons for the defens H Diet approval Prior Diet approval is necessary for ceasefire monitoring and securi by SDF units, in principle (Ex-post facto approval permitted when th H Ensuring the safety of personnel of the International Cooperation C Provide for the development of operational guidelines that set forth temporary suspension of operations to avoid danger and other me Cooperation Corps|, etc. dition overn rity o e of ty of e Di orps pro asur|, protection of individuals related to to ceasefire monitoring and relief ac ance have been expanded. f specified areas and protection of in mandate is allowed. specified areas including protection o et is in recess or the House of Repres of Japan visions for the consideration of safety es for ensuring the safety of the per| |---|---|---| H Five Principles for Participation (underlined portions added) H Requirement: When any of the following is met, in addition to the satisfaction of the Five Principles for Participation (1) Agreement on a ceasefire shall have been reached among the parties to armed conflicts. (1) Based on resolutions adopted by the General Assembly, the (2) Consent for the undertaking of U.N. peacekeeping operations as well Security Council or the Economic and Social Council of the as Japan’s participation in such operations shall have been obtained United Nations from the host countries as well as the parties to armed conflicts. (2) At the request by: (3) The operations shall strictly maintain impartiality, not favoring - The United Nations any of the parties to armed conflicts. - Organizations established by the U.N. Generally Assembly or U.N. (4) Should any of the requirements in the above-mentioned guideline specialized agencies, such as the Office of the U.N. High cease to be satisfied, the Government of Japan may terminate the Commissioner for Refugees or otherwise specified by a Cabinet Order dispatch of the personnel engaged in International Peace - Regional organizations as prescribed in Article 52 of the U.N. Cooperation Assignments. Charter or organizations established by multilateral treaties, (5) The use of weapons shall be limited to the minimum necessary having the actual achievements or expertise pertaining to the for the protection of the lives of the personnel dispatched, in activities of Internationally coordinated operation for peace principle. When the consent of acceptance is deemed to be and security such as the European Union or otherwise consistently maintained, the use of weapons for the defense of specified by a Cabinet Order mandate missions is allowed. (3) At the requests of countries to which the area where those operations are to be conducted belongs (limited to only those supported by any of principal U.N. organizations as prescribed in Article 7 (1) of the U.N. Charter H Addition of Tasks Security of specified areas including protection of local population, etc., protection of individuals related to operations in response to urgent request and tasks at Mission Headquarters have been added, in addition to ceasefire monitoring and relief activities for afflicted people; tasks assisting in the establishment and reestablishment of systems of governance have been expanded. H Review of the authority to use weapons In implementing protection of local population, etc. as well as security of specified areas and protection of individuals related to operations in response to their urgent request, the use of weapons for the defense of mandate is allowed. H Diet approval Prior Diet approval is necessary for ceasefire monitoring and security of specified areas including protection of local population, etc. conducted by SDF units, in principle (Ex-post facto approval permitted when the Diet is in recess or the House of Representatives has been dissolved). H Ensuring the safety of personnel of the International Cooperation Corps of Japan Provide for the development of operational guidelines that set forth provisions for the consideration of safety, the cessation of operations, the temporary suspension of operations to avoid danger and other measures for ensuring the safety of the personnel of the International Peace Cooperation Corps H Other revised matters (1) Dispatching of uniformed SDF personnel (commanding officers, etc.) to the United Nations (2) Waiver of right to claim (3) Provision of supplies or services to the U.S. Forces, etc. for their operation to cope with large-scale disasters (4) Expansion of the scope for cooperation with international election observation operations to life, liberty and pursuit of happiness(the Self-Defense Forces Law) H Addition of support activities to military forces of foreign countries other than the U.S. Armed Forces responding to armed attack situations, and support activities to military forces of foreign countries responding to situations where an armed attack against a foreign country results in threatening Japan’s survival (U.S. and Others’ Military Actions Related Measures Act, which currently has provisions concerning support activities to the U.S. Armed Forces responding to armed attack situations): H Addition of actions by the military forces of foreign countries other than the United States in armed attack situations as objects for accommodation of use of specif c public facilities (Specif c Public Facility Use Act) H Maritime transportation restriction in situations where an armed attack against a foreign country results in threatening Japan’s survival that is in a close relationship with Japan occurs and as a result threatens Japan’s survival and poses a clear danger to fundamentally overturn people’s right to life, liberty and pursuit of happiness (Maritime Transportation Restriction Act) H Application of Prisoners of War Act in situations where an armed attack against a foreign country results in threatening Japan’s survival (Prisoners of War Act) See Fig. II-1-3-8 (Revision of Armed Attack Situations Response Act) Fig. II-1-3-9 (Revision of the Self-Defense Forces Law (Related to situations where an armed attack against a foreign country results in threatening Japan’s survival) Fig. II-1-3-10 (Revision of Related Legislation) **6** **Revision of the Act for Establishment of** **the National Security Council** Among the key items of the Act for Establishment of the National Security Council to be revised, the bill includes the addition of items for deliberation in accordance with the recent legal revisions. See Fig. II-1-3-11 (Revision of the Act for Establishment of the National Security Council) ----- Fig. II-1-3-8 Revision of Armed Attack Situations Response Act H In order to ensure the peace and independence of Japan and the security of Japan and its people, develop the readiness to respond to armed attack situations, etc. by setting such basic matters as basic principles, the responsibilities of national and local governments, and procedures. [Reference] Armed attack situations, etc. Armed attack situation.....................A situation where an armed attack occurred, or an imminent danger of an armed attack occurring is clearly acknowledged Anticipated armed attack situation....A situation where an armed attack has yet to occur, but circumstances are growing increasingly strained and an armed attack is anticipated Armed attack situations, etc..............Armed attack situation and anticipated armed attack situation [Outline of the Revision] H Responses to “situations of an armed attack against a foreign country resulting in threatening Japan’s survival” added (Purpose) * “Situations of an armed attack against a foreign country resulting in threatening Japan’s survival” added H Develop the readiness to respond to armed attack situations, etc. and survival-threatening situations by setting basic principles, the responsibilities of national and local governments, the cooperation of Japanese people and other basic matters concerning responses to armed attack situations, etc. and survival-threatening situations, and also set matters related to the development of legislation necessary to respond to armed attack situations, etc. to contribute to the ensuring of the peace and independence of Japan and the security of Japan and its people. *deleted (Basic Response Plan) *When an armed attack situation or a situation of an armed attack against a foreign country resulting in threatening Japan’s survival is recognized, reasons why the use of force is necessary should also be described. H The Basic Response Plan should describe matters concerning the following: - Developments in the situation, the confirmation of the situation as an armed attack situation, an anticipated armed attack situation or a survival-threatening situation, and the facts that serve as the premises supporting the confirmation. - When the situation is confirmed as an armed attack situation or a survival-threatening situation, reasons why there is no other appropriate means available to ensure Japan’s survival and protect its people, and use of force is necessary to respond to the situation - An overall plan to respond to pertinent armed attack situations or survival-threatening situations, and important matters related to the response measures [Diet Approval] H When an order is given to the SDF for defense operations to respond to a “survival-threatening situation,” prior Diet approval is required under current provisions (Article 9 of the Armed Attack Situation Response Act). Revision of the Self-Defense Forces Law (Related to situations where an armed attack against a foreign country results in Fig. II-1-3-9 threatening Japan’s survival) H The “use of force” is newly permitted under the “Three New Conditions” as an unavoidable “measure of self-defense” to “defend Japan,” and the SDF’s responses to “situations where an armed attack against a foreign country results in threatening Japan’s survival” under the Armed Attack Situation Response Act are subject to Article 76 (Defense Operation) and Article 88 (Use of Force) of the SDF Act and positioned as principal missions under Article 3 (Missions of the SDF) of the SDF Act. (Missions of the SDF) * “against direct or indirect invasion” deleted Article 3: The primary mission of the Self-Defense Forces is to defend Japan against direct or indirect invation in order to keep the peace and independence of Japan and maintain the national security, and the Self-Defence Forces maintain public order as necessary. (Defense Operation) * “Situations where an armed attack against a foreign country results in threatening Japan’s survival” added Article 76: The Prime Minister may, in responses to the situations listed below, give the whole or part of the Self-Defense Forces the Defense Operations Order when necessary to defend Japan. In this case, the approval of the Diet must be obtained pursuant to the provisions of Article 9 of the Act on the Peace and Independence of Japan and Maintenance of the Nation and the People’s Security in Armed Attack Situations etc. and Situations where an armed attack against a foreign country results in threatening Japan’s Survival (Act No. 79 of 2003). 1 A situation where an armed attack against Japan from the outside occurs, or a situation where imminent danger of an armed attack against Japan from the outside occurring is clearly perceived 2 A situation where an armed attack against a foreign country that is in a close relationship with Japan occurs and as a result threatens Japan’s survival and poses a clear danger to fundamentally overturn people’s right to life, liberty and pursuit of happiness (Use of Force under Defense Operations) * No revision Article 88: The SDF being given the Defense Operations Order pursuant to the provisions of the paragraph 1 of Article 76, may use necessary force to defend Japan. 2 In the use of force in the preceding paragraph, international law and practices shall be respected when the use of force is reliant thereupon and the use of force shall not exceed the limit judged to be reasonably necessary in light of the situation. H Aside from the above, a variety of authorities, etc. and special measures necessary for SDF operations are provided for. However, in situations where an armed attack against a foreign country results in threatening Japan’s survival, measures that are necessary in response to direct armed attacks against Japan and physical damage are not applicable. (Examples of application) Organization of special units, Defense call-up of SDF Personnel and SDF Ready Reserve Personnel, etc. (Examples of non-application) Establishment of defense facilities, Maintenance of public order, emergency passage, appropriation of supplies, orders to perform duties, etc. ----- |6 Act Concerning Punishment of Grave Breaches of International Humanitarian Law|Col2| |---|---| |Provides for punishment of inhumane acts perpetrated in armed conflicts|| ||| Fig. II-1-3-10 Revision of Related Legislation **1 Act Related to the Actions of the U.S. Forces and Others** Add provisions regarding G Support for the armed forces of foreign countries other Provides for support measures to ensure the smooth and effective implementation of than the United States in armed attack situations, etc. operations of the U.S. Forces to repel an armed attack against Japan in accordance G Support for the armed forces of foreign countries in with the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty in armed attack situations, etc. situations where an armed attack against a foreign country results in threatening Japan’s survival **2 Maritime Transportation Restriction Act** Provides for procedures for stopped ship inspections and taking ship measures G Add provisions for application in situations where an armed attack against a foreign country results in conducted by the Maritime Self-Defense Force to restrict maritime transportation of threatening Japan’s survival as well weapons, ammunition and military personnel, etc. (supplies to foreign armed forces, etc.) to armed forces, etc. of foreign countries making armed attacks against Japan in G The waters for the restrictions are Japan’s territorial waters, territorial waters of foreign countries (only when armed attack situations their consent is obtained) and the high seas. **3 Prisoners of War Act** Provides for matters necessary for the holding, detention and other treatment of G Add provisions for application in situations where an prisoners of war and other detainees in armed attack situations and ensure the armed attack against a foreign country results in adequate enforcement of international humanitarian law regarding the treatment of threatening Japan’s survival as well prisoners of war and other detainees. **4 Civil Protection Act** Develop the readiness to protect the life, physical wellbeing and property of Japanese G The necessary structure is already in place from the people from armed attacks against Japan and carry out civil protection measures standpoint of protecting the people from direct attacks adequately and promptly against Japan and physical harm. **5 Act Regarding the Use of Specific Public Facilities** Coordinate civil protection measures of local governments, etc. in armed attack G Add operations of the armed forces of foreign countries situations, etc. with the use of specific public facilities by the SDF and the U.S. Forces other than the United States in armed attack situations, for the elimination of infringement (seaports and airports, etc. managed by local etc. to the scope of coordination of the use of facilities governments, etc.) **6 Act Concerning Punishment of Grave Breaches of International Humanitarian Law** G Applicable to situations where an armed attack against a Provides for punishment of inhumane acts perpetrated in armed conflicts foreign country results in threatening Japan’s survival, but no revision is necessary. Revision of the Act for Establishment of the National Fig. II-1-3-11 Security Council 1. The following matters have been newly added as items for deliberation: G Responses to situations that threaten Japan’s survival G Responses to situations that have an important influence on Japan’s peace and security G Joint operations for international peace 2. The following are the matters the National Security Council must deliberate without fail. G Decisions on and changes in plans for implementation related to the implementation of so-called safety-ensuring operations that are international peace cooperation operations G Decisions on and changes in plans for implementation related to the implementation of so-called “Kaketsuke-keigo” that are international peace cooperation operations G Dispatch of uniformed SDF personnel (force commanders, etc.) who are to be engaged in supervisory duties for operations conducted by units of countries participating in U.N. peacekeeping operations G Implementation of rescue measures, including guarding and rescue, of Japanese nationals overseas (*) All related to the stable maintenance of the consent of acceptance of hosting countries P i Mi i t Ab i ti t th l i f th H f R t ti ----- **3** **Outline of the International Peace Support Bill** The International Peace Support Bill, designed to contribute to securing the peace and security of the international community by implementing cooperation and support activities etc. to armed forces of foreign countries, etc. collectively addressing the situations where which threatens the international peace and security is threatened, Fig. II-1-3-12 The International Peace Support Bill Purpose Situations threatening international peace and security that international community is collectively addressing: (1) Situations that threaten peace and security of the international community, and (2) The international community is collectively addressing the situations in accordance with the objectives of the U.N. Charter to remove the threat, and (3) Japan, as a member of the international community, needs to independently and proactively contribute to these activities. Implement cooperation and support activities, etc. for the armed forces of foreign countries engaged in the activities above Contribute to ensuring the peace and security of the international community Conditions Avoidance of “Ittaika” The following U.N. resolutions (by the General Assembly or the Security H Japan does not implement support activities in the scene where Council) are required: combat operations are actually being conducted. (1) Resolutions that decide, call upon, recommend or authorize foreign (*) When the personnel having been lost have already been found countries subject to Japan’s support conduct operations to respond to and rescue operations have commenced, search and rescue situations that threaten the peace and security of the international activities concerning them are allowed to continue as long as community the safety of the SDF units is ensured. (2) In addition to (1), resolutions that regoid the situations as a threat H The commanding officers of the SDF units order a temporary peace or a breach of the peace and call on U.N. member states to suspension of support activities if combat operations occur or are respond to the situations concerned expected to occur at the site of their activities or in the vicinity. H The Minister of Defense designates the area for implementing activities, and if it is deemed difficult to implement operations Response Measures smoothly and safely in the whole or part of that area, must promptly change the designation of the area or order the cessation of the (1) Cooperation and support activities activities being implemented there. Provision of goods and services to armed forces of foreign countries Supply, transportation, repair and maintenance, medical activities, Diet Approval communications, airport and seaport services, base services, lodging, storage, use of facilities, training services and H Prior Diet approval required without exception construction H Each house of the Diet has an obligation to make efforts toward (*) Provision of weapons is not included decisions within 7 days (2) Search and rescue activities H Re-approval required in the case of a lapse of more than two years (3) Ship inspection operations (those set forth in the Ship Inspection since the commencement of the response measures. In the case of Operations Law) re-approval, ex-post facto approval is permitted when the Diet is in recess or the House of Representatives has been dissolved - The Minister of Defense must give consideration ensuring the safety of SDF units, etc. - The authority to use weapons limited only to the self-preservation type **4** **Acceleration of Procedures to Issue Orders for Public Security Operations and Maritime Security Operations** Considering the increasingly severe security environment surrounding Japan, situations that are neither pure peacetime nor contingencies are liable to occur, posing risks which could develop into more serious situations. In order to respond promptly to such situations of infringement that do not amount to an armed attack, and ensure seamless and suff cient responses to any unlawful acts, the Government made cabinet decisions regarding the acceleration of was adopted in a cabinet decision on May 14, 2015, for submission to the Diet. See Fig. II-1-3-12 (The International Peace Support Bill) Reference 7 (Outline of the Bill Concerning Cooperation and Support Activities and Other Activities to Armed Forces, of Foreign Countries and Others in Situations Where the International Community is Collectively Addressing for Peace and Security) Avoidance of “Ittaika” H Japan does not implement support activities in the scene where combat operations are actually being conducted. (*) When the personnel having been lost have already been found and rescue operations have commenced, search and rescue activities concerning them are allowed to continue as long as the safety of the SDF units is ensured. H The commanding officers of the SDF units order a temporary suspension of support activities if combat operations occur or are expected to occur at the site of their activities or in the vicinity. H The Minister of Defense designates the area for implementing activities, and if it is deemed difficult to implement operations smoothly and safely in the whole or part of that area, must promptly change the designation of the area or order the cessation of the activities being implemented there. Diet Approval H Prior Diet approval required without exception H Each house of the Diet has an obligation to make efforts toward decisions within 7 days H Re-approval required in the case of a lapse of more than two years since the commencement of the response measures. In the case of re-approval, ex-post facto approval is permitted when the Diet is in recess or the House of Representatives has been dissolved **Acceleration of Procedures to Issue Orders for Public Security Operations and Maritime Security Operations** procedures to issue orders for public security operations, maritime security, etc. operations on May 14, 2015, particularly in the following three cases: H Responses to foreign naval vessels conducting maritime navigation in Japan’s territorial waters and internal waters that cannot be considered to be innocent passage under international law H Responses to the unlawful landing on remote islands by ----- armed groups H Responses when vessels of the Self-Defense Forces detect foreign vessels infringing on Japanese commercial vessels on the high seas Specif cally, when an urgent decision is necessary concerning the issuance of orders for public security operations, etc. but it is diff cult to convene an extraordinary cabinet meeting, the Prime Minister can preside over a cabinet meeting to make the decision by obtaining the consent of the Ministers of State by telephone and other means. Any Fig. II-1-3-13 Acceleration of Procedures to Issue Orders for Public Security Operations and Maritime Security Operations H Accelerate procedures to issue orders for public security/maritime security operations in the following three cases: Responses to Foreign Naval Vessels Making Maritime Navigation That Does Not Responses to the Unlawful Landing on Responses to Foreign Vessels Infringing on Fall under the Category of Innocent Remote Islands by Armed Groups Japanese Commercial Vessels on the High Seas Passage under International Law H Responses are made by SDF units under H When armed groups or groups that are H When Japanese commercial vessels are orders for maritime security operations, highly probable to be armed are likely to actually subject to infringement activities, in principle. unlawfully land or actually land on H It is necessary to hold a cabinet meeting H The Ministry of Defense, the Ministry of remote islands, to issue orders for (urgent) counterForeign Affairs and the Japan Coast H It is necessary to hold a cabinet meeting piracy operations or maritime security Guard promptly and expeditiously share to issue orders for maritime security operations. information, coordinate and cooperate. operations/public security operations. H It is necessary to hold a cabinet meeting to issue orders for maritime security operations. When an urgent decision is necessary but it is difficult to promptly convene an extraordinary cabinet meeting, the Prime Minister can preside over a cabinet meeting to make the decision by obtaining the consent of the Ministers of State by telephone and other means (Any Minister of State who could not be contacted in advance shall be notified of the cabinet decision ex post facto). **5** **Existing Related Security Legislation** **1** **Frameworks for Responses to Armed Attack** **Situations** Minister of State who could not be contacted in advance shall be notif ed of the cabinet decision ex post facto. See Fig. II-1-3-13 (Acceleration of Procedures to Issue Orders for Public Security Operations and Maritime Security Operations) Reference 8 (Responses to Foreign Naval Vessels Carrying Out Navigation through the Territorial Sea or the Internal Waters of Japan that Does Not Fall Under Innocent Passage in International Law) Reference 9 (The Government’s Responses to Illegal Landing on a Remote Island or its Surrounding Seas by an Armed Group) Reference 10 (Responses to Acts of Infringement When Self-Defense Force Ships or Aircraft Detect Foreign Ships Committing Said Acts Against Japanese Private Ships on the High Seas) Responses to Foreign Vessels Infringing on Japanese Commercial Vessels on the High Seas H When Japanese commercial vessels are actually subject to infringement activities, H It is necessary to hold a cabinet meeting to issue orders for (urgent) counterpiracy operations or maritime security operations. to armed attack situations and the responsibilities of national and local governments in the event of an armed attack situation. Moreover, in preparation for the outbreak of armed attacks, a framework is being developed which allows relevant organizations (designated government institutions, local governments and designated public institutions[11]) to implement response measures in a coordinated and cooperative fashion based on individual legislations dealing with military emergencies such as the Civil Protection Act, thereby the whole nation can fully prepare for armed attack situations. See Fig. II-1-3-15 (Procedures for Responding to Armed Attack Situations) References 11 (Main Operations of the Self-Defense Forces) References 12 (Statutory Provisions about the Use of Armed Force and Weapons by SDF Personnel) Japan’s response framework to deal with the most serious situations affecting the peace and security of the country and its people[8] enables an effective response to armed attack situations and anticipated armed attack situations, etc. (both to armed attack situations[9] and to situations where armed attacks are anticipated[10]) and contributes to the deterrence of an armed attack. See Fig. II-1-3-14 (Outline of the Emergency Legislation) **(1) Responses to Armed Attack Situations** The Armed Attack Situation Response Act specif es items that should be stipulated as basic principles and basic policies (the Basic Response Plan) regarding response 8 Three pieces of legislation for responses to situations were enacted in 2003. Furthermore, seven pieces of Legislation for Responses to Armed Attack Situations were enacted in 2004 and three related treaties were ratifi ed in the same year. With this, a basis for emergency legislation was established. The development of these legal systems refl ects many results of the “emergency legislation study,” which had been conducted by the former Defense Agency since 1977. Note: A fi xed concept has not necessarily been designated for the term “emergency legislation.” When used in this white paper, it refers to legislation for responses to situations that has been developed since 2003. 9 Situation in which an external armed attack on Japan emerges, or an imminent danger is clearly acknowledged. 10 A situation where an armed attack has yet to emerge, but circumstances are growing increasingly strained and an armed attack is expected. 11 Independent administrative agencies, the Bank of Japan, the Japanese Red Cross Society, the Japan Broadcasting Corporation (NHK), other public institutions, and corporations engaged in public ----- Fig. II-1-3-14 Outline of the Emergency Legislation Amendment to the Self-Defense The Armed Attack Situation Response Act Amendment to the Act for Establishment Forces Law of the Security Council of Japan Determines measures to construct In order to ensure national independence and security as well as the safety of Clarifies and enhances the role of the Security self-defense facilities prior to the the people Council in responding to situations issuance of self-defense operations The posture for response to armed attack situations is prepared by stipulating Adds as council members: Minister of Internal orders, and special provisions, the basic items such as the fundamental principles, responsibilities of the Affairs and Communications; Minister of Economy, including exemptions from related national and local governments, and procedures Trade and Industry; and Minister of Land, laws to facilitate smooth operations The act clearly states the policy, items, and system for examinations on the Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism of the SDF development of individual legislations that become necessary when responding Establishes the Special Advisory Committee for to armed attack situations Contingency Planning Individual Legislation under the Armed Attack Situation Response Law Measures to Terminate Armed Attack Situations Guarantee of Appropriate Implementation of International Measures to Protect Lives, etc., Humanitarian Laws of the People and Minimize the Coordination of the Use of Facilities Effects on Their Daily Lives, etc. Facilitation of SDF Operations of Ports and Airfields, Roads Prisoners of War Act and Others Maritime Transportation Act Regarding the Use of Specific Act Concerning Punishment of Grave Civil Protection Act Restriction Act Public Facilities Breaches of International Humanitarian Law Protocol Additional to the Facilitation of U.S. Forces Operations Geneva Conventions, Protocol I U.S. Military Actions Amendment to the Acquisition and Amendment of the SDF Act in conjunction Protocol Additional to the Related Measures Act Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA) with ACSA amendment agreement Geneva Conventions, Protocol II Laws established in the ordinary Diet session in 2003 (three laws related to emergency legislation) Laws established in the ordinary Diet session in 2004 (seven laws related to emergency legislation) Treaties ratified in the ordinary Diet session in 2004 (three related treaties) Fig. II-1-3-15 Procedures for Responding to Armed Attack Situations (1) Formulation of the draft basic response plan by the Prime Minister (2) The draft basic response plan sent to the Security Council for deliberation (3) Recommendation by the Security Council to the Prime Minister concerning the draft basic response plan (4) Cabinet decision on the basic response plan |Government|Government|Col3|Col4| |---|---|---|---| |Consultation Security Council Role: Deliberation of the draft basic response plan Recommendatio Special Advisory Committee for Contingency Planning Role: Specialized assistance to Security Council|Security Council Role: Deliberation of the draft basic response plan|Consultation|| ||||| (5) Approval of the basic response plan by Diet Occurrence of armed attack, etc. Creation of a draft basic response plan Government Consultation Role: Deliberation of the draft basic response plan Recommendation Special Advisory Committee for Contingency Planning Role: Specialized assistance to Security Council Cabinet decision on the basic response plan Request for the approval of the Diet Approval of the basic response plan (6) Comprehensive coordination of response Response according to the basic response plan and usage guidelines |The Diet|Col2|Col3|Col4|Col5| |---|---|---|---|---| |Task Force for Armed Attack Situations and • Comprehensive promotion of response measures Anticipated Situations (note) • Formulation of usage guidelines for specific (Task Force Chief: Prime Minister) public facilities, etc.||||| |||||| |||||| |Designated government institutions Municipal government Designated public institutions||||| ||||Designated public institutions|| Note: The Task Force will be established in the Cabinet for general advancement of measures to respond to armed attacks and other situations. A. Basic Response Plan, etc. In situations such as an armed attack situation, the Cabinet must decide upon the following items for a Basic Response Plan and ask for approval by the Diet. In addition, when the Basic Response Plan has been decided, a temporary Task Force for Armed Attack Situations etc (the Task Force) is to be established within the Cabinet, and it will implement these measures: (1) Certif cation of the facts, and the premises to that certif cation supporting the armed attack situation or the situation where an armed attack situation is anticipated ----- |Measures implemented according to changes in circumstances caused by armed attacks, in order to bring the latter to an end|Col2|Col3| |---|---|---| ||y armed attacks, in order to bring the latter to an end|| |||| |Measures to protect the lives, bodies and property of citizens, or minimize the impact on the lifestyles and economic wellbeing of citizens|Col2|Col3| |---|---|---| ||he impact on the lifestyles and economic wellbeing of citizens|| |||| |Main body|Responsibility| |---|---| |Government|• Has a unique mission to defend Japan, protect the homeland and the lives, physical wellbeing, and properties of the people • Respond to armed attack situations and take every possible measure by using all organizations and functions • Implement all possible measures as a whole nation| |Municipal Government|• Has responsibilities of protecting the region and the lives, physical wellbeing, and properties of the residents • Implement necessary measures in mutual cooperation with the national government, other municipal governments, and other institutions| |Designated Public Institutions|• Implement necessary measures in the scope of their work, in mutual cooperation with the national government, municipal governments, and other institutions| |People|• Strive to provide necessary cooperation for implementation of response measures taken by the designated administrative institutions, municipal governments, or designated public institutions| Responsibilities of the National and Fig. II-1-3-17 Municipal Governments Measures to be Implemented by Designated Fig. II-1-3-16 Administrative Organizations, Municipal Governments or Designated Public Organizations (2) Overall plan to respond to the pertinent armed attack situation. (3) Important items related to the response measures. B. Response Measures When responding to armed attack situations, the designated government institutions, local governments and designated public institutions will implement the required measures based on legal provisions between the period of formulation and termination of the Basic Response Plan. See Fig. II-1-3-16 (Measures to be Implemented by Designated Administrative Organizations, Municipal Governments or Designated Public Organizations) C. Responsibilities of the National and Local Governments The responsibilities of the national and local governments as def ned in the Armed Attack Situation Response Act are as outlined below. See Fig. II-1-3-17 (Responsibilities of the National and Municipal Governments) D. Authority of the Prime Minister for Response Measures Following the stipulation of the Basic Response Plan, for overall promotion of response measures, the Task Force for Armed Attack Situations, etc., (the Task Force) will be established within the Cabinet, with the Prime Minister appointed as leader of the Task Force and appropriate Ministers of State as Deputy Chief and other members of the Task Force. If the Prime Minister recognizes that there are obstacles to protecting the lives, bodies, and properties of the people, and to eliminating an armed attack, when necessary response measures under comprehensive coordination are not implemented, he may instruct the head of the local government concerned and other relevant persons to implement the necessary measures. In circumstances where necessary response measures are not implemented or if there is an obstacle to protecting the lives, bodies, and properties of the people, in emergency response situations, the Prime Minister or the Minister of State responsible for operations relating to the relevant countermeasure may take responsibility for and implement the response measures that the local governments or designated public institutions have failed to implement, after notifying the relevant heads of local government or other relevant individuals. E. Report to the United Nations Security Council In accordance with Article 51 of the U.N. Charter, the Government will immediately report measures it has implemented to terminate armed attacks on Japan to the U.N. Security Council. **(2) Responses to Emergency Situations other than** **Armed Attack Situations** The Armed Attack Situation Response Act provides for appropriate and rapid response measures to be implemented in emergency situations[12] other than armed attacks, in order for the Government to ensure the peace and independence of the country, and to maintain the security of the country and its people. **(3) Initiatives for Civil Protection** A. Basic Guidelines for Civil Protection and the Roles of the Ministry of Defense and the SDF In March 2005, the Government established the Basic Guidelines for Civil Protection (hereinafter the “Basic Guidelines”), based on Article 32 of the Civil Protection Act. The Basic Guidelines presumes four types of armed attack situations, including amphibious landing invasion, guerilla or special operations forces unit attacks, ballistic missile attacks, and air attacks, and prescribes matters requiring attention to implement civil protection measures 12 An emergency response situation (a situation arising due to actions that may kill or injure many people which uses methods equivalent to those used in an armed attack situation, or a situation where it is recognized that the relevant actions represent a clear and present threat that necessitate an emergency response by the state). Alternatively, a contingency situation other than an armed attack ----- in response to each of them. The MOD and the SDF established the Civil Protection Plan based on the Civil Protection Act and the Basic Policy. The Plan included measures to be implemented in full force by the SDF to terminate armed attacks, which is a primary mission of the SDF. In addition, the Plan described civil protection measures to be implemented within a feasible range, relating to support for evacuation and rescue, and responses to armed attack disasters. In the event of an armed attack situation and an emergency situation, the SDF has the authority to conduct such activities as protection and support of residents, including rescuing evacuees, and emergency recovery as a civil protection measure and emergency response protection measure based on the provision for civil protection. See Fig. II-1-3-18 (Mechanism of Civil Protection Dispatches) Fig. II-1-3-18 Mechanism of Civil Protection Dispatches Municipal mayors Ask for dispatch Communication (When a dispatch request cannot be sought) request Prefectural governors Task Force Chief[1] Request for dispatch Ask for dispatch Report (When communication is established by a Municipal mayors) Report Minister of Defense Prime Minister Approve Issue an order to Issue an order for civil gather for civilian protection dispatches protection, etc.[2, 3] SDF ready reserve personnel SDF reserve personnel Report for duty Units Notes: 1. Armed Attack Situations Task Force Chief or Emergency Response Situation Task Force Chief. 2. If specifi cally needed. 3. Ready reserve personnel and reserve personnel will be called on if necessary upon the approval of the Prime Minister. From this perspective, the MOD and the SDF have held civil protection training with cooperation from relevant government organizations, or local governments. In addition, the MOD and the SDF actively participate and cooperate in civil protection training implemented by relevant government organizations, or local governments. See References 13 (Record of Joint Exercises for Civil Protection Implemented by the National and Local Governments (FY 2014)) (b) Coordination with Local Governments in Peacetime During peacetime, the MOD and the SDF closely coordinate with local governments. The Provincial Liaison & Coordination Division has been posted within the GSDF Regional Army Headquarters to achieve effective implementation for civil protection measures through close coordination. To strengthen functions relating to coordination and cooperation with local governments, etc., a Civil Protection and Disaster Countermeasures Liaison Coordination Off cer post was established in each SDF Provincial Cooperation Off ce. Civil Protection Councils were established in prefectures and municipalities as institutions to gather opinions from a wide range of citizens, and members of the Ground, Maritime or Air Self-Defense Force were assigned to be council members. In addition, in some cases, retired SDF personnel are employed by local governments as crisis management supervisors to facilitate cooperation with the MOD and the SDF and help to conceive and implement disaster response plans and training programs as experts on civil protection. **2** **Outline of the Law Concerning Measures** **to Ensure Peace and Security of Japan in** **Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan and the** **Ship Inspection Operations Act** The Law Concerning Measures to Ensure Peace and Security of Japan in Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan establishes the measures (response measures)[13] that Japan will implement in response to situations in areas surrounding Japan and the actual implementation procedures. The Ship Inspection Operations Act provides for the types, measures, and other matters of ship inspection operations implemented by Japan in response to situations in areas surrounding Japan. H The Prime Minister, facing a situation in areas surrounding Japan and deeming it necessary to adopt measures including such SDF activities as rear area support[14], rear area search and rescue operations, and ship inspection operations, must request a Cabinet decision on such measures and on a draft basic plan of response measures. The Prime Minister must obtain prior approval, or ex post facto approval in case of emergency, from the Diet in order for the SDF to conduct response measures. Furthermore, the Prime Minister reports to B. Activities by the MOD and the SDF to Facilitate the Civil Protection Measures (a) Participation in Training for Civil Protection In order to appropriately and promptly implement civil protection measures in armed attack situations, it is essential to jointly coordinate matters related to the implementation of civil protection measures in peacetime with other ministries and agencies, local governments, and other relevant organizations. 13 Law stipulating ship inspection operations and other necessary measures to respond to situations in areas surrounding Japan to implement rear area support, rear area search and rescue operations, and ship inspection operations conducted in relation to situations in surrounding areas (Article 2 of the Law Concerning Measures to Ensure Peace and Security of Japan in Situations in Areas ----- the Diet without delay when the Cabinet has made a decision or approved a revision, or when the response measures have been completed. H In accordance with the basic plan, the Minister of Defense will draw up an implementation guideline (including designation of implementation areas), obtain approval for the guideline from the Prime Minister, and give the SDF orders to conduct rear area support, rear area search and rescue activities, and ship inspection operations. H Heads of relevant administrative organizations will implement response measures and may request the heads of local governments to provide the necessary cooperation for the organizations to exercise their authorities in accordance with relevant laws and regulations and the basic plan. In addition, the heads of relevant administrative organizations may ask persons other than those from the national government to cooperate as necessary in accordance with relevant laws and regulations and the basic plan[15]. **(1) Rear Area Support** Rear area support means support measures, including the provision of goods, services, and conveniences, given by Japan in rear areas to the U.S. Forces conducting activities that contribute to the achievement of the objectives of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty in situations in areas surrounding Japan. As rear area support, the SDF provides goods and services, including supplies, transportation, repair and maintenance, medical activities, communications, airport and seaport, and base services. **(3) Ship Inspection Operations** Ship inspection operations mean operations conducted by Japan in situations in areas surrounding Japan to inspect and conf rm the cargo and destination of ships (excluding warships and others[17]) and to request, if necessary, a change of sea route, or destination port or place, for the purpose of strictly enforcing the regulatory measures concerning trade or other economic activities to which Japan is a party. These activities are conducted based on the U.N. Security Council Resolution or the consent of the f ag state[18] in the territorial waters of Japan or in the surrounding high seas (including the EEZ[19])[20]. **3** **Outline of the International Peace Cooperation Act** The purpose of the Act on Cooperation with United Nations Peacekeeping Operations and Other Operations, enacted in 1992, is to set forth a framework for the implementation of International Peace Cooperation Assignments, with a view to extending appropriate and prompt cooperation for (1) U.N. peacekeeping operations[21], (2) humanitarian international relief operations[22], and (3) international election observation operations, and to take measures to extend Contributions in Kind for those operations, thereby enabling active contribution by Japan to international peace efforts centering upon the United Nations. The law stipulates a set of basic guidelines (so-called f ve principles for participation) for Japan’s participation in a U.N. peacekeeping force. See Fig. II-1-3-19 (Basic Policy on Japan’s Participation in U.N. Peacekeeping Forces (Five Principles)) **(2) Rear Area Search and Rescue Operations** Rear area search and rescue operations mean operations conducted by the SDF in situations in areas surrounding Fig. II-1-3-19 Peacekeeping Forces (Five Principles) Japan to search and rescue those who were engaged in combat Basic Policy on Japan’s Participation in U.N. Fig. II-1-3-19 Peacekeeping Forces (Five Principles) and were stranded in rear areas (including transporting those 1. Agreement on a ceasefi re shall have been reached among the parties to rescued)[16]. If there are non-combatants who face a mishap, armed confl icts. he/she will be also rescued. In addition, if there is anyone Japan’s participation in such operations shall have been obtained from the in the territorial waters of a foreign country adjacent to the host countries as well as the parties to armed confl icts. area in which the SDF is conducting activities, the SDF will 3. The operations shall strictly maintain impartiality, not favoring any of the also rescue that person, after having obtained approval from that foreign country. However, this is limited to cases in to be satisfi ed, the International Peace Cooperation Corps may suspend which no combat operations are conducted at that time and International Peace Cooperation Assignment. are expected to be conducted in those waters throughout the 5. The use of weapons shall be limited to the minimum necessary to protect period during which the SDF conducts rescue activities. 1. Agreement on a ceasefi re shall have been reached among the parties to armed confl icts. 2. Consent for the undertaking of UN peacekeeping operations as well as Japan’s participation in such operations shall have been obtained from the host countries as well as the parties to armed confl icts. 3. The operations shall strictly maintain impartiality, not favoring any of the parties to armed confl icts. 4. Should any of the requirements in the above-mentioned guideline cease to be satisfi ed, the International Peace Cooperation Corps may suspend International Peace Cooperation Assignment. 5. The use of weapons shall be limited to the minimum necessary to protect the lives of personnel, etc. 14 The term “rear area” refers to Japan’s territorial waters and international waters surrounding Japan (including the exclusive economic zone up to 200 nautical miles, or approximately 370 km, from the baseline of the territorial waters) in which no combat operations are conducted at that time and no combat operations are expected to be conducted throughout the period when the rear activities are carried out, and the space over these international waters. 15 If any person other than the central government who had been requested to cooperate suffers a loss as a result of such cooperation, the Government shall take necessary fi scal measures for the loss. 16 Article 3, Paragraph 1, Item 2 of the Law Concerning Measures to Ensure Peace and Security of Japan in Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan. 17 Warships and such vessels that are possessed or operated by foreign governments that are exclusively used for non-commercial purposes. 18 The state that has the right to fl y its fl ag as prescribed in Article 91 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. 19 Article 1 of the Act Concerning Exclusive Economic Zones and the Continental Shelf. 20 Article 2 of the Ship Inspection Operations Act. 21 Operations that are conducted under the control of the United Nations, based on resolutions of the United Nations to respond to confl icts and maintain international peace and security, by such means as ensuring the observance of agreements to prevent the recurrence of armed confl ict among the parties to such confl ict, and assisting in the establishment of systems of governance by democratic means after the cessation of such confl icts. 22 Operations conducted with humanitarian intentions, based on the resolutions of the United Nations or at the request of international organizations, for the purpose of rescuing affl icted people and ----- **National Security Strategy and National Defense** **Chapter** ##### 2 **Program Guidelines, etc.** **Section 1 Outline of the National Security Strategy** **1** **National Security Council** The National Security Council[1] that deliberates Japan’s basic foreign and defense policies with regard to national security such as the National Security Strategy (NSS) is established within the Cabinet, and the MOD and other related administrative organs provide the National Security Council with data and information pertaining to national security in a timely manner. The National Security Secretariat established within the Cabinet Secretary provides constant support to the National Security Council, and some MOD members, including uniformed SDF personnel, are working at additional posts at the National Security Secretariat. Moreover, in December 2014, the Act on the protection of Specially Designated Secrets (SDS)[2] came into effect, resulting in development of common governmental rules for the protection of secrets and more effective and eff cient National Security Council deliberations. It is also expected that the Act would enhance the reliability of Japan’s management of highly classif ed information related to national security and promote the further sharing of information among countries concerned. See Fig. II-2-1-1 (Organization of National Security Council) |cil Prime Minister Chief Cabinet Secretary 4-Minister Meeting 9-Minister Meeting Emergency Situations Minister Meeting Serves as the control tower Maintenance of the civilian Strengthening the response for foreign and defense control function of the to emergencies. policies concerning national Security Council. Deputy Chief security Cabinet Secretary|Col2|Col3|Col4|Col5|Col6| |---|---|---|---|---|---| ||||||| |Special Adviser to the Prime Minister y Chief Cabinet Secretary General of on National Security etary for Crisis Close Coordination National Security anagement Secretariat Assistant Chief Cabinet Secretary Assistant Chief Cabinet Secretary Director of Cabinet (Deputy Secretary General of (Deputy Secretary General of Intelligence National Security Secretariat) National Security Secretariat) Cabinet Intelligence|||||| ||||||| ||Assistant Chie (Deputy Sec National Se|f Cabinet Secretary retary General of curity Secretariat)|||| ||||||| |ation response National Security s management Secretariat|||Foreign affairs|and Research Office|| Fig. II-2-1-1 Organization of National Security Council National Security Council Prime Minister Emergency Situations Chief Cabinet Secretary 4-Minister Meeting 9-Minister Meeting Minister Meeting Serves as the control tower Maintenance of the civilian Strengthening the response for foreign and defense control function of the to emergencies. policies concerning national Security Council. Deputy Chief security Cabinet Secretary Special Adviser to the Prime Minister Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary General of on National Security Secretary for Crisis Close Coordination National Security Management Secretariat Assistant Chief Cabinet Secretary Assistant Chief Cabinet Secretary Director of Cabinet (Deputy Secretary General of (Deputy Secretary General of Intelligence National Security Secretariat) National Security Secretariat) Cabinet Intelligence Situation response National Security Foreign and Research Office Crisis management Secretariat affairs **2** **National Security Strategy** def nes basic policies for Japan’s future defense, the role of its defense capabilities, and objectives for specif c SDF equipment. The NDPG was formulated with a mediumto long-term outlook because the acquisition of defense equipment and the establishment of troop operational systems cannot be accomplished overnight and requires many years of planning. The NSS and NDPG are mainly designed for the next decade or so. The Medium Term Defense Program (MTDP) specif es a maximum budget and the amount of mainstay defense equipment to be Cabinet Secretariat Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary for Crisis Close Coordination Management Assistant Chief Cabinet Secretary (Deputy Secretary General of National Security Secretariat) Situation response Crisis management **2** **National Security Strategy** **1** **Japan’s National Security Policy Framework** The NSS represents Japan’s f rst-ever basic policy on national security with a focus on diplomatic affairs and defense policy. The NSS def nes approaches that Japan should follow based on a long-term view of its national interests. It replaces the Basic Policy on National Defense, which had served as the basis for Japan’s defense policies theretofore. The National Defense Program Guidelines (NDPG), which was established based on the NSS, Established based on the Act of Partial Revision of the Establishment of the Security Council (enacted in November 2013) In order to protect information, in particular highly classifi ed information, on Japan’s defense and foreign affairs, and prevent designated harmful activities (e.g. counter-intelligence) and terrorism, the act stipulates: (1) designation of SDS by the heads of administrative organs; (2) security clearance for personnel that handle SDS in their duties; (3) establishment of a framework for providing or ----- acquired over the subsequent f ve-year period in order to achieve the defense capability targets def ned in the NDPG. The f scal year budget is drawn on the MTDP substantiated as projects, and the necessary expenses for each f scal year will be appropriated based on relevant situations. To date, the NDPG has contained mention of nationwide basic security policies focusing on defense policy to a certain extent. The NSS carries with it great meaning as the def nitive statement of the Government’s basic policy on national security, with a focus on diplomatic affairs and defense policy. See Fig. II-2-1-2 (Relations among NSS, NDPG, MTDP and Annual Budget) Appendix 1 Layout of the NSS and the NDPG rules and universal values, such as freedom, democracy, respect for human rights, and the rule of law. In order to safeguard these national interests and to fulf ll Japan’s responsibilities in the international community, Japan will work to achieve the following national security objectives. H Strengthen the deterrence necessary for maintaining Japan’s peace and security and for ensuring its survival, thus deterring threats from directly reaching Japan, and defeating such threats and minimizing damage if by chance such threats should reach Japan. H Improve the security environment of the Asia-Pacif c region and prevent the emergence of and reduce direct threats to Japan, through strengthening the JapanU.S. Alliance, enhancing the trust and cooperative relationships between Japan and its partners within and outside the Asia Pacif c region, and promoting practical security cooperation. H Improve the global security environment and build a peaceful, stable and prosperous international community by strengthening the international order based on universal values and rules, and by playing a leading role in the settlement of disputes. **(2) Security Environment Surrounding Japan and** **National Security Challenges** a. Global Security Environment and Challenges While China, India, and other developing nations rise, the U.S. has clarif ed its policy to shift its policy emphasis towards the Asia-Pacif c region, and as such the balance between countries is changing. Rapid advancements in globalization and technological innovation have increased the relative inf uence of non-state-actors, and at the same time, they have led to an increase in terrorism and criminal threats from non-state actors. Issues including the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) by North Korea, Iran, and other countries and regions are major threats to Japan and the international community In addition, acts of terrorism have injured Japanese nationals and damaged Japan’s national interests. This means that Japan and its people are directly exposed to the threat of international terrorism at home and abroad. With regard to global commons, the risks of free access to and utilization of global commons such as seas, outer space, and cyberspace being hindered are becoming more and more serious. These risks include unilateral attempts to change the current status quo of the maritime aspect of the global commons by force, threat of anti-satellite weapons, and cyber attacks. Global issues that cannot be dealt with by a single country, including poverty and humanitarian crises are emerging as critical and urgent issues of human security. Additionally, there is a growing risk that one country’s economic crisis can expand to involve the entire global economy Relations among NSS, NDPG, MTDP, and Fig. II-2-1-2 Annual Budget Basic policy for national security centered around diplomatic and defense policies (approx. 10-year time frame) Prescribe future defense force and target levels of defense force that Japan should achieve (approx. 10-year time frame) NSS based on NSS NDPG achieve target levels of defense force MTDP Indicate (limits of) five-year total expenditures and quantity of major equipment Examine based on the current situations, appropriate annual budget as necessary appropriate budget, develop specific projects annual budget **2** **Outline of the National Security Strategy** **(1) Fundamental Principle of National Security** a. Principles Japan Upholds – Proactive Contribution to Peace based on the Principle of International Cooperation Japan is committed to continuing the path it has followed to date as a peace-loving nation and, as a major player in international politics and business, it also seeks its own security as well as peace and security in the Asia-Pacif c region from its stance as a proactive contributor to peace based on the principle of international cooperation. Japan will contribute more proactively than ever before to the peace, security and prosperity of the international community. b. Japan’s National Interests and National Security Objectives In achieving the aforementioned fundamental principle of national security by implementation of concrete policies, the following national interests need to be clearly def ned. H To maintain its sovereignty and independence; to defend its territorial integrity, to ensure the safety of life, person and properties of its nationals, and to ensure its survival while maintaining its own peace and security grounded in freedom and democracy and preserving its rich culture and tradition; H To achieve the prosperity of Japan and its nationals through economic development, thereby consolidating its peace and security; and H To maintain and protect international order based on ----- Fig. II-2-1-3 Outline of Japan’s Strategic Approach to National Security **1. Strengthening and Expanding Japan’s Capabilities and Roles** ❍ Advance vibrant diplomacy in order for Japan to play a more proactive role in achieving peace, stability and prosperity for the international community and to realize an international order and security environment desirable for Japan. H Effi ciently develop a highly effective and joint defense force, and operate with fl exibility and readiness based on joint operations; build in peacetime a comprehensive architecture for responding seamlessly to an array of situations; reinforce structure prioritizing important functions from a joint and comprehensive perspective of the SDF, which plays a central role in the above initiatives; closely cooperate with the U.S. with regard to extended deterrence in response to the threat of nuclear weapons, and Japan’s own initiatives, including ballistic missile defense (BMD) and the protection of its people. H Enhance capabilities of law enforcement agencies responsible for territorial patrols and reinforce maritime surveillance capabilities; strengthen coordination among relevant ministries and agencies; carry out constant review on issues that are relevant to ensuring the security of Japan’s territories, and take effective measures. H As a maritime state, play a leading role in maintaining and developing “Open and Stable Seas” (*1); strengthen Japan’s maritime surveillance capabilities, including the use of outer space; provide assistance to coastal states along sea lanes from the Middle East to the surrounding waters of Japan that are critical to Japan due to its dependence on maritime transport, in order to enhance their maritime security capabilities; strengthen cooperation with partners that share the same strategic interests. H Reinforce Japan’s national capabilities for protection of cyber space and response to cyber attacks; in peacetime, strengthen public-private partnerships; consider expansion of the pool of human resources in the security fi eld; strengthen international cooperation and promote cyber defense cooperation. H Strengthen Japan’s domestic measures against international terrorism, and reinforce measures against international terrorism including information gathering and analysis of intelligence relating to the state of international terrorism. H Fundamentally strengthen Japan’s information-collecting capabilities from a diverse range of sources; utilize geospatial intelligence which combines various types of intelligence; promote comprehensive analysis of intelligence by developing highly-skilled intelligence experts. H While giving due consideration to the roles that the Three Principles of Arms Exports have played thus far, defi ne clear principles on the overseas transfer of arms suited to the new security environment (*2). H Enhance and reinforce the functions of information-gathering satellites; make effective use of satellites in areas such as SDF unit operation and collection, and analysis of information; enhance a system for space situational awareness; promote utilization of outer space in a manner that contributes to national security. H Strengthen Japan’s technological capabilities including dual use technologies; grasp science and technology trends in peacetime, and make effective use of technology in the area of national security by combining the efforts of industry, academia, and the government. **2. Strengthening the Japan-U.S. Alliance** H Revise the Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation; work closely with the U.S. on operational cooperation and policy coordination; enhance the deterrence and response capability of the Japan-U.S. Alliance by strengthening cooperation in a wide range of areas, including BMD, maritime affairs, outer space, cyber space, and large-scale disaster response operations. H Implement measures to reduce the cost burden of the U.S. Forces in Japan; steadily implement measures on the realignment of the U.S. Forces in Japan in order to reduce impacts placed on local communities, including in Okinawa, while continually maintaining and enhancing the deterrence of the Japan-U.S. Alliance. **3. Strengthening Diplomacy and Security Cooperation with Japan’s Partners for Peace and Stability in the International Community** H The ROK, Australia, ASEAN menber states, and India: Strengthen cooperative relations with these countries with which Japan shares universal values and strategic interests. H China: Construct and strengthen a Mutually Benefi cial Relationship Based on Common Strategic Interests; encourage China to play a responsible and constructive role for the sake of regional peace, security and prosperity; fi rmly but in a calm manner respond to China’s attempts to change the current status quo by coercion. H North Korea: achieve a comprehensive resolution to outstanding issues of concern, such as the abduction of Japanese nationals as well as nuclear and missile issues. H Russia: advance cooperation in all areas, including security and energy. H In promoting the initiatives mentioned above, actively utilize multilateral and trilateral frameworks for cooperation. H Other partners of the Asia-Pacifi c region: cooperate toward ensuring stability in the region. H Strengthen cooperative relations with European countries, emerging countries, Middle Eastern countries, as well as African countries. **4. Proactive Contribution to International Efforts for Peace and Stability of the International Community** H Strengthen Japan’s U.N. diplomacy by proactively contributing to efforts aimed at maintaining and recovering international peace and security at the U.N. H Proactively involve Japan in realizing and strengthening the rule of law relating to the sea, outer space, and cyberspace. H Lead international initiatives on disarmament and non-proliferation. H Further step up cooperation with U.N. PKO and other activities; engage in training for peace-building experts and PKO personnel in various countries. H Promote consultations, etc., with other countries on the situation of international terrorism and international counter-terrorism cooperation. **5. Strengthening Cooperation Based on Universal Values to Resolve Global Issues** H Share universal values; respond to global development and global issues; realize human security; cooperate with human resource development initiatives in developing countries; maintain and strengthen the free trade system; respond to energy and environmental issues; enhance people-to-people exchanges. **6. Strengthening the Domestic Foundation that Supports National Security and Promoting Domestic and Global Understanding** H Maintain and enhance defense production and technological bases. H Take a government-wide approach to uniformly and strategically disseminate information; strengthen information dissemination in foreign languages; reinforce the social base and intellectual base. Notes: 1. The NSS defi nes that these are upheld by maritime order based upon such fundamental principles as the rule of law and ensuring the freedom and safety of navigation and overfl ight. 2. Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology were adopted by the Cabinet on April 1, 2014. See Part II, Chapter 2, Section 4. ----- b. National Security Environment and Challenges in the Asia-Pacif c Region Against the backdrop of the existence of various political systems, the concentration of nation states that possess large-scale military force, including nuclear weapons, and the insuff ciently legislated regional cooperation frameworks on national security, so-called “gray-zone” situations, that is, neither pure peacetime nor contingencies over sovereignty of the territory or vested interests, are likely to arise, and this risks further aggravation of the situation. North Korea has enhanced the capability of its WMDs including nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles as well as repeatedly carried out provocative military actions, increasing tension in the region. While there is an expectation for China to share and comply with international norms, and play a more active and cooperative role for regional and global issues, it has been rapidly strengthening and expanding its military capabilities without suff cient transparency, taken actions that can be regarded as attempts to change the current status quo in the seas including the East China Sea and South China Sea, and rapidly expanded and intensif ed its activities in the seas and airspace around Japan. In addition, there is a mutual existence of stability and potential instability in the relationship between the sides of the Taiwan Strait. **(3) Japan’s Strategic Approach to National Security** Japan should take a strategic approach centering on diplomatic policy and defense policy as shown in the reference. See Fig. II-2-1-3 (Outline of Japan’s Strategic Approach to National Security) **Section 2 Outline of the National Defense Program Guidelines** **1** **Basic Approach – Building a Dynamic Joint Defense Force** The NDPG calls for the building of a Dynamic Joint Defense Force as the cornerstone for the protection of Japan’s peace and security. Amid the increasingly severe security environment surrounding Japan, the number and the duration of situations, including so-called “gray-zone” situations, that is, neither pure peacetime nor contingencies over sovereignty of the territory or vested interests, which require the SDF’s commitment are both increasing. Therefore, it is essential to regularly conduct persistent intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) activities and swiftly build a response posture in accordance with the development of the situation to prevent further escalation of a situation. In dealing with such situations, it is also essential to minimize the damage by dealing with situations by effective response through achieving necessary maritime supremacy[1] and air superiority[2]. Among these situations, the quality and quantity of the defense force underpinning the SDF activities were not necessarily suff cient. The NDPG, being fully mindful of these needs, calls for the enhancement of deterrence and response capability by pursuing further joint operations, improving the missioncapable rate of equipment and its employment to conduct activities, as well as developing defense capabilities 1 See Part III, Chapter 1, Section 1 (Effective Deterrence and Response) adequate both in quality and quantity that underpin various activities. To this end, Japan has conducted capability assessments based on joint operations in relation to the SDF’s total functions and capabilities, in order to identify the functions and capabilities that should be comprehensively prioritized. The NDPG carries great signif cance as it has made it possible to adapt to an ever-changing security environment surrounding Japan, and realize a more prioritized and eff cient defense capability build-up, based on the results of these capability assessments. Additionally, it requires the build-up of the most effective operational posture, by further strengthening a wide-ranging logistical support foundation. Specif cally, the new NDPG calls for the strengthening of various f elds as the basic foundations for the SDF such as training and exercise, operational infrastructure, personnel and education, medical, defense production and technological bases, eff cient acquisition of equipment, research and development, collaboration with local communities, boosting of communication capabilities, enhancement of the intellectual base, and promotion of reform of the Ministry of Defense. See Appendix 2 Changes of the Views regarding Defense Capability ----- b. National Security Environment and Challenges in the Asia-Pacif c Region Against the backdrop of the existence of various political systems, the concentration of nation states that possess large-scale military force, including nuclear weapons, and the insuff ciently legislated regional cooperation frameworks on national security, so-called “gray-zone” situations, that is, neither pure peacetime nor contingencies over sovereignty of the territory or vested interests, are likely to arise, and this risks further aggravation of the situation. North Korea has enhanced the capability of its WMDs including nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles as well as repeatedly carried out provocative military actions, increasing tension in the region. While there is an expectation for China to share and comply with international norms, and play a more active and cooperative role for regional and global issues, it has been rapidly strengthening and expanding its military capabilities without suff cient transparency, taken actions that can be regarded as attempts to change the current status quo in the seas including the East China Sea and South China Sea, and rapidly expanded and intensif ed its activities in the seas and airspace around Japan. In addition, there is a mutual existence of stability and potential instability in the relationship between the sides of the Taiwan Strait. **(3) Japan’s Strategic Approach to National Security** Japan should take a strategic approach centering on diplomatic policy and defense policy as shown in the reference. See Fig. II-2-1-3 (Outline of Japan’s Strategic Approach to National Security) **Section 2 Outline of the National Defense Program Guidelines** **1** **Basic Approach – Building a Dynamic Joint Defense Force** The NDPG calls for the building of a Dynamic Joint Defense Force as the cornerstone for the protection of Japan’s peace and security. Amid the increasingly severe security environment surrounding Japan, the number and the duration of situations, including so-called “gray-zone” situations, that is, neither pure peacetime nor contingencies over sovereignty of the territory or vested interests, which require the SDF’s commitment are both increasing. Therefore, it is essential to regularly conduct persistent intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) activities and swiftly build a response posture in accordance with the development of the situation to prevent further escalation of a situation. In dealing with such situations, it is also essential to minimize the damage by dealing with situations by effective response through achieving necessary maritime supremacy[1] and air superiority[2]. Among these situations, the quality and quantity of the defense force underpinning the SDF activities were not necessarily suff cient. The NDPG, being fully mindful of these needs, calls for the enhancement of deterrence and response capability by pursuing further joint operations, improving the missioncapable rate of equipment and its employment to conduct activities, as well as developing defense capabilities 1 See Part III, Chapter 1, Section 1 (Effective Deterrence and Response) adequate both in quality and quantity that underpin various activities. To this end, Japan has conducted capability assessments based on joint operations in relation to the SDF’s total functions and capabilities, in order to identify the functions and capabilities that should be comprehensively prioritized. The NDPG carries great signif cance as it has made it possible to adapt to an ever-changing security environment surrounding Japan, and realize a more prioritized and eff cient defense capability build-up, based on the results of these capability assessments. Additionally, it requires the build-up of the most effective operational posture, by further strengthening a wide-ranging logistical support foundation. Specif cally, the new NDPG calls for the strengthening of various f elds as the basic foundations for the SDF such as training and exercise, operational infrastructure, personnel and education, medical, defense production and technological bases, eff cient acquisition of equipment, research and development, collaboration with local communities, boosting of communication capabilities, enhancement of the intellectual base, and promotion of reform of the Ministry of Defense. See Appendix 2 Changes of the Views regarding Defense Capability ----- **2** **A New Security Environment** level, efforts to deny access and deployment as well as prevention of military activities to its surrounding areas by foreign militaries, insuff cient transparency concerning its military, rapid expansion and intensif cation of activities in the maritime and aerial domains, and attempts to change the status quo by force in maritime areas. As for Russia, it is observed that the country is proceeding to reform and modernize its military forces. The activities of Russian armed forces have been active. The U.S. has clearly manifested its decision on the rebalance to the Asia-Pacif c region, and is maintaining and strengthening its engagement and presence in the region despite f scal and various other constraints while enhancing its relationships with its allies, among other efforts. **1** **The Global Security Environment** As interdependence among countries expands and deepens, there is a growing risk that unrest in the global security environment or a security problem in a single country or region could immediately expand among the entire international community. Moreover, there are shifts in the balance of power due to the further development of countries such as China and India and the relative change of inf uence of the U.S., along with an increase in the number of so-called “gray-zone” situations, that is, neither pure peacetime nor contingencies, and cases of undue infringement upon freedom of the high seas. In addition, securing the stable use of outer space and cyberspace is becoming a signif cant challenge. **2** **The Security Environment in the Asia-Pacifi c Region** While countries are enhancing and strengthening their cooperative relationships, gray-zone situations tend to linger, raising concerns that they may develop into more serious situations. North Korea has deployed a massive military force and continues to maintain and strengthen its asymmetrical military capabilities. Furthermore, North Korea has also repeatedly taken actions that heightened tension in the region. In particular, with regard to nuclear and missile development, North Korea is planning to make technological improvements to extend the range and increase the accuracy of its ballistic missiles. The possibility cannot be ruled out that it has successfully miniaturized nuclear weapons for warheads and equipped them on ballistic missiles. As such, this issue poses a serious and imminent threat to Japan’s security, coupled with its provocative rhetoric and behavior such as suggesting a missile attack on Japan. As for China, while it is greatly expected to play an active role in a more cooperative manner, its military trends have caused security concerns for the Asia-Pacif c region and the international community. The trends include continuous increases in its defense expenditures at a high **3** **Japan’s Geographical Characteristics** As Japan is a maritime state, securing the safety of maritime and air traff c through strengthening an “Open and Stable Seas” order constitutes the basis of peace and prosperity. Japan also faces security vulnerabilities such as frequent natural disasters, concentration of population, and a large number of nuclear power plants in coastal areas. In the event of another massive earthquake like the Great East Japan Earthquake, its impact may spread to the international community. It is increasingly necessary to take every possible measure to prepare for future huge earthquakes such as a Nankai Trough earthquake. **4** **Issues to be Tackled by Japan** As various security challenges and destabilizing factors are emerging and becoming more tangible and acute, the security environment surrounding Japan has become increasingly severe, and it is diff cult for a single country to deal with them on its own. Therefore, it is increasingly necessary that countries which share interests in responding to shared security and other challenges cooperate and actively respond to maintain regional and global stability. **3** **Japan’s Basic Defense Policy** oriented policy, not becoming a military power that poses a threat to other countries, while adhering to the principle of civilian control of the military and observing the Three Non-Nuclear Principles. Additionally, with regard to the threat of nuclear weapons, the extended deterrence provided by the U.S. is indispensable. Japan will closely cooperate with the U.S., and take appropriate responses through its own efforts. In addition, Japan will play a constructive and active role in international nuclear disarmament and non proliferation efforts **1** **Basic policy** In light of the National Security Strategy, Japan will build a comprehensive defense architecture, and actively promote bilateral and multilateral security cooperation with other countries while strengthening the Japan-U.S. Alliance, thereby seeking to establish an infrastructure necessary for fully exercising its defense capabilities. Under the Constitution, Japan will eff ciently build a highly effective and joint defense force in line with the basic principles of maintaining an exclusively defense ----- strengthen and expand the Japan-U.S. cooperative relationship over a broad range of f elds, including intelligence, and defense equipment and technology. **(3) Steady Implementation of Measures Relating to the** **Stationing of the U.S. forces in Japan** Japan will provide stable support for the smooth and effective stationing of the U.S. Forces in Japan. At the same time, efforts will be made to steadily implement the realignment of the U.S. Forces in Japan and mitigate the impact on Okinawa and other local communities while maintaining the deterrence provided by the U.S. Forces. **2** **Japan’s Own Efforts** Given the increasingly severe security environment, Japan will eff ciently develop a highly effective joint defense force and make efforts to employ it with a high level of f exibility and readiness based on joint operations. In the event of various situations, Japan will appropriately and promptly make decisions and seamlessly respond to situations as they unfold, in a whole-of-the-government approach, in coordination with local governments, private sectors, and others. Furthermore, Japan will continue to develop various systems to respond to a variety of disasters and protect its people, and will enhance the capability to ensure the safety of Japanese nationals in foreign countries in an emergency situation. In order to take such approaches appropriately, Japan will increase the effectiveness of its situation and disaster response posture by systemizing various related plans and expanding the use of simulations, comprehensive training, and exercises. Furthermore, Japan will make efforts to build up a Dynamic Joint Defense Force as mentioned above, in addition to the establishment of a comprehensive defense architecture. **4** **Active Promotion of Security Cooperation** **(1) Cooperation in the Asia-Pacifi c Region** Japan will promote a variety of cooperative initiatives in a multi-layered manner to ease the atmosphere of confrontation and the sense of curiosity toward one another in the Asia-Pacif c region. In particular, with regard to the Republic of Korea (ROK), Australia and India, Japan will make efforts to improve cooperation and interoperability. Japan will also endeavor to promote dialogue and exchanges with China and Russia. Additionally, with regard to capacity building assistance, Japan will promote and carry it out in full coordination with diplomatic policy initiatives, including Off cial Development Assistance (ODA), and Japan will expand the range of countries receiving support as well as its scope. Furthermore, in multilateral security cooperation and dialogue, Japan, in cooperation with the U.S. and Australia, will proactively contribute to building cooperative relationships in the region, and Japan will actively participate in multilateral joint training and exercises. **3** **Strengthening of the Japan-U.S. Alliance** The Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements, together with Japan’s own efforts, constitute the cornerstone for Japan’s national security. Also, the Japan-U.S. Alliance functions as public goods that contribute to the stability and prosperity not only of Japan, but also of the Asia-Pacif c region and the world at large. From this perspective, Japan will place emphasis on the following efforts: **(1) Strengthening Deterrence and Response** **Capabilities of the Japan-U.S. Alliance** Japan will continue revising the Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation[3]. In addition, Japan will promote joint training and exercises, joint Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) activities and the joint/shared use of facilities and areas. Japan will also tighten the Japan-U.S. operational cooperation and policy coordination. **(2) Strengthening and Expanding Cooperation in a** **Broad Range of Fields** The Japan-U.S. Alliance will strengthen cooperation not only in the f elds of anti-piracy efforts, capacity building assistance, humanitarian assistance/disaster relief, peacekeeping and counter terrorism, but also in maritime affairs, outer space and cyberspace. As for disaster response, Japan will further strengthen its cooperation between the SDF and the U.S. Forces. In addition, Japan will constantly **(2) Cooperation with the International Community** It is very diff cult for a single country to respond to global security challenges on its own. Moreover, as the roles of military forces have diversif ed, such forces play an important role in building peace and promoting conf dence-building. Therefore, Japan will continue and strengthen various initiatives concerning arms control, disarmament, nonproliferation and capacity building assistance on a regular basis in cooperation with the international community. Specif cally Japan will strengthen its cooperation with the European Union (EU), North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), along with the United Kingdom, France and other European countries. Furthermore, Japan will actively promote various international peace cooperation activities in a multi-layered manner, and in particular, will continue to actively conduct activities utilizing the SDF’s capabilities. ----- **4** **Future Defense Forces** various potential contingencies, the SDF will prioritize the development of capacities to ensure maritime supremacy and air superiority, which is the prerequisite for effective deterrence and response in various situations, including defense posture buildup in the southwestern region. Furthermore, the SDF will emphasize the establishment of rapid deployment capabilities with a consideration to establishing a wide-ranging logistical support foundation. At the same time, in terms of preparation for an invasion such as the landing of large-scale ground forces, the SDF will possess the minimum necessary level of expertise and skills, and thereby further promote efforts to achieve even greater eff ciency and rationalization. **(2) Functions and Capabilities to be Emphasized** The SDF will selectively strengthen the following functions and capabilities in particular, paying attention to enhance joint functions with interoperability with the U.S. forces. H ISR capabilities Japan will implement extensive persistent ISR in the surrounding seas and airspace, and adopt a f exible approach for boosting its ISR posture according to the developments of situations. H Intelligence capabilities Japan will strengthen its system for collecting intelligence, processing information, and analyzing and sharing the collected information, so that the SDF can promptly detect signs of various situations and take other actions. In doing so, the SDF will seek to enhance its various information collection capabilities, including HUMINT, OSINT, SIGINT, and IMINT, as well as persistent ISR capabilities using unmanned aerial vehicles. Also, the SDF will strengthen its geospatial intelligence capabilities to establish a framework for the securing and nurturing of personnel in information gathering and analysis. H Transport capability In order to swiftly deploy and move necessary units, the SDF will strengthen its integrated transport capacity, while seeking collaboration with the civilian transport sector on a regular basis. H Command and control, and information and communication capabilities In order to establish a command and control system that can manage units nationwide in a mobile, joint and integrated manner, a new central headquarters to control all regional armies will be established within the Ground Self-Defense Force (GSDF), among other measures. The SDF will also strive to enhance and strengthen its capabilities for supporting communications infrastructure on remote islands and data link functions **1** **Role of the Defense Forces** **(1) Effective Deterrent of and Response to Various** **Situations** Japan will achieve intelligence superiority[4] through persistent ISR activities in an extensive surrounding area to detect any signs of development at an early stage. Through such activities, Japan will clearly express its resolve not to tolerate any change of the status quo by force, thereby preventing various situations from occurring. At the same time, Japan will swiftly and seamlessly respond to situations from an early stage, including gray zone situations, and establish the necessary posture to continuously address a protracted situation. Moreover, Japan will implement an effective response tailored to each situation, even in cases when multiple events occur in a consecutive or concurrent manner. In particular, the following points will be emphasized: (1) ensuring security of the sea and airspace surrounding Japan; (2) response to an attack on remote islands; (3) response to ballistic missile attacks; (4) responses in outer space and cyberspace; and (5) responses to major disasters. **(2) Stabilization of the Asia-Pacifi c Region and** **Improvement of the Global Security Environment** Through persistent ISR in the area surrounding Japan, and the timely and appropriate implementation of training, exercises, and various other activities, Japan will ensure the stability of the security environment in the region. Moreover, by working in partnership with its allies and partners, Japan will promote multi-tiered initiatives, including bilateral and multilateral defense cooperation and exchange, joint training and exercises, and capacity building assistance. In order to respond appropriately to global security issues, Japan will strengthen various initiatives focused on arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation, as well as actively promote international peace cooperation activities, anti-piracy initiatives and capacity building assistance. Japan will attach importance to the following in particular: (1) holding training and exercises; (2) promoting defense cooperation and exchange; (3) promoting capacity building assistance; (4) ensuring maritime security; (5) implementing international peace cooperation activities; and (6) cooperating with efforts to promote arms control, disarmament, and non-proliferation. **2** **Priorities in Strengthening Architecture of the SDF** **(1) Basic Approach** Based on the results of the capability assessments conducted based on the standpoint of joint operations in relation to ----- among the three services, along with other capabilities. H Response to an attack on remote islands The SDF will strengthen its engagement capability for the ensuring of maritime supremacy and air superiority, which is the prerequisite for an effective response. The SDF will strengthen the integrated capabilities to seek to interdict any attack on Japan’s remote islands, and newly develop suff cient amphibious operations capability, which enables the SDF to land, recapture, and secure without delay in the case of an invasion of any remote islands. Furthermore, the SDF will enhance its logistical support capabilities, so that its units can swiftly and continuously respond in the event of a situation in the southwestern region. In addition, the SDF will also examine the desirable air defense posture in remote islands in the Pacif c. H Response to ballistic missile attacks To counter North Korea’s improved ballistic missile capability, Japan will pursue comprehensive improvement of its response capability against ballistic missiles. With regard to the BMD system, Japan will enhance readiness, simultaneous engagement capability, and sustainable response capability to strengthen the capability to protect the entire territory. Based on appropriate role and mission sharing between Japan and the U.S., in order to strengthen the deterrent of the Japan-U.S. Alliance as a whole through enhancement of Japan’s own deterrent and response capability, Japan will study a potential form of response capability to address the means of ballistic missile launches and related facilities, and take necessary means. H Response in outer space and cyberspace While strengthening information collection capability using satellites, and reinforcing command, control and telecommunications capabilities, the SDF will enhance the survivability of satellites through such initiatives as space situational awareness. As for cyberspace, Japan will enhance integrated persistent surveillance and response capabilities as well as continuously strengthen and secure personnel with expertise and the latest equipment. H Responses to major disasters, etc. The SDF will develop a response posture sustainable for long-term operation, through swift transportation and deployment of appropriately sized units. H Responses focused on international peace cooperation activities and other similar activities The SDF will strengthen protective capabilities to ensure the safety of personnel and units. The SDF will also work on enhancing transport and deployment capability, information communication capability, and on strengthening logistics and medical service structure. Furthermore, the SDF will enhance intelligence gathering capability as well as its education, training and personnel management systems. **3** **Architecture of Each Service of the Self-Defense** **Forces** **(1) Ground Self-Defense Force (GSDF)** In order to respond swiftly to an attack on offshore islands and various other situations, the GSDF will maintain rapidly deployable basic operational units (rapid deployment divisions, rapid deployment brigades, and an armored division) furnished with advanced mobility and ISR capabilities. In addition, the GSDF will maintain mobile operating units capable of effectively performing amphibious and other operations. The GSDF will maintain half of these rapidly deployable basic operational units in Hokkaido, given its excellent training environment. The GSDF will implement rationalization and streamlining with a particular focus on tanks/howitzers and rockets, and review the organization and equipment of units. The number of GSDF personnel will be maintained at around 159,000, which was the same level as at the end of FY2013, in order to ensure suff cient personnel availability to respond to major disasters or other situations. **(2) Maritime Self-Defense Forces (MSDF)** The MSDF will increase the number of destroyers to 54 (14 escort divisions) by using new destroyers that offer improved response capabilities for various missions and have more compact designs, and will maintain ship-based patrol helicopter units in order to secure the defense of surrounding waters and ensure the safety of maritime traff c. Furthermore, two Aegis-equipped destroyers[5] will be added, bringing the f eet to eight. Furthermore, in order to effectively carry out regular information gathering and warning and surveillance activities, as well as patrolling of surrounding waters[6] and defense operations, the MSDF will maintain an augmented submarine f eet and patrol aircraft units. **(3) Air Self-Defense Forces (ASDF)** The ASDF will maintain air warning and control units in order to provide persistent ISR in most air space over Japan and the surrounding areas. By consolidating warning and control operations at air defense command centers, the ASDF will gradually change warning groups into warning squadrons as well as establish one new squadron in the air warning unit[7]. As for Fighter Aircraft Units, the 13th squadron will be newly established, and Air Reconnaissance Unit will be abolished. In addition, one squadron will be added to the Destroyers equipped with the Aegis Weapon System that uses high performance computers to automatically process series of operations such as target search, detection, identifi cation and attack. The act of systematically monitoring a specifi c area with the purpose of gathering intelligence to prevent a surprise attack by an opposing force. ----- Aerial Refueling/Transport Unit, making it a two-squadron architecture. Furthermore, the ASDF will maintain surface-to-air guided missile units providing multi-layered defense for Japan against ballistic missile attacks, together with the Aegis destroyers, as well as protecting key areas in tandem with the surface-to-air guided missile units of the GSDF. See Fig. II-2-2-1 (NDPG Comparison Tables) Fig. II-2-2-2 (Structure of the Major Units of the MSDF (Changes)) Fig. II-2-2-3 (Structure of the Major Units of the ASDF in the 2013 NDPG (Changes)) |Col1|Category|Col3|1976 NDPG|1995 NDPG|2004 NDPG|2010 NDPG|2013 NDPG| |---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---| |GSDF|Authorized Number of personnel Active-Duty Personnel Reserve-Ready Personnel||180,000|160,000 145,000 15,000|155,000 148,000 7,000|154,000 147,000 7,000|159,000 151,000 8,000| ||Major units|Regionally deployed units in peacetime4|12 divisions 2 combined brigades|8 divisions 6 brigades|8 divisions 6 brigades|8 divisions 6 brigades|5 divisions 2 brigades| |||Rapid Deployment Units|1 armored division 1 artillery brigade 1 airborne brigade 1 training group 1 helicopter brigade|1 armored division 1 airborne brigade 1 helicopter brigade|1 armored division Central Readiness|Central Readiness 1 armored division|3 rapid deployment divisions 4 rapid deployment brigades 1 armored division 1 airborne brigade 1 amphibious rapid 1 deployment brigade 1 helicopter brigade| |||Surface-to-Ship Guided Missile units|||||5 surface-to-ship guided missile regiments| |||Surface-to-Air Guided Missile Units|8 anti-aircraft artillery groups|8 anti-aircraft artillery groups|8 anti-aircraft artillery groups|7 anti-aircraft artillery groups/regiments|7 anti-aircraft artillery groups/regiments| ||Major Equipment|Tanks3 Artillery (Main artillery)3|(approx. 1,200) (approx. 1,000/vehicle)|approx. 900 (approx. 900/vehicle)|approx. 600 (approx. 600/vehicle)|approx. 400 (approx. 400/vehicle)|(approx. 300) (approx. 300/vehicle)| |MSDF|Major units|Destroyer units for mobile operations regional deployment Submarine units Minesweeper Units Patrol aircraft units|4 fl otillas (Regional units) 10 units 6 divisions 2 fl otillas (Land-based) 16 squadrons|4 fl otillas (Regional units) 7 units 6 divisions 1 fl otilla (Land-based) 13 squadrons|4 fl otillas (8 divisions) 5 divisions 4 divisions 1 fl otilla 9 squadrons|4 fl otillas (8 divisions) 4 divisions 6 divisions 1 fl otilla 9 squadrons|4 fl otillas (8 divisions) 6 divisions 6 divisions 1 fl otilla 9 squadrons| ||Major Equipment|Destroyers Submarines Combat aircraft|approx. 60 16 approx. 220|approx. 50 16 approx. 170|47 16 approx. 150|48 22 approx. 150|54 22 approx. 170| |ASDF|Major units|Air Warning & Control Units|28 warning groups 1 squadron|8 warning groups 20 warning squadrons 1 squadron|8 warning groups 20 warning squadrons 1 AEW group (2 squadrons)|4 warning groups 24 warning squadrons 1 AEW group (2 squadrons)|28 warning squadron 1 AEW group (3 squadrons)| |||Fighter Aircraft Units Fighter-interceptor units Support fi ghter units|10 squadrons 3 squadrons|9 squadrons 3 squadrons|12 squadrons|12 squadrons|13 squadrons| |||Air Reconnaissance Units|1 squadron|1 squadron|1 squadron|1 squadron|| |||Aerial refueling/transport units Air transport units|3 squadrons|3 squadrons|1 squadron 3 squadrons|1 squadron 3 squadrons|2 squadrons 3 squadrons| |||Surface-to-Air Guided Missile Units|6 groups|6 groups|6 groups|6 groups|6 groups| ||Major Equipment|Combat aircraft (Fighters)|approx. 430 (approx. 350)3|approx. 400 approx. 300|approx. 350 approx. 260|approx. 340 approx. 260|approx. 360 approx. 280| |Major equipment/units that may also serve for BMD missions1||Aegis-equipped destroyers|||4 ships|6 ships2|8 ships| |||Air Warning & Control Units Surface-to-Air Guided Missile Units|||7 warning groups 4 warning squadrons 3 groups|11 warning groups/units 6 groups|| Fig. II-2-2-1 NDPG Comparison Tables Notes: 1. “Major equipment/units that may also serve for BMD missions” are included in the number of main equipment in the MSDF or number of major units in the ASDF in the 2004 NDPG and the 2010 NDPG, but their acquisition/formation will be allowed within the number of destroyers (Aegis-equipped destroyers), air warning & control units, and surface-to-air guided missile units in the 2013 NDPG. 2. Additional deployment of Aegis destroyers equipped with ballistic missile defense functions may be carried out within the number of destroyers set above, depending on factors such as the development of ballistic missile defense technology and fi nancial matters. 3. Although not stated in the Attached Tables of 1976 NDPG and the 2013 NDPG, it is listed here for comparison with the NDPG Attached Table from 1995 to 2010. 4. Units referred to as Regional Deployment Units in the 2013 NDPG. ----- Fig. II-2-2-2 Structure of the Major Units of the MSDF (Changes) Structure of the Major Units of the MSDF (Changes) New Structure In order to defend the seas surrounding Japan and ensure the security of maritime traffic through effectively conducting various operations such as persistent ISR and anti-submarine operations etc., the MSDF promotes various programs, and steadily obtains and secures maritime supremacy. Location of Headquarters, etc., of Destroyer/Submarine/Aircraft Units, etc. Destroyer Unit Units planned to be established are shown in red. Escort Division 3 Escort Division 15 Helicopter Unit Air ASW Helicopter Squadron 25 Ominato Fixed-wing Patrol Aircraft Unit Destroyer Unit Air Patrol Squadron 2 Escort Division 7 Hachinohe Destroyer Unit Escort Division 14 Escort Division 2 Helicopter Unit Escort Division 5 Fixed-wing Patrol Aircraft Unit Air ASW Helicopter Squadron 23 Escort Division 6 Air Patrol Squadron 3 Escort Division 8 Destroyer Unit Escort Division 13 Maizuru Atsugi Yokosuka Escort Division 1 Escort Division 16 Escort Division 11 Kure Tateyama Submarine Unit Komatsushima Helicopter Unit Omura Submarine Division 2 Air ASW Helicopter Squadron 22 Sasebo Helicopter Unit Submarine Division 4 Kanoya Air ASW Helicopter Squadron 24 Submarine Division 6 Destroyer Unit Helicopter Unit Fixed-wing Patrol Aircraft Unit Escort Division 4 Air ASW Helicopter Squadron 21 Air Patrol Squadron 1 Escort Division 12 Landing Ship Unit Landing Ship Division 1 Fixed-wing Patrol Aircraft Unit Submarine Unit Air Patrol Squadron 5 Naha Submarine Division 1 Submarine Division 3 Submarine Division 5 Structure of Destroyer Units Current situation (at the end of (approx. Future Structure of Patrol Aircraft Units FY 2013) 10 years later) Destroyers *47 destroyers as of the end of 2013 Patrol Aircraft (48 destroyers (12 divisions) in the 2010 NDPG H Maintenance of current structure (65 aircraft) of fixed-wing 54 destroyers (14 divisions) in the 2013 NDPG). patrol aircraft (P-1/3C) through continued procurement of P-1. H Increased number of destroyers by introduction of the new **47** **54** H Increased number of patrol helicopters (SH-60K/J) destroyers with additional multifunctional capability and **destroyers** **destroyers** (72 helicopters in the 2010 NDPG with a compact-type hull. 80 helicopters in the 2013 NDPG). Destroyers with detachable equipment for minesweeping and anti-submarine operations. H Establishment of an 8-destroyer structure with 2 additional Aegis-equipped destroyers. **Introduction of** **the new destroyer** H Continued procurement of **25** destroyers (DD). **mine-** **18** **sweeping** **mine-** **vessels** **sweeping** New Destroyer **vessels** Structure of Submarine Units Others Submarines *16 submarines as of the end of 2013. **Capabilities of New Destroyer** (22 submarines in the 2010 NDPG Other main programs Minesweeping by unmanned underwater vehicle 22 submarines in the 2013 NDPG). and other equipment H Refit tank landing ships (operation of H Continued increase in the number of amphibious vehicles and tilt-rotor aircraft). submarines through construction and life H Consider what the role should be of a extension. multipurpose vessel with capabilities for command and control, large-scale transportation, and aircraft operations, which can be utilized in various operations such as amphibious operations. H Provide new destroyers with capabilities for anti-mine operations. Anti-submarine operations by towed array sonar system H Extend the life of existing vessels (destroyers) and aircraft (P-3C, SH-60J). (TASS) and other equipment ----- Fig. II-2-2-3 Structure of the Major Units of the ASDF in the 2013 NDPG (Changes) Fighter aircraft units As of the end of FY 2013 2013 NDPG Fighter aircraft units: 12 squadrons Fighter aircraft units: 13 squadrons 2nd Air Wing Number of fighters: Approx. 260 Number of fighters: Approx. 280 (Chitose) H One squadron of the Air Reconnaissance Unit was abolished, and the Planned in FY 2016 - Initial deployment of F-35A is planned 13th squadron was newly established. at Misawa. H The number of squadrons of the Fighter Aircraft Units at Naha Air Base was increased to 2. 3rd Air Wing (Misawa) 6th Air Wing 601st Squadron Air warning & control units (Komatsu) (Misawa) 7th Air Wing As of the end of FY 2013 2013 NDPG (Hyakuri) Warning & control units : 8 warning groups Warning & control units: : 20 warning squadrons 28 warning groups Air warning units : 2 squadrons Air warning units: 3 squadrons 8th Air Wing(Tsuiki) 404th Squadron 602nd Squadron H One squadron was added to the Air warning units. 5th Air Wing (Komaki) (Hamamatsu) (Nyutabaru) Newly established in FY 2014 Air refueling/transport units Procurement of new aerial Procurement of new airborne refueling/transport aircraft early warning As of the end of FY 2013 2013 NDPG 83rd Air Wing 603rd Squadron (Naha) (Naha) Air refueling/transport units: 1 squadron Air refueling/transport units: 2 squadron New establishment of 9th Air Wing H One squadron was added to the air refueling/transport units. Conceptual image E-2D Continue to consider transformation of fighter aircraft unit structure F-35A F-15 F-2 F-4 E-767 E-2C **5** **Basic Foundation for SDF** To ensure that the defense force can function as effectively as possible, it is also imperative to strengthen the following foundations underpinning the defense force. facilities can be used as part of the operational infrastructure from an early stage, depending on the situation. Furthermore, it will implement various family support measures, in order to alleviate the anxieties both of troops serving away from home and of their families while they are away. In addition, the SDF will secure and stockpile the necessary ammunition, and maintain and upgrade SDF equipment. **1** **Training and Exercises** The SDF will enhance and strengthen training and exercises by making more effective use of the excellent training environment in Hokkaido, and working in partnership with relevant organizations and the civilian sector. In the southwest region, the SDF will promote the joint use of U.S. military facilities and areas, while remaining sensitive to relationships with the local community. **3** **Personnel Education** The SDF will implement measures to ensure an appropriate composition of ranks and age distribution, taking into account the various missions and characteristics of each branch of the SDF. The SDF will implement measures to make effective use of human resources, such as more effective use of female SDF personnel and expansion of reappointment, and measures related to honors and privileges. In order to strengthen the integrated operations structure, the SDF will, through enhanced education and training, retain personnel who can respond f exibly and rapidly to various situations. The SDF will promote a diverse range of recruitment measures and promote support for re employment by **2** **Operations Infrastructure** The SDF will improve survivability, including the recovery capabilities of military camps and bases, so that units can be deployed swiftly and respond to various situations effectively. Moreover, the SDF will promote the maintenance of facilities of each service as well as quarters, thereby enhancing its readiness. The SDF will undertake deliberations concerning civilian airports and ports in order to ensure that such ----- strengthening collaboration with local governments and relevant organizations. Furthermore, in order to support sustainable operation of units, the SDF will promote utilization of reserve personnel in broad areas, and take measures to improve the suff ciency of reserve personnel. **7** **Research and Development** The MOD will ensure consistency with the priorities for research and development and upgrading defense capability, given the operational needs of the SDF in view of the severe f scal situation. The MOD will promote research and development based on a medium- to long-term perspective, with a view to implementing research and development that can ensure Japan’s technological superiority against new threats in strategically important areas. The MOD will strive to make active use of dual-use technologies, by enhancing partnerships with universities and research institutes. **4** **Medical** The SDF will establish an eff cient and high-quality medical care structure, through endeavors including upgrading of SDF hospitals into hubs with enhanced functions, and improvements in the management of the National Defense Medical College Hospital. The SDF will also attach greater importance to securing and training such medical staff as medical off cers, nurses, and emergency medical technicians. The SDF will improve f rst aid capabilities on the frontline, and put in place a posture for rapid medical evacuation. **8** **Collaboration with Local Communities** As well as continuing to advance measures targeting the areas around defense facilities, the MOD and the SDF will routinely engage in various measures such as intensive public relations activities targeting local governments and communities. The MOD and the SDF will give consideration to the attributes of each area in the reorganization of units. Furthermore, in operating the military camps, etc., the MOD will pay attention to the contribution of the operation to the local economy. **5** **Defense Production and Technological Bases** The MOD will formulate a strategy that sets forth its future vision for Japan’s defense production and technological bases as a whole, and will promote adapting defense equipment to civilian use[8]. Furthermore, the Government of Japan will set out clear principles on the overseas transfer of arms and military technology, which f t the new security environment[9]. See Part II, Chapter 2, Section 4 (Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology) **9** **Boosting Communication Capabilities** The MOD and the SDF will strengthen strategic public relations and communication, and utilize a diverse range of media. **6** **Effi cient Acquisition of Equipment** In order to achieve eff cient and effective acquisition of equipment, the MOD will introduce a project manager system, and strengthen project management throughout the life-cycle, including technological aspects. The MOD will consider the possibility of further introducing longterm contracts. The MOD will try to improve readiness and response capabilities through reforms of the logistics posture through effective use of capacity in the private sector. Furthermore, it will ceaselessly pursue greater transparency in the acquisition process and increased rationalization of the contract system. See Part III, Chapter 2, Section 2 (Initiatives for Improving the Contract System and Other Related Matters) **10** **Enhancing the Intellectual Base** The MOD will promote education on security-related matters at educational institutions. Moreover, in addition to strengthening research systems, with a particular focus on the National Institute for Defense Studies, the MOD will promote various partnerships with other research institutions. **11** **Promoting reform of the Ministry of Defense** The MOD will further promote reforms in order to foster a sense of unity among civilian off cials and uniformed personnel, total optimization in building up defense capability, strengthening the SDF’s integrated operation functions, and enhancing policy-making and communication functions. In June 2014, the Ministry of Defense decided on “Strategy on Defense Production and Technological Bases – For strengthening the bases to support defense forces and ‘Proactive Contribution to Peace’.” ----- **6** **Additional Points** The NDPG sets out the form of Japan’s defense capabilities over the next decade or so. The National Security Council will conduct regular, systematic review over the course of implementation of the various measures and programs. Smooth, swift and accurate transition to the future defense capabilities will be facilitated through validations based on joint operational capability assessment. When major changes in the situation are anticipated during the review and verif cation process, necessary examination considering the security environment at that time will be implemented and these guidelines will be revised adequately. In light of the increasingly severe f scal conditions, Japan will strive to achieve greater eff ciency and streamlining in the defense capability buildup while ensuring harmony with other national initiatives. **Section 3 Outline of the Medium Term Defense Program** **1** **Program Guidelines** Following the NDPG, Japan is working to achieve an appropriate defense buildup through the MTDP under the following six basic program guidelines. H Emphasis will be placed on the following functions and capabilities in particular: (1) ISR capabilities; (2) intelligence capabilities; (3) transport capabilities; (4) C3I capabilities; (5) response to an attack on remote islands; (6) response to ballistic missile attacks; (7) response to outer space and cyber space threats; (8) response to large-scale disasters; and (9) international peace cooperation efforts. H Prioritize development of capacities to ensure maritime supremacy and air superiority, development of rapid deployment capabilities, and achievement of greater eff ciency and rationalization of preparations for invasions such as landing invasions. H Eff ciently secure defense capabilities adequate both in quality and quantity. H Promote measures to reform the personnel management system H Strengthen the deterrence and response capabilities of the Japan-U.S. Alliance H Achieve greater eff ciencies and streamline the buildup of the defense forces **2** **Reorganization of the Major SDF Units** Hokkaido will be concentrated into f eld artillery units to be newly organized under the direct command of the respective regional armies. See Fig. II-2-3-1 (Command Relationship of Ground Central Command, etc.) **1** **Ground Self-Defense Force (GSDF)** For the purpose of carrying out swift and f exible nationwide operations of basic GSDF units under the joint operations, the GSDF will establish the Ground Central Command. As part of such efforts the Central Readiness Force will be disbanded and its subsidiary units will be integrated into the Ground Central Command. In order to respond swiftly to an attack on remote islands and various other situations, the GSDF will transform two divisions and two brigades into two rapid deployment divisions and two rapid deployment brigades. In addition, by establishing a coast observation unit and area security units, the defense posture of the remote islands in the southwest region will be strengthened. In order to enable the SDF to land, recapture and secure without delay any remote islands that might be invaded, an amphibious rapid deployment brigade will be established. From the perspective of thoroughly facilitating eff ciencies and rationalization of preparations for full-scale invasions, and swift and f exible operations, the GSDF will deploy mobile combat vehicles and remove tanks deployed in basic operational units stationed in locations other than Hokkaido and Kyushu. In addition, howitzers deployed in basic operational units stationed in locations other than **2** **Maritime Self-Defense Force (MSDF)** For the purpose of defending the seas surrounding Japan and ensuring the security of maritime traff c in the region, through the effective conduct of various operations such as persistent ISR operations and anti-submarine operations, as well as for agile response in international peace cooperation activities, the MSDF will retain four escort f otillas mainly consisting of one helicopter destroyer (DDH) and two Aegis-equipped destroyers (DDG), and f ve escort divisions consisting of other destroyers. Necessary measures to increase the number of submarines will also be continued. **3** **Air Self-Defense Force (ASDF)** To enhance the air defense posture in the southwestern region, the ASDF will relocate one f ghter squadron to Naha Air Base, and newly organize and deploy one airborne early warning squadron at Naha Air Base. To prevent the relative decline of Japan’s air defense capabilities and ----- **6** **Additional Points** The NDPG sets out the form of Japan’s defense capabilities over the next decade or so. The National Security Council will conduct regular, systematic review over the course of implementation of the various measures and programs. Smooth, swift and accurate transition to the future defense capabilities will be facilitated through validations based on joint operational capability assessment. When major changes in the situation are anticipated during the review and verif cation process, necessary examination considering the security environment at that time will be implemented and these guidelines will be revised adequately. In light of the increasingly severe f scal conditions, Japan will strive to achieve greater eff ciency and streamlining in the defense capability buildup while ensuring harmony with other national initiatives. **Section 3 Outline of the Medium Term Defense Program** **1** **Program Guidelines** Following the NDPG, Japan is working to achieve an appropriate defense buildup through the MTDP under the following six basic program guidelines. H Emphasis will be placed on the following functions and capabilities in particular: (1) ISR capabilities; (2) intelligence capabilities; (3) transport capabilities; (4) C3I capabilities; (5) response to an attack on remote islands; (6) response to ballistic missile attacks; (7) response to outer space and cyber space threats; (8) response to large-scale disasters; and (9) international peace cooperation efforts. H Prioritize development of capacities to ensure maritime supremacy and air superiority, development of rapid deployment capabilities, and achievement of greater eff ciency and rationalization of preparations for invasions such as landing invasions. H Eff ciently secure defense capabilities adequate both in quality and quantity. H Promote measures to reform the personnel management system H Strengthen the deterrence and response capabilities of the Japan-U.S. Alliance H Achieve greater eff ciencies and streamline the buildup of the defense forces **2** **Reorganization of the Major SDF Units** Hokkaido will be concentrated into f eld artillery units to be newly organized under the direct command of the respective regional armies. See Fig. II-2-3-1 (Command Relationship of Ground Central Command, etc.) **1** **Ground Self-Defense Force (GSDF)** For the purpose of carrying out swift and f exible nationwide operations of basic GSDF units under the joint operations, the GSDF will establish the Ground Central Command. As part of such efforts the Central Readiness Force will be disbanded and its subsidiary units will be integrated into the Ground Central Command. In order to respond swiftly to an attack on remote islands and various other situations, the GSDF will transform two divisions and two brigades into two rapid deployment divisions and two rapid deployment brigades. In addition, by establishing a coast observation unit and area security units, the defense posture of the remote islands in the southwest region will be strengthened. In order to enable the SDF to land, recapture and secure without delay any remote islands that might be invaded, an amphibious rapid deployment brigade will be established. From the perspective of thoroughly facilitating eff ciencies and rationalization of preparations for full-scale invasions, and swift and f exible operations, the GSDF will deploy mobile combat vehicles and remove tanks deployed in basic operational units stationed in locations other than Hokkaido and Kyushu. In addition, howitzers deployed in basic operational units stationed in locations other than **2** **Maritime Self-Defense Force (MSDF)** For the purpose of defending the seas surrounding Japan and ensuring the security of maritime traff c in the region, through the effective conduct of various operations such as persistent ISR operations and anti-submarine operations, as well as for agile response in international peace cooperation activities, the MSDF will retain four escort f otillas mainly consisting of one helicopter destroyer (DDH) and two Aegis-equipped destroyers (DDG), and f ve escort divisions consisting of other destroyers. Necessary measures to increase the number of submarines will also be continued. **3** **Air Self-Defense Force (ASDF)** To enhance the air defense posture in the southwestern region, the ASDF will relocate one f ghter squadron to Naha Air Base, and newly organize and deploy one airborne early warning squadron at Naha Air Base. To prevent the relative decline of Japan’s air defense capabilities and ----- Fig. II-2-3-1 Command Relationship of Ground Central Command, etc. Minister of Defense |Chief of Joint Staff Overall coordination U.S. Forces r Defense Self-Defense Ground Central Command ommand Fleet Direct command Nationwide operations of GSDF units CRF (abolished) (nationwide GSDF operations across H Airborne brigade all areas, logistics operations, etc.) Overall coordination H Amphibious rapid deployment brigade H Helicopter brigade GSDF North GSDF Eastern Army Northern Army Division Brigade GSDF Middle Army GSDF Eastern Army GSDF Western Army|About 3,000 personnel Amphibious Rapid Support Deployment Brigade Aircraft Brigade Amphibious Amphibious Field Reconnaissance Engineer Signal Logistics Training Units Artillery Units Headquarters, Units Support Units Rapid Vehicle Units Deployment Units Units Units etc. Regiments| |---|---| Largest reform since the establishment **Commentary** of the Ground Self-Defense Force The Ground Self-Defense Force (GSDF) is making efforts to achieve a truly grand reform in order to build a Dynamic Joint Defense Force based on the 2013 NDPG. The aim is to respond fl exibly to the increasingly severe security environment, and establish a ground defense force that can respond to situations seamlessly and dynamically. In order to realize this, the GSDF particularly puts weight on response to attacks on remote islands, which is comprised of the following three levels: regular “deployment of units”; “rapid deployment” of units necessary to interdict any invasion; and “recapturing” in case any remote islands are invaded. The “deployment of units” is to deploy coast observation units and area security units in the southwestern region; “rapid deployment” is to transform about half of the divisions and GSDF personnel taking part in amphibious training brigades deployed across Japan into rapid deployment divisions and brigades that are furnished with advanced mobility and ISR capabilities; and for “recapturing,” new establishment of an amphibious rapid deployment brigade that is able to conduct suffi cient amphibious operations. Mobile combat vehicles (MCVs), amphibious vehicles, Osprey (V-22), and other equipment will be introduced for the operation of these units. Moreover, with a view to integrating the operation of GSDF units across Japan, and improving joint operation with the Maritime Self-Defense Force (MSDF) and Air Self-Defense Force (ASDF) as well as the effectiveness of Japan-U.S. joint training with U.S. Forces, the Ground Central Command will be established as a new integrated headquarters that controls the operation of the fi ve regional armies of the GSDF (The headquarters of the Ground Central Command will be newly established in JGSDF Camp Asaka in FY2017). In addition, education, training, and research functions will be unifi ed, and a system to integrate these three functions swiftly in an inter-related manner to enable continuous reform into the future will be established. Unprecedentedly large-scale transfers of GSDF personnel across Japan will be necessary to realize these efforts. As a whole, this major reform is so grand and extensive that it not only includes organizational and institutional reforms but also a reform of the mentality of each GSDF personnel, including the personal preparedness of each member. As such, the GSDF is making concerted efforts as a whole to realize the largest reform since its establishment. ----- ensure sustained air superiority, ASDF units equipped with training support functions will be integrated for further effective enhancement of advanced tactical skills[1]. **3** **Major Programs Regarding SDF’s Capabilities** **1** **Effective Deterrence and Response to Various** **Situations** **4** **Authorized Number of SDF Personnel** The total number of authorized GSDF personnel at the end of FY2018 will be approximately 159,000, with approximately 151,000 being SDF Regular personnel, and approximately 8,000 being Reserve Ready personnel. The authorized number of SDF Regular personnel of the MSDF and ASDF through FY2018 will be approximately at the same levels as at the end of FY2013. of the important situations described in “The Role of the Defense Force” addressed in the NDPG. See Fig. II-2-3-2 (Programs Related to Effective Deterrent of and Response to Various Situations) The SDF will carry out various programs, including the buildup of defense equipment, in order to respond to each Fig. II-2-3-2 Programs Related to Effective Deterrent of and Response to Various Situations **Category** **Main Programs** H Procure new airborne early warning (and control) aircraft (*1) and fi xed air defense radar; introduce unmanned aerial vehicles (*2); improve airborne warning and control systems (AWACS) (E-767). Ensuring security of the sea and airspace H Steadily procure fi xed-wing patrol aircraft (P-1), Aegis-equipped destroyers (DDG), submarines, and patrol helicopters surrounding Japan (SH-60K). H Introduce the new destroyers, with additional multifunctional capability and with a compact-type hull H Deploy a coast observation unit to Yonaguni Island; introduce new airborne early warning aircraft; establish one Development of a persistent squadron in the air warning unit and its deployment at Naha Air Base. ISR structure H Prepare a deployment structure for mobile air defense radar on remote islands in the southwestern region. H Increase the number of fi ghter aircraft units at Naha Air Base from one squadron to two; steadily procure fi ghter Obtaining and securing air aircraft (F-35A); replace fi ghter aircraft (F-15) unsuitable for modernization with more capable fi ghter aircraft. superiority H Procure new aerial refueling/transport aircraft; equip transport aircraft (C-130H) with aerial refueling capabilities, and procure rescue helicopters (UH-60J). H Increase the number of Aegis-equipped destroyers. Obtaining and securing H Steadily procure patrol helicopters (SH-60K) and surface-to-ship guided missiles. Response to maritime supremacy H Introduce ship-based multipurpose helicopters. attacks on H Introduce tilt-rotor aircraft (*3); steadily procure transport aircraft (C-2). remote islands H Acquire amphibious vehicles; refi t Tank Landing Ships (LST). H Consider active utilization of civilian transport capabilities, and implement necessary measures. Improvement of capabilities for H Newly establish rapid deployment regiments with a focus on improvement of mobility; newly establish area security rapid deployment and response units in charge of initial responses on remote islands in the southwestern region; newly establish an amphibious rapid deployment brigade. H Improve guidance capability of precision-guided bombs; increase fi ring range of ship-to-ship guided missiles. H Station GSDF, MSDF, and ASDF personnel in the main headquarters of each of the other services. Development of C3I H Extend the secured exclusive communication link for the SDF to Yonaguni Island; deploy mobile multiplex communication equipment at Naha Air Base. H Increase the number of Aegis-equipped destroyers; introduce advanced PAC-3 missiles (PAC-3 MSE); improve automated warning and control systems; procure and improve fi xed air defense radar (FPS-7) systems. H Promote Japan-U.S. cooperative development of advanced interceptor missiles (SM-3 Block II-A). Response to ballistic missile attacks H Conduct studies on the best mix of the overall posture of the future BMD system, including the new BMD equipment. H In preparation for an attack by guerrilla or special operations forces concurrently, continue procurement of a variety of surveillance equipment, light armored vehicles, NBC reconnaissance vehicles, etc. H Continue enhancement of information gathering capabilities through the use of various space satellites; steadily develop a sophisticated X-Band satellite communications system; enhance the resiliency of satellites through space Response in outer space and cyberspace situational awareness efforts and research on satellite protection methods. H Enhance survivability of the various SDF systems; strengthen information gathering functions, etc.; develop a practical training environment. H Develop capabilities to respond immediately by transporting and deploying suffi cient numbers of SDF units, as well as Response to large-scale disasters establish a rotating staff posture in the event of various disasters. H Drastically reinforce capabilities to gather intelligence from diverse sources, including SIGINT, GEOINT, and HUMINT. Strengthening intelligence capabilities H Recruit and train personnel who would engage in information gathering and analysis. Notes: 1. E-2D airborne early warning aircraft has been acquired since FY 2015. 2. Acquisition of Global Hawk unmanned aircraft vehicle began in FY 2015. 3. Osprey (V-22) has been acquired since FY 2015. 4. Some of the programs above are reposted in categories that are different from the previous year. ----- **2** **Stabilization of the Asia-Pacifi c Region and** **Improvement of the Global Security Environments** Japan will enhance bilateral and multilateral cooperative relations and conduct various activities including training and exercises in a timely and appropriate manner, as well as actively engage in international peace cooperation activities. See Fig. II-2-3-3 (Programs for the Stabilization of the Asia-Pacifi c Region and Improvement of the Global Security Environments) **4** **Measures for the Strengthening of the Japan-U.S. Alliance** In order to maintain and strengthen the U.S. commitment to Japan and the Asia-Pacif c region and to ensure Japan’s national security, Japan will continue the revision of and revise the Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation[2]. Meanwhile, Japan will expand bilateral training and exercises, joint ISR activities and the joint/shared use of facilities and areas by the SDF and the U.S. Forces. In addition, Japan will further deepen various Japan-U.S. operational cooperation and policy coordination in areas such as BMD, bilateral planning, and bilateral Extended Deterrence Dialogue. Japan will also strengthen cooperation not only in **3** **Basic Structure to Maximize Defense Capability** In order to maximize the effectiveness of functions and capabilities to be emphasized in seamlessly and dynamically fulf lling the role of the defense force, the SDF will steadily develop various basic structures. See Fig. II-2-3-4 (Measures Related to the Basic Structure to Maximize Defense Capability) the f elds of counter-piracy, capacity building assistance, HA/DR, peacekeeping and counter-terrorism, but also in maritime affairs, outer space and cyberspace. Furthermore, Japan will strengthen and expand the Japan-U.S. cooperative relationship over a broad range of f elds, including intelligence cooperation and information security, and defense equipment and technology cooperation. Moreover, from the perspective of making the stationing of the U.S. Forces in Japan more smooth and effective, Japan will steadily ensure the Host Nation Support (HNS). **5** **Quantities of Major Procurement** the NDPG over a 10-year time frame. See Fig. II-2-3-5 (Annex from the Medium Term Defense Program) The Annex Table shows details of the quantities of major procurement described in Section 3. Japan will aim to develop the defense forces described in the Annex Table of **6** **Expenditures** The expenditures required to implement the defense force developments described in this program amount to approximately ¥24,670 billion in FY2013 prices. For the duration of this program, in harmony with other measures taken by the Government, approximately ¥700 billion will be secured by means of further streamlining and Fig. II-2-3-3 Programs for the Stabilization of the Asia-Pacifi c Region and Improvement of the Global Security Environments **Category** **Main Programs** Implementing training and exercises H Proactively promote bilateral and multilateral combined training and exercises in the Asia-Pacifi c region. Promoting defense cooperation and H Promote multilayered bilateral and multilateral defense cooperation and exchanges on various levels, including high level exchanges exchanges and unit exchanges. H Help the militaries of countries eligible for support strengthen their capacities in various fi elds, including humanitarian Promoting capacity building assistance assistance, disaster relief, landmine/unexploded ordinance disposal and military medicine. H Work with the U.S. and Australia to carry out effective and effi cient assistance while coordinating diplomatic policy. H Support anti-piracy operations off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Eden and provide capacity building assistance to Ensuring maritime security coastal countries in the region. H Carry out joint training and exercises with other countries in waters outside of Japan. H Strengthen information gathering capabilities in the deployed area and improve the armor performance of defense equipment. H Enhance posture of engineering units and enhance posture related to telecommunications, supplies, medical services and Implementing international peace family assistance, etc. cooperation activities H Dispatch SDF personnel to local mission headquarters and UN DPKO develop human resources from a long-term perspective H Expand educational content at the Japan Peacekeeping Training and Research Center and enhance cooperation in education with related ministries and agencies. H Actively engage in order to cooperate with international initiatives on arms control and arms reductions, including human Cooperating with efforts to promote arms contributions. control, disarmament, and non-proliferation H Promote initiatives for non-proliferation, through participating in Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) exercises. On April 27 2015 new Guidelines were approved between Japan and the United States ----- |Category|Main measures| |---|---| |Training and Exercises|H Expand the use of the good training environment in Hokkaido by SDF units across the country; facilitate active use of LSTs and transport capabilities of the civilian sector, and improve unit mobility; expand the joint/shared use of U.S. Forces facilities with the SDF; actively engage in bilateral trainings with U.S. Forces. H Reinforce coordination with relevant agencies including police and fi refi ghters, and the Japan Coast Guard; conduct various simulation exercises and training exercises regarding various situations in a tailored manner| |Operations Infrastructure|H Strengthen the SDF’s capabilities to immediately rebuild various support functions; take measures for the SDF to immediately utilize civilian airports and ports in contingency situations; store necessary ammunition and spare parts in locations most appropriate for operations; promote measures supporting families of military personnel to enable a sustained response posture over the long term. H Utilize a new contract system under which the price is to be determined according to realized performance regarding sustainment and procurement.| |Personnel Education|H Achieve a composition of ranks given the characteristics of respective units; ensure an appropriate age distribution. • Secure and nurture appropriate numbers of offi cers, warrant offi cers and sergeants/petty offi cers; review the retirement age of 60; research on new systems for early retirement; take measures to allow airplane pilots to be re-employed in the private sector as pilots. H Make use of SDF personnel more effectively; promote measures related to honors and privileges. • Make use of female personnel more effectively; actively reappoint retiring personnel possessing advanced knowledge, skills and experience; expand the Defense Meritorious Badge program. H Continue to secure competent personnel in the coming years; improve the re-employment environment for SDF personnel. • Effectively engage in public relations to adjust to the changing times: enhance coordination and cooperation with relevant ministries and agencies and local governments; promote provision of more incentives for companies to employ retired SDF personnel; encourage employment of retired SDF personnel in the public sector. H Promote the use of ready reserve personnel and reserve personnel in broad areas. • Appoint reserve personnel and their assignment to duties including possible opportunities to work at headquarters; improve training for call-ups; appoint reserve personnel equipped with specialized skills; promote increased public awareness of the reserve program and enhanced incentives for reserve personnel themselves and companies to employ reserve personnel, in order to increase the staffi ng rate of reserve personnel.| |Medicine|H Establish an effi cient and high-quality medical system including the upgrading of SDF hospitals to hubs with enhanced functions, and promote the formation of its networks. H Arrangements for prompt treatment and medical evacuation, including consideration of the revision of regulations for emergency medical treatment in response to contingencies.| |Defense Production and Technological Bases|H Formulate a strategy that sets forth the MOD’s future vision for Japan’s defense production and technology base as a whole; promote cooperation on defense equipment and technology development with other countries. H Promote the adaptation of defense equipment developed by the MOD/SDF to civilian uses.| |Effi cient Acquisition of Equipment|H In order to carry out effective and effi cient acquisition of equipment, introduce a project manager system, and enhance consistent project management throughout the life-cycle of equipment. H Actively train and appoint personnel related to the acquisition of equipment to positions. H Develop a system that allows for reconsideration, including review of specifi cations and project plans, when there is a signifi cant discrepancy between the estimated life-cycle cost and the real value of the life-cycle costs. H Ensure transparency and fairness; sort and rank, as necessary, parties available for negotiated contracts. H Consider a contract system to incentivize companies to lower prices, longer-term contracts, and the use of a consortium.| |Research and Development (R&D)|H Technically review next-generation surface-to-air guided missiles to strengthen its air defense capabilities. H Conduct strategic studies including empirical research relating to next-generation fi ghter aircraft. H In an effort to improve ISR capability, promote development of SIGINT aircraft as well as research on new fi xed air defense radar, and sonars with higher detecting capabilities through simultaneous use of multiple sonars. H Conduct research on unmanned equipment available for fl exible operations in the case of various contingencies including large-scale natural disasters, R&D to improve existing equipment. H Set a vision for future equipment which shows a direction of medium- and long-term R&D with regard to the development of major equipment. H Actively utilize civilian technologies (dual-use technologies) by enhancement of coordination with universities and research institutions; employ military technologies in civilian activities; strengthen the function of technology control to prevent outfl ow of advanced technologies.| |Collaboration with Local Communities|H Advance measures targeting the areas around defense facilities; secure the understanding and cooperation of local governments and communities through intensive public relations activities. H Give consideration to the attributes of each area in securing the understanding of local governments and residents on the reorganization of units, and deployment and administration of SDF camps and bases, etc.; promote measures conducive to local economies.| |Boosting Communication Capabilities|H Provide information actively and effectively via various media sources such as social media networks. H Facilitate provision of information to foreign countries about MOD/SDF efforts including the overseas activities of the SDF.| |Enhancing the Intellectual Base|H Promote education on security-related matters at educational institutions, etc., including by MOD personnel presenting academic papers and sending MOD lecturers. H Strengthen the role of the National Institute for Defense Studies (NIDS) as an MOD think tank through coordination with policy-making divisions and promotion of academic exchanges.| |Promoting Reform of the MOD|H Reform the MOD’s work methods and organization to foster a sense of unity among civilian offi cials and uniformed personnel, optimize the build-up of defense capabilities, promote SDF joint operation functions, and enhance policy-making and communication functions. H Take measures to facilitate effi ciency and optimization in the acquisition of equipment, keeping in mind the option of establishing a new agency in the MOD. H Conduct an organizational review including the reorganization or disbanding of the Bureau of Operational Policy by such efforts as integration of duties related to actual unit operations into the Joint Staff Offi ce.| Fig. II-2-3-4 Measures Related to the Basic Structure to Maximize Defense Capability rationalization through efforts such as equipment procurement reform. The annual defense budgets for the implementation of this program will be allocated within a limit of approximately ¥23,970 billion over the next five years This program will be reviewed after three years as necessary, with consideration to such factors at home and abroad as the international security environment, trends in technological standards including information communication technology and fiscal conditions ----- |Service|Equipment|Quantity| |---|---|---| |GSDF|Mobile Combat Vehicles Armored Vehicles Amphibious Vehicles Tilt-Rotor Aircraft Transport Helicopters (CH-47JA) Surface-to-Ship Guided Missiles Mid-Range Surface-to-Air Guided Missiles Tanks Howitzers (excluding mortars)|99 24 52 17 6 9 companies 5 companies 44 31| |MSDF|Destroyers (Aegis-Equipped Destroyers) Submarines Other Ships Total (Tonnage) Fixed-Wing Patrol Aircraft (P-1) Patrol Helicopters (SH-60K) Multipurpose Helicopters (Ship-Based)|5 (2) 5 5 15 (approx. 52,000 t) 23 23 9| |ASDF|New Airborne Early Warning (Control) Aircraft Fighters (F-35A) Fighter Modernization (F-15) New Aerial Refueling/Transport Aircraft Transport Aircraft (C-2) Upgrade of PATRIOT Surface-to-Air Guided Missiles (PAC-3 MSE)|4 28 26 3 10 2 groups & education| |Joint units|Unmanned Aerial Vehicles|3| Fig. II-2-3-5 Annex from the Medium Term Defense Program Note: Acquisition of ship-based unmanned aerial vehicles will be allowed within the number of Patrol Helicopters (SH-60K) specifi ed above. **7** **Other** While maintaining the deterrence of the U.S. Forces, Japan will steadily implement specif c measures including the realignment of the U.S. Forces in Japan and SACO (Special Action Committee on Okinawa) related programs to mitigate the impact on local communities, including those in Okinawa. **Section 4 Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology** **1** **Purpose of Establishment of the Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology** Japan has dealt with arms exports in a careful manner, in accordance with the Three Principles of Arms Exports and their related policy guidelines. On the other hand, in individual cases, such as the joint development of BMD by Japan and the U.S., it has taken separate measures by issuing Chief Cabinet Secretary’s statements, where arms exports are dealt with outside the Three Principles. Amidst this situation, in December 2011, the Statement by the Chief Cabinet Secretary on Guidelines for Overseas Transfer of Defense Equipment, etc. put in place exemptions from the Three Principles of Arms Exports based on the premise of strict control[1], with regard to cases related to peace contribution and international cooperation; and cases regarding international joint development and production of defense equipment, etc. that contributes to Japan’s security. However, when Japan endeavored to arrange the participation of companies within Japan in the international logistics support systems for the manufacture of the F-35, in December 2013, and when 10 thousand rounds of ammunition owned by GSDF forces engaged in activities as a part of South Sudan PKO (United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS)) were provided to the U.N. based on a request by the U.N. since it was not possible to apply Guidelines for Overseas Transfer of Defense Equipment, etc. for these cases, the measures were taken by issuing Chief Cabinet Secretary’s statements not to rely on the Three Principles on Arms Export, etc. Given these circumstances, based on the National Security Strategy, in April 2014, the Government decided upon the Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology[2] and implementation guidelines. These clarify the concrete standards, procedures and limitation better than ever and state them clearly with transparency both internally and externally. Based on the Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology, the Ministry of Defense and Self-Defense Forces, in addition to contributing even more The strict control refers to the duty imposed on recipient countries to gain prior consent from Japan with respect to extra-purpose use and third party transfer, within international arrangements concluded between the Governments of Japan and recipient countries. The term “defense equipment” is deemed appropriate for the title of “Three Principles for the Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology,” since possible articles of overseas transfers help peace contribution and international cooperation as was seen in the example of the provision of bulldozers and other items belonging to the SDF to disaster-stricken countries. Similarly, due to the fact that ----- |Service|Equipment|Quantity| |---|---|---| |GSDF|Mobile Combat Vehicles Armored Vehicles Amphibious Vehicles Tilt-Rotor Aircraft Transport Helicopters (CH-47JA) Surface-to-Ship Guided Missiles Mid-Range Surface-to-Air Guided Missiles Tanks Howitzers (excluding mortars)|99 24 52 17 6 9 companies 5 companies 44 31| |MSDF|Destroyers (Aegis-Equipped Destroyers) Submarines Other Ships Total (Tonnage) Fixed-Wing Patrol Aircraft (P-1) Patrol Helicopters (SH-60K) Multipurpose Helicopters (Ship-Based)|5 (2) 5 5 15 (approx. 52,000 t) 23 23 9| |ASDF|New Airborne Early Warning (Control) Aircraft Fighters (F-35A) Fighter Modernization (F-15) New Aerial Refueling/Transport Aircraft Transport Aircraft (C-2) Upgrade of PATRIOT Surface-to-Air Guided Missiles (PAC-3 MSE)|4 28 26 3 10 2 groups & education| |Joint units|Unmanned Aerial Vehicles|3| Fig. II-2-3-5 Annex from the Medium Term Defense Program Note: Acquisition of ship-based unmanned aerial vehicles will be allowed within the number of Patrol Helicopters (SH-60K) specifi ed above. **7** **Other** While maintaining the deterrence of the U.S. Forces, Japan will steadily implement specif c measures including the realignment of the U.S. Forces in Japan and SACO (Special Action Committee on Okinawa) related programs to mitigate the impact on local communities, including those in Okinawa. **Section 4 Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology** **1** **Purpose of Establishment of the Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology** Japan has dealt with arms exports in a careful manner, in accordance with the Three Principles of Arms Exports and their related policy guidelines. On the other hand, in individual cases, such as the joint development of BMD by Japan and the U.S., it has taken separate measures by issuing Chief Cabinet Secretary’s statements, where arms exports are dealt with outside the Three Principles. Amidst this situation, in December 2011, the Statement by the Chief Cabinet Secretary on Guidelines for Overseas Transfer of Defense Equipment, etc. put in place exemptions from the Three Principles of Arms Exports based on the premise of strict control[1], with regard to cases related to peace contribution and international cooperation; and cases regarding international joint development and production of defense equipment, etc. that contributes to Japan’s security. However, when Japan endeavored to arrange the participation of companies within Japan in the international logistics support systems for the manufacture of the F-35, in December 2013, and when 10 thousand rounds of ammunition owned by GSDF forces engaged in activities as a part of South Sudan PKO (United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS)) were provided to the U.N. based on a request by the U.N. since it was not possible to apply Guidelines for Overseas Transfer of Defense Equipment, etc. for these cases, the measures were taken by issuing Chief Cabinet Secretary’s statements not to rely on the Three Principles on Arms Export, etc. Given these circumstances, based on the National Security Strategy, in April 2014, the Government decided upon the Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology[2] and implementation guidelines. These clarify the concrete standards, procedures and limitation better than ever and state them clearly with transparency both internally and externally. Based on the Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology, the Ministry of Defense and Self-Defense Forces, in addition to contributing even more The strict control refers to the duty imposed on recipient countries to gain prior consent from Japan with respect to extra-purpose use and third party transfer, within international arrangements concluded between the Governments of Japan and recipient countries. The term “defense equipment” is deemed appropriate for the title of “Three Principles for the Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology,” since possible articles of overseas transfers help peace contribution and international cooperation as was seen in the example of the provision of bulldozers and other items belonging to the SDF to disaster-stricken countries. Similarly, due to the fact that ----- to peace contribution and international cooperation, will also actively cooperate with Japan’s ally the United States and other countries in the area of defense equipment and technologies, and more proactively advance the measures **2** **Main Contents of the New Three Principles** **1** **Clarifi cation of cases where transfers are** **prohibited (the First Principle)** required to maintain regional peace and stability and ensure Japan’s defense. See Reference 17 (Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology) Government will disclose information concerning the cases that were deliberated at the National Security Council. See Fig. II-2-4-2 (The Second Principle “Limitation to cases where transfers may be permitted”) The cases where transfers are prohibited are clarif ed as shown in the reference. See Fig. II-2-4-1 (The First Principle “The Cases Where Transfers Are Prohibited”) **2** **Limitation to cases where transfers may be** **permitted as well as strict examination and** **information disclosure (the Second Principle)** **3** **Ensuring appropriate control regarding extra-** **purpose use or transfer to third parties** **(the Third Principle)** Overseas transfer of defense equipment and technology will be permitted only in cases where appropriate control is ensured. More concretely, the Government will in principle oblige the Government of the recipient country to gain its prior consent regarding extra-purpose use and transfer to third parties. However, in cases where it is judged appropriate for the proactive advancement of peace contribution and international cooperation, cases involving participation in the international systems for sharing parts, and cases where parts are delivered to a licenser, appropriate control may be ensured with the conf rmation of the control system at the destination. The cases where transfers may be permitted are limited to such cases as shown in the reference. The Government will conduct strict examination on the appropriateness of the destination and end user, and the extent the overseas transfer of such equipment and technology will raise concern for Japan’s security. At the same time, standards of examinations and procedures will be clarif ed and made transparent, strict examination systems of the Government as a whole including deliberations at the National Security Council are decided to be established. In addition, the Fig. II-2-4-1 The First Principle “The Cases Where Transfers Are Prohibited” **Situation** **Specifi c examples** (1) Violation of obligations under treaties concluded and other international Chemical Weapons Convention, Convention on Cluster Munitions, Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention, Arms Trade Treaty, etc. arrangements (2) Violation of obligations under United Nations Security Council Resolution 1718 (nuclear issue of North Korea), Security Council Resolution 1929 (nuclear issue of Iran), etc. Security Council Resolutions (3) Transfer to a nation which is party to a Countries which are the target of measures taken by the United Nations Security Council to maintain or restore confl ict international peace and security in the event of an armed attack. Fig. II-2-4-2 The Second Principle “Limitation to cases where transfers may be permitted” **Situation** **Specifi c examples** Overseas transfers that contribute to active promotion of peace contribution and international cooperation, only if the transfers have (1) Contribution to the proactive positive meaning from the viewpoint of peace contribution and international cooperation,and when: advancement of peace contribution A. the recipient is a foreign government, or and international cooperation B. the recipient is the United Nations (UN) System or organizations conducting the activities based on a UN resolution. Overseas transfers that contribute to Japan’s security, only if the transfers have positive meaning from the viewpoint of Japan’s security, and that: A. are related to international joint development and production with countries cooperating with Japan insecurity area including the U.S., B. contribute to enhancing security and defense cooperation with countries cooperating with Japan in security area including the U.S., and of the following: (a) defense equipment and technology included in the provision of supplies and services in accordance with an agreement concerning reciprocal provision of logistic support, supplies and services (ACSA), (b) provision of military technology as a part of mutual exchange of technology with the U.S., (c) Provision of parts or services related to a licensed product of the U.S. or provision of repair services etc. to the U.S. armed (2) Contribution to the security of Japan forces, or (d) defense equipment and technology related to cooperation concerning rescue, transportation, vigilance, surveillance or minesweeping with countries cooperating with Japan in security area, or C. are necessary for supporting activities of the governmental agencies including the Self-Defense Forces (hereinafter referred to as “the SDF etc.”), which include the activities of foreign governments or private entities etc. related to the activities of the SDF etc., or for ensuring the safety of Japanese nationals, and that are: (a) temporary export of equipment, return of purchased equipment or provision of technical information related to the activities of the SDF etc. including replacements of items which need repairing with non-defective items, (b) export of equipment for the protection or self-protection of public offi cials, or (c) export of equipment for the self-protection of Japanese nationals operating in danger areas ----- **Chapter** **Strengthening of the Japan-U.S. Alliance** ##### 3 Based on the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty, the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements, together with Japan’s own efforts, constitute the cornerstone for Japan’s security. The JapanU.S. Alliance centered on bilateral security arrangements functions as public goods that contribute to the stability and prosperity, not only of Japan but also of the Asia-Pacif c region and the world at large. As the security environment surrounding Japan becomes increasingly severe, and the United States, at the same time, maintains and strengthens its engagement and presence in the Asia-Pacif c region, it has become more important than ever to strengthen the Japan-U.S. Alliance for the security of Japan. The military presence of U.S. Forces in Japan not only contributes to the defense of Japan, but also functions as deterrence and response capabilities to address contingencies in the Asia-Pacif c region, and serves as a core element of the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements. On the other hand, since the stationing of U.S. Forces in Japan impacts the living environment of local residents, efforts that correspond to the actual situation of each region must be made to mitigate the impact on regions such as Okinawa. **Section 1 Signifi cance of the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements** **1** **Maintenance of Japan’s Peace and Security** In the current international community, a watertight defense system capable of responding to every contingency, ranging from all types of armed attacks including the use of nuclear weapons to coercion or intimidation by military power, is necessary to secure the peace, security, and sovereignty of the nation. It is impossible even for the United States to guarantee its security on its own. Therefore, it would be practically impossible for Japan to ensure its national security solely through its unilateral efforts given its population, land, and economy. Moreover, such a strategy would not necessarily contribute to regional stability. Consequently, Japan has maintained its peace and security, centered on the Security Arrangements with the world’s dominant military power, the United States, with which it shares basic values such as democracy, the rule of law, respect for human rights, and a capitalist economy as well as an interest in maintaining the peace and security of the world, and has strong economic ties. **2** **Maintenance of Peace and Stability in the Region Surrounding Japan** Article 6 of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty states that contributing to the security of Japan, and the maintenance of international peace and security in the Far East is the purpose of the use of facilities and areas by the U.S. Forces in Japan. This provision is based on the recognition that the security of Japan is closely tied to the peace and security of the Far East region to which Japan belongs. In the regions surrounding Japan, there are many states and the like with massive military power, including some states that retain nuclear weapons or continue nuclear development. In addition to issues or tension caused by changes in the balance of power, situations that we call “gray zones” over sovereignty of the territory or Specif cally, as well as providing facilities and areas for the U.S. Forces, based on Article 6 of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty, Article 5 of that treaty stipulates that Japan and the United States will take bilateral action in the event of an armed attack against Japan. The U.S. obligation to defend Japan in the event of an armed attack means that if a country plans to attack Japan, the attacker must be prepared to confront not only the defense capability of the SDF, but also the overwhelming military strength of the United States when planning such an act. As a result, the opposing nation becomes aware that they will suffer grievously if they carry out an invasion, and such desires are stopped at the planning stage. In other words, this serves to deter attacks. Japan intends to effectively utilize the deterrence power of the U.S. military in addition to maintaining adequate Japanese defense forces in order to create a seamless posture and secure Japan’s peace and security. vested interests are likely to arise, and this risks further aggravation of the situation. In such a security environment, the military presence of the U.S. Forces in Japan provides deterrence against unexpected contingencies caused by various security issues or unstable factors, providing a great sense of security to the nations in the region and thus fulf lling a role as public goods. Also, the close bonds of cooperation based on the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements constitute the foundation of the United States’ commitment to the peace and stability of the region surrounding Japan. These arrangements, complemented by the alliances established between the United States and other countries in the region such as South Korea ----- Australia, Thailand and the Philippines and also by the indispensable role in maintaining the peace and stability friendly relations developed with other countries, play an of the Asia-Pacif c region. **3** **Further Stabilization of the International Security Environment** The Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements are the foundation for a comprehensive and friendly cooperative relationship between Japan and the United States, not only in defense but also in a wide range of areas, including politics, the economy, and society. The Japan-U.S. Alliance, with these security arrangements at its core, also forms the basis for Japan’s foreign policy. It contributes to Japan’s ability to implement positive measures to maintain the peace and security of the international community, including promoting multinational security dialogue and cooperation, and cooperation with the United Nations. Currently, we are confronted with global security challenges that are extremely diff cult for any single country to tackle alone, including the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles, international terrorism, and acts of piracy, as well as new risks concerning stable access to the seas, space, and cyberspace, and it is important for countries involved to regularly work together in peacetime. The strong bonds forged between Japan and the United States are also playing an important role in the efforts implemented by Japan to effectively respond to such challenges. In particular, under the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements, the SDF and the U.S. Forces are working together in peacetime in a variety of areas to strengthen their cooperation. This kind of close coordination forms the foundation for various forms of international collaboration, such as antipiracy, undertaken by the SDF and the U.S. Forces, and leads to the heightened operational effectiveness of the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements. The peace and prosperity of the international community are closely linked to those of Japan. Accordingly, by cooperating with the United States, which possesses preeminent international operational capabilities, Japan is able to advance measures to further stabilize the global security environment. This in turn is enhancing the security and prosperity of Japan. **Section 2 Overview of the Revision of the Guidelines** It is necessary for both Japan and the United States to discuss and decide the roles each will fulf ll in case of an armed attack against Japan or other situation in advance, with a view to responding rapidly to such an event. The Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation (Guidelines) and the various policies for ensuring their effectiveness provide a framework pertaining to role-sharing between Japan and the United States. Based on that framework and the changing security environment surrounding Japan, both Japan and the United States continuously studied bilateral cooperation plans for the two countries, held consultations on them, and worked on the revision of the Guidelines to adapt to the current situations. **1** **Background to the Revision of the Guidelines** **1** **Background to the Formulation of the Guidelines** The 1978 Guidelines were formulated with a focus on an armed attack on Japan against the backdrop of the Cold War, which was still ongoing then. The subsequent Guidelines were developed in 1997 in light of changes in the security environment, such as the end of the Cold War. The 1997 Guidelines expanded cooperation to responses in situations in areas surrounding Japan. The 1997 Guidelines def ne the roles of Japan and the United States, and the cooperation of the two countries under three categories: (1) in peacetime, (2) in response to an armed attack against Japan, and (3) in situations in areas surrounding Japan. They also stipulated that they would review the Guidelines in a timely and appropriate manner. **2** **Background to the Revision** More than 17 years have passed since the formulation of the 1997 Guidelines. During these years, various issues and destabilizing factors have emerged, and become more visible and aggravated in the security environment surrounding Japan; such as more active military activities of neighboring countries, new threats including international terrorist organizations and risks against stable use of global commons such as oceans, space and cyberspace. In addition, the activities of the SDF have expanded to a global scale, as exemplif ed by antipiracy activities, PKO, and international disaster relief activities. As a result, it had become necessary for the manner of Japan-U.S. defense cooperation to be adapted to these changes in the security environment and the expansion of the SDF’s activities and missions. Against the backdrop of these changes in the security environment Prime Minister Abe directed then Minister ----- Australia, Thailand and the Philippines and also by the indispensable role in maintaining the peace and stability friendly relations developed with other countries, play an of the Asia-Pacif c region. **3** **Further Stabilization of the International Security Environment** The Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements are the foundation for a comprehensive and friendly cooperative relationship between Japan and the United States, not only in defense but also in a wide range of areas, including politics, the economy, and society. The Japan-U.S. Alliance, with these security arrangements at its core, also forms the basis for Japan’s foreign policy. It contributes to Japan’s ability to implement positive measures to maintain the peace and security of the international community, including promoting multinational security dialogue and cooperation, and cooperation with the United Nations. Currently, we are confronted with global security challenges that are extremely diff cult for any single country to tackle alone, including the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles, international terrorism, and acts of piracy, as well as new risks concerning stable access to the seas, space, and cyberspace, and it is important for countries involved to regularly work together in peacetime. The strong bonds forged between Japan and the United States are also playing an important role in the efforts implemented by Japan to effectively respond to such challenges. In particular, under the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements, the SDF and the U.S. Forces are working together in peacetime in a variety of areas to strengthen their cooperation. This kind of close coordination forms the foundation for various forms of international collaboration, such as antipiracy, undertaken by the SDF and the U.S. Forces, and leads to the heightened operational effectiveness of the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements. The peace and prosperity of the international community are closely linked to those of Japan. Accordingly, by cooperating with the United States, which possesses preeminent international operational capabilities, Japan is able to advance measures to further stabilize the global security environment. This in turn is enhancing the security and prosperity of Japan. **Section 2 Overview of the Revision of the Guidelines** It is necessary for both Japan and the United States to discuss and decide the roles each will fulf ll in case of an armed attack against Japan or other situation in advance, with a view to responding rapidly to such an event. The Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation (Guidelines) and the various policies for ensuring their effectiveness provide a framework pertaining to role-sharing between Japan and the United States. Based on that framework and the changing security environment surrounding Japan, both Japan and the United States continuously studied bilateral cooperation plans for the two countries, held consultations on them, and worked on the revision of the Guidelines to adapt to the current situations. **1** **Background to the Revision of the Guidelines** **1** **Background to the Formulation of the Guidelines** The 1978 Guidelines were formulated with a focus on an armed attack on Japan against the backdrop of the Cold War, which was still ongoing then. The subsequent Guidelines were developed in 1997 in light of changes in the security environment, such as the end of the Cold War. The 1997 Guidelines expanded cooperation to responses in situations in areas surrounding Japan. The 1997 Guidelines def ne the roles of Japan and the United States, and the cooperation of the two countries under three categories: (1) in peacetime, (2) in response to an armed attack against Japan, and (3) in situations in areas surrounding Japan. They also stipulated that they would review the Guidelines in a timely and appropriate manner. **2** **Background to the Revision** More than 17 years have passed since the formulation of the 1997 Guidelines. During these years, various issues and destabilizing factors have emerged, and become more visible and aggravated in the security environment surrounding Japan; such as more active military activities of neighboring countries, new threats including international terrorist organizations and risks against stable use of global commons such as oceans, space and cyberspace. In addition, the activities of the SDF have expanded to a global scale, as exemplif ed by antipiracy activities, PKO, and international disaster relief activities. As a result, it had become necessary for the manner of Japan-U.S. defense cooperation to be adapted to these changes in the security environment and the expansion of the SDF’s activities and missions. Against the backdrop of these changes in the security environment Prime Minister Abe directed then Minister ----- of Defense Onodera at the end of 2012 to work on the revision of the Guidelines and other matters. In addition, at the Japan-U.S. Summit held in February 2013, Prime Minister Abe stated to U.S. President Obama that, “in response to the changing security environment, Japan would like to start reviewing the Guidelines through discussions on the two countries’ views of the roles, missions and capabilities (RMC).” responsive and to enable seamless bilateral cooperation in all situations; 5) Describing appropriate role-sharing of bilateral defense cooperation based on the enhancement of mutual capabilities; 6) Evaluating the concepts that guide bilateral defense cooperation in contingencies to ensure effective, eff cient, and seamless Alliance response in a dynamic security environment that includes challenges in emerging strategic domains such as space and cyberspace; and 7) Exploring additional ways in which we can strengthen the Alliance in the future to meet shared objectives. Based on the Joint Statement of the “2+2” Meeting in October 2013 and in line with approaches indicated in the 2013 National Defense Program Guidelines (NDPG) and the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) of the United States, Japan and the United States conducted extensive work on the revision of the 1997 Guidelines. On October 8, 2014, based on the agreement reached at the Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting held on July 11, 2014, the two governments announced “The Interim Report on the Revision of the Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation.” In addition, on December 19, 2014, the Security Consultative Committee (SCC) (“2+2” Meeting), recognizing the signif cance of ensuring consistency between the revision of the Guidelines and Japan’s legislative process, decided to further deepen the discussions to work toward f nalizing the revision of the Guidelines during the f rst half of 2015, taking into account the progress of Japan’s legislative process. **2** **Content of the New Guidelines** the approach of the 1997 Guidelines. H In order to ensure Japan’s peace and security under any circumstances, from peacetime to contingencies, and to promote a stable, peaceful, and prosperous AsiaPacif c region and beyond, bilateral security and defense cooperation will emphasize: – seamless, robust, f exible, and effective bilateral responses; – synergy across the two governments’ national security policies; – a whole-of-government Alliance approach; – cooperation with regional and other partners, as well as international organizations; and – the global nature of the Japan-U.S. Alliance H The two governments will maintain their individual defense postures based on their national security policies. The United States will continue to extend deterrence to Japan through the full range of capabilities, including U.S. nuclear forces. The United States also will continue to forward deploy combat-ready forces in the AsiaPacif c region and maintain the ability to reinforce those forces rapidly **3** **Background to the Revision** Against the background described above, at the JapanU.S. SCC (“2+2” Meeting) in October 2013, the Ministers directed the Subcommittee for Defense Cooperation (SDC) to draft recommended changes to the 1997 Guidelines, and this task was to be completed by the end of 2014. The Joint Statement of the “2+2” Meeting identif ed the following seven objectives of the review of the 1997 Guidelines: 1) Ensuring the Alliance’s capacity to respond to an armed attack against Japan, as a core aspect of JapanU.S. defense cooperation; 2) Expanding the scope of cooperation, to ref ect the global nature of the Japan-U.S. Alliance, encompassing such areas as counterterrorism, counter-piracy, peacekeeping, capacity building, humanitarian assistance/disaster relief, and equipment and technology enhancement; 3) Promoting deeper security cooperation with other regional partners to advance shared objectives and values; 4) Enhancing Alliance mechanisms for consultation and coordination to make them more f exible, timely, and **2** **Content of the New Guidelines** As a result of the intensive bilateral work on the revision of the Guidelines, the Japan-U.S. Security Consultative Committee (SCC) approved the new Guidelines recommended by the Subcommittee for Defense Cooperation (SDC) at the “2+2” Meeting held on April 27, 2015, thereby accomplishing the objectives outlined by the Ministers in October 2013. The new Guidelines, which replace the 1997 Guidelines, update the general framework and policy direction for the roles and missions of the two countries and manifest a strategic vision for a more robust Alliance and greater shared responsibilities by modernizing the Alliance and enhancing its deterrence and response capabilities in all phases, from peacetime to contingencies. See Part II, Chapter 3, Section 3-2-2 (“2+2” Meeting (April 27, 2015)); Reference 18 (The Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation (April 27, 2015)) **1** **Defense Cooperation and the Aim of the Guidelines** The new Guidelines newly specif ed the matters to be emphasized in security and defense cooperation. The objectives of the new Guidelines are retained in line with ----- H The Guidelines provide the general framework and policy direction for the roles and missions of Japan and the United States, as well as ways of cooperation and coordination. H The Guidelines promote domestic and international understanding of the signif cance of the Japan-U.S. Alliance. **(2) Enhanced Operational Coordination** The two governments recognize the importance of collocating operational coordination functions. The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will exchange personnel to ensure robust information sharing, to facilitate coordination and to support international activities. **(3) Bilateral Planning** In peacetime, the two governments will develop and update bilateral plans through Bilateral Planning Mechanism. Bilateral plans are to be ref ected appropriately in the plans of both governments. **2** **Basic Premises and Principles** The basic premises and principles maintain the approaches of the 1997 Guidelines as described below: H The rights and obligations under the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty and its related arrangements will remain unchanged. H All actions and activities undertaken under the Guidelines will be consistent with international law. H All actions and activities undertaken by Japan and the United States will be in accordance with their respective constitutions, laws and regulations then in effect, and basic positions on national security policy. Japan will conduct actions and activities in accordance with its basic positions, such as the maintenance of its exclusively national defense-oriented policy and its three non-nuclear principles. H The Guidelines do not obligate either government to take legislative, budgetary, administrative, or other measures, nor do the Guidelines create legal rights or obligations for either government. Since the objective of the Guidelines, however, is to establish an effective framework for bilateral cooperation, the two governments are expected to ref ect in an appropriate way the results of these efforts, based on their own judgment, in their specif c policies and measures. **4** **Seamlessly Ensuring Japan’s Peace and Security** This section presents the direction of achieving seamless cooperation, from peacetime to contingencies, in order to ensure Japan’s peace and security, the core of the Guidelines. H The two governments will take measures to seamlessly ensure Japan’s peace and security in all phases from peacetime to contingencies, including situations when an armed attack against Japan is not involved. In this context, the two governments also will promote further cooperation with partners. H The two governments will utilize the Alliance Coordination Mechanism where appropriate for assessment of the situation, sharing of information, as well as f exible deterrent options and actions aimed at de-escalation of the situation. The two governments also will coordinate strategic messaging through appropriate channels. **(1) Cooperative Measures from Peacetime** As described below, this section specif es ways of cooperation from peacetime to strengthen the deterrence and response capabilities of the Japan-U.S. Alliance. H The two governments will promote cooperation across a wide range of areas, including through diplomatic efforts, to strengthen the deterrence and capabilities of the Japan-U.S. Alliance. H The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will enhance interoperability, readiness, and vigilance to prepare for all possible situations. To these ends, the two governments will take measures, including, but not limited to, the following: a. Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will conduct intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) activities based on the capabilities and availability of their respective assets. This will include conducting bilateral ISR activities in a mutually supportive manner to ensure persistent coverage of developments that could affect Japan’s peace and security **3** **Strengthened Alliance Coordination** Effective bilateral cooperation under the Guidelines will require the two governments to conduct close, consultative dialogue and sound policy and operational coordination from peacetime to contingencies. For this purpose, the two governments will establish a new, standing Alliance Coordination Mechanism, enhance operational coordination, and strengthen bilateral planning. **(1) Alliance Coordination Mechanism** In order to address seamlessly and effectively any situation that affects Japan’s peace and security or any other situation that may require an Alliance response, the two governments will utilize the Alliance Coordination Mechanism, and will strengthen policy and operational coordination related to activities conducted by the Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces in all phases from peacetime to contingencies. The two governments will establish necessary procedures and infrastructure (including facilities as well as information and communication systems) and conduct regular training and exercises ----- b. Air and Missile Defense The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will maintain and strengthen deterrence and their defense postures against ballistic missile launches and aerial incursions. The two governments will cooperate to expand early warning capabilities, interoperability, network coverage, and real-time information exchange and to pursue the comprehensive improvement of capabilities to respond to the threat of ballistic missiles, and will also closely coordinate in responding to provocative missile launches. c. Maritime Security The two governments will cooperate closely with each other on measures to maintain maritime order based upon international law, including freedom of navigation. The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will cooperate, as appropriate, on various efforts such as maintaining and enhancing a bilateral presence in the maritime domain through ISR and training and exercises, while further developing and enhancing shared maritime domain awareness. d. Asset Protection The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will provide mutual protection of each other’s assets, as appropriate, if engaged in activities that contribute to the defense of Japan in a cooperative manner, including during training and exercises. e. Training and Exercises The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will conduct effective bilateral and multilateral training and exercises both inside and outside of Japan in order to strengthen interoperability, sustainability, and readiness. Timely and realistic training and exercises will enhance deterrence. f. Logistic Support The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will provide mutual logistic support where appropriate, including supply, maintenance, transportation, engineering, and medical services, for such activities as set forth in the Japan-U.S. Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement and its related arrangements. g. Use of Facilities The two governments will enhance joint/shared use of facilities and areas in order to expand interoperability and improve f exibility and resiliency of the Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces. The two governments also will cooperate in conducting site surveys on facilities, including civilian airports and seaports. **(2) Responses to Emerging Threats to Japan’s Peace** **and Security** As set forth below, this section describes measures to respond to emerging threats to Japan’s peace and security. H The Alliance will respond to situations that will have an important inf uence on Japan’s peace and security. Such situations cannot be defned geographically The measures described in this section include those that may be taken, in accordance with the two countries’ respective laws and regulations, in circumstances that have not yet amounted to such a situation. H In addition to continuing cooperative measures from peacetime, the two governments will pursue all avenues. Utilizing the Alliance Coordination Mechanism, the two governments will take additional measures, based on their own decisions, including, but not limited to, those listed below. a. Noncombatant Evacuation Operations The two governments will coordinate in planning and cooperate in carrying out evacuations of Japanese or U.S. noncombatants. These evacuations will be carried out using each country’s capabilities such as transportation means and facilities in a mutually supplementary manner. The two governments will enhance coordination in noncombatant evacuation operations from peacetime, including by conducting training and exercises. b. Maritime Security The two governments’ cooperative measures may include, but are not limited to, information sharing and inspection of ships based on a United Nations Security Council resolution or other basis under international law. c. Measures to Deal with Refugees If a situation develops such that a f ow of refugees into Japan becomes likely or actually begins, the two governments will cooperate to maintain Japan’s peace and security. d. Search and Rescue The two governments will cooperate and provide mutual support, as appropriate, in search and rescue operations. The Self-Defense Forces will provide support to combat search and rescue operations by the United States where appropriate, subject to Japanese laws and regulations. e. Protection of Facilities and Areas The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces are responsible for protecting their own facilities and areas in cooperation with relevant authorities. Upon request from the United States, Japan will provide additional protection for facilities and areas in Japan in close cooperation and coordination with the United States Armed Forces. f. Logistic Support The two governments will enhance mutual logistic support as appropriate, to enable effective and eff cient operations. The Government of Japan will provide logistic or other associated support where appropriate, subject to Japanese laws and regulations. g. Use of Facilities The Government of Japan will provide, as needed, temporary use of facilities, including civilian airports and seaports, in accordance with the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty and its related arrangements. ----- **(3) Actions in Response to an Armed Attack against** **Japan** The new Guidelines state that bilateral actions in response to an armed attack against Japan remain a core aspect of Japan-U.S. security and defense cooperation. While maintaining the basic principles of bilateral responses to an armed attack against Japan described in the 1997 Guidelines, the content of the new Guidelines have been enhanced in view of the expansion and diversif cation of cooperation between Japan and the United States. a. When an Armed Attack against Japan is Anticipated The two governments will take measures to deter an armed attack and to de-escalate the situation, while making preparations necessary for the defense of Japan. b. When an Armed Attack against Japan Occurs (a) Principles for Coordinated Actions - Japan and the United States will take appropriate and coordinated actions to promptly repel the attack and deter any further attacks. - The Self-Defense Forces will have primary responsibility to conduct defensive operations, and the United States Armed Forces will support and supplement the Self-Defense Forces. (b) Concept of Operations 1) Operations to Defend Airspace The Self-Defense Forces will have primary responsibility for conducting air defense operations while ensuring air superiority. For this purpose, the Self-Defense Forces will take necessary actions, including, but not limited to, defense against attacks by aircraft and cruise missiles. The United States Armed Forces will conduct operations to support and supplement the Self-Defense Forces’ operations. 2) Operations to Counter Ballistic Missile Attacks The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will exchange real-time information for early detection of ballistic missile launches. When there is an indication of a ballistic missile attack, they will maintain an effective posture to defend against ballistic missile attacks heading for Japan and to protect forces participating in ballistic missile defense operations. The Self-Defense Forces will have primary responsibility for conducting ballistic missile defense operations. The United States Armed Forces will conduct operations to support and supplement the Self-Defense Forces’ operations. 3) Operations to Defend Maritime Areas The Self-Defense Forces will have primary responsibility for the protection of major ports and straits in Japan and of ships and vessels in waters surrounding Japan and for other associated operations. The United States Armed Forces will conduct operations to support and supplement the Self-Defense Forces’ operations The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will cooperate in the interdiction of shipping activities providing support to adversaries involved in the armed attack. 4) Operations to Counter Ground Attacks The Self-Defense Forces will have primary responsibility to prevent and repel ground attacks, including those against islands. If the need arises, the Self-Defense Forces will conduct operations to retake an island. The Self-Defense Forces, in cooperation with relevant agencies, also will have primary responsibility for defeating attacks by special operations forces or any other unconventional attacks. The United States Armed Forces will conduct operations to support and supplement the Self-Defense Forces’ operations. 5) Cross-Domain Operations Examples of cooperation across domains include the actions described below. The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces, in cooperation with relevant agencies, as appropriate, will strengthen their respective ISR postures, enhance the sharing of intelligence, and provide protection for each other’s ISR assets. The United States Armed Forces may conduct operations involving the use of strike power, to support and supplement the Self-Defense Forces. When the United States Armed Forces conduct such operations, the Self-Defense Forces may provide support, as necessary. These operations will be based on close bilateral coordination, as appropriate. (c) Operational Support Activities 1) Communications and Electronics The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will ensure effective communication between the two forces and maintain a common operational picture for bilateral operations under common situational awareness. 2) Search and Rescue The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces, in cooperation with relevant agencies, will cooperate and provide mutual support in search and rescue operations, including combat search and rescue, as appropriate. 3) Logistic SupportWhen operations require supplementing their respective logistics resources, the Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will provide f exible and timely mutual logistic support, based on their respective capabilities and availability. 4) Use of Facilities The Government of Japan will provide, as needed, additional facilities in accordance with the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty and its related arrangements. The two governments will enhance cooperation in joint/shared ----- use of facilities and areas. 5) Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Protection At Japan’s request, the United States will support Japan in CBRN incident or attack prevention and response-related activities in an effort to ensure the protection of Japan, as appropriate. **(4) Actions in Response to an Armed Attack against a** **Country other than Japan** When Japan and the United States each decides to take actions involving the use of force in accordance with international law, including full respect for sovereignty, and with their respective Constitutions and laws to respond to an armed attack against the United States or a third country, and Japan has not come under armed attack, they will cooperate closely to respond to the armed attack and to deter further attacks. Bilateral responses will be coordinated through the whole-of-government Alliance Coordination Mechanism. Japan and the United States will cooperate as appropriate with other countries taking action in response to the armed attack. The Self-Defense Forces will conduct appropriate operations involving the use of force to respond to situations where an armed attack against a foreign country that is in a close relationship with Japan occurs and as a result, threatens Japan’s survival and poses a clear danger to overturn fundamentally its people’s right to life, liberty, and pursuit of happiness, to ensure Japan’s survival, and to protect its people. Examples of cooperative operations are outlined below. a. Asset Protection The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will cooperate in asset protection, as appropriate. Such cooperation will include, but not be limited to, protection of assets that are engaged in operations such as Noncombatant Evacuation Operations or Ballistic Missile Defense. b. Search and Rescue The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces, in cooperation with relevant agencies, will cooperate and provide support in search and rescue operations, including combat search and rescue, as appropriate. c. Maritime Operations The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will cooperate in minesweeping, as appropriate, including to secure the safety of sea lines of communication. The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces, in cooperation with relevant agencies, will cooperate in escort operations to protect ships and vessels, as appropriate. The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces, in cooperation with relevant agencies, will cooperate in the interdiction of shipping activities providing support to adversaries involved in the armed attack, as appropriate. d. Operations to Counter Ballistic Missile Attacks The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will cooperate in intercepting ballistic missiles, as appropriate, in accordance with their respective capabilities. The two governments will exchange information to ensure early detection of ballistic missile launches. e. Logistics Support When operations require supplementing their respective logistics resources, the Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will provide f exible and timely mutual logistic support, based on their respective capabilities and availability. The two governments will make appropriate use of the authorities and assets of central and local government agencies, as well as private sector assets, to provide support. **(5) Cooperation in Response to a Large-scale Disaster** **in Japan** In light of the experience of the Great East Japan Earthquake, the new Guidelines now include the following. H When a large-scale disaster takes place in Japan, Japan will have primary responsibility for responding to the disaster. The Self-Defense Forces, in cooperation with relevant agencies, local governments, and private actors, will conduct disaster relief operations. The United States, in accordance with its own criteria, will provide appropriate support for Japan’s activities. The two governments will coordinate activities through the Alliance Coordination Mechanism, as appropriate. H The two governments will work together closely, including through information sharing. The United States Armed Forces may participate in disaster-related drills, which will increase mutual understanding in responding to large-scale disasters. **5** **Cooperation for Regional and Global Peace and** **Security** The new Guidelines stipulate specif c ways of Japan-U.S. cooperation for regional and global peace and security, based on experiences from previous international activities. H In an increasingly interconnected world, Japan and the United States will take a leading role in cooperation with partners to provide a foundation for peace, security, stability, and economic prosperity in the Asia-Pacif c region and beyond. H When each of the two governments decides to participate in international activities, the two governments will cooperate closely with each other and with partners, as appropriate, such as in the activities described below. **(1) Cooperation in International Activities** The two governments will participate in international activities, based on their own judgment. When working together, the Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will cooperate to the maximum extent practicable ----- Common areas for cooperation by the two governments will include the following. a. Peacekeeping Operations The two governments will cooperate, as appropriate, to maximize interoperability between the Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces. The two governments also may cooperate in providing logistic support for and protecting UN and other personnel who participate in the same mission, as appropriate. b. International Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief The two governments will cooperate closely to provide mutual support, as appropriate, maximizing interoperability between participating Self-Defense Forces and United States Armed Forces. Examples of cooperative activities may include mutual logistic support and operational coordination, planning, and execution. c. Maritime Security The two governments will cooperate closely, as appropriate. Examples of cooperative activities may include efforts for: safe and secure sea lines of communication such as counterpiracy and minesweeping; nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction; and counterterrorism activities. d. Partner Capacity Building The two governments will cooperate in capacity building activities, as appropriate, by making the best use of their capabilities and experience, with the objective of strengthening the capability of partners. Examples of cooperative activities may include maritime security, military medicine, defense institution building, and improved force readiness for humanitarian assistance/ disaster relief (HA/DR) or peacekeeping operations. e. Noncombatant Evacuation Operations In circumstances when international action is required for the evacuation of noncombatants, the two governments will utilize, as appropriate, all possible avenues including diplomatic efforts to ensure the safety of noncombatants, including those who are Japanese or U.S. nationals. f. Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance When the two governments participate in international activities, the Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will cooperate in ISR activities, as appropriate, based on the respective capabilities and availability of their assets. g. Training and Exercises In order to enhance the effectiveness of international activities, the Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will conduct and participate in joint training and exercises, as appropriate. The two governments also will continue to pursue opportunities to work with partners in training and exercises. h. Logistic support When participating in international activities, the two governments will cooperate to provide mutual logistic support. The Government of Japan will provide logistic support where appropriate subject to Japanese laws and regulations **(2) Trilateral and Multilateral Cooperation** The two governments will promote and improve trilateral and multilateral security and defense cooperation. The two governments also will work together to strengthen regional and international institutions with a view to promoting cooperation based upon international law and standards. **6** **Space and Cyberspace Cooperation** The new Guidelines now incorporate cooperation in emerging strategic domains such as space and cyberspace. **(1) Cooperation on Space** H The two governments will maintain and strengthen their partnership to secure the responsible, peaceful, and safe use of space. H The two governments will ensure the resiliency of their space systems and enhance space situational awareness cooperation. H The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will continue to cooperate in such areas as earlywarning, ISR, positioning, navigation and timing, space situational awareness, meteorological observation, command, control, and communications. **(2) Cooperation on Cyberspace** H The two governments will share information on threats and vulnerabilities in cyberspace in a timely and appropriate manner. The two governments will cooperate to protect critical infrastructure and the services upon which the Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces depend to accomplish their missions. H The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will maintain a posture to monitor their respective networks and systems, conduct educational exchanges, ensure resiliency of their respective networks and systems, contribute to whole-of-government efforts, and conduct bilateral exercises. H In the event of cyber incidents against Japan, Japan will have primary responsibility to respond, and the United States will provide appropriate support to Japan. In the event of serious cyber incidents that affect the security of Japan, the two governments will consult closely and take appropriate cooperative actions to respond. **7** **Bilateral Enterprise** The new Guidelines state that the two governments will develop and enhance the following areas as a foundation of security and defense cooperation, in order to improve further the effectiveness of bilateral cooperation. (1) Defense Equipment and Technology Cooperation (2) Intelligence Cooperation and Information Security (3) Educational and Research Exchanges ----- and appropriate manner if deemed necessary. The new Guidelines newly incorporate the implementation of the regular evaluation while maintaining the approach of the 1997 Guidelines. **8** **Processes for Review** The two governments will regularly evaluate whether the Guidelines remain adequate in light of the evolving circumstances, and will update the Guidelines in a timely **Section 3 Initiatives to Build the Foundation for Strengthening the Alliance** **1** **Background to the Strengthening of the Alliance** Since the conclusion of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty in 1960, Japan and the United States have built a robust alliance based on democratic ideals, respect for human rights, the rule of law and common interests. During the Cold War era, the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements ensured the safety of Japan as a country with a liberal ideology. It also contributed to peace and stability in the region. Following the end of the Cold War, the leaders of Japan and the United States announced the Japan-U.S. Joint Declaration on Security in 1996, reaff rming the importance of the Japan-U.S. Alliance in light of the state of affairs in the Asia-Pacif c region following the Cold War. Upon the Declaration, the f nal report was compiled at the Special Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO) at the end of that year, and as part of the promotion of cooperative relations presented in the Declaration, at the “2+2” Meeting held in the following year (1997), the aforementioned 1997 Guidelines were approved. Afterwards, in light of further changes to the security environment due to the 9/11 terrorist attacks in 2001 and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, following the “2+2” Meeting in December 2002, Japan and the United States held working-level and other consultations as part of bilateral strategic dialogue on security from the perspective of how to make the Japan-U.S. Alliance’s capacity more effective to adapt to changing times. As a result of a number of these Japan-U.S. consultations, the direction of the Japan-U.S. Alliance was arranged in three stages. These stages are: conf rmation of common strategic objectives to both countries, including enhancing peace and stability in the Asia-Pacif c region (f rst stage) in February 2005; the announcement of the results of the examination of the roles, missions, and capabilities of Japan and the United States for accomplishing the common strategic objectives (second stage) in October 2005; and the formulation of the United States-Japan Roadmap for Realignment Implementation, a program for implementing specif c measures for the realignment of the U.S. Forces in Japan, in May 2006. See Reference 19 (United States–Japan Roadmap for Realignment Implementation) Furthermore, Japan and the United States at the “2+2” Meeting in May 2007 reconf rmed and updated their common strategic objectives. In February 2009, the two countries signed the Agreement between the Government of Japan and the Government of the United States of America concerning the Implementation of the Relocation of III Marine Expeditionary Force personnel and their dependents from Okinawa to Guam (the Guam International Agreement), which entered into force in May 2009. In the Joint Statement of the “2+2” Meeting in June 2011, the two countries revalidated and updated their common strategic objectives set forth in the Joint Statements of the previous “2+2” Meetings, including maintenance of maritime security domain by defending the principle of freedom of navigation and maintenance of bilateral cooperation with respect to protection of and access to space and cyberspace, and covered a diverse range of areas regarding the strengthening of alliance security and defense cooperation, including an expansion of information sharing and joint intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) activities. In the Joint Statement of the “2+2” Meeting in April 2012, Japan and the United States announced that they decided to adjust the plans outlined in the United States-Japan Roadmap for Realignment Implementation (Realignment Roadmap) of May 2006, considering signif cant progress on the realignment of the U.S. Forces stationed in Japan since the Joint Statement of the “2+2” Meeting in June 2011 as well as the security environment in the Asia-Pacif c region. See Part II, Chapter 3, Section 4-2-1 (Achievements in the “2+2” Joint Statement (April 27, 2012)); Fig. II-3-3-1 (Major Milestones in Security Cooperation Between Japan and the United States); Fig. II-33-2 (Overview of Japan-U.S. Consultations); Reference 20 (Joint Statement of the Security Consultative Committee (April 27, 2012)) ----- and appropriate manner if deemed necessary. The new Guidelines newly incorporate the implementation of the regular evaluation while maintaining the approach of the 1997 Guidelines. **8** **Processes for Review** The two governments will regularly evaluate whether the Guidelines remain adequate in light of the evolving circumstances, and will update the Guidelines in a timely **Section 3 Initiatives to Build the Foundation for Strengthening the Alliance** **1** **Background to the Strengthening of the Alliance** Since the conclusion of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty in 1960, Japan and the United States have built a robust alliance based on democratic ideals, respect for human rights, the rule of law and common interests. During the Cold War era, the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements ensured the safety of Japan as a country with a liberal ideology. It also contributed to peace and stability in the region. Following the end of the Cold War, the leaders of Japan and the United States announced the Japan-U.S. Joint Declaration on Security in 1996, reaff rming the importance of the Japan-U.S. Alliance in light of the state of affairs in the Asia-Pacif c region following the Cold War. Upon the Declaration, the f nal report was compiled at the Special Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO) at the end of that year, and as part of the promotion of cooperative relations presented in the Declaration, at the “2+2” Meeting held in the following year (1997), the aforementioned 1997 Guidelines were approved. Afterwards, in light of further changes to the security environment due to the 9/11 terrorist attacks in 2001 and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, following the “2+2” Meeting in December 2002, Japan and the United States held working-level and other consultations as part of bilateral strategic dialogue on security from the perspective of how to make the Japan-U.S. Alliance’s capacity more effective to adapt to changing times. As a result of a number of these Japan-U.S. consultations, the direction of the Japan-U.S. Alliance was arranged in three stages. These stages are: conf rmation of common strategic objectives to both countries, including enhancing peace and stability in the Asia-Pacif c region (f rst stage) in February 2005; the announcement of the results of the examination of the roles, missions, and capabilities of Japan and the United States for accomplishing the common strategic objectives (second stage) in October 2005; and the formulation of the United States-Japan Roadmap for Realignment Implementation, a program for implementing specif c measures for the realignment of the U.S. Forces in Japan, in May 2006. See Reference 19 (United States–Japan Roadmap for Realignment Implementation) Furthermore, Japan and the United States at the “2+2” Meeting in May 2007 reconf rmed and updated their common strategic objectives. In February 2009, the two countries signed the Agreement between the Government of Japan and the Government of the United States of America concerning the Implementation of the Relocation of III Marine Expeditionary Force personnel and their dependents from Okinawa to Guam (the Guam International Agreement), which entered into force in May 2009. In the Joint Statement of the “2+2” Meeting in June 2011, the two countries revalidated and updated their common strategic objectives set forth in the Joint Statements of the previous “2+2” Meetings, including maintenance of maritime security domain by defending the principle of freedom of navigation and maintenance of bilateral cooperation with respect to protection of and access to space and cyberspace, and covered a diverse range of areas regarding the strengthening of alliance security and defense cooperation, including an expansion of information sharing and joint intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) activities. In the Joint Statement of the “2+2” Meeting in April 2012, Japan and the United States announced that they decided to adjust the plans outlined in the United States-Japan Roadmap for Realignment Implementation (Realignment Roadmap) of May 2006, considering signif cant progress on the realignment of the U.S. Forces stationed in Japan since the Joint Statement of the “2+2” Meeting in June 2011 as well as the security environment in the Asia-Pacif c region. See Part II, Chapter 3, Section 4-2-1 (Achievements in the “2+2” Joint Statement (April 27, 2012)); Fig. II-3-3-1 (Major Milestones in Security Cooperation Between Japan and the United States); Fig. II-33-2 (Overview of Japan-U.S. Consultations); Reference 20 (Joint Statement of the Security Consultative Committee (April 27, 2012)) ----- |Major Milestones in Security Cooperation Betw Fig. II-3-3-1|ween Japan and the United States| |---|---| |1951 1952 Years of the former Japan-U.S. Security Treaty 1958 Revision of Japan-U.S. Security Treaty 1960 and the new Japan-U.S. Security Treaty|The former Japan-U.S. Security Treaty is signed The treaty enters into force Fujiyama-Dulles Talks (agreement on the revision of the treaty) The new Japan-U.S. Security Treaty is signed and enters into force| |1968 1969 1972 1976 Formulation of the 1978 Guidelines|(Ogasawara Islands are returned to Japan) Sato-Nixon Talks (agreement on the renewal of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty and the return of Okinawa to Japan) (Okinawa is returned to Japan) (Agreement on the establishment of Sub-Committee for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation)| |1978 and expanding Japan-U.S. defense cooperation|Formulation of the 1978 Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation (1978 Guidelines)| |1991 1996 End of the Cold War and the establishment of the 1997 Guidelines 1997 2001 2003 Japan-U.S. relations since the 9/11 2006 Terrorist attacks in the United States|(Collapse of USSR and end of the Cold War) Japan-U.S. Joint Declaration on Security (Hashimoto-Clinton Talks) SACO Final Report Formulation of the 1997 Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation (1997 Guidelines) 9/11 terrorist attacks in the U.S. The Japan-U.S. Alliance in the global context (Koizumi-Bush Talks) Formulation of the United States-Japan Roadmap for Realignment Implementation| |2007 2010 2012 2013 2014 2015 New security environment and the establishment of the new Guidelines|The Japan-U.S. Alliance of the New Century (Koizumi-Bush Talks) The Japan-U.S. Alliance for the World and Asia (Abe-Bush Talks) Irreplaceable Japan-U.S. Alliance (Abe-Bush Talks) 50th anniversary of the conclusion of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty Japan-U.S. Joint Statement: A Shared Vision For the Future (Noda-Obama Talks) Agreement on the revision of the 1997 Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation (1997 Guidelines) The United States and Japan: Shaping the Future of the Asia-Pacific and Beyond (Abe-Obama Talks) U.S.-Japan Joint Vision Statement (Abe-Obama Talks) Formulation of the New Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation (New Guidelines)| ----- |Col1|Col2|Col3|Col4|SS|ttaa|ggeess oo|ff JJ|aa|ppaa|nn--|UU..SS.. CCoo|nnssuu|llttaa|ttiioo| |---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---| |Fig. II-3-3-2|Overview of Japan-U.S. Consultations|Col3|Col4|Col5|Col6|Col7|Col8|Col9|Col10|Col11|Col12|Col13|Col14|Col15|Col16|Col17|Col18|Col19| |---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---| |Consultation|SSttaaggeess ooff JJaappaann--UU..SS.. CCoonnssuullttaattiioonnss|||||||||||||||||| ||First stage||||||Second stage|||||Third stage||||||| |December 2002|The two coun|||||||||||eld of security||||||| ||||||||Joint Statement at the “2+2” Meeting tries agreed to further bilateral consultations in the general fi|||||||||||| |February 2005 October 2005||||||||||||Force posture realignment (realignment of U.S. Force structure in Japan) (at the third stage)||||||| ||Confirmation of Common Strategic Objectives (at the first stage)||||||Joint Statement at the “2+2” Meeting Roles, Missions, and Capabilities of Japan and the U.S. (at the second stage)||||||Force posture realignment (realignment of U.S. Force structure in Japan) (at the third stage)|||||| ||||||Japan-U.S. Alliance||: Transformation and Realignment for the Future S Summary of studies on roles, missions, and capabilities (at the second stage)|||||tudy Recommendation on realignment||||||| |May 2006||||||||||||Maintenance of deterrence and capabilities||||Mitigate impact on local communities||| ||||||||Japan-U.S. Roadmap for||Real|ignment Implementation||Finalization of realignment initiatives (at the third stage)||||||| |||||||||||||||||||| |May 2007||||||||||||||||||ent| ||Reconfirm|Reconfirm||ation|/renewal||oint Statement at the “2+2”||Meeti|ng, “Alliance Transformati||on: ion” Implementation of the realignment roadmap||||||| ||||||||vancing Japan-United States||Sec|urity and Defense Cooperat||||||||| |||||||||||||||||||| |||||Co|mmon Strategic Objectives|||Roles, Missio|ns, a|nd Capabilities|||Implementation of the realignment roadmap|||||| |||Reconfirm||ation|/renewal|||||||Com|||||plem|| |June 2011|||||B mon Strategic Objectives||Joint Statement at the “2+2”||Mee|ting, “Toward a Deeper an||2+2 Document “Progress d on the Realignment ip” of U.S. Forces in Japan” Continued progress toward r Realignment Roadmap’s Obj||||||ng es| ||||||||roader U.S.-Japan Alliance: B||uildi|ng on 50 Years of Partnersh||||||||| |||||Com|mon Strategic Objectives||Strengthening o Defens|Strengthening o Defens|f Allia e Coo|nce Security and peration|||Continued progress toward r Realignment Roadmap’s Obj||||ealizi ectiv|ng es| |||||||||||||||||||| |||||||||||||||||||| |April 2012||||||||||||||||||ed| ||||||||Joint Statement||of th|e “2+2” Meeting||Decision to adjust the plans o in the Roadmap||||||ed| ||||||||||||||Decision to adjust the plans o in the Roadmap||||utlin|ed| |||||||||||||||||||| |||||||||||||||||||| |October 2013||||||||||||||||||| ||Stra in||||Joint Statement at the||“2+2” Meeting, “Toward a M||ore R|obust Alliance and Greater||Shared Responsibilities”||||||asures ding ies| ||||Stra in|tegic form|concept and recognition of local ation of the Japan-U.S. Alliance||Strengthening of bila cooperation includin||teral g rev|security and defense iew of the guidelines||Welcomes the progress in realignme for the U.S. Forces and the USFJ mitigating impact on local com|Welcomes the progress in realignme for the U.S. Forces and the USFJ mitigating impact on local com||||nt me inclu munit|asures ding ies| |||||||||||||||||||| |||||||||||||||||||| |April 2015||||||||||||urity Environment” Reaffirmed the two governments’ continued commitment to the realignment of U.S. Forces in Japan||||||| ||Joint Statement a Reconfirmed the Alliance’s commitment||||||t the “2+2” Meeting, “A Stronger Alliance for a Dynamic Sec|||||urity Environment” Reaffirmed the two governments’ continued commitment to the realignment of U.S. Forces in Japan||||||| ||||||||Enhanced bilateral security and defense cooperation (e.g. release of the new Guidelines)|||||||||||| |||||||||||||||||||| Stages of Japan-U.S. Consultations ----- **2** **Policy Consultations between Japan and the United States** **1** **Initiatives including the “2+2” Meeting** Japan and the United States have maintained close coordination at multiple levels, including the summitlevel and ministerial level, and have continually strengthened and expanded cooperative relations for the peace, stability and prosperity of not only the two countries but also the entire international community, including the Asia-Pacific region. Close policy consultations on security are conducted through diplomatic channels as well as between off cials in charge of defense and foreign affairs at multiple levels in the Governments of Japan and the United States through meetings such as the Japan-United States Security Consultative Committee (SCC) (“2+2” Meeting), the Security Subcommittee (SSC) and the Subcommittee for Defense Cooperation (SDC). As the framework for ministerial consultations among the top off cials in charge of defense and foreign affairs of the two countries, the Security Consultative Committee (SCC) (“2+2” Meeting) represents such policy consultations. The SCC functions as an important consultative panel to discuss issues related to Japan-U.S. cooperation in the area of security. See Fig. II-3-3-3 (Major Consultations on Policies Held between Japanese and U.S. Government Offi cials concerning Japan-U.S. Security Issues) In addition, the Ministry of Defense organizes Japan-U.S. defense ministerial meetings between the Japanese Defense Minister and the U.S. Secretary of Defense as necessary where discussions are made with a focus on the defense policies of the respective governments and defense cooperation. Furthermore, the Japanese Parliamentary Senior Vice-Minister of Defense and the U.S. Deputy Secretary of Defense work together, and MOD officials, including the Administrative ViceMinister of Defense, the Chief of Staff of the Joint Staff, the Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs, and Chiefs of Staff of SDFs, have working level meetings when necessary and exchange information with the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) and others under the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements. Furthermore, in recent years, the Chief of Staff of the Joint Staff of the SDF and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff held the strategic dialogue in April 2014 for the first time ever. The importance of these opportunities has been further increased as Japan-U.S. defense cooperation has been enhanced. The sharing of information and views at every opportunity and level between Japan and the United States is undoubtedly conducive to the increased credibility of the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements, and results in the further enhancement of close collaboration between the two countries. Therefore, the MOD is proactively engaging in these initiatives. See Reference 21 (Japan U S (Minister Level) Consultations (Since 2012)) Chief of Staff of the Joint Staff Kawano meeting with General Martin E. Dempsey, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the United States **2** **“2+2” Meeting (April 27, 2015)** On April 27, 2015, Japan and the United States held the “2+2” Meeting in New York. This meeting, held in the milestone year marking the 70th anniversary of the end of World War II, heralded Prime Minister Abe’s off cial visit to the United States and the Japan-U.S. Summit Meeting held on the next day (April 28, 2015), opening a new chapter in the long history of the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements and Defense Cooperation. The major accomplishments of the Joint Statement of this “2+2” Meeting are as follows. (1) The Ministers announced the approval of “the new Guidelines,” which update the general framework and policy directions for the roles and missions of the two countries and manifest a strategic vision for a more robust Alliance and greater shared responsibilities by modernizing the Alliance and enhancing its deterrence and response capabilities for all phases from peacetime to contingencies. (2) Both countries noted with satisfaction ongoing progress in strengthening the Alliance’s deterrence and response capabilities. (3) Recognizing the Japan-U.S. Alliance as the cornerstone of peace and security in the region as well as a platform for promoting a more peaceful and stable international security environment, the Ministers highlighted recent progress in regional and international cooperation, including humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations. (4) The Ministers reaff rmed the two governments’ continued commitment to implement existing arrangements on the realignment of U.S. forces in Japan as soon as possible, while ensuring operational capability, including training capabilities, throughout the process. In addition, both parties also underscored their commitment to maintaining a robust and f exible force posture that enhances deterrence by strengthening the capability to respond effectively to future challenges ----- |Consultative Forum|Participants|Col3|Purpose|Legal Basis| |---|---|---|---|---| ||Japanese Side|U.S. Side||| |Security Consultative Committee (SCC) (“2+2” Meeting)|Minister for Foreign Affairs, Minister of Defense|U.S. Secretary of State, U.S. Secretary of Defense1|Study of matters which would promote understanding between the Japanese and U.S. Governments and contribute to the strengthening of cooperative relations in the areas of security, which form the basis of security and are related to security|Established on the basis of letters exchanged between the Prime Minister of Japan and the U.S. Secretary of State on January 19, 1960, in accordance with Article IV of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty| |Security Subcommittee (SSC)|Participants are not specifi ed2|Participants are not specifi ed2|Exchange of views on security issues of mutual concern to Japan and the United States|Article IV of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty and others| |Subcommittee for Defense Cooperation (SDC)3|Director-General of North American Affairs Bureau, Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Director General of Bureau of Defense Policy, Director General of the Bureau of Operational Policy, Ministry of Defense; Representative from Joint Staff4|Assistant Secretary of State, Assistant Secretary of Defense, Representative from: U.S. Embassy in Japan, USFJ, Joint Staff, PACOM|Study and consideration of consultative measures to Japan and the United States including guidelines to ensure consistent joint responses covering the activities of the SDF and USFJ in emergencies|Established on July 8, 1976, as a subentry under the Japan-U.S. Security Consultative Committee in its 16th meeting Reorganized at the Japan-U.S. vice-ministerial consultation on June 28, 1996| |Japan-U.S. Joint Committee|Director-General of North American Affairs Bureau, Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Director General of Bureau of Local Cooperation, Ministry of Defense; and others|Deputy Commander of USFJ, Minister at the U.S. Embassy, and others|Consultation concerning implementation of the Status of Forces Agreement|Article XXV of the Status of Forces Agreement| Fig. II-3-3-3 Major Consultations on Policies Held between Japanese and U.S. Government Offi cials concerning Japan-U.S. Security Issues Notes: 1. The U.S. side was headed by the U.S. Ambassador to Japan and the Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. Pacifi c Command before December 26, 1990. 2. Meetings are held from time to time between working-level offi cials of the two Governments, such as offi cials corresponding in rank to vice-minister or assistant secretary. 3. A Council of Deputies consisting of Deputy-Director General and Deputy Assistant Secretaries was established when the SDC was recognized on June 28, 1996. 4. Then Director-General of the Bureau of Defense Operations was added on September 23, 1997. and threats, while also mitigating the impact of U.S. forces on local communities. The outline of the Joint Statement of the “2+2” Meeting is as follows: a. Overview (a) The Japan-U.S. Alliance and the New Guidelines H The Ministers announced the approval and release of new, revised “Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation” (the Guidelines). H The new Guidelines update the roles and missions of the two countries and promote a more balanced and effective Alliance to meet the emerging security challenges of the 21st century. H Both countries aff rmed that the Japan-U.S. Alliance, strengthened by the new Guidelines and the two countries’ respective security and defense policies, continues to serve as the cornerstone of peace and security in the Asia-Pacif c region as well as a platform for promoting a more peaceful and stable international security environment. (b) The United States continues to implement its rebalance to focus on the Asia Pacifc region H As articulated in its 2015 National Security Strategy, the United States is actively implementing its rebalance to focus on the Asia-Pacif c region. H The ironclad U.S. commitment to the defense of Japan, through the full range of U.S. military capabilities, including nuclear and conventional, is central to this. H In this context, the Ministers reaff rmed the indispensable role of the Japan-U.S. Alliance in promoting regional peace, security, and prosperity. (c) Japan’s Security Policy H As Japan continues its policy of “Proactive Contribution to Peace,” based on the principle of international cooperation, the United States welcomes and supports Japan’s recent momentous achievements. H Among these are: the cabinet decision by the Government of Japan on July 1, 2014, for developing seamless security legislation; the creation of its National Security Council; the Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology; the Act on the Protection of Specially Designated Secrets; the Basic Act on Cybersecurity; and the new Basic Plan on Space Policy ----- (d) Recognition of the Regional Situation The Ministers also reaff rmed that the Senkaku Islands are territories under the administration of Japan and therefore fall within the scope of the commitments under Article 5 of the Japan-U.S. Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security, and that they oppose any unilateral action that seeks to undermine Japan’s administration of these islands. b. The New Guidelines H Both countries approved the new Guidelines recommended by the Subcommittee for Defense Cooperation (SDC). This accomplished the objectives of the revision of the Guidelines as outlined by the Ministers in October 2013. H Recognizing the signif cance of ensuring consistency between the new Guidelines and Japan’s efforts to develop seamless security legislation, the Ministers acknowledged that such legislation would make bilateral efforts under the new Guidelines more effective. The United States welcomes and supports the ongoing efforts to develop the legislation, which is to ref ect Japan’s policy of “Proactive Contributions to Peace” and its July 2014 cabinet decision. H The Ministers conf rmed their intention to start bilateral work under the new Guidelines. In this context, the SCC directed the SDC to implement the new Guidelines, including establishing the standing Alliance Coordination Mechanism and upgrading the Bilateral Planning Mechanism, thereby strengthening bilateral planning. H The Ministers also expressed their intention to expeditiously negotiate an acquisition and cross-servicing agreement to operationalize the mutual logistics cooperation envisioned by the new Guidelines. c. Bilateral Security and Defense Cooperation H The Ministers noted with satisfaction ongoing progress in strengthening the Alliance’s deterrence and response capabilities in a variety of areas. - The Ministers confi rmed the strategic importance of deploying the most modern and advanced U.S. capabilities to Japan (i.e., welcomed the U.S. plans to deploy U.S. Navy P-8 maritime patrol aircraft; U.S. Air Force Global Hawk unmanned aerial vehicles; the USS Green Bay, an upgraded amphibious transport ship; and U.S. Marine Corps F-35B aircraft). - The Ministers committed to continued engagement through the bilateral Extended Deterrence Dialogue[1], which reinforces the credibility of the U.S. defense commitment to Japan, including through discussions on nuclear and conventional capabilities. - sustained cooperation in enhancing Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) capabilities, particularly the deployment of an AN/TPY-2 radar system to Kyogamisaki in December 2014 and the planned deployment of two additional BMD-capable destroyers to Japan by 2017. - space security, including the collaboration through the whole-of-government Japan-U.S. Comprehensive Dialogue on Space and other mechanisms and the establishment of a new framework for discussing space-related issues among the defense authorities. - cooperation on cyberspace issues, including cooperation through the whole-of-government Japan-U.S. Cyber Dialogue and the Cyber Defense Policy Working Group. - enhanced Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) cooperation, including the rotational deployment of U.S. Air Force Global Hawk unmanned aerial vehicles. - strengthened defense equipment cooperation, as ref ected by Japan’s Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology, the F-35 regional maintenance location (regional depot), the Japan-U.S. Systems and Technology Forum (S&TF) and others. - continued progress in information security measures through the Bilateral Information Security Consultations, including the implementation of the Act on the Protection of Specially Designated Secrets and the enhancement of information security cooperation. H The Ministers expressed their intention to start consultations on future arrangements to provide an appropriate level of host-nation support for U.S. forces in Japan. H Both countries aff rmed their intent to consider at the earliest opportunity an appropriate bilateral consultation framework that would enhance the eff ciency and effectiveness of Alliance management processes. d. Regional and International Cooperation H Recognizing the Japan-U.S. Alliance as the cornerstone of peace and security in the Asia-Pacif c region, as well as a platform for promoting a more peaceful and stable international security environment, the Ministers highlighted recent progress in the following areas: - Increased cooperation in Humanitarian Assistance/ Disaster Relief operations, as observed in the response to the November 2013 typhoon in the Philippines; - Continued close coordination on partner capacity building, particularly in Southeast Asia, including maritime security capacity building endeavors; and - Expanded trilateral and multilateral cooperation, particularly with key partners such as the Republic of Korea (ROK) and Australia, as well as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations. Japan and the United States leverage a trilateral information sharing arrangement with the ROK for expanded cooperation into the future concerning the nuclear and missile threats posed by North Korea. The Ministers also aff rmed their intention to pursue closer cooperation with Australia The Extended Deterrence Dialogue is designed for a frank exchange of views on ways to ensure the Japan-U.S. Alliance’s deterrence capability as part of Japan-U.S. security and defense cooperation, and functions as a forum for Japan, which is being provided with the U.S. deterrence capability, to deepen its understanding of the U.S. deterrence policy and to make policy adjustments necessary ----- in the Asia-Pacif c region remains increasingly severe, the Ministers agreed to further develop trilateral defense cooperation with the ROK or Australia. Furthermore, both parties agreed to continually enhance cooperation with Southeast Asian nations for capacity building assistance and other initiatives, from the perspective of making contributions to the peace and stability of the Asia-Pacif c region. b. Efforts to Ensure the Effectiveness of the New Guidelines and Development of Legislation for Peace and Security Minister Nakatani mentioned that the Cabinet had decided to approve the legislation for peace and security, and that the Japanese Diet had started deliberations on this topic. The Ministers conf rmed that this legislation will help ensure the effectiveness of the new Guidelines. Both parties also agreed to continually facilitate steady efforts to ensure the effectiveness of the new Guidelines by establishing the new Alliance Coordination Mechanism, developing bilateral plans, and expediting negotiations on the Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement. Both parties welcomed the fact that the Cyber Defense Policy Working Group had successfully compiled the results of its discussions and agreed to further enhance bilateral cooperation in cyber space. c. Realignment of U.S. Forces in Japan Minister Nakatani explained that Japan would continue to make utmost efforts to realize the return of Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS) Futenma and the relocation of MCAS Futenma to Camp Schwab as soon as possible. The Minister also stated that the relocation to Camp Schwab is the only solution to avoid continued use of MCAS Futenma. In addition, Minister Nakatani explained the importance of mitigating the impact of the U.S. Forces on Okinawa and requested cooperation from the United States. Secretary Carter stated that the United States would continue efforts to cooperate with Japan to mitigate the impact. d. Osprey Minister Nakatani stated that the Government of Japan has been explaining to its people that the deployment of the CV-22 Osprey to Japan starting in 2017 would enhance the deterrence and response capabilities of the Japan-U.S. Alliance and contribute to the stability of the Asia-Pacif c region. The Minister also referred to the accident involving an Osprey in Hawaii[2] and requested the U.S. side to offer additional information to ensure the safety of the aircraft, including information on this accident. Secretary Carter stated that the United States would provide necessary information to Japan and make all possible efforts to ensure safe operation of Osprey, including the MV-22 already deployed to Japan. Security Consultative Committee (SCC) (“2+2” Meeting) on capacity building activities in Southeast Asia, and on security and defense issues through the Security and Defense Cooperation Forum. e. Realignment of U.S. Forces in Japan H The Ministers reaff rmed the two governments’ continued commitment to the realignment of U.S. Forces in Japan. - Continue aviation training relocation, including to locations outside of Okinawa - Relocation of MCAS Futenma to Camp Schwab (Henoko). - Returns of the land south of Kadena Air Base (conf rmed the update of the Consolidation Plan by Spring 2016 and highlighted the on-time return of the West Futenma Housing Area). - Relocation of U.S. Marine Crops personnel from Okinawa to Guam (conf rmed the steady implementation of U.S. Marine Crops personnel relocation from Okinawa to locations outside of Japan as planned). - Continue negotiation on ancillary documents of an Agreement on Cooperation in the Field of Environmental Stewardship to supplement the Japan-U.S. Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) as expeditiously as possible. See Part II, Chapter 3, Section 4-2-3 (Achievements in the “2+2” Joint Statement (April 27, 2015)); Reference 23 (Joint Statement of the Security Consultative Committee (April 27, 2015)) **3** **Recent Japan-U.S. Meetings** **(1) Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting (May 30, 2015)** Minister Nakatani and Secretary Carter took the opportunity of the 14th IISS Asia Security Summit (Shangri-La Dialogue) to hold the Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting in Singapore. a. Overview and Regional Situation The Ministers exchanged views on the security environment in the Asia-Pacif c region and shared their view to continually oppose any attempts to change the status quo through the use of force in such areas as the East China Sea and the South China Sea. Also, as the security environment In relation to the hard landing of the MV-22 Osprey in the State of Hawaii on May 17, 2015 (U.S. time), the U.S. Government reported to Japan that as of the end of May 2015 there was no reason to believe that there was any fundamental defi ciency in the design of the MV-22 and that no reason had so far been discovered for generally stopping the operation of the MV-22, while investigations ----- represented the f rst time in history that a Prime Minister of Japan had such an opportunity. This visit also enhanced the personal relationship between President Obama and Prime Minister Abe. The following summarizes the Japan-U.S. Summit Meeting, made during this visit, from a security perspective. a. Opening Remarks President Obama said that Japan and the United States were making efforts to further vitalize their security relationship, and that strengthening the Japan-U.S. Alliance would be important for addressing various challenges in the region. Furthermore, President Obama stated that there was no more reliable partner than Japan when addressing various global challenges and working in the international arena, and that Prime Minister Abe’s courage and strength were important for both the United States and the world. In response, Prime Minister Abe emphasized the historic signif cance of his visit to the United States in this milestone year marking the 70th anniversary of the end of World War II, and expressed his gratitude for the invitation to make the off cial visit. Furthermore, Prime Minister Abe expressed his intention to take the opportunity of this Summit Meeting to send out a powerful message at home and abroad that the Japan-U.S. Alliance, whose foundation is a set of fundamental values of freedom, democracy, human rights and the rule of law, would fulf ll a leading role in ensuring peace and prosperity of the Asia-Pacif c region and the world. b. Japan-U.S. relations (a) Security and Defense Cooperation The two leaders voiced their appreciation of the success of the Japan-U.S. “2+2” Meeting that was held on April 27, and conf rmed that the alliance’s deterrence and response capabilities would be further strengthened under the new Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation issued after the meeting. Also, Prime Minister Abe explained that Japan is working rigorously on developing security legislation. President Obama responded by expressing his support for Japan’s initiatives. (b) Realignment of U.S. Forces Concerning the relocation of Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS) Futenma, Prime Minister Abe explained that he had recently held his first talks with Governor of Okinawa Prefecture Takeshi Onaga and stated that despite Governor Onaga’s opposition to the plan to construct the Futenma Replacement Facility (FRF) at Henoko, the unwavering position of the Government of Japan is that the relocation to Henoko is the only solution, and that the Government continues to hold talks in order to obtain Okinawa’s understanding. Furthermore, to that end, Prime Minister Abe explained that it was a priority for the Government to mitigate the impact on Okinawa, including through increasing training of MV-22 Osprey outside the prefecture and return of the land south of Kadena Air Base. In addition, Prime Minister Abe stated that Foreign Minister Fumio Kishida had explained that Prime Minister Shinzo Abe making an address at the Joint Meeting of the U.S. Congress [Cabinet Public Relations Offi ce] A welcome ceremony at the White House [Cabinet Public Relations Offi ce] **(2) Japan-U.S. Summit Meeting (April 28, 2015)** From April 26 to May 2, 2015, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe visited the United States, which was the f rst off cial visit by a Prime Minister of Japan to the United States in nine years. During this visit in the year marking 70 years since the end of World War II, Japan and the United States conf rmed how the Japan-U.S. Alliance has contributed to peace and stability in the Asia-Pacif c region and the world in the postwar period. Both countries also demonstrated their strong intention to continue to contribute hand-in-hand to the region and the world based on their shared fundamental values, such as freedom, democracy, human rights, and the rule of law. These points were particularly emphasized by Prime Minister Abe’s address to a joint session of the U.S. Congress Prime Minister Abe’s address to the joint session ----- the operation of MCAS Futenma would be suspended within five years to Secretary of State John Kerry at the Japan-U.S. “2+2” Meeting. Prime Minister Abe expressed his will to sign the Agreement to Supplement the Japan-U.S. Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) on Environmental Stewardship at an early date. Prime Minister Abe also asked for the cooperation of the United States in order to obtain the public support for the Japan-U.S. Alliance. In response, President Obama said that the United States would continue to cooperate to mitigate the impact on Okinawa. Prime Minister Abe further explained that the relocation of the U.S. Marines in Okinawa to Guam would promote the development of Guam as a strategic hub and would also contribute to U.S. rebalancing policy, and expressed his intention to steadily advance the relocation in coordination with the United States. c. Regional Situation (a) Asia Prime Minister Abe explained the outcomes of the most recent Japan-China Summit Meeting. Both leaders agreed that Japan and the United States would play key roles to maintain and develop a free and open AsiaPacific region based on the rule of law, and that both countries would cooperate to incorporate China into the region. The two leaders also affirmed their opposition to any unilateral attempts by China to change the status quo. President Obama reiterated that Article 5 of the Japan-U.S. Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security covers all the territories under the administration of Japan, including the Senkaku Islands. Both leaders conf rmed that Japan and the United States were pursuing various measures to resolve the issues in the South China Sea, including supporting a united **3** **Major Initiatives for Strengthening the Alliance** The new Guidelines def ne that the two countries will work on a variety of measures, including intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) activities, air and missile defense, maritime security, and joint training and exercises, and cooperate in response to a large-scale disaster in Japan in order to “seamlessly ensure Japan’s peace and security.” The Guidelines also require both countries to work on “Cooperation for Regional and Global Peace and Security,” through cooperation in international activities and trilateral and multilateral cooperation; to cooperate for “Space and Cyberspace Cooperation” which are emerging as new strategic domains; and to develop and enhance “Bilateral Enterprise” through defense equipment and technology cooperation for further improving the effectiveness of bilateral cooperation. Many of these items are incorporated into the National Defense Program Guidelines to “strengthen the Alliance’s deterrence and response capabilities” and to “strengthen and expand cooperation in a variety of areas ” ASEAN response. Prime Minister Abe explained Japan’s efforts to improve relations with the ROK, and President Obama expressed his support for such efforts. With regard to North Korea, Prime Minister Abe explained Japan’s consistent policy of pursuing a comprehensive resolution of outstanding issues of concern including the nuclear, missile, and abduction issues. Both leaders reaff rmed that Japan, the United States, and the ROK would coordinate their responses to the North Korea nuclear and missile issues. Prime Minister Abe also stated Japan’s intention to resolve the abduction issue at the earliest stage and President Obama expressed his understanding and support for these efforts. (b) Ukraine Prime Minister Abe said that while continuing to monitor the local situation in Ukraine and prioritizing coordination with the G7, Japan would respond appropriately, including working on Russia, to achieve a peaceful and diplomatic resolution. Both leaders agreed that they would continue to support the reform efforts in Ukraine. (c) Iran Prime Minister Abe welcomed the recent agreement on Iran’s nuclear issue and expressed his complete support for President Obama’s policies. He also described the outcomes of the recent Japan-Iran Summit Meeting, and explained that Japan would continue to work with Iran and play its own role. d. Global Issues Both leaders shared the view that the importance of global cooperation through the Japan-U.S. Alliance is increasing, and discussed measures to address climate change and infectious diseases. See Part II, Chapter 3, Section 2-2 (Content of the New Guidelines); Reference 18 (The Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation (April 27, 2015)) **1** **Cooperative Measures from Peacetime to** **Seamlessly Ensure Japan’s Peace and Security** **(1) Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance** **(ISR) Activities** With regard to joint ISR activities, from the perspective that it is important to implement ISR activities in a broad Asia-Pacif c region in cooperation between Japan and the U.S. to enhance the eff ciency and effectiveness of the activities between both countries, the two countries set up the Defense ISR Working Group in February 2013 consisting of director-level defense off cials from Japan and the U.S., which is further deepening the cooperation between the two countries as well as expanding bilateral exercises and training. The expansion of these ISR activities will function as ----- deterrence capabilities, and will also ensure information superiority over other nations and enable the establishment of a seamless cooperation structure in all phases from peacetime to contingencies. **(2) Missile defense** Regarding the response to ballistic missiles, bilateral response capabilities have improved, through such measures as operational information sharing and the establishment of the guidelines for responding to an attack. Accordingly, Japan and the U.S. closely cooperated and coordinated in responding to the missile launches carried out by North Korea respectively in April 2009, and April and December 2012, which were purported to be “satellites.” Also, in the systems and technology f eld, the cooperative development of a new ballistic missile defense (BMD) interceptor with enhanced capabilities (SM-3 Block IIA) is steadily in progress. have vast experience in actual f ghting, are invaluable and greatly contribute to improving the JSDF’s capabilities. In addition, holding bilateral exercises at effective times, places, and scales demonstrates the unif ed commitment and capabilities of Japan and the United States, which has a deterrent effect. In light of these perspectives, the MOD and the SDF are continuing their initiatives to enrich the contents of bilateral training and exercises. See Reference 24 (Record of Japan-U.S. Bilateral Exercises in FY2014) Joint training and exercises have been expanded not only within Japan but also to the United States by dispatching SDF units, and continuous efforts are being made to improve interoperability and bilateral response capabilities at the military service and unit levels, including participation in exercises including the Japan-U.S. Bilateral Regional Army command post exercises, special anti-submarine exercises, and Japan-U.S. Bilateral Fighter combat training. Expanding joint training and exercises increases cooperative activities in peacetime, thereby improving the readiness and operational capability of units as well as interoperability between the SDF and the U.S. Forces. Since FY1985, mostly on an annual basis, command post exercise and f eld training exercise have been conducted alternately as the Japan-U.S. Bilateral Joint Exercise; the f eld training post exercise held in November 2014 was the 12th of its kind. In recent years the U.S. Forces stationed in Japan have also participated in disaster drills organized by local governments, thereby deepening cooperation with relevant institutions and local governments. **(3) Maritime Security** The new Guidelines will allow Japan and the United States to develop and enhance the sharing of maritime surveillance information from peacetime and to cooperate where appropriate for the maintenance and enhancement of the presence of Japan and the United States through ISR as well as training and exercises. The Maritime Self-Defense Force and the United States Navy plan to maintain and enhance both countries’ presence in the Western Pacif c through multiple joint training and exercises, including a bilateral special anti-submarine training held in February 2014. **(4) Joint Training and Exercises** Such joint training and exercises in peacetime not only contribute greatly to maintaining and enhancing the JapanU.S. joint response capabilities by deepening mutual understanding of tactics and other aspects, enhancing mutual communication, and improving interoperability, but also are effective for improving tactical skills on each side. In particular, the knowledge and techniques that the Japanese side can learn from the U.S. Forces, which **(5) Logistics support** Japan-U.S. cooperation is also being steadily promoted through logistical support based on the Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA)[3] signed in 1996, as a result of increased opportunities for cooperation between the two countries. The Agreement is designed to positively contribute to the smooth and effective operation under the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty and to initiatives for international peace taken under the leadership of the United GSDF personnel and the U.S. military personnel at a casualty evacuation training using the MV-22 Osprey MSDF and U.S. Navy vessels participating in the multilateral joint exercise hosted by the U.S. Navy (RIMPAC 2014) ASDF and the U.S. Air Force aircraft participating in the JapanU.S. joint exercise RED FLAG-Alaska The offi cial title is the Agreement between the Government of Japan and the Government of the United States of America Concerning Reciprocal Provision of Logistic Support, Supplies and Services ----- Fig. II-3-3-4 Scope of the Japan-U.S. Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA) **Scope of the Japan-U.S. Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA)** Japan-U.S. bilateral training Training, communication and other daily activities Transportation of Japanese International disaster PKO, etc. Disaster relief nationals overseas relief activities Situations in Areas Armed attack situations and situations in which armed attack is anticipated Surrounding Japan Nations. Its scope of application includes various occasions such as bilateral training and exercises in peacetime, disaster relief activities, U.N. peacekeeping operations, international disaster relief activities, situations in areas surrounding Japan, and armed attack situations. If either the JSDF or the U.S. Forces require the other party to provide supplies or services, this Agreement in principle allows the party to do so[4]. In addition, the Joint Statement of the “2+2” Meeting in April 2015 demonstrated the intention to expeditiously work on a negotiation on the Acquisition and CrossServicing Agreement to operationalize the mutual logistics cooperation envisioned by the new Guidelines. The negotiations are underway between the two countries. See Fig. II-3-3-4 (Scope of the Japan-U.S. Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA)); Part II, Chapter 3, Section 3-2-2 (“2+2” Meeting (April 27, 2015)) **(6) Joint/Shared Use** Expanding joint/shared use of facilities and areas increases bases for the SDF’s activities such as maneuver areas, ports, and airf elds, which in turn enhances the diversity and eff ciency of Japan-U.S. bilateral training and expands the scope and raises the frequency of such activities as ISR. The SDF have only a limited number of facilities in Okinawa, including Naha Air Base, and most of them are located in urban areas, which results in operational limitations. The joint/shared use of USFJ facilities and areas in Okinawa will greatly improve the SDF’s training environment in Okinawa, and facilitate implementation of joint exercises and interoperability between the SDF and the U.S. Forces. It will improve readiness and contribute to maintaining the safety of local people in the case of a disaster. While taking the JSDF defense posture in the regions including Southwestern Islands and relations with local communities into account, Japan and the U.S. are proactively engaged in deliberations, and specif c initiatives are steadily progressing. For example, the GSDF has been using Camp Hansen since March 2008 for exercises. Moreover the relocation of the ASDF Air Defense Command to Yokota in April 2012 and the relocation of the GSDF Central Readiness Force Headquarters to Zama in March 2013 were carried out. In addition, in December 2013, the MSDF conducted the training on the sea and training utilizing facilities in Guam and its surrounding area in cooperation with the U.S. Navy. The development of training ranges in Guam and the Northern Mariana Islands (Tinian Island, Pagan Island, etc.) for shared use by the SDF and the U.S. Forces is under consideration. **2** **Cooperation in Response to a Large-scale** **Disaster in Japan** In the aftermath of the Great East Japan Earthquake, 2011, the SDF and the U.S. Forces demonstrated their high joint response capabilities based on the strong ties they had developed. The success of the joint response between the U.S. Forces and the SDF through “Operation Tomodachi” was the result of Japan-U.S. Bilateral Training and Exercises over many years, and will lead to the Alliance being deepened further in the future. “Operation Tomodachi” involved the deployment of a large-scale force, at its peak including troops of approximately 16,000 personnel, around 15 ships, and around 140 aircraft; resulting in relief activities that were unprecedented in scale, contributing greatly to Japan’s restoration and reconstruction. Not only SDF and U.S. Forces personnel collaboratively engaged in disaster relief activities The categories of supplies and services as provided under the Agreement include: food; water; billeting; transportation (including airlift); petroleum, oils, and lubricants; clothing; communications; medical services; base support; storage; use of facilities; training services; spare parts and components; repair and maintenance; airport and seaport services; and ammunition (only in armed attack ----- those affected but numerous Japanese at large were f lled with a deepened sense of appreciation and trust for the U.S. Forces in Japan. The main factors behind the success of the joint JapanU.S. response to the Great East Japan Earthquake were the cooperation between the two countries that has been taking place even in peacetime, the swift and thorough implementation of coordination between them, and the presence of the U.S. Forces in Japan. In addition, the success of these endeavors was also due not only to the ongoing policy discussions and bilateral exercises carried out between the two countries in peacetime, but also to the fact that the stationing of the U.S. Forces in Japan means that their troops here are well-acquainted with the geography and culture of the country. On the other hand, some issues have emerged; such as clarifying the roles, missions and capabilities of Japan and the United States in the event of a disaster within Japan, as well as stipulating more concrete joint guidelines to facilitate greater participation by the U.S. Forces in disaster prevention drills, and examining mechanisms for the sharing of information and more effective coordination mechanism. In addition, the December 2013 Response Plan for a Massive Earthquake in the Nankai Trough listed the JapanU.S. Joint Response Plan and the two countries conducted a bilateral joint comprehensive disaster prevention training in Kochi Prefecture in February 2014 to prepare for an earthquake in the Nankai Trough. The U.S. Forces in Japan (USFJ) also participated in the Wakayama Prefecture Tsunami Disaster Readiness Practical Training (October 2014) and “Michinoku ALERT 2014” (November 2014), a disaster relief exercise by the GSDF Tohoku Headquarters. This shows how the JSDF and USFJ have been enhancing their cooperation for disaster readiness at home and abroad. **3** **Cooperation for Regional and Global Peace and** **Security** fundamental rules such as freedom of navigation, ensured safety, and the rule of law (e.g. peaceful dispute resolution based on international laws). The two countries have been working closely together on various multilateral maritime security cooperation initiatives supported by such countries as those around sea lanes, including the International Minesweeping Exercise in the Persian Gulf hosted by the United States from October to November in 2014, the PSI Maritime Interdiction Training hosted by the United States in August 2014, and the participation in CTF 151 for responding to pirates. See Part III, Chapter 3, Section 2-1 (Ensuring Maritime Security); Part III, Chapter 3, Section 2-3-2 (International Initiatives Aimed at Nonproliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction) **(2) Trilateral and Multilateral Training and Exercises** The new Guidelines will enable Japan and the Unites States to promote and enhance trilateral and multilateral security and defense cooperation. Thus, the JSDF are participating in trilateral (e.g. Japan-U.S.-Australia, Japan-U.S.-India, and Japan-U.S.-ROK) and multilateral training, in addition to bilateral training and exercises between Japan and the United States. **4** **Cooperation on Space and Cyberspace** **(1) Cooperation on Space** With regard to cooperation on space, based on the agreement made by the Japan-U.S. Summit Meeting in November 2009 to promote cooperation in areas of space security as part of initiatives to deepen the Japan-U.S. Alliance, the two countries have periodically been working together to discuss how they should cooperate in the future by allowing related ministries and agencies to hold the 1st Japan-U.S. Space Security Dialogue in September 2010. Furthermore, the Japan-U.S. Summit Meeting in April 2012 decided to deepen the space-based partnership for civil and security purposes and to create a whole-ofgovernment comprehensive dialogue on space, enabling a variety of related ministries and agencies to hold the 1st whole-of-government Japan-U.S. Comprehensive Dialogue on Space in March 2013. The two countries have been sharing information on their respective space policies and discussing plans for future cooperation on a regular basis. Moreover, based on the instructions given by the Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting on April 8, 2015, the two countries established the Space Cooperation Working Group (SCWG) to further promote the cooperation among bilateral defense authorities in the area of space. Going forward, Japan and the United States will leverage this working group to deepen discussion in a wide variety of areas, including (1) promoting space policy dialogue, (2) reinforcing information sharing, (3) working together to develop and ensure experts, and (4) implementing tabletop exercises. **(1) Cooperation in International Activities** Japan is conducting activities in close cooperation with the U.S. through activities pursuant to the former AntiTerrorism Special Measures Act, international disaster relief activities and international peace-keeping operations in the Philippines and Haiti, and anti-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden. Japan and the United States worked closely together at local multilateral coordination centers to respond to the typhoon disaster that hit the Philippines in November 2013. To respond to the outbreak of Ebola virus disease, Japan started to dispatch liaison off cers to the U.S. Africa Command in October 2014 for close cooperation, coordinating efforts and collecting information with related countries including the United States. As for maritime security, both Japan and the United States are making efforts as maritime nations to maintain and develop “the open and stable ocean” based on ----- **(2) Cooperation on Cyberspace** Concerning cooperation on cyberspace, the Cyber Defense Policy Working Group (CDPWG) was established in October 2013 as a framework between the MOD and DoD to discuss a broad range of professional and concrete issues, including the sharing of information at the policy level, human resources development, and technical cooperation. The two countries plan to accelerate discussions based on the new Guidelines released in April 2015 and the CDPWG Joint Statement published in May 2015[5]. **5** **Bilateral Enterprise as a Foundation for** **Enhancing the Effi ciency of Cooperation** the United States with 20 items of arms and military technologies, including military technologies related to joint technological research on BMD. Japan and the United States consult with each other at forum such as the Systems and Technology Forum (S&TF) and conduct cooperative research and development regarding the specif c projects agreed upon at the forum. See Reference 25 (Japan-U.S. Joint Research and Development Projects) Part III, Chapter 2 explains initiatives for the common maintenance infrastructure for the 24 Osprey deployed by the U.S. Marine Corps at MCAS Futenma and the Osprey planned to be deployed by the GSDF[8] as well as initiatives for the on-site maintenance locations for the F-35A deployed by the ASDF. See Part III, Chapter 2, Section 4-1 (Deepening Relationships with the United States regarding Defense Equipment and Technology Cooperation) **(1) Defense Equipment and Technology Cooperation** Japan proactively promotes cooperation in defense equipment and technology while bearing in mind the maintenance of the technological and production bases and the mutual cooperation principle based on the JapanU.S. Security Treaty and the Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement between Japan and the United States of America. In view of the progress in technology cooperation between Japan and the United States, the improvement of technological level, and other factors, Japan decided to transfer its military technology to the United States regardless of the Three Principles on Arms Exports and related guidelines. In 1983, Japan established the Exchange of Notes concerning the Transfer of Military Technologies to the United States of America[6]. In 2006, the Exchange of Notes concerning the Transfer of Arms and Military Technologies to the United States of America[7] was established to replace the foregoing Exchange of Notes. Under these frameworks, Japan decided to provide **(2) Education and Research Exchange** The new Guidelines recognize the importance of intellectual cooperation relating to security and defense, and the two governments will deepen exchanges between members of relevant organizations, and strengthen communication between each side’s research and educational institutions. To this end, the JSDF and the MOD have been working on education and research exchange by accepting students from abroad and holding bilateral and multilateral seminars with the United States so that security and defense personnel can share knowledge and enhance cooperation. See Reference 55 (Exchange Student Acceptance Record (Number of Newly Accepted Students in FY2014)); Reference 56 (Multilateral Security Dialogues Hosted by the Ministry of Defense); Reference 57 (Other Multilateral Security Dialogue) A document showing a clear direction for future cooperation in cyber defense between Japan and the United States, including cooperation in response to signifi cant cyber attacks, roles and responsibilities, information sharing, and protection of critical infrastructure for cyber security to complete required tasks. The two countries will defi ne specifi c measures in the future through the CDPWG and other mechanisms. The offi cial title is the Exchange of Notes concerning the Transfer of Military Technologies to the United States of America under the Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement between Japan and the United States of America The offi cial title is the Exchange of Notes concerning the Transfer of Arms and Military Technologies to the United States of America under the Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement between Japan and the United States of America ----- **Section 4 Stationing of the U.S. Forces in Japan** Realignment of the U.S. Forces in Japan is extremely important in mitigating the impact on local communities, such as those in Okinawa, while maintaining the deterrence capabilities of the U.S. Forces. The Ministry of Defense **1** **Stationing of the U.S. Forces in Japan** **1** **Signifi cance of the Presence of U.S. Forces** **in Japan** (MOD) will advance the U.S. Forces realignment and other initiatives while making continuous efforts to gain the understanding and cooperation of local communities accommodating USFJ facilities and areas. As mentioned in Part II, Chapter 3, Section 1-1, the U.S. Forces in Japan serve as deterrence against aggression towards Japan. Further, the realization of a stable U.S. military presence is necessary for a swift Japan-U.S. joint response based on Article 5 of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty in the event of an armed attack on Japan. Additionally, the actions of the U.S. Forces in Japan in the defense of Japan will be assisted by the timely reinforcement of other U.S. Forces, and the U.S. Forces in Japan will serve as the basis of such support. In order for the U.S. Forces in Japan to carry out the abovementioned role, it is necessary that all the services of the U.S. Forces, including those in Japan, are functionally integrated. For instance, the U.S. Forces hold a primarily offensive power as a “spear” when responding to armed aggression to Japan in cooperation with the SDF. When For the Japan-U.S. Alliance, based on the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements, to adequately function as a deterrence that contributes to Japan’s defense as well as peace and stability in the Asia-Pacif c region, it is necessary to secure the presence of the U.S. military in Japan, and to maintain a posture in Japan and the surrounding areas in peacetime that enables the U.S. Forces in Japan to respond swiftly and expeditiously to emergencies. For this purpose, based on the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty, Japan allows the stationing of the U.S. Forces in Japan, which is a core part of the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements. See Fig. II-3-4-1 (Deployment Map of the U.S. Forces in Japan) Fig. II-3-4-1 Deployment Map of the U.S. Forces in Japan Misawa Kyogamisaki Shariki U.S. Air Force: 35th Fighter Wing, F-16 fighters U.S. Army: TPY-2 (so-called U.S. Army: TPY-2 (so-called X-Band Radar System) U.S. Navy: P-3C antisubmarine patrol aircraft and others X-Band Radar System) Atsugi Yokota U.S. Navy: Headquarters, U.S. Forces, Japan F/A-18 strike fighters and others U.S. Air Force: Iwakuni (Carrier-based aircraft) Headquarters, Fifth Air Force Shariki U.S. Marine Corps: Misawa 374th Airlift Wing Marine Aircraft Group 12 C-130 transport aircraft F/A-18 strike fighter C-12 transport aircraft AV-8 attackers UH-1 helicopters and others EA-6 electronic warfare aircraft Plan to deploy CV22 Osprey C-12 transport aircraft Zama KC-130 tankers and others Headquarters, U.S. Army, Japan Sasebo U.S. Army: 1st Corps (Forward) Yokota U.S. Navy: Fleet Activities Sasebo Kyogamisaki Atsugi Yokosuka Amphibious assault ships Iwakuni Yokosuka Headquarters, U.S. Naval Forces, Japan Minesweeping ships Sasebo U.S. Navy: Fleet Activities Yokosuka Transport ships Aircraft carrier Cruisers Torii U.S. Marine Corps facilities and areas such as Camp Courtney Destroyers U.S. Army: 1st Battalion, 1st Special U.S. Marine Corps: 3rd Marine Expeditionary Force HQ Amphibious command ship Forces Group (Airborne)/10th Support Group Kadena Schwab U.S. Air Force: 18th Wing U.S. Marine Corps: F-15 fighters Futenma 4th Marine Regiment (infantry) KC-135 tankers U.S. Marine Corps: HH-60 helicopters Marine Aircraft Group 36 E-3 airborne warning and control system Hansen CH-53 helicopters (AWACS) aircraft White Beach Area AH-1 helicopters U.S. Marine Corps: U.S. Navy: P-3C, P-8A patrol aircraft and others UH-1 helicopters U.S. Navy: 12th Marine Regiment (artillery) U.S. Army: 1-1 Air Defense Artillery MV-22 Osprey and others Port facility, POL depot 31st Marine Expeditionary Unit Patriot Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3) ----- the U.S. Forces function as an offensive power, it can be expected that the U.S. Navy, Air Force, and Marines stationed in Japan work in an integrated manner to fully exert their functions. In addition, while Article 5 of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty stipulates the obligation of the United States to defend Japan, Article 6 allows for the use by the United States of facilities and areas in Japan for maintaining the security of Japan and international peace and security in the Far East, and overall Japan-U.S. obligations are kept in balance. See Part II, Chapter 3, Section 1-1 (Maintenance of Japan’s Peace and Security) **2** **Measures to Ensure the Smooth Stationing of** **the U.S. Forces in Japan** departments on base, and sales staff at welfare/recreational facilities. They perform functions essential for the smooth operations of the USFJ, and support its activities. The Government of Japan hires these employees in accordance with the provisions of the SOFA. The MOD supports the stationing of the U.S. Forces in Japan by performing administrative work for personnel management, payment of wages, health care, and welfare, etc. **3** **Host Nation Support (HNS)** HNS plays an important role to ensure the smooth and effective implementation of the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements. Due to soaring prices and wages in Japan since the mid-1970s, and changes in the international economy, the Government of Japan began to bear labor costs such as welfare costs in FY1978. Then in FY1979, Japan began to bear the Facilities Improvement Program (FIP) respectively. Furthermore, as labor costs soared due to changes in economic conditions that affected both countries, the employment stability of the employees was adversely inf uenced, and there was even concern that it would affect the activities of the U.S. Forces in Japan. Therefore in 1987 the governments of Japan and the United States agreed on a special measure in Article 24 of the SOFA (the Special Measures Agreement)[4] as a provisional measure for an exception to the cost principle in the SOFA. Based on this agreement, the Government of Japan started to bear labor costs of eight categories such as the adjustment allowance (currently replaced by the regional allowance). As the Special Measures Agreement (SMA) was revised later on, the costs borne by the Government of Japan expanded to cover labor costs for base pay, etc., and utilities costs from FY1991. The f nancial responsibility of the Japanese Government was further expanded to cover training relocation costs from FY1996. Japan has been reviewing HNS with careful consideration to its own diff cult f nancial situation. The amount of Japan’s HNS budget peaked in FY1999 (annual expenditure base), and has since been declining. According to the comprehensive review conducted in 2010, the Japanese and U.S. Governments agreed that the overall expense borne by Japan to support the stationing of the U.S. Forces in Japan during the period in which the SMA is in effect (for f ve years from FY2011 to FY2015), was determined to be maintained at the same level as FY 2010 (approximately 188.1 billion yen). The Status of Forces Agreement[1] (SOFA) stipulates matters pertaining to USFJ facilities and areas and the status of the U.S. Forces in Japan, including provisions of facilities and areas for use by the U.S. Forces (USFJ facilities and areas), and satisfying the labor requirements of the U.S. Forces in Japan. **(1) Provision of USFJ Facilities and Areas** Japan provides USFJ facilities and areas for the U.S. Forces under the provisions of the SOFA, in accordance with agreements reached through the Joint Committee between the governments of Japan and the United States. The Government of Japan has entered into agreements and concluded lease contracts with owners of private and public lands on which these facilities and areas exist in order to ensure the stable use of USFJ facilities and areas. However, should the Government be unable to obtain the approval of landowners, it will acquire title under the Act on Special Measures for USFJ Land Release[2], while compensating the landowners for any loss they may have suffered in the process[3]. **(2) Satisfying Labor Requirements of the USFJ** The USFJ require manpower (labor) to maintain its forces, and the SOFA stipulates that the requirements of the USFJ shall be satisf ed with the assistance of the Government of Japan. As of the end of FY2014, approximately 25,200 USFJ local employees (hereinafter referred to as the “employees”) work at USFJ facilities and areas throughout Japan, working as off ce workers at headquarters, engineers at maintenance/ supply facilities, members of security guards and f re The offi cial title is the Agreement Under Article VI of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security Between Japan and the United States of America, Regarding Facilities and Areas and the Status of United States Armed Forces in Japan. The offi cial title is the Act on Special Measures for USFJ Land Release, Incidental to the Agreement Under Article VI of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security Between Japan and the United States of America, Regarding Facilities and Areas and the Status of United States Armed Forces in Japan. The term “title” means a legal cause that justifi es a certain act. The offi cial title is the Agreement between Japan and the United States of America concerning Special Measures relating to Article XXIV of the Agreement under Article VI of the Treaty of Mutual ----- |m|t|he Special Measures Agreement (¥148| |---|---|---| |||| Fig. II-3-4-2 U.S. Forces Japan-related Costs (Budget for FY2015) Costs for Stationing of USFJ SACO-related costs Realignment-related (MOD-Related Budget: ¥372.5 billion (1)+(2)) (¥4.6 billion) costs (¥142.6 billion) Cost sharing for the stationing of USFJ - Projects for land returns - Relocation of the U.S. Marines in ¥0.5 billion Okinawa to Guam ¥1.7 billion (¥189.9 billion (1)) - Projects for training improvement - Projects for realignment in Okinawa ¥0.2 billion ¥27.1 billion - Costs for taking measures to improve - Projects for noise reduction - Projects related to the reform of U.S. the living environment in areas - Costs for Facility Improvement Program ¥0.3 billion Army Headquarters ¥0.1 billion surrounding the USFJ facilities ¥22.1 billion - Projects for facilitating SACO Project - Projects for the relocation of Carrier ¥59.0 billion - Labor costs (welfare costs, etc.) ¥2.5 billion Air Wing ¥92.6 billion - Rent for facilities ¥97.1 billion ¥26.2 billion - Projects for training relocation - Relocation, etc ¥0.7 billion (local coordination cost) ¥20 million - Other costs (compensation for - Projects for facilitating realignment fishery, etc.) ¥25.8 billion initiatives ¥15.8 billion **Total: ¥182.6 billion (2)** **Total: ¥48.3 billion** **Total: ¥3.4 billion** **Total: ¥137.4 billion** - Non MOD-related budget Burden from the Special Measures Agreement (¥148.1 billion) - Expenditures borne by other - Labor costs (basic salary, etc.) - Training relocation costs: ¥1.2 billion - Training relocation costs ministries (base subsidy, etc.) ¥116.4 billion (one of the projects aimed at ¥5.2 billion - Estimated costs of government Utilities costs ¥24.9 billion enhancing training) owned land provided for use as USFJ facilities[3] - Training relocation costs (NLP) - Artillery live-fire training over - Aviation training relocation ¥0.3 billion Highway 104 as part of realignment **Total: ¥141.6 billion** - Parachute training initiatives Notes: 1. Training relocation costs under the Special Measures Agreement extend either into the cost sharing for the stationing of USFJ or the SACO-related costs and the realignment-related costs. 2. The SACO-related costs refer to the cost for implementing the contents of the SACO Final Report to reduce the impact on people in Okinawa, while the realignment-related costs refers to the cost relating to a step to contribute to reducing the impact on local communities as part of the realignment initiatives. Since the cost-sharing for the stationing of USFJ is Japan’s voluntary effort to bear some costs in light of the importance of ensuring the smooth and effective implementation of the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements, its nature is different from the SACO-related costs and the realignment-related costs, and is categorized separately. 3. The costs related to the stationing of USFJ include the MOD-related budget, other ministry-related budgets (base subsidy, etc.: ¥38.8 billion, FY2014 Budget) and the estimated costs of government-owned land provided for use as USFJ facilities (¥166.5 billion, FY2014 Estimated Costs). 4. Numbers may not add up due to rounding. adjustment will be phased in over the new SMA period. (3) Cost-saving initiatives: It is clearly stipulated that the United States shall make further efforts to reduce these expenditures[6]. See Reference 26 (Outline of Cost Sharing of the Stationing of the USFJ) **5** **Costs Associated with the U.S. Forces Stationed** **in Japan** **4** **Contents of the Special Measures Agreement** **(SMA)** The key points of the SMA that took effect in April 2011 are as follows: (1) Effective period: Five years (2) Cost sharing: Japan shall bear all or part of labor costs, utilities costs, and the costs incurred in training relocation. With regard to training relocation costs, on top of the additional costs incurred on domestic training relocations, costs incurred in training relocation to areas under the administration of the U.S. government, such as Guam, have also been added. - Operational Guidelines (specifi ed in the Exchange of Notes concerning the SMA) Labor costs: The upper limit of the number of workers to be funded by Japan will be reduced from 23,055 to 22,625[5]. The adjustment will be phased in over the new SMA period. Utilities costs: The upper limit for utilities costs is set at 24.9 billion yen for each f scal year. At the same time, the share of costs to be borne by Japan is reduced from the current 76% (approximate) to 72% (approximate). The In addition to the costs of stationing the U.S. Forces in Japan, the various costs associated with the U.S. Forces in Japan include costs for implementing the stipulations of the Special Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO) Final Report for mitigating the impact on the people of Okinawa, as well as costs for implementing measures that will contribute to mitigating the impact on local communities associated with the initiatives for the realignment of the U.S. Armed Forces. See Part II, Chapter 3, Section 4-3-1 (Initiatives for Realignment, Consolidation, and Reduction of USFJ Facilities and Areas in Okinawa) See Fig. II-3-4-2 (U.S. Forces Japan-related Costs (Budget for FY 2015) The Security Consultative Committee Document issued on June 21, 2011: “The Ministers shared the view to continue to exert maximum effort to maintain stable employment of the employees of the U.S. Armed Forces in Japan while reducing labor costs.” ----- true sense as well as to allow them to perform to the best of their capabilities. Our national land is narrow with limited plains and there are many cases where USFJ facilities and areas are located close to urban and business areas. In such areas, factors including the existence of those facilities and areas, and the takeoffs and landings of the U.S. Forces aircraft, have considerable impact on the residents’ living environment and local development. It is therefore necessary to make efforts to mitigate the impact with the realities of each area in mind. **2** **Progress of the Realignment of the U.S. Forces in Japan** in the Asia-Pacif c region in recent years. As a result, the Governments of Japan and the United States decided to delink both the relocation of U.S. Marine Corps personnel from Okinawa to Guam and resulting land returns south of Kadena Air Base from the progress on the Futenma Replacement Facility (FRF). See Reference 20 (Joint Statement of the Security Consultative Committee (April 27, 2012)) **6** **USFJ Facilities and Areas and the Local** **Communities** For USFJ facilities and areas to fully exert their capabilities, it is vital to gain cooperation and understanding from the local communities. Meanwhile, the social conditions in the surrounding areas have changed signif cantly, including for example, through their urbanization over the past several decades. In light of such changes, it is necessary to reduce the impact of the facilities and areas as much as possible in order to gain acceptance and support from the public in a Fig. II-3-4-3 shows the progress of the realignment of the U.S. Forces in Japan, as set forth in “the United States-Japan Roadmap for Realignment Implementation of May 2006” (Roadmap) described in Part II, Chapter 3, Section 3-1. As to the USFJ realignment, in the meantime, the governments of Japan and the United States have conducted full-f edged bilateral discussions concerning the plan for the realignment, in view of factors including the following: 1) The necessity of implementing measures to promptly and steadily enable visible mitigation of the impact on Okinawa; 2) The necessity of coordinating the realignment package and strategic rebalance to the Asia-Pacif c region, which was set out in the U.S. Defense Strategic Guidance released in January 2012; and 3) The fact that a reduction in the cost associated with the relocation of the U.S. Marine Corps to Guam has been demanded by the U.S. Congress. The achievements thereof have been announced as part of the “2+2” Joint Statements and through other means. See Fig. II-3-4-3 (Progress of the Realignment of Force Structure of USFJ and the SDF Described in “Japan-U.S. Roadmap for Realignment Implementation”) **1** **Achievements in the “2+2” Joint Statement** **(April 27, 2012)** **2** **Achievements in the “2+2” Joint Statement** **(October 3, 2013)** The Joint Statement of the “2+2” in October 2013 cited the achievements in bilateral consultations on the realignment of the U.S. Forces in Japan since the release of the Joint Statement of the “2+2” Meeting in April 2012. Japan and the United States renewed their strong determination to complete the relocation of MCAS Futenma to Camp Schwab, and agreed to continue to consult on other possible measures while implementing the previous agreements as early as possible and steadily from the perspective of mitigating the impact on Okinawa. See Reference 22 (Joint Statement of the Security Consultative Committee (October 3, 2013)) **3** **Achievements in the “2+2” Joint Statement** **(April 27, 2015)** The Joint Statement of the “2+2” Meeting in April 2015 cited the achievements in bilateral consultations on the realignment of the U.S. Forces in Japan since the release of the Joint Statement of the “2+2” Meeting in October 2013. The Ministers reaff rmed the two governments’ continued commitment to implement the existing arrangements on the USFJ realignment as soon as possible, while ensuring operational capability, including training capability, throughout the process. The Ministers underscored their commitment to maintaining a robust and f exible force posture that enhances deterrence by strengthening the capacity to respond effectively to future challenges and threat, while also mitigating the impact of US Forces on local communities The following are sections pertaining to the This “2+2” Joint Statement stated that, in light of important progress made in regard to the plan for USFJ realignment since the “2+2” Joint Statement in June 2011, it had been decided to adjust the plans outlined in the 2006 Roadmap. Originally, the 2006 Roadmap stated that, among the III Marine Expeditionary Force (III MEF) stationed in Okinawa, the main focus of the relocation to Guam would be the command elements, but the U.S. decided to alter the composition of the units. As a result, the U.S. government decided to continue to retain the U.S. Forces in Okinawa, and deploy Marine Air-Ground Task Forces (MAGTF)—consisting of command, ground, aviation and logistic support elements—in Japan, Guam, and Hawaii, as well as in Australia as a rotational unit. This ref ects the U.S. review of the composition of the units of the U.S. Marine Corps following the evolving security environment ----- Fig. II-3-4-3 Progress of the Realignment of Force Structure of USFJ and the SDF Described in “Japan-U.S. Roadmap for Realignment Implementation” **1. Realignment in the Kanto Area1. Realignment in the Kanto Area** [Yokota related][Yokota related] [Relocation of the JASDF Air Defense Command] Establishment of the bilateral joint operations coordination center Establishment of the bilateral joint operations coordination Relocation of the Air Defense Command and relevant (BJOCC) at Yokota Air Basecenter (BJOCC) at Yokota Air Base units (Completed on March 26, 2012) Partial return of airspace, (returned in September 25, 2008) and Partial return of airspace, (returned on September 25, 2008) placing the JASDF air traffic controllers besides the Yokota and placing the JASDF air traffic controllers besides the Yokota RAPCON facility (started on May 18, 2007), etc.RAPCON facility (started on May 18, 2007), etc. Tokyo Yokota Deliberation on civilian-military dual-use of Yokota Air Base Deliberation on civilian-military dual-use of Yokota Air Base Fuchu (specific conditions and modalities are considered between (specific conditions and modalities are considered between [Camp Zama] Japan and the U.S.)Japan and the U.S.) Sagamihara Reorganization of the headquarters, U.S. Army, Japan (Reorganized at the end of September 2008) [U.S. Forces Sagami General Depot] Relocation of the headquarters of the JGSDF Central Establishment of facilities due to the realignment of U.S. Army Zama Readiness Force (Completed on March 26, 2013) Japan Headquarters(Facilities including the Training Center) Kanagawa Joint/shared use of heliport (*JC agreement dated March 25, 2013) (Operations of the Training Center started in August 2011. Development of the Training Assistance Center completed.) Release of portions (1.1 ha) of housing area and others Return of part of the land in front of JR Sagamihara Station (*JC agreement on partial return (about 5.4 ha) of (approx. 17 ha) housing area dated October 31, 2011) (Return of land completed in September 2014) Legend: Joint use of West Open-air Storage Area (approx. 35 ha) (Agreement of the Joint Committee on June 29, 2012) Implemented Continuing *JC: Joint Committee: Japan-U.S. Joint Committee **2. Realignment in Okinawa** MCAS Futenma (total return, about 481 ha) [Joint/Shared Use] [Relocation within Okinawa Prefecture] Camp Hansen is used for JGSDF training Transport capabilities using helicopters - Implemented on March 17, 2008 Replacement facilities constructed in Camp Schwab Henokosaki and adjacent water areas JASDF uses Kadena Air Base for bilateral training with [Relocation of operations outside Okinawa Prefecture] U.S. Forces, while taking into account the noise Operations of air-refueling aircraft → impact on local communities MCAS Iwakuni - Relocation to MCAS Iwakuni completed on August 26, 2014 Contingency use → [Land Returns] Tsuiki/Nyutabaru Air Base, etc. Formulated a detailed plan (Consolidation Plan) Camp Schwab for returning of significant land area south of Kadena Air Base by consolidating the remaining facilities and areas in Okinawa Camp Hansen Replacement SDF bases in mainland, etc. *Announced the Consolidation Plan on April 5, 2013 Facility Camp Courtney Army POL Depot Kuwae Tank Farm No. 1 Kadena Air Base [Relocation of U.S. Marine Corps] (total return, about 16 ha) III Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF), Replacement Facility about 8,000 personnel and about 9,000 of their dependents will relocate to Guam Makiminato Service Area (Camp To Guam, etc. - “2+2” Joint Statement of April 27, 2012 states Kinser) (total return, about 271 ha) that about 9,000 personnel and their dependents *Return of north access road (about Naha would be relocated outside of Japan and the 1 ha) on August 31, 2013 Camp Kuwae (Lester) authorized strength of U.S. Marine Corps in Guam (total return, about 68 ha) will be about 5,000. Naha Port (total return, about 56 ha) Legend: A replacement facility will be Camp Zukeran (Camp Foster) Implemented Continuing Six candidate facilities for land return constructed in the Return of West Futenma Housing Area located south of Kadena Air Base Urasoe-Pier district under the (approx. 51 ha) on March 31, 2015 (Areas indicated are based on the consolidation plan. See Fig.III-2-3-6 for the current status on the returning of Naha Port and Harbor Plan land south of Kadena Air Base) ----- |KKoomm|aattssuu| |---|---| **3. Relocation of Aircraft, etc.** TPY-2 Rader: deployment of so-called “X-band Radar System”) The relocation of flight training activities from Chitose Kadena, Misawa and Iwakuni to ASDF bases, Chitose, Misawa, Hyakuri, Komatsu, Tsuiki and Nyutabaru, as well as to Guam. *The relocation to Guam, etc. was agreed upon at Shariki Misawa the Japan-U.S. Joint Committee in January 2011. Legend: Deployment of a TPY-2 radar Implemented Relocation of carrier-based aircraft (Deployment completed in December 2014) squadrons to Iwakuni Continuing KomatsuKomatsu HyakuriHyakuri Atsugi IwakuniIwakuni Kyogamisaki Tsuiki Relocation of MSDF E/O/UP-3 squadrons Nyutabaru and other units from Iwakuni to Atsugi (“2+2” Joint Statement in 2013 confirmed the continued deployment of these units in Iwakuni Air Base) Kanoya Relocation of the KC-130 squadron to Iwakuni Kadena (Recolation completed in August 2014) Futenma The KC-130 squadron will deploy on a rotational basis to MSDF Kanoya Base and Guam Relocation of the functions of aircraft for contingency use to Tsuiki and Nyutabaru Mariana Islands Part of future civilian aviation facilities were established within MCAS Iwakuni (Civil Airport opened 2012) Relocation of the CH-53D squadron to Guam (Already relocated to continental U.S.) Saipan Guam ----- realignment of USFJ in this Joint Statement. The Ministers: H Replacement and Return of MCAS Futenma - Welcomed the transfer of KC-130 squadrons from MCAS Futenma to MCAS Iwakuni and reconf rmed the commitment to the continued relocation of aviation training, including to locations outside Okinawa Prefecture, through efforts such as the development of training areas and facilities. - Reconfi rmed that the plan to construct the FRF in the Camp Schwab Henokosaki area and adjacent waters is the only solution that addresses operational, political, f nancial, and strategic issues as the only way to avoid the continued use of MCAS Futenma. - Reaffi rmed the unwavering commitment of Japan and the United States to this plan and emphasized their strong determination to complete this plan and achieve the long-desired return of MCAS Futenma to Japan. - The United States welcomed the steady and continuing progress of the FRF construction projects. H Return of Land Areas South of Kadena Air Base - Reaffi rmed the signifi cance of land returns south of Kadena Air Base based on the 2006 “Roadmap” and the April 2013 Consolidation Plan and stated once again the determination of Japan and the United States to **3** **Stationing of the U.S. Forces in Okinawa** In comparison to areas such as the U.S. mainland, Hawaii, and Guam, Okinawa is located closer to East Asia. Its location is extremely important from the perspective of security, being roughly in the center of the Southwestern Islands and close to Japan’s sea lanes. Thus, the stationing of the U.S. Forces in Okinawa—including the U.S. Marine Corps, which is in charge of f rst response for a variety of contingencies and is capable of high mobility and rapid response—with the above-mentioned geographical characteristics, further ensures the effectiveness of the Japan-U.S. Alliance, strengthens deterrence, and contributes greatly not only to the security of Japan but also to the peace and stability of the Asia-Pacif c region. On the other hand, Okinawa has many USFJ facilities and areas such as airbases, exercise f elds, logistics facilities. As of January 2015, approximately 74% of USFJ facilities and areas (for exclusive use) are concentrated in Okinawa Prefecture, occupying approximately 10% of the land area of the prefecture and 18% of the main island of Okinawa. Therefore, it is necessary to make utmost efforts to mitigate the impact on Okinawa, while also considering the above-mentioned security standpoints. See Fig. II-3-4-4 (The Geopolitical Positioning of Okinawa and the Signifi cance of the U.S. Marine Corps Stationed in Okinawa) continually work on the implementation of the plan, and anticipated the update of the plan by the spring of 2016. - Emphasized the on-time return of the West Futenma Housing Area within Camp Zukeran on March 31, 2015. This is the most important of all land returns to Japan based on the consolidation plan. H Guam - Confi rmed that the two governments are steadily implementing the relocation of U.S. Marine Corps personnel from Okinawa to locations outside Japan, including Guam, based on the revised Guam International Agreement. H Initiatives for Protecting the Environment - Reaffi rmed their commitment to enhancing cooperation for protecting the environment. - Confi rmed the signifi cance of making further efforts in environmental matters. - Welcomed the progress of a supplementary Agreement on Cooperation in the Field of Environmental Stewardship and conf rmed their intention to continually negotiate documents of this agreement as expeditiously as possible. See Reference 23 (Joint Statement of the Security Consultative Committee (April 27, 2015)) **1** **Initiatives for Realignment, Consolidation, and** **Reduction of USFJ Facilities and Areas in Okinawa** When Okinawa was returned to Japan in 1972, the Government of Japan provided 83 facilities and areas covering approximately 278 km[2] for exclusive use by the U.S. Forces under the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty. However, their concentration in Okinawa has led to strong calls for their realignment, consolidation and reduction on the grounds that they seriously affect the lives of people in Okinawa Prefecture. Both countries have continued their initiatives to realign, consolidate, and reduce USFJ facilities and areas, and, in relation to the so-called 23 issues, it was agreed in 1990 that both sides would proceed with the required adjustments and procedures for the return of land. Most recently, approximately 55 ha out of 162 ha of Camp Hansen (part of a slope at the East China sea side) was returned on June 30, 2014. Moreover, regarding the so-called Three Okinawa Issues such as the return of Naha Port[7], it was agreed in 1995 that initiatives would be made to resolve these issues. See Reference 27 (Outline of 23 Issues) Subsequently, in response to an unfortunate incident that occurred in 1995, as well as the refusal of the then Governor of Okinawa to sign land lease renewal documents ----- Fig. II-3-4-4 The Geopolitical Positioning of Okinawa and the Signifi cance of the U.S. Marine Corps Stationed in Okinawa **Okinawa holds a position of great** **strategic importance** **1. Reasons for Stationing the U.S. Marine Corps in Okinawa** Compared to locations such as the U.S. mainland, Hawaii and Guam, Okinawa is closer to various regions in East Asia. ⇒ In the event where urgent deployment within this region is required, the U.S. military in Okinawa can respond rapidly. Beijing Seoul Okinawa has the geographic advantage of being located in a place with certain distance from Japan’s neighbors. Access from continental Asia to the Pacific → Expected that passage would be Tokyo Okinawa is in a crucial strategic position in terms of the access through waters surrounding Okinawa to the Eurasian Continent and the Pacific Ocean, as it is Izu Islands located more or less in the center of the Nansei Islands and is close to Japan’s sea lanes. Shanghai 2000km 1000km Adjacent to sea lanes **2. The Significance & Roles of the U.S. Marine Corps** Okinawa **in Okinawa** With their high level of mobility and readiness,* the U.S. Marine Hong Kong Taipei the Southwest IslandsCenter of Ogasawara Islands Corps in Okinawa plays various roles, including securing the peace and safety of the region through such endeavors as assisting in the defense of Japan and providing support after the Great East Japan Earthquake as well as dealing with the Java earthquake in Indonesia in May 2006 Japan’s sea lanes ⇒ The stationing of USFJ in Okinawa, an area with unique Sea lanes Okinotorishima geographic characteristics, including the Marine corps, Marine transportation routes. which has high-level mobility and readiness to carry out Japan is dependent upon marine transportation for at least 99% of a wide range of duties and to deal with various types of the total volume of its trade. emergencies, makes a significant contribution to the Manila Saipan security of Japan, and to peace and stability in the Asia Pacific region. Guam - The Marine Corps constantly utilizes all combat elements (land, sea and air) during its drills and deployments, so it is suited to providing a rapid response in the event of all kinds of situations. under the Act on Special Measures for USFJ Land Release, the Government of Japan decided to devote even greater initiatives towards realignment, consolidation, and reduction, believing that the impact should be shared by the whole nation. In order to hold consultations on issues related to USFJ facilities and areas in Okinawa, the Government of Japan established the Okinawa Action Council between the central government and Okinawa Prefecture, and the Special Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO) between Japan and the United States, and the so-called SACO Final Report was compiled in 1996. the implementation of the SACO Final Report, which is roughly 43 km[2]. See Fig. II-3-4-5 (Facilities and Areas Related to the SACO Final Report); II-3-4-6 (Changes in Number and Area of the USFJ Facilities and Areas (Exclusive Use) in Okinawa); Reference 28 (The SACO Final Report); Reference 29 (State of Progress of the SACO Final Report) **3** **History and Progress of the U.S. Forces** **Realignment in Okinawa** As for initiatives relating to realignment of the U.S. Forces based on the Roadmap, measures have been taken to mitigate the impact on the local communities in Okinawa Prefecture while maintaining deterrence capabilities. **(1) Relocation and Return of MCAS Futenma** The Government of Japan believes that it is imperative not to allow MCAS Futenma to remain indef nitely at its current location, which is in the vicinity of houses and schools in the center of Ginowan City, Okinawa Prefecture. This is a fundamental idea shared between the Government of Japan and the people of Okinawa. As for the relocation of MCAS Futenma, the Government of Japan has not changed its stance that the current plan to construct the FRF in the Camp Schwab **2** **SACO Final Report and Progress** The SACO Final Report stipulates the return of land, the adjustment of training and operational procedures, the implementation of noise abatement initiatives, and the improvement of operational procedures regarding the Status of Forces Agreement, and also refers to the related facilities and areas covered. The land to be returned based on the SACO Final Report represents approximately 21% (about 50 km[2]) of USFJ facilities and areas in Okinawa at that time, exceeding the amount of land returned during the period between the reversion of Okinawa and ----- Facilities and Areas Related to the SACO Fig. II-3-4-5 Final Report Changes in Number and Area of the USFJ Facilities Fig. II-3-4-6 and Areas (Exclusive Use) in Okinawa 400 350 300 250 200 150 100 50 |Col1|Area (km2)| |---|---| |353 Area (km2)|Col2|Col3|Col4|Col5|Col6|Col7|Col8|Col9|Col10|Col11|Col12|Col13|Col14|Col15| |---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---| |||Facilities/Areas 278 249||||||||||||| ||||||242 227|||||||||| |||144||||||||||||| ||||||83|||||||||| |||||||||46|||43|||| |||||||||||||||32| Right before May 1972 End of End of As of the returning (On return) FY1980 FY1990 January 2015 of Okinawa of external aircraft in cases of emergency will also be transferred to mainland Japan. (b) Land-f ll Area The area required for the land reclamation to build the FRF is less than one-third of MCAS Futenma and the new facility will be equipped with signif cantly shorter runways. (c) Flight Routes Two runways will be constructed in a V-shape, which enables the f ight path for both takeoff and landing to be located over the sea, in line with the requests of the local community. In MCAS Futenma, f ight paths used daily for training and other purposes are located over residential areas, whereas f ight paths in the FRF will be changed to over the sea, thereby reducing noise and risks. For example, there will be zero households requiring such insulation around the FRF, while more than 10,000 households are located in areas requiring housing noise insulation near MCAS Futenma. This means that the noise levels experienced by all households will comply with the environment criteria applied to exclusive housing areas. In the case that an aircraft encounters any contingency, safety on the ground can be ensured by diverting the aircraft offshore. b. The Necessity of Relocating the Futenma Replacement Facility within Okinawa Prefecture The U.S. Marine Corps in Okinawa consists of air, ground, logistics, and command elements. The interaction of those elements in highly mobile and responsive operations of the U.S. Marine Corps is indispensable, so it has been determined that the FRF needs to be located within Okinawa Prefecture so that rotary-wing aircraft stationed at MCAS Futenma will be located near the elements with which they train, operate, or otherwise work on a regular basis. c. Background Concerning the Futenma Replacement Facility Considering the occurrence of the U.S. Forces helicopter crash in Ginowan City in August 2004, bilateral discussions on realignment have been made toward realizing the Ie Jima Auxiliary Airfield Camp Hansen Northern Training Area Senaha Communication Station Aha Training Area Sobe Communication Site Yomitan Auxiliary Offshore Camp Schwab Airfield Gimbaru Training Area Torii Communication Station Kin Blue Beach Training Area Kadena Air Base Camp Zukeran Camp Kuwae MCAS Futenma Makiminato : Facilities and areas involved in land return Service Area : Facilities and areas involved in land return Naha Port Facility (Cancellation of joint use) : Destination sites of other facilities relocation programs Henokosaki area and adjacent waters is the only solution to avoid the continued use of MCAS Futenma. Japan plans to make further efforts to achieve the replacement and return of MCAS Futenma as early as possible and to mitigate the impact on Okinawa in a speedy manner. The return of MCAS Futenma is expected to eliminate danger in the area and to contribute to the further growth of Okinawa, including Ginowan City, through the reuse of the area (approximately 481 ha with a land area 100 times larger than Tokyo Dome). a. Relocation of MCAS Futenma and Mitigation of the Impact on Okinawa The relocation of MCAS Futenma holds more signif cance than merely moving the facility from one location to another. Rather, it also contributes greatly to mitigating the impact on Okinawa. As such, the Government will work as one to implement this initiative. (a) Distribution of Functions Offered by MCAS Futenma MCAS Futenma fulf lls the following functions relating to the aviation capabilities of the U.S. Marine Corps stationed in Okinawa: H Operation of the Osprey and other aircraft H Operation of air refueling aircraft H Accepting a large number of transient aircraft in cases of emergency Of these three functions, only “operation of the Osprey and other aircraft” will be relocated to Camp Schwab. All 15 KC-130 air refueling aircraft were relocated to MCAS Iwakuni (in Yamaguchi Prefecture) in August 2014. This marked the completion of a task that has remained unresolved for 18 years since the SACO Final Report in 1996, enabling a vast majority of f xed-wing aircraft located in MCAS Futenma to be moved outside Okinawa Prefecture. This move also led to the relocation of approximately 870 USFJ personnel, civilian employees, and dependents. The function of providing a base for accepting a large number ----- relocation and return of MCAS Futenma at the earliest possible date in order to resolve the unease of the residents living in the vicinity. In the SCC document compiled in October 2005, the initiative to “locate the FRF in an ‘L’-shaped conf guration that combines the shoreline areas of Camp Schwab and adjacent water areas of Oura Bay” was approved. Then, based on negotiation and agreement with the local municipalities including Nago City, it was decided to stipulate in the Roadmap that the FRF be located in a conf guration that “combines Henokosaki and adjacent water areas of Oura and Henoko Bays.” In regard to construction of this replacement facility, “a Memorandum of Basic Understanding” was exchanged between the Governor of Okinawa Prefecture and then Minister of State for Defense in May 2006. After the change of government in September 2009, the Exploratory Committee for Okinawa Base Issues was established. After reviews conducted by the Committee, both Governments, at the “2+2” Meeting held in May 2010, conf rmed the intention to locate the FRF in the Camp Schwab Henokosaki area and the adjacent waters, and also agreed to take concrete measures to mitigate the impact on Okinawa. Subsequently, at the “2+2” Meeting held in June 2011, it was decided that the runway would take a “V” shape, and the Ministers conf rmed their commitment to complete the relocation project at the earliest possible date after 2014 in order to avoid the indef nite use of MCAS Futenma and to remove the risks as early as possible. During the deliberation process which led to these conclusions, f rst of all, it was determined that, from a security perspective, the deterrence of the U.S. Forces, including that of the U.S. Marine Corps stationed in Okinawa that is crucially located for the security of Japan, cannot be lessened while there remains instability and uncertainty in the East Asian security environment. Furthermore, concern was expressed that the functions of the U.S. Marine Corps would be weakened if the helicopter units stationed at MCAS Futenma were to be detached from the other Marine units stationed in Okinawa and moved abroad or out of the prefecture. Therefore, it was concluded that the FRF had to be within Okinawa Prefecture. At the “2+2” Meetings in October 2013 and April 2015, which followed the “2+2” Meeting of April 2012, the Governments of Japan and the United States also conf rmed that the plan to construct the FRF at Camp Schwab Henokosaki area and adjacent waters is the only solution that avoids the continued use of MCAS Futenma. See Fig. II-3-4-7 (Background for the Futenma Replacement Facility) See Reference 20 (Joint Statement of the Security Consultative Committee See See (April 27, 2012)); Reference 22 (Joint Statement of the Security Consultative Committee (October 3, 2013)); Reference 30 (Estimated Timelines for the Return of Facilities and Areas South of Kadena) d. Completion of Environmental Impact Assessment Procedures After the MOD sent the environmental impact assessment scoping document in 2007 to the Governor of Okinawa Prefecture and other parties, the MOD worked on revising its document based on the opinions provided by the Governor. Finally, the MOD completed the environmental impact assessment procedures by sending the revised assessment document to related parties including the governor in December 2012, while making the assessment document publicly viewable. Throughout these procedures, the MOD received a total of 1,561 opinions from the Governor of Okinawa Prefecture on six occasions, made all the required revisions, and ref ected them in the content of the environmental assessment. In this way, the MOD had taken steps to comply with relevant laws, ask opinions and ideas from Okinawa Prefecture over a suff cient period of time, and ref ect them in the assessment. e. Promotion of the Futenma Replacement Facility Construction Project. In relation to this project, the land-f ll request on public waters was submitted in March 2013 and was approved by the Governor of Okinawa Prefecture in December 2013. In the meantime, the Governor sent a total of 260 questions to the Okinawa Defense Bureau on four occasions and the MOD responded appropriately to these questions and spent suff cient time working on the procedures. Based on the approval from the Governor, the offshore boring survey started on August 14, 2014 and the project has been steadily underway for the land-f ll work and the bank reinforcement. This project is composed of land-f ll work on public waters and the installation of an air base and other facilities. The notif cation of the start of construction for the latter was submitted to Okinawa Prefecture on June 30, 2014 and the work was kicked off on July 1, 2014. **(2) Force Reductions and Relocation to Guam** In conjunction with the realignment of the U.S. Marine Corps in the Asia-Pacif c region, the “2+2” Meeting in June 2011 and other agreements prescribe that approximately 8,000 personnel of the III MEF and approximately 9,000 dependents will be relocated from Okinawa to Guam at the earliest possible date after 2014. Regarding the costs of the relocation, the two sides reached an agreement that, of the estimated $10.27 billion (in U.S. f scal year 2008 dollars) cost of the facilities and infrastructure development costs, Japan would provide $6.09 billion, including $2.8 billion in direct cash contribution, while the U.S. would fund the remaining $4.18 billion. In February 2009, the Japanese Government and the U.S. Government signed “the Agreement between the Government of Japan and the Government of the United States of America Concerning the Implementation of the Relocation of the III MEF Personnel and Their Dependents from Okinawa to Guam” (the Guam International Agreement) The Agreement legally guarantees and ----- |Month & Year|Background| |---|---| |April 1996|Then Prime Minister Hashimoto and then U.S. Ambassador Mondale held a meeting, and the full return of Marine Corps Air Station Futenma (MCAS Futenma) was announced. SACO Interim Report. → The airfi eld will be returned within fi ve to seven years, following the completion of an adequate replacement facility.| |December 1996|SACO Final Report → A maritime facility will be constructed off the east coast of the main island of Okinawa (one that can be dismantled).| |November 1999|Then Governor of Okinawa Inamine stated that he had chosen the Henoko coast region of Nago City as a candidate for the facility relocation on condition that it would be for joint military-civilian use| |December 1999|Then Mayor of Nago City Kishimoto expressed that the city would accept the FRF “Government Policy on Relocation of MCAS Futenma” (Cabinet decision) → Construction in the Nago City Henoko coastal region in the water area of Camp Schwab| |July 2002|“Basic Agreement Regarding the Use of Replacement Facilities” concluded between the Director General of Defense Agency and the Governor of Okinawa. “Basic Plan for Replacement Facilities for MCAS Futenma” was prepared. → Scale, construction methods, and specifi c construction site decided.| |November 2003|Then Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld visited Okinawa.| |April 2004|The Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) procedure started (abolished in 2007).| |August 2004|A U.S. Forces helicopter crashed into a university campus in Ginowan City, Okinawa.| |October 2005|“2+2” Joint Statement → Agreement on a new plan (an L shape plan connecting the coastal area of Camp Schwab with the adjacent water area of Oura bay)| |April 2006|“Basic Agreement Regarding the Construction of the Futenma Replacement Facility” concluded between the Director General of the Defense Agency, the Mayor of Nago, and the village mayor of Ginoza. → Agreement was reached by creating fl ight paths avoiding overfl ight of the surrounding region (the V shape plan).| |May 2006|“2+2” Joint Statement → Final adjustments made for the “U.S.-Japan Roadmap for Realignment Implementation,” V shape plan approved “Basic Confi rmation Regarding the Realignment of U.S. Military Forces in Okinawa” concluded between the Director General of the Defense Agency and the Governor of Okinawa. “GOJ Efforts for USFJ Force Structure Realignment and Others” (Cabinet decision) → The cabinet decision of December 1999 was abolished.| |August 2006|Establishment of “the Council on Measures for Relocation of MCAS Futenma”| |August 2007|The EIA scoping document was sent to the governor, municipal mayors etc. of Okinawa.| |April 2009|Draft Environment Impact Statement was sent to the governor and municipal mayors of Okinawa.| |September 2009|Conclusion of a three-party coalition government agreement between the Democratic Party of Japan, the Social Democratic Party, and the People’s New Party. → Agreement on reviewing the status of the U.S. Forces realignment and U.S. Forces bases in Japan.| |November 2009|Establishment of the Ministerial-Level Working Group on the Replacement Facility for Futenma Air Station. Japan-U.S. summit meeting → Agreement on resolving the relocation of Futenma Air Station expeditiously through the working group.| |December 2009|Ministerial Committee on Basic Policies convened, Exploratory Committee for the Okinawa Bases Issue was established.| |May 2010|“2+2” Joint Statement → Confi rmed the intention to locate the Futenma Replacement Facility at the Camp Schwab Henokosaki and adjacent water areas Cabinet approval of “immediate actions by the Government of Japan on items decided by the Japan-United States Security Consultative Committee on May 28th, 2010”| |August 2010|Futenma Replacement Facility Bilateral Experts Study Group Report| |June 2011|“2+2” Joint Statement → Confi rming the commitment that a replacement plan should be completed as early as possible after 2014, while deciding that the shape of the runway in the replaced facility should be V-shaped.| |December 2011– January 2012|The Environmental Impact Statement report was sent to the governor of Okinawa.| |February 2012|The Japan-U.S. Joint Statement was announced on the realignment of the U.S. forces stationed in Japan. → Offi cial discussion was initiated to delink two issues—the movement of Marines to Guam and resulting land returns South of Kadena—from progress on the FRF.| |April 2012|“2+2” Joint Statement → The current plan to relocate the air base from Futenma to Henoko was reconfi rmed to be the only viable solution.| |December 2012|Revised Environment Impact Statement was sent to the governor and municipal mayors of Okinawa.| |March 2013|Application for approval of public water body reclamation was submitted to the governor of Okinawa.| |April 2013|Release of “the consolidation plan of USFJ facilities and areas in Okinawa” → Return of facilities and areas to be completed in or after Fiscal Year 2022| |October 2013|“2+2” Joint Statement → Recognition was reaffi rmed that the plan to construct the Futenma Replacement Facility in Henoko is the only solution that avoids continued use of MCAS Futenma| |December 2013|Governor of Okinawa approved reclamation of the public water body related to the Futenma Replacement Facility construction project| |July 2014|Started the construction of replacement facilities| |October 2014|Joint press release by Japan and the United States → Reaffi rmed that the plan to construct the Futenma Replacement Facility in Henoko is the only solution to avoid the continued use of MCAS Futenma| |April 2015|“2+2” Joint Statement → Reconfi rmed that the plan to construct the Futenma Replacement Facility at the Camp-Schwab Henokosaki area and adjacent waters is the only solution that addresses operational, political, fi nancial, and strategic concerns and avoids the continued use of MCAS Futenma| Fig. II-3-4-7 Background for the Futenma Replacement Facility ----- ensures actions taken by Japan and the United States, such as Japan’s long-term funding for projects to which Japan provides direct cash contributions (so-called Mamizu projects). As part of the measures based on this Agreement, the Japanese government has provided cash contributions to the U.S. Government in relation to the Mamizu projects since FY2009[8]. Subsequently, in the “2+2” Joint Statement of April 2012, the unit composition and the number of personnel to be relocated to Guam were revised. More specif cally, with the revision, Marine Air-Ground Task Forces (MAGTF) are to be stationed and deployed in Guam, approximately 9,000 personnel are to be relocated to locations outside of Japan, the authorized strength of the U.S. Marine Corps forces in Guam is to be around 5,000 personnel and the end-state for the presence of the U.S. Marine Corps in Okinawa is to be consistent with the levels envisioned in the Roadmap. In this Joint Statement, the preliminary cost estimate by the U.S. Government for the relocation is $8.6 billion (in U.S. f scal year 2012 dollars). With regard to Japan’s f nancial commitment, it was reaff rmed that it was to be the direct cash contribution of up to $2.8 billion (in U.S. f scal year 2008 dollars) as stipulated in Article 1 of the Guam International Agreement. It was also conf rmed that Japan’s equity investment and loans for family housing projects and infrastructure projects would not be utilized. Moreover, it was stipulated that any funds that had already been transferred to the U.S. Government under the Guam International Agreement would be counted as part of the Japanese contribution. Furthermore, as a new initiative, a portion of the direct cash contribution of $ 2.8 billion mentioned above would be used to develop training areas in Guam and the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands as shared use facilities for Japan and the U.S. In addition, it was agreed that the remaining costs and any additional costs would be borne by the U.S., and that the two governments were to complete a bilateral cost breakdown. At the “2+2” Meeting in October 2013, the Ministers conf rmed that the relocation of U.S. Marine Corps personnel from Okinawa contributes to sustaining the forward presence of the U.S. Forces and promoting the development of Guam as the strategic hub, while also mitigating the impact on Okinawa. On that occasion, a Protocol amending the Guam International Agreement, which forms the basis for the bilateral cooperation necessary to achieve these goals of the relocation, was signed. The amendment, which is in line with the “2+2” Joint Statement of 2012, conf rmed the delinking of the relocation of U.S. Marine Corps units from Okinawa to Guam from progress on the FRF, and added provisions concerning the development of training areas in Guam and the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands and the shared use of these training areas by the U.S. Forces and the SDF. The limit on Japanese cash contributions remains unchanged at $2.8 billion (in U.S. f scal year 2008 dollars). Both countries also completed the process of creating a detailed breakdown of required costs. Under the relocation plan described in the 2012 “2+2” Joint Statement, U.S. Marine Corps units are to begin to relocate from Okinawa to Guam in the f rst half of the 2020s. The plan is considered to promote the implementation of the consolidation plan on returning the land areas south of Kadena Air Base published in April 2013. Furthermore, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2015[9] was stipulated in December 2014, which lifted the restriction on the use of funds by the U.S. Congress. The Supplemental Environmental Impact Statement (SEIS), conducted based on the revision of operations due to the plan adjustment, is to be completed in 2015, subsequently enabling full-scale relocation work in Guam. As for the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands Joint Military Training Environmental Impact Statement (CJMT-EIS), the draft was released in April 2015, and it is planned to be completed in 2016. See Reference 31 (Agreement between the Government of Japan and the Government of the United States of America Concerning the Implementation of the Relocation of III Marine Expeditionary Force Personnel and Their Dependents from Okinawa to Guam); Reference 32 (Protocol amending the Agreement between the Government of Japan and the Government of the United States of America Concerning the Implementation of the Relocation of III Marine Expeditionary Force Personnel and Their Dependents from Okinawa to Guam) **(3) Return of Land Areas South of Kadena Air Base** At the SCC Joint Statement in April 2012, it was decided to delink the progress on the FRF from both the relocation of the III MEF personnel from Okinawa to Guam, and resulting land returns south of Kadena. In addition, with regard to the land to be returned, it was agreed to conduct consultations focusing on three stages, namely 1) land eligible for immediate return; 2) land eligible for return once the relocation of functions is completed; and 3) land eligible for return after the relocation abroad. The return of all these types of land will enable the return of approximately 70% of USFJ facilities located in densely populated areas in the central and southern parts of the main island of Okinawa. Since the change of administration at the end of 2012, Japan and the United States have continued consultation under the basic policy of the Abe administration to dedicate all its strength to mitigate the impact of the U.S. Forces on Okinawa communities. Japan strongly requested an early return of lands south of Kadena, including Makiminato Service Area (Camp Kinser). As a result of bilateral As for Japan’s Mamizu projects, Japan provided cash contributions of approximately 109.4 billion yen to the U.S. side by using the budgets from FY2009 to FY2014. The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2015 repealed a provision that imposed the restriction on the use of funds provided by the U.S. and Japanese governments for the Guam Relocation project, which had been included in the acts since the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012, and states that the total costs for the Guam relocation project may not exceed ----- Fig. II-3-4-8 Return of Land Areas South of Kadena Air Base The 1st Kuwae Tank Farm of the Army Oil Storage Facility Camp Kuwae FY2022 FY2025 16 ha 68 ha or later or later Camp Zukeran (Lower Plaza Housing area) Camp Zukeran (a portion of the warehouse area of the Facilities and Engineering Compound) FY2024 23 ha or later FY2019 or later 10 ha Camp Zukeran - JC reached Agreement of Return on September 19, 2013 (a part of Kishaba Housing area) FY2024 Camp Zukeran (industrial corridor, etc.) or later 5 ha FY2024 or later 62 ha Camp Zukeran (additional areas) Makiminato Service Area (the remainder) α ha[note3] FY2024 or later 142 ha Camp Zukeran (West Futenma Air Base Futenma Housing area) Makiminato Service Area Makiminato Service Area (north access road) FY2022 481 ha Returned on March 31, 2015 (areas near Gate 5) or later Returned on August 31, 2013 1 ha FY2014 or later 2 ha - JC reached Makiminato Service Area Agreement of Return (Area to include majority of storage areas) on July 11, 2013 FY2025 or later 129 ha Legend : Returned or prompt return (65 ha) Naha Port facilities : Return after the relocation of functions within the prefecture (841 ha) : Return after the relocation of the Marine Corps outside Japan FY2028 56 ha (142 ha +more) or later Total: 1,048 ha + more Notes: 1. The times and years are based on the best case scenario concerning the return of specifi c facilities/areas after the completion of necessary measures and procedures to be taken by the Governments of Japan and the United States. The periods may become delayed due to such factors as the progress of the preparation for relocation in Okinawa by the Government of Japan and the U.S. Government’s efforts for relocation of the U.S. Marine Corps to outside Japan. Furthermore, the times and fi scal years in parentheses do not include the time necessary for relocation of the Marine Corps from Japan because, though the conditions for returning the areas include its relocation to outside of Japan, the plan for the relocation is yet to be decided. Consequently, the times of return of these areas may be changed depending on the progress of the relocation of the Marine Corps from Japan. 2. The area of each area is an approximate fi gure and may be slightly modifi ed based on the results of future surveys, etc. 3. Studies will be made in the process of developing a master plan to determine the feasibility of additional land returns. *JC: Japan-U.S. Joint Committee coordination, both countries announced the consolidation plan in April 2013, which stipulated the return schedule, including the specif c years of return. In the consolidation plan, both sides conf rmed that they will implement the plan as early as possible. The Government of Japan needs to continue to work with all its strength so that lands south of Kadena would be returned at the earliest possible date. Furthermore, following the announcement of the consolidation plan, the consultations have been held since April 2013, involving Ginowan City, Ginowan City Military Land Owners Association, Okinawa Prefecture, Okinawa Defense Bureau, and Okinawa General Bureau[10], and the MOD has also been providing necessary cooperation. Efforts have been made to enable the early return of land areas, including the land areas that are to be returned as soon as required procedures are completed (shown in red in Fig. II-3-4-8), since the announcement of the consolidation plan in April 2013, creating a path for the return of all four eligible land areas. This allowed the return of the north entrance of Makiminato Service Area (approximately 1 ha) in August 2013 and West Futenma Housing Area within Camp Zukeran, approximately 51 ha, at the end of March 2015. The Government of Japan will take every opportunity to hold consultations with the United States for the prompt development by the United States of a master plan for the return of land in the remaining areas, and support its development. So far, the Japan-U.S. Joint Committee has agreed on master plans for the Torii Communication Station which would be the relocation point of U.S. Army warehouses located in Camp Kinser, and Chibana Area of Kadena Ammunition Storage Area. All-out initiatives are being continuously made to steadily implement the consolidation plan and mitigate the impact on Okinawa as early as possible, and also to realize the respective returns of land in the shortest possible time for more visible mitigation of the impact on Okinawa. See Fig. II-3-4-8 (Return of Land Areas South of Kadena Air Base); Reference 30 (Estimated Timelines for the Return of Facilities and Areas South of Kadena) ----- are provided and the safety of f ight operation was reconf rmed. Additionally, in order to conf rm its safety, a Japanese analysis and assessment team was set up to validate the contents of the accident investigations of the U.S. government, based on Japan’s own viewpoints and knowledge. The team examined the investigation results and conf rmed that these accidents were caused largely by human factors and that there were no safety problems with the aircraft itself. Furthermore, in relation to the f ight operations of the MV-22, the two governments conf rmed that measures would be taken to address these human factors in light of the lessons learned from the accidents and agreed to implement specif c measures to ensure the safety of MV-22 operations in Japan through the Japan-U.S. Joint Committee and other occasions. Based on the above results, considering that the safety of MV-22 operations in Japan is fully conf rmed, f ight operations of the MV-22 Osprey resumed in Japan. The Government of Japan has conf rmed, from information obtained from the United States, that the CV-22 and the MV-22 offer the same propulsion system and have a basically similar structure and that the United States will ensure complete safety in operating the CV-22 in Japan as in the case of the MV-22. Based on this, Japan believes that the safety of the CV-22 in Japan will be ensured just like that of the MV-22. Furthermore, in order to ensure that full consideration is given to local residents and that the Joint Committee agreement is properly implemented for f ight operations of the MV-22 and the CV-22, the Government of Japan has been continuously engaging with the U.S. side through various opportunities, including the Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meetings. See Fig. II-3-4-9 (Chronology of Osprey Deployment by the U.S. Forces) **(4) Usability of Osprey Deployed by the U.S. Forces in** **Case of Disaster** In the aftermath of the devastating typhoon that hit the central Philippines in November 2013, 14 MV-22 aircraft, deployed in Okinawa, were dispatched for humanitarian assistance and disaster relief activities to support “Operation Damayan.” The MV-22s were deployed promptly to affected areas that were diff cult to access, and they transported several hundred isolated victims and about six tons of relief materials in a day. In April 2014, the MV-22, deployed in Okinawa, was dispatched for rescue activities in the wake of an accidental sinking of a passenger ship off the coast of Jindo in the Republic of Korea. Furthermore, in response to the large earthquake that hit Nepal in April 2015, four MV-22 aircraft, deployed in Okinawa, were dispatched to the country to transport personnel and supplies. In contrast, the MV-22 was used in Japan to conduct training for transporting victims to an MSDF escort vessel and other locations on such occasions as “Wakayama Prefecture Tsunami Disaster Readiness Practical Training” (October **4** **Osprey Deployment by the U.S. Forces in Japan** **(1) MV-22 Osprey Deployment in Okinawa** The Osprey is an aircraft that combines the vertical takeoff/ landing and hovering functions of rotary-wing aircraft on one hand and the speed and range of f xed-wing aircraft on the other. As the primary air unit of the U.S. Marine Corps, the MV-22 Osprey that have been developed for the U.S. Marine Corps play an important role in engaging in a broad range of activities, including transportation of personnel and goods. The U.S. Marine Corps is in the process of replacing aged rotary-wing airplanes (CH-46) with MV-22s, which have superior basic performance. In September 2013, all the 24 CH-46s deployed at MCAS Futenma were replaced by MV-22s. The MV-22 is a highly capable aircraft compared with the CH-46; it can f y faster, can carry more payload, and has a longer range. Its deployment to Okinawa will strengthen the deterrence of the U.S. Forces in Japan as a whole and greatly contribute to the peace and stability of the region. **(2) CV-22 Osprey Deployment to Yokota Air Base** On May 11, 2015 (same day U.S. time), the United States notif ed Japan of its plan to deploy CV-22 Osprey aircraft to Yokota Air Base starting in the latter half of 2017, followed by the announcement of this plan by the U.S. Department of Defense on May 12 (May 11 U.S. time). The United States plans to deploy the f rst three aircraft in the latter half of 2017 and complete the deployment of a total of 10 aircraft by 2021. The CV-22 aircraft deployed to Yokota Air Base handles tasks for transporting personnel and supplies for Special Operation Forces of the U.S. Forces to deal with crises and emergencies in the Asia-Pacif c region, including humanitarian assistance and natural disasters. The CV-22 and the MV-22 are two different models, but both models offer the same propulsion system and have a fundamentally similar structure. As Japan faces increasingly tougher security e nvironments, the deployment of high-performance CV-22 as part of the rebalancing strategy and enhancement of readiness posture of the United States will enhance the deterrence and response capabilities of the Japan-U.S. Alliance and contribute to the stability of the Asia-Pacif c region. The Government of Japan will continue to respond to local communities in a sincere manner in order to obtain their understanding and cooperation. **(3) Safety of the Osprey** After the crash of an MV-22 in Morocco in April 2012 and the crash of a CV-22 in Florida in June 2012, concerns about its safety have grown among Japanese people. In response, the Government of Japan and the Government of the United States agreed to refrain from any f ight operation in Japan until the results of the accident investigation ----- |Chronolo Fig. II-3-4-9|ogy of Osprey Deployment by the U.S. Forces| |---|---| |June 6, 2011|Provided information to relevant local governments and other organizations on the announcement made by the U.S. Department of Defense to replace the CH-46 deployed at MCAS Futenma with the MV-22 in the latter half of 2012.| |June 13–26|Provided safety/noise information that GOJ had obtained so far to relevant local governments and other organizations.| |June 24|Received a letter with 29 questions from the Okinawa Governor and others.| |September 1|The fi rst written response was handed to the Okinawa Governor and others by Administrative Vice-Minister.| |September 2–13|Provided an explanation on the fi rst written response to relevant local governments and other organizations.| |December 20|The second written response was handed to the Okinawa Governor by chief of the Okinawa Defense Bureau.| |December 20–January 17, 2012|Provided an explanation on the second written response above to relevant local governments and other organizations.| |April 12|A prompt report on the accident involving an MV-22 in Morocco was provided to relevant local governments and other organizations.| |June 13–|Provided an explanation on the results of the Environment Review, MV-22 pamphlet, and the content of the third response to the questions to Okinawa Prefecture, relevant local governments and other organizations.| |June 14|A prompt report on the accident involving a CV-22 in Florida was provided to relevant local governments and other organizations.| |June 26–|Provided an explanation on the information provided from the U.S. side regarding the accidents in Morocco and Florida to relevant local governments and other organizations.| |June 29–|Provided an explanation on the content of the Host Nation Notifi cation and the press release to relevant local governments and other organizations.| |July 20|Provided information from the U.S. side stating that the MV-22 would be offl oaded on MCAS Iwakuni on July 23 to relevant local governments and other organizations.| |August 1–September 18|Received four questionnaires regarding the Environment Review etc., from the Okinawa Governor and others.| |August 28–|Provided an explanation on the “Analysis and Evaluation Report on the MV-22 Accident in Morocco” to relevant local governments and other organizations.| |September 11–|Provided an explanation on the “Analysis and Evaluation Report on the CV-22 Accident in Florida” to relevant local governments and other organizations.| |September 14–|Q&A session on Osprey deployment with members of the Iwakuni City Council full member committee.| |September 19–|Provided an explanation on the report “MV-22 Osprey deployment in Okinawa” to relevant local governments and other organizations.| |September 21|Provided Yamaguchi Prefecture and Iwakuni City with the information that function check fl ights, etc. were commenced at MCAS Iwakuni.| |September 27-28|Provided information on the contents of the responses to the questionnaires from Okinawa Prefecture and others received from August 1 to September 18 to Okinawa Prefecture, other relevant local governments and other organizations.| |November 2|In the nationwide prefectural governors meeting hosted by the Government, the Minister of Defense explained the initial training plan with the MV-22 Osprey, and the Prime Minister and the Minister of Defense asked for the governors’ cooperation in relocating the training to outside Okinawa.| |December 10|The MOD received another letter of questions from the Governor of Okinawa in response to the answers to his initial questions which the MOD submitted to him in September.| |December 12–14|The MOD provided explanations to Okinawa Prefecture and relevant local governments in Okinawa regarding the content of the second set of answers the MOD prepared, since some of these answers did not satisfactorily address the letter of questions from the Governor of Okinawa Prefecture on environmental review.| |December 25|Received a letter requesting information on the fl ight operation of the MV-22 etc. from the Governor of Okinawa Prefecture.| |January 28, 2013|The Okinawa Citizens’ Council, the Okinawa Prefectural Assembly, and other organizations sent a statement to the Prime Minister.| |April 30|The MOD provided explanation to the relevant local governments and other organizations regarding the U.S. explanation on the deployment of the MV-22 squadron (unloaded at MCAS Iwakuni in summer 2013).| |July 1|Announcement of plans to unload the MV-22 squadron to MCAS Iwakuni in the fi nal week of July| |September 25|Relocation to MCAS Futenma was completed.| |May 12, 2015|The U.S. Department of Defense provided related municipalities and organizations with information related to the announcement of the deployment of the CV-22 Osprey at Yokota Air Base starting in the latter half of 2017.| ----- 2014) and “Michinoku ALERT 2014” (November 2014), a disaster relief exercise by the GSDF Tohoku Headquarters. Like the MV-22, the CV-22 can conduct humanitarian assistance and disaster relief activities, including search and rescue missions, both immediately and over a large range, in the case of a large-scale disaster. As such, it is expected that the superior capabilities of the Osprey deployed by the U.S. Forces can be showcased in a variety of operations in the future as well. **5** **Consultation Structure for Mitigating the Impact** **on Okinawa** Today, a number of USFJ facilities and areas still remain in Okinawa because of the U.S. occupation of Okinawa and the slower returning progress of USFJ facilities and areas compared to other areas of Japan even after the occupation ended. In order to mitigate the concentrated impact on Okinawa, the Government of Japan has been implementing initiatives toward the realization of the SACO Final Report and the Roadmap. The MOD is committed to further mitigating the impact on Okinawa through the Okinawa Policy Council, its subcommittee and other means[11], while listening to the opinions of the local residents. At the Okinawa Policy Council Meeting on December 17, 2013, the Governor of Okinawa presented several requests, including cessation of the operation of MCAS Futenma within f ve years and its early return, the re-deployment of about 12 MV-22 Osprey aircraft to bases outside of Okinawa, and the total return of Makiminato Service Area within seven years. The Japanese government as a whole is addressing the mitigation of the impact on Okinawa by establishing the Council for Promoting the Mitigation of the Impact of MCAS Futenma on Okinawa, consisting of the Chief Cabinet Secretary, the Minister of State for Okinawa, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, the Minister of Defense, the Governor of Okinawa and the Mayor of Ginowan. The MOD also created the Committee for Promoting the Mitigation of the Impact of Bases on Okinawa headed by the State Minister of Defense on January 22, 2014 to continually work on the reduction of the impact on Okinawa. In addition to discussions based on this framework, Japan has advanced discussions with the United States to mitigate the impact on Okinawa. Both countries shared the view to continue efforts to relocate aviation training, including that of MV-22s, to locations outside Okinawa Prefecture and Japan and to continue and enhance initiatives to accelerate the process of returning land areas south of Kadena (particularly Makiminato Service Area), enabling the two countries to announce these matters through a joint press release on October 20, 2014. The Japanese Government has continually been working on Japan-U.S. joint exercises using the MV-22 and cooperating with local communities to allow the use of Saga Airport by the U.S. Marine Corps in order to develop the training infrastructure and locations for the MV-22. In addition, efforts are underway to realize the return of Makiminato Service Area. To accelerate this process, Japan has helped the U.S. Forces to develop a master plan related to the return of this area. See Part II, Chapter 3, Section 4-6 (Measures to Mitigate the Impacts of USFJ Facilities and Areas) **6** **Initiatives for the Use of Lands Previously** **Provided for Use by the Stationed Forces** For the return of lands in Okinawa provided for use by the USFJ (hereinafter, “USFJ Land”), the “Act on Special Measures Concerning Promotion of Effective and Appropriate Use of the Lands in Okinawa Prefecture Previously Provided for Use by the Stationed Forces” stipulates various measures concerning the USFJ Land agreed to be returned. Mainly, the MOD: (1) conducts mediation in relation to access for surveys, etc. to be implemented by prefectural governments and local municipalities on the USFJ Land which are agreed to be returned; (2) conducts measures applying to all the returned lands to remove impediments for use such as soil contamination and unexploded ordnance, not only those caused by the activities of the stationed forces, before handing over the land to the owners of former USFJ Land; and (3) provides f nancial benef ts to alleviate the impact on the owners of the returned lands and to promote use of the land. The MOD will continue its initiatives to promote the effective and appropriate use of returned lands by coordinating and cooperating with related ministries, the prefectural government and local municipalities. 11 On March 19, 2013 a subcommittee was established under the Okinawa Policy Council in order to address issues concerning mitigation of the impact relating to U.S. bases and Okinawa development ----- **4** **Stationing of the U.S. Forces in Regions Other than Okinawa** In regions other than Okinawa, the MOD is implementing measures to secure the stable presence of the U.S. Forces by maintaining its deterrence abilities and trying to mitigate the impact on local communities. **1** **Realignment of USFJ Facilities and Areas in** **Kanagawa Prefecture** responses to various contingencies, the JGSDF Central Readiness Force Headquarters, which unilaterally controls JGSDF mobile operation units and specialized units, was relocated from JGSDF Camp Asaka (in Saitama Prefecture) to Camp Zama, where the headquarters of U.S. Army Japan (USARJ) are located, at the end of FY2012. In accordance with the transformation of USARJ headquarters, a mission command training center and other support facilities were constructed within the U.S. Forces Sagami General Depot (SGD, in Kanagawa Prefecture) using U.S. funding. In addition, measures will be implemented for more effective and eff cient use of Camp Zama and the SGD, including partial release of facilities and areas. The partial release of land (approximately 17 ha) at SGD was approved by the Joint Committee in June 2008, while the partial release of land (approximately 5.4 ha) at Camp Zama, and the shared use of a portion of land at SGD (approximately 35 ha) with Sagamihara City were approved in October 2011 and June 2012, respectively, by the Joint Committee. Of all these land areas, a portion of land at SGD Due to the strong desire from local public bodies and other organizations, the return of six facilities and areas (including Kami Seya Communication Station in Yokohama City), as well as the construction of approximately 700 housing units for the U.S. Forces families in the Yokohama area of the “Ikego Housing Area and Navy Annex” were agreed in October 2004 by the Joint Committee. Subsequently, both countries held consultations regarding the review of the number of housing units to be constructed and the return of part of the land in the Zushi area currently used by the US Forces Japan as “Ikego Housing Area and Navy Annex.” As a result, the Joint Committee in September 2010 agreed that the number of housing units to be constructed would be around 400 as an interim measure to facilitate the relocation of the Negishi Housing Area and that ongoing discussions regarding the return of part of the land in the abovementioned Zushi area would be held. As a stopgap measure until the land is returned, the Joint Committee added that use of the land would be shared with Zushi City, once the requirements are fulf lled. Up to now, three facilities and areas (Fukaya Communication Site, Koshiba POL Depot, and Tomioka Storage Area) have been returned and part of the land in the Zushi area of the Ikego Housing Area has been designated for shared use. The Joint Committee in April 2014 also set the goal of returning the Kami Seya Communication Station at the end of June 2015. In addition, the Joint Committee agreed to change the number of housing units to be constructed in the Yokohama area of the Ikego Housing Area from approximately 400 to 171. See Fig. II-3-4-10 (Facilities and Areas Related to the Reorganization of the USFJ Facilities and Areas in Kanagawa Prefecture) **2** **Current Situation Regarding the Realignment of the** **U.S. Forces in Japan as Stipulated in the Roadmap** **(1) Improvement of U.S. Army Japan Command and** **Control Capability** To have enhanced mobility and readiness as well as to enable joint missions, the headquarters of U.S. Army Japan (USARJ) at Camp Zama (in Kanagawa Prefecture) was reorganized into the headquarters of the USARJ&I Corps (Forward) in December 2007 and the reorganization took place at the end of September 2008. With the aim of strengthening coordination with the reorganized USARJ headquarters so as to enable rapid Facilities and Areas Related to the Fig. II-3-4-10 Reorganization of the USFJ Facilities and Areas in Kanagawa Prefecture **Kamiseya Communication Station** As of May 31, 2014 Location: Seya-ku and Asahi-ku, Yokohama City Area: About 242 ha National land: About 110 ha Private/public land: About 133 ha To be returned aiming at the end of June, 2015 **Fukaya Communication Site** **Yokohama City,** Location: Izumi-ku, Yokohama City Area: **Kanagawa** About 77 ha (national land) **Prefecture** To be returned aiming at the end of June, 2014 **Asahi-ku** **Negishi Dependent Housing Area** **Seya-ku** Location: Naka-ku, Minami-ku and Isogo ku, Yokohama City Area: **Minami-** About 43 ha **Izumi-ku** **ku** **Naka-ku** National land: About 27 ha Private/public land: About 16 ha **Isogo-ku** **Totsuka-ku** **Tomioka Storage Area** Location: Kanazawa-ku, Yokohama City Area: **Kanazawa-ku** About 3 ha (national land) Returned in May 2009 **Koshiba POL Depot** Location: Kanazawa-ku, Yokohama City Area: About 53 ha **“Ikego Housing Area and Navy** National land: About 51 ha **Annex”** Private/public land: About 1 ha Location: Kanazawa-ku, Yokohama Returned in December 2005 City and Zushi City Land area: approx. 288 ha **Detached part of the “Ikego Housing Area and** National land: approx. 288 ha **Navy Annex”** Private/public land: Location: Kanazawa-ku, Yokohama City Area: approx. 0.5 ha About 1 ha Including the following two areas National land: About 1 ha Yokohama area Private land: About 0.1 ha Land area: approx. 37 ha National land: approx. 36 ha In April 2014, an agreement on the timing of the return Private/public land: of both the Fukaya Communication Site and Kami Seya approx. 0.3 ha Communication Station was reached. Zushi area The areas in total to be returned will be about Land area: approx. 252 ha 320 ha, which is equivalent to about 70% of the National land: approx. 252 ha total land area of the USFJ facilities and areas in Private/public land: Yokohama City (about 470 ha). (As of April 2014) approx. 0.2 ha Construction of 171 ----- (approximately 17 ha) was released on September 30, 2014. This marks the f rst release of land of USFJ facilities and areas in mainland Japan based on the Roadmap. **(2) Yokota Air Base and Airspace** a. Establishment of the Bilateral Joint Operations Coordination Center (BJOCC) Enhancement of coordination between the headquarters of both countries, combined with the transition to joint operational posture, is highly important to ensure a response of f exibility and readiness of the SDF and the U.S. Forces. The headquarters of the U.S. Forces in Japan located at Yokota Air Base, and Tokyo plays an important role in the various mechanisms under the Guidelines. Therefore, along with the relocation of ASDF Air Defense Command HQ as mentioned below, the BJOCC[12] was established at Yokota Air Base and commenced operations at the end of FY2011. See Part II, Chapter 3, Section 2 (Overview of the Revision of the Guidelines) b. Relocation of ASDF Air Defense Command HQ In the case of air defense and BMD, only a short time is available for response. Therefore, it is important for the SDF and the U.S. Forces to immediately share the necessary information. Thus, at the end of FY2011, the ASDF Air Defense Command HQ and its relevant units were relocated to Yokota Air Base where the U.S. 5th Air Force Headquarters is located. This arrangement and the establishment of the above-mentioned BJOCC have made it possible to enhance coordination between the headquarters of the SDF and the U.S. Forces, including the sharing of information concerning air defense and BMD. c. Yokota Airspace To facilitate the operations of civilian airplanes in Yokota airspace, where the U.S. Forces conduct radar approach control, measures have been taken since 2006 to temporarily transfer the responsibility for air traff c control of portions of Yokota airspace to the Japanese authorities, to deploy ASDF off cers at the Yokota Radar Approach Control (Yokota RAPCON), and to reduce the airspace by about 40% (i.e. the release of air traff c control from USFJ). d. Civilian-Military Dual Use of Yokota Air Base At the Japan-U.S. Summit Meeting held in 2003, it was agreed that the joint civilian-military use of Yokota Air Base would be studied, and a Liaison Conference was then established as a working panel attended by relevant government ministries and agencies and the Tokyo Metropolitan Government. The governments of Japan and the United States are conducting a study on the specif c conditions and modalities, with the understanding that both countries will not compromise the military operations and safety of Yokota Air Base. **(3) Deployment of U.S. Aircraft Carrier to Yokosuka** **Naval Base** The presence of the U.S. Pacif c Fleet plays an important role in ensuring maritime security in the Asia-Pacif c region as well as regional peace and stability. The U.S. aircraft carrier provides the core capability of the Fleet. The aircraft carrier USS George Washington, which has been forward deployed in Yokosuka (Kanagawa Prefecture) until May 2015, will proceed to the United States for fuel exchange, and in its place, the nuclear-powered aircraft carrier[13] USS Ronald Reagan will be forward deployed. The U.S. Navy aff rms that it will continue to ensure that all of its nuclear-powered vessels (including USS George Washington) adhere to the relevant safety policies. For example, the nuclear reactor will normally be shut down while the aircraft carrier is anchored, and repairing and refueling will not be carried out in Japan. The Government of Japan intends to continue taking all possible measures to ensure safety. **(4) Measures relating to Atsugi Air Facility and MCAS** **Iwakuni** a. Relocation of Carrier-Based Aircraft Atsugi Air Facility (in Kanagawa Prefecture) is currently used as a base for carrier-based aircraft. Since Atsugi Air Facility is located at the center of an urban district, the noise of carrier jets taking off and landing in particular has been a problem for a long time. It is necessary to resolve such problems as soon as possible in order to stably maintain the operations of aircraft carriers. On the other hand, after the completion of the runway relocation project[14] at MCAS Iwakuni (the relocation of the runway approximately 1,000 meters offshore), safe aircraft operations would become possible with less impact on the living environment of the surrounding communities. Taking these factors into consideration, CVW-5 squadrons are to be relocated from Atsugi Air Facility to MCAS Iwakuni. In order to mitigate impacts of the increased operations at MCAS Iwakuni due to the projected relocation, related measures will be taken, including: (1) conducting the relocation after the runway is moved offshore, (2) relocation of MSDF EP-3, etc. from MCAS Iwakuni to Atsugi Air Facility, (3) deployment of KC-130 (to be relocated from MCAS Futenma to MCAS Iwakuni) on a regular rotational basis to MSDF Kanoya Base (in Kagoshima Prefecture) and Guam for training and operations, and (4) relocation of U.S. Marine Corps CH-53D helicopters from MCAS Iwakuni to Guam. Due to these measures, the area requiring residential noise-abatement work (so-called f rst category area) will 12 The BJOCC functions to contribute to providing a joint response for Japan’s defense. To that end, it works to enhance information sharing, close coordination, and interoperability between the Japanese and U.S. headquarters. 13 Nuclear-powered aircraft carriers do not need to replenish their fuel and they are able to maintain the high speeds necessary for the operation of aircraft, giving them excellent combat and operational capabilities. 14 A project to relocate the runway of MCAS Iwakuni by approximately 1,000 meters to the east (offshore), in response to the requests from Iwakuni City, etc. The new runway commenced its operations ----- decrease from approximately 1,600 ha to 500 ha. Subsequently, at the “2+2” held in October 2013, it was acknowledged that the relocation of CVW-5 from Atsugi Air Facility to MCAS Iwakuni should be completed by around 2017. In addition, with regard to the relocation of MSDF EP-3, etc. to Atsugi Air Facility as stated in (2) above, upon the request of local public entities in the vicinity of MCAS Iwakuni, it was aff rmed that, as a result of Japan-U.S. deliberation including defense posture review, MSDF EP-3, etc. would remain at MCAS Iwakuni. With regard to the regular deployment of KC-130 on a rotational basis to MSDF Kanoya Base and Guam as stated in (3) above, consultations are being held between Japan and the United States pertaining to training and operations at MSDF Kanoya Base. In addition, concerning the relocation of U.S. Marine Corps CH-53D helicopters from MCAS Iwakuni to Guam as stated in (4) above, Japan and the United States conf rmed that based on the Roadmap, etc. the unit, which has been temporarily dispatched to the Middle East from MCAS Iwakuni, will be relocated to the mainland of the United States without returning to MCAS Iwakuni and then relocated to Guam. In order to construct family housing and sports facilities, etc. required for the relocation of carrier-based aircraft to MCAS Iwakuni, site development work is currently being undertaken in the Atagoyama area. b. Field-Carrier Landing Practice (FCLP) The 2006 Roadmap prescribes that a bilateral framework to conduct a study on a permanent FCLP facility is to be established with the goal of selecting a permanent site at the earliest possible date. At the “2+2” Meeting of June 2011, it was conf rmed that the Government of Japan will explain to local authorities that Mageshima is considered to be the candidate site for a new SDF facility. This SDF facility would be used to support operations in response to a variety of situations including large-scale disasters as well as regular exercises and other activities, including use by the U.S. Forces as a permanent site for FCLP. In addition, the 2005 SCC document conf rmed that the U.S. Forces will continue to conduct FCLP at Iwo-To in accordance with existing temporary arrangements until a permanent FCLP training facility is identif ed. c. Resumption of Civil Aviation Operations at MCAS Iwakuni Considering that the local public entities, etc., including Yamaguchi Prefecture and Iwakuni City, had been working together to request the resumption of civil aviation operations, it was agreed in 2005 that civil aviation operations of four round trips per day would be allowed as long as such operations do not compromise U.S. military operational requirements. It was then agreed in the Roadmap that “portions of the future civilian air facility will be accommodated at MCAS Iwakuni.” Based on this agreement, Iwakuni Kintaikyo Airport was opened in 2012, resuming regular f ights of civil aviation aircraft after 48 years. **(5) Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD)** Japan and the United States are set to continue close coordination on BMD as the two countries improve their respective BMD capabilities. In June 2006, an AN/TPY-2 radar (so-called “X-Band Radar”) system was deployed to the U.S. Shariki Communication Site[15]. Also in October 2006, U.S. Army Patriot PAC-3 units (Patriot Advanced Capability) were deployed to Kadena Air Base and Kadena Ammunition Storage Area. At the Japan-U.S. Summit Meeting in February 2013, both sides agreed on the necessity of the additional deployment of TPY-2 radar in Japan to further enhance BMD capabilities and completed the deployment to the U.S. Kyogamisaki Communication Site (in Kyoto Prefecture) in December 2014. Moreover, at the Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting in April 2014, the U.S. Secretary of Defense stated that the United States would deploy additional Aegis ships with BMD capabilities to Japan. The U.S. notif ed Japan in October 2014 that the country would deploy additional Aegis ships with BMD capabilities to Yokosuka Naval Base in August 2015 and July 2017 and replace an Aegis ship already deployed to Yokosuka Naval Base with one that has BMD capabilities. See Part III, Chapter 1, Section 1-3 (Response to Ballistic Missile Attacks) Parliamentary Vice-Minister Harada delivering a congratulatory speech at the unit launch of the U.S. Kyogamisaki Communication Site **(6) Training Relocation** Based on the decision that U.S. aircraft from three USFJ facilities—Kadena, Misawa (in Aomori Prefecture) and MCAS Iwakuni—would participate for the time being in bilateral training with ASDF at ASDF facilities, training ----- relocation has been underway since 2007[16]. The MOD has been improving its infrastructure, as required, for the training relocation. In addition to assisting USFJ, the MOD and the SDF are conducting efforts to ensure the safety and security of the local community, such as the establishment of a liaison off ce, facilitated communication with related government agencies, and response to requirements from the local community. These efforts have been contributing to successful training relocation. In January 2011, at the Joint Committee, based on the “2+2” Joint Statement in 2010, both governments agreed to include Guam as a new training relocation site and to expand the scale of training. Moreover, at the Joint Committee in October 2011, they agreed on details for training sites. After that, training was relocated to Guam **5** **Initiatives for Smooth Implementation of the Realignment of the U.S. Forces in Japan** In order to smoothly implement the realignment of the U.S. Forces in Japan based on the Roadmap, the “Act on Special Measures on Smooth Implementation of the Realignment of United States Forces in Japan (USFJ Realignment Special Measures Act)” was enacted in August 2007. Realignment grants, Special Subsidy Rates for Public Projects, etc. and other systems were established based on the law. During a period of time before and after the implementation of realignment (10 years in principle), realignment grants[17] will be awarded to help cover the expenses of projects[18] which contribute to increasing the convenience of the lives of residents of local municipalities affected by the realignment[19], and to stimulate local and other locations for the f rst time, leading to a series of training conducted at relocation sites. Furthermore, in March 2014, both governments agreed to add air-to-ground training using the Misawa Air-to-Ground Range through the Joint Committee. The addition of air-to-ground training contributes to enhancing interoperability between the two countries, and also to relocating part of air-to-ground training originally conducted at Tori Shima Range, etc. with U.S. Forces aircraft f ying to Kadena Air Base. Thus, this training relocation will help noise abatement around Kadena Air Base, thereby contributing to the mitigation of the impact of U.S. Forces training activities in Okinawa. This agreement resulted in air-to-ground training using the Misawa Air-toGround Range in June 2014. industries. To this end, they will be awarded in accordance with progress made in the steps of U.S. Forces realignment, after the Defense Minister designates the specif ed defense facilities and neighboring municipalities affected by realignment. As of April 2015, 16 defense facilities in 41 municipalities are eligible to receive the grant. In addition, under U.S. Forces realignment, some USFJ facilities and areas will be returned, and the U.S. Marine Corps in Okinawa will be relocated to Guam. Since this may affect the employment of USFJ local employees, the Government of Japan will take measures to include education and skills training, which is to help retain their employment. 16 USFJ aircraft conduct bilateral exercises at JASDF facilities in order to improve interoperability and reduce the impact of training activities on the areas surrounding USFJ air bases. 17 Approximately 13 billion yen in the FY2015 budget 18 Under the Realignment Special Measures Act, changes in the composition of units of those naval vessels that conduct operations integrally with US air wings subject to realignment (replacement of the aircraft carrier at Yokosuka Naval Base with a nuclear aircraft carrier) will be treated in the same way as the realignment of the U.S. Forces in Japan. 19 The scope of specifi c projects includes 14 projects identifi ed by Article 2 of the enforcement ordinance of the Act on Special Measures on Smooth Implementation of the Realignment of United States ----- **6** **Measures to Mitigate the Impacts of USFJ Facilities and Areas** As for the implementation of the FRF project, it was determined to take maximum environmental conservation measures in order to avoid or mitigate impacts on the environment as much as possible. Such measures include consideration and implementation of measures to improve environmental conditions to make them suitable for sea turtles to come onto land and lay eggs, the transplanting of corals and seaweeds, periodic checking for the habitats of dugongs using aircraft and underwater recording devices, and the use of rubble[22] for land-f ll material, which is produced regardless of the project; it was also determined to engage in other enhanced initiatives such as follow-up surveys. In order to implement these measures, an environmental monitoring committee was established to ask for advice and guidance by specialists and experts, as was considered when approval was given by the Governor of Okinawa Prefecture for the reclamation. In addition, where necessary, environmental conservation measures will be improved and the range of surveys will be expanded to make sure all possible measures will be taken. **1** **Initiatives to Conserve the Environments around** **USFJ Facilities and Areas** At the “2+2” meeting in September 2000, based on the recognition that environmental conservation is important, the governments of both nations agreed to make it a common objective to ensure the health and safety of residents in the vicinity of USFJ facilities and areas, U.S. Forces personnel, their families and other such parties, and made the “Joint Statement of Environmental Principles[20].” To follow up on this announcement, Japan-U.S. consultation has been enhanced. Specif cally, the MOD has been working with relevant ministries and agencies to enhance cooperation for regular reviews of the Japan Environmental Governing Standards (JEGS)[21], exchange information on the environment, and deal with environmental pollution. Additionally, at the “2+2” meeting in May 2010, from the perspective of shared responsibility for environmental conservation, Japan and the United States instructed their staffs to discuss the possibility of taking a “Green Alliance” approach for the U.S. Forces facilities and areas in Japan, and the adoption of renewable energy for U.S. bases under development in Japan as one of the elements of HNS was reviewed, along with other issues. The result was ref ected in the comprehensive review of HNS as described in Part II, Chapter 3, Section 4-1-3. In December 2013, the governments of both Japan and the U.S. announced the “Joint Announcement on a Framework Regarding Environmental Stewardship at U.S. Armed Forces Facilities and Areas in Japan.” The governments engaged in discussions aimed at the creation of a framework for increased initiatives in managing the environment associated with USFJ facilities and areas, and announced in October 2014 that both parties reached a substantial agreement that would supplement the SOFA through a joint press release. This supplemental agreement is part of a more comprehensive framework for recognizing the signif cance of environmental protection and fulf lls the bilateral goal def ned by the press release in December 2013. Both countries expect to compile a series of related technical documents in the future to complete this entire framework. See Part II, Chapter 3, Section 4-1-3 (Host Nation Support (HNS)) **2** **Other Measures** Japan is engaged in measures for the improvement of the living environment in regions surrounding USFJ facilities and areas. It also provides municipalities with base grants[23] which have alternate features in terms of municipal tax on real estate. See Part III, Chapter 4, Section 1-4 (Measures to Promote Harmony between Defense Facilities and Surrounding Areas) Moreover, in the vicinities of USFJ facilities and areas, incidents and accidents caused by U.S. Forces personnel and others have affected local areas and their residents, so the Government of Japan has requested USFJ to take effective measures for the prevention of recurrence, such as educating military personnel and others, and enforcing strict discipline among them. The Government of Japan is cooperating with USFJ in these preventive measures; at the same time it has taken measures for prompt and appropriate compensation for the damage caused by the incidents and accidents. The U.S. side has put in place its guidelines for offduty action (liberty policy), including measures such as 20 Consisting of four items; (1) environmental governing standards, (2) information sharing and access, (3) response to environmental contamination, and (4) environmental consultation. 21 JEGS is an environmental standard compiled by USFJ in order to ensure that USFJ activities and installations protect the natural environment of people and health, and stipulates the handling of environmental pollutants and storage methods within the facilities and areas. 22 Byproduct created in producing broken stones at quarries ----- nighttime alcohol restrictions and curfews applying to U.S. Forces personnel ranked below a certain level. Because ceaseless initiatives by the people involved is important for the prevention of incidents and accidents involving U.S. Forces personnel, the MOD will continue efforts to prevent incidents and accidents involving U.S. Forces personnel based on feedback from the communities and institutions involved. ----- **Chapter** **Reform of the Ministry of Defense** ##### 4 **Section 1 Organization of the Ministry of Defense and the Self-Defense Forces** **1** **Organizational Structure Supporting Defense Capability** **1** **Organization of the Ministry of Defense and the** **Self-Defense Forces** To fulf ll their mission of defending Japan, the Ministry of Defense (MOD) and the SDF[1] consist of various organizations, mainly the Ground, Maritime and Air SelfDefense Forces as armed forces. See Fig. II-4-1-1 (Organizational Chart of the Ministry of Defense); Fig. II-4-1-2 (Outline of the Ministry of Defense) **2** **Systems to Support the Minister of Defense** The Minister of Defense is responsible for issues related to the defense of Japan as the head of the MOD, and is in overall charge of the SDF duties in accordance with the provisions of the SDF Act. The Minister is supported by the State Minister of Defense, the Parliamentary Vice-Ministers of Defense (two) and the Senior Adviser to the Minister of Defense. There are also Special Advisers to the Minister of Defense, who advise the Minister of Defense, and the Fig. II-4-1-1 Organizational Chart of the Ministry of Defense Cabinet Prime Minister Minister of Defense National Security Council State Minister of Defense Senior Adviser to the Minister of Defense Special Advisers to the Minister of Defense (up to three people) Parliamentary Vice-Ministers of Defense (two) Administrative Vice-Minister of Defense Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs Private Secretary of the Minister of Defense (Internal bureaus) Cooperative Cooperative Units Organizations Note: The date of the establishment of the Acquisition, Technology and Logistics Agency shall be (Excluding temporary or special positions.) Note: The date of the establishment of the Acquisition, Technology and Logistics Agency shall be the date specified by a Cabinet Order within a period not exceeding ten months from the day of promulgation (June 17, 2015) The Ministry of Defense and the SDF form a single organization for national defense. Whereas the term “Ministry of Defense” refers to the administrative aspects of the organization, which manages ----- |Organization|Outline| |---|---| |GSDF*|H Regional Armies • Composed of multiple divisions and brigades, and other directly controlled units (such as engineer brigades and antiaircraft artillery groups) • There are fi ve regional armies, each mainly in charge of the defense of their respective regions H Divisions and Brigades Composed of combat units and logistics support units which support combat units, and others H Central Readiness Force Consisting of an airborne brigade, a helicopter brigade, the Central Readiness Regiment, the Special Operation Group, and the Central NBC Weapon Defense Unit| |MSDF*|H Self-Defense Fleet • Consists of key units such as the Fleet Escort Force, the Fleet Air Force (consisting of fi xed-wing patrol aircraft units and such), and the Fleet Submarine Force • Responsible for the defense of sea areas surrounding Japan primarily through mobile operations H Regional Districts There are fi ve regional districts who mainly protect their responsible territories and support the Self-Defense Fleet| |ASDF*|H Air Defense Command • Composed of three air defense forces and the Southwestern Composite Air Division • Primarily responsible for general air defense duties H Air Defense Force Composed of key units such as air wings (including fi ghter aircraft units and others), the Aircraft Control and Warning Wing (including aircraft warning and control units ), and Air Defense Missile Groups (including surface-to-air guided missile units and others)| |National Defense Academy of Japan (Yokosuka, Kanagawa)|H An institution for the cultivation of future SDF personnel H Offers a science and engineering postgraduate course equivalent to master’s or doctoral degree from a university (undergraduate and postgraduate courses) and a comprehensive security postgraduate course equivalent to a master’s degree.| |National Defense Medical College (Tokorozawa, Saitama)|H An institution for the cultivation of future SDF medical personnel, the SDF personnel and engineering personnel who are nurses. H An institution for the cultivation of future SDF offi cers who are public nurses, nurses, and SDF engineering personnel. H Offers a medical course that complies with university establishment standards for PhD programs for schools of medicine.| |National Institute for Defense Studies (Meguro-ku, Tokyo)|H Organization that functions as a “think tank” of the Ministry of Defense • Conducts basic research and studies related to the administration and operation of the SDF • Conducts research and compiles data on military history • Educates SDF personnel and other senior offi cials • Manages books and documents of historical value located in the connected library| |Defense Intelligence Headquarters (Shinjuku-ku, Tokyo)|H Central intelligence organization of the Ministry of Defense, which collects and analyzes military data • Collects various military intelligence, including signal intelligence, images and other information acquired by warning and surveillance activities; comprehensively analyzes and assesses the information; and provides information to related organizations within the ministry • Consists of six communication sites and its headquarters| |Inspector General’s Offi ce of Legal Compliance (Shinjuku-ku, Tokyo)|H Organization that inspects overall tasks of the Ministry of Defense and the SDF from an independent position.| |Regional Defense Bureau (eight locations nationwide)|H Ensure understanding and cooperation of local public organizations, and conduct cost audit, supervision, and inspection related to acquisition of defense facilities, management, construction, taking measures concerning neighborhood of the base, and procurement of equipment.| |Acquisition, Technology and Logistics Agency|H External organization that integrates and consolidates the departments within the Ministry of Defense related to procurement, research and development, etc.| Fig. II-4-1-2 Outline of the Ministry of Defense *See “Location of Principal SDF Units” at the end of the book. Defense Council in which deliberations concerning general policies related to the MOD take place. Furthermore, there are an Administrative Vice-Minister of Defense, who organizes and supervises the administrative affairs of each bureau and organization to support the Minister of Defense, and a Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs, who is responsible for the overall coordination of duties such as those related to international affairs. Moreover, the Internal Bureau, Joint Staff Off ce, Ground Staff Off ce, Maritime Staff Off ce and Air Staff Off ce have been established in the MOD. The Internal Bureau is responsible for basic politics relating to the duties of the SDF. The Director-General of the Minister’s Secretariat and the Directors-General of each Bureau within the Internal Bureau shall, in accordance with their respective responsibilities, support the Minister of Defense with regard to the instructions and authorization, etc. that the Minister issues to the Chief of Joint Staff and the Chiefs of the Ground Staff, Maritime Staff and Air Staff. The Joint Staff is a staff organization for the Minister of Defense concerning the operation of the SDF. The Chief of Joint Staff provides centralized support on the operation of the SDF for the Minister of Defense from a military expert’s perspective. The Ground Staff, Maritime Staff and Air Staff are the staff organizations for the Minister of Defense concerning their respective services except operations of the SDF, with the Chiefs of Staff for the GSDF, the MSDF and the ASDF acting as the top-ranking expert advisers to the Minister of Defense regarding these services. In this manner, MOD has ensured that the support for the Minister from a policy perspective and the support for the Minister from a military expert’s perspective shall be provided in a well-balanced manner like the two wheels on a spoke, so to speak, in order for the Minister of Defense to appropriately make decisions. The provisions of the Act for Partial Revision of the Ministry of Defense Establishment Act ----- etc. that was enacted on June 10, 2015[2] make this existing concept regarding the support system for the Minister of Defense even more explicit with regard to Article 12 of the Ministry of Defense Establishment Act[3]. As shall be explained below, the new establishment of the Acquisition, Technology & Logistics Agency and the reorganization of the Joint Staff will be conducted as part of reform. **3** **Base of Defense Administration in Regional Areas** The MOD has Regional Defense Bureaus in eight locations across the country (Sapporo City, Sendai City, Saitama City, Yokohama City, Osaka City, Hiroshima City, Fukuoka City, and Kadena Town) as its local branch off ces in charge of comprehensive defense administration. In addition to implementing measures to alleviate the burden on local communities hosting the U.S. bases in Japan and inspecting equipment, Regional Defense Bureaus carry out various activities to obtain the understanding and cooperation of both local public entities and local residents toward MOD and SDF activities. See Part III, Chapter 4, Section 1 (Collaboration with Local Communities) **2** **Joint Operations System of the Self-Defense Forces** See Fig. II-4-1-3 (Operational System of the SDF and Roles of the Chief of Joint Staff and the Chiefs of Staff of the Ground, Maritime, and Air Self-Defense Forces) In order to rapidly and effectively fulf ll the duties of the SDF, the MOD and the SDF have adopted the joint operation system in which the GSDF, the MSDF, and the ASDF are operated integrally. The MOD and the SDF are making efforts to strengthen the foundation of the joint operations as well as to enhance the functions of the Joint Staff in light of the current security environment. **2** **Establishment of Foundation to Enhance** **the Joint Operations Structure** Within the joint operations structure, communication of accurate commands and prompt information sharing between the units in the GSDF, the MSDF and the ASDF are crucial. The MOD and the SDF are required to maintain a command and control function utilizing an advanced communications network and a system for sharing intelligence in order to strengthen the joint operational foundation. Thus, the MOD and the SDF continue to develop a wide-ranging and f exible communications system that uses advanced communications technology available both within and outside Japan. At the unit level, they are required to create plans to be able to respond to various situations, while at the same time they are also required to maintain conditions to be ready for executing duties through joint training and other means. For this purpose, personnel from other SDF branches are stationed at major command headquarters under normal circumstances, and the number of such staff personnel will be increased as necessary. Based on the achievement to date, topics such as the improvement of education and training, the SDF Headquarter structure, and the human resources development, and standardization of equipment will continue to be reviewed, aiming for a more effective joint operations system, and necessary measures will be taken to realize this. **1** **Outline of Joint Operations System** **(1) Role of the Chief of Staff** a. The Chief of Staff, Joint Staff develops a joint operations concept for SDF operations, and centrally supports the Minister of Defense on SDF operations from a military expert’s perspective. b. The Minister’s commands concerning the operations of the SDF shall be delivered through the Chief of Staff, Joint Staff and orders concerning operations of the SDF shall be executed by the Chief of Joint Staff. In doing this, the Minister’s commands and orders shall be delivered through the Chief of Joint Staff not only in cases where a joint task force[4] is organized, but also in cases where a single SDF unit is employed to respond. **(2) Relationship between Chief of Staff, Joint Staff, and** **Other Chiefs of Staff** The Joint Staff Off ce undertakes functions relating to the operation of the SDF, while the Ground, Maritime and Air Staff Off ces undertake functions for unit maintenance, such as personnel affairs, building-up defense capability, and education and training. “The Director-General of the Minister’s Secretariat, the directors-general of the bureaus and the Director-General of the Acquisition, Technology & Logistics Agency shall support the Minister of Defense concerning their work so that, conjointly with the support from the Chief of Joint Staff and the Chief of the Ground Staff, Chief of the Maritime Staff and the Chief of the Air Staff (hereinafter referred to as “Chiefs of Staff”) concerning the services pursuant to the provision of Article 9, paragraph (2) of the Self-Defense Forces Act, the work of MOD shall be performed in compliance with laws and regulations and appropriately in order to achieve the mission of Article 3.” The Government has made remarks regarding civilian control and the role of the civilian officials in the Internal Bureau during the Diet deliberations on the Amendment Act, stating; “Civilian control means the priority of politics to the military in democratic countries. Civilian control in our country consists of control by the Diet, control by the Cabinet (including the National Security Council), and control within the MOD. Control within the MOD means that the Minister of Defense, a civilian, manages, operates, and controls the SDF. In addition to support from political appointees such as the State Minister of Defense and Parliamentary Vice-Ministers of Defense, support from civilian officials in the Internal Bureau also plays an important role in aiding the exercise of civilian control by the Minister of Defense. Regarding civilian control, the role of civilian offi cials in the Internal Bureau in civilian control is to support the Minister of Defense, and there is no relationship in which civilian offi cials of the Internal Bureau issue commands to units.” This applies to the case in which a special unit is organized to carry out a specifi c duty, or the required troops are placed partly under the authority of a commander outside of their usual command ----- |Minister|Col2| |---|---| ||| |f Defense|| |Col1|Col2|Force provider| |---|---|---| |||| ||Chief of Staff, GSDF Ground Staff Office|Chief of Staff, MSDF Maritime Chief of Staff| Operational System of the SDF and Roles of the Chief of Joint Staff and the Chiefs of Staff of the Ground, Maritime, Fig. II-4-1-3 and Air Self-Defense Forces Basic Rule for Joint Operation Prime Minister The Chief of Joint Staff, solely assists the Minister of Defense on SDF operations from a military expert’s viewpoint Minister of Defense The Minister of Defense commands SDF operations through the Chief of Joint Staff The Minister of Defense’s orders to the SDF are executed by the Chief of Joint Staff Responsibilities for affairs other than force operations (such as human resources, education, training[1], buildup Responsibilities for force operations of defense capabilities) Force user Force provider Defense Intelligence Headquarters Directorate for Joint Intelligence Chief of Chief of Staff, Chief of Staff, Chief of Staff, Joint Staff GSDF MSDF ASDF Ground Staff Maritime Air Staff Joint Staff Office Chief of Staff Office Chain of command for operations Chain of command for affairs other than Joint Task Force Commanding General, Commander, Self- Commander, Air operations[2] Commander Army and Others Defense Fleet and Others Defense Command and Others Information Line Coordination Line Mobilization unit Close coordination among the Chiefs of Staff Chief of Joint Staff clearly indicates the integrated policies for rear support and other relevant activities Each of the Chiefs of Staff of the GSDF, MSDF and ASDF assists in rear support and other activities during operations Notes: 1. The Chief of Joint Staff is responsible for joint training. 2. With respect to forces affairs other than operations in regard to the Joint Task Force, command responsibilities of the Defense Minister. **Section 2 Background of the Reform of the Ministry of Defense** **1** **Background of the Reform** In response to the frequent incidence of scandals within the Ministry of Defense (MOD) and the SDF, the “Council for Reforming the Ministry of Defense” was established in the Prime Minister’s Off ce in 2007, and a report was compiled in 2008. In accordance with the basic directions stipulated in this report, the MOD made various initiatives aimed at the MOD reform, including thorough adherence to rules and regulations, and the establishment of operational management that prioritizes the execution of duties, with the aim of total optimization; additionally, in 2009, the establishment of the Defense Council under law, the abolition of the post of the Director of Defense and new establishment of the Special Adviser to the Minister of Defense was implemented in order to strengthen support for the Minister of Defense and ensure thorough civilian control. Furthermore, the FY2010 budget request made in August of the same year incorporated an organizational reform proposal which included unif cation of defense capabilities build-up departments in the MOD central organization into the Internal Bureau, and unif cation of the operational departments into the Joint Staff. However, the request in the FY2010 budget request in October of the same year was passed over in order to review the MOD reform from the Democratic Party of Japan’s perspective, which came to administrative power in September of the same year. The subsequent change in administration to the Liberal Democratic Party and Komeito in December 2012 promulgated the release of the “Direction by the Minister of Defense on the MOD Reform” and the establishment of the “Committee for the Deliberations on the MOD Reform (referred to as “Committee” hereinafter),” whose chairperson was the State Minister of Defense in February 2013, in order to accelerate the deliberations on the MOD reform. **2** **Direction of the MOD Reform** 7th Committee Meeting, reported to the Defense Council and made public in August. See Reference 33 (Direction of the MOD Reform) **1** **Course of Considerations** The “Direction of the MOD Reform” was arranged at the ----- |Minister|Col2| |---|---| ||| |f Defense|| |Col1|Col2|Force provider| |---|---|---| |||| ||Chief of Staff, GSDF Ground Staff Office|Chief of Staff, MSDF Maritime Chief of Staff| Operational System of the SDF and Roles of the Chief of Joint Staff and the Chiefs of Staff of the Ground, Maritime, Fig. II-4-1-3 and Air Self-Defense Forces Basic Rule for Joint Operation Prime Minister The Chief of Joint Staff, solely assists the Minister of Defense on SDF operations from a military expert’s viewpoint Minister of Defense The Minister of Defense commands SDF operations through the Chief of Joint Staff The Minister of Defense’s orders to the SDF are executed by the Chief of Joint Staff Responsibilities for affairs other than force operations (such as human resources, education, training[1], buildup Responsibilities for force operations of defense capabilities) Force user Force provider Defense Intelligence Headquarters Directorate for Joint Intelligence Chief of Chief of Staff, Chief of Staff, Chief of Staff, Joint Staff GSDF MSDF ASDF Ground Staff Maritime Air Staff Joint Staff Office Chief of Staff Office Chain of command for operations Chain of command for affairs other than Joint Task Force Commanding General, Commander, Self- Commander, Air operations[2] Commander Army and Others Defense Fleet and Others Defense Command and Others Information Line Coordination Line Mobilization unit Close coordination among the Chiefs of Staff Chief of Joint Staff clearly indicates the integrated policies for rear support and other relevant activities Each of the Chiefs of Staff of the GSDF, MSDF and ASDF assists in rear support and other activities during operations Notes: 1. The Chief of Joint Staff is responsible for joint training. 2. With respect to forces affairs other than operations in regard to the Joint Task Force, command responsibilities of the Defense Minister. **Section 2 Background of the Reform of the Ministry of Defense** **1** **Background of the Reform** In response to the frequent incidence of scandals within the Ministry of Defense (MOD) and the SDF, the “Council for Reforming the Ministry of Defense” was established in the Prime Minister’s Off ce in 2007, and a report was compiled in 2008. In accordance with the basic directions stipulated in this report, the MOD made various initiatives aimed at the MOD reform, including thorough adherence to rules and regulations, and the establishment of operational management that prioritizes the execution of duties, with the aim of total optimization; additionally, in 2009, the establishment of the Defense Council under law, the abolition of the post of the Director of Defense and new establishment of the Special Adviser to the Minister of Defense was implemented in order to strengthen support for the Minister of Defense and ensure thorough civilian control. Furthermore, the FY2010 budget request made in August of the same year incorporated an organizational reform proposal which included unif cation of defense capabilities build-up departments in the MOD central organization into the Internal Bureau, and unif cation of the operational departments into the Joint Staff. However, the request in the FY2010 budget request in October of the same year was passed over in order to review the MOD reform from the Democratic Party of Japan’s perspective, which came to administrative power in September of the same year. The subsequent change in administration to the Liberal Democratic Party and Komeito in December 2012 promulgated the release of the “Direction by the Minister of Defense on the MOD Reform” and the establishment of the “Committee for the Deliberations on the MOD Reform (referred to as “Committee” hereinafter),” whose chairperson was the State Minister of Defense in February 2013, in order to accelerate the deliberations on the MOD reform. **2** **Direction of the MOD Reform** 7th Committee Meeting, reported to the Defense Council and made public in August. See Reference 33 (Direction of the MOD Reform) **1** **Course of Considerations** The “Direction of the MOD Reform” was arranged at the ----- for defense capabilities will be established based on the use in joint operation. In combination with this, equipment acquisition will be streamlined and optimized by means of equipment management throughout its lifecycle, and also organizational reform will be conducted in order to contribute to the overall optimization of defense capabilities. **(3) Make Accurate Decisions More Swiftly (Joint Operation)** In order to ensure the accuracy of and swift decisionmaking related to the SDF operations, a review of the organization will be conducted so that affairs concerning actual operations will be unif ed into the Joint Staff. **2** **Basic Concept and Direction of Reform** It was determined that full-f edged reform would be undertaken, taking into due account the matters specif ed in previous considerations, and considering the following situational changes such as: the increasing severity of the security environment surrounding Japan; recognition of the lessons learned relating to the unit operation in the Great East Japan Earthquake and elsewhere; and the changes in the policy environment, including the establishment of the National Security Council. **(1) Removal of Barriers Between Civilian Offi cial and** **Uniformed Personnel** In order to foster a sense of unity among civilian off cials and uniformed personnel, permanent posts will be established for uniformed personnel in the Internal Bureau and for civilian off cials in each of the Staff Off ces and major commands. **(2) From Partial to Total Optimization** **(defense capabilities build-up)** In order to eliminate defense capabilities build-up based on individual, vertically-divided optimization for each GSDF, MSDF, and ASDF, and ensure that build-up is instead conducted based on total optimization, a work procedure **(4) Enhancement of Policy-planning and Public** **Relations Capability** Policy-planning functions will be enhanced in response to the rapid increase in international affairs-related work and the establishment of the National Security Council. In addition, public relations capability will also be strengthened. It is important to establish a series of truly effective reforms by avoiding stagnation and confusion in operations, and seeking changes in the mentality of both civilian off cials and uniformed personnel through steady and phased implementation while Internal Bureau and Staff Off ces equally support the Minister of Defense. **Section 3 Specifi c Ministry of Defense Reform Initiatives** **1** **Initiatives up to the Previous Year** In FY 2014, the Act for Establishment of the Ministry of Defense (MOD) was revised, and a total of 40 permanent posts for uniformed off cials were established in the Internal Bureau, while permanent posts for civilian off cials were established in the Joint Staff and the major commands of each branch of the SDF. In response to the diversifying security challenges and rapidly increasing volume of work related to international affairs, a Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs, who is responsible for the overall coordination of duties such as those related to international affairs, was newly established. **2** **Main Initiatives in FY2015[1]** agencies. Regarding this work, the Director-General for Operational Policy (provisional name), a Deputy Chief of Joint Staff-level post for civilian off cials, will be newly established. The Director-General for Operational Policy will provide assistance to the Chief of Joint Staff from a policy perspective, regarding remarks at the Diet as a government witness and actual operation of the units. In addition, posts for civilian off cials at the level of division directors and department director generals shall be newly established and staffed with necessary subordinates to assist the DirectorGeneral for Operational Policy (provisional name). **1** **Strengthening integrated operational functions** As work related to actual unit operations are unif ed into the Joint Staff, the Bureau of Operational Policy will be abolished, and some of the functions of the bureau, such as the planning and drafting of laws and regulations related to unit operations, will be transferred to the Bureau of Defense Policy. The Joint Staff shall assume work that the Internal Bureau has conducted, such as external explanations including remarks at the Diet and communication and coordination with related ministries and governmental ----- for defense capabilities will be established based on the use in joint operation. In combination with this, equipment acquisition will be streamlined and optimized by means of equipment management throughout its lifecycle, and also organizational reform will be conducted in order to contribute to the overall optimization of defense capabilities. **(3) Make Accurate Decisions More Swiftly (Joint Operation)** In order to ensure the accuracy of and swift decisionmaking related to the SDF operations, a review of the organization will be conducted so that affairs concerning actual operations will be unif ed into the Joint Staff. **2** **Basic Concept and Direction of Reform** It was determined that full-f edged reform would be undertaken, taking into due account the matters specif ed in previous considerations, and considering the following situational changes such as: the increasing severity of the security environment surrounding Japan; recognition of the lessons learned relating to the unit operation in the Great East Japan Earthquake and elsewhere; and the changes in the policy environment, including the establishment of the National Security Council. **(1) Removal of Barriers Between Civilian Offi cial and** **Uniformed Personnel** In order to foster a sense of unity among civilian off cials and uniformed personnel, permanent posts will be established for uniformed personnel in the Internal Bureau and for civilian off cials in each of the Staff Off ces and major commands. **(2) From Partial to Total Optimization** **(defense capabilities build-up)** In order to eliminate defense capabilities build-up based on individual, vertically-divided optimization for each GSDF, MSDF, and ASDF, and ensure that build-up is instead conducted based on total optimization, a work procedure **(4) Enhancement of Policy-planning and Public** **Relations Capability** Policy-planning functions will be enhanced in response to the rapid increase in international affairs-related work and the establishment of the National Security Council. In addition, public relations capability will also be strengthened. It is important to establish a series of truly effective reforms by avoiding stagnation and confusion in operations, and seeking changes in the mentality of both civilian off cials and uniformed personnel through steady and phased implementation while Internal Bureau and Staff Off ces equally support the Minister of Defense. **Section 3 Specifi c Ministry of Defense Reform Initiatives** **1** **Initiatives up to the Previous Year** In FY 2014, the Act for Establishment of the Ministry of Defense (MOD) was revised, and a total of 40 permanent posts for uniformed off cials were established in the Internal Bureau, while permanent posts for civilian off cials were established in the Joint Staff and the major commands of each branch of the SDF. In response to the diversifying security challenges and rapidly increasing volume of work related to international affairs, a Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs, who is responsible for the overall coordination of duties such as those related to international affairs, was newly established. **2** **Main Initiatives in FY2015[1]** agencies. Regarding this work, the Director-General for Operational Policy (provisional name), a Deputy Chief of Joint Staff-level post for civilian off cials, will be newly established. The Director-General for Operational Policy will provide assistance to the Chief of Joint Staff from a policy perspective, regarding remarks at the Diet as a government witness and actual operation of the units. In addition, posts for civilian off cials at the level of division directors and department director generals shall be newly established and staffed with necessary subordinates to assist the DirectorGeneral for Operational Policy (provisional name). **1** **Strengthening integrated operational functions** As work related to actual unit operations are unif ed into the Joint Staff, the Bureau of Operational Policy will be abolished, and some of the functions of the bureau, such as the planning and drafting of laws and regulations related to unit operations, will be transferred to the Bureau of Defense Policy. The Joint Staff shall assume work that the Internal Bureau has conducted, such as external explanations including remarks at the Diet and communication and coordination with related ministries and governmental ----- Fig. II-4-3-1 The New Establishment of the Acquisition, Technology and Logistics Agency (Overview) Defense Planning Departments Strengthening the Inspection Function Minister of Defense Close coordination DepartmentJoint StaffPlanningDefense Departmentsstaff offices’RespectiveDefense Bureau ofDefensePolicy Facilities PlanningCapability and(provisionalBureau ofname) Strengthened Newly established Acquisition, Technology Inspector General’s Inspection, Accounting and Logistics Agency Equipment departments Office for Legal and Evaluation Officer and technology departments Compliance (provisional name) Internal inspection and auditing Reorganization the operations and accountingof the Acquisition, TechnologyInspection concerning procurementdepartmentsEquipment Logistics planningdepartments and Logistics Agency inspectionExternal Bureau of Finance and EquipmentEquipment Group Procurement departments of the respectiveStaff Offices (provisional name)of the respective Equipment policy of the respective Staff Offices (Procurement departments of Staff Offices (Foundations of defense production the equipment departments reorganization of and technology, strategy, international Procurement of equipment by and technology departments of the equipment equipment cooperation, the respective Self-Defense Forces the respective Staff Offices) departments) procurement reform, etc.) Integration and consolidation of functions Close coordination Equipment Procurement Technical Research and and Construction Office Development Institute The actual procurement work The actual research and for equipment, etc. development work on equipment, etc. (provisional name) in order to strengthen the defense capacity improvement function with the objective of building a Dynamic Joint Self Defense Force. The Bureau of Defense Programming (provisional name) will consist of consolidated functions of defense capability build-up, information and communication, and facilities construction from the Bureau of Defense Policy, the Bureau of Operational Policy, the Bureau of Finance and Equipment, and the Equipment Procurement Off ce, thereby establishing the structure of comprehensive defense capability build-up. **3** **The establishment of the Acquisition,** **Technology and Logistics Agency** **2** **Reorganization of Internal Bureau, etc.** **(1) Strengthening public relations capabilities** The position of Counselor (spokesperson) of the Minister’s Secretariat shall be established to strengthen media-related functions. **(2) Reorganization related to the new establishment** **of the Acquisition, Technology and Logistics** **Agency, etc.** a. Reorganization related to the establishment of the Acquisition, Technology and Logistics Agency The procurement and research and development functions for defense equipment, etc. that belong to the Bureau of Finance and Equipment, the Technical Research and Development Institute, and the Equipment Procurement and Construction Off ce, shall be transferred to the Acquisition, Technology and Logistics Agency. The departments in the Ground, Maritime, and Air Staff Off ces that have been conducting work related to equipment will be consolidated as the Logistics Planning Department (provisional name). b. Reorganization related to the unif cation of the work regarding actual unit operations into the Joint Staff Off ce The Bureau of Operational Policy will be abolished, and functions such as the planning and drafting of laws and regulations relating to operations and the training of units will be transferred to the Bureau of Defense Policy. c. Reorganization to strengthen policy planning function A new division shall be established in the Bureau of Defense Policy in order to strengthen planning functions concerning defense strategy from mid- and long-term perspectives and concerning space, cyber and other new policy issues; and to promote strategy consultations and other collaboration regarding these issues with other countries. d. Reorganization to strengthen the defense capability build-up function The Bureau of Finance and Equipment shall be reorganized to newly establish the Bureau of Defense Programming The Acquisition, Technology and Logistics Agency shall be established as an extra-ministerial organization by bringing together and consolidating equipment procurement related departments in MOD regarding procurement, research and development (namely the Internal Bureau, the respective Staff Off ces, the Technical Research and Development Institute, and the Equipment Procurement and Construction Off ce), aiming for the following four objectives as well as strengthening the inspection and auditing functions: (1) Implementation of unif ed project management throughout the life cycle of equipment from a comprehensive perspective; (2) Smooth and prompt ref ection of the operational needs of the units to the equipment to be procured; (3) Active engagement in new areas (such as further internationalization of defense equipment, investment in cutting edge technology research, etc.); (4) Simultaneously achieving procurement reform while also maintaining and strengthening the foundations of defense production and technology. See Fig. II-4-3-1 (The New Establishment of the Acquisition, Technology and Logistics Agency (Overview)) ----- **Property of the People as well as Securing** ###### Part the Territorial Land, Water and Airspace ## III **Chapter** **Building a Dynamic Joint Defense Force** ##### 1 The National Defense Program Guidelines (NDPG) calls for the building of a Dynamic Joint Defense Force, which emphasizes soft and hard aspects of readiness, sustainability, resiliency and connectivity, reinforced by advanced technology and capability for C31 (Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence), with a consideration to establish a wide range of infrastructure to support operations by the Self-Defense Forces (SDF). This Dynamic Joint Defense Force must be proactively built while adequately managing the progress of the various measures laid out in the NDPG and the Medium Term Defense Program (MTDP). The MOD and SDF are striving to develop a Dynamic Joint Defense Force that includes the build-up of defense capabilities in order to respond seamlessly and dynamically to intelligence gathering and warning/ surveillance activities in peacetime, “gray-zone” situations, and complex situations wherein various contingencies arise consecutively or simultaneously. With this in mind, based on the order of the Minister of Defense issued in December 2013, the Ministry of Defense established the Dynamic Joint Defense Force Committee, chaired by the Parliamentary Senior Vice-Minister of Defense, and has been carrying out these reviews. The Dynamic Joint Defense Force Committee, under the direction of the Minister of Defense, carries out essential initiatives for proactively developing the Dynamic Joint Defense Force, while assessing and verifying the progress of various measures laid out in the NDPG and the MTDP. This Committee is to be closely coordinated with various frameworks, including existing committees within the Ministry of Defense, namely the Cyber Policy Review Committee, Comprehensive Acquisition Reform Committee, and Ministry of Defense Reform Review Committee. See Fig. III-1-1-1 (Structure of Committees) State Minister of Defense Sato hosting the Dynamic Joint Defense Force Committee Fig. III-1-1-1 Structure of Committees |Comprehensive Acquisition Reform Committee Minister of Defense Chair: Minister of Defense ation Orders Reports Comprehensive Acquisition n Dynamic Joint Defense Reform Project Team Force Committee Collaboration Chair: Parliamentary Senior Vice-Minister of Defense n Chair: Parliamentary Senior Collaboration Committee to Promote the Use of Vice-Minister of Defense Private Sector Maritime Transport n Chair: Parliamentary Secretary Collaboration Working Group to Build up Defense Capabilities Examines reviews and initiatives concerning major issues for the building of a Dynamic Joint Defense Force|Col2|Comprehensive Acquisition Reform Committee| |---|---|---| |Working Group to Build up Defense Capabilities||| |Examines reviews and initiatives concerning major issues for the building of a Dynamic Joint Defense Force||| Ministry of Defense Reform Review Committee Chair: Parliamentary Senior Collaboration Vice-Minister of Defense Cyber Policy Review Committee Collaboration Chair: Parliamentary Senior Vice-Minister of Defense Space Promotion Committee Collaboration Chair: Parliamentary Senior Vice-Minister of Defense Collaboration Committee to Review Securing Talented Human Resources for National Defense Chair: Parliamentary Secretary Committee to Review Strengthening of Medical Functions Chair: Parliamentary Secretary ----- **Section 1 Effective Deterrence and Response** In order to respond to a variety of situations in a timely and appropriate manner, and to assure the protection of the lives and property of the people as well as territorial land, water and airspace, it is necessary to make efforts to prevent the occurrence of a variety of situations before they arise by building a comprehensive defense architecture. At the same time, if a situation does arise, it is required to respond seamlessly to the situations as they unfold. To that end, it is important to ensure intelligence superiority[1] through continuous surveillance over a wide region in peacetime encompassing the surroundings of Japan. If a situation does arise, ensuring maritime supremacy[2] and air superiority[3] in our sea and airspace in a timely manner is important to respond effectively and minimize the damage. Fig. III-1-1-2 Conceptual Image of Warning and Surveillance of the Sea Areas and Airspace Surrounding Japan Territorial waters Sea areas IslandEtrofu (Including inland waters) around Hokkaido Contiguous zone EEZ (Including contiguous zone) E-2C Airborne E-2C Airborne Early Warning AircraftEarly Warning Aircraft P-3C Patrol Aircraft Sea of Japan Takeshima E-767 Airborne WarningE-767 Airborne Warning Joint Staff, etc. and Control System and Control System Hachijo Island Ogasawara Minami Torishima Islands Destroyer Senkaku Islands Ground SDF: Coast observation unit East China Sea Okidaitojima Air SDF: Radar site Air SDF: Radar site (BMD response) Yonagunijima - Schematic image of a surveillance range. It does not exactly match with the actual range Okinotorishima - Flow of information JGSDF personnel from the Coast Observation Unit engaging in their duties P-3C Patrol Aircraft engaging in warning and surveillance around the Senkaku Islands E-767 early warning and control aircraft To have an advantage over the other party in terms of quickly and correctly identifying, collecting, processing and conveying intelligence. Maritime supremacy refers to the condition in which one side has a tactical advantage over the opposing force in seas and can carry out maritime operations without suffering extensive damages by the opposing force. ----- **1** **Ensuring Security of Sea and Airspace Surrounding Japan** Japan is composed of a little over 6,800 islands, and is surrounded by a wide region of sea, which includes the sixth largest Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) in the world. The SDF is engaged in persistent intelligence gathering and warning and surveillance in Japan’s territorial waters and airspace in peacetime, as well as the surrounding sea and airspace. **1** **Warning and Surveillance in Waters and** **Airspace Surrounding Japan** See Fig. III-1-1-3 (Number of Incursions into the Territorial Waters around the Senkaku Islands Performed by Chinese Government Ships) Number of Incursions into the Territorial Waters Fig. III-1-1-3 around the Senkaku Islands Performed by Chinese Government Ships (Times) 25 20 15 **(1) Basic Concept** The SDF persistently engages in warning and surveillance activities in the waters and airspace surrounding Japan in peacetime so that it can respond to various contingencies immediately and seamlessly. **(2) Response by the MOD and the SDF** The MSDF patrols the waters surrounding Hokkaido, the Sea of Japan, and the East China Sea in peacetime, using P-3C patrol aircraft and other aircraft to monitor the numerous vessels that sail through those waters. The ASDF uses radar sites at 28 locations nationwide, E-2C early warning aircraft, and E-767 early warning and control aircraft, amongst others, to carry out warning and surveillance activities over Japan and its surrounding airspace 24 hours a day. It also conducts surveillance in major channels, to monitor MSDF guard posts, GSDF coastal surveillance units, and so forth. Furthermore, warning and surveillance activities are carried out with the f exible use of destroyers and aircraft as required. Thus, the JSDF maintains a defense and security system that enables it to respond quickly to situations in areas surrounding Japan. See Fig. III-1-1-2 (Conceptual Image of Warning and Surveillance of the Sea Areas and Airspace Surrounding Japan) In 2014, there were seven incidents of activity by Chinese Navy vessels involving the passage through the southwestern islands, and also another incident of such activities conf rmed in waters south of Okinawa. It is expected that the areas of activity by Chinese Navy vessels will continue to expand and their activities will become more activated. Moreover, since the Japanese government’s acquisition of the ownership of the Senkaku Islands in September 2012, Chinese governmental ships have intermittently intruded into Japanese territorial waters. In recent years, activities by Chinese Navy vessels and Chinese government ships are rapidly expanding and becoming more activated. Due to such a state of affairs, the MOD and the SDF are working to strengthen the collaboration with relevant government ministries and agencies, for example by routinely sharing information obtained through warning and surveillance activities with the Japan Coast Guard in peacetime 10 21 18 13 12 10 10 3 3 3 Jan-Apr May-Aug Sep-Dec Jan-Apr May-Aug Sep-Dec Jan Feb Mar 2013 2014 2015 **2** **Warnings and Emergency Takeoffs (Scrambles) in** **Preparation against Intrusion of Territorial Airspace** **(1) Basic Concept** Under international law, nations have complete and exclusive sovereignty over their airspace. Scrambling against intruding aircraft is conducted as an act to exercise the right of policing intended to maintain public order. Unlike measures taken on land or in the seas, this measure can be taken only by the SDF. Therefore, the ASDF is primarily responsible for conducting actions against intruding aircraft based on Article 84 of the SDF Act. See Reference 11 (Main Operations of the Self-Defense Forces), Reference 12 (Statutory Provisions about the Use of Armed Force and Weapons by SDF Personnel) **(2) Response by the MOD and the SDF** The ASDF detects and identif es aircraft f ying in the Japanese territorial and adjacent airspace using warning and control radar, the E-767 early-warning and control system, and E-2C early-warning aircraft. If any aircraft suspected of intruding into Japan’s territorial airspace is detected, f ghters and other aircraft scramble to approach them to conf rm the situation and monitor the aircraft as necessary. In the event that a territorial airspace intrusion does occur, responses such as warning to withdraw will be issued. On December 13, 2012, a f xed-wing aircraft (Y-12) of the Chinese State Oceanic Administration intruded into Japan’s territorial airspace in the vicinity of Uotsuri-jima, which is part of the Senkaku Islands In addition on August ----- 22, 2013, a TU-95 bomber of the Russian Air Force intruded into Japanese airspace in the vicinity of Okinoshima, Fukuoka Prefecture. Moreover, September 9 of the same year, an incident where a presumably unmanned aircraft of unidentif ed nationality f ew over the East China Sea. The ASDF urgently scrambled f ghters in response to these incidents. In FY2014, the ASDF aircraft scrambled 943 times[4], a signif cant increase by 133 in comparison with the previous f scal year. This is the second largest number since 1958 when the ASDF started taking strict antiterritory intrusion measures. See Fig. III-1-1-4 (Number and Breakdown of Scrambles since the Cold War) See Fig. III-1-1-5 (Example Flight Patterns of Chinese Aircraft to Which Scrambles Responded) See Fig. III-1-1-6 (Example Flight Patterns of Russian Aircraft to Which Scrambles Responded) F-15 Fighter scrambling Even after the establishment of the “East China Sea Air Defense Identif cation Zone” by China in November 2013, the MOD and the SDF have been implementing warning and surveillance activities and other activities as before in the East China Sea, including the zone in question, and have continued to take all initiatives necessary to engage in warning and surveillance in both the sea and airspace around Japan. The MOD and the SDF have also decided to engage in strict airspace anti-intrusion measures in accordance with international law and the SDF Act. See Fig. III-1-1-7 (Air Defense Identifi cation Zone (ADIZ) of Japan and those of Neighboring Countries) See Part I, Chapter 1, Section 3 (Defense Policies of Other Countries and Regions: China) See Reference 11 (Main Operations of the Self-Defense Forces), Reference 12 (Statutory Provisions about the Use of Armed Force and Weapons by SDF Personnel) **3** **Response to Submarines Submerged in Japan’s** **Territorial Waters** **(1) Basic Concept** With respect to foreign national submarines navigating underwater in Japan’s territorial waters[5], an order for maritime security operations will be issued promptly. The submarine will be requested to navigate on the surface of the water and show its f ag, in accordance with international law, and in the event that the submarine does not comply with the request, it will be requested by the SDF to leave Japanese territorial waters. See Reference 11 (Main Operations of the Self-Defense Forces), Reference 12 (Statutory Provisions about the Use of Armed Force and Weapons by SDF Personnel) **(2) Response by the MOD and the SDF** The MSDF is maintaining and enhancing capabilities for: expressing its intention not to permit any navigation that violates international law; and responding in shallow water Fig. III-1-1-4 Number and Breakdown of Scrambles since the Cold War (Times) 1,000 800 600 400 200 943 944 Russia China Taiwan Other countries total 812 810 464 567 415 425 386 306 311 299 96 156 220 237 158 31 38 359 473 264 247 248 193 197 124 1984* 1989 1993 1998 2003 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 (FY) Note: The peak of the cold war Break down by country of aircraft subject to scrambles: Russia, approximately 50%; China, approximately 49%; and others, approximately 1%. ----- Fig. III-1-1-5 Example Flight Patterns of Chinese Aircraft to Which Scrambles Responded Trends in the number of (Times) scrambles per quarter (FY2014) 200 150 100 50 164 104 103 93 1st Quarter 2nd Quarter 3rd Quarter 4th Quarter Fig. III-1-1-6 Example Flight Patterns of Russian Aircraft to Which Scrambles Responded Trends in the number of (Times) scrambles per quarter (FY2014) 250 200 150 100 50 235 89 104 45 1st Quarter 2nd Quarter 3rd Quarter 4th Quarter areas by detecting, identifying, and tracking foreign national submarines navigating underwater in the territorial waters of Japan. In November 2004, the MSDF observed a submerged Chinese nuclear-powered submarine navigating underwater in Japanese territorial waters around the Sakishima Islands. In response to this incident, the MSDF issued an order for maritime security operations, and MSDF vessels and aircraft continued to track the submarine until it entered the high seas. In May 2013 and March 2014, although there was no intrusion into the territorial waters of Japan, the MSDF P-3C observed submarines navigating underwater in the contiguous water zone. Although international law does not forbid foreign submarines navigating underwater in the contiguous zone of coastal nations, Japan maintains a stance of properly dealing with such activities **4** **Response to Armed Special Operations Vessels** **(1) Basic Concept** The Japan Coast Guard, as a police organization, is primarily responsible for responding to suspicious armed special operations vessels (unidentif ed vessels). However, in the event that it is deemed extremely diff cult or impossible for the Japan Coast Guard to respond to a situation, an order for maritime security operations will be issued promptly and the SDF will respond to the situation in cooperation with the Japan Coast Guard. See Reference 11 (Main Operations of the Self-Defense Forces), Reference 12 (Statutory Provisions about the Use of Armed Force and Weapons by SDF Personnel) ----- Fig. III-1-1-7 Air Defense Identifi cation Zone (ADIZ) of Japan and those of Neighboring Countries Northern territories Japanese airspace ROK ADIZ Takeshima East China Sea ADIZ Japan ADIZ Ogasawara Senkaku Taiwan ADIZ Islands Islands Yonaguni Island Philippines ADIZ The ROK expanded its ADIZ in December 2013. In light of the lessons learned from the incident involving an unidentif ed vessel off Noto Peninsula in 1999, the incident involving an unidentif ed vessel in the sea southwest of Kyushu in 2001, and other similar incidents, the Japanese government has been taking all necessary precautionary measures while the MOD and the SDF have strengthened cooperation with other relevant ministries and agencies. **(2) Response by the MOD and the SDF** The MSDF is taking the following steps: (1) deployment of missile boats; (2) establishment of the MSDF Special Boarding Unit[6]; (3) equipment of destroyers with machine guns; (4) furnishing forcible maritime interdiction equipment (f at-nose shells)[7]; (5) improving the suff ciency ratio of essential military vessel personnel; and (6) enhancing equipment for the Vessel Boarding Inspection Team. In addition, the MOD and the Japan Coast Guard regularly carry out joint exercises, etc. Based on the “Manual on Joint Strategies concerning Unidentif ed Vessels,” which was prepared jointly by the then Defense Agency (now the Ministry of Defense) and the Japan Coast Guard in 1999, the MSDF and the Japan Coast Guard are strengthening cooperation between the two organizations. **2** **Defense of Japan’s Remote Islands** attacks. If, by any chance, islands are captured without any signs detected in advance, the enemy will be brought under control by ground f re from aircraft and vessels, and then tactical operations will be implemented to regain the islands by the landing of SDF forces and taking other initiatives. It is particularly important in the defense of Japan’s remote islands to obtain and secure maritime and air superiority. Furthermore, a clear response will be taken to attacks using ballistic missiles, cruise missiles and so forth. See Reference 11 (Main Operations of the Self-Defense Forces), Reference 12 (Statutory Provisions about the Use of Armed Force and Weapons by SDF Personnel) See Fig. III-1-1-8 (Conceptual Image of Defending Japan’s Offshore Islands)[8] **1** **Basic Concept** Japan possesses a number of remote islands. In order to respond to attacks on these islands, it is important to position units and so forth in accordance with the security environment, and also to detect signs at an early stage through persistent intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) conducted by the SDF in peacetime. If signs of attack are detected in advance, troops will be expeditiously deployed and concentrated in an area expected to be attacked ahead of the deployment of enemy units, and try, through the joint operation involving all the SDF forces (the GSDF, MSDF, and ASDF), to deter and remove enemy A special unit of the MSDF was newly established in March 2001 to deter expected resistance, and disarm suspicious vessels in the event of vessel boarding inspections under maritime security operations. The fl at front edge of the destroyer prevents a non-bursting shell from scattering when launched from the 76-mm gun equipped on the ship. During FY2015, the MOD is to acquire V-22 Osprey and AAV7 amphibious vehicles as equipment necessary to enhance rapid deployment and response capabilities in dealing with attacks to Japan’s ----- Fig. III-1-1-8 Conceptual Image of Defending Japan’s Offshore Islands Overall air defenseOverall air defense Secure and maintain marine superiority and air superiority Aerial refuelingAerial refueling SurfaceSurface Close Air SupportClose Air Support vesselsvessels Maritime air supportMaritime air support Landing by aircraft Anti-surfaceAnti-surface warfarewarfare Landing by amphibious Response in the water Landing vehicle by boat In cases where islands are occupied, operations Anti-submarine warfare will be conducted to recapture them. Submarine Enemy submarines SDF troops will be swiftly deployed and concentrated in an area expected to be attacked ahead of the deployment of enemy units and they will try to intercept and defeat any invasions. persistent intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) operations, and develop an immediate response posture in the case of contingencies. Furthermore, in order to secure capabilities for swift and large-scale transportation and deployment of units, initiatives are underway to enhance rapid deployment capabilities through: the improvement of Osumi class transport LST (Landing Ship, Tank); overseas research to review the role of multipurpose vessels; and the introduction of V-22 Ospreys. In particular, for the operation of V-22 Ospreys, the MOD determined that the Ariake Saga Airport was the best airf eld to be used as the deployment site for V-22 Ospreys due to positional relationships with relevant units in joint **2** **Initiatives of the MOD and the SDF** In the southwest region, there are many remote islands that are vacuum regions for SDF deployment. Thus, the GSDF will newly form a coast observation unit in Yonaguni and deploy an area security unit in charge of the initial responses within the remote islands area in the southwest region. The GSDF will also establish an “Amphibious Rapid Deployment Brigade (provisional name)” equipped with a full function for amphibious operations. In addition, the MSDF will acquire f xed-wing patrol aircraft (P-1) and other equipment. The ASDF will deploy two f ghter squadrons at Naha Air Base and establish the 9th Air Wing. Through these initiatives, the MOD and SDF will continue Osprey (the photo shown is an MV-22 Osprey operated by U S Marine Corps) [U S Government] GSDF personnel conducting a landing exercise during the Iron Fist 15 a field training exercise LCAC entering the MSDF transport vessel “Shimokita” ----- operations, the length of the runway, and the geographic environment that can reduce burdens borne by the local community. Along with other topics such as the training relocation of the US Marine Corps, the MOD and the SDF hope to gain understanding from the local community through providing in-depth explanations[9]. In addition, the SDF conducts various training to improve the joint operation capabilities of the GSDF, MSDF, and ASDF, and also training exercises with the U.S. Forces aimed at establishing mutual coordination procedures. In January through March of 2015, the GSDF and US Marine Corps conducted a f eld training exercise (Iron Fist) in California, which was f rst started in 2006, and worked to improve amphibious operational capabilities. In August 2015, the GSDF, MSDF and ASDF is to participate in a joint exercise that has been held on the western coast of the United States, called “Dawn Blitz.” As a Japan-U.S. bilateral training excercises overseas (Dawn Blitz 15), they are to practice a series of tactical activities related to collaborating with the U.S. Forces, and response to island invasions. Enhancement of the Air Defense Posture in the Southwestern **Commentary** Region – Establishment of a New Air Wing In recent years, Japan’s neighboring countries have been expanding and intensifying their activities in the sea and airspace around Japan. In particular, China has intruded into Japanese territorial waters intermittently and has violated Japan’s territorial airspace. At the same time, China has also been engaging in dangerous activities, which could cause unexpected situations, including infringement of the freedom of fl ight over the high seas such as the establishment of the “East China Sea Air Defense Identifi cation Zone” based on its own unilateral assertion. Currently, scrambles against aircraft in the Southwestern Composite Air Division are conducted solely by the 204th fi ghter squadron, which belongs to the ASDF 83rd Air Wing (Naha Air base). However, not only has the number of scrambles been steadily increasing, but also, the airspace that must be covered by the 204th fi ghter squadron is quite extensive. In light of these circumstances, in order to enhance the air defense posture in the southwestern region, the ASDF will transfer the 304th fi ghter squadron of the 8th Air Wing (Tsuiki Air Base) to Naha Air Base in JFY2015. Along with this, the 83rd Air Wing will be abolished, and a new “9th Air Wing” will be established. This establishment of the new Air Wing would be the fi rst time in nearly 50 years since 1964 when the 8th Air Wing was newly formed. Establishment of the new 9th Air Wing will enhance the air defense posture in the southwestern region and will enable the ASDF to obtain and secure air superiority, which is the basis for realizing effective deterrence and response in various situations. Present After new reorganization 83rd Air Wing 9th Air Wing Two F-15 fghter Naha squadrons Naha 204th fighter squadron 304th fighter squadron 204th fighter squadron Abolition of the 83rd Air Wing and the establishment of the 9th Air Wing. At the Ariake Saga Airport, the ramp and aircraft hangars etc., are to be developed on the west side of the airport by FY2019. Approximately 70 aircraft, consisting of 17 newly acquired V-22 Ospreys ----- **3** **Response to Ballistic Missile Attacks** Japan began developing the Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) system in FY2004 to be fully prepared for the response against ballistic missile attacks. Necessary amendments were subsequently made to the SDF Act in 2005, and in the same year, the Security Council and Cabinet decided to begin Japan-U.S. cooperative development of an advanced ballistic missile interceptor. To date, Japan has steadily built up its own multi-tier defense system against ballistic missile attacks, by such means as installing ballistic missile defense capability to the Aegis-equipped destroyers[10] and deploying the Patriot Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3)[11]. See Reference 50 (History of Efforts for BMD Development in Japan) On the other hand, if ballistic missiles are launched towards Japan, and the situation is not acknowledged as an armed attack, the Minister of Defense can order the SDF units to take measures to destroy the ballistic missiles with suff cient consideration taken to (1) carrying out prompt and appropriate response and (2) ensuring civilian control. As a response against ballistic missiles or other objects, the Joint Task Force-BMD is formed, with the Commander of the Air Defense Command serving as its Commander, and various postures for effective defense are to be taken under a unif ed command through JADGE. Furthermore, the GSDF will play a leading role in dealing with damage caused by the impact of ballistic missiles. See Fig. III-1-1-9 (Build-up and Operational Concept of BMD) **(2) Response by the MOD and the SDF** In March 2009, the MOD and the SDF, in response to North Korea’s advance notif cation for an intended launch of an “experimental communication satellite” received through the International Maritime Organization (IMO), organized the Joint Task Force-BMD and transmitted launch information collected from Shared Early Warning (SEW)[13] and the various SDF radar units[14] to the Prime Minister’s Off ce and other agencies, while carrying out information gathering to identify any damage caused by this incident. In March 2012, the MOD and the SDF, responding to North Korea’s advance notif cation for an intended launch of an “earth observation satellite” received through the IMO, deployed Aegis destroyers equipped with SM-3 missiles to the Sea of Japan and the East China Sea, and Patriot PAC-3 units on the islands of Okinawa Prefecture and within the Tokyo metropolitan area, while dispatching the GSDF units to the Southwestern Islands in case any debris were to fall from the sky. In December, the MOD and the SDF, in response to North Korea’s announcement regarding a launch of a “satellite,” took all possible measures including the deployment of Aegis destroyers equipped with SM-3 missiles. North Korea repeatedly engaged in a variety of provocative acts, including an implication of missile launches in the f rst half of 2013, while it launched ballistic missiles on March 3 and 26, June 29, July 9, 13 and 26, 2014, and on March 2, 2015. Under such circumstances, the MOD and the SDF took every necessary measure to protect the lives and properties of the nation in any potential situation. See Part I, Chapter 1, Section 2-1 (North Korea) **1** **Japan’s Ballistic Missile Defense** **(1) Basic Concept** Japan’s BMD is an effective multi-tier defense system with the upper tier interception by Aegis-equipped destroyers and the lower tier by Patriot PAC-3, both interconnected and coordinated by the Japan Aerospace Defense Ground Environment (JADGE). In case ballistic missiles or other objects[12] are launched against Japan as an armed attack, it will be dealt with by issuing a defense operation order for armed attack situations. PAC-3 missile test launch 10 See Part II, Chapter 2, Section 2, Footnote 5 11 The Patriot PAC-3 system is one of the air defense systems for countering airborne threats. Unlike the conventional type of anti-aircraft PAC-2 missiles, which mainly target the interception of aircraft, the PAC-3 missiles are designed primarily to intercept ballistic missiles. 12 The term “ballistic missiles or other objects” refers to objects other than aircraft such as ballistic missiles which could cause grave damage to human life and property when they fall to the ground. 13 Information on the area of launch, the time of the launch, the projected area where objects fall and the projected time when the objects fall relating to ballistic missiles launched in the direction of Japan, which is analyzed and conveyed to the SDF by the U.S. Forces in a short period of time after the launch. (The SDF started to receive the information since April 1996.) 14 On the day before an actual launch, misinformation related to the launch was distributed due to the mishandling of information by the MOD and the SDF. At the time of the actual launch, information ----- Fig. III-1-1-9 Build-up and Operational Concept of BMD **Mid-course phase** In this phase, the rocket engine burns out and the missile is flying in outer space (exoatmosphere) inertially **Detection/Discrimination/** **Boost phase** **Tracking** In this phase, the **Terminal phase** rocket engine is burning and This phase covers the accelerating the part from atmospheric missile re-entry to the impact **ASDF** **ASDF Air control and** **Patriot PAC-3** **warning radar** **Ballistic missile** **(FPS-5, FPS-3 Upgraded)** **JADGE (Japan Aerospace Defense** **Ground Environment)** **MSDF Aegis** **BMD destroyer** **Commander, Joint Task Force-BMDCommander, Joint Task Force-BMD** Commander, Air Defense Command Further cooperation with the U.S. government including the U.S. Forces in Japan is necessary for eff cient and effective operation of the BMD system. Thus, related measures including constant real-time sharing of BMD operational and relevant information, and the expansion of BMD cooperation have been agreed upon at the Japan-U.S. Security Consultative Committee (2+2). See Part II, Chapter 3, Section 3-2 (Policy Consultation between Japan and the United States) Furthermore, Japan has closely cooperated with the United States in responding to ballistic missiles, by means such as receiving SEW from the U.S. Forces, and sharing intelligence gathered by assets including transportable BMD radar (TPY-2 radar) and Aegis-equipped destroyers deployed in Japan by the U.S. Forces. In addition, maintenance, enhancement and validation of Japan-U.S. bilateral response capabilities have been actively conducted through training and other activities. In February 2015, following on from the previous year, a special BMD exercise was held between the MSDF and the U.S. Navy, connecting their ships via a network and conducting a simulation of response to ballistic missiles, to improve tactical capabilities and strengthen bilateral coordination. **2** **Missile Defense of the United States and Japan-** **U.S. BMD Technical Cooperation** **(1) Missile Defense of the United States** The United States is developing a multi-tier missile defense system that combines defense systems suited for each of the following phases of the ballistic missile f ight path to provide a mutually complementary response: (1) the boost phase, (2) the mid-course phase, and (3) the terminal phase. Japan and the United States have developed close coordination concerning ballistic missile defense, and a part of the missile defense system of the United States has been deployed in our country in a step-by-step manner. Specif cally, a TPY-2 radar (so-called “X-band radar”) for BMD has been deployed at the U.S. Shariki Communication Site in 2006, and BMD-capable Aegis ships have been forward deployed in Japan and surrounding areas. In October 2006, Patriot PAC-3 units were deployed in Okinawa Prefecture, and in October 2007, a Joint Tactical Ground Station (JTAGS)[15] was deployed in Aomori Prefecture. Furthermore, the 2nd TPY-2 radar was deployed at the U.S. Kyogamisaki Communication Site in December 2014. ----- **(2) Japan-U.S. BMD Technology Cooperation, etc.** The government commenced a Japan-U.S. cooperative research project on a sea-based upper-tier system in FY1999. As the result showed good prospects for resolving initial technical challenges, in December 2005, the Security Council and the Cabinet decided to start JapanU.S. cooperative development of an advanced ballistic missile interceptor by using the results of the project as a technical basis. The joint development started in June 2006 with a view to expanding the coverage of protection and dealing with future threats posed by increasingly advanced and diverse ballistic missiles attacks, and it is aimed to be completed by around 2017. With regard to the Japan-U.S. cooperative development, it is necessary to export BMD related arms from Japan to the United States. In accordance with the Chief Cabinet Secretary’s statement issued in December 2004, it was determined that the Three Principles on Arms Exports would not apply to the BMD system and related matters under the condition that strict controls are maintained. Based on these circumstances, it was decided that the prior consent of Japan could be given to the third party transfer of the SM-3 Block IIA under certain conditions[16]. This decision was formally announced in the Joint Statement of the U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee (2+2) on June 21, 2011. The Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology (Three Principles) received Cabinet approval in April 2014. However, with regard to exceptional measures instigated before the Three Principles were decided, overseas transfers will continue to be organized in the guidelines for the principles as allowable under the Three Principles. See Part II, Chapter 2, Section 4 (Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology) See Reference 17 (Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology) **4** **Initiatives towards Ensuring Maritime Security** and promote international cooperation and will make use of fora such as multilateral and bilateral ocean conferences to contribute to international rules and consensus-building. **1** **Basic Approach by the Government** The National Security Strategy (NSS) states that Japan will play a leading role in maintaining and developing “Open and Stable Seas,” and will take necessary measures to address various threats in sea lanes of communication, including counter-piracy operations, ensuring safe maritime transport and promoting cooperation with other countries by conducting bilateral/multilateral joint exercises related to maritime security. In addition, it is stated that Japan will provide assistance to those coastal states alongside the sea lanes of communication and other states in enhancing their maritime law enforcement capabilities. The new Basic Plan on Ocean Policy[17], which was given Cabinet approval in April 2013, states the following initiatives for ensuring the security of the oceans: reinforcement of the wide-range routine system of surveillance; systematic improvement of warships, aircraft and other vehicles; strengthening of the system of collaboration between the SDF and Japan Coast Guard; and development of a system of collaboration to ensure order and safety on the coasts and isolated islands. In addition, the Basic Plan on Ocean Policy states that in order to contribute to the creation and development of order on the ocean, it will ensure international collaboration **2** **Initiatives of the MOD and the SDF** In order to maintain the order of “Open and Stable Seas” and to ensure the safety of maritime transport, the MOD and the SDF promote various kinds of initiatives such as implementing counter-piracy activities, providing capacity building assistance to coastal countries, and enhancing joint exercises and practices using a variety of opportunities. Within the framework of the Western Pacif c Naval Symposium (WPNS), the MSDF has been actively engaged in and cooperating with initiatives such as the establishment of the Code for Unplanned Encounters at Sea (CUES), which was adopted at the 14th meeting in April 2014[18]. On October 7, the sixth Japan-ASEAN Defense Vice-Ministerial Forum hosted by the MOD took place and participants agreed to further strengthen cooperation in each f eld such as discussion of the establishment of a hotline in preparation for unforeseen consequences and the promotion of capacity building by the MSDF. In addition, in relation to China, consultation meetings have been held between the defense authorities of both 16 This refers to the case where the transfer supports the national security of Japan and/or contributes to international peace and stability, and when the third party has suffi cient policies to prevent the future transfer of the SM-3 Block IIA. 17 Based on changes in the situation regarding the ocean, the Basic Plan on Ocean Policy specifi es the following targets for Japan as an oceanic state and has set out initiatives to be pursued intensively: (1) international cooperation and contribution to the international community, (2) wealth and prosperity through ocean development and use, (3) shift from a country protected by the ocean to a country that protects the ocean, and (4) challenge towards unexplored frontiers. 18 This specifi es the procedures for ensuring safety, communications methods and other factors when there are unplanned encounters at sea by naval ships and naval aircraft of the participating nations ----- countries towards the commencement of early implementation of the maritime and air communication mechanism in order to avoid and prevent unexpected situations. See Part III, Chapter 3, Section 1-4-4 (Japan-China Defense Exchanges and Cooperation) See Part III, Chapter 3, Section 2-1 (Ensuring Maritime Security) **5** **Responses in Space** region of the earth; (2) using outer space to respond to various incidents including incoming ballistic missiles; and (3) ensuring stable use of space; the MOD and the SDF is implementing initiatives to enhance their information gathering capabilities using satellites; reinforcing command, control and communication; and realizing the stable use of space. The MOD’s “Basic Policy Relating to the Development and Use of Space,” which was decided when the Basic Space Law was enacted in 2008, was revised in August 2014. This was done in light of the major changes in the environment surrounding space policy such as the revision of the Law Concerning Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency (JAXA) in 2012, the Cabinet Decision on the NSS and NDPG in 2013, and from the viewpoint of systematically and realistically promoting various measures concerning the development and utilization of space. From the perspective of further promoting cooperation in the space f eld between the defense authorities in Japan and the U.S., the “Space Cooperation Working Group (SCWG)” was established based on the instruction given in the Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Talk in April 2015. Making use of this working group, reviews will be further promoted in broader f elds such as: 1. promotion of policyrelated consultation regarding space, 2. closer information sharing, 3. cooperation for nurturing and securing experts, 4. implementation of tabletop exercises. **1** **The Whole-of-Government Approach** The Off ce of National Space Policy established in the Cabinet Off ce in July 2012 engages in the planning, drafting, coordinating and other policy matters relating to the government’s development and use of space. In light of the environmental changes surrounding space policy, and in order to suff ciently ref ect the new security policies stated in the NSS that was approved by the Cabinet in 2013, improve predictability of industries’ investments, and strengthen the industrial base, the Basic Plan on Space Policy was decided upon in the Strategic Headquarters for Space Development established within the Cabinet in January 2015 as a 10-year development plan focusing on the next approximately 20 years. This plan has set the following goals: (1) Ensuring space security; (2) Promoting the use of space in the civilian sector; and (3) Maintaining and strengthening of space industry and scientif c/ technological bases. **2** **Initiatives of the MOD/SDF** The use of space is extremely important for the MOD and the SDF to conduct a range of tasks effectively and eff ciently. Thus, from the following three perspectives of: (1) promoting the use of space by leveraging the special characteristics of satellites that are able to access every **6** **Response to Cyber Attacks** **1** **The Whole-of-Government Approach and** **Other Initiatives** f scal year, which was approximately 1,080,000[19]. In order to deal with these issues, in November 2014, the Cyber Security Basic Act was enacted in the 187th Extraordinary Session of the Diet. In light of the current situation where urgent response to emerging threats against cyber security occurring on a global scale has become a pressing matter along with the development of information and communications technology advances, the act aims to contribute to the security of Japan by clarifying the basic principles of Japan’s cyber security measures and the responsibilities of local governments, as well as by comprehensively and effectively promoting the measures regarding cyber security. Based on the Cybersecurity Basic Act, the Cybersecurity Strategic Headquarters has been established in the Cabinet to take a controller role, and the National Information and communications technology has developed and been widely adopted at great speed and, as a result, it is now an essential infrastructure for socioeconomic activities. On the other hand, there is a possibility that people’s lives and economic activities will be severely affected if the computer systems or networks fail. This is the same for both the MOD and the SDF. If the critical functions of the SDF are intercepted by a cyber attack, there is a possibility that problems that threaten the core of Japan’s defense may arise. The number of cyber attacks targeting Japanese governmental organizations and agencies in JFY2013 reached approximately 5,080,000. It shows a rapid increase by f ve times in comparison with the number in the previous ----- center of Incident readiness and Strategy for Cybersecurity (NISC)[20] has been established in the Cabinet Secretariat as a secretariat of the Cybersecurity Strategic Headquarters. The NISC is responsible for planning and promotion of cybersecurity-related policies and takes the central role in taking measures and responding to signif cant cybersecurity incidents in government organizations and agencies, as well as critical infrastructures. Various initiatives are also being promoted by both the public and private sectors; along with the National Police Agency, the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications, the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the MOD is designated as one of the f ve government agencies that cooperate particularly closely with the NISC. The MOD contributes to the cross-sector initiatives led by the NISC to provide it with the knowledge and skills of the MOD and the SDF. For example, the MOD participates in cyber attack response training and personnel exchanges, and provides information about cyber attacks, etc. In light of such incidents as the cyber attacks on defense industry companies reported in 2011, the NISC has established the Cyber Incident Mobile Assistance Team (CYMAT) to provide agile support, forming cross-cutting partnerships among ministries and agencies. The MOD also sends personnel to the CYMAT. integrated deliberations regarding cooperation with other countries and relevant organizations, training and securing personnel capable of responding to cyber attacks, cooperation with the defense industry, and responses to supply chain risks[22]. In March 2014, a “Cyber Defense Group” was established under the SDF C4 (Command, Control, Communication & Computers) Systems Command, in order to appropriately deal with the threat posed by cyber attacks, which are becoming increasingly sophisticated and complicated, and the relevant systems were enhanced and strengthened. In addition, in March 2015, cyber information gathering devices have been installed to aid the prevention of attacks by the early detection of cyber attack indications. The necessary systems are also scheduled to be developed, such as the development of a cyber training environment in which the SDF units can conduct more practical trainings. At the same time, it is diff cult for the MOD and the SDF alone to achieve the stable use of cyberspace. In particular, since comprehensive defense cooperation between Japan and its ally the United States, including joint response, is vital, the “Cyber Defense Policy Working Group” (CDPWG) was set up as a framework between the defense authorities of the U.S. and Japan. Under this framework, meetings have been held three times to discuss the following topics: (1) promotion of policy discussions regarding cyber issues, (2) closer sharing of information, (3) promotion of joint exercises incorporating response to cyber attacks, and (4) matters such as cooperation for training and maintaining experts. In May 2015, a joint declaration on the specif c future direction of the cooperation between the two countries was announced. In addition, through participation in the “Japan-U.S. Cyber Dialogue,” a whole-of-government approach by both nations, and in the “Japan-U.S. IT Forum,” a framework between the defense authorities that has been discussed repeatedly since 2002, Japan’s cooperation with the United States is to be strengthened. In addition to the IT Forum held between the defense authorities of Singapore and Vietnam, cyber dialogues are also being held between the authorities of the United Kingdom, NATO, Estonia, the Republic of Korea and others, in order to exchange views on threat awareness and relevant initiatives taken by each country. In 2013, the “Cyber Defense Council” (CDC) was set up, and its core members consist of around ten companies in the defense industry with a strong interest in cyber security. Efforts are being made to improve capacities to counter cyber attacks by both the MOD and the SDF, and the defense industry, through joint exercise and other initiatives. **2** **Initiatives of the MOD and the SDF** As for response to cyber attacks, the SDF C4 (Command, Control, Communication & Computers) Systems Command is monitoring MOD/SDF communications networks around the clock. Along with introduction of intrusion prevention systems in order to increase the safety of information and communications systems, and development of defense systems such as the security and analysis device for cyber defense, the MOD and the SDF are engaged in holistic measures including enactment of regulations[21], stipulating postures and procedures for responding to cyber attacks, and improving the human resources and technological bases, as well as conducting research on cutting-edge technology. See Reference 52 (MOD/SDF Comprehensive Measures to Deal with Cyber Attacks) **3** **Initiatives towards the Responses to** **Cyber Attacks** The Cyber Policy Review Committee, chaired by the Parliamentary Senior Vice-Minister of Defense, was established in February 2013. The committee is conducting 20 With the enactment of the Cyber Security Basic Act in January 2015, the name of the organization was changed from the National Information Security Center (NISC) to the National center of Incident readiness and Strategy for Cybersecurity (NISC). 21 There are directives relating to the information assurance of the MOD (MOD Directive No. 160, 2007). 22 Supply chain risks refers to the risks that malicious software, including computer viruses, may be inserted in the components of equipment during the design, manufacturing, procuring or installation ----- **7** **Response to Large-Scale Disasters** When disasters such as natural disasters occur, the SDF works in collaboration with municipal governments, engaging in various activities such as the search for and rescue of disaster victims or missing ships or aircraft, controlling f oods, offering medical treatment, preventing epidemics, supplying water, and transporting personnel and goods. However, when a warning declaration is issued based on the Act on Special Measures Concerning Countermeasures for Large-Scale Earthquakes[24] or a declaration of a nuclear emergency situation is issued based on the Act on Special Measures Concerning Nuclear Emergency Preparedness, the Minister of Defense is authorized to order a nuclear disaster dispatch upon the request of the Director of the Nuclear Disaster Countermeasures Headquarters (the Prime Minister). See Fig. III-1-1-10 (Flow of Events from the Point of Request to Dispatch and Withdrawal) See Reference 11 (Main Operations of the Self-Defense Forces), Reference 12 (Statutory Provisions about the Use of Armed Force and Weapons by SDF Personnel) The SDF has put in place arrangements for an initial response to ensure that disaster relief operations are conducted promptly. This is called “FAST-Force.” See Fig. III-1-1-11 (State of Readiness for Disaster Dispatches (Standard)) **1** **Outline of Disaster Relief Dispatches** In principle, disaster dispatch is carried out at the request of prefectural governors and other off cials when there has been a natural disaster; in cases where a request has been made to the Minister of Defense or another designated off cer who then determines that the situation warrants such action[23]. This is because the course of action considered to be most appropriate is that prefectural governors and other off cials grasp the overall conditions of the disaster and their own disaster relief capabilities f rst, and then decide whether to make a request for the SDF disaster relief dispatch. Fig. III-1-1-10 Flow of Events from the Point of Request to Dispatch and Withdrawal Outbreak of a disaster In case of particular urgency with no time to wait for a request from prefectural governors Demand a request from the prefectural governor - Prefectural governors Request for withdrawal - Director-General of the Japan Coast Guard - Director General of the Regional Maritime Municipal mayor Safety Headquarters 1) Procedure for request Direct notification - Director of the Airport Administrative Office - Normally requested in writing (when a request cannot be demanded, etc.) Request for dispatch - Requested verbally or by telegram or telephone in The Minister of Defense or the individuals designated by the Minister case of emergency (a written request should later follow) Order to dispatch Order to dispatch Alarm[1] 2) Content of request - Conditions of the disaster and Dispatch of units Dispatch of units Alarm in such cases as reasons for the request (discretionary dispatch) disasters - Desired length for dispatch SDF ready reserve - Desired area for dispatch personnel and desired activities SDF reserve personnel - Other items for reference Disaster relief operations - Disbandment of alarm[2] - Order for withdrawal Disbandment of alarm[2] Withdrawal of units Notes: 1. SDF ready reserve personnel and SDF reserve personnel will be called on by the Minister of Defense as necessary with the approval of the Prime Minister. 2. Disbandment of SDF ready reserve personnel and SDF reserve personnel must be done by the Minister of Defense. 23 The Director General of the Japan Coast Guard, the Director General of the Regional Maritime Safety Headquarters, and the Director of the Airport Administrative Office may request a disaster dispatch. With regard to disaster dispatch, earthquake prevention dispatch, and nuclear disaster relief dispatch, (1) SDF personnel ordered for dispatch may exercise authority based on the SDF Act; (2) SDF Reserve Personnel and SDF Ready Reserve Personnel may be called up for service in the event of disaster dispatch, and SDF Ready Personnel in the event of earthquake prevention dispatch or nuclear disaster dispatch; and (3) special units may be temporarily formed as necessary. 24 The Prime Minister issues an earthquake alert with the endorsement of the Cabinet in the event that an earthquake has been predicted and when it is deemed necessary to urgently implement ----- Fig. III-1-1-11 State of Readiness for Disaster Dispatches (Standard) **Common to All** The state in which information can be gathered immediately when an earthquake of GSDF Northern Army seismic intensity five or greater occurs. Personnel, vehicles, helicopters **FAST Force (GSDF)** (image transmission), About 3,870 personnel, about 1,100 vehicles, about 36 aircraft chemical protection First response units throughout Japan on around-the-clock standby deploy in an hour upon receiving an order as a standard procedure. **FAST Force (MSDF)** Vessels on standby: Designate one initial response vessel in each regional district Aircraft on standby (about 20 aircraft): Deploy in 15 minutes to two hours in each base **FAST Force (ASDF)** Standby for scrambling against intrusions into airspace GSDF North Eastern Army Standby for aircraft rescue and emergency transport duties (about 20 aircraft): Personnel, vehicles, helicopters Deploy within 15 minutes to two hours in each base (image transmission), *When an earthquake of seismic intensity five or greater occurs, intelligence is chemical protection collected diverting standby aircraft. GSDF Eastern Army GSDF Western Army Personnel, vehicles, helicopters Personnel, vehicles, helicopters (image transmission), (image transmission), chemical chemical protection, bomb disposal protection, bomb disposal GSDF Middle Army Personnel, vehicles, helicopters (image transmission), chemical Iwo Jima protection, bomb disposal Okinawa b. Disaster dispatch relating to eruptions on Mount Ontake On September 27, 2014, a volcanic eruption occurred on Mount Ontake. In response to the request for disaster relief dispatch from the Governor of Nagano Prefecture, the SDF conducted lifesaving operations and searches for missing persons in cooperation with the municipality, police, f re department, and other relevant organizations. The scale of this disaster relief dispatch was approximately 7,150 personnel, 1,840 vehicles, and 298 aircraft. GSDF personnel conducting disaster relief mission related to Mount Ontake Eruption **2** **Response of the MOD and the SDF** **(1) Response to Natural Disasters** a. Disaster relief dispatch to a lifesaving operation in Hiroshima City, Hiroshima Prefecture On August 20, 2014, a landslide occurred in the Asaminami district and Asakita district of Hiroshima City in Hiroshima Prefecture due to heavy rain. In response to the request for a disaster relief dispatch from the Governor of Hiroshima Prefecture, the SDF conducted lifesaving operations and searches for missing persons. The scale of this disaster relief dispatch was approximately 14,970 personnel, 3,240 vehicles and 66 aircraft. GSDF l i i di t di t h f th l d lid di t i Hi hi P f ----- c. Disaster relief dispatch related to the eruption in Kuchinoerabu-jima On May 29, 2015, an eruption occurred in Kuchinoerabujima. In response to a request for disaster relief dispatch from the Governor of Kagoshima Prefecture, the SDF conducted evacuation assistance and intelligence gathering. The scale of this disaster relief effort was approx. 430 personnel, approx. 20 vehicles, and a total of around 44 aircraft. d. Other natural disasters The GSDF conducted disaster relief dispatches for an earthquake with an epicenter in northern Nagano Prefecture that occurred on November 22, 2014 and a disaster caused by heavy snow in Tokushima Prefecture that occurred from December 5 to 6 . ASDF’s rescue helicopter engaging in a rescue operation off the coast of Noto **(2) Transportation of Emergency Patients** The SDF uses its aircraft to transport emergency patients from isolated islands and remote areas with insuff cient medical facilities (transportation of emergency patients). In FY2014, out of a total of 521 cases of disaster relief operation dispatch, 407 cases involved the transportation of emergency patients, with dispatches to remote islands such as the Southwestern Islands (Okinawa and Kagoshima Prefectures) and the Ogasawara Islands (Tokyo) representing the majority of such cases. In addition to aiding in the transport of emergency patients from vessels navigating areas of ocean far from the mainland where the aircraft of other organizations are unable to respond, due to reasons including a short f ight range, in the event that urgent action is required due to incidents such as f re, f ooding or capsizing, the SDF carries out sea rescues when requested to do so by the Japan Coast Guard. Furthermore, it conducts wide-ranging medical transport operations, using the Mobile Medical Unit to move serious-case patients by C-130H transport aircraft. At the same time, in FY2014, there were 73 dispatches of f ref ghting support, the second largest number of dispatches after those for the transportation of emergency patients. Within this category, responses to f res in areas near SDF facilities were the largest in number, with 54 cases in FY2014. The SDF also conducts aerial f ref ghting activities in locations such as mountain and forest areas where f ref ghting conditions are diff cult. ASDF personnel engaging in an emergency patient transport See Fig. III-1-1-12 (Record of Disaster Relief Dispatches (FY2014)) See Reference 42 (Record of Disaster Relief Dispatches (Past Five Years)) See See Fig. III-1-1-12 Record of Disaster Relief Dispatches (FY2014) **(3) Response to Highly Pathogenic Avian Infl uenza.** On January 15 and January 18 of 2015, there was an outbreak of highly pathogenic avian inf uenza at poultry farms in Kasaoka City in Okayama Prefecture and Arita Town in Nishi-Matsuura County of Saga Prefecture, respectively. In response to a request for disaster relief dispatch from the governors of each prefecture, the SDF conducted the culling and disposal (by burial) of birds, and other relevant activities. The scale of the disaster relief effort was approximately 670 personnel, and a total of around 100 vehicles Also on April 12 there was an outbreak of |Description|Number of dispatches|Total number of personnel|Total number of vehicles|Total number of aircraft|Total number of vessels| |---|---|---|---|---|---| |Responses to storm, fl ood, and earthquake disasters|13|50,522|8,239|560|0| |Transporting emergency patients|407|2,239|0|442|0| |Search and rescue|17|1,457|271|36|0| |Assisting fi refi ghting|73|7,285|539|162|0| |Other|11|4,764|572|32|0| |Total|521|66,267|9,621|1,232|0| ----- highly pathogenic avian inf uenza at poultry farms in Kuma County in Kumamoto Prefecture. In response to a request for disaster relief dispatch from the Governor of Kumamoto Prefecture, the SDF conducted the culling and disposal (by burial) of birds, and other relevant activities. The scale of the disaster relief effort was approximately 880 personnel, and a total of around 180 vehicles. **(4) Exercises Involving SDF** In order to respond to large-scale and various other disasters with speed and accuracy, the SDF carries out various disaster prevention drills including joint exercises for rescue in peacetime, in addition to formulating disaster relief plans. The SDF also actively participates in local government disaster prevention drills and is seeking to ensure cooperation with various ministries and agencies, and local governments. In FY2014, the SDF organized and participated in various emergency drills with the objective of maintaining and improving the ability to carry out disaster relief missions swiftly and accurately in times of disaster, such as major earthquakes, and many of the issues relating to the response in the event of a disaster that arose due to the Great East Japan Earthquake were actively incorporated into disaster prevention exercises. See Reference 43 (Implementation and participation record of major drills concerning disaster dispatch (FY2014)) On October 19, 2014, the SDF participated in tsunami response drills hosted by Wakayama Prefecture and worked to enhance their earthquake response capability in preparation for the predicted earthquake along the Nankai trough. In collaboration with the U.S. Forces in Japan, the SDF conducted exercises and other activities in which SDF personnel carried the sick and wounded to the MSDF destroyer “Ise” standing by offshore, and used the Osprey V-22 vertical takeoff and landing transport aircraft. On November 6, 2014, the SDF conducted disaster response training for the Northeastern Army called “Michinoku ALERT 2014” covering the whole Tohoku region. Rescue activities during Michinoku Alert training MSDF personnel conveying an injured person at Rimpac 14 Disaster Relief Exercise participating in nuclear disaster prevention exercises, and other collaboration opportunities. **3** **Initiatives for Preparation for Disaster** **(1) SDF Plans for Responding to Various Disasters and** **Operational Plans** In the event of the occurrence of various disasters, the MOD and the SDF will take all possible measures such as swift transportation and deployment of suff ciently sized units in their initial response. At the same time, by establishing a rotating staff ng posture based on a joint operational approach, the MOD and the SDF will ensure that they are able to sustain a well-prepared condition for a long-term response. In doing so, the two organizations will fully take into account the lessons learned from the Great East Japan Earthquake. The MOD and the SDF are in the process of formulating various contingency plans for responses to large-scale earthquakes, which are under consideration at the Central Disaster Management Council, based on the Ministry of Defense Disaster Prevention Plan that was formulated in 2012 to respond to such earthquakes. **(5) Response to Large-Scale Disasters, the Great East** **Japan Earthquake and Other Disasters** Following the Great East Japan Earthquake, which occurred on March 11, 2011, the MOD and the SDF dispatched as many as 100,000 or so personnel and did their utmost to rescue disaster victims. The SDF’s disaster relief activity ended on December 26, 2011, when the period for the dispatch for nuclear relief expired. In addition, the MOD and the SDF are making efforts to increase the effectiveness and eff ciency of their work by reviewing the format of collaboration with the relevant organizations through assigning two GSDF regular personnel to the Nuclear Regulation Authority in September 2012[25], 25 Based on the fourth recommendation by the ruling parties for the acceleration of the reconstruction from the Great East Japan Earthquake, alongside the strengthening of the nuclear disaster ----- **(2) Coordination with Local Governments** It is also important for the SDF to strengthen coordination with local governments in peacetime in order to conduct disaster relief operations smoothly. For this reason, the SDF implements various measures including: (1) Establishment of the post of Liaison and Coordination Off cer for Civil Protection and Disaster Relief Operation Countermeasures at the SDF Provincial Cooperation Headquarters; (2) Temporary assignment of SDF off cers to the department in charge of disaster prevention at the Tokyo Metropolitan Government, and mutual exchange between administrative off cials of both the GSDF Middle Army Headquarters and Hyogo Prefectural Government; and (3) Recommending retired SDF personnel with knowledge in disaster prevention in response to requests from local governments. As of the end of March 2015, the total number of retired SDF personnel working in disaster prevention in local governments was 334 individuals in 46 prefectures and 220 municipalities throughout the country. Personnel-related cooperation with local governments and the MOD and the SDF is a very effective method of improving cooperation with those governments, and its eff cacy was conf rmed during the Great East Japan Earthquake. In **8** **Response to Attacks by Guerillas, Special Operations Forces and Others** **1** **Responses to Attacks by Guerillas and Special** **Operations Forces** particular, each GSDF regional army provides opportunities to interact with crisis management supervisors and other off cials from local governments and exchange information and opinions to strengthen the cooperation with these local organizations and agencies. See Reference 44 (Employment situation of retired uniformed SDF Personnel in disaster prevention-related bureaus in local government) Retired uniformed SDF personnel actively working as a supervisor on disaster prevention for a local government for and detected by reconnaissance units, aviation units and others and combat units will be promptly deployed to besiege and capture or to defeat them. See Fig. III-1-1-13 (Example of Operations against the Attacks by Guerillas and Special Forces) Even small-scale inf ltrations and attacks by guerrillas or special forces can pose a serious threat. Such attacks could result in the destruction of critical private infrastructure and other facilities, attacks on people, and assassinations of dignitaries. In the event that an armed attack is carried out against Japan by guerillas or special forces, Japan will respond under a defense operation order. See Reference 11 (Main Operations of the Self-Defense Forces), Reference 12 (Statutory Provisions about the Use of Armed Force and Weapons by SDF Personnel) In dealing with attacks by guerrillas, the MOD and the SDF respond with a particular emphasis on the establishment of an intelligence gathering posture, warning and surveillance to prevent invasions in coastal areas, the safeguarding of key facilities, and search and defeat of invading units. Efforts will be made for early detection of attacks and signs through warning and surveillance, and, as required, the SDF units will be deployed to guard key facilities such as nuclear power plants and a guarding posture will be established at an early stage. Based on this, in the event of an inf ltration of our territorial land by guerrillas or special operations forces, they will be searched **2** **Response to Armed Agents** **(1) Basic Concept** While the police assumes primary responsibility for responding to illegal activities of armed agents[26], the SDF will respond in accordance with situational developments. When this happens, it is important for the SDF to cooperate with the police agency. Accordingly, with regard to public security operations, the Basic Agreement concerning cooperation procedures between the SDF and the police[27], as well as local agreements and other agreements between GSDF divisions/brigades and prefectural police forces, have been concluded[28]. **(2) MOD and SDF Initiatives** The GSDF continues to implement combined f eld exercises nationwide with the police of each prefecture and has been strengthening such collaboration by, for example, conducting f eld exercises at the sites of nuclear power 26 Refers to persons engaging in illegal acts such as subversive activities in Japan while possessing weapons with significant killing power, those cooperating with such persons, etc. 27 The Agreement on the Maintenance of Public Order in the Event of Public Security Operations, which was concluded between the former Defense Agency and the National Public Safety Commission (concluded in 1954 and fully revised in 2000). ----- Fig. III-1-1-13 Example of Operations against the Attacks by Guerillas and Special Forces Patrol helicopter Enemy aircraft Fixed-wing patrol aircraft Search and destruction Reconnaissance aircraft Observation helicopter at sea by MSDF and ASDF Destroyer Guerillas and Enemy Submarine special forces landing Depot ship submarine Base for underwater vehicles used in landing operations Underwater scooters used Search and in landing operations destruction at Warning and the water’s edge Light armored surveillance Reconnaissance Protection of Air vehicle unit important facilities defense Search and destruction in Fighting helicopter Short range Tanks Obstacle mountainous areas Infantry unit ship-to-air missiles Search and Multipurpose Base destruction helicopter in urban areas Shovel car Tank Tank Bulldozer Mortar Damage Infantry unit limitation Wheeled armored vehicle Base Leading local residents for evacuation, etc. Police NBC attack NBC Artillery reconnaissance vehicle Rescuing hostage Special operations unit Mortar Decontamination vehicle danger of the proliferation of NBC (Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical) weapons, which can cause indiscriminate mass casualties and contamination of an extensive area, and the means for transporting such weapons, as well as related equipment and materials, to terrorists and countries under suspicion of proliferating such weapons. The sarin gas attack[30] on the Tokyo subway in 1995 is one of the examples of an incident in which these weapons were used. **(1) Basic Concept** In the event of the use of NBC weapons in Japan in a way that corresponds to an armed attack, the SDF will conduct defense operations to abate the armed attack and rescue victims. Furthermore, in the event of the use of NBC weapons in a way that does not correspond to an armed attack but against which the general police alone cannot maintain public security, the SDF will conduct public security operations to suppress the armed attack and rescue victims in cooperation with related agencies. Furthermore, when the incident does not fall under the category of defense operations or public security operations, the chemical protection units of the GSDF and medical units of the ASDF, GSDF and MSDF will cooperate with relevant organizations in intelligence gathering concerning the extent of the damage, decontamination activities, transportation of the sick and injured, and medical activities through different GSDF personnel conducting checkpoint training jointly with the police plants throughout the country since 2012[29]. Furthermore, combined exercises in dealing with unidentif ed vessels are also continuously implemented between the MSDF and the Japan Coast Guard. **3** **Response to Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical** **Weapons** In recent years, there has been strong recognition of the 29 The GSDF also conducted exercises at the Ikata Nuclear Power Plant (Ehime Prefecture) in 2012, at the Tomari Nuclear Power Plant (Hokkaido) and the Mihama Nuclear Power Plant (Fukui Prefecture) in 2013, at the Shimane Nuclear Power Plant (Shimane Prefecture) in 2014, and at the Higashidori Nuclear Power Plant (Aomori Prefecture) in 2015. 30 An incident in which members of Aum Shinrikyo spread extremely poisonous sarin gas in subway trains crowded with commuters, claiming the lives of 12 people (this number refers to the number of deaths indicated in the judgment rendered to Chizuo Matsumoto (commonly known as Shoko Asahara, a guru of Aum Shinrikyo)). The SDF conducted decontamination operations on the trains and ----- dispatches such as disaster relief dispatches, and civilian protection dispatches. **(2) MOD and SDF Initiatives** The MOD and the SDF possess and maintain the GSDF Central NBC Weapon Defense Unit and increasing chemical protection unit personnel, in order to improve the capability for responding to NBC weapon attacks. Also, the GSDF has designated personnel to take initial action in the event of special-type disasters in order to allow operations to begin within approximately one hour. The MSDF and the ASDF have also acquired protective equipment and materials to be used on vessels and at bases. **9** **Transport of Japanese Nationals Overseas, etc.** multinational joint exercise “Cobra Gold” in Thailand in cooperation with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Japanese Embassy in Thailand, and others, together with local Japanese Embassy staff and their family members, and conducted the f rst ever overseas ground transport exercises. See Reference 11 (Main Operations of the Self-Defense Forces), Reference 12 (Statutory Provisions about the Use of Armed Force and Weapons by SDF Personnel) In the event of disasters, insurgencies, and other emergencies overseas, the Minister of Defense is authorized to transport Japanese nationals and other people overseas upon request from the Minister for Foreign Affairs and subsequent consultations with the Foreign Minister, as well as on the basis of Article 84 (3) of the SDF Law (transport of Japanese nationals overseas, etc.). In such cases, the SDF will protect the Japanese nationals and other parties in the country in question, and safely guide them to transport by aircraft, ships and vehicles. To this end, the SDF maintains operational readiness, with the GSDF designating helicopter unit and leading transport unit personnel, the MSDF designating vessels such as transport ships (including boarded aircraft), and the ASDF designating airlift units and personnel for dispatch. Through the revision of the SDF Law in 2013, vehicles were added to the means of ground transport, resulting in the introduction of transport protection vehicles with superior defensive capabilities. Since the transport of Japanese nationals overseas requires close coordination among the GSDF, MSDF, and ASDF, collaborative exercises are carried out in peacetime. In addition, in FY2014, the f rst joint exercises in Japan were carried out. The MOD participated in the exercise for the transport of Japanese nationals overseas in the annual **10** **Readiness against Invasion** The NDPG states that only the necessary level of readiness against land invasions involving the mobilization of large ground forces, which was expected primarily during the Cold War, will be retained. In case Japan faces a full-scale invasion, the SDF will respond to the situation in an aligned and systematic manner based on their integrated operations. Their operations are categorized into (1) operations for aerial air defense operations, (2) defense operations protecting waters around Japan, (3) operations protecting the land, and (4) operations ensuring security in maritime communication, based on the characteristic of their purposes. In executing these operations, the U.S. Forces will assist the operations implemented by the SDF and deploy operations to Cobra Gold 15 – GSDF personnel guiding Japanese nationals to ASDF’s C-130H transport aircraft in training to transport Japanese nationals overseas complement the capabilities of the SDF, including the use of striking power, in line with the Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation. See Part II, Chapter 1, Section 3-5 (Existing Related Security Legislation) See Reference 11 (Main Operations of the Self-Defense Forces), Reference See See 12 (Statutory Provisions about the Use of Armed Force and Weapons by SDF Personnel) **1** **Air Defense Operations** Based on the geographic features of Japan, in that it is surrounded by the sea, and the features of modern wars[31], it is expected that Japan will be hit by repeated rapid aerial attacks by aircraft and missiles in the case where a fullscale invasion against Japan occurs. Operations for aerial 31 Aerial attacks are important elements influencing the results of modern wars. It is vital to obtain air superiority before or at the same time as implementing ground or maritime operations. 32 A special characteristic of aerial defense operations is the importance of initial response in terms of infl uencing the entirety of operations. Thus, Japan needs to maintain its readiness for a quick initial ----- Fig. III-1-1-14 Example of Air Defense Operations Interception order Detect Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) [1] Destroy Combat air patrol (CAP) [2] Aerial refueling/transport Intercept aircraft (KC-767) Detect Warning and Detect Destroy control radar Destroy Cruise missile launched by an enemy Scrambing fighters Intercept Identification of friend or foe Flow of air defense operations Interception order Air Defense Direction Center (DC) Air wing command post Notes: 1. Aircraft with airborne warning and control functions in waters distant from its national land and with alternative control capabilities for defense ground environments. 2. Keeping armed fi ghters on an airborne alert so that they can immediately respond to approaches by enemy aircraft. defense[32] can be categorized into comprehensive aerial defense mainly conducted by the ASDF and individual aerial defense conducted by the GSDF, MSDF or ASDF for their bases or troops. Comprehensive aerial defense aims to deal with enemy aerial attacks at the farthest point from our territory, prohibiting enemies from gaining air superiority and preventing harm to the people and the sovereign territory of Japan. At the same time, efforts will be made to inf ict signif cant damage on the enemy thus making the continuation of their aerial attack diff cult. See Fig. III-1-1-14 (Example of Air Defense Operations) **2** **Defense Operations Protecting Waters** **Surrounding Japan** See Fig. III-1-1-15 (Example of the Strategy for Defending Sea Areas Surrounding Japan) **3** **Operations Protecting the Land** In order to invade the islands of Japan, invading countries are expected to gain sea and air superiority, followed by the landing of ground troops from the sea and airborne troops from the air. Invading ground and airborne troops f nd it diff cult to exert systematic combat capabilities while they are moving on their vessels or aircraft or right before or after they land in our territory. As we protect our land, we need to eliminate this weakness to deal with our enemies between coastal and sea areas or at landing points as much as possible and attack them at an early stage. See Fig. III-1-1-16 (Example of Operations for Coping with the Landing of Invading Forces) **4** **Operations Ensuring Security in Maritime** **Transportation** As the islands of Japan are attacked with arms, aerial attacks are expected to be combined with attacks against our ships and territory by enemy destroyers. In addition, transport vessels could be deployed to enable massive enemy ground forces to invade our territory. Our defense operations protecting the waters surrounding Japan are composed of measures at sea, measures in waters around our coasts, measures in major straits, and aerial defense above waters around Japan. We need to protect the waters around our country by combining the results of these multiple operations, blocking the invasion of our enemies, and attacking and depleting their combat capabilities Japan depends upon other countries for the supply of much of its resources and food, making maritime transportation routes the lifeblood for securing the existence of our country and the foundation of our prosperity. Furthermore, in case our country comes under armed attack, maritime transportation routes set the foundation to maintain continuous warfare ----- Fig. III-1-1-15 Example of the Strategy for Defending Sea Areas Surrounding Japan Airborne warning and control system Anti-air warfare Fighters Air defense in Enemy aircraft the surrounding waters Response in the main channel Enemy surface vessels Anti-surface warfare Mine deployment warfare Patrol helicopter Surface vessels Response in the waters Surface-to-air missile Fixed-wing patrol aircraft Minesweeper Anti-mine warfare Anti-submarine warfare Response in coastal waters Submarine Enemy submarine capabilities and enable the U.S. Forces to come and assist in the defense of Japan. As such, operations to ensure the safety of our maritime transportation are important. Our operations ensuring security in maritime transportation can be done in waters around Japan or in sea lanes[33]. In the case where operations are to be implemented in waters around Japan, the SDF combines various operations such as anti-sea, anti-submarine, anti-air and anti-mine operations to patrol[34], defend SDF ships, and **11** **Response to Other Events** **1** **Response to Situations in Areas Surrounding** **Japan** protect straits and ports. In the case where operations are implemented by setting up sea lanes, the SDF periodically patrols the def ned areas, detects and addresses attacks by enemy vessels or submarines at an early stage, and directly defends Japanese ships as required. Aerial defense (anti-air operations) for Japanese ships on maritime transportation routes is conducted by destroyers, and support from f ghter jets and other aircraft is provided as required. **2** **Military Intelligence Collection** For formulating defense policy accurately in response to the changes in the situation and for effective operation of defense capabilities in dealing with various contingencies, it is necessary to ascertain the long-term military trends in the neighboring countries of Japan and to detect the signs of those situations at an early stage. For this reason, the MOD and the SDF always make efforts to collect information swiftly and accurately using various methods. Some examples of intelligence collection methods used by the MOD and the SDF include: In the event of situations in areas surrounding Japan, the MOD and the SDF will provide materials and services as rear area support and conduct rear area search and rescue activities or ship inspection activities as stipulated in the Act Concerning the Measures for Peace and Safety of Japan in Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan and the Ship Inspections Operations Act. See Reference 11 (Main Operations of the Self-Defense Forces), Reference 12 (Statutory Provisions about the Use of Armed Force and Weapons by SDF Personnel) 33 Relatively safe marine areas defined to enable the transportation of ships. The locations and width of sea lanes change depending on the situation of a specific threat. ----- Fig. III-1-1-16 Example of Operations for Coping with the Landing of Invading Forces Fighters Response in coastal waters Assault helicopter Surface ship Surface-to-ship missile Unmanned reconnaissance aircraft Surface-to-air missile Response in sea waters Response to enemy heliborne units Surface-to-air missile Surveillance radar Tank Response in sea waters Armored Artillery vehicle Response in urban areas Response to enemy airborne unit Guiding evacuees (1) collecting, processing and analyzing signals detected from military communications and electronic weapons, in the air over Japanese territory; (2) collecting and analyzing high resolution commercial satellite imaging data[35]; (3) warning and surveillance activities by ships, aircraft and other vehicles; (4) collecting and organizing a variety of open source information; (5) information exchanges with defense organizations of other nations; and (6) intelligence collection conducted by Defense Attachés and other off cials. As the security environment surrounding Japan has become increasingly severe, the strengthening of information capabilities is considered to be an increasingly important issue. For this reason, the MOD is currently promoting comprehensive enhancement of its information capabilities at all stages, including gathering, analyzing, sharing, and securing intelligence. Specif cally, the MOD will implement the high-level use of geospatial data such as by integrating various information to visualize the situation, securing highly competent analysts by integrating and strengthening educational curricula, and strengthening the dispatch system for Defense Attachés through their dispatch to Africa, and other means. 35 In order to enhance Japan’s capabilities for gathering image intelligence, fi ve intelligence-gathering satellites are currently operated at the Cabinet Satellite Intelligence Center. The MOD has properly ----- **Commentary** About Defense Attachés Defense Attachés are stationed in Japanese Embassies and other relevant offi ces abroad and perform tasks such as collecting military intelligence and coordinating defense cooperation with the country where they are stationed. Based on a trusting relationship between militaries that share the same mission of “national defense,” Defense Attachés are able to gain various types of information from the armed forces, national defense authority of the country where they are stationed and from Defense Attachés from other countries. As the security environment surrounding Japan is becoming increasingly severe, the importance of collecting military intelligence in a timely manner is growing. In addition, defense cooperation, including equipment cooperation, between Japan and other countries is expanding both in quality and quantity. Therefore, expectations for A Defense Attaché who was newly dispatched to Algeria in the role to be played by Defense Attachés are becoming increasingly higher. For this January of this year reason, the MOD is working to enhance the dispatch system of Defense Attachés. During the previous fi scal year, the MOD newly dispatched Defense Attachés to seven countries in Africa (Algeria, Ethiopia, Kenya, Djibouti, Nigeria, South Africa, and Morocco) in order to enhance its intelligence gathering capability regarding Africa, in light of the terrorist attack in Algeria in which Japanese nationals in Algeria were involved. Also, the MOD increased the number of Defense Attachés in three European countries (the United Kingdom, Germany, and France), which possess a wide range of information regarding Africa. Furthermore, in cooperation with MOFA, the MOD is currently considering the strengthening of its dispatch system of Defense Attachés in the Middle East, in light of the terrorist attack in Syria which involved the killing of Japanese nationals. Defense Attachés are seconded from the MOD to MOFA, and are then dispatched overseas. They possess the status of both SDF offi cer and MOFA offi cial. This ensures the mechanism that allows MOFA and the MOD to cooperate closely, whilst maintaining centralized diplomatic efforts. As of March 31, 2015, the MOD has a total of 58 Defense Attachés dispatched to 40 Embassies of Japan and two Permanent Missions of Japan. Forming KIZUNA (meaning “Bonds”) – Dispatch and Acceptance **Commentary** of Liaison Off cers In order for us to maintain our peaceful and stable lives in the contemporary international community, it is necessary to cooperate with other countries that share the same values as Japan. People to people exchange is a valid means of achieving this objective. The SDF dispatches Defense Attachés and security attachés to the Embassies of Japan and other relevant offi ces located in foreign countries. In addition, the SDF personnel are dispatched to foreign countries that have a cooperative relationship with Japan as liaison offi cers to exchange and share information, as well as to engage in various tasks such as coordinating joint exercises. The MSDF dispatches liaison offi cers to the Naval Academy, the offi ce of the Chief of Naval Operations, and other organizations of the U.S. Navy. At the Commander in Chief of the Self Defense Fleet and the fi rst Royal Navy same time, it accepts a liaison offi cer from the U.S. Navy to the MSDF Offi cer liaison offi cer dispatched to the Headquarters of the Self Defense Fleet visit the Memorial Ship Mikasa (former battleship Mikasa) (Yokosuka City) Candidate School. Furthermore, since February 2015, the MSDF has accepted a liaison offi cer from the Royal Navy, who is the fi rst liaison offi cer accepted from a country other than the United States. Just like Japan, the United Kingdom is a maritime state whose development as a nation depends on the “sea”. Thus, the two countries share common values, and Japan recognizes the United Kingdom as an important partner in the same manner as the United States. This acceptance of a liaison offi cer on this occasion will signifi cantly contribute to information exchange and the enhancement of cooperation between Japan and the U.K. In order to further ensure peace and stability of Japan, liaison offi cers are steadily forming small but strong and fi rm KIZUNA “bonds” in foreign countries at this very moment. ----- **Section 2 Build-Up of Defense Capability in FY2015** Japan will steadily build up its defense capability during FY2015, which serves as the second f scal year under the NDPG and MTDP, to establish a Dynamic Joint Defense Force, based on these programs. As part of this build-up, Japan will improve its defense capabilities, focusing on further enhancement of joint functions in order to seamlessly and dynamically fulf ll its defense responsibilities, which include providing an effective deterrence and response to a variety of security situations, and supporting stability in the Asia-Pacif c region, as well as improving the global security environment. In doing so, Japan will place particular emphasis on the following measures: intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities; intelligence capabilities; transport capabilities; command, control, communication, intelligence (C3I) capabilities; response to attacks on remote islands; response to ballistic missile attacks; response in outer space and cyberspace threats; response to large-scale disasters, etc.; and international peace cooperation efforts, etc. Furthermore, considering the increasingly severe situation in Japan’s public f nance, Japan will strive to achieve greater eff ciencies and streamlining, while harmonizing these efforts with other measures taken by the Government. See Fig. III-1-2-1 (Main Aspects of Build-up of Defense Capabilities for FY 2015) |Category|Col2|Main Programs| |---|---|---| |I. Effective deterrence and response to various situations|Ensure security of the sea and airspace surrounding Japan|Acquire fi xed-wing patrol aircraft (P-1), acquire patrol helicopters (SH-60K), construct a submarine, acquire new airborne early-warning aircraft (E-2D) and acquire part of the Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (Global Hawk) system, etc.| ||Response to attacks on remote islands|Deploy a coast observation unit to cover Yonaguni Island, acquire fi ghter (F-35A), newly establish the 9th Air Wing due to two squadrons added to the fi ghter aircraft units at Naha Air Base, conduct a study towards the construction of a new destroyer, acquire V-22 Ospreys, acquire an amphibious vehicle (AAV7), upgrade the Osumi-class LST in order to enhance its transport capability in amphibious operations, conduct research to discuss the purpose of multi-functional vessels, promote initiatives such as PFI programs with respect to the use of the private sector maritime transport , etc.| ||Response to ballistic missile attacks|Construct an aegis-equipped destroyer, conduct Japan-U.S. cooperative development of advanced ballistic missile interceptor (SM-3 Block IIA), recertify PAC-3 missiles, develop infrastructure for the PAC-3 unit deployment in Ichigaya, etc.| ||Response in outer space|Study on the specifi cations of the capabilities of the Space Surveillance system, empirical research on dual-wavelength infrared sensor technology in outer space, utilize the Advanced Land Observing Satellite-2 “DAICHI-2” (ALOS-2), etc.| ||Response in cyber space|Strengthen functions for the cyber exercises environment (cyber range), implement initiatives to introduce serious games (educational games) as a form of practical educational material and educational program etc.| ||Response to large-scale disasters|Maintain and strengthen functions of camps and bases that will serve as hubs during a disaster, carry out training on large-scale and special disasters, improve alternative functions in case the Ichigaya building becomes damaged due to a disaster, acquire double arm construction machines, etc.| ||Strengthening intelligence capabilities|Enhance HUMINT gathering capabilities, enhance research capabilities in relation to public information gathering through the analysis of big data, strengthen the system related to Defense Attachés, etc.| |II. Stabilization of the Asia-Pacifi c region and improvement of the global security environment||Strengthen bilateral and multilateral cooperation for stabilizing the Asia-Pacifi c region, and carry out training and exercises as needed and as appropriate. More actively participate in international peace cooperation activities, etc., in order to respond appropriately to global security issues and other issues.| |III. Measures for the strengthening of the Japan- U.S. Alliance||Steadily carry out specifi c measures such as the relocation of U.S. Marine Corps stationed in Okinawa to Guam, the relocation of Futenma Air Station, and return of the land south of Kadena Air Station.| |IV. Measures for personnel and education||Strengthen recruiting operations and re-employment assistance, raise the staffi ng rate of SDF reserve personnel and enhance and improve the SDF reserve personnel system, promote successful female personnel through providing support for good work-life balance and improving the work environment| |V. Initiatives for greater effi ciency||Introduce long-term contracts for the procurement of equipment etc., review maintenance and improvement methods, purchase defense equipment in bulk, revise specifi cations for the use of civilian items etc.| |VI. Ministry of Defense reform||Mutually deploy civilian offi cials and uniformed personnel, strengthen joint operation function, reform internal departments, carry out initiatives to strengthen information dissemination functions, and establish Defense Equipment Agency, etc.| ||SDF organization|In order to provide an effective deterrent and respond to various situations, implement projects to reorganize each unit such as the Oceanographic Command etc., and increase the actual number of SDF personnel.| ||Promotion of base measures|Steadily implement measures surrounding bases in order to achieve harmony between defense facilities and surrounding communities as well as carry out measures to facilitate and streamline the stationing of U.S. Forces in Japan.| ||Strengthening of education and research systems|Conduct next generation fi ghter aircraft related projects, conduct a study on large vessels and warhead technologies for guided missiles in response to threats to remote islands, conduct a study on high mobility powered suits, and establish an initiative called the Innovative Science & Technology Initiative for Security, etc.| ||Promotion of technological research and development|Research fuel cells for unmanned submersible robots, research robots that can be used to counter threats from a nuclear accident, and research radar and fi ring systems for detecting stealth aircraft, etc.| ||Enhancement of medical function|Carry out initiatives towards upgrading SDF hospitals into hubs with enhanced functions, improve fi rst aid capabilities on the frontline while responding to contingencies, and conduct initiatives to contribute to smooth SDF activities in the southwestern region, etc.| Fig. III-1-2-1 Main Aspects of Build-up of Defense Capabilities for FY2015 Extend the period to which tax exemption measures related to the power source of ships used by the SDF and Tax system reform equipment used for communication purposes are applied, and establish special measures to be taken when providing tax-exempt diesel fuel based on the ACSA (Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement) etc ----- Amphibious vehicle (AAV7) Fixed-wing patrol aircraft (P-1) New airborne early-warning aircraft (E-2D) **Section 3 Defense-Related Expenditures** **1** **Defense-Related Expenditures and Changes** Defense-related expenditures include spending for maintaining and managing the SDF, improving living conditions in the neighborhoods of defense facilities, and supporting U.S. Forces in Japan. In FY2015, in light of the increasingly harsh security environment, defense-related expenditures were increased for the second consecutive year in a row in order to reinforce preparedness aimed at protecting the lives and property of the people and the nation’s land, sea, and airspace. In comparison with the previous f scal year, when including expenses related to SACO (Special Action Committee on Okinawa) and the U.S. Forces realignmentrelated expenses (the portion allocated for reducing the burden on local communities and the expenses associated with the introduction of a new dedicated government aircraft), defense-related expenditures were increased by 95.3 billion yen to 4.9801 trillion yen. If the SACOrelated expenses and the U.S. Forces realignment-related expenses (the portion allocated for reducing the burden on local communities and the expenses associated with the introduction of a new dedicated government aircraft) are excluded from the above amount, defense-related expenditures were increased by 38.3 billion yen from the previous f scal year to 4.8221 trillion yen. Additionally the supplementary budget for FY2014 contains an appropriation of 211.0 billion yen for improving SDF’s disaster response capabilities, securing stable operations of the SDF, and necessary expenses for SDF operations. See Fig. III-1-3-1 (Comparison Between FY2014 Budget and FY2015 Budget) See Appendix 4 (Trend in Defense-Related Expenditures Over the Past 15 See See Years) Fig. III-1-3-1 Comparison Between FY2014 Budget and FY2015 Budget (100 million) |Category|Col2|FY2014|FY2015 Fiscal YOY growth ( indicates negative growth)|Col5| |---|---|---|---|---| |||||Fiscal YOY growth ( indicates negative growth)| |Annual expenditure (note)||47,838|48,221|383 (0.8%)| ||Personnel and food provisions Expenses Material expenses|20,930 26,909|21,121 27,100|192 (0.9%) 192 (0.7%)| |Future obligation (note)||33,594|39,530|5,936 (17.7%)| ||New contracts Existing contracts|19,465 14,129|22,998 16,532|3,534 (18.2%) 2,403 (17.0%)| Notes: Does not include SACO-related expenses, U.S. Forces realignment-related expenses (portion meant to reduce the burden on the local community), or expenses associated with the acquisition of new government aircraft based on “The Policy Concerning Government Aircraft” (August 7, 2013 decision by the Review Committee on Government Aircraft). If these are included, the fi gures are 4,884.8 billion yen for FY2014 and 4,980.1 billion yen for FY2015; and for future obligation, 3,630.4 billion yen for FY2014 and 4,363.5 billion yen for FY2015. **2** **Breakdown of Defense-Related Expenditures** Personnel and food provision expenses as well as obligatory outlay expenses, both of which are mandatory expenses, account for 80% of the total defense-related budget. While general material expenses account for approximately 20% of the total budget, within that, mandatory costs, such as expenses related to measures to alleviate the burden on local communities hosting U.S. bases in Japan, account for over 40% of the total As these fgures show the defense related expenditures are based on a structure, the breakdown of which cannot be easily altered in a signif cant manner on a single-year basis. See Fig. III-1-3-2 (Relationship between Annual Expenditure and Future Obligation Due to New Contracts) Personnel and food provision expenses were increased by 19.2 billion yen from the previous f scal year due to the revision of the remuneration of civil servants based on ----- Amphibious vehicle (AAV7) Fixed-wing patrol aircraft (P-1) New airborne early-warning aircraft (E-2D) **Section 3 Defense-Related Expenditures** **1** **Defense-Related Expenditures and Changes** Defense-related expenditures include spending for maintaining and managing the SDF, improving living conditions in the neighborhoods of defense facilities, and supporting U.S. Forces in Japan. In FY2015, in light of the increasingly harsh security environment, defense-related expenditures were increased for the second consecutive year in a row in order to reinforce preparedness aimed at protecting the lives and property of the people and the nation’s land, sea, and airspace. In comparison with the previous f scal year, when including expenses related to SACO (Special Action Committee on Okinawa) and the U.S. Forces realignmentrelated expenses (the portion allocated for reducing the burden on local communities and the expenses associated with the introduction of a new dedicated government aircraft), defense-related expenditures were increased by 95.3 billion yen to 4.9801 trillion yen. If the SACOrelated expenses and the U.S. Forces realignment-related expenses (the portion allocated for reducing the burden on local communities and the expenses associated with the introduction of a new dedicated government aircraft) are excluded from the above amount, defense-related expenditures were increased by 38.3 billion yen from the previous f scal year to 4.8221 trillion yen. Additionally the supplementary budget for FY2014 contains an appropriation of 211.0 billion yen for improving SDF’s disaster response capabilities, securing stable operations of the SDF, and necessary expenses for SDF operations. See Fig. III-1-3-1 (Comparison Between FY2014 Budget and FY2015 Budget) See Appendix 4 (Trend in Defense-Related Expenditures Over the Past 15 See See Years) Fig. III-1-3-1 Comparison Between FY2014 Budget and FY2015 Budget (100 million) |Category|Col2|FY2014|FY2015 Fiscal YOY growth ( indicates negative growth)|Col5| |---|---|---|---|---| |||||Fiscal YOY growth ( indicates negative growth)| |Annual expenditure (note)||47,838|48,221|383 (0.8%)| ||Personnel and food provisions Expenses Material expenses|20,930 26,909|21,121 27,100|192 (0.9%) 192 (0.7%)| |Future obligation (note)||33,594|39,530|5,936 (17.7%)| ||New contracts Existing contracts|19,465 14,129|22,998 16,532|3,534 (18.2%) 2,403 (17.0%)| Notes: Does not include SACO-related expenses, U.S. Forces realignment-related expenses (portion meant to reduce the burden on the local community), or expenses associated with the acquisition of new government aircraft based on “The Policy Concerning Government Aircraft” (August 7, 2013 decision by the Review Committee on Government Aircraft). If these are included, the fi gures are 4,884.8 billion yen for FY2014 and 4,980.1 billion yen for FY2015; and for future obligation, 3,630.4 billion yen for FY2014 and 4,363.5 billion yen for FY2015. **2** **Breakdown of Defense-Related Expenditures** Personnel and food provision expenses as well as obligatory outlay expenses, both of which are mandatory expenses, account for 80% of the total defense-related budget. While general material expenses account for approximately 20% of the total budget, within that, mandatory costs, such as expenses related to measures to alleviate the burden on local communities hosting U.S. bases in Japan, account for over 40% of the total As these fgures show the defense related expenditures are based on a structure, the breakdown of which cannot be easily altered in a signif cant manner on a single-year basis. See Fig. III-1-3-2 (Relationship between Annual Expenditure and Future Obligation Due to New Contracts) Personnel and food provision expenses were increased by 19.2 billion yen from the previous f scal year due to the revision of the remuneration of civil servants based on ----- Fig. III-1-3-2 Relationship between Annual Expenditure and Future Obligation Due to New Contracts |2016|Col2|2017|Col4|Col5|2018|2019|Col8| |---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---| ||||||||| |Amount of future obligation When improving defense capabilities, it is common for work in areas like the procureme of equipment and the upgrading of facilities to be carried out over several year Consequently, a procedure is undertaken whereby a contract that extends for multip years is arranged (five years in principle), and the Government promises in advance at t time of the agreement to make the payment at a fixed time in the future. Future obligation refers to the sum of money to be paid in the following year and beyo under such contracts, which extend for multiple years. Example: A case in which 10 billi yen of equipment is procured under a contract that runs for four years FY2015 FY2016 FY2017 FY2018 Contract Payment Obligatory outlay Obligatory outlay Obligatory outlay Remaining sum paid expenses paid in part expenses paid in part expenses paid in part (6 billion yen) (1 billion yen) (1 billion yen) (2 billion yen) General material Obligatory outlay Obligatory outlay Obligatory outlay expenses expenses expenses expenses Future obligation (9 billion yen) Amount of contract (10 billion yen)|||||||| |Amount of future obligation|||||||| |When impro of equipme Consequent years is arra time of the a Future oblig under such yen of equip Cont Ob expe ( Ge||ving defense capab nt and the upgra ly, a procedure is nged (five years in greement to make ation refers to the contracts, which ex ment is procured u FY2015|||||| ||Cont|ract|||||Payment emaining sum paid (6 billion yen) Obligatory outlay expenses| |||||exp|Obligatory outlay enses paid in part ex (1 billion yen) Obligatory outlay expenses|Obligatory outlay R penses paid in part (2 billion yen) Obligatory outlay expenses|| ||Ob expe ( Ge||||||| |||||||obligation (9 billion y|en)| ||||||Future Amount of contract (||| |||||||10 billion yen)|| ||||||||| |2011|2012|2013|2014|2015|Col6| |---|---|---|---|---|---| ||||||| |||||Personnel and food provisions expenses (43.8%)|| |Contract|||||| ||||||| ||||||| ||||||| ||||||| ||Contract||||| ||||||| ||||||| ||||||| |||||Obligatory|| |||Contract|||| |||||outlay|| |||||expenses|| ||||||| ||||||| ||||Contract||| ||||||| |||||(35.6%)|| ||||||| ||||||| ||||||| |||||General|| |||||material|| ||||||| |||||expenses (activity expenses) (20.6%)|| Amount of future obligation When improving defense capabilities, it is common for work in areas like the procurement of equipment and the upgrading of facilities to be carried out over several years. Consequently, a procedure is undertaken whereby a contract that extends for multiple years is arranged (five years in principle), and the Government promises in advance at the time of the agreement to make the payment at a fixed time in the future. Future obligation refers to the sum of money to be paid in the following year and beyond under such contracts, which extend for multiple years. Example: A case in which 10 billion yen of equipment is procured under a contract that runs for four years FY2015 FY2016 FY2017 FY2018 Contract Payment Obligatory outlay Obligatory outlay Obligatory outlay Remaining sum paid expenses paid in part expenses paid in part expenses paid in part (6 billion yen) (1 billion yen) (1 billion yen) (2 billion yen) General material Obligatory outlay Obligatory outlay Obligatory outlay expenses expenses expenses expenses Future obligation (9 billion yen) Amount of contract (10 billion yen) **expenditures** 2011 2012 Existing contracts New contracts 2013 2014 Future obligation |Personnel and food provisions expenses|Col2|Expenses relating to wages for personnel, retirement allowance, meals in barracks, etc.| |---|---|---| |Material expenses (operating expenses) Obligatory outlay expenses General material expenses (activity expenses)||Expenses relating to procurement; repair and upgrading of equipment; purchase of oil; education and training of staff; facilities improvement; barracks expenses such as lighting, heating, water and supplies; technological research and development; cost-sharing for the stationing of USFJ; and expenses related to measures to alleviate the burden on local communities hosting U.S. bases in Japan| ||Obligatory outlay expenses|Expenses paid in FY2015 based on contracts made before FY2014| ||General material expenses (activity expenses)|Expenses paid in FY2015 based on contracts made in FY2015| Structure of Defense-related Expenditures Annual expenditure Defense-related expenditures are broadly classified into personnel and food provision expenses and material expenses (operating expenses). Personnel and Expenses relating to wages for personnel, retirement food provisionsexpenses allowance, meals in barracks, etc. Expenses relating to procurement; repair and upgrading of equipment; purchase of oil; education and training of staff; facilities improvement; barracks Material expenses expenses such as lighting, heating, water and supplies; (operating expenses) technological research and development; cost-sharing for the stationing of USFJ; and expenses related to measures to alleviate the burden on local communities hosting U.S. bases in Japan Obligatory Expenses paid in FY2015 based on contracts made before outlay expenses FY2014 General material expenses Expenses paid in FY2015 based on contracts made in FY2015 (activity expenses) the FY2014 recommendation by the National Personnel Authority and other factors. Obligatory outlay expenses for the year increased by 800 million yen from the previous year, while general material expenses increased by 18.1 billion yen from the previous year[1]. See Fig. III-1-3-3 (Breakdown of Defense-Related Expenditures (FY2015)) See Reference 40 (Changes in Composition of Defense-Related Expenditures See See (Original Budget Basis)) In addition to the budget expenditure, the amount of new future obligation also indicates payments for the following year and beyond. In the build-up of defense capabilities, it is common for multiple years to be required from contract to delivery or completion, in areas such as the procurement of vessels, aircraft, and other primary equipment, as well as the construction of buildings such as aircraft hangars and barracks. However, the budget of Japan must gain Diet approval each f scal year, and therefore, as a general rule, the spending of national expenditures prescribed in the budget is limited to the applicable f scal year. Consequently, for items that require multiple years between contract and delivery or completion, a procedure is undertaken whereby a contract that extends for multiple years is arranged, and it is promised in advance at the time of the agreement that payment will be made at a f xed time in the future (within f ve years, in principle). The sum of money to be paid in the following f scal year and beyond, based on such contracts that extend for multiple years, is called the “future obligation.” The amount of new future obligation arising in FY2015 (future obligation concerning new contracts) increased from the previous f scal year by 353.4 billion yen (18.2%), partly due to the impact of the introduction of integrated procurement associated with long-term contracts for over f ve years. Furthermore, if looked at on a contract basis[2], which shows the scale of operations, there is an increase from the previous f scal year of 371.8 billion yen (12.7%). See Part III, Chapter 2, Section 2 (Initiatives for Improving the Contract System and Other Related Matters) The comparison with the previous year is made by expenditure excluding the SACO-related expenses and the U.S. Forces realignment-related expenses (the portion for the reduction of the burden on local communities and the expenses associated with the introduction of a new dedicated government aircraft). The same applies hereinafter in regard to this section. The sum total of general material expenses and future obligation concerning new contracts, which shows the amount of the material expenses (operating expenses) that are to be contracted in the ----- Fig. III-1-3-3 Breakdown of Defense-Related Expenditures (FY2015) R&D 2.9% **23.6% (11,358)** Other 1.6% Facility development **2.7%** Base measures Personnel and **9.2%** food provisions **43.8%** Procurement of **By purpose** equipment, etc. **of use** **15.4%** Other General materials Maintenance, etc. **20.6% (9,918)** **24.5%** **16.9% (8,144)** GSDF [1.9%] **36.7% (17,684)** Personnel and **By** **By expense** food provisions **organization** **43.8% (21,121)** ASDF [0.9%] **22.9% (11,035)** Obligatory outlays **35.6% (17,182)** MSDF [0.0%] Notes: 1. ( ) is the budget amount; unit: 100 million yen. 2. The above fi gure does not include SACO-related expenses (4.6 billion yen), excluding the portion meant to reduce the burden on the local community (142.6 billion yen) out of the U.S. Forces realignment expenses and expenses associated with the acquisition of new government aircraft. 3. Figures in square brackets [ ] indicate year on year growth rate (%) **3** **Comparison with Other Countries** Understanding the defense expenditures of each country using a single standard is not possible in view of differences in the socioeconomic and budgetary systems. There is not an internationally unif ed def nition of defense expenditures, and breakdowns of defense expenditures are unclear in some countries where such data is publicly disclosed. Furthermore, in comparing the defense expenditures of each country, though there exists the method of converting their defense expenditures into dollar amounts for comparison by foreign exchange rate, their dollarbased defense spending calculated by this method does not necessarily ref ect the precise value based on each country’s price levels. Therefore, the results of converting Japan’s defense-related expenditures and the off cial defense expenditures published by other countries into dollar amounts, using the purchasing power parity[3] of each country as published by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), are shown in Figure III-1-3-4 (The Defense Budgets of Major Countries (FY2013)). See Part I, Chapter 1 (Defense Policies of Countries), Reference 41 (Trend of Defense Expenditures of Major Countries) In addition, Fig. III-1-3-5 (Changes in Defense Budgets in Surrounding Countries Over the Past Ten Years) shows the changes in defense expenditures of Japan’s neighboring counties over the past ten years. Fig. III-1-3-4 The Defense Budgets of Major Countries (FY2013) 7,000 6,000 5,000 4,000 3,000 2,000 1,000 5.0 4.0 3.0 2.0 1.0 0.0 |（ ion USD)|Col2|Col3|Col4|Col5|Col6|Col7|Col8| |---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---| |Defense budgets (100 million USD) Defense budgets as % of GDP|||||||| |Japan|U. S.|China|Russia|ROK|Australia|UK|France| |450|6,078|2,046|1,143|401|167|495|446| |1.0|3.8|1.3|3.2|2.4|1.6|2.1|1.8| Notes: 1. Defense budgets are based on each country’s public documents. Dollar conversions have been made while referring to each country’s purchasing power parity for FY2013 as published by the OECD (offi cial rate listed on the OECD website) (as of April 2015). (1 dollar=104.0898517 yen=3.520582033 yuan=18.42503504 rubles= 860.2190041 won= 1.522099936 Australian dollars=0.854056461 euros (France)) 2. Defense budgets as a proportion of GDP have been estimated based on fi gures published by the governments of each country. ----- Fig. III-1-3-5 Changes in Defense Budgets in Surrounding Countries Over the Past Ten Years (Times) 7.00 6.00 5.00 4.00 3.00 2.00 1.00 0.00 Russia 5.87 times China 3.64 timesChina 3.64 times Australia 1.87 times ROK 1.77 times U.S. 1.20 times Japan 1.00 times 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 Notes: 1. Created based on the defense budgets published by each country. 2. These are numerical values obtained by simple calculation of the ratio between the defense budgets each year, with the FY2005 value as 1 (times) (rounded to two decimal places). 3. The defi nition and breakdown of the defense budgets of each country are not necessarily clear. As we must take into account various factors such as foreign exchange fl uctuations and price levels of each country, it is very diffi cult to draw a comparison of defense budgets among countries. **Section 4 Human Foundation and Organization that Supports the Defense Force** In order to exert their defense capabilities with the maximum effectiveness, it is necessary that the MOD and the SDF enhance their human foundation as well as further deepening mutual trust between local communities, the people, and the SDF. **1** **Recruitment and Employment** **1** **Recruitment** **2** **Employment** Expectations from the public for the MOD and the SDF have continued to rise. In Japan, however, due to the declining birthrate and increasing university enrollments, the general recruitment climate for uniformed SDF personnel is anticipated to become increasingly severe. In light of these circumstances, it is necessary to recruit personnel with superior abilities and a strong desire to enlist, after carefully explaining to them the missions and duties as well as the working conditions of the SDF. See Fig. III-1-4-1 (Changes in the Number of People Eligible to Join the SDF) For this reason, the MOD and the SDF hold recruiting meetings at schools and also maintain Provincial Cooperation Off ces in 50 locations throughout Japan to respond to the individual needs of applicants, with help in the form of understanding by educators and support from recruitment counselors. Moreover, local governments are also obliged to carry out some of the administrative activities regarding the recruitment of uniformed SDF personnel and candidates for uniformed SDF personnel, such as announcing the recruitment period and promoting the SDF as a workplace, for which the MOD allocates them the requisite budget. **(1) Uniformed SDF personnel** Under a voluntary system, which is based on individuals’ free will, uniformed SDF personnel are recruited under various categories. See Fig. III-1-4-2 (Overview of Appointment System for SDF Regular Personnel) Due to its uniqueness as a career, personnel management of uniformed SDF personnel differs from that of general civilian government employees[1], including aspects such as an “Early Retirement System” for maintaining a powerful SDF, and “Fixed Term System.” Upon employment, uniformed SDF personnel are assigned a job appropriate to their choice or aptitude in a training unit or at a school belonging to the respective branch of the SDF, followed by an appointment to units and positions all around the country. See Reference 46 (Authorized and Actual Strength of Uniformed SDF Personnel), Reference 47 (Status of Recruiting and Employing Uniformed SDF Personnel (FY2014)) See Fig. III-1-4-3 (Rank and Retirement Age of SDF Regular Personnel) ----- Fig. III-1-3-5 Changes in Defense Budgets in Surrounding Countries Over the Past Ten Years (Times) 7.00 6.00 5.00 4.00 3.00 2.00 1.00 0.00 Russia 5.87 times China 3.64 timesChina 3.64 times Australia 1.87 times ROK 1.77 times U.S. 1.20 times Japan 1.00 times 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 Notes: 1. Created based on the defense budgets published by each country. 2. These are numerical values obtained by simple calculation of the ratio between the defense budgets each year, with the FY2005 value as 1 (times) (rounded to two decimal places). 3. The defi nition and breakdown of the defense budgets of each country are not necessarily clear. As we must take into account various factors such as foreign exchange fl uctuations and price levels of each country, it is very diffi cult to draw a comparison of defense budgets among countries. **Section 4 Human Foundation and Organization that Supports the Defense Force** In order to exert their defense capabilities with the maximum effectiveness, it is necessary that the MOD and the SDF enhance their human foundation as well as further deepening mutual trust between local communities, the people, and the SDF. **1** **Recruitment and Employment** **1** **Recruitment** **2** **Employment** Expectations from the public for the MOD and the SDF have continued to rise. In Japan, however, due to the declining birthrate and increasing university enrollments, the general recruitment climate for uniformed SDF personnel is anticipated to become increasingly severe. In light of these circumstances, it is necessary to recruit personnel with superior abilities and a strong desire to enlist, after carefully explaining to them the missions and duties as well as the working conditions of the SDF. See Fig. III-1-4-1 (Changes in the Number of People Eligible to Join the SDF) For this reason, the MOD and the SDF hold recruiting meetings at schools and also maintain Provincial Cooperation Off ces in 50 locations throughout Japan to respond to the individual needs of applicants, with help in the form of understanding by educators and support from recruitment counselors. Moreover, local governments are also obliged to carry out some of the administrative activities regarding the recruitment of uniformed SDF personnel and candidates for uniformed SDF personnel, such as announcing the recruitment period and promoting the SDF as a workplace, for which the MOD allocates them the requisite budget. **(1) Uniformed SDF personnel** Under a voluntary system, which is based on individuals’ free will, uniformed SDF personnel are recruited under various categories. See Fig. III-1-4-2 (Overview of Appointment System for SDF Regular Personnel) Due to its uniqueness as a career, personnel management of uniformed SDF personnel differs from that of general civilian government employees[1], including aspects such as an “Early Retirement System” for maintaining a powerful SDF, and “Fixed Term System.” Upon employment, uniformed SDF personnel are assigned a job appropriate to their choice or aptitude in a training unit or at a school belonging to the respective branch of the SDF, followed by an appointment to units and positions all around the country. See Reference 46 (Authorized and Actual Strength of Uniformed SDF Personnel), Reference 47 (Status of Recruiting and Employing Uniformed SDF Personnel (FY2014)) See Fig. III-1-4-3 (Rank and Retirement Age of SDF Regular Personnel) ----- Fig. III-1-4-1 Changes in the Number of People Eligible to Join the SDF The number of 18–26 year-olds (thousand people) 20,000 Number of newly-employed personnel (people) 30,000 25,000 19,000 18,000 17,000 16,000 15,000 14,000 13,000 12,000 11,000 10,000 20,000 15,000 10,000 5,000 |The number of 18–26 year-olds: About 17 million ⇒ About 11 million (down by about 40%) The number of newly-employed personnel The number of 18-26 year olds (thousand people) About 17 million people The number of newly-employed personnel: varies from year to year (approximately equal to or higher than that of FY1994) About 14,000 people About 12,000 people About 11 million people|Col2|Col3|Col4|Col5| |---|---|---|---|---| ||ut 12 eop|||| |||||| |1989 1990 1991 1992 1993|199|4 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013|2014|2015 2016 2017 2018| Material sources: Data before FY2014 (excluding data for FY2005 and FY2010) are based on “Population Estimates of Japan 1920–2000” and “Annual Report on Population Estimates,” Statistics Bureau, Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications. Data for FY2005 and FY2010 are the proportionally adjusted populations of unknown age ascertained by the National Institute of Population and Social Security Research based on “Population Census,” Statistics Bureau, Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications. Data from FY2015 onward are based on “Population Projection for Japan” (medium estimates in January 2012), National Institute of Population and Social Security Research. Fig. III-1-4-3 Rank and Retirement Age of SDF Regular Personnel Overview of Appointment System for SDF Regular Fig. III-1-4-2 Personnel ||Col2|Col3|Col4|Col5|Col6|Col7|Col8|Col9|Col10|Col11|Col12|Col13|Col14| |---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---| |General (GSDF, ASDF), Admiral (MSDF) to Second Lieutenant (GSDF, ASDF), Ensign (MSDF)|Officer||||||||||||| |Warrant Officer Warrant Officer|||||||||||(Note 1)||| |Sergeant Major (GSDF), Chief Petty Officer (MSDF), Senior Master Sergeant (ASDF) Master Sergeant (GSDF) Petty Officer First Class (MSDF) Master Sergeant (ASDF) Sergeant First Class (GSDF) Petty Officer Second Class (MSDF) Technical Sergeant (ASDF) Sergeant (GSDF) Petty Officer Third Class (MSDF) Staff Sergeant (ASDF)|Enlisted (upper)||||Officer Candidate (Note 5)||||||||| |||||||||||(Note 5)|||| |Leading Private (GSDF) Leading Seaman (MSDF) L Airman First Class (ASDF) P (Note 4) Private First Class (GSDF) Seaman (MSDF) Airman Second Class (ASDF) 3rd Class Private (GSDF) Seaman Apprentice (MSDF) Airman Third Class (ASDF) 2nd Class|(Note 3) eading rivate (3 years, GSDF Leading High Technical Private upon School graduation) Student||||||National Defense Academy Student (4 years: MSG/CPO/MSgt upon graduation)||Division of Medicine National Defense Medical College student (6 years: MSG/CPO/MSgt upon graduation)||Division of Nursing National Defense Medical College student (4 years: MSG/CPO/MSgt upon graduation)||Civilian universities and colleges (Includes students on loans)| ||||SDF Personnel (u) in short-term service|(2 officers per appointment, two / three years per term)|Student airmen (MSDF, ASDF) (2 officers per appointment, Second Lieutenant/ Ensign after about 6 years)||||||||| ||GSDF High Technical School Student (3 years, Leading Private upon graduation)||||||||||||| ||||Candidate for SDF Personnel (u) (3 month)||||||||||| ||||||||||||||| Aged 18 or older Senior high school, and others Class Aged 18 or older Junior high school, and under 27 and others 1. Staff candidates for the medicine, dentistry, and pharmacy faculties will be promoted to the position of First Lieutenant if they pass the national examinations in medicine. 2. Student candidates for enlistment (upper) refers to a candidate who has been appointed as an officer with the premise that he/she will be promoted to a fixed-term position of “Enlisted (upper).” Until FY2006, there were two programs consisting of “Student candidates for enlistment (upper)” and “Enlisted (upper) candidates.” However, these two programs were reorganized and combined, and since 2007, candidates have been appointed as “General candidates for enlistment (upper)”. 3. As for the SDF candidates, in order to enhance the initial education of SDF personnel in short-term service, in July 2010, it was decided that their status for the first three months of their enlistment would be as non-SDF personnel, and they would engage exclusively in fundamental education and practice as non-regular Ministry of Defense personnel. 4. GSDF High Technical School trains people to be SDF personnel who will be capable not only of operating and making full use of equipment in the GSDF but also of conducting missions in the international community. For SDF students, starting from FY2010 appointments, their status was changed from SDF officer to “students,” which is a new non-regular status. New students receive a high school diploma at the conclusion of a student course (three years) through distance learning. From the FY2011 appointments, a new recommendation system was introduced in which those who are considered appropriate to be a GSDF High Technical School student are selected from among the candidates based on the recommendation of the principal of their junior high school etc., in addition to the conventional general examination. 5. A three-year program ended in FY2013. A new four-year program was established at the National Notes: |Rank|Designation|Mandatory Retirement Age| |---|---|---| |General (GSDF), Admiral (MSDF), General (ASDF)|Sho|60| |Major General (GSDF), Rear Admiral (MSDF), Major General (ASDF)|Shoho|| |Colonel (GSDF), Captain (MSDF), Colonel (ASDF)|Issa|56| |Lieutenant Colonel (GSDF), Commander (MSDF), Lieutenant Colonel (ASDF)|Nisa|55| |Major (GSDF), Lieutenant Commander (MSDF), Major (ASDF)|Sansa|| |Captain (GSDF), Lieutenant (MSDF), Captain (ASDF)|Ichii|54| |First Lieutenant (GSDF), Lieutenant Junior Grade (MSDF), First Lieutenant (ASDF)|Nii|| |Second Lieutenant (GSDF), Ensign (MSDF), Second Lieutenant (ASDF)|Sani|| |Warrant Offi cer (GSDF), Warrant Offi cer (MSDF), Warrant Offi cer (ASDF)|Juni|| |Sergeant Major (GSDF), Chief Petty Offi cer (MSDF), Senior Master Sergeant (ASDF)|Socho|| |Master Sergeant (GSDF), Petty Offi cer First Class (MSDF), Master Sergeant (ASDF)|Isso|| |Sergeant First Class (GSDF), Petty Offi cer Second Class (MSDF), Technical Sergeant (ASDF)|Niso|53| |Sergeant First Class (GSDF), Petty Offi cer Second Class (MSDF), Technical Sergeant (ASDF)|Sanso|| |Leading Private (GSDF), Leading Seaman (MSDF), Airman First Class (ASDF)|Shicho|—| |Private First Class (GSDF), Seaman (MSDF), Airman Second Class (ASDF)|Isshi|| |Private (GSDF), Seaman Apprentice (MSDF), Airman Third Class (ASDF)|Nishi|| Notes: 1. The mandatory age of retirement for SDF Regular Personnel who hold the rank of General (GSDF and ASDF) or Admiral (MSDF), and serve as Chief of Staff of Joint Staff Offi ce, GSDF Chief of Staff, MSDF Chief of Staff, or ADSF Chief of Staff, is 62. 2. The mandatory age of retirement for SDF Regular Personnel who hold positions such as physician, dentist, pharmacist, musician, military police offi cer, or information analyst, is 60. The New MTDP states that it will review this system of retirement at the age of 60. ----- |Col1|SDF Reserve Personnel|SDF Ready Reserve Personnel|Candidate for SDF Reserve Personnel| |---|---|---|---| |Basic concept|H When defense call-up or disaster call-up is received, they will serve as SDF Regular Personnel|H When defense call-up is received, or under similar conditions, they will serve as SDF Regular Personnel in a pre-determined GSDF unit, as part of the basic framework of defense capability|H Appointed as SDF Reserve Personnel upon completion of education and training| |Candidate|H Former Regular Personnel, former SDF Ready Reserve Personnel, former Reserve Personnel|H Former Regular Personnel, former Reserve Personnel|(Same for General and Technical) H Inexperienced SDF Personnel (includes those with less than a year of SDF experience)| |Age|H Enlisted (Lower): 18–36 years old H Offi cer, Warrant Offi cer, Enlisted (Upper): Under two years above the retirement age|H Enlisted (Lower): 18–31 years old H Offi cer, Warrant Offi cer, Enlisted (Upper): Under three years below the retirement age for each rank|H General: over 18 and under 34 years old; Technical: over 53 and under 55 years old depending on technical skills possessed after the age of 18| |Employment|H Employment on screening, based on application H Candidate for SDF Reserve Personnel is appointed as SDF Reserve Personnel upon completion of education and training|H Employment on screening, based on application|H General: Employment on examination, based on application H Technical: Employment on screening, based on application| |Rank|H Former Regular Personnel: As a rule, rank at the point of retirement H SDF Ready Reserve Personnel: Current specifi ed rank H Former Reserve Personnel and Former Ready Reserve Personnel. As a rule, rank at the point of retirement H Candidate for Reserve Personnel • General: Private • Technical: Assignment based on skills|H Former Regular Personnel: As a rule, rank at the point of retirement H Former Reserve Personnel: As a rule, designated rank at the point of retirement|H Not designated| |Term of service|H Three Years/One term|H Three Years/One term|H General: Maximum of three years H Technical: Maximum of two years| |Education/ Training|H Although the Self-Defense Forces Law designates a maximum of 20 days per year, actual implementation is a minimum of 5 days per year|H 30 days per year|H General: 50 days within a maximum of three years (equivalent to SDF personnel cadet course) H Technical: 10 days within a maximum of two years (training to serve as an SDF Regular Personnel by utilizing each skill)| |Promotion|H Promotion is determined by screening the service record of personnel who have fulfi lled the service term (actual serving days)|H Promotion is determined by screening the service record of personnel who have fulfi lled the service term (actual serving days)|H Since there is no designated rank, there is no promotion| |Benefi ts, allowances, and other terms|H Training Call-up Allowance: ¥8,100/day H SDF Reserve Allowance: ¥4,000/month|H Training Call-up Allowance: ¥10,400–14,200/day H SDF Ready Reserve Allowance: ¥16,000/month H Continuous Service Incentive Allowance: ¥120,000/one term H Special subsidy for corporations employing Ready Reserve Personnel: ¥42,500/month|H Education and Training Call-up Allowance: ¥7,900/day H Allowance as Candidate for SDF Reserve Personnel is not paid because defense call-up duty is not imposed on them| |Call-up duty and other duties|H Defense call-up, civil protection call-up, disaster call- up, training call-up|H Defense call-up, civil protection call-up, security call-up, disaster call- up, training call-up|H Education and training call-up| Fig. III-1-4-4 Overview of Systems Related to SDF Reserve Personnel of the system. To enable Ready Reserve Personnel to participate in training sessions without any constraint, the MOD takes into consideration the burden on the companies that employ these personnel and takes necessary measures to allow such employees to attend training sessions, and provides a special subsidy to companies. Furthermore, the MOD promotes the use of retired ASDF pilots more widely over a range of f elds by appointing them as SDF reserve personnel through the reemployment system[3]. At the same time, it also implements measures to increase the rate fulf llment of actual uniformed SDF personnel, for example, by promoting a system in which a special sticker is issued to off ces that have provided cooperation in employing SDF reserve personnel and other reserve personnel. **(3) Administrative Offi cials, Technical and Engineering** **Offi cials, Instructors, and Other Civilian Personnel** There are approximately 21,000 civilian personnel— administrative off cials, technical and engineering off cials, instructors, and others—in addition to uniformed SDF personnel in the MOD and the SDF. Civilian personnel are mainly employed from among those who have passed the Examination for National Public Off cials for either career track or general staff run by the National Personnel Authority (NPA), and those who have passed the Examination for **(2) SDF Reserve Personnel, SDF Ready Reserve Personnel,** **and Candidates for SDF Reserve Personnel** The number of uniformed SDF personnel should be expanded promptly in the event of a crisis, to meet the needs of each contingency. To fulf ll such needs promptly and systematically, the MOD maintains three systems: the SDF Reserve Personnel system, the SDF Ready Reserve Personnel system, and the system for Candidates for SDF Reserve Personnel[2]. See Fig. III-1-4-4 (Overview of Systems Related to SDF Reserve Personnel) SDF Reserve Personnel become uniformed SDF personnel in cases such as the issue of muster orders for defense, and carry out logistical support and base guard duties as uniformed SDF personnel. SDF Ready Reserve Personnel introduced into the GSDF are assigned to carry out their mission together with active duty uniformed SDF personnel as part of frontline units following the issue of muster orders for defense and other orders. SDF Reserve Personnel candidates are to be assigned as SDF Reserve Personnel after completing the necessary education and training to work as uniformed SDF personnel. As SDF Reserve Personnel work in their own civilian jobs during peacetime, they need to adjust their work schedule and participate in musters for training exercises or in the event of a crisis. Therefore, understanding and cooperation from the companies that employ these SDF Reserve Personnel are essential for the smooth operation Many countries other than Japan also have reserve personnel systems. The reemployment system for SDF pilots is intended to prevent the outfl ow of active young SDF pilots to civil aviation companies in an unregulated manner. This system is also designed to utilize SDF ----- “SDF Personnel” Who Carry out Their Missions Only When **VOICE** the Need Arises The SDF Reserve Personnel System is a system supported by the understanding and cooperation provided not only by the Reserve Personnel themselves but also by the parties concerned such as companies employing them. During FY2015, the “SDF Reserve Personnel Cooperation Offi ces Display System” will be introduced in order to facilitate collaboration and cooperation with business offi ces that employ SDF Reserve Personnel. Below are comments from people who have registered as SDF Reserve Personnel with no previous experience of serving as SDF Personnel. H I attended my fi rst mobile training and visited a base of the U.S. Marine corps in Okinawa for a study tour. In Marine Corps Air Station Futenma I was shown the inside of an Osprey aircraft and received an explanation about it, which broadened my knowledge. In addition, I had an opportunity to exchange opinions regarding the Reserve Personnel Systems both in Japan and the U.S. as well as on the subject of balancing being a reserve personnel with my work, and I was impressed by the professionalism of the Reserve Personnel of the U.S Marines regarding national defense. SDF Okayama Provincial Cooperation Off ce Reserve Master Sergeant Ikuko Kamimoto, Trade Administration Interpreter and Translator H I was employed as an SDF Reserve Personnel Candidate in the second batch of personnel belonging to the “Technical” category. I joined Camp Takeyama and the fi rst words I received were “Your status outside of the SDF has no bearing here.” Over time I gradually began to realize how much sense that made and completed education in Takeyama. Even now, when I think about taking things a little easy, I think of what my leader would say if he saw me doing this. Currently, I work at Camp Narashino as a commissioned doctor. Going forward, I will continue to keep in mind the importance of one’s rank and improve my profi ciency by taking part in many different training sessions. SDF Chiba Provincial Cooperation Off ce Reserve Lieutenant Colonel Masatoshi Sassa, Medical Doctor Defense Ministry Professional Civilian Off cials run by the MOD. After participating in the common training course, civilian personnel recruited in this process undertake a wide range of work. Administrative off cials are engaged in policy planning in the Internal Bureau, and analysis and research at the Defense Intelligence Headquarters as well as a variety of administrative work (general affairs, personnel affairs, budget, public relations, military facilities-related activities, etc.) at the SDF bases, the Regional Defense Bureaus, and other locations throughout the country. Technical and engineering off cials are engaged in constructing various defense facilities (headquarters, runways, magazines, etc.), carrying out R&D, as well as effective procurement, maintenance and improvement of a range of equipment, and providing mental health care for SDF personnel at the Internal Bureau, Technical Research and Development Institute, and Equipment Procurement and Construction Off ce, as well as at the SDF bases, the Regional Defense Bureaus, and other locations throughout the country. Instructors conduct advanced research on defenserelated issues and provide high-quality education to SDF personnel at the National Institute for Defense Studies, the National Defense Academy, the National Defense Medical College, and other organizations. See Reference 45 (Breakdown of Ministry of Defense personnel) **2** **Daily Education and Training** duties, in order to nurture the necessary qualities and instill knowledge and skills. A considerable level of effort in terms of personnel, time, and funding, such as securing instructors with special skills, and improving equipment and educational facilities, is necessary in order to provide education. In the event that personnel need to further improve their professional **1** **Education of Uniformed SDF Personnel** Enhancing the ability of the individual uniformed SDF personnel who comprise SDF units is essential to the execution of the units’ duties. At its schools and training units, therefore, the SDF provides opportunities for systematic and phased education according to rank and ----- knowledge and skills, or where it is diff cult for them to acquire such knowledge and skills within the SDF, the MOD and the SDF commission external educational institutions[4], including those abroad, as well as domestic companies or research institutes to provide such education to SDF personnel. and to better respond to various situations, efforts are being made to expand the scope of bilateral and multinational exercises engaged by the individual SDF services[5]. **(2) Training Environment** SDF training has been planned and conducted under conditions that are as close as possible to actual combat situations, yet many restrictions remain. Therefore, the SDF makes maximum use of its limited domestic training areas, including further use of the prime training environment of Hokkaido stated in the National Defense Program Guidelines (NDPG) and other guidelines. They also strive to carry out more practical combat training by conducting joint exercises and other training and exercises in the United States and surrounding sea and airspace where they can secure training conditions not available in Japan See Reference 49 (Results of Firing Training and Related Training by Dispatch of Each of the Self-Defense Forces to the United States (FY2014)) **2** **SDF Training** **(1) Training by Each SDF** Training conducted by units in each service can be broadly divided into training for individual SDF personnel to improve the necessary prof ciency for their respective f elds, and training for units to enhance their systematic capabilities. Training for individuals is conducted oneon-one in stages based on occupational classif cation and individual ability. Training for units is conducted by size of unit, from small to large; meanwhile, large-scale comprehensive training including coordination between units is also conducted. See Reference 48 (Major Exercises Conducted in FY2014) In addition to such training for national defense, enhanced training is given in response to the diversif ed roles required of the SDF in recent years, such as peacekeeping operations and large-scale disaster relief operations. Moreover, in order to strengthen joint operational capabilities **3** **Safety Management Initiatives** Any accidents that cause injury to the public, damage to its property, or the loss of life of SDF personnel, must be avoided at all costs. Therefore, during routine training, the MOD and SDF make a united effort to ensure the constant management of safety through the utmost mindfulness of ensuring safety. **3** **Promotion of the Careers of Female Personnel** having to quit their job, and to further expand the range of activities available to them. The MOD and the SDF also promote the active participation of female uniformed SDF personnel with the motivation and the ability. For example, since December 1, 2014, a female uniformed SDF personnel has been sent to NATO Headquarters as the adviser to NATO Special Representative for Women, Peace and Security for approximately two years. On January 28, 2015, the MOD formulated the “Action Plan for Promoting the Active Participation of Female Employees and Work-Life Balance,” which incorporated three reforms—“Working style reform,” “Reform to realize a successful career with a balanced life between childrearing and nursing, etc.,” and “Reform for promoting successful female personnel”—in order to promote the work-life balance of the personnel in a unif ed manner whilst promoting further recruitment and promotion of female personnel. Along with these initiatives, with regard to the recruitment and promotion of female personnel, the MOD is also planning to actively work for the promotion of successful female personnel by setting up specif c goals. **1** **Specifi c Initiatives** The MOD and the SDF open their doors wide not only to men but to women to fulf ll their duties. As of the end of March 2015, the number of female personnel is about 13,000 (about 5.6% of total uniformed SDF personnel). Compared with ten years ago (end of March 2005, at around 4.6% of total uniformed SDF personnel), this is a rise of 1.0 percentage points, indicating that the ratio of female personnel has been on an increasing trend in recent years. While there are still limitations to certain assignments, due to the requirement for protecting motherhood and securing privacy (excluded from assignment to tanks, submarines, f ghters, etc.), female uniformed SDF personnel engage in boarding escort vessels and piloting antisubmarine patrol aircraft and transport aircraft, and their roles are expanding even at the nucleus of the SDF, such as the staff off ces and headquarters. In order to continue the further expansion of recruitment and promotion of female uniformed SDF personnel, the MOD and the SDF call for the consideration and implementation of various measures to allow female uniformed SDF personnel to lead a balanced life between work and family without Such external educational institutions in FY2015 include the Tokyo Institute of Technology and Waseda University in Japan, and the National Defense University (United States) overseas. Training includes SDF Joint Exercises, Japan-U.S. Bilateral Joint Exercises, and Ballistic Missile Response training which are to prevent and repel direct threats to Japan. Other training includes International Peace Cooperation Exercises that assumes SDF’s international peace cooperation activities and Joint International Humanitarian Operation Training, in which the handling of prisoners is ----- **(1) Female Administrative Offi cials, and Others** As a goal to be achieved from FY2016 onwards, women should account for 30% of newly hired staff at the MOD. Regarding furthering the careers of women, as a goal to be achieved by the end of FY2015, the proportion of women reaching the Division-Director level at local organizations and Assistant-Division-Director or equivalent level at the ministry proper should be over 2.8%, and the proportion of women serving at the Division-Director level or equivalent level at the ministry proper should be 1.2%. **(2) Female SDF Personnel** The goal, by the end of FY2015, is to increase the proportion of women among newly hired staff from the current 7.6%. As for FY2016 and beyond, based on the uniqueness of the career and recruitment environment going forward, necessary measures for active recruitment will be formulated by the end of FY2015. In addition, with regard to the goal of furthering women’s careers to be realized by the end of FY2015, the proportion of women accounting for uniformed SDF personnel with a rank of f eld off cer or higher is planned to increase from the current 2.8%. See Appendix 5 (Trends in Incumbent Female SDF Personnel) Female uniformed personnel serving in the GSDF, MSDF and ASDF **2** **Expansion of the Recruitment and Promotion of** **Female Personnel** With regard to the promotion of active participation by female personnel, whilst taking into account the maintenance of strength as well as ability, aptitude and motivation of each individual, the MOD plans to actively expand the recruitment and promotion of female personnel by implementing initiatives aiming for the expansion of recruitment and systematic development of female personnel, career development support, and initiatives to raise the motivation of female personnel. **4** **Measures Aimed at Ensuring Effective Use of Human Resources** **1** **Measures for Personnel System Reform and for** **the Enhancement of Pay and Conditions** allotted number of the SDF personnel has been constantly reduced. On the other hand, there has been the need for further skilled and professional personnel in order to respond to the sophistication of equipment as well as With regard to the personnel structure of the SDF, the **VOICE** Successful Female SDF Personnel In light of the severe recruitment environment associated with the declining birth rate and the popularization of higher education, the maintenance and enhancement of the SDF’s strength, amid the diversifi cation and globalization of the duties of the MOD and the SDF, as well as based on the perspective of realizing a society in which both men and women can fully express their individuality and abilities, the MOD and the SDF promote effective utilization of human resources. Specifi cally, various initiatives that expand opportunities for women to be more active are being promoted, such as disaster relief dispatch, including responses to the Great East Japan Earthquake, international peace cooperation activities, and dispatch to international organizations. NATO Headquarters, Advisor to the NATO Secretary General’s Special Representative for Women, Peace and Security Lieutenant Colonel Chizu Kurita Since December 2014, I have been serving at the NATO Headquarters and have been learning a great deal about their mission everyday. NATO is implementing advanced initiatives in the fi elds of women, peace and security, as well as gender, and women account for approximately 10% of the military personnel in the member states of NATO. “No Women, No Peace” is a slogan I have with my colleagues. Going forward, I intend to make great efforts to bring most of the knowledge and experiences I have acquired through this experience back to Japanese society, while contributing to the development of Japan-NATO cooperation. - Details of Lieutenant Colonel Kurita’s activities are available on “Chizu’s room” on the website of the The Special Representative, colleagues and the author (second from Embassy of Japan in Belgium. (http://www.be.emb-japan.go.jp/japanese/) the left) in front of the main entrance to NATO. ----- diversif cation and internationalization of SDF missions. The MOD will employ measures for personnel system reform as stipulated in the NDPG and other programs in order to ensure an appropriate age distribution, taking into account the various missions and characteristics of each branch of the SDF. Specif cally, the MOD will implement the following measures: the retirement age of 60 will be reviewed; an early retirement system will be proactively employed; more suitable personnel management will be implemented; and the re-employment of aircraft pilots in the private sector will be mediated. Furthermore, f nal promotion rates of off cers, warrant off cers, sergeants and petty off cers will be reviewed, and in order to maintain the strength of the SDF, more appropriate personnel management, which takes into account physical attributes, will be employed. Within the Ground, Marine, and Air SDF etc., serving as senior sergeant, petty off cers or other similar positions, veteran warrant off cers, sergeants and petty off cers who possess a superior sense of responsibility, knowledge, skills, and leadership will be assigned the role of managing uniformed SDF personnel of warrant off cer, sergeant, or petty off cer rank. By doing so and based on the characteristics of each of the Ground, Marine, and Air SDF etc., the MOD and the SDF are striving to activate uniformed SDF personnel of warrant off cer, sergeant or petty off cer rank by, for example, promoting support for the leadership of commanders, maintenance of discipline among the units, and raising the morale of personnel. Furthermore, due to the harsh environmental circumstances under which uniformed SDF personnel have to perform their duties, the MOD and the SDF strive to provide salaries, allowances, welfare and other benef ts that ref ect the special nature of their duties in order to instill uniformed SDF personnel with pride and allow them to concentrate on their duties without anxiety. The MOD and the SDF will also promote measures relating to awards and honors, beginning with the expansion of the system of Defense Meritorious Badges. within the SDF. So far, internal crèche facilities have been opened at f ve locations including one in the JGSDF Asaka dormitory district that was opened in April 2015 (JGSDF Camp Mishuku, JGSDF Camp Kumamoto, the JMSDF Yokosuka Naval Base district, JGSDF Camp Makomanai, and the JGSDF Asaka dormitory district). In addition, the required conditions are being enhanced on an ongoing basis, to facilitate the temporary care of children when personnel must suddenly attend to duties, such as when dispatched to a disaster area. **3** **Initiatives to Support Families** Measures such as exchanges between units and personnel’s families, as well as between families are pursued as routine initiatives. Furthermore, specif c welfare services for SDF personnel who will be deployed overseas include facilitating direct communication between SDF personnel on deployment and their families in Japan by means such as e-mail and video conference systems. In addition, support for sending comfort items from their families on a later day is also provided. Moreover, brief ng sessions for families of the dispatched personnel are held to provide them with a variety of information, and family support centers and similar facilities have been established to respond to various questions and concerns raised by the families. **4** **Discipline-related Initiatives** The MOD and the SDF strive to foster well-disciplined personnel by distributing the “discipline reference material,” which explains the gist of instructing subordinates. Moreover, by setting up such campaign periods as the “Anti-Drug Abuse Month,” the “Self-Defense Forces Personnel Ethics Week,” and “Self-Defense Personnel Sexual Harassment Prevention Week,” the MOD and the SDF are making efforts to instill in personnel an awareness of compliance with the law. **5** **Initiatives towards the Prevention of Bullying and** **Other Similar Incidents within the Ministry of Defense** **2** **Promotion of Measures to Support Child-Raising** Based on the “Action Plan for Promoting the Active Participation of Female Employees and Work-Life Balance at the MOD” formulated in January 2015 and the “Action Plan to Support a Good Work-family Balance of the Personnel of the MOD” (FY2015-FY2020) formulated in March 2015, the MOD currently implements measures aimed at encouraging its personnel to use the system, which supports them in their efforts to balance work with family, by creating a “Work-Family Balance Handbook,” holding lectures to educate them and so on, in order to make the MOD a workplace where both male and female personnel with time constraints due to child rearing and nursing of the elderly can play an active role. Internal crèche facilities have been developed to respond to the need for special working arrangements Based on the fact that the defense of Japan, which is a mission of the SDF, will never be achieved without continuous trust and support from the people of Japan, the MOD recognizes that the prevention of bullying and similar incidents is extremely important from the perspective of promoting the maintenance of rigorous service disciplines. For this reason, the “Review Committee on the Prevention of Bullying within the Ministry of Defense” chaired by the Parliamentary Senior Vice-Minister of Defense was established on September 17, 2014, and the examination of valid measures with regard to the prevention of bullying is being undertaken. ----- their lives in the line of duty In the MOD and the SDF, funeral ceremonies are carried out by each unit to which the personnel who perished in the line of duty belonged, in order to express condolences. Moreover, in order to eternally recognize the achievements of the SDF personnel who perished in the line of duty, and to express deep honor and condolences, memorial ceremonies are carried out in various forms, such as the Memorial for SDF Members Killed in the Line of Duty conducted with the participation of the Prime Minister[6]. **8** **Dealing with Retirement and Outplacement of** **SDF Personnel** **6** **Initiatives to Prevent Suicide among SDF Personnel** While a record was set in FY2005, with 101 SDF personnel suicides, subsequent f gures have shown a decline, with 83 suicides in 2012, 82 suicides in 2013, and 69 suicides in 2014. The suicide of a member of the SDF is truly a great tragedy for both the persons who committed suicide and their bereaved families. It also represents a great loss to the MOD and the SDF in terms of the loss of capable personnel, and the MOD and the SDF are taking on-going measures to prevent suicides, including the following initiatives: (1) Expansion and enhancement of the counseling system (internal/external counselors, a 24-hour telephone counseling hotline, assignment of clinical psychotherapists at camps and bases, etc.); (2) Strengthening of education among commanders as well as enlightening education for enlisted personnel such as mental health education; (3) Establishment of a campaign period for enhancing mental health measures, close monitoring by commanders of the mental health condition of their subordinates whose environment has been changed due to personnel transfers, etc., and distribution of various reference materials. **7** **Commemorating Personnel Perished in the Line** **of Duty** In order to maintain the strength of the SDF, many uniformed SDF personnel retire by their mid-50s (personnel serving under the early retirement system) or their 20s (most uniformed SDF personnel serving under the f xed-term service system). Therefore, many of them need to f nd another job after retirement in order to secure their livelihoods. It is the responsibility of the Japanese government (the MOD) as the employer to support this re-employment. As this is of the utmost importance both for resolving any concerns that uniformed SDF personnel may have about their future, and for securing high-quality human resources, support measures such as occupational training is provided. The re-employment of retired uniformed SDF personnel is also important from the perspective of enabling them to serve society, making the best use of their various skills, thereby reinforcing human resources infrastructure. As the MOD does not have the authority to work as an employment agency, the SDF Personnel Support Association has permission from the Minister of Health, Labor and Welfare and the Minister of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism to provide free job consultations. Retired uniformed SDF personnel have excellent abilities in planning, leadership, faculty, cooperativeness and responsibility gained through work performance, education, and training. Furthermore, they also have various qualif cations and licenses acquired through their work and occupational training. For these reasons, they are making positive contributions in a broad range of sectors, including the manufacturing and service industries, as well as the f nance, insurance, real estate, and construction industries, in addition to the areas of disaster prevention and risk management at local governments. Going forward, based on the NDPG, the MOD will make an effort to improve the reemployment of retired uniformed SDF personnel by developing measures to increase incentives Since the establishment of the National Police Reserve in 1950 and through its evolution via the National Safety Force and the Coastal Safety Force into the SDF today, SDF personnel have been striving to accomplish the noble mission of protecting the peace and independence of Japan. They have accomplished this by devoting themselves unstintingly to training, day and night, to live up to the expectations and trust of the Japanese citizens, regardless of danger, and with a strong sense of responsibility. During this time, however, more than 1,850 personnel have lost Memorial service for SDF personnel who perished in the line of duty in FY2014 The Monument for SDF Personnel Who Perished in the Line of Duty was constructed in 1962 in Ichigaya. In 1998, the Memorial Zone in its current form was completed by combining this monument with other monuments located in the same area. A memorial ceremony for SDF personnel who perished in the line of duty is held annually by the MOD. This ceremony is attended by surviving family members of the honored dead, and also attended by the Prime Minister and high-ranking offi cials of the MOD and the SDF including the Minister of Defense, former Directors-General of the Defense Agency, and others. At the Monument for SDF Personnel Who Perished in the Line of Duty in the Memorial Zone, there is an iron plate containing the names and other information of personnel who perished in the line of duty. When foreign dignitaries such as Defense Ministers visit the MOD, they make offerings of fl owers, expressing their respect and condolences to personnel who perished in ----- for private companies to hire them, and by promoting their appointment to positions in the public sector further. With a view to creating an environment where uniformed SDF personnel can devote themselves to their duties without any worry, the MOD has a reappointment system that enables uniformed SDF personnel to be appointed for f xed terms of up to three years before the age of 60 (for SDF administration off cials and others, up to one year). The Mid-Term Defense Program (MTDP) states that, regarding SDF personnel who possess advanced knowledge, skills and experiences, the MOD will actively re-appoint these personnel if such an appointment is recognized to contribute to the enhancement of the comprehensive strength of the organization. See Reference 53 (Main Measures for Re-employment Support) **5** **Enhancement of Medical Functions** **1** **Opening of a Four-year Nursing Course at** **the National Defense Medical College** Meanwhile, reemployment of SDF personnel is regulated[7] in order to ensure public service impartiality. When SDF personnel become employed at private companies within two years of retirement, and if that company had a contract with the MOD within f ve years before that SDF member’s retirement, the approval of the Minister of Defense or other delegated authority must be sought in accordance with the regulation. In 2014, the MOD approved 81 cases (81 individuals) of reemployment individually. As a part of the government-wide Reform of National Public Off cers’ Systems, the MOD will introduce new re-employment regulations[8] in accordance with the examples of civilian government employees as early as autumn 2015. is caused by medical off cers leaving the SDF, one of the major reasons of which is the lack of opportunity to engage in training and medical practice. The MOD and the SDF will make efforts to implement various measures to prevent medical off cers from leaving the SDF by providing them with more opportunities to engage in training and medical practice as well as increasing motivation for their work. Furthermore, in light of the MTDP, the training system for nurses will be strengthened, and efforts made to ensure the availability of staff possessing high-level skills. Aiming to train high-quality nurses who are capable of fully responding to the diversif cation of duties and the sophistication of medical technology, a four-year “nursing program” was established for the training of public health/ registered nurses at the Division of Nursing, School of Medicine, National Defense Medical College, in April 2014. The nursing program consists of two courses: one for fostering nurses who will be SDF off cers, and the other for fostering nurses who will be technical off cials requiring high-level medical skills. Administrative Vice-Minister of Defense Nishi addressing the enrollment ceremony of the National Defense Medical College **3** **SDF Hospitals as Hub Hospitals with Enhanced** **Functions** SDF hospitals play the role of hospitals that are to admit SDF personnel injured while in service in response to various emergency events, and in normal circumstances, these hospitals are required to play a role in providing medical treatment and also educating medical staff. For this reason, based on the NDPG and the MTDP, SDF hospitals will be centralized and their performance levels increased, making an active contribution to local medical care, in order to establish a high-quality medical care system. The MOD will conduct required examinations of the aid capabilities on the front line when responding to contingencies, including aspects of the system, as well as promoting the improvement of the arrangements for prompt onward transfer of patients. In addition, the functioning of the National Defense Medical College will be strengthened to make it a center of training and research for defense medicine, with features not available in general medical schools. **2** **Enhancement of Education of Medical Offi cers** **and Nurses** The f ll rate of SDF medical personnel is currently low, particularly for mid-level personnel. Such low suff ciency “Seclusion from private companies” is stipulated in Article 62 of the SDF Act Under the new system, the following points among others will be regulated: 1. Requests regarding re-employment of other personnel and provision of information (mediation); 2. Seeking re-employment ----- **Chapter** **Measures on Defense Equipment** ##### 2 **Section 1 The Current Status of Defense Production and** **Technological Bases, and the Strategy on Defense** **Production and Technological Bases** **1** **The Current Status of Japan’s Defense Production and Technological Bases** The term “defense production and technological bases” refers to the human, physical and technological bases for development, production, operation, sustainment and maintenance, remodeling, and refurbishment of defense equipment required for MOD and SDF activities. As Japan has no national arsenal (state-owned munitions factory), most of the technological base is covered by companies that manufacture defense equipment and associated items (the defense industry). Therefore, a broad range of companies in the defense industry[1], which are equipped with specialized and advanced skills and facilities are involved in the “defense production and technological bases.” On the other hand, the advances in recent defense equipment have raised per unit cost and maintenance/ Fig. III-2-1-1 Current Status of the Unit Price and the Acquisition Quantity of Defense Equipment Status of Procurement: Unit Price sustainment costs, which has caused a decrease in the number of units procured. In addition, despite the trend in increasing research and development costs, the ratio of research and development expenditure to defense-related expenditure has leveled off. Furthermore, Japan’s defense production and technological bases also face challenges in retaining and passing on skills and techniques, and some companies, which cannot cope with the reduced number of units being procured, have pulled out of the defense business. There has also been exposure to changes in the international security environment such as the realignment of the European/US defense industries and advances in international joint development and production projects. Amidst these situations, there are new changes emerging Type-74 Tank: Approximately 0.39 billion yen (contracted in FY1989) **(2.5 times increase)** Type-10 Tank: Approximately 1 billion yen (contracted in FY2014) Status of Procurement: Quantity Trend in the annual average procurement quantity of the main vehicles (Data shown for the period prior to FY2012 is the annual average for each period) Number of vehicles 120 Harushio type: Approximately 38.6 billion yen (contracted in FY1991) **(1.35 times increase)** Soryu type: Approximately 52.1 billion yen (contracted in FY2014) Trend in the annual average procurement quantity of the main vessels (Data shown for the period prior to FY2012 is the annual average for each period) Number of vessels F-4EJ: Approximately 3.8 billion yen (contracted in FY1977) **(4.2 times increase)** F-35A: Approximately 15.9 billion yen (contracted in FY2014) Trend in the annual average procurement quantity of the main aircraft (Data shown for the period prior to FY2012 is the annual average for each period) Number of aircraft 100 80 80 60 60 40 40 20 20 |99|Col2| |---|---| ||Rotary-wing aircraft Fixed-wing aircraft| |47 Fighter aircraft|Fighter aircraft| |56 42.6 29|| |31 31 22 19.4 18|| |18 16 21 14.8 8 9 9 5.8 10.8 0.8 6 2 45|| FY1983– FY1993– FY2003– FY2008– FY2013 FY2014 FY1992 FY2002 FY2007 FY2012 |110 16|Self-propelled guns| |---|---| ||Armored vehicles Tanks| |47|| |54 6 41.6|| |7.6 35.6 32 30 7.4 6 27 47 21.2 6|| |17 12 8 18 12.8 11.2 14 13|| |5|Minesweepers| |---|---| ||Submarines Destroyers| |2 3.8 1.4 3 3|| |2.6 1 2.4 1 1 0.8 0.6|| |1 1 1 1 0.8|| |2 1.4 1 1 1 0.8|| FY1983– FY1993– FY2003– FY2008– FY2013 FY2014 FY1992 FY2002 FY2007 FY2012 FY1983– FY1993– FY2003– FY2008– FY2013 FY2014 FY1992 FY2002 FY2007 FY2012 ----- Fig. III-2-1-2 Trends in the Maintenance and Upgrade Expenditures for Equipment, etc. (100 million yen) (100 million yen) 11,000 9,000 48,000 45,000 7,000 5,000 42,000 39,000 Maintenance and upgrade expenditures for equipment etc. (100 million yen) **49,414** **49,201** **49,388** **49,265** Defense related expenditures (100 million yen) **48,455** **49,290** **49,218** **49,395** **48,301** **48,221** **48,764** **47,818** **46,406** **46,835** **47,236** **47,906** **47,426** **47,028** **46,625** **47,838** **46,826** **46,804** **46,453** **45,518** **43,860** **8,237** **8,211** **8,285** **7,755** **7,923** **7,803** **7,786** **7,562** **7,575** **7,479** **7,180** **6,972** **6,794** **6,790** **6,837** **6,829** **41,593** **6,600** **6,642** **6,610** **6,372** **6,477** **6,184** **5,737** **5,339** **39,198** **4,908** **4,769** **4,400** FY1989 FY1990 FY1991 FY1992 FY1993 FY1994 FY1995 FY1996 FY1997 FY1998 FY1999 FY2000 FY2001 FY2002 FY2003 FY2004 FY2005 FY2006 FY2007 FY2008 FY2009 FY2010 FY2011 FY2012 FY2013 FY2014 FY2015 Note: “Maintenance and upgrade expenditure” refers to the budget for repair costs for equipment, consumable goods costs, and service costs (repair costs exclude those repair costs for the extension of vessel life and modernization of aircraft). Fig. III-2-1-3 Current Status of Research & Development Expenditure **Defense R&D Expenditure of Major Countries (FY2013)** **Percentage of R&D Expenditure out of Defense Expenditure of** **Major Countries(FY2013)** (100 million yen) (%) - FY2012 ** FY2011 - FY2012 ** FY2011 **11.80** 8,000 6,000 10 **8.72**** 4,000 2,000 **4.98*** **3.19** **2.74** **2.14** **3.51*** **65,876** **2,063**** **1,667*** **1,512** **1,043** **1,125** **225*** USA UK France ROK Sweden Germany Japan USA UK France ROK Sweden Germany Japan Source: “OECD:Main Science and Technology Indicators” “THE MILITARY BALANCE 2014” in the framework, such as the overseas transfer of defense equipment and technology based on the Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology which was approved by the Cabinet in April 2014. See Fig. III-2-1-1 (Current Status of the Unit Price and the Acquisition Quantity of Defense Equipment) **2** **Defense Production and Technological Bases Strategy** **1** **Context of Formulation of Strategy on Defense** **Production and Technological Bases, etc.** See Fig. III-2-1-2 (Trends in the Maintenance and Upgrade Expenditures for Equipment, etc.) See Fig. III-2-1-3 (Current Status of Research & Development Expenditure) See Part I, Chapter 2, Section 6-2 (Trends Concerning Defense Production See See and Technological Bases) See Part II, Chapter 2, Section 4 (Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology) and technological bases, which are important and essential elements supporting Japan’s defense capability, the “Strategy on Defense Production and Technological Bases” was adopted in June 2014. The Strategy responded to the National Security Strategy and the National Defense In light of the current situation, for the purpose of maintaining and strengthening Japan’s defense production ----- Program Guidelines (NDPG), replacing “kokusankahoshin (guideline for domestic development/production).”[2] The Strategy identif es the targets for and signif cance of maintaining and strengthening defense production and technological bases, as well as basic viewpoints in promoting measures for a long-term public-private partnership and strengthening international competitiveness, basic concepts regarding methods of defense equipment acquisition, such as domestic development, international joint development and production, and import; improvement of contract systems; measures relating to research and development; measures for maintaining and strengthening defense production and technological bases, such as defense equipment and technological cooperation; and the current situation and future direction of defense equipment sectors. See Reference 14 (National Security Strategy) See Reference 15 (NATIONAL DEFENSE PROGRAM GUIDELINES for FY2014 See See and beyond) **(2) Goals and Signifi cance of Maintaining and** **Strengthening Defense Production and** **Technological Bases** The MOD intends to (1) ensure sovereignty of security, (2) potentially contribute to deterrence enhancement, and maintain and improve bargaining power, and eventually (3) contribute to the sophistication of the domestic industry in Japan driven by cutting-edge technology. **(3) Basic Stance for Promoting Measures** The MOD intends to promote necessary measures based on the following basic viewpoints: (1) establishing long-term partnership between the private and public sector; (2) strengthening international competitiveness; (3) ensuring consistency with effective and eff cient acquisition of defense equipment. **(4) Methods of Defense Procurement** Methods of defense procurement, such as (1) domestic development, (2) international joint development and production, (3) licensed domestic production, (4) utilization of commercially produced goods, and (5) imports, directly affect defense production and technological base. According to the characteristics of each type of defense equipment, it is necessary to select the acquisition method appropriately, including international joint development and production, the agile and f exible implementation of which became achievable based on the Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology. **2** **Composition of the Strategy** **(1) Context of Formulation of Strategy on Defense** **Production and Technological Bases** “The Strategy on Defense Production and Technological Bases” has made clear the following three points: (1) the context of the formulation of the strategy on defense production and technological bases and the historical positioning of this strategy; (2) characteristics of defense production and technological bases; (3) changes in the security environment surrounding defense production and technological bases. Fig. III-2-1-4 Policies for Maintaining and Strengthening Defense Production and Technological Bases **Policies for Maintaining and Strengthening Defense Production and Technological Bases** H Use of single-tendering contracts H Even longer-term contracts (integrated procurement for multiple fi scal years) Improvement of contract H Construction of a fl exible system for receiving orders, in joint venture (JV) and other formats systems, etc. H Increasing desire to lower purchasing prices and reduce business costs H Strengthening of project management throughout its life cycle H Establishment of a vision for research and development H Increasing the ability to examine technology, including cutting-edge technology relating to people’s livelihoods Policies relating to research H Strengthening collaboration with universities and research institutions and development H Using and collaboration with research and development programs, including dual-use technology H Funding for promising cutting-edge research for use in defense H Strengthening of collaboration with foreign parties H Deepening relationships with the United States regarding defense equipment and technology cooperation H Building new relationships in defense equipment and technology cooperation Defense equipment and H Contribution to international logistics support technological cooperation, etc. H Improve the foundations for defense equipment and technology cooperation H Promotion of adapting equipment to civilian use H Technology management and security H Promoting understanding of the necessity for defense operations and the defense industry Efforts relating to defense H Maintaining a robust supply chain industry organizations H Use of industrial organizations and contract systems Strengthening of systems in H Consideration of efforts such as unifi cation of departments associated with equipment acquisition, as a part of the MOD reform the Ministry of Defense H Consideration of the strengthening of inspection functions and the training of human resources in project management and procurement Promotion of policies in collaboration with other H Consideration of support measures through the use of policies of other ministries relevant ministries ----- **(5) Measures for Maintaining and Strengthening** **Defense Production and Technological Bases** Considering Japan’s severe f scal condition, MOD will promote the following; (1) improvement of the contract system; (2) efforts regarding research and development; (3) defense equipment and technology cooperation; (4) efforts regarding defense industry organization; (5) strengthening of MOD’s structure; and (6) collaborative measures with other relevant ministries. See Fig. III-2-1-4 (Policies for Maintaining and Strengthening Defense Production and Technological Bases) **(6) Course of Action for Each Area of Defense Equipment** In deciding the MOD’s principle regarding defense production and technological bases of the main defense equipment sectors (such as land equipment, supplies, etc., ships, aircraft, explosives, guided weapons, communications electronics and command control systems, unmanned equipment, cyber and space systems) the MOD will take the following f ow: Based on the matters emphasized in strengthening the architecture of the Self-Defense Forces which is indicated in the NDPG, point out the future direction of the maintenance and strengthening of defense production and technological bases in each respective f eld and state the acquisition plan for each type of defense equipment. By deciding on the principle, efforts will be made to increase predictability for the private sector side. See Fig. III-2-1-5 (Direction in the Various Defense Equipment Sectors (Outline)) |Dir Fig. III-2-1-5|rection in the Various Defense Equipment Sectors (Outline)| |---|---| |Ground equipment|H With regard to tanks and artillery, making use of its world-class level of strength in this area, the MOD will maintain its production and technological bases to the appropriate level. In addition, production and technological bases for mobile combat vehicles etc., will be built. H Through further promotion of standardization (categorization), effective and effi cient acquisition as well as the maintenance and strengthening of production and technology bases of wheeled vehicles will be implemented. H Regarding amphibious capabilities, aspects of Japan’s technological weakness will be reinforced as necessary, while defense equipment and technology cooperation that make use of our strengths will be promoted.| |Supplies, etc.|H Based on factors such as compatibility with the physical characteristics of the Japanese people, the relevant foundations will be maintained, thereby making it possible to continue the procurement of supplies from domestic companies H As for fi elds where Japan can excel, such as chemical protection equipment, adapting equipment for civilian use, and defense equipment and technology cooperation will be considered.| |Ships|H With regard to vessels, in order to enable the MOD to respond to the latest technology such as stealth capabilities, production and technological bases will be maintained and strengthened through the entry of multiple prime enterprises. H Consideration will be given to the bulk order of multiple escort ships with a standardized design. In doing so, a review of the format of contracts will also be considered, taking into account the effects of lowering prices. H Since the National Defense Program Guidelines state that the number of submarines will be increased to 22, the existing bases will be maintained and strengthened through continuous research and development for enhancing capabilities.| |Aircraft|H For the acquisition of F-35A aircraft, the MOD will make efforts to promote the participation of Japanese companies in production and to prepare for the commencement of the operation of a regional depot for F-35 aircraft in the Asia Pacifi c region. As for next-generation fi ghter aircraft, necessary measures including empirical research will be taken so as to maintain the option of the development of next-generation fi ghter aircraft including the possibility of international joint development of an aircraft to replace the F-2 when it is time to retire it. H With regard to transport aircraft and amphibian rescue aircraft, multifaceted use of the results of development such as the possibility of adaptation for civilian use, and defense equipment and technology cooperation will be promoted. For rotary-wing aircraft, keeping both the civilian and defense demand in mind, international joint development and production will be considered as an option based on the technologies cultivated through licensed domestic production and domestic development.| |Explosives|H A certain scale of procurement from domestic companies will continue to be made possible and bases, which ensure the necessary scale of explosives in various situations, will be maintained.| |Guided weapons|H In order to improve air defense performance, technological considerations regarding future SAMs will be pursued to further strengthen the relevant technological bases. A vision for research and development for the implementation of technological examinations of future guided weapons will be established including propulsion devices such as fi xed rocket motors and other technologies required to improve the performance of various types of guided weapons such as the extension of their launch range. H Regarding international joint development as one option, effi cient acquisition methods will be selected based also on the enhancement of interoperability with allied and friendly nations. H Along with the continuous promotion of SM-3 Block IIA Cooperative Development (SCD) between Japan and the United States, necessary measures for the transition to the production and deployment phases will be taken, considering the sustainment and enhancement of production and technological phases.| |Communications electronics and command control systems|H Research and development into cutting-edge technology for the bases required for defense will be implemented with priority, involving the improvement of the detection performance of fi xed warning and control radar systems as well as the simultaneous, parallel use of multiple sonar systems. At the same time, the technological bases will be maintained and strengthened by pursuing the applicability of cutting-edge civilian technology. H Because systems capable of responding to battles based around network data are necessary for future command control systems, civilian technological bases, which are progressing at a signifi cant pace, will be adopted to ensure a system replacement at the appropriate timing refl ecting the latest technological standards. H Defense equipment and technology cooperation, as well as civilian use of wireless software technology, radar technology, which uses high- output semiconductors, and other technologies will be promoted.| |Unmanned equipment|H In light of the trend towards defense technology such as future battle conditions, smarter technologies and networking, a vision for research and development will be established and proactive research will be implemented for the enhancement of technological bases in order to present a direction of unmanned equipment whilst taking the perspective of integrated operation into account. H Defense equipment and technological cooperation such as research collaboration with research institutions and joint research and development with other countries will be advanced in order to raise the level of Japan’s technological bases.| H While cooperating with the MOD’s initiatives to increase its capability to respond to cyber attacks and policies relating to the use of space Cyber and space systems development, from the perspective of the defense of Japan, the future outlook of defense production and technological bases, which will be required in the future will be discussed ----- **Section 2 Initiatives for Improving the Contract System and Other Related Matters** **1** **Improving the Contract System and other Related Matters** defense industries. For this reason, the 189th extraordinary session of the Diet saw the enactment of the “Special Measures Law Concerning the Term of Expenditure Based on the Obligatory Assurance of National Subsidization for Specif c Defense Procurement,” which stipulates changes to the upper limit of acts that incur national debt from 5 years in principle, as prescribed in the Public Finance Act, to 10 years for specif c equipment. As for the FY2015 budget, this includes the procurement cost for 20 f xedwing patrol aircraft (P-1) through a long-term contract based on this Act resulting in an expected cost reduction of approximately 41.7 billion yen. See Fig. III-2-2-1 (Image of Long-term Contracts and the Cost Reduction Effect) In addition, by realizing long-term multiple-year contracts through active utilization of the PFI Act[1] and the Public Service Reform Act[2], it is anticipated that the planned acquisition and execution of budgets through the standardization of investment amounts will be realized. It is also anticipated that the realization of long-term multiple-year contracts will give rise to such benef ts as cutting equipment procurement costs by reducing risks for those accepting orders and by promoting the entry of new suppliers. To that **1** **Long-term Contracts, etc.** The production of the equipment, ships and aircraft of the SDF requires a signif cant amount of time. Therefore, if a certain set amount is to be acquired by the integrated procurement method, in many cases a contract for more than f ve years is needed. With regard to the equipment etc., and services used by the SDF, economies of scale tend not to exist due to the following reasons: (1) the annual procurement quantity is small; (2) procurement is handled only by the MOD; (3) companies that provide such equipment etc., are limited. In addition, for companies, it is particularly diff cult to systematically move forward with their businesses with a high degree of predictability. In light of such unique characteristics of the equipment etc., and services that the SDF use, if long-term contracts are introduced, then stable procurement will become possible, leading to the realization of the systematic improvement of defense capability. At the same time, for companies, given that the procurement amount will be assured, the systematic use of personnel and equipment as well as cost reductions are made possible by the receiving of bulk orders. Furthermore, this will contribute to the prevention of subcontractors from withdrawing from the Fig. III-2-2-1 Image of Long-term Contracts and the Cost Reduction Effect |FY2016 FY2017 FY2018|FY2019|FY2020|FY2021| |---|---|---|---| |Delivery of five aircraft|||| ||Delivery of five aircraft||| |ion of a contract||Delivery of five aircraft|| ||||| |Conclusion of a contract|||Delivery of five aircraft| ||||| **Conclusion of a contract** (Image of a long-term contract) |FY2016 FY2017 FY2018|FY2019|FY2020|FY2021| |---|---|---|---| ||||Delivery of five aircraft| |Delivery of five aircraft|Delivery of five aircraft|Delivery of five aircraft|| [Cost reduction effect in comparison with previous contracts] (Comparison with a case in which five P-1 aircraft are procured annually from FY2015 to FY2018) |re procured annually Reduction of 381.3 billion yen approx. 41.7 billion yen|When 20 aircraft are procured in bulk Total of approx. 339.6 billion yen| |---|---| Reduction of approx. 41.7 billion yen realized due to long-term contracts with periods lasting over five fiscal years Act on Promotion of Private Finance Initiative ----- end, in regard to the project focused on the enhancement and operation of the X-band communications satellite, which makes use of the PFI Act, the MOD concluded the contract for the project in January 2013. Patrol aircraft P-1, which procurement method is bulk procurement based on a long-term contract in order to reduce the procurement cost incentives for the company. Therefore, the MOD will carry out a review of contract methods in which the cost reduction incentives for companies work more effectively, taking into consideration the perspective of realizing the eff cient procurement of defense equipment. Furthermore, the MOD will conduct independent estimates of more appropriate acquisition prices and, with the cooperation of companies, will also review the development of a cost database related to the acquisition of defense equipment, which is required in order to account for the validity of contract prices. The MOD will also examine the mechanism for discontinuing a project if the primary estimate and the results differ when proceeding with the project management. **3** **Strengthening of Project Management** **throughout Its Life Cycle** In order to ensure the performance of defense equipment required by the MOD and SDF with appropriate costs and without a delay in schedule throughout the life cycle of the equipment, a cross-functional Integrated Project Team (IPT) headed by a Project Manager (PM) has been established for the acquisition of primary defense equipment, and the development of a system in which projects can be managed in a unif ed way from conception to disposal is in progress. As a leading example, currently, in the project to develop a new multi-purpose helicopter (UH-X)[3], where a Parliamentary Vice-Minister is the group leader in charge of project management, this initiative is being promoted cross-organizationally by establishing an IPT under a neutral PM who does not have a stake in the development and also under a management system with enhanced objectivity and fairness[4]. This development project advances the development of SDF aircraft in parallel with the development of private aircraft, which are implemented jointly by domestic and overseas companies, and promotes the project under a system with enhanced project management function, such as aiming to realize a cost reduction through the standardization of the platform. **2** **Initiatives Aimed at Increasing the Effi ciency of Procurement, and Other Related Initiatives** incorporate approximately 153 billion yen of cost reduction in the FY2015 budget. Specif cally, the MOD has implemented the following measures: a bulk purchase, which seeks greater eff ciency by budgeting and entering into contracts for equipment, supplies and components based on the approach of consolidating the quantities required for several years into a single specif c f scal year; and integrated procurement, **2** **Decrease Procurement Cost and Improve** **Companies’ Incentives to Reduce Cost** With regard to the procurement of defense equipment, based on the special fact that there exists a variety of equipment without a market price, it is necessary to achieve both the reduction of procurement cost and improvement of companies’ incentives to reduce cost simultaneously. Thus, the MOD has been striving to achieve the reduction of procurement prices by requiring companies to return any excessive prof t after the execution of the contract, through cost audit contracts with a special provision stipulating that an audit of the actual costs incurred will be conducted and that the f nal amount paid will be established based on this (audit contracts incorporating a provision requiring the return of excessive prof t). Meanwhile, regarding the provision requiring the return of excessive prof t, it is also noted that particular conditions, such as the request that this be returned after the completion of the contract payment during the end of the f scal year, diminish the effectiveness of cost reduction **1** **Achieving Further Effi ciency in the Acquisition** **of Equipment** For the purpose of promoting acquisition reform, the MOD has continuously been holding meetings of the Comprehensive Acquisition Reform Committee since October 2007 and the Contractual Systems Study Groups since 2010, ref ecting acquisition eff ciency policies that As a successor of the GSDF helicopter UH-1J, this is the development of a new multi-purpose helicopter to be used for air operations in various situations and lifesaving activities in large-scale disasters. In order to undertake the development during the 2015 fi scal year, currently the process of selecting the developer is in progress. In order to ensure the adequacy of the formulation of a specifi cation and a request for proposal, efforts are being made to increase the transparency and clarity of the process by collecting information ----- which involves the consolidated implementation of budgets for equipment used across multiple different organizations, or for components that are common to different types of equipment. For example, in the FY2015 budget, the bulk purchase of Aegis-Equipped Destroyers will save approximately ¥35 billion on a contract base. In addition, the Ministry is striving to reduce development, acquisition and maintenance expenses through (1) procuring common equipment and supplies, (2) standardizing some components, and (3) development of product families, etc[5]. **2** **Effective and Efficient Maintenance and** **Replenishment** PBL will be newly introduced for the minesweeping /transport helicopter (MCH-101) and Construction Off ce, and an auditing division was established in the Internal Bureau, showing that the MOD is working toward strengthening its checking functions. However, because it was revealed that Mitsubishi Electric and four of its subsidiaries and aff liates, and Sumitomo Heavy Industries and its subsidiary[8] had engaged in overcharging, in December 2012, the MOD announced measures to prevent recurrence, centering on the strengthening of system investigation, the revision of penalties, and the establishment of guidelines concerning bidding suspensions. These measures to prevent recurrences seek to enhance and strengthen measures to alleviate the closed nature of those involved in defense production and increase transparency, as well as reviewing measures toward the impartial evaluation of the costs and risks borne by companies. In March 2013, the Investigative Committee on Cases of Overcharging, chaired by the Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Defense, began deliberations concerning the specif c ways to implement these measures, and some of these measures have entered into force since April of the same year. Furthermore, in June 2013, Sumitomo Heavy Industries reported to the Equipment Procurement and Construction Off ce that they had delivered “12.7-mm heavy machine guns” having falsif ed the results of product testing on them. The MOD is working to prevent recurrence, while at the same time implementing f ve months of bidding suspension measures against Sumitomo Heavy Industries. Having made every effort to securely ensure safety, the MOD has been endeavoring to achieve greater eff ciency by extending the interval between periodic maintenance checks of defense equipment. During FY2014, cost reductions have been achieved, for example, by extending the interval between the regular maintenance of P-3C maritime patrol aircraft (P-3C) from 48 to 60 months. In addition, the MOD embarks on the introduction of Performance Based Logistics (PBL)[6] from the perspective of improving the equipment availability ratio and longterm cost reductions. In FY2015, PBL contracts are due to be concluded on the aircraft maintenance of the MSDF minesweeper and transporter (MSH-101). **3** **Efforts to Increase Fairness and Transparency** The MOD aims to increase fairness and transparency in relation to the acquisition of equipment and materials, and has thus far implemented a variety of measures from the perspective of making contracts more appropriate and strengthening checking functions. Recently, as a part of the effort to make public procurement more appropriate across the whole government, the MOD has been working on a number of measures, including the introduction and expansion of a comprehensive evaluation bidding system[7], the increase of multiple-year contracts, making bidding procedures more eff cient, and reviews of single-tendering contracts. Alongside these measures, a deputy chief in charge of auditing was assigned at the Equipment Procurement Examples of each of these include, (1) small arms, vehicles, and chemical supplies in the GSDF, MSDF, and ASDF; (2) short-range surface-to-air missiles used by the GSDF and ASDF; and (3) anti-ship missiles used by all three branches of the SDF. PBL is a contract method that involves payment of compensation relative to the level of equipment performance achieved, in terms of availability ratio and stable stock. It has achieved positive outcomes upon application to the maintenance and servicing of equipment in Western countries. Unlike the automatic bid system, which focuses only on price, this is a system in which the successful bidder is determined on the basis of a comprehensive evaluation that includes both the price and other elements, which is used in cases in which it is appropriate to carry out such procedures as evaluating the technological elements. ----- **Section 3 Research and Development** **1** **Orientation for Research and Development of Equipment and Material** Based on changes in future combat modality in light of joint operations, as well as the trend in technology enabling smarter, more networked and more unmanned conditions, the MOD is in the process of formulating a medium-tolong-term roadmap for research and development called “Research and Development Vision,” covering items that could potentially become Japan’s important defense equipment in approximately 20 years. The “Research and **2** **Technical Research and Development Institute (TRDI) Initiatives** The TRDI conducts advanced research that corresponds to the needs of the Self-Defense Forces, including 1. improvement of air defense capability, 2. enhancement of intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities, and 3. unmanned equipment that can be used f exibly at times of various contingencies including largescale disasters. TRDI also makes proposals regarding highly promising technologies based on technology seeds, while adopting advanced technology for prototyping as well as testing and evaluation. Particularly for improving air defense capability, with regard to future f ghters, TRDI has been promoting strategic deliberations through research on f ghter engines with high thrust using cutting-edge materials technology and research concerning system integration utilizing a simulation environment in order to verify the technological feasibility of future f ghters, in addition to demonstrational research on high-mobility stealth f ghter “Advanced Technology Demonstrator (ATD-X).” This will enable the f ghterrelated technology to be compiled and advanced within Japan, and the development (including the possibility of international joint development) of f ghters to be taken into account as an option before the retirement of F-2 f ghters. The decision on the development will be made by FY2018 and necessary measures will be taken accordingly. To improve ISR capabilities, the MOD has launched demonstrational research in outer space by loading dual wavelength infrared sensors with superior detecting and discriminating capabilities developed by TRDI onto “advanced optical satellites,” which are currently being planned by the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology (MEXT) and the Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency (JAXA). TRDI also promotes research on unmanned equipment, high mobility powered suits and other equipment that can be used f exibly at times of various contingencies including large-scale disasters. Furthermore, from the perspective of joint operation, Development Vision” is intended to realize effective and eff cient research and development by presenting a farsighted concept of defense equipment and a roadmap for research and development designed to achieve the concept. The MOD also aims to increase predictability for industries, and promote stable and eff cient capital investment as well as staff assignment by off cially publishing the vision. TRDI has also been engaged in “operational verif cation research”[1] such as research on information sharing technology required for a joint data link system, which realizes high-speed and large-capacity data communication that responds to the enhancement of information capability among the three services of the SDF, as well as information diversif cation and complication, research on application of wireless secret communication function between the Ground, Maritime and Air Self-Defense Forces using softwaredef ned-radio technology, and other relevant research. Advanced Technology Demonstrator-X (ATD-X) under experimental research High-mobility powered suits under study (image) Research to prototype or design equipment with new functions for each of the Self-Defense Forces and other organizations. The performance of the equipment etc. is identifi ed while taking the users’ ----- **3** **Technological Cooperation with Domestic Institutions** TRDI and domestic research institutions, such as independent administrative agencies and universities have been proactively working on research collaborations and technological information exchanges in order to ensure that superior civilian technology is incorporated and eff cient research and development is conducted. As part of these initiatives, the MOD’s own funding program called “Innovative Science & Technology Initiative for Security” (competitive funding) was newly established in FY2015 to discover creative research conducted by the universities, research institutes and companies etc. that are noted for their application of defense equipment, and to nurture emerging research that is deemed promising. For strengthening the cooperation between industry, academia and government as well as promoting open innovations, the outcome of research cooperation with research institutions, including universities and the Innovative Science & Technology Initiative for Security Program, should be open to the public in principle. See Fig. III-2-3-1 (Image of the Innovative Science & Technology Initiative for Security Program (Competitive Funds)) Fig. III-2-3-1 Image of the Innovative Science & Technology Initiative for Security Program (Competitive Funds) Outline of the program Ministry of Defense Research institutes in Japan, etc. Presenting themes Universities and independent administrative agencies, etc. Proposing technological Creative and advanced solutions technologies Private companies Commissioning excellent research proposals Outcome (Dual-use technology) Utilization in the MOD’s future research and development Utilization in the civilian sector (contractors) International peace Defense of Japan Disaster relief cooperation activities Applying and utilizing outcome of basic research in the civilian sector **Section 4 Defense Equipment and Technology Cooperation** Based on the Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology, Japan promotes cooperation in defense equipment and technology with other countries in order to contribute to promoting the maintenance and enhancement of defense production and technological bases, as well as contributing to the promotion of peace and international cooperation. ----- **3** **Technological Cooperation with Domestic Institutions** TRDI and domestic research institutions, such as independent administrative agencies and universities have been proactively working on research collaborations and technological information exchanges in order to ensure that superior civilian technology is incorporated and eff cient research and development is conducted. As part of these initiatives, the MOD’s own funding program called “Innovative Science & Technology Initiative for Security” (competitive funding) was newly established in FY2015 to discover creative research conducted by the universities, research institutes and companies etc. that are noted for their application of defense equipment, and to nurture emerging research that is deemed promising. For strengthening the cooperation between industry, academia and government as well as promoting open innovations, the outcome of research cooperation with research institutions, including universities and the Innovative Science & Technology Initiative for Security Program, should be open to the public in principle. See Fig. III-2-3-1 (Image of the Innovative Science & Technology Initiative for Security Program (Competitive Funds)) Fig. III-2-3-1 Image of the Innovative Science & Technology Initiative for Security Program (Competitive Funds) Outline of the program Ministry of Defense Research institutes in Japan, etc. Presenting themes Universities and independent administrative agencies, etc. Proposing technological Creative and advanced solutions technologies Private companies Commissioning excellent research proposals Outcome (Dual-use technology) Utilization in the MOD’s future research and development Utilization in the civilian sector (contractors) International peace Defense of Japan Disaster relief cooperation activities Applying and utilizing outcome of basic research in the civilian sector **Section 4 Defense Equipment and Technology Cooperation** Based on the Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology, Japan promotes cooperation in defense equipment and technology with other countries in order to contribute to promoting the maintenance and enhancement of defense production and technological bases, as well as contributing to the promotion of peace and international cooperation. ----- **1** **Deepening Relationships with the United States regarding Defense Equipment and Technology Cooperation** In December 2014, with regard to regional Maintenance, Repair, Overhaul and Upgrade (MRO&U) Capability in the Asia-Pacif c region for F35s, the U.S. government announced the following decisions: (1) regional MRO&U capability for airframes will be provided to Japan and Australia with both capabilities required not later than early 2018[2]; (2) With regard to the regional MRO&U Capability for engines, initial capability will be provided by Australia by early 2018, with Japan providing additional capability within the next 3-5 years[3]. Utilizing the FACO facility for airframes and engines, and contributing to maintenance in the Asia-Pacif c region are signif cant from the perspectives of securing the operational support system for F-35A in Japan, maintaining the foundation of the domestic defense industry, strengthening the Japan-U.S. Alliance, and deepening equipment cooperation in the region. F-35A aircraft, the production of which involves the participation of Japanese industries (U.S. Air Force) **1** **Joint Research and Development, etc.** Since 1992, Japan has implemented 19 joint research projects and 1 joint development project with the United States. At present, 2 joint research projects (joint research on hybrid electric propulsion and another joint research on high-speed multi-hull vessel optimization) and 1 development project (Japan-U.S. joint development of an Advanced Ballistic Missile Interceptor) are underway. In addition, with regard to the transfer of Patriot (PAC-2) parts produced under license in Japan from Japan to the licenser in the United States, Japan aff rmed in July 2014 that this overseas transfer falls under the case which may be permitted, based on deliberations at the National Security Council. See Part II, Chapter 2, Section 4 (Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology) See Part III, Chapter 1, Section 1-3-2 (Missile Defense of the United States and Japan-U.S. BMD Technological Cooperation) See Reference 25 (Japan–U.S. Joint Research and Development Projects) **2** **Production, Maintenance and Upgrade of** **Common Equipment between Japan and the U.S.** **(1) Participation of Japanese Industry in the Production** **of the F-35A and the Establishment of Regional** **Maintenance, Repair, Overhaul and Upgrade** **(MRO&U) Capability** In December 2011, Japan selected the F-35A as the next-generation f ghter aircraft to succeed the F-4 f ghter aircraft. At the same time, the government decided to procure 42 aircraft from FY2012 onwards and to have Japanese industries participate in its production, aside from several f nished aircraft which shall be imported. In light of this decision, the Japanese government has been working to enable the involvement of Japanese industries in the manufacturing process in preparation for the F-35A acquisition from FY2013 onwards. Following discussions with related parties such as the U.S. government, the Japanese government has steadily expanded the range of production participation by Japanese industries including the Final Assembly and Check Out (FACO) for airframes and engines, the manufacture of engines and radar parts, and the Electro-Optical Distributed Aperture System (EODAS) parts[1]. It is important for Japanese industries to participate in the manufacturing process and to come into contact with cutting edge f ghter aircraft technology and knowledge in order to ensure safety and high operational availability, resulting in the safe and eff cient management of ASDF F-35As. **(2) Initiatives towards the Establishment of the Japan-** **U.S. Osprey Common Maintenance Base, etc.** As the Periodic Maintenance Inspection (PMI) of the U.S. Marine Corps Ospreys (24 aircraft) deployed at Futenma is scheduled to commence roughly in 2017, the U.S. Forces will determine a maintenance company for this purpose by public bidding. With regard to the Osprey (V-22)[4] to be introduced to the GSDF, the MOD recognizes the importance of establishing a common maintenance base for the U.S. Marine Corp aircraft within Japan from the following perspectives: 1. Smooth introduction of Ospreys to the GSDF; 2. Smooth and effective operation of the Japan-U.S. security arrangement; and 3. Enhanced eff ciency in maintenance. Based on this perspective, the MOD plans to allow Japanese companies to use the hangars at GSDF Camp Kisarazu for regular aircraft maintenance Electro-Optical Distributed Aperture System (EODAS), comprising six cutting edge electro-optical sensors per aircraft for 360 degree spherical situational awareness, missile detection and tracking. The regional MRO&U for airframes in Japan is scheduled to be located at Mitsubishi Heavy Industry Ltd. (Komaki-minami factory in Aichi Prefecture). The regional MRO&U for engines in Japan is scheduled to be located at IHI Corporation (Mizuho factory in Tokyo). GSDF will introduce 17 tilt-rotor aircraft (Osprey (V-22)) that can complement and strengthen the capabilities of transport helicopters (CH-47JA) in terms of cruising speed and range. Deployment is ----- of the U.S. Marine Corps Ospreys and also to implement the same camp. Under this plan, Japanese companies are the future aircraft maintenance of the GSDF Ospreys at participating in a U.S. Forces bid. **2** **Building New Defense Equipment and Technology Cooperation** **(1) Australia** With Australia, the Agreement between the Government of Japan and the Government of Australia concerning the Transfer of Defence Equipment and Technology was signed in July 2014. In addition, joint research in the f eld of marine hydrodynamics is scheduled to commence in FY2015. Meanwhile, at the Japan-Australia Defence Ministerial Meeting held in October of the same year, it was agreed to seek multifaceted defense equipment and technology cooperation, including the following: 1. exploration of potential cooperation opportunities in the F-35 program; 2. acquisition reform dialogue with the Defence Material Organisation of Australia; 3. at the request of the Australian side, building upon previous discussions, exploration of the possibility of Japanese cooperation in the Australian Future Submarine Program; 4. defense technology exchanges with the Defence Science and Technology Organisation of Australia (marine hydrodynamics f eld and exchanges among engineers and scientists); and 5. talks between defense industries in both countries. Furthermore, during the Japan-Australia Defense Ministerial telephone conference on May 6, 2015, the Australia side made a remark regarding the importance of developing Japan-Australia defense cooperation and the strategic importance of the Australian Future Submarine Program. Following this remark, based on Japan’s longstanding achievement and technological capabilities regarding a conventional submarine, the Australian side explained its intention to examine the possibility of jointly designing and building Australian future submarines with Japan. Then, the Australian government requested that Japan participate in the procedure of selecting Australian future submarines. In May 2015, responding to this request, in light of the importance of Japan-Australia defense cooperation, it was conf rmed that, with the participation of private companies, consultations with the Government of Australia would be commenced. In order to conduct these consultations, the transfer of technology information for feasibility research of the joint development and production of submarines was deliberated at the National Security Council, and it was aff rmed that this falls under the case in which the transfer of technology to overseas could be permitted. See Part II, Chapter 2, Section 4 (Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology) See Part III, Chapter 3, Section 1-4-1 (Japan-Australia Defense Cooperation and Exchanges) **1** **Defense Equipment and Technology Cooperation** **with Major European Countries, etc.** Defense equipment and technology cooperation with major European countries, which have competitive defense industries, will contribute to the strengthening of security and defense cooperation with these countries as well as the maintenance and strengthening of the defense production and technological base in Japan. Therefore, Japan will seek to establish and deepen relationships with these countries. **(1) United Kingdom** In July 2013, the governments of Japan and the United Kingdom concluded an intergovernmental framework agreement regarding joint development and other initiatives related to defense equipment etc[5]. In the same month, the two countries also started joint research on chemical and biological protection technology, marking the f rst time that Japan had engaged in such research with a country other than the United States. Also, in July 2014, information on seeker technology for joint research with the United Kingdom was determined by the National Security Council as a case where overseas transfer may be permitted. Responding to said decision, in November of the same year, a letter of arrangement was formulated in relation to Japan-U.K. joint research on the feasibility of a jointly developed new air-toair missile and the joint research was commenced. See Part III, Chapter 3, Section 1-4-7 (Japan-U.K. Defense Cooperation and Exchanges) **(2) France** Japan and France established a committee on cooperation in the f eld of defense equipment and a committee on export control in January 2014, and signed the JapanFrance Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology Agreement[6] in March 2015. See Part III, Chapter 3, Section 1-4-8 (Japan-France Defense Cooperation and Exchanges) **2** **Defense Equipment and Technology Cooperation, etc.,** **with Partner Countries in the Asia-Pacifi c Region** As partner countries in the Asia-Pacif c region have expressed their interest and expectation regarding defense equipment and technology cooperation with Japan, the MOD will proactively seek to build relationships with these countries. Offi cial name: Agreement Between the Government of Japan and the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland Concerning the Transfer of Arms and Military Technologies Necessary to Implement Joint Research, Development and Production of Defence Equipment and Other Related Items ----- **(2) India** With India, which has been considering the acquisition of amphibian search and rescue aircraft, the establishment of the Joint Working Group (JWG) to facilitate bilateral cooperation for the US-2 aircraft was decided during the Japan-India Summit Meeting held in May 2013. So far, three JWG meetings have been held in total in which the Japanese representatives provided information on the performance, overview of operations, production and assembly, and maintenance, etc. of the US-2, including the offer of an opportunity to experience a US-2 f ight and to visit the factory to the Indian delegation of the JWG. Furthermore, talks between the two countries are taking place to prepare the formulation of a roadmap for industryto-industry cooperation, including technology transfer and production within India. Also, in response to the JapanIndia Summit Meeting in September 2014, working-level meetings have been held in order to promote cooperation in defense equipment and technology. See Part III, Chapter 3, Section 1-4-3 (Japan-India Defense Cooperation and Exchanges) **(3) ASEAN[7] countries** Between the Association of South-East Asia Nations (ASEAN) and Japan, opinion exchanges are taking place regarding defense equipment and technology cooperation Japan and India are discussing how to engage in bilateral cooperation in relation to the US-2 amphibian rescue aircraft in non-traditional security sectors, such as humanitarian assistance, disaster relief and maritime security through the Japan-ASEAN Defense Vice-Ministerial Meetings and other occasions. Participating countries have expressed their expectation for Japan’s cooperation in effectively dealing with these issues. In September 2014, as part of the Seminar on Capacity Building in Maritime Security and Disaster Relief (hosted by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs), an event to introduce defense equipment, etc., by Japanese defense-related companies was held at the MOD. See Part III, Chapter 3, Section 1-2-3 (Japan–ASEAN Defense ViceMinisterial Forum) **3** **Adapting Defense Equipment for Civilian Use** In August 2010, the MOD compiled a set of guidelines for the development of a concrete system for converting aircraft to civilian use, while in 2011, it also developed the application procedure for private companies interested in civilian use. At present, technical data related to the civilian use of the US-2 amphibian rescue aircraft and the C-2 transport aircraft are being disclosed in response to requests from the implementing companies. The possibility of civilian use of equipment other than aircraft will be considered based on the needs of foreign countries and the intentions of the defense industry. **4** **Technology Control, etc.** control under the Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology. **1** **Technology Control** In promoting defense equipment and technology cooperation internationally, it is necessary to evaluate the sensitivity and strategic value of defense technology and dual-use technology and protect those technologies that should be protected as strengths of Japan. At the same time, it is necessary to strengthen the technology control functions by avoiding the risk of their conversion into weapons from the perspective of Japan’s security. As such, cooperation with the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry will be promoted, and efforts will be made to contribute to strict examination and appropriate **2** **Other** In December 2014, the “Committee on Challenges surrounding the Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology,” consisting of members that include external experts and others, was launched with the aim of reviewing the system for smoothly and appropriately advancing cooperation in defense equipment and technology for the security of Japan, as well as support measures for companies. ----- **Chapter** **Active Promotion of Security Cooperation** ##### 3 The international community today is facing an increasing number of challenges, which are extremely diff cult for one country to deal with on its own. Therefore, it is important to strengthen bilateral and multilateral security cooperation, as well as proactively engage in international peace cooperation activities, from the perspective of “proactive contribution to peace” based on the principle of international cooperation. In light of this situation, the National Defense Program Guidelines aims to continuously promote and enhance various initiatives related to capacity building, arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation in order to address global security issues, such as local conf icts, expansion and spread of international terrorism, failed states, and proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), while promoting cooperation with the allied countries and the related countries that share the security benef ts in peacetime. **Section 1 Defense Cooperation and Exchanges with Other Countries and Regions** **1** **Signifi cance and Evolution of Security Cooperation and Dialogue and Defense Cooperation and Exchange** In recent years, dialogues and exchanges with other countries have been deepened qualitatively and expanded quantitatively. In the security f eld, the following approaches are necessary: nurturing the habits of cooperation, and promoting practical and concrete cooperation for building regional order and establishing common norms and standards; eliminating the sense of confrontation and sense of caution in our neighboring countries and region in order to foster a collaborative and cooperative atmosphere with a future-oriented perspective; and actively promoting cooperation in bilateral and multilateral arenas. To that **2** **Initiatives under the Multilateral Security Framework and through Dialogue** **1** **Initiatives under the ASEAN Defense Ministers’** **Meeting-Plus (ADMM-Plus) Framework** end, the MOD and the SDF are promoting multi-layered security cooperation and dialogue, defense cooperation and exchange, as well as joint training and exercises, utilizing the limited resources effectively and eff ciently, and taking into account the characteristics of each country and region. See Reference 54 (Record of Major Multinational Security Dialogues (AsiaPacific Region, Last Five Years)), Reference 55 (Exchange Student Acceptance Record (Number of Newly Accepted Students in FY2014)) See Fig. III-3-1-1 (High-Level Visits (January 2014-May 2015)) Fig. III-3-1-2 (Security Dialogues and Defense Exchanges) Fig. III-3-1-3 (From Dialogues and Exchanges to Cooperation) Fig. III-3-1-4 (Image of Defense Cooperation and Exchanges) outside the ASEAN region. Thus, the establishment of the ADMM-Plus is highly signif cant from the perspective of encouraging the development and deepening of security and defense cooperation in the region, and the MOD and the SDF are providing active support for its initiatives. The ADMM-Plus is comprised of (1) ADSOMPlus (ASEAN Defence Senior Off cials’ Meeting Plus), (2) ADSOM-Plus Working Groups (ADSOM-Plus WG), and (3) Experts’ Working Groups (EWG). Japan and Singapore served as co-chairs of the EWG on Military Medicine until March 2014, and the participants in the meeting exchanged practical opinions on approaches to cooperation with each country in the f eld of military medicine at times of a major disaster. Furthermore, at meetings of the EWG on Maritime Security, Japan emphasized the importance of establishing shared customary “manners” by which all countries abide, The countries of ASEAN hold meetings such as the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF)[1], which serves as a security framework for the region, and the ASEAN Defense Ministers’ Meeting (ADMM), which is a ministerial level meeting between defense authorities in the ASEAN countries. In addition to these meetings, a decision was taken to establish the ASEAN Defense Ministers’ MeetingPlus (ADMM-Plus), which added eight new non-ASEAN countries[2] including Japan to the members, and the 1st ADMM-Plus was held in October 2010 in Hanoi, Vietnam. Until the establishment of the ADMM-Plus, there had been no off cial meeting for the region’s defense ministers in the Asia Pacif c region including the countries The ARF, a forum aimed at improving the security environment in the Asia-Pacifi c region through dialogue and cooperation on the political and security sectors, has been held since 1994. The ARF currently comprises the following 26 countries and 1 organization as member states, and holds various inter-governmental meetings on security that are attended by both foreign affairs offi cials and defense offi cials to exchange opinions on the regional situation and security areas that require a particular focus. The 26 countries consist of 10 ASEAN countries (Brunei Darussalam, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam, Cambodia (since 1995) and Myanmar (since 1996)), in addition to Japan, Australia, Canada, China and India (since 1996), New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, the Republic of Korea (ROK), Russia, the United States and Mongolia (since 1998), North Korea (since 2000), Pakistan (since 2004), Timor-Leste (since 2005), Bangladesh (since 2006), and Sri Lanka (since 2007), plus the European Union (EU). ----- Fig. III-3-1-1 High-Level Visits (January 2014-May 2015) |United Kingdom Finland|Canada Russia|Col3|United States|Col5| |---|---|---|---|---| |Minister of Defense January 2015 State Minister of Defence State Minister of Defense January 2015 February 2015 Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Defense Administrative Vice-MiM nia sy te 2 r 0 o1 f 4 D, eJ fu el ny s 2 e0 14 Belgium Chief of Staff, ASDF Febru Ja ur lyy 22 00 11 44 A dministrative Vice-Minister Fo ef bD re uf ae rn ys 2e 0 15 France Chief of Staff, Joint Staff March 2014 Minister of Defense January 2014 Bulgaria State Minister of Defense June 2014 Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Defense State Minister of Defence May 2015 July 2014 Chief of Staff, Joint Staff March 2014 Italy Minister of Defense May 2014 Administrative Vice-Minister of Defense February 2015 Chief of Staff, Joint Staff March 2014 Saudi Arabia Laos Chief of Staff, MSDF February 2014 Administrative Vice-Minister of Defense UAE Vice-Minister of Defense for InJa ten ru na ar ty io 2 n0 al1 4 Chief of Staff, MSDF February 2014 Affairs February 2015 South Sudan India M P ain rli is at mer e o nf tD are yfe Vn is ce e -MMa iny i s2 t0 e1 r 4 o, f J Da en Mu fea anr yy s e 22 00 11 55 M V Ai fci fn aei i-s rM ste ir n o isf t eD re ofe f n Ds ee f ense for InJa ten r Au n pa ar rt iy i lo 2 2n0 0a1 l 1 4 5 Sri Lanka Djibouti Chief of Staff, MSDF June 2014 Minister of Defense May 2014, January 2015 Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Defense|Chief of Staff, Joint Staff February 2014 Administrative Vice-Minister of Defense March 2014 Estonia V Ai fc fae i- rM s i nister of Defense for In Nte or vn ea mtio bn ea r l 2 014 State Minister of Defence May 2015 Chief of Staff, Joint Staff April 2014||Minister of Defense July 2014, April 2015 State Minister of Defence August 2014 Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Defense January 2014 Administrative Vice-Minister of Defense June 2014, March 2015 Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs August 2014, September 2014, November 2014, March 2015, April 2015 Chief of Staff, Joint Staff April 2014, June 2014, December 2014, May 2015 Chief of Staff, Joint Staff February 2014, April 2014, July 2014, October 2014 Chief of Staff, MSDF July 2014 Chief of Staff, ASDF March 2014, November 2014|| ||New Zealand Parliamentary Vice-Minister of D Chief of Staff, Joint Staff A Philippines Administrative Vice-Minister of D Ja Vietnam V Ai fc fae i- rM s inister of Defense for Int Me Thailand V A Ci f hc f iae ei- frM s o fin Sis tate ffr , o Af S D De Ff ense for In Jate nr u Mn aa art yyio 22n 00a 1l 1 55 Mongolia C C Ch h hi i ie e ef f f o o of f f S S St t ta a af f ff f f, , , AJ Mo SSi Dn D Ft F S taff Se Fp et be Chief of Staff, Joint Staff February 2014 Chief of Staff, Joint Staff June 2014 Singapore Malaysia Myanmar Minister of Defense May 2014, May 2015 China Minister of Defense M S At di an mti es in t Me isr i t no raif s ttD ie ve er f oe Vfn i cDs ee e - f Men inc ie s teN r o ov f e Dm eJ fb u ee l nyr s 2 2 e0 0 1 14 4 P Via cr eli -a Mm ie nn ist ta er ry oV fi c De e- fM enin si es t fe or r o Inf tD ere A nf pe arn ti is l o e 2 n 0 al1 4 C Rh eie pf u o bf lS icta f of, f M KS oD rF e a April 2014 V A Ci f hc f iae ei- frM s o fin Sis tate ffr , o Mf SD F De e Ff be rn us ae r yfo 2r 0 In 1t 5e||August 2014, Septem November 2014, March 2015, Chief of Staff, Joint Staff April 2014, June 2014, December 2014, Chief of Staff, Joint Staff February 2014, April 2014, July 2014, Oct Chief of Staff, MSDF Chief of Staff, ASDF March 2014, Nove|| |||||| ||||Brazil Parliamentary Vice-Minister of D efense Au April 2015|efense gust 2014| ||||ugust 2014 Australia Minister of Defense Parliamentary Vice-Minister of D n m rre a uu nf br aa ae c e rr tn h yy i ros 2222 ne 0000 a 11l 11 5454 C C CV A i f h h hc f i i iae e e ei- f f frM s o o f f fin S S SSis t t tea a at pe f f ftf f fr e, , o mJ J Mf o o b SD i in n e De t t r f S Se 2 n t t 0a as 1f fe f f 4 ,f o S Nr e oI pn O vtAt eece utr o , F|April 2014 efense April 2015 national ober 2014 gust 2014 mber 2014 mber 2014| |May 2015 Jordan Chief of Staff, Joint Staff May 2015 Uganda Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Defense Bahrain May 2015 Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Defence May 2015|||May 2015 Chief of Staff, ASDF March 2014, February 2015 April 2014 Indonesia ,r J Mn ua nat eyio 22n 00a 1l 1 45 P Aa dr mlia inm ise tn rata tir vy e V Vi ic ce e- -M Mi in ni is st te er r o of f D De A ef fpe ern nis l s e 2 e 0 14|| |South Africa Oman Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Defense August 2014 Chief of Staff, MSDF February 2014|April 2014 Affairs May 2015 Vice-Minister of Defense for International Chief of Staff, Joint Staff Affairs November 2014 May 2014, May 2015 Chief of Staff, Joint Staff May 2014 Chief of Staff, ASDF February 2014|Vice-Minister of Defense for International Brunei Darussalam Affairs October 2014, December 2014, February 2015 Chief of Staff, Joint Staff Nove|March 2014 Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs May 2015 mber 2014 Chief of Staff, ASDF June 2014|| |Classifi cation Type|Signifi cance|Outline| |---|---|---| |Improvin through Exchange between and nati Defense Ministers and interests high-level offi cials defense Paving t Regular consultation through between defense between offi cials to the e Bilateral between Contribu Exchange between mutual t units through In additi the und Exchange of students and the mutual t personn Deepeni Research exchanges both cou mainten|g and reinforcing mutual trust and cooperation frank exchanges of views on regional situations onal defense policies that are important common to both sides, as well as enhancing the following exchanges|• Dialogues and mutual visits between Japan’s Defense Minister and Defense Ministers from other countries • Dialogues and mutual visits between Japan’s Parliamentary Senior Vice-Minister for Defense; Parliamentary Vice-Minister for Defense; Administrative Vice-Minister of Defense; Chief of Joint Staff; GSDF, MSDF, ASDF Chiefs; and their counterparts in other countries| ||he way for high-level dialogues and exchanges continuous and direct exchanges of views national defense policy-makers, and contributing nhancement of mutual trust and cooperation related countries|• Consultations between Director-General-level offi cials, Deputy Director-General-level offi cials, and their counterparts • Dialogue between Japan’s Joint Staff, GSDF, MSDF, ASDF, and their counterparts in foreign countries| ||ting to the improvement and enhancement of rust and cooperation between related countries bilateral exercises and events for exchanges|• Personnel exchanges • Mutual visits to training squadrons aircraft, and bilateral exercises for search and rescue operations| ||on to the original educational purposes, deepenin erstanding of the other countries’ defense policies situation of their defense units, as well as building rust through the promotion of relatively long-term el, and establishing human networks|g • Mutual acceptance of students • Dispatch of students to overseas military-related organizations| ||ng mutual understanding between researchers of ntries through frank exchange of opinions for the ance and promotion of defense exchanges|Research exchanges between Japan’s National Institute for Defense Studies and military-related research organizations in other countries| |Deepeni situation Security dialogue countrie Multilateral Improvin Multilateral exercises of mutu and seminars exercise|ng mutual understanding on the recognition of s and on security perceptions among related s, and multilateral issues broadly|• Dialogues at the ADMM-Plus and ARF • Multilateral dialogues sponsored by the Ministry of Defense Japan • Multilateral dialogues sponsored by governments • Multilateral dialogues sponsored by private sectors| ||g skills and contributing to enhancement al trust and cooperation through multilateral s and seminars|• Personnel exchanges • Multilateral exercises and seminars related to disaster relief, minesweeping, and submarine rescue operations| Fig. III-3-1-2 Security Dialogues and Defense Exchanges ----- |Fig. III-|From Dialogues and Exchanges to Cooperation -3-1-3| |---|---| ||Cold War Inception Period Expanding and Deepening Period Era (1990s - early 2000s) (Early 2000s -)| |Bilateral|Partial and Substantial From “exchanges” to “cooperation” limited exchanges begin “exchanges” Promoting mutual Promoting mutual understanding and trust understanding and trust Carried over China, ROK, →Main focus on explaining defense Promoting specific security and defense cooperation in the region Western policies and on facilitating mutual Europe, etc. understanding Mainly non-traditional security (maritime security for disaster relief, counter-terrorism, etc.), and logistics support| |Trilateral|Framework for complementing bilateral/multilateral efforts (Japan-U.S.-Australia, Japan-U.S.-ROK)| |Multilateral|Beginning of multilateral From “dialogue” to “cooperation “dialogue” within the region (theconstruction of an intraregional order)” Development of ARF, etc. 1994 1997 2003 2005 2006 2009 2010 2011 2013 2014 ARF Disaster Terrorism/ EAS ADMM Maritime Security ADMM-Plus Implementation of disaster Implementation of ARF disaster Commencement of established Relief ISM Transnational established established ISM, established relief field exercise, DiREx relief field exercise, DiREx the second phase Crime ISM Non-proliferation (1) Humanitarian assistance/ ADMM-Plus humanitarian activities by each and disarmament ISM, Disaster relief assistance/disaster relief/ EWG, etc. Disaster relief field exercises (2) Maritime security military medicine field exercise Maritime security (3) Counterterrorism Holding the second ADMM-plus and Tabletop (4) Military medicine Establishing Humanitarian exercise (5) Peacekeeping operations Mine Action EWG Observation of anti- Foundation of Experts’ Working terrorism exercises Groups (EWG) in 5 fields by the Australian Main focus on fostering trust in the Reinforcement of security and defense cooperation Defence Force short term with the ultimate goal of resolving conflicts through specific and practical cooperation| Cold War Inception Period Expanding and Deepening Period Era (1990s - early 2000s) (Early 2000s -) **Partial and** **Substantial** **From “exchanges” to “cooperation”** **limited** **exchanges begin** **“exchanges”** Promoting mutual Promoting mutual understanding and trust understanding and trust Carriedover China, ROK, →Main focus on explaining defense Promoting specific security and defense cooperation in the region Western policies and on facilitating mutual Europe, etc. understanding Mainly non-traditional security (maritime security for disaster relief, counter-terrorism, etc.), and logistics support Framework for complementing bilateral/multilateral efforts (Japan-U.S.-Australia, Japan-U.S.-ROK) **Beginning of multilateral** **From “dialogue” to “cooperation** **“dialogue” within the region** **(theconstruction of an intraregional order)”** Development of ARF, etc. 1994 1997 2003 2005 2006 2009 2010 2011 2013 2014 ARF Disaster Terrorism/ EAS ADMM Maritime Security ADMM-Plus Implementation of disaster Implementation of ARF disaster Commencement of established Relief ISM Transnational established established ISM, established relief field exercise, DiREx relief field exercise, DiREx the second phase Crime ISM Non-proliferation (1) Humanitarian assistance/ ADMM-Plus humanitarian activities by each and disarmament ISM, Disaster relief assistance/disaster relief/ EWG, etc. Disaster relief field exercises (2) Maritime security military medicine field exercise Maritime security (3) Counterterrorism Holding the second ADMM-plus and Tabletop (4) Military medicine Establishing Humanitarian exercise (5) Peacekeeping operations Mine Action EWG Observation of anti Foundation of Experts’ Working terrorism exercises Groups (EWG) in 5 fields by the Australian Main focus on fostering trust in the Reinforcement of security and defense cooperation Defence Force short term with the ultimate goal of resolving conflicts through specific and practical cooperation |Fig. III-3-1|Image of Defense Cooperation and Exchanges 1-4| |---|---| |Level|Examples of Specific Initiatives| |Defense Exchange Defense Cooperation|H Overseas student exchanges, research exchanges H High-level and working-level exchanges between defense authorities and between forces H Unit-to-unit exchanges between forces, mutual visits by vessels and aircraft H Goodwill training H Memorandums of defense cooperation and exchanges H Capacity building assistance H Range of cooperation in non-traditional security (including joint training) [Ex.] • Field training exercises at the ADMM-Plus and ARF, joint search and rescue exercises • JPN-AUS Cooperation (Support from the Australian Army when the Great East Japan Earthquake occurred, cooperation in the missing Malaysian Airplane case, Japan-U.S.-Australia joint disaster relief exercises “Michinoku ALERT”, etc.) • Pacific Partnership, cooperation with countries and organizations in counter-piracy, etc. H Conclusion of various agreements related to defense cooperation (Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement, Information Security Agreement, Defense Equipment and Technology Transfer Agreement, etc.)| ||H Formulation of joint response plan H Joint exercises on the premise of joint response (Examples: Japan-U.S. Bilateral Joint Exercise, Japan-U.S. Bilateral Regional Army Command Post Exercises, Special Anti-Submarine Exercises, and Japan-U.S. Bilateral Fighter Combat Training) H Joint response in the event of Japan’s crisis| Defense H Overseas student exchanges, research exchanges Exchange H High-level and working-level exchanges between defense authorities and between forces H Unit-to-unit exchanges between forces, mutual visits by vessels and aircraft H Goodwill training H Memorandums of defense cooperation and exchanges H Capacity building assistance H Range of cooperation in non-traditional security (including joint training) [Ex.] • Field training exercises at the ADMM-Plus and ARF, joint search and rescue exercises Defense - JPN-AUS Cooperation (Support from the Australian Army when the Great East Japan Earthquake occurred, cooperation Cooperation in the missing Malaysian Airplane case, Japan-U.S.-Australia joint disaster relief exercises “Michinoku ALERT”, etc.) - Pacific Partnership, cooperation with countries and organizations in counter-piracy, etc. H Conclusion of various agreements related to defense cooperation (Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement, Information Security Agreement, Defense Equipment and Technology Transfer Agreement, etc.) H Formulation of joint response plan H Joint exercises on the premise of joint response (Examples: Japan-U.S. Bilateral Joint Exercise, Japan-U.S. Bilateral Regional Army Command Post Exercises, Special Anti-Submarine Exercises, and Japan-U.S. Bilateral Fighter Combat Training) H Joint response in the event of Japan’s crisis in order to avoid unintended collisions and the escalation of situations when warships and government vessels approach and encounter each other at sea. In June 2013, Japan participated in the f rst ADMMPlus f eld training exercise held in Brunei Darussalam organized by the EWG on Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief and the EWG on Military Medicine. In September 2013, Japan also participated in the tabletop exercise held in Indonesia, organized by the EWG on Counter Terrorism as well as the feld training exercise held in Australia, organized by the EWG on Maritime Security. Since April 2014 Japan has been serving as a co-chair with Laos of the EWG on Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief of the ADMM-Plus. In Tokyo and Laos in July and December of the same year, respectively, EWG meetings for experts from ADMM-Plus member states were held. They discussed issues to be tackled as well as plans for the next three years. See Fig. III-3-1-5 (Organizational Chart and Overview of the ASEAN Defense Ministers’ Meeting-Plus (ADMM-Plus)) ----- Organizational Chart and Overview of the ASEAN Fig. III-3-1-5 Defense Ministers’ Meeting-Plus (ADMM-Plus) MSDF personnel conducting medical activity training for a simulated patient during the ARF-DiREx **3** **Multilateral Security Dialogue Hosted by** **the MOD and the SDF** **ASEAN Defense Ministers’** **Meeting Plus (ADMM-Plus)** ASEAN + Australia, China, India, Japan, Republic of Korea, New Zealand, Russia, - Held once every two years United States - Ministerial level **ASEAN Defense Senior** **Officials’ Meeting Plus** **(ADSOM-Plus)** - Held annually - Vice-Minister and Director General level **Experts’ Working** **Group (EWG)** **ADSOM-Plus Working Group** - Held annually - Director level **(1) Japan-ASEAN Defense Ministers’ Roundtable Meeting** Based on the proposal by Prime Minister Abe at the ASEAN-Japan Commemorative Summit in December 2013, the Japan-ASEAN Defense Ministers’ Roundtable Meeting took place in Myanmar in November 2014. This roundtable, in which opinion exchanges were conducted regarding cooperation in non-traditional security areas such as humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, and maritime security, was a breakthrough opportunity, bringing together defense ministers from the relevant countries for the f rst time in the 40 years of friendship and cooperation between Japan and ASEAN, this marked an important f rst step towards strengthening defense cooperation in future. Overview of Experts’ Working Group (EWG) Establishing EWGs in the six specific regional security fields Co-chaired with non-ASEAN countries Promoting information sharing, workshops and seminars, and multinational joint training Submitting recommendations and reports EWG and Chair Nations (1) Humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (Laos and Japan) (2) Maritime security (Brunei Darussalam and New Zealand) (3) Military medicine (Thailand and Russia) (4) Counter-terrorism (Singapore and Australia) (5) Peacekeeping operations (Cambodia and ROK) (6) Humanitarian Mine Action (Vietnam and India) **2** **ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF)** In recent years, specif c initiatives[3] in non-traditional security areas such as disaster relief, maritime security, and peacekeeping and peace building have been actively implemented by the ARF. For example, in the maritime security f eld, an Inter-Sessional Meeting on Maritime Security (ISM-MS) has been held since 2009[4]. At the ISM-MS, Japan compiled a collection of best practices concerning support for capacity building in the f eld of maritime security was formulated on the basis of a summary compiled by Japan. In the f eld of disaster relief, the MOD and the SDF have dispatched SDF personnel and aircraft to participate in ARF Disaster Relief Exercises (ARF-DiREx) since 2009. In May 2015, ARF-DiREx 2015, the fourth such exercise, was held in Malaysia, with Japan sending around 10 personnel to participate. Then Minister of Defense Eto (sixth from right) at the fi rst Japan-ASEAN Defense Ministerial Roundtable Session In addition to Foreign Ministers’ meetings at the Foreign Minister level, the Senior Officials Meeting (SOM) and Inter-Sessional Meetings (ISM) are held each year, as well as meetings of the InterSessional Support Group on Confidence Building Measures and Preventive Diplomacy (ISG on CBM/PD) and the ARF Security Policy Conference (ASPC). Moreover, since the Foreign Ministers’ meeting in 2002, ARF Defense Officials’ Dialogues (DOD) is held ahead of the main meeting. ----- **(2) Tokyo Defense Forum etc.** As Japan’s own initiatives regarding security in the AsiaPacif c region, the MOD has held since 1996 the AsiaPacif c Defense Forum (Tokyo Defense Forum) with the participation of off cers in charge of defense policy (Directors General of defense ministries and Generalclass off cers) from the countries in the region. At the forum, defense policies of the participating countries and conf dence-building measures in the region are discussed. 24 countries from the Asia-Pacif c region, as well as the ASEAN Secretariat, the European Union (EU), the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), and the United Nations Off ce for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA) took part in the 19th forum in March 2015. At this forum, discussions took place on the topics of (1) Enhancing Maritime Security; and (2) Synergy among the Frameworks for Multilateral Cooperation. Since 2001, the MOD has invited key f gures who are primarily involved in security policy to Japan from countries in the Asia-Pacif c region, with the objective of promoting understanding of Japan’s security and defense policy as well as the current status of the SDF. **(3) Japan-ASEAN Defense Vice-Ministerial Forum** Since 2009, the MOD has annually held the Japan-ASEAN Defense Vice-Ministerial Forum, with the purpose of creating a foundation for strengthening multilateral and bilateral relationships through establishing human networks between Japanese and ASEAN vice-ministerial-level off cials. On the sidelines of the forum, the Ministry holds bilateral talks at the vice-ministerial level. The 6th meeting was held in Yokohama in October 2014, attended by the vice-ministerial level off cials from ASEAN member states and the ASEAN Secretariat. They exchanged opinions on the topics of (1) Promoting Maritime Defense Cooperation; and (2) Possible Maritime Cooperation – From the Perspective of Equipment and Technology Cooperation and Capacity Building. At the forum, the Administrative ViceMinister of Defense conducted bilateral talks at the viceministerial level with participants from Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Myanmar, and other countries. **4** **Other** **(1) International Conferences Held by Private** **Organizations** In the f eld of security, various international conferences are also held by private organizations, and such conferences provide a forum for sharing and exchanging opinions on medium-to long-term security issues. The leading international conferences are the IISS Asia Security Summit (Shangri-La Dialogue)[5] and the IISS Regional Security Conference (Manama Dialogue), both hosted by the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS). At the 14th Shangri-La Dialogue held in May 2015, Minister of Defense Nakatani delivered a speech at the second plenary session entitled “New Forms of Security Collaboration in Asia,” and also held bilateral and trilateral talks with the participating countries to explain the security policies of Japan, as well as exchange opinions on regional situations and defense cooperation. The Manama Dialogue is an international conference held in Manama, Bahrain at which foreign and defense off cials in the Middle East exchange opinions on security. As the stability of the Middle East is extremely important for Japan, from the perspective of energy security, as well as the safety and security of sea lanes, the MOD has participated in every conference since the 2nd conference in 2005. **(2) Inter-Service Branch Initiatives** a. Asia-Pacific Chiefs of Defense Conference (CHOD) The CHOD is a meeting of the chiefs of defense, mostly from the Asia-Pacif c region, aimed at nurturing trust among countries in the region and enhancing security relations through free exchanges of opinions on regional security and bilateral dialogues, among other activities. Japan has participated in each conference since the f rst one held in 1998. In 2004, Japan hosted the 7th conference together with the United States Pacif c Command. More recently, in November 2014, the 17th Conference was held in Brunei Darussalam, and was attended by the Joint Chief of Staff. b. Chief of Army’s Exercise (CA EX) CA EX is a forum held once every two years by the Australian Army where army chiefs, experts and other relevant off cials in the Asia-Pacif c region participate in and widely exchange opinions on issues regarding ground forces in the region. The GSDF participated in CA EX for the f rst time in 2012, while the Chief of the Staff of the GSDF attended and delivered a speech at CA EX 2014, which was held in September 2014. Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs Hideshi Tokuchi (in the center of the photo) serving as a Chair at the Sixth Japan-ASEAN Defense Vice-Ministerial Forum (Yokohama) This is a multilateral conference initiated by IISS, a private British think tank, in which defense ministers from various countries participate with the objective of discussing defense-related issues and ----- c. The Western Pacific Naval Symposium (WPNS) The WPNS has been held since 1988. It is attended by the chiefs of staff of the navy of countries in the Western Pacif c region, and holds discussions on various maritime security issues. The MSDF has been participating since the second symposium in 1990, and the Chief of Maritime Staff attended the last meeting held in Qingdao, hosted by China in April 2014. d. The Pacific Air Chiefs Symposium (PACS), etc. The PACS, hosted by the United States, is held every two years. It aims to promote mutual understanding and enhance security relationships between the countries in the region through exchanges of views among the chiefs of staff of the air forces, etc. from those countries. The ASDF has been participating in PACS since the f rst symposium in 1989, except the 13th in 2013, and the Chief of Staff of the ASDF attended the last meeting held in Washington, D.C., in March 2014. In October 2014, the ASDF also hosted the Air Chief’s Dialogue in Japan (ACDJ), an event inviting air chiefs and others, as part of celebrations for the 60th anniversary of the ASDF[6]. 60th Anniversary of the Air Self-Defense Force, Air Chiefs’ **Commentary** Dialogue in Japan (ACDJ) In October 2014, the ASDF invited a total of eight Air Chiefs and Commanders from seven different countries as part of its 60th Anniversary, and held a fi ve-day event named the Air Chiefs’ Dialogue in Japan (ADCJ), which included a symposium, a courtesy call on the Prime Minister, and participation in the Air Review. The Chief of Staff of the ASDF held bilateral talks with Air Chiefs and Commanders who visited Japan, and agreed to strengthen their mutual relationships and to further promote dialogues at various levels. The symposium, which was the main event of the ACDJ, was held on the theme of “The Future of Air Power” Following the opening speeches by the State-Minister of Defense and the Chief of Staff of the The Air Chiefs and Commanders with Prime Minister Abe ASDF, representatives of each participating country delivered a speech at the Prime Minister’s Offi ce. on subjects including the relationship between scientifi c technologies and the air force, and the role of the air force in the future. In particular, the delegates came to share the recognition about the importance of respecting international law in order to maintain order in airspace. Next, the delegates paid a courtesy call to Prime Minister Shinzo Abe at his offi cial residence. Prime Minister Abe stated, “As the role of air power grows increasingly important, the fact that I am able to meet with you who play a major role in maintaining the peace and stability of the region makes this a signifi ciant occasion.” General Robinson, the fi rst female Commander of the U.S. Pacifi c Air Forces, expressed her gratitude on behalf of the delegation. Furthermore, the delegates viewed the ASDF aircraft fl ying in a well-organized formation at the Air Review commemorating the 60th Anniversary of the MOD and the SDF. For Japan, to host such an event, in which Air Chiefs from different countries were able to interact with one another, is extremely benefi cial in terms of promoting defense cooperation and exchanges. It is important that Japan will continue to implement defense cooperation and exchanges to promote the understanding of the SDF and to further enhance relationships with other countries through all available opportunities. Air Chiefs from Australia, India, Indonesia, Singapore, the United Kingdom, and Vietnam, as well as the Commander of the Pacifi c Air Forces and the Commander of the 5th Air Force of the United ----- **3** **Promoting Capacity Building Assistance and Other Practical Multilateral Security Cooperation** Japanese people and the countries receiving such support of Japan’s stance of working proactively and independently to realize regional peace and stability, thereby increasing trust in the MOD and the SDF, as well as Japan as a whole. In addition, these initiatives also facilitate improving the capabilities of the SDF itself. **(2) Specific Activities** The long-term dispatch program involves dispatching a team composed of defense off cials, SDF personnel, and staff from knowledgeable private sector groups such as NGOs for a comparatively long period in order to conduct large-scale, systematic human resource development, such as lectures and practical training. This program has so far been conducted in Timor-Leste, Cambodia, and Mongolia. The short-term dispatch program involves activities such as giving lectures at seminars, so knowledgeable SDF personnel are dispatched for short periods of time. To date, the MOD and the SDF have dispatched SDF personnel etc., to Mongolia, Vietnam, Indonesia, Papua New Guinea, and Myanmar. The invitation program involves inviting practitioners from the counterpart country to Japan, in order to provide opportunities for them to view facilities and undergo training. To date, the MOD and the SDF have invited military off cials from Vietnam, Mongolia, Indonesia, Timor-Leste, Cambodia, and the Philippines. See Fig. III-3-1-6 (Status of Capacity Building Assistance Program) See Reference 58 (Status of Invitation Program) **1** **Proactive and Strategic Initiatives for Capacity** **Building Assistance** **(1) Significance of the Implementation of Capacity** **Building Assistance** In recent years, the importance of capacity building assistance has received increasing recognition. Capacity building assistance is an initiative based on the concept of seeking to actively create stability within the region and improve the global security environment by enhancing the ability of countries eligible for support through continuous human resource development and technical support in security and defense f elds in peacetime[7]. Providing support for capacity building has the following signif cance: (1) enabling the countries receiving such support to contribute to improving the global security environment; (2) strengthening bilateral relationships with the countries receiving such support; (3) the strengthening of relationships with other supporting countries; and (4) promoting an awareness among the See See GSDF personnel lecturing on the use of measurement equipment in Mongolia (Long-term dispatch program) MSDF personnel lecturing on underwater medicine in Vietnam (Short-term dispatch project) ASDF personnel explaining to the invited participants the proper fastening technique for supply drops (Philippine Air Force) ----- Fig. III-3-1-6 Status of Capacity Building Assistance Program 1 Human resource development regarding 4 Human resource development regarding civil 6 Human resource development regarding civil 7 Human resource development regarding civil 9 Seminar on military medicine vehicle maintenance skills engineering engineering engineering Period: July 2014 Period: December 2012 - March 2013 Period: January - March 2013 Period: October - November 2014 Period: June - July 2014 Target: Morgan Military Engineer Unit Target: Timor-Leste Military Headquarters, etc. Target: National Centre for Peacekeeping Forces, Target: Royal Cambodian Armed Forces Target: Mongolian Military Engineering Unit Dispatched personnel: 3 GSDF personnel, Dispatched personnel: Mines and ERW Clearance in Cambodia Peacekeeping Training School Dispatched personnel: 1 Internal Bureau 2 Internal Bureau administrative official 2 GSDF personnel, 1 Internal Bureau Dispatched personnel: 4 GSDF personnel, Dispatched personnel: 3 GSDF personnel, administrative official, 3 private-sector administrative official, 4 private-sector organization officers 1 Internal Bureau administrative official, 6 private-sector organization officers 1 Internal Bureau administrative official organization officers 10 Human resource development regarding civil engineering (Field research) 8 Seminar on military medicine Period: June 2013 2 Human resource development regarding 5 Human resource development regarding civil Period: October 2012 Target: Mongolian Military Engineer Unit vehicle maintenance skills engineering Target: Medical officers at the central hospital of Dispatched personnel: 5 GSDF personnel, Period: October 2013 - March 2014 Period: December 2013 - March 2014 the Mongolian military, etc. 3 Internal Bureau administrative official Target: Timor-Leste Military Headquarters, etc. Target: National Centre for Peacekeeping Forces, Dispatched personnel: 2 GSDF personnel, Dispatched personnel: 8 GSDF personnel, Mines and ERW Clearance in Cambodia 7 8–11 1 Internal Bureau administrative official 1 Internal Bureau administrative official, Dispatched personnel: 4 GSDF personnel, 11 Human resource development regarding 6 private-sector organization officers 1 Internal Bureau administrative official, civil engineering (Field research) 6 private-sector organization officers Mongolia Period: July - August 2013Target: Mongolian Military Engineer Unit 3 Human resource development regarding Dispatched personnel: 6 GSDF personnel, vehicle maintenance skills 1 Internal Bureau administrative official Period: September - November 2014 Target: Timor-Leste Military Headquarters, etc. Dispatched personnel: 8 GSDF personnel, 1 Internal Bureau administrative official, 3 private-sector organization officers 22–24 4–6 Myanmar 12–18 Cambodia [Legend] Vietnam : Long-term dispatch program : Short-term dispatch program G: GSDF personnel 25 M: MSDF personnel Indonesia 19–21 1–3 A: ASDF personnel I: Internal Bureau administrative official Timor-Leste Papua New Guinea P: Private-sector organization officer 22 Seminar on underwater medicine Period: December 2014 Target: Medical officers and divers etc., of the Myanmar Army and Navy Dispatched personnel: 4 MSDF Personnel, 1 Internal Bureau administrative official 12 Seminar on underwater medicine Period: October 2012 Target: Medical officers in the Vietnamese Navy, 23 Seminar on aviation meteorology etc. 15 Seminar on underwater medicine Period: January 2015 Dispatched personnel: 3 MSDF Personnel, Period: March 2015 Target: Myanmar Air Force 1 Internal Bureau administrative official Target: Medical officers in the Vietnamese Navy, Dispatched personnel: 4 ASDF Personnel, etc. 1 Internal Bureau administrative official Dispatched personnel: 5 MSDF Personnel 20 Seminar on oceanography 13 Seminar on underwater medicine Period: July 2013 Period: May 2013 18 Seminar on international aviation law Target: Indonesian Navy Hydro-Oceanographic 24 Seminar on humanitarian assistance and Target: Medical officers in the Vietnamese Navy, 16 Seminar on aviation safety Period: February 2015 Office disaster relief etc. Period: September 2013 Target: Vietnam Air Defence and Air Force Dispatched personnel: 1 MSDF Personnel, Period: March 2015 Dispatched personnel: 2 MSDF Personnel, Target: Vietnam Air Defence and Air Force Dispatched personnel: 2 ASDF Personnel, 2 Internal Bureau administrative official Target: Myanmar Army 2 Internal Bureau administrative official Dispatched personnel: 5 ASDF Personnel, 1 Internal Bureau administrative official (1 Maritime Safety Official) Dispatched personnel: 2 GSDF personnel 2 Internal Bureau administrative official 14 Seminar on underwater medicine 19 Seminar on oceanography 21 Seminar on international aviation law 25 Seminar on humanitarian assistance and Period: March 2014 17 Seminar on aviation safety Period: February 2013 Period: February 2015 disaster relief Target: Medical officers in the Vietnamese Navy, Period: November 2014 Target: Indonesian Navy Hydro-Oceanographic Target: Indonesian Navy Hydro-Oceanographic Period: July 2014 etc. Target: Vietnam Air Defence and Air Force Office Office Target: Papua New Guinea Defence Force Dispatched personnel: 3 MSDF Personnel, Dispatched personnel: 4 ASDF Personnel, Dispatched personnel: 3 MSDF Personnel, Dispatched personnel: 2 ASDF Personnel, Dispatched personnel: 2 GSDF personnel, 2 Internal Bureau administrative official 1 Internal Bureau administrative official 1 Internal Bureau administrative official 1 Internal Bureau administrative official 1 Internal Bureau administrative official **2** **Pacific Partnership** The Pacif c Partnership (PP), which started in 2007, is an initiative in which naval vessels, primarily those from the U.S. Navy, visit countries in the region to provide medical care, to conduct civil engineering business, and to engage in cultural exchange, as well as to seek to strengthen collaboration with the participating countries and facilitate international disaster relief activities, through cooperation with the government, military, international organizations, and NGOs in each of those countries. Since 2007, Japan has dispatched SDF medical personnel and units, amongst others, as part of this initiative. In 2015, SDF medical personnel, engineering personnel from the GSDF, and an MSDF vessel have been dispatched to Fiji, Papua New Guinea and the Philippines since May, and are scheduled to complete their activities in August. **3** **Multilateral Joint Training** **(1) Significance of Multilateral Joint Training in the** **Asia-Pacific Region** Since 2000, in the Asia-Pacif c region, in addition to conventional training conducted in preparation for combat situations, steps have also been taken to undertake multinational training in non-traditional security f elds, such as humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, as well as non-combatant evacuation operation. It is important to participate in and host such multinational training exercises so as not only to raise the skill level of the SDF, but to create a cooperative platform through various forms of coordination and exchanges of opinions with the countries involved. The MOD and the SDF continue to actively engage in such training. See Reference 59 (Participation in Multilateral Training (Last Three Years)) ----- **(2) Initiatives toward Multilateral Training** a. Participation in, and Hosting of, Multilateral Joint Training and Exercises In April 2002, the MSDF hosted the second Western Pacif c submarine rescue exercise, its f rst time hosting the exercise. In October 2002, the MSDF also hosted multilateral search and rescue exercises. In March 2011, Japan and Indonesia co-hosted ARF-DiREx2011, the second time the exercise was held, within the framework of the ARF. Furthermore, in September 2013, the MSDF hosted the Sixth Western Pacif c submarine rescue exercises. Moreover, since 2005, the SDF has also been involved in the annual Cobra Gold exercise, a multinational joint training exercise co-hosted by the United States and Thailand. In Cobra Gold 15 held in February 2015, the SDF participated in the command post exercises, conducted training in transporting Japanese nationals overseas, and also participated in the public health section of humanitarian and civic assistance activities. Since 2010, the SDF has participated in the Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI) Capstone Exercise, a multinational exercise for U.N. peacekeeping operations launched by the United States. In August 2014, the SDF participated in staff exercises, f eld training, and a leaders’ seminar as part of the Garuda Shanti Dharma exercise held in Indonesia. The GSDF participated in the multilateral exercise, KHAAN QUEST 14, co-hosted by the United States and A scene from the training in Cobra Gold 15 for transporting Japanese nationals overseas Mongolia in June 2014. The MSDF participated in the multilateral exercise (TGEX KOA KAI EAST) in October 2014, and at the same time, it also participated in the U.S.hosted International Minesweeper Training conducted in the waters around the Arabian Peninsula between October and November of the same year. The ASDF participated in the exercise “Corp North Guam 15,” which was hosted jointly by Japan, the United States and Australia and was held in Guam in February 2015. The ASDF also participated in the HA/DR exercises, which was a multilateral exercise. b. Multinational Tabletop Exercises, etc. Initiatives have also been made to invite observers from other foreign countries since September 2001, when observers from eight Asia-Pacif c countries participated in the fourth Japan-Russia Search and Rescue training hosted by Japan. In addition, the GSDF has hosted the Multinational Cooperation Program in the Asia Pacif c (MCAP) every year since 2002 as part of its multilateral cooperative initiatives, inviting off cers from the respective countries involved. In November 2014, 26 countries and organizations including administrative agencies, the largest number in the past, participated in the event, and conducted a group discussion on the theme of the “Approaches to multilateral joint operations in on-site humanitarian assistance/disaster relief activities” and observed the disaster relief exercise “Michinoku ALERT 2014.” The Multinational Cooperation Program in the Asia Pacifi c (MCAP) hosted by the GSDF Japanese, U.S. and Australian aircraft participating in the Cope North Guam 15 exercise (fl ying over Guam) ----- **4** **Promotion of Defense Cooperation and Exchanges** In order to improve the security environment in the AsiaPacif c region, as well as across the globe, and ensure the safety and prosperity of Japan, it is important to utilize the Japan-U.S. Alliance as an axis, while developing networks that combine bilateral and multilateral dialogue, cooperation and exchange frameworks in a complementary and multilayered manner. Accordingly, the MOD and the SDF are conducting strategic defense cooperation and exchanges based on the characteristics of each country and region in question. **1** **Japan-Australia Defense Cooperation and** **Exchanges** **(2) Recent Major Achievements in Defense Cooperation** **and Exchanges** From the policy perspective, based on the agreement made at the Japan-Australia Defense Ministers Meeting in September 2012, personnel in charge from the Australian Department of Defence were seconded to the Ministry of Defense in Japan from February 2015, while personnel in charge from the latter have been dispatched to the former since June 2015, as part of human resources exchanges in the capacity building support area[10]. The ministers also agreed to establish vice-ministerial and working level meetings as a framework for discussions on defense equipment and technology cooperation. Furthermore, the Japan-Australia Defense Cooperation Off ce was established at the Internal Bureau since FY2014, in order to further enhance defense cooperation between the two countries. At the Japan-Australia Summit Meeting in July 2014, Prime Minister Abe described the relationship between the two countries as a “Special Strategic Partnership for the 21st Century” and signed the Agreement on the Transfer of Defence Equipment and Technology between Japan and Australia as well as approved the proposal for JapanAustralia defense cooperation that was agreed upon at the f fth Japan-Australia “2+2” held in June 2014. This proposal deepened the bilateral security and defense relationship through the expansion and enhancement of training and exercises, extension of human exchanges, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, maritime security, peacekeeping and capacity building as well as Japan-Australia-U.S. trilateral cooperation. At the same time, it also determined the commencement of negotiation towards the development of an agreement to mutually improve administrative, policy and legal procedures in order to facilitate joint operation and training. At the Japan-Australia Ministers Meeting in October 2014, the two ministers agreed to move ahead with the proposed matters for the enhancement of JapanAustralia defense cooperation, which were approved by the abovementioned joint declaration, as well as carrying out a review to enhance Japan-Australia and Japan-U.S.Australia joint exercises going forward. In May 2015, at the Defense Ministerial Talks held at the timing of the 14th Shangri-La Dialogue, Minister of Defense Nakatani informed the Australian side of Japan’s decision to commence consultations with the Government of Australia in order to examine in detail how specif cally Japan could cooperate with Australia with regard to the Australian Future Submarine Program. In response to this, Minister for Defence Kevin Andrews expressed his **(1) Significance of Defense Cooperation and Exchanges** **with Australia** Australia is an important partner for Japan in the AsiaPacif c region: Both Japan and Australia are allies of the United States and share not only universal values[8] but also strategic stakes and interests in the security f eld. In particular, in recent years, as responsible countries in the Asia Pacif c region, Japan and Australia are strengthening mutual cooperation focused primarily on areas such as humanitarian assistance and disaster relief activities. In terms of Japan-Australia bilateral defense cooperation and exchanges, the Japan-Australia Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation, the f rst such joint declaration in the realm of security with a country other than the United States, was announced at the Japan-Australia Summit Meeting in March 2007. It has been making steady progress since then and has now reached the stage of more concrete and practical cooperation. In May 2010, the Japan-Australia Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA)[9] and its Procedural Arrangement were signed at the third Japan-Australia Foreign and Defense Ministerial Consultations (“2+2”), and they entered into force in January 2013. The ACSA enabled the reciprocal provision of supplies and services by the SDF and the Australian Defence Force (ADF) during international peace cooperation and other activities. Moreover, due to the Japan-Australia Information Security Agreement that entered into force in March 2013 and the foundations for sharing information that have been developed between the two countries, it is expected that bilateral cooperation will be further strengthened. Furthermore, at the fourth Japan-Australia “2+2” in September 2012, both countries issued a joint statement entitled Common Vision and Objectives agreeing to further expand defense cooperation between Japan and Australia. 8 Universal value: The National Security Strategy (approved by the National Security Council and the Cabinet on December 17, 2013) stipulates, “freedom, democracy, respect for fundamental human rights, and the rule of law” as universal values. 9 Official title: The Agreement between the Government of Japan and the Government of Australia concerning reciprocal provision of supplies and services between the SDF of Japan and the ADF of Australia. 10 The period of secondment of personnel from the Australian Department of Defence to the MOD is planned to be for approximately 18 months. The previous secondment took place from July 2013 ----- gratitude. The two ministers agreed on the necessity of further strengthening Japan-Australia defense cooperation through joint exercises and other initiatives. Furthermore, at the Defense Ministerial Talks held in Tokyo in June 2015, the two ministers conf rmed the progress of defense policies and defense cooperation between Japan and Australia, and exchanged opinions regarding the future defense cooperation between the two countries. The ministers agreed that the two countries would continue to hold close consultations regarding their bilateral cooperation concerning the submarine program, strongly oppose any unilateral attempts to change the status quo by force in the South China Sea, share grave concerns over China’s attempts to reclaim land, and resolve the situation in accordance with international law. As for service-to-service exchanges, exchanges took place between the Chief of Joint Staff and the Commander of the Australian Defence Force in August 2014, the GSDF Chief of Staff and the Australian Chief of Army in September 2014, the MSDF Chief of Staff and the Australian Chief of Navy in November of the same year, and the ASDF Chief of Staff and the Australian Chief of Air Force in February 2015, thereby promoting the enhancement of mutual understanding, trust, and friendly relations between the two countries. As for the operational side, in 2012, the defense authorities of Japan and Australia agreed to enhance cooperation between SDF personnel and ADF personnel in peacekeeping activities. Following this, two ADF personnel have been working at a Coordination Unit (the former Coordination Center) of the SDF since August of the same year, providing liaison assistance for the United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS). Moreover, through the international emergency relief activities for the typhoon disaster in the Philippines and the incident of the missing Malaysian airplane, the strategic partnership between Japan and Australia has been facilitated and consolidated. It is anticipated that the cooperation between Japan and Australia facilitated and strengthened in this way will contribute to the peace and prosperity of the Asia-Pacif c region, while also being conducive to fostering intraregional order through cooperation and efforts to achieve international peace undertaken by the United Nations in particular, such as conducting U.N. peacekeeping operations. As for the f eld of training and exercises, MSDF naval vessels and aircraft participated in the Kakadu 14 multinational naval exercise organized by the Royal Australian Navy in August 2014. In addition, in October 2014, the MSDF destroyer Kirisame participated in the Albany Convoy Commemorative Event to celebrate its centenary[11]. Moreover, further reviews will be conducted on multifaceted equipment and technology cooperation such as discussions on the possibility of Japanese cooperation for the Australian Future Submarine Program. See Part III, Chapter 2, Section 4-2 (Building New Defense Equipment and Technology Cooperation) See Reference 60 (Recent Defense Cooperation and Exchanges with Australia (Past Three Years)) **(3) Cooperative Relationship between Japan, the United** **States, and Australia** Japan and Australia are both allied with the United States, and share universal values. They cooperate closely in order to resolve the various challenges the Asia-Pacif c region and the international community are facing. In order to ensure the effectiveness and eff ciency of such cooperation, it is important to promote trilateral cooperation with the United States, whose presence is indispensable for regional peace and stability. The Security and Defense Cooperation Forum (SDCF), which is a Director General-level meeting among the three countries, has been held six times since April 2007, with discussions taking place on such issues as coordinated promotion of trilateral defense cooperation. In May 2015, the Japan-U.S.-Australia Defense Ministerial Talks were held at the timing of the 14th Shangri-La Dialogue. The three Ministers exchanged opinions regarding the regional security situations, joint exercises, and defense cooperation through capacity building assistance etc., and expressed their strong opposition against any unilateral attempts to change the status quo by force in the East China Sea and the South China Sea. The Ministers also expressed serious concern over China’s attempts to reclaim land in the South China Sea. In terms of training and exercises, the MSDF, the U.S. Navy, and the Royal Australian Navy held joint exercises in the sea and airspace around Guam in August 2014 and around Hawaii in September 2014. In February 2015, The Air Force Chiefs of Staff of Japan, the United States and Australia at the symposium for Air Force Chiefs of Staff hosted by the Australian Air Force (Left: Australian Chief of Air Force Brown; Middle: U.S. Pacifi c Air Force Commander Robinson; Right: ASDF Chief of Staff Saito) 11 The event commemorates the centenary of the departure of the fi rst convoy of the Australian and New Zealand Army Corps (ANZAC) to the First World War, which was escorted by the Imperial ----- the ASDF, the U.S. Air Force, and the Royal Australian Air Force conducted joint exercises called “Cope North Guam 15”; and in May 2015, the GSDF, the U.S. Army, and the Australian Army held the joint exercise “Southern Jackaroo.” Furthermore, in November 2014, ADF personnel, in addition to the U.S. Army and U.S. Marines, participated in the GSDF’s earthquake response exercise called “Michinoku ALERT2014,” and the f rst Japan-U.S.Australia joint exercises in Japan was conducted. **2** **Japan-Republic of Korea Defense Cooperation** **and Exchanges** **(1) Significance of Defense Cooperation and Exchange** **with the Republic of Korea** The Republic of Korea (ROK) is the most important neighboring country of Japan, and is extremely vital to Japan in geopolitical terms. In addition, the two countries share many strategic interests as allies of the United States. Therefore, even if diff cult issues occasionally arise, close collaboration between the two countries on the security front has enormous signif cance for the peace and stability of the Asia-Pacif c region. Both Japan and the ROK are confronted with wideranging and complex security challenges including not only the North Korean nuclear and missile issues, but also counter-terrorism, peacekeeping operations, large-scale natural disasters, antipiracy measures, maritime security and so on. In order for the two countries to deal effectively GSDF personnel coordinating with the Australian Army in small unit training during Exercise Southern Jackaroo MSDF personnel marching in the city at the Albany Convoy Commemorative Event **VOICE** Aspirations of Ministry of Defense Personnel **Tara Boyd, International Policy Division, Bureau of Defense Policy** My name is Tara Boyd from the Australian Department of Defence. In February 2015, I entered the Japanese Ministry of Defense’s International Policy Division as a Civilian Policy exchange offi cer and will work for 18 months in the capacity building offi ce. I aim to contribute to expanding Australia-Japan people-to-people links and exchanges, through building enduring and productive working relationships within the Japanese Ministry of Defense and the Japanese Self-Defense Forces. I hope to gain a broader understanding of the Japanese Ministry of Defense and Japanese policy processes, and assist in progressing mutually agreed defence cooperation. Working in the Capacity Building Offi ce, I hope to improve exchanges of information between Australia and Japan’s defence cooperation programs in South East Asia and the Pacifi c and look for opportunities where we can coordinate our efforts. My experience in the MOD has been very enjoyable. I have been fortunate enough to meet a number of seniors throughout the Department, including Defence Minister Nakatani. All of the staff in the International Policy Bureau have welcomed me and are happy to answer all of my questions. The all Japanese-speaking environment is challenging for me at times, but every day I strive to do my best. I look forward to working on Japan’s capacity building projects in the region. Minister of Defense Gen Nakatani and the author ----- with such challenges, it is important to carry out more broadranging and concrete defense cooperation and exchanges. With this in mind, at talks between the defense ministers of the two countries held in January 2011, it was agreed to further exchange views concerning ACSA to enable reciprocal provision of water, food, fuel, and so on in PKO activities, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, etc. Furthermore, it was also agreed that the defense authorities of the two countries will exchange views on the content of an information security agreement. **(2) Recent Major Achievements in Defense Cooperation** **and Exchange** The Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs visited the ROK in October 2014 to attend the international conference “Seoul Defense Dialogue” organized by the Ministry of National Defense of the ROK, and held a Japan-ROK defense vice-ministerial meeting with ViceDefense Minister Baek Seung-joo. During the meeting, the two off cials discussed Japan-ROK defense cooperation and exchanges, and the Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs introduced Japan’s initiatives for national security such as the development of security legislation and a review of the Japan-U.S. guidelines. In April 2015, the Japan-ROK Security Dialogue at the foreign and defense working-level was held in Seoul for the f rst time in nearly f ve years where the security policies and defense policies of the two countries were discussed. Furthermore, in May 2015, Defense Minister Nakatani held the f rst Japan-ROK Ministerial Dialogue in four years with Defense Minister Han Min-koo at the timing of the 14th Shangri-La Dialogue. The two ministers shared a common recognition regarding the security environment surrounding the two countries and exchanged opinions concerning the defense policies of Japan and the ROK. They also consulted each other regarding specif c defense cooperation and exchange such as the participation of ROK naval vessels in the SDF naval review and the implementation of the JapanROK joint search and rescue bilateral exercise within this year, to which the ROK side responded positively. Regarding training and exercises, the MSDF conducted a Japan-ROK search and rescue bilateral exercise in the waters west of Kyushu in December 2013, which further enhanced coordination with the ROK Navy. See Reference 61 (Recent Defense Cooperation and Exchanges with the ROK (Past Three Years)) **(3) Cooperative Relationship between Japan, the U.S.,** **and the ROK** As both Japan and the ROK have alliances with the United States, which are indispensable for the peace and stability of the Asia-Pacif c region, trilateral cooperation among Japan, the United States, and the ROK is continuously developing. In July 2014, the Chief of Joint Staff of Japan, the Chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Chairman of the ROK Joint Chiefs of Staff held the f rst chief-of-stafflevel meeting in Hawaii to discuss a broad range of issues, including the increasingly strained security situation, such as nuclear and missile threats from North Korea, and measures to enhance trilateral coordination among Japan, the United States and the ROK. Furthermore, in December of the same year, the defense authorities of Japan, the United States, and the ROK signed the “Japan-U.S.-ROK Information Sharing Agreement among the Defense Authorities”[12]. This agreement has enabled the defense authorities from the three countries to share security secrets regarding the threat of the North Korea’s nuclear weapon and missiles. Moreover, in May 2015, the Japan-U.S.-ROK Defense Ministerial Talks were held at the timing of the 14th Shangri-La Dialogue, and a joint statement was issued following discussion on the regional situations including North Korea and cooperation between Japan, the United States and the ROK. During the meeting, the three countries once again emphasized their unchanged stance of not condoning North Korea’s continued possession and development of nuclear weapons and delivery systems. At the same time, the three ministers also decided to hold continuous dialogues regarding trilateral security issues, and agreed to proceed with trilateral cooperation on the basis of the common interests in terms of democracy and security. With regard to training and exercises, the MSDF conducted Japan-U.S.-ROK search and rescue trilateral exercises in the waters west of Kyushu in July 2014 to strengthen the coordination and cooperation among the three countries. In addition, the GSDF has been promoting initiatives to enhance relationships, starting with personnel at the junior off cer level who will become future leaders, for example, through exchanges between junior off cers held in December 2014 and April 2015. It is important to further develop cooperative relations among Japan, the United States, and the ROK in this way, in order to contribute to the peace and stability of the region. 12 Offi cial name: Trilateral Information Sharing Agreement Concerning the Nuclear and Missile Threats Posed by North Korea Among the Ministry of National Defense of the Republic of Korea, the Ministry ----- relationship between the two countries to a special strategic global partnership: (1) Reviewing possible measures for strengthening the Foreign and Defense Vice-ministerial level “2+2”; (2) Welcoming the signing of a memorandum on defense cooperation and exchanges; (3) Regularizing the joint maritime exercises between Japan and India; (4) Continuous participation of Japan in the Indo-U.S. Naval Exercises (Malabar); (5) Commencing a meeting between working-level off cials of the two countries with the purpose of promoting defense equipment and technology cooperation; and (6) Giving instructions to accelerate the discussion at the JWG regarding the US-2 amphibian rescue aircraft. Furthermore, in September, implementation of the following initiatives was agreed upon in the memorandum of defense cooperation and exchanges signed during the visit by Prime Minister Modi: high level exchanges including regular ministerial meetings with the ministers from the two countries, such as bilateral maritime training consultation between the chiefs of staff of the MSDF and the Indian Navy; cooperation in non-traditional security areas; educational and scholarly exchanges; defense equipment and technology cooperation, etc. Furthermore, during the Japan-India Ministerial Meeting held in March 2015, both ministers conf rmed that the two countries would make efforts to realize early progress regarding defense equipment cooperation, such as holding discussions towards cooperation concerning the US-2 amphibian rescue aircraft, and the regular continuation of not only bilateral maritime training but also cooperation involving the ground and air forces. With regard to exercises and training, the MSDF participated in the third Japan-U.S.-India trilateral naval drill conducted in waters south of Shikoku and east of Okinawa in July 2014, which included anti-submarine and on-site inspection exercises, as well as strengthening the cooperative relationship with the U.S. Navy and the Indian Navy. See Part III, Chapter 2, Section 4-2 (Building New Defense Equipment and Technology Cooperation) See Reference 62 (Recent Defense Cooperation and Exchanges with India (Past Three Years)) Navy vessels of the MSDF, the U.S. Navy, and the Indian Navy conducting the Japan-U.S.-India trilateral exercises **3** **Japan-India Defense Cooperation and Exchanges** **(1) Significance of Defense Cooperation and Exchanges** **with India** India, which is becoming increasingly inf uential against a backdrop of what is projected to become the world’s largest population as well as its high economic growth and latent economic power, is located in the center of sea lanes that connect Japan with the Middle East and Africa, making it an extremely important country geopolitically for Japan. Furthermore, Japan and India,which share universal values[13] as well as have a common interest in the peace, stability, and prosperity of Asia and the world, have established the “Special Strategic and Global Partnership”. In this context, Japan and India have also been strengthening their relations in the area of security in recent years. In October 2008, the prime ministers of Japan and India signed the Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation between Japan and India (Joint Declaration). India is the third country with which Japan has signed a joint declaration specializing in security, following those with the United States and Australia. The declaration serves as a guideline for cooperation in the f eld of security between Japan and India, covering such areas as meetings and dialogues at various levels such as the ministerial, vice-ministerial, and staff level, as well as service to service exchanges including bilateral and multilateral exercises, and educational and academic exchanges. Moreover, in December 2009, the prime ministers of Japan and India formulated the Action Plan to advance security cooperation between their two countries. The Action Plan includes measures to promote cooperation in maritime security such as cooperation in anti-piracy activities and the holding of joint exercises at sea. **(2) Recent Major Achievements in Defense Cooperation** **and Exchanges** At the Japan-India Summit in May 2013, the prime ministers of Japan and India welcomed the expanding defense relations between the two countries based on the Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation between Japan and India. At the same time, they signed the joint statement in which they decided to conduct on a regular basis and with increased frequency bilateral exercises between the MSDF and the Indian Navy and to establish a Joint Working Group (JWG) regarding the US-2 amphibian rescue aircraft. In September 2014, Prime Minister Modi visited Japan and a Japan-India Summit Meeting was held. During the Summit Meeting, both prime ministers agreed on the following approaches in order to upgrade the ----- and June 2014. Taking into account the situation, in which the maritime communication mechanism is becoming increasingly necessary to avoid and prevent unforeseen consequences, Japan has been encouraging the Chinese side to hold discussions aimed at realizing the commencement of its early operation. In response to this, China and Japan, at the second meeting of the High-Level Consultation on Maritime Affairs held in September 2014, agreed in principle to resume discussions towards the early commencement of the operation of the maritime communication mechanism between the defense authorities. Furthermore, at the Japan-China Summit Meeting held in November 2014, the two leaders agreed to continue communication at the working-level to realize the early commencement of the operation of the maritime communication mechanism between the defense authorities. In January 2015, the fourth Working-Level Talks between Japanese and Chinese defense authorities were held and both parties agreed to further coordinate to make its title “Maritime and Air Communication Mechanism.” They also discussed matters relevant to this mechanism and technical issues, and reached a certain level of shared understanding. In addition, following necessary arrangements based on this meeting, both sides agreed to strive to realize the early commencement of the operation of said mechanism. Moreover, a Japan-China Security Dialogue at the foreign and defense working-level was held in Tokyo in March 2015, for the f rst time in approximately four years. In this dialogue, opinions were exchanged regarding security and defense policies as well as defense exchanges between the two countries, while the two countries once again conf rmed that they would make efforts to achieve the early commencement of the operation of the “Maritime and Air Communication Mechanism” In regard to exchanges between troops, since 2007, the Chinese Navy destroyer Shenzhen and training vessel Zhenghe have visited Japan, while the MSDF destroyers Sazanami and, most recently (in December 2011), Kirisame have visited China. Moreover, in June 2010, the Commanding General of the Jinan Military Region of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army visited the GSDF Middle Army, while in March 2012, the Commanding General of the GSDF Middle Army visited the Jinan Military Region. In April 2014, the Chief of Staff of the MSDF visited Qingdao to attend the WPNS. As part of initiatives to construct a “Mutually Benef cial Relationship Based on Common Strategic Interests,” it will be essential to strive to promote mutual trust and understanding between Japan and China through dialogue at various levels and in a range of areas, while also actively promoting concrete cooperation in non-traditional security areas, such as counter-piracy measures. See Reference 63 (Recent Defense Cooperation and Exchanges with China (Past Three Years)) **4** **Japan-China Defense Exchanges and Cooperation** **(1) Significance of Defense Exchange and Cooperation** **with China** Stable relations between Japan and China are an essential factor for the peace and stability of the Asia-Pacif c region. From a broad and a medium- to long-term perspective, Japan it is necessary for both countries to strive to construct and enhance a “Mutually Benef cial Relationship Based on Common Strategic Interests with China” in all areas, including security. In particular, Japan will continue to encourage China to play a responsible and constructive role for the sake of regional peace, stability and prosperity, to adhere to international norms of behavior, as well as to improve openness and transparency with regard to its advancing military capabilities in the context of its rapidly increasing military budget. As part of such efforts, through continuing and promoting defense exchange, Japan will urge China to demonstrate greater transparency in its military and security policies, and promote measures such as establishing a framework to avert or prevent unexpected situations. **(2) Recent Major Achievements in Defense Exchange** At the Japan-China Defense Ministerial Conference held in June 2011, both Ministers agreed that promoting defense exchange between Japan and China in a stable manner through calm dialogues between the defense authorities of the two countries will be the basis of the “Mutually Benef cial Relationship Based on Common Strategic Interests,” as well as lead to the strengthening of a friendly and cooperative relationship between the two nations, and the improvement of transparency in defense policies. Japan and China are undertaking initiatives to avoid and prevent unforeseen consequences, as an important aspect of defense exchange. In particular, the construction of a maritime communication mechanism between the defense authorities of the two countries has become an urgent matter. Accordingly, at the third JWG meeting held in Beijing in June 2012, it was agreed that the maritime communication mechanism would be constructed, consisting of (1) annual meetings and expert meetings; (2) high-level hotlines between the defense authorities of Japan and China; and (3) direct communications between naval vessels and aircraft. The objective of this was to avoid unexpected collisions and prevent unforeseen consequences in waters and airspace from escalating into military clashes or political problems. Since September 2012, however, defense exchange, including this process, was stagnated and during this time a number of incidents occurred. For example, a Chinese naval vessel directed its f re-control radar at a JMSDF destroyer in January 2013; China announced the establishment of the “East China Sea Air Defense Identif cation Zone” based on its own unilateral assertion in November 2013; and Chinese fghter jets few excessively close to JSDF aircraft in May ----- In October 2014, the MSDF carried out the 15th bilateral Japan-Russia search and rescue exercises. Also, in December of the same year, the ASDF Commander of the Northern Air Defense Force visited Khabarovsk as part of commander exchange activities. See Reference 64 (Recent Defense Cooperation and Exchanges with Russia (Past Three Years)) **6** **Defense Cooperation and Exchanges with** **Southeast Asian Countries** **5** **Japan-Russia Defense Exchanges and Cooperation** **(1) Significance of Defense Exchange and Cooperation** **with Russia** Russia has great inf uence on the security of Europe, Central Asia, and the Asia-Pacif c region, and is an important neighboring country of Japan. It is therefore very important for Japan to deepen defense exchanges and promote mutual trust and cooperation with Russia. As Japan-Russia relations have continuously been developing in a wide range of areas, the MOD and the SDF have been steadily promoting exchanges with Russia at various levels in accordance with the Memorandum on Japan-Russia Defense Exchanges drawn up in 1999 (revised in 2006). Security consultations between foreign and defense authorities, and MilitaryMilitary Talks at the Director General-level and Councillor level, as well as annual meetings based on the Japan-Russia Agreement on Prevention of Incidents On and Over the High Seas and bilateral search and rescue exercises are all held continuously. Regarding Japan’s relationship with Russia, the Government of Japan is taking an appropriate response whilst emphasizing the solidarity of the G7 (Group of Seven)[14], taking the Ukrainian situation and other factors into account. In light of this, the MOD has also taken this into account in its exchanges with Russia. Simultaneously, it is important to maintain constant contact at the working level in order not to cause any unforeseen circumstances and unnecessary conf icts with Russia, a neighboring country. The MOD will consider these points in a comprehensive manner and advance exchanges with Russia accordingly. **(2) Recent Major Achievements in Defense Exchange** At the Japan-Russia Summit Meeting in April 2013, the two leaders aff rmed the importance of expanding cooperation between Japan and Russia in the f eld of security and defense, amid the growing role of the Asia-Pacif c region and major changes in the international security environment, and agreed to set up a meeting between foreign and defense authorities at the ministerial level (the “2+2” Meeting). At the f rst Japan-Russia “2+2” Meeting in November 2013, the two countries agreed to conduct ground-to-ground unit exchanges between land forces and mutual dispatch of exercise observers on a regular basis, and bilateral exercises between counter piracy units of the MSDF and Russian Navy in the Gulf of Aden, as well as regular hosting of the Japan-Russia Cyber Security Meeting. In addition, JapanRussia bilateral talks were held at the Vice-Ministerial level at the timing of the 14th Shangri-La Dialogue, which took place in May 2015, and defense exchange between two countries was discussed. Southeast Asian countries are located in an area strategically important for the maritime traff c for Japanese sea lanes, and have been traditional partners for Japan for over 40 years, having close economic relations with Japan. Promoting trust and cooperative relations for issues in various security challenges is meaningful for both Japan and Southeast Asian countries. Moreover, the countries of Southeast Asia are members of ADMM-Plus and ARF, so from the perspective of stabilizing the security environment in the Asia-Pacif c region, it is important to build relationships of trust and cooperation with each country, with a view to cooperation in multilateral frameworks. As 2013 marked the 40th anniversary of ASEANJapan Friendship and Cooperation, Prime Minister Abe announced the Five Principles of Japan’s ASEAN Diplomacy[15] and visited all of the ten ASEAN countries. In addition, Japan and ASEAN have been discussing defense equipment and technology cooperation in non-traditional security areas as a new f eld for cooperation. See Part III, Chapter 2, Section 4-2 (Building New Defense Equipment and Technology Cooperation) **(1) Indonesia** At the Japan-Indonesia Summit Meeting in March 2015, President Joko Widodo of the Republic of Indonesia and Prime Minister Abe agreed to strengthen the Strategic Partnership underpinned by sea and democracy. Both leaders welcomed the signing of the memorandum on Cooperation and Exchanges in the f elds of defense f eld, including capacity building, PKO activities, disaster relief, defense equipment and technology, and highlevel exchanges. The two leaders also re-aff rmed their intention to hold the “Japan-Indonesia Foreign and Defense Ministerial Consultation.” Similarly, at the workinglevel, the sharing of knowledge and experiences has been accumulated through consultations between foreign and defense authorities, consultations between defense authorities, various educational and academic exchanges and initiatives. In November 2014, personnel from the Joint Staff etc., 14 In addition to Japan, the G7 consists of the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Italy, and Canada. 15 (1) Protect and promote together with ASEAN member states universal values, such as freedom, democracy and basic human rights; (2) Ensure in cooperation with ASEAN member states that the free and open seas, which are global public commons, are governed by the rule of law, and not by force, and welcome the United States’ rebalancing to the Asia-Pacifi c region; (3) Further promote trade and investment, including fl ows of goods, money, people and services, through various economic partnership networks, for Japan’s economic revitalization and the prosperity of both Japan and ----- participated in the “Pacif c Area Senior Off cer Logistics Seminar,” co-hosted by Indonesia and the U.S. Pacif c Command (USPACOM), with Japan serving as a chair country for one session. These initiatives also contribute to ensuring effective multinational coordination functions in cases such as disaster relief for typhoons. Furthermore, Japan and Indonesia have been working on strengthening cooperation through capacity building assistance. See Fig. III-3-1-6 (Status of Capacity Building Assistance Program) Prime Minister Abe and Indonesian President Joko Widodo at the Japan-Indonesia Summit Meeting (Cabinet Public Relations Offi ce) and exchanged views on regional affairs as well as future defense cooperation and exchanges with Vietnamse Air Force Commander and others. Furthermore, Japan and Vietnam are also working to strengthen cooperation through capacity building. It is vital to strengthen relationships in order to achieve more concrete, practical cooperation, based on the memorandum on defense cooperation and exchange as the cornerstone of our cooperation and exchanges. See Fig. III-3-1-6 (Status of Capacity Building Assistance Program) **(3) Singapore** In December 2009, Singapore became the f rst country in Southeast Asia with which Japan signed a memorandum on defense cooperation and exchange, and a cooperative relationship is progressing steadily based on this memorandum. In particular, discussions between the defense authorities of Japan and Singapore have the longest history of any of Japan’s defense discussions with the countries of Southeast Asia, with the 14th round of talks being held in Singapore in December 2014. The two countries have also actively conducted highlevel exchanges. In July 2012 the Permanent Secretary of Singapore’s Ministry of Defence visited Japan and held discussions with the Administrative Vice-Minister of Defense, followed by a visit to Japan by the Minister for Defence and the holding of a Japan-Singapore Defense Ministerial Meeting in October 2012. In December 2013, former Parliamentary Senior Vice-Minister of Defense Takeda visited Singapore and held talks with the Permanent Secretary of Singapore’s Ministry of Defence, and in April 2014, former Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Defense Wakamiya also visited Singapore and held talks with Minister of State for Defence. As for service to service exchanges, in February 2014, the Chief of Staff of the ASDF attended the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacif c and Singapore Airshow for the purpose of promoting mutual understanding and building mutual trust. Furthermore, at the 14th Shangri-La Dialogue held in May 2015, Minister of Defense Nakatani held a meeting with Singaporean Defense Minister Dr. Ng. Minister Nakatani expressed his gratitude to the Singaporean Defense Ministry for its effort to host the Dialogue, and exchanged opinions on regional situations. **(2) Vietnam** During the Japan-Vietnam Summit Meeting held in March 2014, President Truong Tan Sang of Vietnam and Prime Minister Abe agreed to elevate cooperative relations from “Strategic Partnership” to an “Extensive Strategic Partnership.” In October 2011, at the Japan-Vietnam Defense Ministerial Meeting, the two ministers signed a memorandum concerning Japan-Vietnam defense cooperation and exchange, and agreed to promote highlevel exchanges, regular dialogue at the vice-ministerial level, and cooperation in such f elds as humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. During the Japan-Vietnam Ministerial Meeting in September 2013, the two countries agreed to proactively promote Japan-Vietnam defense cooperation and exchanges, including cooperation towards Vietnam’s dispatch for U.N. peacekeeping operations. The Minister of Defense of Japan also visited Cam Ranh Bay, a military port located at a key strategic location in the South China Sea. As for vice-ministerial consultation, the f rst consultation was held in November 2012, the second in August 2013, and the third in January 2015. During these consultations, the two vice-ministers exchanged opinions regarding regional situations, as well as discussing cooperation in the f eld of capacity building assistance. In February 2015, the Vietnamese Naval Commander visited Japan and exchanged opinions with the Chief of Staff of the MSDF regarding Japan-Vietnam naval service-to-service exchanges and agreed to strengthen their exchanges. In May 2015 the Chief of Staff of the ASDF visited Vetnam **(4) The Philippines** To date, as well as high-level exchange with the Philippines, there have been frequent exchanges at the working-level including visits by naval vessels and consultations between the two defense authorities and ship visits. At the defense ministerial meeting held in January 2015, the two defense ministers signed a memorandum on defense cooperation and exchanges. This memorandum shows intensions of the two countries to conduct cooperation in non-traditional security areas such as maritime security; in addition to high level exchanges such as defense ministerial meetings ----- and vice-ministerial consultations; reciprocal visits between the Chief of Staff of the Joint Staff, Chiefs of Staff of the SDFs, Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Commanders of each services; and working-level exchanges such as regular consultations between the SDF and the Armed Forces of the Philippines, as well as participation in trainings and exercises. In service-to-service exchanges, in September 2014, the Chief of Staff of the GSDF visited the Philippines as the f rst ever Chief of Staff of the GSDF to do so and gained positive responses towards the enhancement and expansion of defense cooperation and exchanges between both services through the meeting with the Filipino Army Commander. In February 2015, the Chief of Staff of the MSDF visited the Philippines to promote mutual understanding and to strengthen the relationship of trust through the discussion with the Navy Commanders. Furthermore, in March 2015, the Commander of the Philippine Air Force visited Japan and held a meeting with the Chief of Staff of the ASDF, conf rming their intention to work on the enhancement of relationships between their services. With regard to training and exercises, in September and October 2014, four GSDF off cers participated in the joint exercise PHIBLEX15 as observers, which was conducted by the United States and the Philippines aiming to enhance their interoperability in amphibious operations as well as humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. In October 2014, the MSDF destroyer Sazanami, which was undergoing Japan-U.S. joint overseas cruise training, participated in the f rst trilateral goodwill exercises in waters west of Manila. The Chief of Staff of the MSDF Takei having a meeting with the Philippine Deputy Secretary of Defense and the Naval Commander since 2005, have been participating in the multilateral military exercise Cobra Gold hosted by the United States and Thailand. In January 2013, the Chief of Staff of the ASDF and the GSDF consecutively visited Thailand. In September 2013, the Minister of Defense visited Thailand and held talks with then Prime Minister and Defense Minister Yingluck Shinawatra and other off cials, conf rming that both countries would further deepen the bilateral defense relationship. Furthermore, in February 2014, the Chairman of the Joint Staff Council visited Thailand to inspect the Cobra Gold 2014 exercise. **(6) Cambodia** Cambodia is the f rst country to which Japan dispatched the SDF for U.N. peacekeeping operations in 1992. Since then, defense cooperation and exchanges between the two countries have been continuously improving: in 2008, the Defense Attaché to Vietnam was also appointed as Defense Attaché to Cambodia, and support for capacity building was started in 2013. At the Japan-Cambodia Summit Meeting in December 2013, the bilateral relationship was upgraded to “strategic partnership.” After the summit, the Minister of Defense signed the Memorandum on Defense Cooperation and Exchanges between the Ministry of Defense of Japan and the Ministry of National Defence of the Kingdom of Cambodia, with the attendance of the prime ministers of Japan and Cambodia. In addition, a Vice-Minister-level meeting was held on the sidelines of the 14th Shangri-La Dialogue in May 2015. During the meeting, the two viceministers exchanged views regarding Japan-ASEAN defense cooperation, as well as Japan-Cambodia bilateral defense cooperation and exchange. See Fig. III-3-1-6 (Status of Capacity Building Assistance Program) **(7) Other Southeast Asian Countries** Regarding Japan’s relations with Myanmar, Japan has been promoting exchanges since Myanmar’s transition from military rule to democratic government in March 2011, such as realizing the Administrative Vice-Minister of Defense’s f rst visit to the country, and inviting Myanmar to participate in multilateral conferences hosted by Japan. In November 2013, the f rst consultation between defense authorities was held in the capital city Naypyidaw, during which the two countries exchanged opinions regarding the procedures for future defense exchanges between the two nations and agreed to further promote exchanges. Furthermore, in 2014, the Chief of Staff of the Joint Staff and the Parliamentary Senior Vice-Minister visited Myanmar in May and July, respectively. In addition, in September the Commander-in-Chief of the Defence Services visited Japan, thereby further advancing highlevel exchange between the two countries. Moreover, then Minister of Defense Eto held a meeting with Minister for Defense Wai Lwin of Myanmar, the chair country, whilst attending the Japan-ASEAN Roundtable and conf rmed their intention to promote defense exchanges **(5) Thailand** With Thailand, the dispatching of Defense Attachés and consultations between defense authorities were initiated at an early stage. Thailand is also the f rst country to send students to the National Defense Academy, and has sent the largest cumulative number of students. While maintaining the traditionally good relationship the MOD and the SDF ----- Regarding Japan’s relations with Laos, defense cooperation and exchanges have been gradually developing since 2011, when the Defense Attaché to Vietnam was also appointed as Defense Attaché to Laos. In April 2013, the National Defense Academy accepted students from Laos for the f rst time, and in August 2013, the f rst Japan-Laos Defense Ministerial Meeting was held during the 2nd ADMM-Plus meeting. During the Japan-Laos Summit Meeting in December 2013, it was agreed that both sides would coordinate toward the early realization of a security dialogue between the diplomatic and defense authorities, and the f rst security dialogue was held in April 2014. In addition, in January 2014, the Administrative Vice-Minister of Defense visited Laos for the f rst time, and held meetings with the Deputy-Prime Minister and Defense Minister as well as Vice-Minister of Defense of Laos. During the meetings, as the co-chair countries of the EWG on Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief of the ADMM-Plus, the two countries agreed to enhance cooperation in HA/DR. Regarding Japan’s relations with Malaysia, JapanMalaysia Defense Ministerial Meeting was held at the 14th Shangri-La Dialogue, and the ministers exchanged views regarding bilateral defense cooperation and exchanges. In particular, the two ministers shared the recognition of the importance of Japan-ASEAN cooperation in the f eld of disaster relief and agreed to continue cooperation in this area between Japan and Malaysia. As for service to service exchanges, in April 2014, vessels from the MSDF and the Royal Malaysian Navy conducted a goodwill exercise in waters west of Kyushu, and in June 2014 the Chief of Staff of the MSDF visited Malaysia, promoting friendship and goodwill with Malaysian Navy. Regarding Japan’s relations with Brunei Darussalam, during the 2nd ADMM Plus meeting held in Brunei Darussalam in August 2013, the Minister of Defense held talks with Brunei’s Minister of Energy Mohammad Yasmin Umar and exchanged views on the initiatives of the ADMM Plus. As for service-to-service exchanges, in November 2014, the Chief of Staff of the Joint Staff held a meeting with the Commander-in-Chief of Defence and attended the 17th Asia-Pacif c Chief of Defense Conference held in Brunei Darussalam. See Reference 65 (Recent Defense Cooperation and Exchanges with ASEAN Countries (Past Three Years)) issues such as international peace cooperation activities, anti-terrorism and anti-piracy operations, and through exchange of views on regional situations. With regard to Japan’s relationship with the United Kingdom, in April 2012, a joint statement was issued by the prime ministers of both countries, entitled “A Leading Strategic Partnership for Global Prosperity and Security,” which stated that the two nations would begin negotiations for a government-to-government information security agreement, endorse the signing of the Defense Cooperation Memorandum, and promote the identification of appropriate defense equipment for joint development and production. In terms of interaction between the defense authorities of the two countries, in addition to the exchange of the memorandum on defense cooperation in June 2012, the Japan-UK Information Security Agreement entered into force in January 2014 leading to the development of a foundation for information-sharing between the two countries. At the Japan-U.K. Summit in May 2014, the prime ministers agreed to hold the Foreign and Defense Ministerial Meeting, to begin negotiations toward the conclusion of an Acquisition and Cross-Serving Agreement (ACSA), and to promote joint exercises between the SDF and the British Armed Forces in order to enhance their cooperation in security f elds. Following this, the Foreign and Defense Ministerial Meeting was held on January 21, 2015. At the meeting, the U.K. side demonstrated its stance of providing maximum cooperation in relation to the incidents involving the taking of Japanese hostages by the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), as well as expressed the United Kingdom’s high regard for Japan’s assistance and activities in non-military areas in the f ght against terrorism. The four ministers also conf rmed the promotion of defense equipment and technology cooperation between Japan and the United Kingdom, and discussed the enhancement of cooperation in global security issues such as cyber and maritime security areas, as well as exchanging of views for sharing strategic situational awareness. Furthermore, the U.K. side stated that it would welcome Japanese initiatives in the development of security legislation. With regard to active engagement in high-level exchanges between the two countries, then Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Defense Wakamiya visited the United Kingdom in July 2014 and State Minister of Defense Sato also visited in January 2015 to participate in the Japan-U.K. strategic dialogue. As for service-to-service exchanges, the First Sea Lord and Chief of the Naval staff of the British Navy visited Japan in December 2013, as well as the Chief of Staff of the Royal Army in March 2014 to exchange views with the Chief of Staff of the GSDF. In addition, in July 2014, the Chief of Staff of the ASDF participated in the Air Power Conference held in the United Kingdom, advancing the exchanges between the two countries. As for the operational side, in February 2015, Japan accepted a Royal Navy offcer as an MSDF liaison offcer **7** **Japan-U.K. Defense Cooperation and Exchanges** The United Kingdom, being a major power that has inf uence not only in Europe but also in the rest of the world, has historically maintained close relations with Japan. On the security front, Japan shares the same strategic interests as the United Kingdom, as both countries are important allies of the United States. Given this relationship, it is extremely important for Japan to promote cooperation through working together on global ----- in an effort to further deepen Japan-U.K. cooperation through information exchanges regarding maritime security cooperation and the regional situation. In addition, Japan is actively promoting defense equipment and technology cooperation with the U.K., the f rst country other than the United States with which Japan has promoted such cooperation, by launching joint research on defense equipment. See Part III, Chapter 2, Section 4-2 (Building New Defense Equipment and Technology Cooperation) See Reference 66 (Recent Defense Cooperation and Exchanges with the United Kingdom (Past Three Years)) Four ministers at the Foreign and Defense Ministerial Meeting (London) GSDF personnel participating in the commemoration of the First World War Centenary (a military parade to commemorate the Bastille Day) Foreign and Defense Ministerial Meeting held in Tokyo in March 2015, the four ministers discussed the threat of terrorism that both countries had faced from January to February of that year. It was conf rmed that the two countries strengthen information exchange and cooperation in Africa and the Middle East to work on the f ght against terrorism in cooperation with the international community, and that they would also strengthen cooperation in the f elds of defense equipment and technology cooperation, maritime security, and other f elds. Moreover, the four ministers signed the agreement regarding the transfer of defense equipment and technology between the Government of Japan and the Government of France. In addition, in July 2014, then Parliamentary ViceMinister of Defense Wakamiya attended the First World War Centenary held in Paris, and four GSDF personnel participated in the parade for the Bastille Day. Japan and France are also developing defense equipment and technology cooperation by, for example, establishing a committee on defense equipment cooperation, etc. See Part III, Chapter 2, Section 4-2 (Building New Defense Equipment and Technology Cooperation) **8** **Japan-France Defense Cooperation and** **Exchanges** France is a major power that has inf uence not only in Europe and Africa, but also in the world. Historically it has had a close relationship with Japan, and is positioned as a special partner in various international organizations. The defense authorities of the two countries have held consultations annually since 1994 to exchange a wide range of opinions regarding regional situations and security issues. In addition, in October 2011, the Japan-France Information Security Agreement was signed to develop the infrastructure for sharing information. In June 2013, French President Francois Hollande visited Japan, and the two countries issued a joint statement regarding cooperation in three f elds, namely politics and security, economy, and culture. In addition, at the f rst Japan-France Foreign and Defense Ministerial Meeting held in Paris in January 2014, the two sides shared recognition of the importance of maintaining the freedom of the high seas and the freedom of f ight in international airspace. In May 2014, Prime Minister Abe visited France and held talks with President Hollande. The two leaders agreed to launch dialogue on cyber security and strengthen bilateral cooperation in maritime security. In July of the same year, the French Minister of Defense visited Japan to hold the Japan-France Defense Ministerial Meeting, and the two ministers signed the statement of intent to promote defense cooperation and exchanges Furthermore during the second **9** **Defense Cooperation and Exchanges with Other** **Countries** **(1) European Countries** Europe shares universal values with Japan and plays a central role in working to address shared challenges to global security, focusing primarily on non-traditional security areas such as counter-terrorism and combating piracy, as well as international peace cooperation activities. In this regard, promoting defense cooperation and exchanges with European countries provides the foundations for Japan to become actively involved in dealing with challenges, and is important for both Japan and Europe ----- In April-May 2014, Prime Minister Abe made a round of visits to Germany, the United Kingdom, Portugal, Spain, France and Belgium, holding talks with the top leaders of these countries as well as the EU and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). He had a meeting with NATO Secretary General Rasmussen at the NATO Headquarters and signed the Individual Partnership and Cooperation Programme (IPCP). Prime Minister Abe made an address before the North Atlantic Council[16], drawing appreciation and support from European countries for Japan’s security policy, which is based on the concept of proactive contribution to peace. He also exchanged views with the permanent representatives of NATO’s 28 member countries, developing a common recognition of the security environment between Japan and Europe. Furthermore, Prime Minister Abe agreed on continued and expanded cooperation with NATO and the EU relating to counterpiracy operations off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden, as well as cooperation in the f eld of defense equipment and technology with the United Kingdom and France. Following this, the MSDF has been conducting joint exercises with participating units of NATO’s Operation Ocean Shield and the EU’s Operation Atlanta since September 2014. In October 2014, Minister of Defense of the Republic of Finland Carl Haglund visited Japan and the Japan-Finland Defense Ministerial Meeting was held. In November 2014, Minister of Defense of Spain Pedro Morenés visited Japan, and the Memorandum regarding Japan-Spain defense cooperation and exchanges was signed by the two ministers during the Japan-Spain Defense Ministerial Meeting. Regarding Japan’s relations with NATO, based on the agreement between Prime Minister Abe and NATO Secretary General Rasmussen reached in May, female GSDF personnel were dispatched to NATO Headquarters for the f rst time in December 2014 as part of Japan-NATO cooperation in the f eld of women, peace and security. Furthermore, the Japan-Germany Defense Ministerial Meeting was held during the 14th Shangri-La Dialogue for the f rst time in six years, and opinions were exchanged mainly on bilateral defense cooperation and exchanges. Regarding information security agreements with European countries, Japan concluded an agreement with NATO in June 2010, and the negotiation towards concluding an agreement with Italy is under way. **(2) Other Countries** Following the signing of a memorandum on JapanMongolia defense cooperation and exchanges in January 2012, the f rst Defense Vice-ministerial Level Meeting was held in November 2012, and the second meeting in November 2013, in which the two countries exchanged opinions regarding defense cooperation and exchanges. At the same time, the two countries have been working on the enhancement of cooperation through support for capacity building. In addition, in April 2014, Mongolian Minister of Defense Dashdemberel Bat-Erdene visited Japan, while in June 2014 the Chief of Staff of the GSDF visited Mongolia, conducting opinion exchanges with the Chief of Defense and Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Defense in Mongolia regarding defense cooperation in areas such as support for capacity building. In this way, high-level exchanges between the two countries have been steadily moving ahead. Furthermore, at the 14th Shangri-La Dialogue held in May 2015, the Japan-Mongolia Defense Ministerial Meeting was held and opinions were exchanged regarding bilateral defense cooperation and exchanges, including capacity building assistance and the participation of the SDF in the Kahn Quest multinational joint exercises. See Fig. III-3-1-6 (Status of Capacity Building Assistance Program) The Administrative Vice-Minister of Defense conducted talks with the Undersecretary of the Ministry of National Defence Ümit Dündar in July 2012, where he signed a Statement of Intent to promote defense cooperation and exchanges between Japan and Turkey. In March 2013, Minister of National Defence Yilmaz visited Japan and held a defense ministerial meeting. At this meeting, the two ministers agreed to hold discussions between the defense authorities of the two countries (at the director general level) at the earliest possible date, and to push forward with various forms of defense exchange. The Administrative Vice-Minister of Defense visited Kazakhstan for the f rst time in July 2012, and he held talks with First Deputy Minister of Defence Zhasuzakov. They concurred regarding the necessity of developing exchange between the two countries in the f eld of defense, and agreed to commence high-level exchanges, starting at the vice-ministerial level, as well as working-level discussions, starting with consultations between the defense authorities of the two nations. They also agreed to promote cooperation in the areas of peacekeeping operations and humanitarian assistance, as well as promoting cooperation through exchanges between educational and research institutes. With New Zealand, a memorandum of Japan-New Zealand defense cooperation and exchange was signed in August 2013. During the Summit Meeting in July 2014, the two countries agreed to conduct studies on an ACSA. With regard to Japan’s relationship with Canada, highlevel exchanges, talks between defense authorities, and other exchanges have been conducted. In August 2011, the f rst Japan-Canada Vice-Ministerial “2+2” was held and both sides agreed to commence the negotiation to conclude an ACSA. In March 2015, the f rst Defense Ministerial Meeting with Minister of Defense Mr. Pinzón of the Republic of Colombia was held during his visit to Japan. The two ----- ministers agreed to move forward with coordinations aimed at signing a memorandum on defense cooperation exchange, and also to continue opinion exchanges concerning areas such as humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, and cyber issues. Regarding Japan’s relationship with Middle Eastern countries, Japan-Saudi Arabia Summit Meetings were held in April 2013 and February 2014. During the meetings, the two leaders reconf rmed their intention to promote dialogue and exchange in the security f eld, and continue engaging in consultation and cooperation at various levels including the commencement of a dialogue between the National Security Councils (NSC) of the two countries in order to enhance the comprehensive partnership between the two countries. Prime Minister Abe visited the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Kuwait and Qatar in succession in May and August 2013, and shared a recognition of the necessity of promoting cooperation in the security and defense f eld. In February 2015, a Japan-Qatar defense exchange memorandum was signed. With Oman, Prime Minister Abe held a meeting with His Majesty Qaboos bin Said, the Sultan of Oman, in January 2014, and both leaders agreed to enhance cooperation in the f eld of maritime security, including counter-piracy measures for ensuring the security and safety of maritime routes, as well as promoting defense exchanges. In addition, in February 2015, the Chief of Staff of the MSDF visited Saudi Arabia, Oman, and the United Arab Emirates. With the Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste, a ministerial meeting with the Minister of Defence Mr. Cristovão was held when he visited Japan in March 2015, during which both ministers agreed to continue exchanges between their defense authorities through educational exchanges and support for capacity building. See Reference 67 (Recent Defense Cooperation and Exchanges with European Nations and Others (Past Three Years)) **Section 2 Initiatives concerning Issues in the International Community** **1** **Ensuring Maritime Security** For Japan, a major maritime state, strengthening order on the seas based on such fundamental principles as the rule of law and the freedom of navigation, as well as ensuring safe maritime transport, is the foundation for its peace and prosperity. In cooperation with the relevant countries, Japan will support anti-piracy operations, as well as promoting various initiatives including assistance for capacity building in this f eld for coastal states, and making the most of various opportunities to enhance joint training and exercises in waters other than those in the immediate vicinity of Japan. See Part III, Chapter 1, Section 1-4 (Initiatives towards Ensuring Maritime Security) itself, the SDF is to take action as well. **(2) Circumstances Surrounding Incidents of Piracy and** **Initiatives by the International Community** Incidents involving pirates armed with machine guns and rocket launchers who seek to take hostages for ransom have continued to occur in waters off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden. See Fig. III-3-2-1 (Piracy Incidents Off the Coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden (Comparison with the number of incidents in Southeast Asia)) Successive United Nations Security Council resolutions[1], such as United Nations Security Council Resolution 1816, which was adopted in June 2008, have requested that various countries take actions, particularly the dispatch of warships and military aircraft, to deter piracy off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden. To date, approximately 30 countries, including the United States, have dispatched their warships to the waters off the coast of Somalia and the Gulf of Aden. As part of counter-piracy initiatives, the European Union (EU) has also commenced Operation Atalanta since December 2009, and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has been conducting Operation Ocean Shield since August 2009, in addition to the counter-piracy operations conducted by the Combined Task Force 151 (CTF 151)[2] that was established in January 2009. Each country continues to respond against piracy in the waters off the coast of Somalia and the Gulf of **1** **Counter-Piracy Operations** Piracy is a grave threat to public safety and order on the seas. In particular, for Japan, which depends on maritime transportation to import most of the resources and food necessary for its survival and prosperity as a maritime nation, it is an important issue that cannot be ignored. **(1) Basic Approach** The Japan Coast Guard (JCG), one of the law enforcement agencies in Japan, is primarily responsible for coping with piracy. However, in cases where it is deemed extremely diff cult or impossible for the JCG to cope with piracy by Other United Nations Security Council resolutions calling for cooperation in deterring piracy are: Resolutions 1838, 1846, and 1851 (adopted in 2008), Resolution 1897 (adopted in 2009), Resolutions 1918 and 1950 (adopted in 2010), Resolutions 1976 and 2020 (adopted in 2011), Resolution 2077 (adopted in 2012), Resolution 2125 (adopted in 2013), and Resolution 2184 (adopted in 2014) The Combined Maritime Force (CMF), the headquarters of which is located in Bahrain, announced the establishment of the CTF in January 2009 as a multilateral combined task force for counter ----- ministers agreed to move forward with coordinations aimed at signing a memorandum on defense cooperation exchange, and also to continue opinion exchanges concerning areas such as humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, and cyber issues. Regarding Japan’s relationship with Middle Eastern countries, Japan-Saudi Arabia Summit Meetings were held in April 2013 and February 2014. During the meetings, the two leaders reconf rmed their intention to promote dialogue and exchange in the security f eld, and continue engaging in consultation and cooperation at various levels including the commencement of a dialogue between the National Security Councils (NSC) of the two countries in order to enhance the comprehensive partnership between the two countries. Prime Minister Abe visited the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Kuwait and Qatar in succession in May and August 2013, and shared a recognition of the necessity of promoting cooperation in the security and defense f eld. In February 2015, a Japan-Qatar defense exchange memorandum was signed. With Oman, Prime Minister Abe held a meeting with His Majesty Qaboos bin Said, the Sultan of Oman, in January 2014, and both leaders agreed to enhance cooperation in the f eld of maritime security, including counter-piracy measures for ensuring the security and safety of maritime routes, as well as promoting defense exchanges. In addition, in February 2015, the Chief of Staff of the MSDF visited Saudi Arabia, Oman, and the United Arab Emirates. With the Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste, a ministerial meeting with the Minister of Defence Mr. Cristovão was held when he visited Japan in March 2015, during which both ministers agreed to continue exchanges between their defense authorities through educational exchanges and support for capacity building. See Reference 67 (Recent Defense Cooperation and Exchanges with European Nations and Others (Past Three Years)) **Section 2 Initiatives concerning Issues in the International Community** **1** **Ensuring Maritime Security** For Japan, a major maritime state, strengthening order on the seas based on such fundamental principles as the rule of law and the freedom of navigation, as well as ensuring safe maritime transport, is the foundation for its peace and prosperity. In cooperation with the relevant countries, Japan will support anti-piracy operations, as well as promoting various initiatives including assistance for capacity building in this f eld for coastal states, and making the most of various opportunities to enhance joint training and exercises in waters other than those in the immediate vicinity of Japan. See Part III, Chapter 1, Section 1-4 (Initiatives towards Ensuring Maritime Security) itself, the SDF is to take action as well. **(2) Circumstances Surrounding Incidents of Piracy and** **Initiatives by the International Community** Incidents involving pirates armed with machine guns and rocket launchers who seek to take hostages for ransom have continued to occur in waters off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden. See Fig. III-3-2-1 (Piracy Incidents Off the Coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden (Comparison with the number of incidents in Southeast Asia)) Successive United Nations Security Council resolutions[1], such as United Nations Security Council Resolution 1816, which was adopted in June 2008, have requested that various countries take actions, particularly the dispatch of warships and military aircraft, to deter piracy off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden. To date, approximately 30 countries, including the United States, have dispatched their warships to the waters off the coast of Somalia and the Gulf of Aden. As part of counter-piracy initiatives, the European Union (EU) has also commenced Operation Atalanta since December 2009, and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has been conducting Operation Ocean Shield since August 2009, in addition to the counter-piracy operations conducted by the Combined Task Force 151 (CTF 151)[2] that was established in January 2009. Each country continues to respond against piracy in the waters off the coast of Somalia and the Gulf of **1** **Counter-Piracy Operations** Piracy is a grave threat to public safety and order on the seas. In particular, for Japan, which depends on maritime transportation to import most of the resources and food necessary for its survival and prosperity as a maritime nation, it is an important issue that cannot be ignored. **(1) Basic Approach** The Japan Coast Guard (JCG), one of the law enforcement agencies in Japan, is primarily responsible for coping with piracy. However, in cases where it is deemed extremely diff cult or impossible for the JCG to cope with piracy by Other United Nations Security Council resolutions calling for cooperation in deterring piracy are: Resolutions 1838, 1846, and 1851 (adopted in 2008), Resolution 1897 (adopted in 2009), Resolutions 1918 and 1950 (adopted in 2010), Resolutions 1976 and 2020 (adopted in 2011), Resolution 2077 (adopted in 2012), Resolution 2125 (adopted in 2013), and Resolution 2184 (adopted in 2014) The Combined Maritime Force (CMF), the headquarters of which is located in Bahrain, announced the establishment of the CTF in January 2009 as a multilateral combined task force for counter ----- the Security of Japanese Flagged Vessels in Areas that Are Highly Susceptible to Acts of Piracy came into force on November 2013, which made it possible to have security guards on board a Japanese ship provided certain requirements are met, enabling them to carry small arms for the purpose of security operations. See Reference 11 (Main Operations of the Self-Defense Forces), Reference 12 (Statutory Provisions about the Use of Armed Force and Weapons by SDF Personnel), Reference 68 (Outline of a Bill Concerning Punishment of and Response to Acts of Piracy) b. Activities by the Self-Defense Forces (a) Participation in CTF 151 Due to the fact that the scope of the area susceptible to acts of piracy is spreading to areas off the coast of Oman and the Arabian Sea in recent years, there is a tendency that the area of activity of the Combined Task Force 151 (CTF 151), which conducts warning and surveillance activities (zone defense), has been increasingly spreading. Furthermore, the number of vessels that are directly escorted by the SDF surface force per escort operation (a method in which the destroyers guard the front and rear of the convoy) was gradually reduced. In light of such a situation, in July 2013, Japan decided to participate in CTF 151 to commence zone defense in addition to direct escort missions as before, while coordinating closely with the units of other countries that are engaged in counter piracy operations in order to conduct more f exible and effective operations. Following this, the surface force started zone defense in December 2013. In addition, air forces have been participating in CTF 151 since February 2014. This participation enabled the force to acquire information that was previously not accessible. Moreover, it became possible to conduct more f exible warning and surveillance activities. For example, aircraft can be deployed as needed even to areas that are highly susceptible to acts of piracy, and as a result, coordination between other countries’ units was further enhanced. Moreover, on July 18, 2014, the SDF decided to dispatch a commander and command center staff to CTF 151. With SDF personnel serving as the CTF 151 commander and command center staff, it becomes possible to facilitate coordination among units of countries involved and more broadly gather information on the counter-piracy operations of other countries off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden. This enables Japan to enhance the effectiveness of the SDF’s counter-piracy operations through strengthened coordination with the units of other countries engaged in counter-piracy operations. The SDF dispatched command center staff in August 2014, and dispatched a CTF 151 commander as well as approximately another 10 command center staff in May 2015. No member of the SDF has ever served as a commander of a multinational force since the foundation of the SDF, and it is believed that this Piracy Incidents Off the Coast of Somalia and in the Fig. III-3-2-1 Gulf of Aden (Comparison with the number of incidents in Southeast Asia) 250 200 150 |ber of incidents)|Col2| |---|---| |Southeast Asia Somalia and|221188 221199 223377| |surroundings|| 100 50 0 Southeast Asia 218 219 237 Somalia and surroundings 158 141 128 102 111 104 83 70 54 75 45 70 80 20 10 44 45 11 15 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 (Year) Notes: The data is based on a report by the International Maritime Bureau (IMB) of the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC). Aden, recognizing it to be a serious concern. Although the number of acts of piracy occurring in the waters off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden has declined substantially in recent years, the root causes of piracy such as poverty in Somalia have not been solved. In addition, considering the fact that Somalia’s capability to crackdown on piracy is also still not suff cient, if the international community reduces its counter-piracy efforts, the situation could be easily reversed. Moreover, the Japanese Shipowners’ Association and other entities are continuously requesting that the SDF continue their counter-piracy operations. Therefore, there is no great change in the situation in which Japan must carry out its counter-piracy operations. **(3) Japanese Initiatives** a. Legislation Concerning Counter-piracy Operations In March 2009, following the order for Maritime Security Operations for the purpose of protecting Japan-aff liated vessels from acts of piracy in the waters off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden, two Japanese destroyers began escorting Japan-aff liated vessels, while P-3C patrol aircraft also commenced warning and surveillance operations in June the same year. In view of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Japan subsequently enacted the AntiPiracy Measures Act[3] in July the same year in order to deal appropriately and effectively with acts of piracy. This act made it possible to protect the vessels of all nations from acts of piracy, regardless of their f ag states. Moreover, it also enabled the use of weapons to a reasonable extent, if no other means were available, in order to halt vessels engaging in acts of piracy, such as approaching civilian vessels. Furthermore, the Act on Special Measures concerning ----- In addition, the maritime patrol aircraft (P-3C) conduct warning and surveillance operations in the f ight zone that is determined based on coordination with the CTF 151 headquarters. The P-3Cs conf rm any suspicious boats, and at the same time, they provide information to the destroyers, the naval vessels of other countries and civilian vessels, responding by such means as conf rming the safety of the surrounding area immediately, if requested. The information gathered by SDF P-3Cs is constantly shared with CTF 151 and other related organizations, and contributes signif cantly to deterring acts of piracy and disarming vessels suspected of being pirate ships. Since commencing duties in June 2009, the aircraft have f own 1,319 missions as of April 30, 2015, and their f ying hours total 10,160 hours. Approximately 108,300 ships conducted identif cation tasks, and information was provided to vessels navigating the area and other countries engaging in counter-piracy operations on around 10,720 occasions. While other countries also dispatch patrol aircraft, the activities conducted by the two MSDF P-3C patrol aircraft account for approximately 60% of the warning and surveillance operations in the Gulf of Aden. Moreover, in order to improve the operational eff ciency and effectiveness of the Deployment Air Force for Counter Piracy Enforcement, the Ministry of Defense (MOD) and the SDF have set up a base in the northwest district of the Djibouti International Airport, which started its operation in June 2011. In addition, GSDF personnel are also involved in the Deployment Support Unit for Counter Piracy, providing guards at operational bases and serving at the headquarters of the Support Unit. Furthermore, the ASDF has formed an airlift squadron to support these activities and is engaged in transport missions. In December 2014, the ASDF, for the f rst time, dispatched an ASDF medical off cer to the Support Unit. See Fig. III-3-2-4 (Structure of the Deployed Forces) Parliamentary Vice-Minister Harada giving instructions at the returning home event for the Deployed Maritime Force for Anti-Piracy Operations in Yokosuka |CTF 151 Commander|Col2|Col3| |---|---|---| |CTF 151 Commander Japan Australia Thailand Netherlands New Turkey United United Zealand Kingdom States|Col2| |---|---| |Japan|United States| Organization of the CTF 151 Headquarters in which Fig. III-3-2-2 Japan Takes the Role of Commander [Number of personnel at the headquarters (plan)] SDF personnel: Approximately 10 Military personnel of other countries: Approximately 10 Total: Approximately 20 in total. [Major achievement at the headquarters] Information gathering and estimation regarding counter-piracy activities, and development of an allocation adjustment plan for zone defense, etc. will enable Japan to further contribute to peace and stability in the international community. See Fig. III-3-2-2 (Organization of the CTF 151 Headquarters in which Japan Takes the Role of Commander) (b) Achievements At present, two destroyers have been dispatched, one of which is in principle escorting civilian vessels back and forth across the Gulf of Aden. The other destroyer is conducting zone defense in the designated marine area within the Gulf of Aden. The direct escort method f rstly places the destroyer and private vessels to be escorted at the assembly point, one each designated at the eastern and western ends of the Gulf of Aden. When the destroyer guards the convoy, the helicopter carried on the destroyer also watches the surrounding area from the sky. In this way, the ships take around two days to sail approximately 900 km[4], all the while making absolutely certain that the convoy is safe and secure, day and night. Moreover, there are JCG off cers aboard the destroyers[5]. As for zone defense, the destroyers conduct warning and surveillance activities as they stay within waters designated based on coordination with the CTF 151 headquarters, and strive to ensure the safety of the vessels. As of April 30, 2015, 3,671 vessels have been escorted under the protection of the destroyers. Not a single vessel has come to any harm from pirates and they have all passed safely across the Gulf of Aden. See Fig. III-3-2-3 (SDF’s Counter-Piracy Operations) During the non-monsoon seasons (March-May, September-November), when the area within which acts of piracy occur grows due to the calmer seas, the escort route is extended by approximately 200 km to the east. ----- Fig. III-3-2-3 SDF’s Counter-Piracy Operations Activities with deployment of one for escort and one for defense zone as Deploy one a basis. for escort Japan’s original framework is used for escort, while for defense it is implemented by participating in the CTF 151. *The relationship between the CTF 151 Headquarters and participating units is a relationship of coordination. Point C Deploy one for Defense Zone Point B *** Conducting escort between point A** **and point B during the monsoon season** **(June-August, December-February)** Conducting warning and surveillance operations, Djibouti and Information collection and provision - Point A Sharing Gathering Information Information CTF 151 - Established in January 2009 for counter-piracy Merchant ship Escorted ships operations. The United States, Australia, United Suspicious vessel Kingsom, Turkey, ROK, Pakistan, etc. participated Deployed Maritime - Participants are to be engaged in operations Force for Antiupon liaison coordination on deployment dates, Piracy Operations etc. with the Command. Fig. III-3-2-4 Structure of the Deployed Forces : Structured by MSDF personnel : Structured by MSDF and GSDF personnel Commander, Self Defense Fleet Commander, Deployment Support Unit Combined Task Force 151 (CTF 151) for Counter Piracy Enforcement Deployed unit at the Headquarters |Commander, Deploy for Counter Pira|ed Maritime Force cy Operations| |---|---| |Commander, Dep for Counter Pira|loyed Air Force cy Operations| |---|---| |loyed Air Force Commander, Deplo cy Operations for Counter Pir Headquarters Support and Operation Guar logistics units units|Col2|Col3| |---|---|---| |||| |||d units| Combined Task Force 151 (CTF 151) Deployed unit at the Headquarters Total of less than 20 personnel 1 destroyer 1 destroyer Squadron (2 P-3Cs) Headquarters Military Police units Total approx. 110 personnel (about 40 maritime, about 70 ground) Total approx. 400 personnel Coast Guard Officers: 8 officials aboard Total approx. 70 personnel In addition, transport units comprised of C-130H transport aircraft under the Air Support Commander will provide airborne transportation of materials etc. when necessary. Special Boarding Unit personnel aboard 1 or 2 patrol helicopters, as well as 1 or 2 special boats, on each vessel Coast Guard Officers: 8 officials aboard [Deployed Maritime Force for Counter Piracy Operations] Escort a private ship with two destroyers and conduct zone defense within CTF 151 [Deployed Air Force for Counter Piracy Operations] Conduct warning and surveillance flight over the Gulf of Aden by two P-3C patrol aircraft [Deployment Support Unit for Counter Piracy Enforcement] Facilitate communication and coordination with relevant authorities of Djibouti and conduct duties related to necessary support for the Deployed Air Force for Counter Piracy Operations to conduct counter-piracy operations [CTF 151 Deployed Unit at the Headquarters] SDF personnel serving as CTF 151 commander and command center officers facilitate coordination among units of countries participating in CTF 151. ----- **(4) Praise for Japan’s Endeavors** The counter-piracy operations by the Japan SDF have been highly praised by the international community, with national leaders and others expressing their gratitude. Moreover, the MSDF, which is engaging in counter-piracy operations off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden, has received many messages from the captains and ship owners of the vessels that its units have escorted, expressing their gratitude that the ships were able to cross the Gulf of Aden with peace of mind and asking them to continue escorting ships there. From the 1st to the 19th unit, a total of 2,900 messages have been received. **2** **Contribution to the Maintenance of Public Safety** **and Order on the Seas through Maritime Training** **(2) U.S-Hosted International Mine Countermeasures** **Exercise** From October 27 to November 13, 2014, the MSDF participated in multilateral mine countermeasures exercise in the waters around the Arabian Peninsula hosted by the U.S. Navy (Third International Mine Countermeasures Exercise)[10]. This exercise has been conducted annually since 2012, and Japan has constantly participated in it. Participating in this exercise assists in the enhancement of the tactical skills of the MSDF and the strengthening of trust among the participating countries. The exercise also contributes to the maintenance of maritime security, while also contributing to the improvement of the global security environment. See Reference 59 (Participation in Multilateral Training (Last Three Years)) Vessels from different countries participating in the international mine countermeasures exercise (U.S. Marine Corp website) **(1) Training Conducted by the SDF and Counter-Piracy** **Teams from Various Countries in the Gulf of Aden** On September 25, 2014, in accordance with the agreement made between Prime Minister Abe and NATO Secretary General Rasmussen, the SDF deployed forces and NATO’s counter-piracy unit, with the objective of enhancing their cooperation and tactical skills required for counter-piracy activities, implemented joint exercises for the f rst time in the Gulf of Aden, followed by the second exercises on November 26 of the same year[6]. In addition, on October 16, 2014, the SDF conducted their f rst joint exercises with the EU surface forces, followed by the second exercises on November 5, 2014, the third exercises on November 22, 2014, and the fourth exercises on March 6 in 2015[7]. Furthermore, the SDF also conducted joint exercises with counter-piracy units from the Turkish Naval Forces[8] on November 8, 2014 and another joint exercises with Pakistani counter-piracy units on March 22, 2015[9]. These training exercises conducted in the Gulf of Aden had a great signif cance in that they strengthened the cooperation between the SDF and counter-piracy teams from various countries, and contributed to the maintenance of public safety and order on the seas. **(3) Strengthening of Cooperation in Maritime Security** **through Japan-Philippines Joint Training** On May 12, 2015, the MSDF conducted a joint training with the Philippine Navy in the waters west of Manila with the aim of improving tactical skills and strengthening cooperation between the two countries in the area of maritime security[11]. This training was conducted based on the agreement reached in the Japan-Philippines Defense Ministerial Meetings held in January 2015, and during the exercises the communication training using CUES (Code for Unplanned Encounters at Sea)[12] and tactical maneuvering was conducted. The signif cance of the training was that it contributed to the steady implementation and further development of CUES, and also leading to the strengthening of maritime security cooperation between Japan and the Philippines. 6 On September 25, the Japanese destroyer Takanami and one P-3C aircraft conducted joint exercises with the Royal Danish Navy Combat Support Ship Esbern Snare from the Operation Ocean Shield Unit including exercises in communication, tactical movement, and on-the-spot inspections. On November 26, the Japanese destroyer Takanami and the Royal Danish Navy Combat Support Ship Esbern Snare from the above operation unit carried out their second joint exercises in communication, tactical movement, on-the-spot inspections, fi ring training, and takeoff and landing of helicopters on the vessels. 7 The Japanese destroyer Takanami conducted the following joint exercises with the Naval Forces of different countries from the Operation Atalanta Forces: on October 16 exercises in communication, tactical movement, on-the-spot inspections, etc., with the Italian Navy destroyer Andrea Doria; on November 5 exercises in communication, takeoff and landing of helicopters on the destroyers, and exercises in close proximity with the German Navy frigate Lübeck; and on November 22 exercises in communication, exercises in close proximity, and takeoff and landing of helicopters on the vessels with the Royal Netherlands Navy frigate “Van Spejik.” In addition, On March 6, 2015, the Japanese destroyer Harusame carried out joint exercises in communication, tactical movement, and takeoff and landing of helicopters on the destroyers with the German Navy destroyer “Bayern.” 8 The MSDF destroyer Takanami carried out a bilateral joint exercise in communication and takeoff and landing of helicopters on the destroyer, and exercises in close proximity etc., with the frigate Gemlic of the Turkish Naval Forces from CTF 151. 9 The MSDF destroyer Harusame carried out a bilateral exercise in communication and tactical movement with the destroyer Tariq of the Pakistan Navy from CTF 151. 10 Minesweeper tender Bungo and minesweeper Yaeyama conducted minesweeping training, submarine training, and other training. 11 MSDF, the destroyers “Harusame” and “Amagiri” of the 20th Counter-Piracy Marine Unit, and the frigate Ramon Alcaraz of the Philippine Navy participated in the training. ----- in order to contribute to the creation and development of order on the ocean, it will ensure international collaboration and promote international cooperation by making use of fora such as multilateral and bilateral ocean conferences to contribute to establishment of international rules and consensus. In response to this, the MOD has been working on cooperation for maritime security within the regional security dialogue such as the ASEAN Defense Ministers’ Meeting (ADMM) Plus and the Inter-Sessional Meeting on Maritime Security (ISM-MS). See Part III, Chapter 3, Section 1-3 (Promoting Capacity Building Assistance and Other Practical Multilateral Security Cooperation) See Part III, Chapter 3, Section 1-2 (Initiatives under the Multilateral Security Framework and through Dialogue) **3** **Capacity Building Assistance Initiatives and** **Other Initiatives** The National Security Strategy and the National Defense Program Guidelines state that Japan will play a leading role in maintaining and developing “Open and Stable Seas,” including maritime security cooperation with other countries. As previously described, the MOD and the SDF implement capacity building assistance on maritime security for Indonesia, Vietnam and Myanmar, thereby assisting coastal states along sea lanes and others in enhancing their capabilities, and strengthening cooperation with partners that share the same strategic interests as Japan. In addition, the Basic Plan on Ocean Policy states that **VOICE** Assuming the Post of First Commander of a Multinational Unit **Rear Admiral (MSDF) Hiroshi Ito, the 4th Escort Flotilla Commander** Piracy is a grave threat to public safety and order on the seas. In particular, for Japan, which depends on maritime transportation to import most of the resources and food necessary for its survival and prosperity as a maritime nation, it is an important issue that cannot be ignored. While the number of incidents of piracy off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden has been decreasing, piracy has not been completely eradicated. Therefore, it is necessary that Japan continue to respond to this issue in close cooperation with the international community, and in particular with the naval forces of relevant countries. The MSDF has been conducting counter-piracy operations since 2009. This year, which marks the 70th anniversary of the end of World War II, from the perspective of the policy of “Proactive Contribution to Peace,” the Government of Japan has made the decision to dispatch a commander and HQ offi cers to the multinational unit headquarters for counter-piracy operations. Nearly half of the units and the headquarters of Combined Task Force 151 (CTF 151), where a member of the MSDF will serve as commander on this occasion, is comprised of dispatched offi cers from the naval forces of other countries. Since ancient times, we, the Japanese, have possessed a spirit of “valuing harmony,” which respects the personalities of others and accepts diversity. Making effective use of this unique Japanese characteristic and collaborating with various units and partners, I will leverage the abilities of each of these offi cers and partners in an effi cient manner. The MSDF has grown to possess world-class maritime defense capabilities. As responsible members of the international community, countries with such a preeminent ability are required to fulfi l their responsibilities accordingly. The MSDF will endeavor to complete this mission, and continue to contribute to the peace and stability of the The author (right) is exchanging opinions with a New Zealand Royal Navy international community. Brigadier General who has previously served as CTF 151 Commander ----- **2** **Efforts to Support International Peace Cooperation Activities** The MOD and the SDF are proactively undertaking international peace cooperation activities, working in tandem with diplomatic initiatives, including the use of Off cial Development Assistance (ODA) for resolving the fundamental causes of problems such as conf ict and terrorism. See Appendix 6 (Record of Activities in the International Community by the Ministry of Defense and Self-Defense Forces) **1** **Frameworks for International Peace Cooperation** **Activities** **(1) Framework of International Peace Cooperation** **Activities and the Signifi cance of Stipulating such** **Activities as One of the Primary Missions of the SDF** The international peace cooperation activities undertaken by the MOD and the SDF to date are as follows: (1) international peace cooperation duties such as United Nations peacekeeping operations (so-called UN PKO); (2) international disaster relief operations to respond to large-scale disasters overseas; (3) activities based on the former Special Measures on Humanitarian Reconstruction Assistance in Iraq; and (4) activities based on the former Anti-terrorism Special Measures Act, and the former Replenishment Support Special Measures Act. In 2007, international peace cooperation activities, which used to be regarded as supplementary activities[13] were upgraded, and are now to be one of the primary missions of the SDF, alongside the defense of Japan and the maintenance of public order[14]. See Fig. III-3-2-5 (International Peace Cooperation Activities Conducted by the SDF) See Reference 11 (Main Operations of the Self-Defense Forces), Reference 12 (Statutory Provisions about the Use of Armed Force and Weapons by SDF Personnel), Reference 69 (Summary Comparison of Laws Concerning International Peace Cooperation Activities), Reference 70 (The SDF Record in International Peace Cooperation Activities) International Peace Cooperation Activities Fig. III-3-2-5 Conducted by the SDF |International Peace Cooperation Activities Activities based on the “Act Concerning Japan’s Cooperation in International the U.N. Peacekeeping Operations and Other Operations” International Disaster Relief Activities Activities based on the “Act Concerning the Dispatch of Peace International Disaster Relief Teams” Cooperation in Efforts toward the Reconstruction of Iraq Cooperation Activities based on the “Act Concerning Special Measures on Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance and Support Activities for Ensuring Security in Iraq” (Ended in February 2009) Mission Activities to Respond to International Terrorism Activities based on the Act Concerning the Special Measures on|International Peace Cooperation Activities| |---|---| |International Peace Cooperation Mission|| Counter-Terrorism Maritime Interdiction Activities (Ended in January 2010) Legend : Activities based on time-limited acts : Activities based on permanent acts of the f ve area forces in Japan in rotation. Furthermore, the MSDF and ASDF also have a designated stand-by unit, which are always ready to be deployed. In 2009, in order to participate more actively in U.N. peacekeeping operations, Japan registered for the United Nations Stand-by Arrangement System (UNSAS)[15], which is a system used when the U.N. peacekeeping operation is deployed. The objective of this system is to make the process faster and smoother for the United Nations to approach countries with a request for dispatch when implementing peacekeeping operations. Japan has registered its preparedness to provide SDF personnel capable of providing logistic support for such activities and operations as transportation, facilities, and HQ off cers[16]. The SDF is enhancing information-gathering abilities and defensive abilities, which would enable SDF units to complete their missions successfully and safely in the f eld. In addition, in order to respond to various environments and prolonged missions, the SDF is improving its capabilities for transport, deployment, and information communication, and is developing a structure of replenishment and medical support for conducting smooth and continuous operations. For example, the GSDF promotes initiatives to enhance the conditions of the engineering unit, which is in high demand in dispatch destinations, as well as improving protection vehicles for transport that are used to protect people from mines and Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs). It also **(2) Continuous Initiatives to Promptly and Accurately** **Carry Out International Peace Cooperation Activities** To be a proactive contributor to world peace, it is important for the SDF to be fully prepared for any future operations. For this purpose, the Central Readiness Regiment, a unit which can be deployed swiftly whenever it is needed and prepares the area for when the main unit arrives, was established under the GSDF Central Readiness Force in March 2008. Also, the GSDF has a rotational stand-by unit, in which members are chosen from each area force 13 Activities prescribed in Article 8 of the SDF Act (a miscellaneous provision) or supplementary provisions 14 Missions defi ned in Article 3 of the SDF Act. The primary mission is to defend Japan. The secondary missions are the preservation of public order, activities in response to situations in areas surrounding Japan and international peace cooperation activities. 15 This is a system adopted by the United Nations in 1994 in order to facilitate agile deployment for U.N. peacekeeping operations. The system involves member nations registering beforehand the scope of the contribution that they can make, the number of personnel available for dispatch, and the time required for dispatch. When the United Nations approaches member nations with a request for dispatch based on the registered information, it is up to each country to decide whether or not to actually dispatch personnel. 16 As of the end of March 2015, Japan has registered its preparedness to provide SDF personnel capable of providing logistic support for the following activities and operations: (1) medical care (including epidemic prevention measures); (2) transportation; (3) storage (including reserve); (4) communications; (5) construction; (6) SDF units capable of logistic support for installation, inspection, ----- promotes the development of wheeled armored personnel **(3) Welfare and Mental Health Care of Dispatched SDF** carriers (modif ed). The MSDF is promoting the portability **Units** and deployability of the Marine Air Command and Control SDF personnel are expected to fulf ll their assigned duty System (MACCS) to facilitate the effective operation of under severe working conditions while being far away f xed-wing patrol aircraft overseas. The ASDF promotes the from their home country and their families. Therefore, it upgrading of its equipment and devices including aviation is extremely important to make necessary arrangements satellite phones, as well as countermeasure dispensers for so that dispatched SDF personnel can effectively carry out transport aircraft, and airborne collision avoidance systems, their assigned duty while maintaining both their physical in order to maintain command communication function and mental health. For this reason, the MOD and the SDF between aircraft and ground controllers under a range of have implemented various measures to support families environments. to reduce anxiety for the dispatched SDF personnel and With regard to the necessary education for engaging in their families. international peace cooperation activities, the International See Part III, Chapter 1, Section 4 (Human Foundation and Organization that Peace Cooperation Activities Training Unit at Camp Supports the Defense Force) Komakado (Shizuoka Prefecture) provides training and The SDF provides mental health checkups several support for training for GSDF personnel to be deployed to times from the time before a dispatch to the time after a international peace cooperation activities. In addition, the dispatch, for all the personnel to be sent. At the same time, Japan Peacekeeping Training and Research Center (JPC), the SDF also provides dispatched personnel with suff cient which was newly formed under the Joint Staff College in mental care such as offering a course on stress reduction 2010, offers a basic training course on international peace methods and assigning SDF personnel who have completed cooperation activities, and it also provides specialized specialized counseling education and training to SDF units training to train future candidates for contingent in overseas mission sites. In addition to assigning medical commanders and staff off cers at the deployed mission off cers to SDF units engaged in overseas missions, the headquarters to support UNPKO and other peace support MOD regularly sends mental healthcare support teams and missions. These specialized courses are conducted by using provides education on methods of dealing with stress on UN standard training materials and foreign instructors. the spot, as well as important points to consider in terms Furthermore, since FY2014, the JPC has provided training of communication with families or fellow SDF personnel not just to SDF personnel but also to students from after returning to Japan. foreign militaries and other Japanese ministries. This initiative represents the approach taken by the MOD and **2** **Initiatives to Support U.N. Peacekeeping** the SDF, which emphasizes the necessity of collaboration **Operations, etc.** and cooperation with related government departments and foreign countries, based on the recent situation that As a means to promote peace and stability in the conf ict international peace cooperation activities have become regions around the world, the United Nations Peacekeeping more complicated and multi-dimensional. The MOD and Operations (PKO) has expanded its missions in recent years the SDF aim to conduct more effective international peace to include such duties as the Protection of Civilians (POC), cooperation activities by enhancing training collaboration the promotion of political processes, providing assistance with related actors at home and abroad who are expected to in Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) work in various international activities. into society of former soldiers, Security Sector Reform (SSR), the rule of law, elections, human rights, and other f elds, in addition to such traditional missions as ceasef re monitoring. To date, 16 U.N. peacekeeping operations and 11 political and peace building missions have been established (as of the end of March 2015). International organizations, such as the Off ce of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), respective governments, and non-governmental organizations (NGO) conduct relief and restoration activities for the victims of conf icts and large-scale disasters from a humanitarian perspective and from the viewpoint of stabilizing affected countries. Japan has been promoting international peace cooperation activities in various regions including Cambodia, the Golan Heights, Timor-Leste, Nepal, and South Sudan for more than 20 years, and the results of these Ed ti l ti iti id d t th J P k i T i i d R h C t activitieshavebeenhighlypraisedbybothinsideandoutside ----- Japan. From the perspective of “Proactive Contribution to Peace” based on the principle of international cooperation, and in light of the appreciation and expectation from the international community, Japan will actively engage in international peace cooperation operations in a multilayered way. In this regard, to maximize the effect of Japan’s contribution to the international community, it is necessary to deliberate more deeply about how the SDF should contribute to the international community. Therefore, regarding international peace cooperation operations and other relevant missions, the SDF will continue proactively taking part in peacekeeping activities utilizing their accumulated experiences and advanced skills in f elds such as engineering, as well as by expanding the dispatch of SDF personnel to further responsible positions, such as mission headquarters and the Department of Peacekeeping Operations in the United Nations. As such, the SDF places more emphasis on taking more of a leading role, and the MOD will be proactively involved in Japan’s initiatives for international contribution. **(1) United Nations Mission in the Republic of South** **Sudan (UNMISS)** a. Background to the Decision to Dispatch Personnel to UNMISS The United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) was established following the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) between the Government of Sudan and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army in January 2005. Beginning in October 2008, Japan dispatched two GSDF off cers to UNMIS headquarters as staff off cers (logistics and information staff off cers), but UNMIS ended its mission in July 2011 following South Sudan’s independence. Meanwhile, with the objective of consolidating peace and security as well as helping to establish necessary conditions for the development of South Sudan, the United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS) was established. The Japanese Government was requested by the United Nations to cooperate with UNMISS, particularly through the dispatch of GSDF engineering units. The Cabinet approved the dispatch of two staff off cers (logistics and information staff off cers) to UNMISS in November 2011, and in December it decided to dispatch an SDF engineering unit, former Coordination Center, and an additional staff off cer (engineering staff off cer). In addition, the Cabinet also approved the dispatch of one staff off cer (air operations staff off cer). The peace and stability of South Sudan is essential for the stability of Africa as a whole, and it is a crucial issue that should be dealt with by the international community. The |South Fig. III-3-2-6|h Sudan and Its Surrounding Area|Col3| |---|---|---| |||| |South Sudan Central Equatoria Province Western Equatoria Province Eastern Equatoria Province Juba||| |||| Central Equatoria Province Western Equatoria Province Eastern Equatoria Province MOD and the SDF have accumulated experience through past peacekeeping operations, and we believe that it is possible for Japan to contribute to the peace and stability of South Sudan by providing personnel-based cooperation in infrastructure development, on which the United Nations places great expectations. See Part I, Chapter 2, Section 1-2-7 (Situation in Sudan and South Sudan) See Fig. III-3-2-6 (South Sudan and Its Surrounding Area) See See b. Activities by the SDF In January 2012, a Coordination Center (at the time) of the SDF was established for the f rst time in the SDF’s participation in U.N. peacekeeping operation, both in the South Sudan capital city Juba and in Uganda, in order for coordination for the activities conducted by the dispatched engineering unit to begin. Since the commencement of engineering activities within the United Nations facilities in March 2012, the SDF has gradually expanded its activities and has so far implemented engineering activities outside of the United Nations facilities; projects in cooperation with international organizations; and the “All Japan Project,” which consists of efforts in collaboration with development assistance projects. In May 2013, an SDF mobilization order regarding the expansion of areas for operation was issued, extending the SDF action areas from in and around Juba to areas in Eastern and Western Equatoria[17]. Since December 2013, due to the worsened security situation in South Sudan, the dispatched engineering unit conducted site preparation and maintenance activities for the internally displaced peoples (IDPs) camp within the United Nations’ facility in Juba. In addition, they also provided assistance in water supply activities and medical services, making use of 17 The SDF operation was planned to be conducted in Eastern and Western Equatoria as well in accordance with the needs of the United Nations. However, following the armed confl icts in South Sudan that started in December 2013, it was decided that the dispatched units should focus on internally displaced persons support in Juba. For this reason, full-scale operations in Eastern and Western ----- Parliamentary Vice-Minister Ishikawa inspecting the Juba River Port Security Fence construction work in South Sudan Chairs donated to a primary school in Poroti Star SDF personnel conducting gutter maintenance in South Sudan |Special Representative of the U|nited Nations Secretary-General| |---|---| |Fo Comm|rce ander| |---|---| |Chief o|f Staff| |---|---| Fig. III-3-2-7 Organization of UNMISS Special Representative of the United Nations Secretary-General CommanderForce Chief of Staff Director ofSupportDivisionMission Resident & HumanitarianSecretary-General, UNRepresentative of theDeputy SpecialCoordinator Representative ofGeneral (Political)Deputy Specialthe Secretary Logistics Branch Analysis CenterJoint Mission EngineeringSection Aviation Section Aviation Operation Logistics Staff Intelligence Staff Engineering Staff Staff Officer Officer (1 officer) Officer (1 officer) Officer (1 officer) (1 officer) (about 350 personnel)Engineer Unit Other Units Notes: Blue boxes show the number of Japanese personnel dispatched to UNMISS. the SDF management capabilities. On December, 2013, at the request of the United Nations and other organizations, Japan provided 10,000 bullets to the United Nations in light of the urgent necessity and humanitarian nature of the situation[18]. In May 2014, the United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 2155, which created the mandate of shifting the UNMISS role from support for nation building to the protection of civilians. Accordingly, the tasks of the deployed engineering unit also shifted from infrastructure development to mainly the provision of civilian protection support for the U.N. troops. In addition, the deployed engineering unit resumed road development and maintenance outside the U.N. facilities in June 2014 as the situation in Juba has become relatively stable. Furthermore, in November 2014, due to the United Nations Security Council’s decision to adopt Resolution 2187, which extended the dispatch period to UNMISS until May 30, 2015, Japan made changes to the implementation plan of the International Peace Cooperation Operations in South Sudan in February 2015 and extended the dispatch period until August 31, 2015. In May 2015, the Security Council adopted the United Nations Security Council Resolution 2223 to extend the dispatch period of the UNMISS for six months. See Fig. III-3-2-7 (Organization of UNMISS) See Fig. III-3-2-8 (Overview of the Coordination Center and the Engineer See See Unit Deployed in South Sudan) c. Cooperation Between Japan and Australia in UNMISS To date, the MOD and SDF have cooperated closely with the Australian Defense Forces in the f eld, such as in activities to provide humanitarian and reconstruction assistance in Iraq and United Nations peacekeeping operations. Both Japan and Australia are also participated in UNMISS. In August 2012, two Australian military personnel, who were dispatched to carry out UNMISS duties, began to undertake coordination activities with Japan’s Coordination Team. **(2) Dispatch of SDF Personnel to the U.N. Department of** **Peacekeeping Operations** Currently two SDF personnel (one Division-Director level and one operational-level) have been dispatched to the U.N. Department of Peacekeeping Operations (U.N. DPKO) for a two-year period to serve as the primary contact to and for the military components within the off ce of operations and to conduct force generation affairs for U.N. peacekeeping operations. See Reference 71 (Dispatch of Ministry of Defense Personnel to International Organizations) ----- |Overview of the Coordination Center an g. III-3-2-8|nd the Engineer Unit Deployed in South Sudan|Col3| |---|---|---| |: Orders concerning the activities and duties of the engineer un : SDF chain of command (Collaboration among each force)|it Minister of Defense Chief of Staff, Joint Staff adiness Force Self Defense Fleet Air Support Command About 350 Commanders (Colonel) eer Unit Engineering Equipment Platoon Engineering Platoon Garrison Military Police|| |UNMISS Central Re National Contingent Commander (Commander, Engineer Unit) Engin Unit Headquarters Support Unit for H.Q. Coordination Section||| |Unit Headquarters||Military Police| |Fig. III-3-2-9 Status of Instructors Dispatched to PKO centers|Col2| |---|---| |Tunisia Morocco PKO training Center (Mali) Liby Algeria Mauritania Niger Senegal Mali Ch Bamako Burkina Faso Guinea Benin Cote Ghana Nigeria D’lvoire Togo Centra Liberia Accra Cameroon Equatorial Guinea Sao Tome and Republic of Co Principe Gabon D Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre (Ghana) Angola South African National Peace Mission Training Centre (South Africa) Namibia S|Cyprus Syria Lebanon Iran Israel Iraq Cairo Jordan| ||a Cairo Regional Center for Egypt Training on Conflict| ||Resolution and Peacekeeping in Africa (Egypt) ad Eritrea Yemen| ||Sudan Ethiopian International Peace Keeping Training Centre: EIPKTC (Ethiopia) South Sudan l African Ethiopia Somalia Uganda Kenya| ||ngo emocratic Republic of Tanzania the Congo International Peace Support Training Centre (Kenya)| ||Zambia Mozambique Zimbabwe Madagascar Botswana| ||Lesotho| ||outh Africa| Center for United Nations Peacekeeping (India) the International Peace Support Training Centre in Kenya *Excludes commands relating to judicial police duties. **(3) Dispatch of Instructors to PKO Centers** To support peacekeeping operation undertaken by African and other countries, the MOD and SDF have dispatched SDF personnel as instructors to the PKO centers to contribute to the peace and stability by enhancing the capacity of the centers. Starting with the deployment to the Cairo Regional Center for Training on Conf ict Resolution and Peacekeeping in Africa (CCCPA) in November 2008, a total of 20 SDF personnel (17 deployments and eight countries in total), including two female SDF off cers, were dispatched over the period until May 2015. The SDF personnel provided education based on their experiences and lessons gained through SDF activities overseas, to include lectures concerning the importance of building relationships with local population in international peace cooperation activities, and the international disaster relief activities in which the SDF has engaged. In March to May at 2014, a SDF personnel was dispatched to the Ethiopian International Peacekeeping Center (EIPKTC) as an international consultant for the f rst time besides instructors, to provide advice on education and to design curriculums for cultivating U N peacekeepers which were highly appreciated by concerned local parties and students. Furthermore, in March 2015, two SDF off cers were dispatched to Centre for U.N. Peacekeeping (CUNPK) in India, one as an evaluation off cer for evaluating the educational content of the United Nations Peacekeeping Special Military Female Military Off cers Course, and one as an observer for this training. See Fig. III-3-2-9 (Status of Instructors Dispatched to PKO centers) MSDF l idi d ti t th PKO C t i K ----- **(4) Formulation of United Nations Military Unit Manuals** **(UNMUM) for Engineers** In order to play more of a leading role in international peace cooperation activities, the MOD and SDF support the formulation of the United Nations Military Unit Manuals (UNMUM) for Engineers, which is initiated by the United Nations Headquarters, and Japan also serves as a chair country of the Engineering Unit Manual Working Group. In March 2014, the f rst Engineer Unit Manual Working Group was held in Tokyo, its second meeting was held in Indonesia in June, and in August a f nal draft was submitted. The manual will be distributed to the member countries following the last adjustment within the United Nations. **(5) Partnership project for the Rapid Deployment of** **Engineering Capabilities in Africa** In some UN PKO missions in Africa, serious shortage of personnel and heavy equipment was revealed. In order to solve this problem, the Government of Japan is discussing the possibility to prepare equipment such as heavy equipment in advance at the United Nation’s facilities in Africa. Together, the Government of Japan is also reviewing the initiatives to support the dispatch of engineering units by providing education on heavy equipment operation for African Troop Contributing Countries (TCC). **3** **International Disaster Relief Operations** In recent years, the role of advanced capabilities in military affairs has become more diverse, and opportunities for its use in humanitarian assistance and disaster relief are growing. To contribute to the advancement of international cooperation, the SDF has also engaged in global disaster relief operations proactively from the viewpoint of humanitarian contributions and improvement of the international security environment. To this end, the SDF maintains their readiness to take any necessary action based on prepared disaster relief operation plans. Based on the consultation with the Minister for Foreign Affairs, the SDF has been proactively conducting international disaster relief operations, which fully utilize their functions and capabilities, while taking into consideration specif c relief requests by the governments of affected countries and disaster situations in these countries. See Reference 70 (The SDF Record in International Peace Cooperation Activities) **(1) Outline of the Japan Disaster Relief Team Law** Since the enactment of the Law Concerning the Dispatchment of the Japan Disaster Relief Team (Japan Disaster Relief Team Law) in 1987, Japan has engaged in international disaster relief activities in response to requests from the governments of affected countries and international organizations. In 1992, the Japan Disaster Relief Team Law was partially amended, enabling the SDF to participate in international disaster relief activities and to provide transport to its personnel and equipment for this purpose. See Reference 11 (Main Operations of the Self-Defense Forces) **(2) International Disaster Relief Operations by the SDF** **and SDF’s Posture** Responding to specif c relief requests by the governments of affected countries and the scale of disaster situations in these countries, the SDF’s capabilities in international disaster relief operations encompass (1) medical services, such as f rst-aid medical treatment and epidemic prevention; (2) transport of personnel and equipment by helicopter and other means; and (3) water supply activities using waterpurifying devices. In addition, the SDF uses transport planes and ships to carry disaster relief personnel and equipment to the affected area. The Central Readiness Force and regional units of the GSDF maintain their readiness to ensure that they can carry out international disaster relief operations in an independent manner anytime the need arises. The Self Defense Fleet of the MSDF and Air Support Command of the ASDF also **(6) United Nations Chiefs of Defence Conference** In March 2015, the United Nations Chiefs of Defence Conference was held as a follow-up to the summit meeting on the United Nations Peacekeeping Operations[19]. Over 100 countries participated in this conference. From Japan, the Chief of Staff of the GSDF attended the conference and delivered a speech expressing the SDF’s determination about fulf lling its responsibility for international peacekeeping by actively participating in U.N. peacekeeping operations and providing support for capacity building and Rapid Deployment of Engineering Capabilities in Africa. Chief of Staff, GSDF General Iwata participating in the United Nations Chiefs of Defence Conference 19 U.S. Vice President Joe Biden called for a high-level meeting concerning the United Nations Peacekeeping Operations, and in response to this, Prime Minister Abe co-hosted the meeting in September 2014. Leaders and offi cials at the ministerial level from around the world attended the meeting, and their commitment to make contributions towards the United Nations Peacekeeping Operations ----- constantly maintain their readiness to transport personnel and their supplies to disaster affected areas. **(3) International Disaster Relief Operations in the Philippines** In November 2013, responding to a request from the Government of the Philippines, which was suffering catastrophic damage from a large-scale typhoon, to the Government of Japan, and based on consultation with the Minister for Foreign Affairs, the Minister of Defense decided to initiate international disaster relief operations conducted by the SDF. Following the 50 SDF members who were initially dispatched, the MOD and the SDF formed the f rst ever international disaster relief Joint Task Force[20] (with approximately 1,100 personnel, the largest number to date). During the month-long activities, a total of 2,646 people received medical care; 11,924 people were vaccinated; epidemic control operations were conducted in an approximately 95,600 square meter area; approximately 630 tons of supplies were transported by aircraft; and a total of 2,768 affected people were transported by aircraft. The Joint Operations Center consisting of SDF personnel which was also dispatched to the Philippines took part in coordination activities with the Embassy of Japan and JICA, with the related Filipino organizations and other relevant countries. In addition, liaison off cers were exchanged between the MSDF destroyer Ise and the U.K. aircraft carrier HMS Illustrious for maintaining close communication and coordination. Furthermore, based on the Japan-US and Japan-Australia Acquisition and CrossServing Agreement (ACSA), supplies and services were provided and received[21] between these countries for the f rst time in international disaster relief operations. SDF personnel, engaged in the activity, conducting search and rescue operations 46 times and for approximately 400 hours. During this operation, MSDF P-3C patrol aircraft received support including fuel from Australia based on the ACSA. **(5) International Disaster Relief Operations for the** **Outbreak of Ebola in West Africa** Following the outbreak reported by Guinea in March 2014, Ebola continued to primarily spread in the three countries of Guinea and its neighboring countries Liberia and Sierra Leone. The MOD dispatched a liaison off cer to the United States Africa Command (AFRICOM) located in Germany in October 2014, in order to strengthen the cooperation between Japan and the United States regarding the response to the Ebola epidemic and to gather information on the operational status of other countries including the United States (the f rst was a member of the ASDF, followed by a member of the GSDF). Furthermore, in response to the request of the United Nations Mission for Ebola Emergency Response (UNMEER) for swift and reliable transport of personal protective equipment that is vital for safe medical practice, and based on consultation with the Minister for Foreign Affairs, the Minister of Defense decided to conduct international disaster relief operations on November 28, 2014. The MOD and SDF organized the International Disaster Relief Airlift Unit for West Africa and initially four personnel were dispatched on December 5 to Accra, the capital city of Ghana, to conduct coordination and preparation tasks with relevant organizations such as UNMEER. On December 6, the International Disaster Relief Airlift Unit for West Africa (one KC-767 aerial refueling/transport aircraft) was dispatched, and on December 8, delivered approximately 20,000 items of personal protective equipment to UNMEER. Furthermore, at the request of the World Health **(4) The International Disaster Relief Operations for the** **Missing Malaysian Airplane** In March, 2014, in the search for the lost Malaysia Airlines Flight MH370 f ying from Kuala Lumpur to Beijing, based on the consultation with the Minister for Foreign Affairs the Minister of Defense decided to conduct international disaster relief operations, taking into consideration the request for assistance from the Malaysian government. The MOD and SDF initially dispatched two P-3C patrol aircraft of the MSDF and two C-130H Transport planes of the ASDF to Malaysia. After that, at the request of the governments of Malaysia and Australia, the two P-3C patrol aircraft moved to western Australia to continue the search and rescue operations. In this operation, which continued over a month until April of the same year, a total of six P-3C patrol aircraft and C-130H transport planes, as well as 130 dispatched SDF Airlift Unit for transporting protective clothing during the international disaster relief activities in West Africa 20 The Philippines International Disaster Relief Team Joint Task Force: This team consisted of the following groups - the headquarters; a medical assistance and air support unit consisting of the 6th Division of the GSDF, 1st Helicopter Brigade, Northeastern Army Aviation Group, Tohoku Logistic Depot of the GSDF and Sendai Hospital; the maritime dispatched group consisting of the MSDF destroyer Ise and transport vessel Osumi; additionally an airlift unit consisting of the ASDF KC-767 tanker aircraft and C-130H transport aircraft were also dispatched. ----- Organization (WHO), Japan has dispatched several experts to support epidemiological survey in the affected countries. In April 2015, receiving additional request to dispatch an expert, the MOD decided to dispatch one instructor from the National Defense Medical College (NDMC). Based on the consultation with the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Japan, the Minister of Defense decided to send an NDMC instructor to Sierra Leone for approximately six weeks until the end of May 2015. **(6) The International Disaster Relief Operations for the** **Missing AirAsia Airplane** In the early hours of December 28, 2014, AirAsia Flight 8501 f ying from Surabaya to Singapore lost its contact . Following the request for search and rescue assistance from the Indonesian government, and based on the consultation with the Minister for Foreign Affairs, the Minister of Defense decided to initiate international disaster relief operations conducted by the SDF on December 31. The MOD and SDF organized the SDF Maritime Vessel Unit for the missing Air Asia airplane, and dispatched three personnel to conduct preparatory work as a Coordination Center. Two destroyers “Takanami” and “Onami,” as well as three helicopters, which were on their way to return to their bases following the completion of counter-piracy operations off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden, were dispatched to the waters where the international disaster relief was being conducted, engaged in search and rescue activities for approximately one week, and worked to recover the remains of the deceased passengers. Japan. In addition to this, responding to a request from the Government of Nepal, and based on the consultation with the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Japan, the MOD decided to initiate international disaster relief operations. The MOD and the SDF deployed personnel to Nepal that were comprised of the Joint Operations Coordination Center (four personnel), International Disaster Relief Medical Assistance Unit (approximately 110 personnel), and International Disaster Relief Air Transport Unit (approximately 160 personnel and six C-130 transport aircraft, etc.). At the same time, considering the urgent needs for medical assistance in the affected areas, part of the Medical Assistance Unit (approximately 20 personnel) was swiftly dispatched as the First Response Unit. In addition, the Airlift Unit and main Medical Assistance Unit were dispatched on April 29 and on April 30, respectively. During the operation period of approximately three weeks, the Medical Assistance Unit provided medical treatment to approximately 2,900 people within the capital Kathmandu and its suburbs, while the Joint Operations Coordination Center conducted coordination tasks with the Government of Nepal and other relevant organizations. At the same time, the Airlift Unit transported a total of nearly 9.5 tons of equipment and goods necessary for medical activities. Members of the Medical Assistance Unit conducting medical activities on the spot SDF Surface Force conducting a search and rescue operation during the international disaster relief activities in Indonesia **(7) International Disaster Relief Activities in Nepal** **(Earthquake)** A massive M7.8 earthquake struck Nepal on April 25, 2015. On April 26, the MOD allowed an investigation team consisting of three personnel to accompany the Japan Disaster Relief Team dispatched by the Government of Unloading cargo from a C-130H transport aircraft (Kathmandu, Nepal) ----- **3** **Initiatives for Arms Control, Disarmament and Non-Proliferation** Causing anxiety not only to Japan, but also countries across the globe, North Korea’s launch of a missile, which was purported to be a satellite, and its nuclear test demonstrated that the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and missiles, which serve as their means of delivery, still posed a pressing challenge to the peace and stability of the international community. Moreover, many countries are working on the regulation of certain conventional weapons, while taking into account the need to maintain a balance between the humanitarian perspectives and defensive requirements. One of the initiatives to deal with these issues is the development of an international framework for arms control, disarmament, and nonproliferation, and Japan is playing an active role in this effort. See Fig. III-3-2-10 (Framework for Arms Control, Disarmament and Nonproliferation Relating to Conventional Weapons, Weapons of Mass Destruction, Missiles and Related Materials, etc.) Framework for Arms Control, Disarmament and Nonproliferation Relating to Conventional Weapons, Weapons of Mass Destruction, Fig. III-3-2-10 Missiles and Related Materials, etc. |Weapons of Mass Destruction, etc.|Col2|Col3|Conventional Weapons| |---|---|---|---| |ear Weapons Chemical Weapons|Biological Weapons|Delivery Systems (Missiles)|| |n the Non- tion of Nuclear Chemical Weapons s (NPT) Convention (CWC) hensive Nuclear- n Treaty (CTBT)|Biological Weapons Convention (BWC)|The Hague Code of Conduct Against Ballistic Missile Proliferation (HCOC)|Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) Convention on Cluster Munitions (Oslo Convention) Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (Ottawa Treaty) U.N. Register of Conventional Arms U.N. Report on Military Expenditures Arms Trade Treaty (ATT)| |r Suppliers Group Australia Group (AG) (NSG)||Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR)|Wassenaar Arrangement (WA)| |Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540|||| **Category** Conventions on Arms Control, Disarmament and Nonproliferation, etc. Export Control Frameworks Aimed at Nonproliferation New International Initiatives Aimed at Nonproliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction Moreover, the whole of the Japanese government is working on projects aimed at disposing of abandoned chemical weapons in China, in accordance with the CWC, and the Ministry has seconded nine personnel, including GSDF personnel, to the Cabinet Off ce to work on this project. Since 2000, GSDF personnel with expertise in chemicals and ammunitions have been dispatched to conduct excavation and recovery projects on a total of 14 occasions. In 2014, from August to September, seven GSDF personnel participated in the project undertaken by the Cabinet Off ce in Hunchun, in China’s Jilin Province. In addition, the MOD has been cooperating in endeavors aimed at increasing the effectiveness of regulations and decisions, by dispatching off cials to major meetings such as those of the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), as well as international export control regimes in the form of the Australia Group (AG) and the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). Furthermore, from 2011 to 2012, one GSDF personnel was dispatched to the headquarters of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) for the f rst time. See Reference 71 (Dispatch of Ministry of Defense Personnel to International Organizations) **1** **Initiatives Focused on Treaties Relating to Arms** **Control, Disarmament, and Nonproliferation** Japan actively participates in international initiatives for arms control, disarmament, and nonproliferation in regard to weapons of mass destruction, in the form of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons, as well as missiles as their means of delivery and associated technologies and materials. Japan has contributed personnel in this f eld, offering its knowledge in the f eld of chemical protection from the time when negotiations over the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) were taking place, as well as dispatching GSDF personnel who are experts on protection against chemical weapons to the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), which was established to continuously implement verif cation measures following the entry of the Convention into force. Furthermore, small quantities of chemical substances subject to regulation under the Convention are synthesized at the GSDF Chemical School (Saitama City), in order to conduct protection research. Thus, the school has undergone a total of nine inspections since its establishment, in accordance with the Convention regulations ----- Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Defense Ishikawa having a meeting with Ambassador Ahmet Üzümcü, Director-General of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) Taking into account both the humanitarian perspectives and security needs, Japan has signed various conventions on the regulation of conventional weapons, including the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects (CCW)[22]. Japan has also signed the Convention on Cluster Munitions (Oslo Convention)[23], which was adopted outside the framework of the CCW. With the entry of this Convention into force in August 2010, the use of all cluster munitions in the possession of the SDF immediately became prohibited. While the Convention stipulates that, in principle, all cluster munitions held by signatories be destroyed within eight years of its entry into force, disposal of such munitions possessed by the SDF was completed on February 9, 2015. Furthermore, the MOD has actively cooperated in the initiatives of the international community that are focused on the problem of anti-personnel mines, such as submitting annual reports that include data on Japan’s exceptional stocks to the United Nations[24]. In addition, the MOD and the SDF participate in various systems introduced by the United Nations with the goal of increasing the transparency of military preparedness and military expenditure (the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms and the United Nations Report on Military Expenditures), and as well as providing the requisite reports, they dispatch personnel as needed to governmental expert meetings held in order to review and improve these systems. GSDF personnel conducting projects to excavate and recover abandoned chemical weapons in Jilin Province, China **2** **International Initiatives Aimed at Nonproliferation** **of Weapons of Mass Destruction** **(1) Proliferation Security Initiative** Harboring grave concerns about the development of weapons of mass destruction and missiles by countries such as North Korea and Iran, the United States announced its Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI)[25] in May 2003, and sought the participation of other countries therein. Various initiatives are being undertaken based on PSI, such as PSI interdiction exercises aimed at improving the ability of participating countries to thwart the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and related items, and holding meetings to consider issues on policies and legislations. Since the 3rd PSI Meeting in Paris (September 2003), the MOD and the SDF have collaborated with relevant organizations and countries, dispatching MOD off cials and SDF personnel to various meetings, as well as engaging in ongoing participation in these exercises since 2004. To date, Japan has twice hosted PSI maritime interdiction exercises, working in partnership with relevant organizations, including the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the National Police Agency, the Ministry of Finance and the Japan Coast Guard, and for the f rst time hosted the PSI air interdiction exercise in July 2012. In addition, during the PSI maritime interdiction exercise, which was hosted by the United States in August 2014, Japan sent participants including personnel from the Joint Staff, MSDF naval vessels and aircraft, as well as personnel from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the National Police Agency, the Ministry of Finance, and the Japan Coast Guard. Based on the proliferation cases in the areas surrounding Japan, and from the perspectives of preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction 22 CCW: Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects 23 Countries such as the United States, China and Russia, which are major producers and owners of cluster munitions, have not yet signed the Oslo Convention. 24 Between 1999 and December 2006, the MOD nominated retired Self-Defense Offi cials to the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA), to support antipersonnel mine removal activities in Cambodia; these retired SDF personnel were dispatched to the Cambodian Mine Action Center (CMAC) as maintenance and transport advisors within JICA’s long-term expert dispatch framework. 25 An initiative that seeks to strengthen the relevant domestic laws of respective countries to the maximum possible extent, and considers measures that participating countries can jointly take while ----- |Date|Exercise|Location|Participation of MOD/SDF| |---|---|---|---| |July 2012|PSI air interdiction exercise hosted by Japan|Japan|Joint Staff, Air Defense Command, Air Support Command, Northern Army, Central Readiness Force, Internal Bureau| |September 2012|PSI maritime interdiction exercise hosted by the ROK|Republic of Korea|1 destroyer, 1 patrol aircraft (P-3C)| |February 2013|PSI exercise co-hosted by the U.S. and UAE|UAE|Dispatch of observer| |August 2014|PSI maritime interdiction exercise hosted by the U.S.|United States|1 destroyer| Fig. III-3-2-11 Participation of MOD/SDF in PSI Interdiction Exercise (Since 2012) in peacetime and improving the response capability of the SDF, the MOD will continue its efforts to conduct activities to strengthen nonproliferation frameworks, including PSI, as well as participating in and holding various relevant exercises and meetings. See Fig. III-3-2-11 (Participation of MOD/SDF in PSI Interdiction Exercise (Since 2012)) **(2) United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540** **Regarding the Nonproliferation of Weapons of Mass** **Destruction** In April 2004, the United Nations Security Council unanimously adopted United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 regarding the nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction, which lays the foundations for the international community to deal with the acquisition, development, use, and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction by non-state actors. Japan supports the adoption of this resolution and hopes that all United Nations member countries will comply with it. ----- **Interaction with Local Communities and** **Chapter** ##### 4 **Japanese Citizens** **Section 1 Collaboration with Local Communities** **1** **Activities in Civic Life and Contributions to Society** The MOD/SDF conducts activities to support the lives of citizens in a range of f elds, in response to requests from municipal governments and relevant organizations. Such activities contribute to further deepening the trust in the SDF, and provide SDF personnel with pride and conf dence. The GSDF handles the disposal of unexploded ordnance found throughout Japan. In FY2014, there were 1,560 such cases (approx. 57.1 tons). In particular, cases handled in Okinawa Prefecture accounted for approx. 40% of the total cases. The MSDF clears and disposes of underwater mines and other dangerous explosives, and approx. 333 explosives (approx. 4.8 tons) were handled in FY2014. The SDF camps and bases allow the local residents access to their facilities to the extent that it does not interfere with unit activities, thus striving to foster friendly interaction with local communities. The SDF also provides transportation and other assistance at a variety of athletic events. In addition, it supports regional medical treatment efforts by providing general medical care at some SDF hospitals as well as conducting urgent transport for emergency patients from isolated islands. Furthermore, based on national policy[1], the MOD and SDF will ensure **2** **Cooperation from Municipal Governments and Other Related Organizations for the SDF** Amid the harsh recruitment and employment situation, the cooperation of local governments and relevant organizations is vital to secure highly qualif ed personnel and to assist the outplacement of uniformed SDF personnel who retire in compliance with the early retirement system of SDF. Furthermore, SDF camps and bases maintain close relations with local communities, and therefore, opportunities for local small and medium sized enterprises to receive orders, while taking eff ciency into account, by such measures as the promotion of separated/divided ordering[2] and the securing of competition amongst companies within the same qualif cation and grade divisions[3]. Blue Impulse fl ying over Himeji Castle at the “Ceremony Marking the Completion of the Preservation and Restoration Project for the Main Keep of Himeji Castle.” (March 26, 2015) See Reference 72 (Activities in Civic Life), Reference 73 (Activities Contributing to Society) various forms of support and cooperation from the local community are indispensable for the SDF to conduct its diverse activities, including training exercises and disaster dispatch. Moreover, units dispatched overseas for international peace cooperation missions and other duties receive support and assistance from the relevant organizations for the procedures involved[4]. **3** **Activities for Securing Understanding and Cooperation of Municipal Governments and Local Residents** Regional Defense Bureaus make efforts to build cooperative relationships with local communities, through collaboration with SDF units and Provincial Cooperation Off ces. Specif cally, Regional Defense Bureaus provide explanations and conduct coordination regarding defense policies and the realignment of the U.S. Forces in Japan. They also hold seminars on defense issues for local residents and host Japan-U.S. friendship programs for citizens who live near U.S. Forces facilities and areas in Japan, U.S. Forces personnel, and their families. Furthermore, The offi cial name of the policy is “The Contract Policy of the Government regarding Small and Medium Enterprises” (Cabinet decision on June 27, 2014) For example, this is a method through which grouping of products etc. takes place when putting up the order for general competitive bidding, and then a successful bidder for the groups is decided. Out of the bidding participation eligibility categorized into grade A-D, this refers to competition between grade C or D only, which comprise mostly of small and medium enterprises. In addition to this kind of support, many letters of encouragement are sent from the public to the SDF personnel, which raise the morale of SDF personnel and reinforce their awareness of serving the ----- Regional Defense Bureaus conduct the necessary liaison other emergency situations. and coordination in the event of disasters, accidents, or any **4** **Measures to Promote Harmony between Defense Facilities and Surrounding Areas** **1** **Scale and Features of Defense Facilities** The uses of defense facilities[5] are diverse, and they often require large volumes of land. Meanwhile, approx. 24% of the land area of the facilities and areas (for exclusive use) of the U.S. Forces in Japan is jointly used by the SDF under the Japan-U.S. Status of Forces Agreement. In addition, problems related to restricted establishment and operations of defense facilities have emerged due to the urbanization of areas around many of the defense facilities. Also, another problem is that frequent aircraft operations such as takeoffs and landings cause noise and other issues, impacting the living environment of local residential communities. See Fig. III-4-1-1 (Status of SDF Facilities (Land Plots)), Fig. III-4-1-2 (Status of Facilities and Areas of U.S. Forces in Japan (Exclusively Used Facilities)) **2** **Initiatives to Promote Harmony between** **Defense Facilities and Surrounding Areas** Defense facilities, as the foundation that supports the defense capabilities of Japan and the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements, are indispensable for our country’s security. Therefore, it is necessary to maintain conditions for constant and stable utilization by ensuring harmony between the defense facilities and the surrounding areas as well as obtaining the understanding and cooperation of the local residents. For that purpose, the MOD has taken measures to promote harmony between defense facilities and surrounding areas since 1974, based on the Act on Improvement of Living Environment of Areas Around Defense Facilities (Living Environment Improvement Act). See Fig. III-4-1-3 (Measures for Harmony Between Defense Facilities and Surrounding Areas) Reference 74 (Outline of Measures to Improve the Living Environment in the Areas Surrounding Defense Facilities) Fig. III-4-1-1 Status of SDF Facilities (Land Plots) (as of January 1, 2015) Status of Facilities and Areas of U.S. Forces in Fig. III-4-1-2 Japan (Exclusively Used Facilities) (as of January 1, 2015) Distribution by region Distribution by region by use Other regions 10% Approx. 111km[2] Kanto region 5% Approx. 57km[2] Kyushu region 12% Approx. 135km[2] Tohoku region 14% Approx. 147km[2] Chubu region 16% Approx. 178km[2] Hokkaido region 42% Approx. 459km[2] accounting for approx. 0.3% Total area: Approx. 1,087km[2] of Japan’s land area Maneuver Areas 75% Approx. 812km[2] Airfields 7% Approx. 81km[2] Barracks 5% Approx. 54km[2] Others 13% Approx. 140km[2] 0 20 40 60 80 100 (%) Notes: Numbers may not add up to 100 due to rounding. Other regions 7% Approx. 22km[2] Tohoku region 8% Approx. 24km[2] Kanto region 11% Approx. 35km[2] Okinawa Prefecture 74% Approx. 227km[2] Total area: accounting for 0.08% of Approx. 307km[2] Japan’s land area Maneuver Areas 53% Approx. 164km[2] Airfields 20% Approx. 60km[2] Warehouses 13% Approx. 40km[2] Others 14% Approx. 43km[2] 0 20 40 60 80 100 (%) Notes: Numbers may not add up to 100 due to rounding. ----- |Purpose|Measures|Description of Measures| |---|---|---| |Preventing Noise Problems|Subsidies to fi nance sound insulation work|H Educational facilities such as elementary schools, junior high schools, and kindergartens; medical facilities such as hospitals and clinics; and welfare facilities such as nursery centers, day-service centers for the elderly, and special nursing homes for the elderly H Housing| ||Compensation for relocations|H Compensation for relocating buildings H Land procurement H Improvement of public facilities such as roads, water-supply systems, and sewage facilities in the area where housing, etc., is to be relocated| ||Improving green belts|H Planting trees, installing grass fi elds| |Preventing Nuisances Besides Noise|Subsidies to fi nance trouble prevention work|H Canals, reservoirs, roads, river improvement, television broadcast community reception facilities| |Reducing Troubles Related to Living and Business|Subsidies for building facilities meant to stabilize people’s lives|H Roads, radio broadcast facilities, nursing homes, fi re departments, parks, waste disposal facilities, welfare centers for the elderly, public facilities for learning, etc. H Agricultural facilities, fi shing facilities| |Reducing Impact on Surrounding Areas|Provision of specifi ed defense facilities environs improvement adjustment grants|H Improving public facilities such as traffi c facilities, recreation centers, and welfare facilities H Medical expenses, operating costs of community buses, assessment fees for earthquake resistance for school buildings, etc.*| Fig. III-4-1-3 Measures for Harmony Between Defense Facilities and Surrounding Areas - Newly added due to the partial revision of the Act on Improvement of Living Environment of Areas Around Defense Facilities (effective as of April 27, 2011) **(1) Measures of the Act on Improvement of Living** **Environment of Areas Around Defense Facilities** Based on the Act on Improvement of Living Environment of Areas Around Defense Facilities, the MOD has implemented various measures to prevent, alleviate, and mitigate impediments such as aircraft noise in the surrounding areas caused by the SDF or U.S. Forces activities, or by establishing and operating defense facilities including airf elds. Furthermore, taking into consideration the requests of the relevant municipal governments, the MOD partially revised the Living Environment Improvement Act in 2011, and conducted a review to make it possible for the specif ed defense facilities environs improvement adjustment grants to be applied to so-called soft projects, such as aid for medical expenses. In addition, the MOD added defense facilities to be eligible for these grants. Focused work is also underway to provide residential sound insulation and efforts are being made to ensure its further progress. Regarding the specif ed defense facilities environs improvement adjustment grants, the MOD has implemented initiatives such as the ‘PDCA Cycle’ process since April 2014, aiming to increase the effectiveness of these grants. See Reference 75 (Partial Amendment of the Law Concerning Adjustment, etc. of the Living Environment in the Environs of Defense Facilities) FY2015 Costs for Countermeasures in Areas near Fig. III-4-1-4 Bases (Based on Expenditures) (100 million yen) |Project|Mainland|Okinawa| |---|---|---| |Projects for preventing disturbances|103|19| |Sound insulation projects|423|79| |Measures related to relocations|37|3| |Subsidies for stabilizing people’s livelihoods|212|19| |Road improvement projects|67|4| |Environs Improvement Adjustment Grants|166|29| |Other projects|18|6| **(2) Considerations for Future Harmonization of Defense** **Facilities and Surrounding Areas** In response to the requests by related municipal governments, the MOD continues to consider practical ways to achieve more effective and eff cient measures to harmonize defense facilities and surrounding areas, in light of the severe f scal situation. See Fig. III-4-1-4 (FY2015 Costs for Countermeasures in Areas Near Bases (Based on Expenditures)) **Section 2 Public Relations Activities, Information Disclosure, and Related Activities** **1** **Various Public Relations Activities** As the activities of the MOD/SDF cannot be carried out without the understanding and support of the Japanese people, it is important to be proactive in undertaking easily comprehensible public relations activities and to gain the trust and cooperation of the public. According to a “Public Opinion Survey on the Self Defense Forces and Security Issues” conducted by the Cabinet Off ce (in January 2015), the public expectations and evaluations towards the SDF have been increasing as the scope of MOD/SDF activities has expanded both domestically and internationally. In light of this result, the MOD/SDF will continue to conduct a variety of PR activities, thereby striving to ensure better understanding of the current status of the MOD/SDF. See Reference 76 (“Public Opinion Survey on the Self Defense Forces and Defense Issues” (excerpt) (Public Relations Offi ce of Cabinet Offi ce: as of January 2015)) ----- |Purpose|Measures|Description of Measures| |---|---|---| |Preventing Noise Problems|Subsidies to fi nance sound insulation work|H Educational facilities such as elementary schools, junior high schools, and kindergartens; medical facilities such as hospitals and clinics; and welfare facilities such as nursery centers, day-service centers for the elderly, and special nursing homes for the elderly H Housing| ||Compensation for relocations|H Compensation for relocating buildings H Land procurement H Improvement of public facilities such as roads, water-supply systems, and sewage facilities in the area where housing, etc., is to be relocated| ||Improving green belts|H Planting trees, installing grass fi elds| |Preventing Nuisances Besides Noise|Subsidies to fi nance trouble prevention work|H Canals, reservoirs, roads, river improvement, television broadcast community reception facilities| |Reducing Troubles Related to Living and Business|Subsidies for building facilities meant to stabilize people’s lives|H Roads, radio broadcast facilities, nursing homes, fi re departments, parks, waste disposal facilities, welfare centers for the elderly, public facilities for learning, etc. H Agricultural facilities, fi shing facilities| |Reducing Impact on Surrounding Areas|Provision of specifi ed defense facilities environs improvement adjustment grants|H Improving public facilities such as traffi c facilities, recreation centers, and welfare facilities H Medical expenses, operating costs of community buses, assessment fees for earthquake resistance for school buildings, etc.*| Fig. III-4-1-3 Measures for Harmony Between Defense Facilities and Surrounding Areas - Newly added due to the partial revision of the Act on Improvement of Living Environment of Areas Around Defense Facilities (effective as of April 27, 2011) **(1) Measures of the Act on Improvement of Living** **Environment of Areas Around Defense Facilities** Based on the Act on Improvement of Living Environment of Areas Around Defense Facilities, the MOD has implemented various measures to prevent, alleviate, and mitigate impediments such as aircraft noise in the surrounding areas caused by the SDF or U.S. Forces activities, or by establishing and operating defense facilities including airf elds. Furthermore, taking into consideration the requests of the relevant municipal governments, the MOD partially revised the Living Environment Improvement Act in 2011, and conducted a review to make it possible for the specif ed defense facilities environs improvement adjustment grants to be applied to so-called soft projects, such as aid for medical expenses. In addition, the MOD added defense facilities to be eligible for these grants. Focused work is also underway to provide residential sound insulation and efforts are being made to ensure its further progress. Regarding the specif ed defense facilities environs improvement adjustment grants, the MOD has implemented initiatives such as the ‘PDCA Cycle’ process since April 2014, aiming to increase the effectiveness of these grants. See Reference 75 (Partial Amendment of the Law Concerning Adjustment, etc. of the Living Environment in the Environs of Defense Facilities) FY2015 Costs for Countermeasures in Areas near Fig. III-4-1-4 Bases (Based on Expenditures) (100 million yen) |Project|Mainland|Okinawa| |---|---|---| |Projects for preventing disturbances|103|19| |Sound insulation projects|423|79| |Measures related to relocations|37|3| |Subsidies for stabilizing people’s livelihoods|212|19| |Road improvement projects|67|4| |Environs Improvement Adjustment Grants|166|29| |Other projects|18|6| **(2) Considerations for Future Harmonization of Defense** **Facilities and Surrounding Areas** In response to the requests by related municipal governments, the MOD continues to consider practical ways to achieve more effective and eff cient measures to harmonize defense facilities and surrounding areas, in light of the severe f scal situation. See Fig. III-4-1-4 (FY2015 Costs for Countermeasures in Areas Near Bases (Based on Expenditures)) **Section 2 Public Relations Activities, Information Disclosure, and Related Activities** **1** **Various Public Relations Activities** As the activities of the MOD/SDF cannot be carried out without the understanding and support of the Japanese people, it is important to be proactive in undertaking easily comprehensible public relations activities and to gain the trust and cooperation of the public. According to a “Public Opinion Survey on the Self Defense Forces and Security Issues” conducted by the Cabinet Off ce (in January 2015), the public expectations and evaluations towards the SDF have been increasing as the scope of MOD/SDF activities has expanded both domestically and internationally. In light of this result, the MOD/SDF will continue to conduct a variety of PR activities, thereby striving to ensure better understanding of the current status of the MOD/SDF. See Reference 76 (“Public Opinion Survey on the Self Defense Forces and Defense Issues” (excerpt) (Public Relations Offi ce of Cabinet Offi ce: as of January 2015)) ----- State Minister of Defense Akira Sato exchanging opinions with local residents at a Roundtable The SDF Marching Festival held at the Nippon Budokan in FY2014 Talk (Zentsuji City, Kagawa Prefecture) visitors in total in 2014. Concerning annual reviews by the SDF, a troop review, a f eet review, and an air review are hosted in rotation by the GSDF, MSDF, and ASDF respectively. In 2014, an air review commemorating the 60th anniversary of the MOD/SDF was held at Hyakuri Base, which attracted approximately 15,000 visitors, including visitors who attended the review and the rehearsal. In 2015, a f eet review is planned to take place. The MOD/SDF also actively opens PR facilities to the public. For instance, the number of visitors on the facility tour at the PR facilities in the MOD at Ichigaya district (Ichigayadai Tour) reached 350,000 as of the end of March 2015. Each SDF service also has a large-scale PR facility in addition to PR facilities and archives at the SDF camps and bases open to the public. Furthermore, the MOD/SDF provides cooperation for shooting f lms and TV programs. The Air Review Commemorating the 60th Anniversary of the MOD/SDF **1** **Website, Brochures, and Other Forms of PR** The MOD/SDF conducts PR activities using the Internet such as official websites, video distribution, and social media. The MOD has also been making great efforts to provide accurate information in a more extensive and timely fashion, by creating brochures, PR videos, and manga editions of the defense white paper, as well as providing assistance in editing the PR magazine MAMOR and cooperation on media coverage. Furthermore, based on the increasing interest in MOD/SDF initiatives by the international community, the MOD has been striving to gain the understanding of people in foreign countries by publishing the monthly English magazine, “Japan Defense Focus.” It is proactively transmitting information to the international community through efforts such as providing foreign media with opportunities to cover stories, enhancement of the English section of the MOD website, publishing English versions of the defense white paper and brochures, as well as producing PR videos. **2** **Events and PR Facilities** The MOD/SDF conducts activities to widely inform nationals of the current circumstances of the SDF. These activities include the GSDF Fuji Fire Power Exercise, cruises to experience MSDF vessels, and demonstration f ights and boarding experiences on aircraft. In addition, at camps and bases throughout the country, events including equipment exhibitions and unit tours are held on occasions such as the anniversary of a unit’s foundation. In some instances, they also hold parades throughout the cities, with cooperation from the local communities. Furthermore, as part of the commemoration of the SDF anniversary, the SDF Marching Festival is held at Nippon Budokan arena every year. The festival attracted approximately 41,000 **3** **Trial Enlistment Programs** The MOD/SDF offers SDF Life Experience Tours[1] and Enlistment Experience Programs[2]. These programs are intended to promote participants’ understanding of the SDF by offering the opportunity to experience the daily life and Information on the Summer Tour/Spring Tour for College Students, Ms. Parsley Tour (trial tour for women in their 20s); and One-Day Visit to SDF for Women etc. is available on the MOD website. ----- training of the SDF, as well as to have direct contact with SDF personnel. In FY2014, approximately 150 persons participated in SDF Life Experience Tours. From the private **2** **Initiatives for Information Disclosure** **1** **Appropriate Operation of the Information Disclosure** **System and Personal Data Protection System** In accordance with the Act on Access to Information Held by Administrative Organs in 2001, the MOD discloses its administrative documents properly. In the light of respecting individual rights in line with the Act on the Protection of Personal Information Held by Administrative Organs, the MOD takes measures to ensure the security of the personal information under its jurisdiction, and discloses such information upon due request. See Reference 77 (Record of Information Disclosure by the Ministry of Defense (FY2014)), Reference 78 (MOD Contacts for Information Disclosure and Personal Information Protection) sector, the SDF received approximately 1,500 requests for Enlistment Experience Programs, and approximately 24,000 employees experienced SDF life. **2** **Appropriate Operation of the Whistleblower** **Protection System** The MOD set up a system to handle public interest-related information disclosures by its off cials, employees and outside workers, establishing an internal contact desk for dealing with information disclosure that is in the public interest and whistleblower protection. **3** **Engagement in Policy Evaluation** The MOD has been conducting the evaluation of various policies based on its policy evaluation system. In FY2014, the MOD conducted policy evaluations of R&D programs and the special measures concerning taxation as well as the major policies and programs of the National Defense Program Guidelines (NDPG) and the Mid Term Defense Program (MTDP). ----- Reference **Table of Contents** **Part I** **Security Environment Surrounding Japan** Reference 37 Guided Missile Specifi cations .......................................................... 373 Reference 1 Number of Nuclear Warheads Arsenals by Country and Reference 38 Pattern of Defense-Related Expenditures (Original Budget Basis) .... 374 Their Major Means of Delivery ......................................................... 314 Reference 39 Changes in Major Area of Expenditures on General Account Reference 2 Outline of Military Power of Major Countries and Regions Budget (Original Budget Basis) ........................................................ 374 (Approximate Numbers) .................................................................. 314 Reference 40 Changes in Composition of Defense-Related Expenditures Reference 3 Outline of Regular and Reserve Forces of Major Countries and (Original Budget Basis) .................................................................... 375 Regions (Approximate Numbers) ..................................................... 314 Reference 41 Trend of Defense Expenditures of Major Countries ........................... 375 Reference 4 Transition of Military Power in the Area Surrounding Japan ............. 315 Reference 42 Record of Disaster Relief Dispatches (Past Five Years) ..................... 376 **Part II** **Japan’s Security and Defense Policy and the Japan-U.S. Alliance** Reference 43 Implementation and participation record of major drills concerning Reference 5 Development of Seamless Security Legislation to disaster dispatch (FY2014) .............................................................. 376 Ensure Japan’s Survival and Protect its People ................................ 315 Reference 44 Employment situation of retired uniformed SDF Personnel in Reference 6 Summary of the Bill for Partial Amendments to the Self-Defense disaster prevention-related bureaus in local government Forces Law and Other Existing Laws for Ensuring Peace and (as of March 31, 2015: 334 persons) ............................................... 376 Security of Japan and the International Community ......................... 317 Reference 45 Breakdown of Ministry of Defense Personnel .................................. 377 Reference 7 Outline of the Bill Concerning Cooperation and Support Activities Reference 46 Authorized and Actual Strength of Uniformed SDF Personnel ........... 377 and Other Activities to Armed Forces, of Foreign Countries and Others in Situations Where the International Community is Reference 47 Status of Recruiting and Employing Uniformed SDF Personnel Collectively Addressing for Peace and Security ................................ 320 (FY2014) ......................................................................................... 378 Reference 8 Responses to Foreign Naval Vessels Carrying Out Navigation Reference 48 Major Exercises Conducted in FY2014 ............................................ 379 through the Territorial Sea or the Internal Waters of Japan that Reference 49 Results of Firing Training and Related Training by Dispatch of Does Not Fall Under Innocent Passage in International Law ............. 323 Each of the Self-Defense Forces to the United States (FY2014) ....... 379 Reference 9 The Government’s Responses to Illegal Landing on a Remote Reference 50 History of Efforts for BMD Development in Japan ........................... 380 Island or its Surrounding Seas by an Armed Group .......................... 323 Reference 51 Flow of Responce to Ballistic Missiles ............................................ 380 Reference 10 Responses to Acts of Infringement When Self-Defense Force Reference 52 MOD/SDF Comprehensive Measures to Deal with Cyber Attacks ..... 381 Ships or Aircraft Detect Foreign Ships Committing Said Acts Against Japanese Private Ships on the High Seas ........................... 324 Reference 53 Main Measures for Re-employment Support ................................... 381 Reference 11 Main Operations of the Self-Defense Forces ................................... 325 Reference 54 Record of Major Multinational Security Dialogues (Asia-Pacifi c Region, Last Five Years)............................................... 382 Reference 12 Statutory Provisions about the Use of Armed Force and Weapons by SDF Personnel ............................................................. 326 Reference 55 Exchange Student Acceptance Record (Number of Newly Accepted Students in FY2014) ........................................................ 382 Reference 13 Record of Joint Exercises for Civil Protection Implemented by the National and Local Governments (FY2014) ............................ 327 Reference 56 Multilateral Security Dialogues Hosted by the Ministry of Defense .......................................................................................... 383 Reference 14 National Security Strategy ............................................................... 327 Reference 57 Other Multilateral Security Dialogue ................................................ 384 Reference 15 NATIONAL DEFENSE PROGRAM GUIDELINES for FY2014 and beyond ..................................................................................... 335 Reference 58 Status of Invitation Program ............................................................ 385 Reference 16 Medium Term Defense Program (FY2014-FY2018) .......................... 342 Reference 59 Participation in Multilateral Training (Last Three Years) .................... 385 Reference 17 Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment Reference 60 Recent Defense Cooperation and Exchanges with Australia and Technology ............................................................................... 348 (Past Three Years) ........................................................................... 387 Reference 18 The Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation Reference 61 Recent Defense Cooperation and Exchanges with the ROK (April 27, 2015) ............................................................................... 349 (Past Three Years) ........................................................................... 387 Reference 19 United States–Japan Roadmap for Realignment Implementation ..... 354 Reference 62 Recent Defense Cooperation and Exchanges with India (Past Three Years) ........................................................................... 388 Reference 20 Joint Statement of the Security Consultative Committee (April 27, 2012) ............................................................................... 356 Reference 63 Recent Defense Cooperation and Exchanges with China (Past Three Years) ........................................................................... 388 Reference 21 Japan–U.S. (Minister-Level) Consultations (Since 2012) .................. 356 Reference 64 Recent Defense Cooperation and Exchanges with Russia Reference 22 Joint Statement of the Security Consultative Committee (Past Three Years) ........................................................................... 388 (October 3, 2013) ............................................................................ 358 Reference 65 Recent Defense Cooperation and Exchanges with ASEAN Countries Reference 23 Joint Statement of the Security Consultative Committee (Past Three Years) ........................................................................... 389 (April 27, 2015) ............................................................................... 359 Reference 66 Recent Defense Cooperation and Exchanges with Reference 24 Record of Japan-U.S. Bilateral Exercises in FY2014 ........................ 361 the United Kingdom (Past Three Years) ............................................ 390 Reference 25 Japan–U.S. Joint Research and Development Projects .................... 362 Reference 67 Recent Defense Cooperation and Exchanges with Reference 26 Outline of Cost Sharing of the Stationing of the USFJ....................... 362 European Nations and Others (Past Three Years).............................. 391 Reference 27 Outline of 23 Issues ........................................................................ 363 Reference 68 Outline of a Bill Concerning Punishment of and Response to Reference 28 The SACO Final Report .................................................................... 363 Acts of Piracy .................................................................................. 392 Reference 29 State of Progress of the SACO Final Report...................................... 366 Reference 69 Summary Comparison of Laws Concerning International Peace Cooperation Activities ...................................................................... 393 Reference 30 Estimated Timelines for the Return of Facilities and Areas South of Kadena ....................................................................................... 367 Reference 70 The SDF Record in International Peace Cooperation Activities .......... 393 Reference 31 Agreement between the Government of Japan and Reference 71 Dispatch of Ministry of Defense Personnel to International the Government of the United States of America Concerning Organizations .................................................................................. 395 the Implementation of the Relocation of III Marine Expeditionary Reference 72 Activities in Civic Life ...................................................................... 396 Force Personnel and Their Dependents from Okinawa to Guam ....... 367 Reference 73 Activities Contributing to Society ..................................................... 396 Reference 32 Protocol amending the Agreement between the Government of Reference 74 Outline of Measures to Improve the Living Environment in Japan and the Government of the United States of America the Areas Surrounding Defense Facilities......................................... 397 Concerning the Implementation of the Relocation of III Marine Expeditionary Force Personnel and Their Dependents from Reference 75 Partial Amendment of the Law Concerning Adjustment, etc. of Okinawa to Guam ........................................................................... 368 the Living Environment in the Environs of Defense Facilities ............ 398 Reference 33 Direction of the MOD Reform .......................................................... 369 Reference 76 “Public Opinion Survey on the Self Defense Forces and Defense Issues” (excerpt) (Public Relations Offi ce of Cabinet **Part III Initiatives to Protect the Lives and Property of the People as well as** Offi ce: as of January 2015) ............................................................. 399 **Securing the Territorial Land, Water and Airspace** Reference 77 Record of Information Disclosure by the Ministry of Defense Reference 34 The Number of Tanks and Major Artillery Owned ............................. 372 (FY2014) ......................................................................................... 400 Reference 35 Number of Major Aircraft and Performance Specifi cations ............... 372 Reference 78 MOD Contacts for Information Disclosure and Personal Reference 36 Number of Major Ships Commissioned into Service 372 Information Protection 400 ----- **Reference 1** **Number of Nuclear Warheads Arsenals by Country and Their Major Means of Delivery** |Col1|Col2|United States|Russia|United Kingdom|France|China| |---|---|---|---|---|---|---| |Missiles|ICBM (intercontinental ballistic missiles)|450 Minuteman III: 450|378 SS-18: 54 SS-19: 40 SS-25: 160 SS-27: 78 RS-24: 46|―|―|56 DF-5 (CSS-4): 20 DF-31 (CSS-10): 36| ||IRBM MRBM|―|―|―|―|132 DF-3 (CSS-2): 6 DF-4 (CSS-3): 10 DF-21 (CSS-5): 116| ||SLBM (submarine launched Ballistic missiles)|336 Trident D-5: 336|144 SS-N-18: 48 SS-N-23: 96|48 Trident D-5: 48|64 M-45: 32 M-51: 32|48 JL-1 (CSS-N-3): 12 JL-2 (CSS-NX-14): 36| |Submarines equipped with nuclear ballistic missiles||14|12|4|4|4| |Aircraft||74 B-2: 20 B-52: 54|78 Tu-95 (Bear): 62 Tu-160 (Blackjack): 16|―|63 Mirage2000N: 23 Rafale: 40|36 H-6K: 36| |Number of warheads||Approx. 4,785|Approx. 4,300 (including approx. 2,000 tactical)|Less than 225|Approx. 300|Approx. 250| Notes: 1. Data is based on Military Balance 2015, the SIPRI database, etc. 2. In April 2015, the United States released the following fi gures based on the new Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty between the United States and Russia as of March 1, 2015 —the number of deployed strategic warheads for the United States was 1,597 and the delivery vehicles involved 785 missiles/aircraft; the number of deployed strategic warheads for Russia was 1,582 and the delivery vehicles involved 515 missiles/aircraft. However, according to the SIPRI database, as of January 2014, the number of deployed U.S. nuclear warheads was approx. 2,100 (including 184 tactical nuclear warheads). 3. In October 2010, the U.K.’s Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR) stipulated that the number of deployed nuclear warheads is to be fewer than 120, while the number of nuclear warheads possessed is to be fewer than 180. 4. According to the SIPRI database, India possesses 90-110 nuclear warheads, Pakistan 100-120, Israel a maximum of 80, and North Korea 6-8. **Reference 2** **Outline of Military Power of Major Countries and** **Regions (Approximate Numbers)** |Ground Forces|Col2|Naval Forces|Col4|Col5|Air Forces|Col7| |---|---|---|---|---|---|---| |Country or Region|Ground Forces (10,000 persons)|Country or Region|Tonnage (10,000 tons)|Number of Vessels|Country or Region|Number of Combat Aircraft| |China|160|United States|624.3|949|United States|3,646| |India|115|Russia|196.8|956|China|2,616| |North Korea|102|China|147.0|871|Russia|1,407| |Pakistan|55|United Kingdom|66.2|139|India|963| |United States|54|India|47.2|223|Republic of Korea|622| |Republic of Korea|52|France|41.1|298|Egypt|586| |Viet Nam|41|Indonesia|24.8|159|North Korea|563| |Turkey|40|Turkey|22.3|212|Taiwan|501| |Myanmar|38|Germany|21.3|140|Israel|482| |Iran|35|Italy|21.2|184|Pakistan|456| |Egypt|31|Taiwan|20.1|409|Turkey|411| |Indonesia|30|Australia|20.0|97|France|363| |Thailand|25|Republic of Korea|19.7|209|Iran|336| |Colombia|24|Spain|19.1|224|Saudi Arabia|324| |Russia|23|Brazil|17.5|112|United Kingdom|303| |Japan|14|Japan|46.7|137|Japan|410| Notes: 1. Data on ground forces and air forces is taken from Military Balance 2015 and other sources, and data on naval forces is taken from Jane’s Fighting Ships 2014–2015 and other sources. 2. Figures for Japan show the actual strength of its Self-Defense Forces as of the end of FY2014, and combat aircraft (Air Forces) include ASDF combat aircraft (excluding transports) and MSDF combat aircraft (only those with fixed wings). 3. Arrangement is in order of the scale of armed strength. **Reference 3** **Outline of Regular and Reserve Forces of Major Countries** **and Regions (Approximate Numbers)** |Country or Region|Military Service System|Regular (10,000 persons)|Col4|Reserves (10,000 persons)| |---|---|---|---|---| |United States|Volunteer|143||85| |Russia|Conscription / Volunteer|77||200| |United Kingdom|Volunteer|16||8| |France|Volunteer|22||3| |Germany|Volunteer|18||5| |Italy|Volunteer|18||2| |India|Volunteer|135||116| |China|Conscription|233||51| |North Korea|Conscription|119||60| |Republic of Korea|Conscription|66||450| |Egypt|Conscription|44||48| |Israel|Conscription|18||47| |Japan|Volunteer|Ground|14|3.1 (0.5)| |||Maritime|4.2|0.06| |||Air|4.3|0.06| Notes: 1. Data taken is from Military Balance 2015 and other sources. 2. Figures for Japan show the actual strength of its Ground, Maritime, and Air Self Defense Forces as of the end of FY2014. The figure in brackets shows the number of SDF Ready Reserve Personnel, and is not included in the total figure. 3. Russia uses a personnel augmentation system which adds a contract employment system (a type of volunteer system) to the preexisting conscription system. 4. In Germany, as a result of the enactment of the Military Law Amendment Act in April 2011, the conscription system was suspended effective July 1, 2011, and the volunteer system was newly introduced as a replacement of the former. ----- **Reference 4** **Transition of Military Power in the Area Surrounding Japan** Ground Forces Maritime Forces Air Forces (10,000 persons) (10,000 tons) (Number of Combat Aircraft) 250 250 8,000 4,000 2,000 0 0 0 1995 2005 2015 1995 2005 2015 1995 2005 2015 Far East Russia China North Korea Japan Far East Russia China North Korea Japan Far East Russia China North Korea Japan **Reference 5** **Development of Seamless Security Legislation to** **Ensure Japan’s Survival and Protect its People** (Approved by the National Security Council and the Cabinet on July 1, 2014) Since the end of World War II, Japan has consistently followed the path of a peace-loving nation under the Constitution of Japan. While adhering to a basic policy of maintaining an exclusively national defense-oriented policy, not becoming a military power that poses a threat to other countries, and observing the Three Non-Nuclear Principles, Japan has f ourished as an economic power through continuous efforts of its people and built a stable and aff uent livelihood. Japan, as a peace-loving nation, has also been cooperating with the international community and international organizations including the United Nations (U.N.), and has proactively contributed to their activities, adhering to the Charter of the United Nations. The course that Japan has taken as a peace-loving nation has garnered signif cant praise and respect from the international community, and Japan must continue these steps to further fortify such a position. During the 67 years since the Constitution of Japan came into effect, the security environment surrounding Japan has fundamentally transformed and is continuing to evolve, and Japan is confronted by complex and signif cant national security challenges. There exist no prospects of the realization of the so-called formal “U.N. forces”, an ideal proclaimed in the Charter of the United Nations. Moreover, even when considering only the quarter-century since the end of the Cold War, the shift in the global power balance, rapid progress of technological innovation, development and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles, and threats such as international terrorism have given rise to issues and tensions in the Asia-Pacif c region, and there exists a situation in which any threats, irrespective of where they originate in the world, could have a direct inf uence on the security of Japan. Furthermore, in recent years, risks that can impede the utilization of and free access to the sea, outer space and cyberspace have been spreading and become more serious. No country can secure its own peace only by itself, and the international community also expects Japan to play a more proactive role for peace and stability in the world, in a way commensurate with its national capability. Maintaining the peace and security of Japan and ensuring its survival as well as securing its people’s lives are the primary responsibility of the Government. In order to adapt to the changes in the security environment surrounding Japan and to fulf ll its responsibility, the Government, f rst and foremost, has to create a stable and predictable international environment and prevent the emergence of threats by advancing vibrant diplomacy with suff cient institutional capabilities, and has to pursue peaceful settlement of disputes by acting in accordance with international law and giving emphasis to the rule of law. Moreover, it is important to appropriately develop, maintain and operate Japan’s own defense capability, strengthen mutual cooperation with the United States, which is Japan’s ally, and deepen trust and cooperative relations with other partners both within and outside the region. In particular, it is essential to avoid armed conf icts before they materialize and prevent threats from reaching Japan by further elevating the effectiveness of the Japan-United States security arrangements and enhancing the deterrence of the Japan-United States Alliance for the security of Japan and peace and stability in the Asia-Pacif c region. On that basis, in order to resolutely secure the lives and peaceful livelihood of its people under any situation and contribute even more proactively to the peace and stability of the international community under the policy of “Proactive Contribution to Peace” based on the principle of international cooperation, it is necessary to develop domestic legislation that enables seamless responses. In accordance with the basic orientation presented by Prime Minister Abe at the May 15 press conference which took place after the report of “the Advisory Panel on Reconstruction of the Legal Basis for Security” was submitted on the same day, discussions have been repeatedly held in the ruling parties and examination has also been conducted by the Government. Based on the result of the discussions of the ruling coalition, the Government will promptly develop domestic legislation necessary for securing the lives and peaceful livelihood of its people, in accordance with the following basic policies: 1. Response to an Infringement that Does Not Amount to an Armed Attack (1) Considering the increasingly severe security environment surrounding Japan, situations that are neither pure peacetime nor contingencies are liable to occur, posing risks which could develop into more serious situations. In such situations of infringement that does not amount to an armed attack, it is an even more important task to prepare and ensure seamless and suff cient responses to any unlawful acts through closer cooperation between relevant agencies, including police organizations, and the Self-Defense Forces (SDF), premised on the basic allocation of their roles. (2) Specif cally, in order to respond to various unlawful acts, under the basic policy that relevant agencies including the police and Japan Coast Guard are to respond in close cooperation in accordance with their respective duties and authorities, the Government will further strengthen necessary measures in all areas, which include enhancing the respective agency’s response capabilities, strengthening collaboration among agencies including information sharing, examining and developing concrete response guidelines, accelerating procedures to issue orders, and improving exercises and training. (3) As for accelerating procedures, in cases of responding to a situation where an infringement from the outside that does not amount to an armed attack occurs in areas surrounding remote islands, etc., and police forces are not present nearby or police agencies cannot respond immediately (including situations in which police agencies cannot respond because of the weapons possessed by the armed groups, etc.), the Government will thoroughly examine the application of related provisions to order public security operations or maritime security operations in advance and establish a common understanding among relevant agencies. At the same time, in order to avoid the spread of damages caused by unlawful acts while internal administrative procedures are taken, the Government will also make concrete considerations on measures for issuing orders swiftly and accelerating procedures in light of circumstances. (4) Moreover, for ensuring Japan’s security, it is important for the SDF and the United States armed forces to respond seamlessly in close cooperation to a situation where an attack occurs against the units of the United States armed forces currently engaged in activities which contribute to the defense of Japan and such situation escalates into an armed attack depending on its circumstances. Assuming a situation where an infringement that does not amount to an armed attack occurs in the course of various peacetime activities carried out in coordination between the SDF and the United States armed forces and referring to the concept of “use of weapons” for the purpose of protecting its own weapons and other equipment under Article 95 of the SDF Law, the Government will develop legislation that enables the SDF to carry out very passive and limited “use of weapons” to the minimum extent necessary to protect weapons and other equipment of the units of the United States armed forces, if they are, in cooperation with the SDF, currently engaged in activities which contribute to the defense of Japan (including joint exercises), in line with the provisions of Article 95 of the SDF Law, premised on request or consent by the United States. ----- 2. Further Contributions to the Peace and Stability of the International Community (1) So-called Logistics Support and “Ittaika with the Use of Force” A. So-called logistics support is an activity that does not in itself constitute a “use of force”. For instance, when international peace and security are threatened and the international community is united in responding to the situation in accordance with a U.N. Security Council resolution, there exist situations in which it is necessary for Japan to conduct such support activities to armed forces of other countries carrying out legitimate “use of force” based on the resolution. As for Japan’s support activities, however, legal frameworks limiting the area of such activities to “rear area” or so-called “noncombat area”, etc. have been established in past legislations to ensure that the issue of “ittaika with the use of force” (forming an “integral part” of the use of force) does not arise, in relation to Article 9 of the Constitution. This is intended to avoid Japan from being legally evaluated as carrying out by itself the “use of force” which is not permitted under the Constitution because its support activities would form an “integral part” of the use of force (“ittaika with the use of force”) by other countries. B. The SDF, even under such legal frameworks, has steadily accumulated its records of various support activities, and the expectations to and trust in Japan have been growing. Amid a major change in the security environment, from the perspective of “Proactive Contribution to Peace” based on the principle of international cooperation, it is necessary to enable the SDF to play suff cient roles in wide-ranging support activities for peace and stability of the international community. It is also vital from the viewpoint of ensuring Japan’s peace and security to enable the carrying out of such activities more than before without hindrance. C. The Government, while premising on the theory of so-called “Ittaika with the use of force” itself, based on the accumulation of discussions related to the “ittaika with the use of force” and considering factors such as the SDF’s actual experiences to date and the reality of U.N. collective security measures, no longer takes the current framework uniformly limiting SDF’s activities to such areas as “rear area” or so-called “non-combat area” where the issue of “ittaika with the use of force” does not arise. Instead, the Government takes the recognition that Japan’s support activities such as supply and transportation conducted at a place which is not “the scene where combat activities are actually being conducted” by a foreign country are not regarded as “ittaika with the use of force” by that country. From the viewpoint of the following positions which is based on that recognition, the Government will proceed with developing legislation which enables necessary support activities to armed forces of foreign countries engaging in activities for ensuring Japan’s security or for peace and stability of the international community: (a) Do not conduct support activities in “the scene where combat activities are actually being conducted” by armed forces of a foreign country to which Japan provides support. (b) Immediately pause or cease support activities if the place where Japan is conducting support activities becomes “the scene where combat operations are actually being conducted” due to changes of the situation. (2) Use of Weapons Associated with International Peace Cooperation Activities A. To date, Japan has developed necessary legislation and has conducted international peace cooperation activities for over 20 years. In conducting such activities, Japan has limited the right of SDF personnel to use weapons when engaging in international peace cooperation activities to so-called selfpreservation type and protection of its own weapons and other equipment since use of weapons associated with so-called “kaketsuke-keigo” (coming to the aid of geographically distant unit or personnel under attack) or “use of weapons for the purpose of execution of missions” could constitute the “use of force” prohibited by Article 9 of the Constitution, if such use of weapons are directed against “a state or a quasi-state organization.” B. From the perspective of a “Proactive Contribution to Peace” based on the principle of international cooperation, Japan needs to enhance its efforts to promote the peace and stability of the international community. To that end, it is important to be able to participate in international peace cooperation activities including peace keeping operations (PKOs) suff ciently and proactively. Moreover, given that many Japanese nationals are actively working overseas and face risks of being involved in emergency situations such as terrorism, it is necessary to enable subject to the consent of acceptance from the territorial State which, under international law, has the obligation to extend protection to foreigners who are within its territories. C. Based on the above, the Government will proceed with developing legislation based on the following positions in order to enable the SDF’s use of weapons associated with so-called “kaketsuke-keigo” and the “use of weapons for the purpose of execution of missions” in international peace cooperation activities that do not invoke “use of force” including U.N. peacekeeping operations as well as police-like activities that do not invoke “use of force” including the rescuing of Japanese nationals with a consent from the territorial State, through ensuring that “a state or a quasi-state organization” does not appear as the adversary: (a) As for U.N. peacekeeping operations, etc., since “consent by the State to which the areas in which activities are conducted belong” and “consent by the parties to the conf ict to activities conducted” are necessary under the framework of the Five Principles for PKOs, “a quasi-state organization” other than parties to the conf ict who have given consent of acceptance is, in principle, not expected to appear as the adversary. For more than 20 years, this has been demonstrated by Japan’s experience of U.N. peacekeeping operations, etc. When the use of weapons for the execution of missions is expected to exceed selfpreservation and protection of its own weapons and other equipment including when the SDF is tasked with the maintenance of order such as the protection of population, which is deemed as an important mission in recent U.N. peacekeeping operations, it is necessary that consent from the parties to the conf ict is stably maintained, especially because of the nature of the activities. (b) When the SDF units conduct police-like activities that do not involve “use of force” including the rescuing of Japanese nationals in a foreign country based on the consent of the territorial State’s Government, it is natural that the activities be conducted in the area within which the consent of the territorial State’s Government is valid, i.e. the area within which its authority is maintained. This means that no “quasi-state organization” exists in that area. (c) The Cabinet will make a decision on whether the consent ofacceptance is stably maintained or the area within which the consent of the territorial State’s Government is valid, etc. based on deliberations etc. at the National Security Council. (d) Use of weapons in these activities is subject to the inherent constraint of the strict principle of proportionality which is similar to the principle of police proportionality. 3. Measures for Self-Defense Permitted under Article 9 of the Constitution (1) In order to adapt to the changes in the security environment surrounding Japan and secure the lives and peaceful livelihood of its people under any situations, the Government has examined what constitutional interpretation would be appropriate, as suff cient responses would not necessarily be possible if the constitutional interpretation to date were maintained. In this regard, logical consistency and legal stability are required for the Government’s constitutional interpretation. Accordingly, it is necessary to draw a logical conclusion for securing the lives and peaceful livelihood of its people within the limit of the basic logic of the interpretation of Article 9 of the Constitution as expressed by the Government to date. (2) The language of Article 9 of the Constitution appears to prohibit “use of force” in international relations in all forms. However, when considered in light of “the right (of the people) to live in peace” as recognized in the Preamble of the Constitution and the purpose of Article 13 of the Constitution which stipulates, “their (all the people’s) right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness” shall be the supreme consideration in governmental affairs, Article 9 of the Constitution cannot possibly be interpreted to prohibit Japan from taking measures of self-defense necessary to maintain its peace and security and to ensure its survival. Such measures for self-defense are permitted only when they are inevitable for dealing with imminent unlawful situations where the people’s right to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness is fundamentally overturned due to an armed attack by a foreign country, and for safeguarding these rights of the people. Hence, “use of force” to the minimum extent necessary to that end is permitted. This is the basis, or so-called the basic logic, of the view consistently expressed by the Government to date with regard to “use of force” exceptionally permitted under Article 9 of the Constitution, and clearly shown in the document “Relationship between the Right of Collective Self-Defense and the Constitution” submitted by the Government to the Committee on ----- This basic logic must be maintained under Article 9 of the Constitution (3) To date, the Government has considered that “use of force” under this basic logic is permitted only when an “armed attack” against Japan occurs. However, in light of the situation in which the security environment surrounding Japan has been fundamentally transformed and continuously evolving by shifts in the global power balance, the rapid progress of technological innovation, and threats such as weapons of mass destruction, etc. as mentioned at the outset, in the future, even an armed attack occurring against a foreign country could actually threaten Japan’s survival, depending on its purpose, scale and manner, etc. Japan, as a matter of course, will make the utmost diplomatic efforts, should a dispute occur, for its peaceful settlement and take all necessary responses in accordance with the existing domestic laws and regulations developed based upon the constitutional interpretation to date. It is still required, however, to make all necessary preparations in order to ensure Japan’s survival and protect its people. Under such recognition and as a result of careful examination in light of the current security environment, the Government has reached a conclusion that not only when an armed attack against Japan occurs but also when an armed attack against a foreign country that is in a close relationship with Japan occurs and as a result threatens Japan’s survival and poses a clear danger to fundamentally overturn people’s right to life, liberty and pursuit of happiness, and when there is no other appropriate means available to repel the attack and ensure Japan’s survival and protect its people, use of force to the minimum extent necessary should be interpreted to be permitted under the Constitution as measures for self-defense in accordance with the basic logic of the Government’s view to date. (4) As a matter of course, Japan’s “use of force” must be carried out while observing international law. At the same time, a legal basis in international law and constitutional interpretation need to be understood separately. In certain situations, the aforementioned “use of force” permitted under the Constitution is, under international law, based on the right of collective self-defense. Although this “use of force” includes those which are triggered by an armed attack occurring against a foreign country, they are permitted under the Constitution only when they are taken as measures for self-defense which are inevitable for ensuring Japan’s survival and protecting its people, in other words for defending Japan. (5) Moreover, even when “use of force” is permitted under the Constitution, since they are carried out to secure the lives and peaceful livelihood of the people, it is natural to require an assurance of democratic control. The Government will stipulate in the draft legislation that prior approval of the Diet is in principle required upon issuing orders of operations to the SDF for carrying out “use of force” permitted under the Constitution when an armed attack occurs not against Japan but against a foreign country, in the same manner as the procedures related to defense operations stipulated in the current laws and regulations. 4. The Way Forward for Developing Domestic Legislation When these activities are to be conducted by the SDF, the Cabinet shall make a decision in accordance with deliberations, etc. at the National Security Council. Including such procedures, domestic legislation which serves as the legal basis is necessary in order to enable the SDF to actually conduct such activities. Based on the basic policies described above, the Government will herewith commence the tasks of drafting legislation that enables seamless responses to any situations in order to secure the lives and peaceful livelihood of its people. The Government will give adequate consideration, and as soon as it completes its preparation, it will submit the draft legislation to the Diet for its deliberations. **Reference 6** **Summary of the Bill for Partial Amendments to** **the Self-Defense Forces Law and Other Existing Laws** **for Ensuring Peace and Security of Japan and** **the International Community** **I. Partial Amendments to the Self-Defense Forces Law** (Article 1) 1. Tasks of the Self-Defense Forces The tasks of the Self-Defense Forces (SDF) shall be amended, following the addition of situations for which defense operations may be ordered and the partial amendments to the Law Concerning Measures to Ensure Peace and Security of Japan in Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan. 2. Defense operations (1) With regard to the situations for which the Prime Minister may order the whole or part of the SDF into operation, the following situations shall be added: situations in which an armed attack occurs and as a result threatens Japan s survival and poses a clear danger to fundamentally overturn people’s right to life, liberty, and pursuit of happiness. (2) The provisions, etc. pertaining to the establishment of defense facilities in Article 77-2 of the Self-Defense Forces Law, control over the Japan Coast Guard in Article 80 of the Law, powers to maintain public order during defense operations in Article 92 of the Law, emergency passage during defense operations in Article 92-2 of the Law, and appropriation of supplies during defense operations in Article 103 of the Law, etc. shall not apply to the operations pertaining to the situations in (1). 3. Protection of Japanese nationals overseas (1) When a request is received from the Minister for Foreign Affairs for the SDF to guard or rescue Japanese nationals who are at risk for harm to their life or body in emergency situations in a foreign country, or to take other measures to protect the life or body of the aforementioned Japanese nationals (including transport; hereinafter referred to as “protection measures”), the Minister of Defense shall be able to allow SDF units, etc. to carry out said protection measures upon consulting the Minister for Foreign Affairs and obtaining the consent of the Prime Minister. (2) In the case of having SDF units, etc. carry out protection measures pursuant to (1), the Minister of Defense shall be able to allow SDF units, etc. to take measures to protect the life or body of foreign nationals of whom the Minister for Foreign Affairs requested protection, as well as of others of whom it is deemed that protection is suitable in conjunction with the said protection measures (referred to as “other protected people” in (3)). (3) SDF personnel engaged in their duty of carrying out protection measures in foreign territories pursuant to (1) shall be able to, when executing their duty, use weapons to the extent that is considered reasonably necessary based on the situation, when there are suff cient grounds for judging that the use of weapons is inevitable to protect their own lives or bodies, or those of Japanese nationals to whom said protection measures apply, or those of other protected people, or to eliminate acts that interfere with their duty. 4. Use of weapons for the protection of weapons, etc. of the U.S. Forces and other forces (1) SDF personnel shall be able to use weapons to the extent that is considered reasonably necessary based on the situation, when there are suff cient grounds for judging that the use of weapons is necessary to protect people or weapons, etc. under the SDF’s duty to protect the weapons, etc. of the military forces of the United States of America, the military forces of other countries, or other similar organizations (referred to as “U.S. Forces, etc.” in (2)), which are engaged in activities that contribute to the defense of Japan (including joint exercises but excluding activities conducted in places where combat activities are actually being conducted) in collaboration with the SDF. (2) SDF personnel shall carry out the protection activity in (1) only when requested by the U.S. Forces, etc. and when the Minister of Defense considers it necessary. 5. Provision of supplies or services to the U.S. Forces (1) The Minister of Defense or the person entrusted by him/her shall be able to, when a request is received from the U.S. Forces (refers to the military forces of the United States of America) listed below, provide supplies belonging to the SDF to said U.S. Forces to the extent that it does not interfere with the execution of the SDF’s tasks: (i) U.S. Forces which are participating in exercises that are participated by both the SDF and the U.S. Forces; (ii) U.S. Forces which are located on the premises of the facilities and areas stated in Article 81-2, Paragraph 1, Item 2 of the SelfDefense Forces Law, together with the SDF units, etc. that are conducting the protection activity in said paragraph, and which are protecting said facilities and areas; (iii) U.S. Forces which are located on site together with the SDF units, etc. that are carrying out protection measures or carrying out the counter-piracy operations in Article 82-2 of the SelfDefense Forces Law, actions needed to take measures to destroy ballistic missiles, etc. in Article 82-3, Paragraphs 1 or 3 of said Law, the elimination of mines and other dangerous objects in Article 84-2 of said Law, or activities to collect intelligence that contributes to the defense of Japan, and which are carrying out activities similar to these actions or activities; and (iv) U.S. Forces which are located on site together with the SDF units, etc. that have arrived by aircraft, ship, or motor vehicle and are temporarily staying at the facilities of the U.S. Forces to carry out exercises, liaison and coordination, or other daily activities, and which are carrying out exercises, liaison and coordination, or other daily activities. (2) The Minister of Defense shall be able to, when a request is received ----- units, etc. of the Ministry of Defense provide services to said U.S. Forces to the extent that it does not interfere with the execution of the SDF’s tasks. 6. For some crimes, penal provisions shall also apply to those who committed said crimes outside of Japan, or shall be implemented in accordance with the examples in Article 2 of the Penal Code. 7. Other necessary provisions shall be developed. **II. Partial Amendments to the Act on Cooperation with United Nations** **Peacekeeping Operations and Other Operations** (Article 2) [PROVISIONAL TRANSLATION] 1. Addition of a type of operation and its modality (1) Internationally coordinated operations for peace and security shall be added to the def nition of operations and contributions in kind to which international peace cooperation assignments are to be conducted under this Act. The said operations shall be def ned as operations that are conducted based on resolutions, etc. of the General Assembly, the Security Council, or the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations, to respond to conf ict situations and maintain international peace and security, by such means as ensuring the observance of agreements to prevent the recurrence of armed conf ict among the parties to armed conf ict, protecting populations under imminent threat of violence associated with disruption caused by conf icts, assisting in the establishment and reestablishment of the systems of governance by democratic means after the cessation of armed conf ict, provided that such operations are implemented under the partnership of two or more countries, which are listed in the following: (i) Operations that are conducted without partiality to any of the parties to the armed conf ict, in cases where agreement to cease armed conf ict and to maintain the cessation has been reached among the parties to the armed conf ict and where consent for conduct of such operations has been obtained from the countries to which the area where those operations are to be conducted belongs as well as from the parties to the armed conf ict; (ii) Operations that are conducted when the armed conf ict has ceased and the Parties to Armed Conf ict ceased to exist in the area where the operations are to be conducted and in case where consent for conduct of such operations has been obtained from the countries to which the area where those operations are to be conducted belongs; and (iii) Operations that are conducted without partiality to any specif c positions, aimed at primarily preventing the occurrence of armed conf icts, in cases where the armed conf ict has not yet arisen but such possibility is developing, and where consent for conduct of such operations has been obtained from the countries to which the area where those operations are to be conducted belongs. (2) The Minister of Defense may dispatch Self-Defense off cials and have them engaged in the tasks of the United Nations and those concerning overall management of tasks implemented by units of SDF, etc. or units of armed forces of foreign states participating in the United Nations Peacekeeping Operations, at the request of the United Nations, with consent of the Prime Minister. (3) International election observation operations shall cover elections, etc. that are held in the process of eliminating the disruption caused by conf icts. (4) Personnel of Corps engaged in international peace cooperation assignments pertaining to observation of election and other tasks shall be limited to those employed by selection and non-SDF personnel of relevant administrative organizations. 2. Addition of tasks to be implemented as international peace cooperation assignments (1) The following tasks shall be added as international peace cooperation assignments: (i) Monitoring, stationing, patrol, inspection at checkpoints and security escort and protection for the purpose of security of specif ed areas including prevention and suppression of injury or harm against lives, bodies and properties of local population, Aff icted People and other populations requiring protection. (ii) Provision of advice or guidance and supervision related to correctional administrative work (iii) Provision of advice or guidance related to legislative or judicial matters; (iv) Provision of advice, guidance or education and training related to work for the purpose of assisting in establishing or re-establishing organizations of the government relating to national defense or other organizations. (v) Planning, drafting, coordination or collection and updating of information in Headquarters Off ce or coordination off ces conducting the United Nations peacekeeping operations or for implementation of certain tasks. (vi) Protection of lives and bodies of individuals engaging in the United Nations peacekeeping organizations, internationally coordinated operations for peace and security, or international humanitarian operations, or providing support for these Operations in response to urgent request when unexpected dangers to lives or bodies of such individuals related Organization occur or are imminent, while implementing tasks, while implementing tasks other than certain tasks such as monitoring the observance of cessation of armed conf ict, stationing in and patrol of buffer zones, etc. (2) On the implementation of international peace cooperation assignments that are implemented for the United Nations peacekeeping operations or for internationally coordinated operations for peace and security, consent of countries to which the area where those operations are to be conducted belongs, regarding such operations and the said assignments are deemed to be maintained consistently throughout the duration of such operations as well as the said assignments. (3) The Prime Minister shall obtain the approval of the Diet for the implementation of assignments as specif ed in (1) (i) and certain international peace cooperation assignments such as monitoring the observance of cessation of armed conf ict and stationing and patrol of buffer zones which are implemented for the United Nations peacekeeping operations or internationally coordinated operations for peace and security prior to the commencement of dispatch of units of SDF, etc. by attaching Implementation Plan. 3. Use of weapons (1) Self-Defense Off cials engaged in International Peace Cooperation Assignment may use weapons in case of attack against the camp stationing the unit of the Self-Defense Forces where the unit members of armed forces of foreign states engaged in the United Nations peacekeeping operations, internationally coordinated operations for peace and security, or international humanitarian relief operations for the said Assignment are also stationing, jointly with the said members who will take measures to protect lives and bodies of individuals at the said camp. (2) Self-Defense Off cials engaged in the task outlined in 2.(1) (i), while engaging their duties, may use weapons within the limits judged reasonably necessary according to the circumstances, when reasonable grounds are found for the unavoidable necessity to protect the lives, bodies or properties of themselves or other individuals, or to eliminate obstructive behavior, for their duties. (3) Self-Defense Off cials engaged in the task outlined in 2.(1) (vi), while engaging their duties, may use weapons within the limits judged reasonably necessary according to the circumstances, when reasonable grounds are found for the unavoidable necessity to protect the lives or bodies of themselves or individuals related to operations that they intend to protect. 4. Other measures (1) The Chief of the International Peace Cooperation Headquarters shall give due consideration to ensuring the safety of personnel of the International Peace Cooperation Corps. (2) Organizations shall be added to the appended table listing international organizations whose request can form basis of international humanitarian relief operations. (3) Two organizations shall be added to the appended table listing international organizations to which contributions in kind under this Act can be extended in cases where there is no ceasef re agreement. The requirements for said contributions in kind shall be clarif ed. (4) Upon participating in the United Nations peacekeeping operations, etc., if requested by participating states to waive its right of claim against participating states or their national personnel for damages arising from these operations, and if it is deemed necessary to do so when participating in the operation, the Government may stipulate to waive its right of claim against participating states or their national personnel for damages arising from these operations. (5) When the armed forces of the United States of America or the Australian Defense Force that is located in the area together with the units of SDF, etc., where the units of SDF, etc. are undertaking International Peace Cooperation Assignments, etc., and is undertaking activities to cope with large scale disaster, request the units of SDF, etc., to provide supplies necessary for the activities of urgent nature to be undertaken in that area of activities, the Minister of Defense, etc., may provide them with the supplies belonging to SDF. 5. Other necessary provisions shall be established. **III. Partial Amendments to the Law Concerning Measures to Ensure Peace** **and Security of Japan in Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan** (Article 3) 1. Title The title of this Law shall be amended to “Law Concerning Measures ----- Important Inf uence on Japan s Peace and Security. 2. Purpose The purpose of this Law shall state that collaboration will be strengthened with foreign countries that are addressing situations that will have an important inf uence on Japan’s peace and security, including situations that could develop into a direct armed attack against Japan if left unaddressed (hereinafter referred to as “situations that will have an important inf uence on Japan’s peace and security”), whose core purpose is to contribute to the effective execution of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty through the implementation of logistics support and other activities for U.S. Forces, etc. in situations that will have an important inf uence on Japan’s peace and security. 3. Basic principles of responses to situations that will have an important inf uence on Japan’s peace and security (1) Logistics support and search and rescue activities shall not be carried out in places where combat activities are actually being conducted; provided, however, that if lost people have already been found and SDF units, etc. have commenced their rescue work, the units, etc. may continue their search and rescue activities for said lost people as long as the safety of said units, etc. is ensured. (2) Response measures shall be implemented in the territories of foreign countries only when said countries, etc. have given their consent to the implementation of said response measures. 4. Def nitions (1) In this Law, “U.S. Forces, etc.” shall refer to the military forces of the United States of America which conduct activities that contribute to the achievement of the objectives of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty by addressing situations that will have an important inf uence on Japan’s peace and security, other military forces of foreign countries which conduct activities that contribute to the achievement of the objectives of the United Nations Charter, and other similar organizations. (2) In this Law, “logistics support activities” shall refer to the provision of supplies, services, conveniences, and other support measures to the U.S. Forces, etc. which are provided by Japan. (3) In this Law, “search and rescue activities” shall refer to the search or rescue of combat participants who have become lost due to combat activities conducted in situations that will have an important inf uence on Japan’s peace and security (including the transport of rescued individuals), which is carried out by Japan. 5. Basic plan (1) The matters provided for in the basic plan shall include the following matters, etc. concerning situations that will have an important inf uence on Japan’s peace and security: (i) Background of the situation and its impact on Japan’s peace and security; (ii) The reasons why it can be deemed that Japan needs to implement response measures; and (iii) In the case that the SDF conduct logistics support activities, search and rescue activities, or logistics support activities associated with the implementation thereof in a foreign territory, the size, composition, equipment, and dispatch period of the SDF units, etc. that are conducting these activities in foreign territory. (2) In the case of (1) (iii), the scope of the area of the implementation of activities shall be set forth in consultation with the relevant foreign country, etc. 6. Use of weapons (1) SDF personnel of the SDF units, etc. that have been ordered to provide SDF services or conduct search and rescue activities under logistics support activities shall be able to use weapons to protect the life or body of themselves, of other SDF personnel who are at the site with them, or of those who are under their management for the implementation of their duty. (2) In the case of an attack against an encampment set up in a territory of a foreign country which accommodates the relevant units, etc. as well as the personnel of U.S. Forces, etc., and furthermore, there is no place to ensure the safety of SDF personnel, etc. in the vicinity other than said encampment, the SDF personnel in (1) shall be able to use weapons pursuant to (1) jointly with the personnel who are taking measures to protect the life or body of the people in said encampment. 7. Other necessary provisions shall be developed. **IV. Partial Amendments to the Law Concerning Ship Inspection Operations** **in Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan** (Article 4) 1. Title The title of this Law shall be amended to “Law Concerning Ship Inspection Operations in Situations that Will Have an Important Inf uence on Japan’s Peace and Security and Other Situations.” 2. Purpose The purpose of this Law shall be to provide for the mode, procedures, that Japan conducts in response to situations that will have an important inf uence on Japan’s peace and security or situations where the international community is collectively addressing for peace and security, and to contribute to ensuring the peace and security of Japan and of the international community coupled with the Law Concerning Measures to Ensure Peace and Security of Japan in Situations that Will Have an Important Inf uence on Japan’s Peace and Security and the International Peace Support Law. 3. Ship inspection operations (1) SDF units, etc. shall carry out ship inspection operations in situations that will have an important inf uence on Japan’s peace and security or situations where the international community is collectively addressing for peace and security. (2) In the case of conducting ship inspection operations or their associated logistics support activities or cooperation support activities in a foreign territory, the equipment and dispatch period of the SDF units, etc. that are conducting these activities in a foreign territory shall be provided for in the basic plan prescribed in the Law Concerning Measures to Ensure Peace and Security of Japan in Situations that Will Have an Important Inf uence on Japan’s Peace and Security or the International Peace Support Law. (3) In the case of (2), the scope of the area of the implementation of activities shall be set forth in consultation with the relevant foreign country, etc. 4. Use of weapons SDF personnel of the SDF units, etc. that have been ordered to provide SDF services under ship inspection operations or their associated logistics support activities or cooperation support activities shall be able to use weapons to protect the life or body of themselves, of other SDF personnel who are at the site with them, or of those who are under their management for the implementation of their duty. 5. Other necessary provisions shall be developed. **V. Partial Amendments to the Law for Ensuring Peace and Independence** **of Japan and Security of the State and the People in Situations** **including Where an Armed Attack against Japan Occurs** (Article 5) 1. Title The title of this Law shall be amended to “Law for Ensuring Peace and Independence of Japan and Security of the State and the People in Situations including Where an Armed Attack Against Japan Occurs and in Situations of an Armed Attack Against a Foreign Country Resulting in Threatening Japan’s Survival.” 2. Purpose The purpose of this Law shall state that it provides for basic matters pertaining to responses to survival-threatening situations, and thereby, establishes readiness for responding to survival-threatening situations. 3. Def nition (1) In this Law, “survival-threatening situations” shall refer to situations in which an armed attack against a foreign country that is in a close relationship with Japan occurs and as a result threatens Japan’s survival and poses a clear danger to fundamentally overturn people’s right to life, liberty, and pursuit of happiness. (2) The def nition of “response measures” shall include measures that are implemented based on the trends in survival-threatening situations. 4. Basic principles Basic principles concerning responses to survival-threatening situations shall be provided. 5. Responsibilities of the state (1) The state shall have the duty to respond to survival-threatening situations and ensure that the state as a whole can take all possible measures through an organization-wide approach that leverages all available functions. (2) The state shall provide training to relevant organizations on responses to situations of an armed attack against Japan, etc. and an armed attack against a foreign country resulting in threatening Japan’s survival, as well as implement measures that contribute to ensuring close coordination and cooperation among other relevant organizations, in order to enable smooth and effective responses to such situations. 6. Basic Response Plan (1) When there is a situation threatening Japan’s survival, the Government shall set forth a Basic Response Plan. (2) The matters provided for in the basic response plan shall include the following matters concerning situations that need to be dealt with: (i) Background of the situation, recognition of the armed attack situation, the situation where an armed attack is anticipated, or the survival-threatening situation, and the facts that constituted the base of the recognition; and (ii) In the case that the situation is recognized as an armed attack situation or a survival-threatening situation, the reasons why ----- available to ensure Japan s survival and protect its people and use of force is necessary to respond to the situation. (3) In the case of a situation threatening Japan’s survival, when the Prime Minister requests the consent of the Diet outlined in (i) (when the House of Representatives is dissolved, the consent of the House of Councillors by convoking an emergency session provided for in Article 54 of the Constitution of Japan) or when the Prime Minister orders defense operations of the SDF outlined in (ii), the Basic Response Plan shall state to this effect. (i) Request for the consent of the Diet pursuant to the provision of Article 76, Paragraph 1 of the Self-Defense Forces Law regarding the Prime Minister’s order of defense operations (ii) Defense operations that the Prime Minister orders pursuant to Article 76, Paragraph 1 of the Self-Defense Forces Law 7. Other necessary provisions shall be developed. **VI. Partial Amendments to the Law Concerning the Measures Conducted** **by the Government in Line with U.S. Military Actions in Situations** **including where an Armed Attack Situations against Japan Occurs** (Article 6) 1. Title The title of this Act shall be amended to “Law Concerning the Measures Conducted by the Government in Line with U.S. and Other Countries’ Military Actions in Situations including Where an Armed Attack Against Japan Occurs and in Situations of an Armed Attack Against a Foreign Country Resulting in Threatening Japan’s Survival.” 2. Purpose The purpose of this Law shall state that it provides for measures, etc. aimed at the smooth and effective implementation of acts conducted by foreign military forces in cooperation with the SDF that are needed to eliminate armed attacks against Japan or armed attacks against a foreign country resulting in threatening Japan’s survival in situations of armed attacks against Japan, etc. and armed attacks against a foreign country resulting in threatening Japan’s survival. 3. Def nition (1) In this Law, “foreign military forces” shall refer to military forces of other countries that are conducting acts in cooperation with the SDF that are needed to eliminate armed attacks against Japan or armed attacks against a foreign country resulting in threatening Japan’s survival, in situations of armed attacks against Japan, etc. and armed attacks against a foreign country resulting in threatening Japan’s survival (except for the U.S. Forces that are conducting acts needed to eliminate armed attacks in accordance with the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty, in situations of armed attacks against Japan, etc.). (2) The def nition of “action-related measures” shall include measures for the smooth and effective implementation of foreign military actions, as well as other measures conducted by Japan in line with foreign military actions, in situations of armed attacks against Japan, etc. and armed attacks against a foreign country resulting in threatening Japan’s survival. 4. Other necessary provisions shall be developed. **VII. Partial Amendments to the Law Concerning the Use of Specifi c Public** **Facilities and Others in Situations including Where an Armed Attack** **against Japan Occurs** (Article 7) The def nition of “response measures, etc.” shall include acts conducted by foreign military forces in cooperation with the SDF that are needed to eliminate armed attacks. **VIII. Partial Amendments to the Law Concerning the Restriction of** **Maritime Transportation of Foreign Military Supplies and Others in** **Armed Attack Situations** (Article 8) 1. The title of this Law shall be amended to “Law Concerning the Restriction of Maritime Transportation of Foreign Military Supplies and Others in Situations of an Armed Attack Against Japan and an Armed Attack Against a Foreign Country Resulting in Threatening Japan’s Survival.” 2. Necessary provisions shall be developed concerning the restriction of maritime transportation of foreign military supplies, etc. in situations of an armed attack against a foreign country resulting in threatening Japan’s survival. **IX. Partial Amendments to the Law Concerning the Treatment of Prisoners** **of War and Other Detainees in Armed Attack Situations** (Article 9) 1. The title of this Law shall be amended to “Law Concerning the Treatment of Prisoners of War and Other Detainees in Situations of an Armed Attack Against Japan and an Armed Attack Against a Foreign Country Resulting in Threatening Japan’s Survival.” 2. Necessary provisions shall be developed concerning the capture, internment, and other treatment of prisoners of war and other detainees in situations of an armed attack against a foreign country resulting in **X. Partial Amendments to the Act for Establishment of the National** **Security Council** (Article 10) 1. The National Security Council shall carry out deliberations: the basic guidelines concerning responses to survival-threatening situations; important matters concerning responses to survival-threatening situations, situations that will have an important inf uence on Japan’s peace and security, and situations where the international community is collectively addressing for peace and security; important matters concerning the implementation of international peace cooperation assignments; and important matters concerning the activities of the SDF. The National Security Council shall state its opinions to the Prime Minister as necessary. 2. Matters on which the Prime Minister shall consult the National Security Council shall include the f nalization of and changes to the implementation plan of international peace cooperation assignment pertaining to the implementation of activities outlined in II. 2. (1) (i) or (vi), matters concerning the dispatch of SDF personnel to the United Nations in II. 1. (2), and matters concerning the implementation of protection measures. 3. Other necessary provisions shall be developed. **XI. Effective Date, etc. (Supplementary Provisions)** 1. This Act comes into effect as of the day specif ed by Cabinet Order within a period not exceeding six months from the date of promulgation. 2. In addition to establishing other necessary adjustment provisions, necessary revisions shall be made to the relevant Acts. **Reference 7** **Outline of the Bill Concerning Cooperation and Support** **Activities and Other Activities to Armed Forces, of** **Foreign Countries and Others in Situations Where the** **International Community is Collectively Addressing for** **Peace and Security** **I. Purpose** The purpose of this Law is to contribute to ensuring peace and security of the international community in situations where the peace and security of the international community is threatened, where the international community is collectively addressing the situation to remove the threat in accordance with the objectives of the United Nations Charter, and where Japan needs to make independent and proactive contributions to these activities as a member of the international community (hereinafter referred to as “situations where the international community is collectively addressing for peace and security”) by conducting cooperation and support activities and other activities to the armed forces of foreign countries, etc. (Article 1) **II. Basic Principles** 1. In situations where the international community is collectively addressing for international peace and security, the Government shall contribute to ensuring peace and security of the international community by appropriately and swiftly implementing the cooperation and support activities or search and rescue activities in accordance with this Law, or the ship inspection operations prescribed in Article 2 of the Ship Inspection Operation Act in Situations that Will Have an Important Inf uence on Japan’s Peace and Security and Other Situations (limited to operations implemented in situations where the international community is collectively addressing for peace and security; simply referred to as “ship inspection operations” in IV. 2. (5)) (hereinafter referred to as “response measures”). (Article 2, Paragraph 1) 2. The implementation of response measures shall not involve the threat or use of force. (Article 2, Paragraph 2) 3. Cooperation and support activities and search and rescue activities shall not be implemented in the scene where combat operations (refer to operations that involve the killing or injuring of people or the destruction of properties conducted as part of international armed conf icts; hereinafter the same shall apply) are actually being conducted; provided, however, that this shall not apply to search and rescue activities carried out pursuant to the provision of VIII. 6. (Article 2, Paragraph 3) 4. Response measures in the territories of foreign countries shall be implemented provided that consent for the implementation of such response measures has been obtained from said countries (if there is an organization that governs said countries in accordance with a resolution of the General Assembly or the Security Council of the United Nations, said organization). (Article 2, Paragraph 4) 5. In implementing the response measures, the Prime Minister shall direct and supervise administrative departments on behalf of the Cabinet, in d ith th b i l ib d i IV 1 ----- 6. The heads of the relevant administrative organizations shall cooperate with the Minister of Defense on the implementation of the response measures to achieve the purpose in I. (Article 2, Paragraph 6) **III. Defi nitions and Other Matters** 1. In this Law, the meanings of the terms set forth below shall be as prescribed respectively below: (Article 3, Paragraph 1) (1) “Armed forces of foreign countries, etc.” means the armed forces of foreign countries and other similar organizations addressing situations where peace and security of the international community is threatened when there exists either of the following resolutions of the General Assembly or the Security Council of the United Nations (except for those that conduct the United Nations peacekeeping operations prescribed in Article 3, Item 1 of the Law on Cooperation with United Nations Peacekeeping Operations and Other Operations, internationally coordinated peace and security operations prescribed in Item 2 of said Article, or international humanitarian relief operations prescribed in Item 3 of said Article, and U.S. Forces, etc. prescribed in Article 3, Paragraph 1, Item 1 of the Law Concerning the Measures to Ensure Peace and Security of Japan in Situations that Will Have an Important Inf uence on Japan’s Peace and Security): (i) A resolution that decides, calls upon, recommends, or authorizes the foreign countries to conduct said operations (ii) Other than what is set forth in (i), a resolution that regards said situations as a threat to peace or a breach of the peace and calls on the United Nations member states to respond to said situations. (2) “Cooperation and support activities” means the provision of goods and services to the armed forces of foreign countries, etc., which is implemented by Japan. (3) “Search and rescue activities” means the search or rescue of combat participants who have become lost due to combat operations conducted during the activities of the armed forces of foreign countries, etc. (including the transport of rescued personnel), which is implemented by Japan. 2. The provision of goods belonging to the Self-Defense Forces (SDF) and provision of services by the SDF implemented under cooperation and support activities (except for those prescribed in 3.) shall consist of supply, transportation, repair and maintenance, medical activities, communications, airport and seaport services, base services, lodging, storage, use of facilities, training services, and construction. The provision of goods shall not include the provision of weapons. (Article 3, Paragraph 2) 3. Search and rescue activities shall be implemented by SDF units, etc. (referring to the units, etc. prescribed in Article 8 of the Self-Defense Forces Act; hereinafter the same shall apply). In this case, the provision of goods belonging to the SDF and the provision of services by the SDF, implemented under cooperation and support activities along with the search and rescue activities implemented by the SDF units, etc. for the units of the armed forces of foreign countries, etc. that are conducting activities equivalent to said activities, shall consist of supplies, transportation, repair and maintenance, medical activities, communications, lodging, and disinfection. The provision of goods shall not include the provision of weapons. (Article 3, Paragraph 3) **IV. Basic Plan** 1. When it is deemed that any one of the response measures needs to be implemented in situations where the international community is collectively addressing for peace and security, the Prime Minister shall seek the approval of the Cabinet on the implementation of said response measure and on the proposal of the basic plan concerning said response measure (hereinafter referred to as the “basic plan”). (Article 4, Paragraph 1) 2. The matters provided for in the basic plan shall be as follows: (Article 4, Paragraph 2) (1) The following matters concerning situations where the international community is collectively addressing for peace and security: (i) Background of the situation and its inf uence on the peace and security of the international community; (ii) The status of the responses by the international community; and (iii) The reasons why it can be deemed that Japan needs to implement response measures. (2) Other than what is set forth in (1), basic policies concerning the implementation of response measures. (3) The following matters in the case of implementing the cooperation and support activities in III. 2.: (i) Basic matters pertaining to said cooperation and support activities; (ii) Types and the contents of said cooperation and support activities; (iii) The scope of the area where said cooperation and support activities are implemented and matters concerning the designation of said area; (iv) In cases where the SDF implement said cooperation and support activities in foreign territories, the size, composition, equipment, and dispatch period of the SDF units, etc. that are implementing said cooperation and support activities in foreign territories; (v) In cases where the SDF procure goods other than the ones they provide or had provided for their administrative work or duties, and transfer the goods to the military forces of foreign countries, etc. for free or at prices lower than the actual values, important matters pertaining to its implementation; and (vi) Other important matters concerning the implementation of said cooperation and support activities. (4) The following matters in the case of implementing search and rescue activities: (i) Basic matters pertaining to said search and rescue activities; (ii) The scope of the area where said search and rescue activities are implemented and matters concerning the designation of said area; (iii) Important matters concerning the implementation of the cooperation and support activities in III. 3. accompanying the implementation of said search and rescue activities (including the scope of the area where said cooperation and support activities are implemented and matters concerning the designation of said area); (iv) In cases where the SDF implement said search and rescue activities or its accompanying cooperation and support activities in III. 3. in foreign territories, the size, composition, equipment, and dispatch period of the SDF units, etc. that are implementing these activities in foreign territories; and (v) Other important matters concerning the implementation of said search and rescue activities. (5) Matters prescribed in Article 4, Paragraph 2 of the Ship Inspection Operation Act in Situations that Will Have an Important Inf uence on Japan’s Peace and Security and Other Situations in the case of implementing ship inspection operations. (6) Matters concerning the liaison and coordination among relevant administrative organizations for the implementation of response measures. 3. In the case of implementing cooperation and support activities or search and rescue activities in foreign territories, the scope of the area where the activities are implemented shall be set forth in consultation with the relevant foreign countries (in the case of an organization prescribed in II. 4., said organization). (Article 4, Paragraph 3) 4. With regard to changes of the basic plan, the same shall apply as 1. and 3. (Article 4, Paragraph 4) **V. Reporting to the Diet** When the basic plan is decided or changed, the Prime Minister shall report its content to the Diet without delay, and when the response measures provided for in the basic plan are completed, their results. (Article 5) **VI. Consent of the Diet** 1. Before implementing the response measures, the Prime Minister shall obtain the approval of the Diet on the implementation of said response measures, attached with the basic plan. (Article 6, Paragraph 1) 2. In cases where the Prime Minister seeks the consent of the Diet pursuant to the provision in 1., efforts shall be made to take a vote at the House that f rst deliberates the measure, within seven days after the Prime Minister seeks the approval of the Diet, excluding the period that the Diet is not in session, and at the House that next deliberates the measure, within seven days after the measure is sent from the f rst House, excluding the period that the Diet is not in session. (Article 6, Paragraph 2) 3. If the response measures will continue to be implemented beyond the date on which two years have passed since the date of obtaining the approval of the Diet pursuant to the provision in 1., the Prime Minister shall, between 30 days prior to the said date and the said date, submit for Diet deliberations the matter of continuing to take said response measures, attached with the basic plan and a report describing the response measures taken until then, and seek the approval of the Diet; provided, however, that the Diet is not in session or the House of Representatives has been dissolved, the Prime Minister shall request the approval in the f rst Diet session that is convoked thereafter. (Article 6, Paragraph 3) 4. If the Diet votes not to approve in the case of 3., the Government shall terminate the response measures without delay. (Article 6, Paragraph 4) 5. In the case of continuing with the response measures upon obtaining the approval of the Diet and then attempting to continue with said ----- response measures after another two years have passed, the same shall apply as 3. and 4. (Article 6, Paragraph 5) **VII. Cooperation and Support Activities** 1. The Minister of Defense or the person entrusted by him/her shall provide the goods belonging to the SDF under the cooperation and support activities in III. 2. in accordance with the basic plan. (Article 7, Paragraph 1) 2. With regard to the provision of services by the SDF under the cooperation and support activities in III. 2., the Minister of Defense shall, in accordance with the basic plan, set forth implementation details, obtain the approval of the Prime Minister thereof, and order its implementation to SDF units, etc. (Article 7, Paragraph 2) 3. The Minister of Defense shall designate in the implementation details in 2. the area where said cooperation and support activities will be implemented (hereinafter referred to as the “implementation area” in VII.) for SDF units, etc. to be able to provide services smoothly and safely, taking into consideration the details of the services that need to be provided. (Article 7, Paragraph 3) 4. If it is deemed that it is diff cult for SDF units, etc. to implement the cooperation and support activities in III. 2. smoothly and safely in the entire or part of the implementation area, or if it is deemed that the consent in II. 4. no longer exists for said cooperation and support activities to be implemented in foreign territories, the Minister of Defense shall swiftly modify the designation of the implementation area or order the cessation of the activities that are implemented in said area. (Article 7, Paragraph 4) 5. In cases where combat operations occur at the place where cooperation and support activities are being implemented or in its vicinity, or in cases where combat operations are anticipated to occur in light of the situation in nearby areas, etc., or in cases where it is deemed necessary for the purpose of ensuring the safety of SDF units, etc., the commanding off cer of said units, etc. that have been ordered to implement said cooperation and support activities in III. 2. outside Japanese territory or the person designated by him/her shall avert danger, such as by temporarily suspending the implementation of said cooperation and support activities or by evacuating, and wait for the measures pursuant to the provision in 4. (Article 7, Paragraph 5) 6. With regard to changes of the implementation details in 2. (except for changes that make the implementation area smaller pursuant to the provision in 4.), the same shall apply as 2. (Article 7, Paragraph 6) **VIII. Search and Rescue Activities** 1. With regard to the search and rescue activities, the Minister of Defense shall, in accordance with the basic plan, set forth implementation details, obtain the approval of the Prime Minister thereof, and order its implementation to SDF units, etc. (Article 8, Paragraph 1) 2. The Minister of Defense shall designate in the implementation details in 1. the area where said search and rescue activities will be implemented (hereinafter referred to as the “implementation area” in VIII.) for SDF units, etc. to be able to implement search and rescue activities smoothly and safely, taking into consideration the details of said activities that need to be implemented. (Article 8, Paragraph 2) 3. In the case of implementing search and rescue activities, if there are non-combat participants who are lost, they shall be rescued. (Article 8, Paragraph 3) 4. With regard to changes of the designation of the implementation area and cessation of activities, the same shall apply as VII. 4. (Article 8, Paragraph 4) 5. In cases where combat operations occur at the place where search and rescue activities are being implemented or in its vicinity, or in cases where combat operations are anticipated to occur in light of the situation in nearby areas, etc., or in cases where it is deemed necessary for the purpose of ensuring the safety of SDF units, etc., the commanding off cer of said units, etc. that have been ordered to implement said search and rescue activities outside Japanese territory or the person designated by him/her shall avert danger, such as by temporarily suspending the implementation of said search and rescue activities or evacuating, and wait for the measures pursuant to the provision in 4. (Article 8, Paragraph 5) 6. Notwithstanding the provision in 5., if lost personnel have already been found and SDF units, etc. have commenced the rescue operations, the units, etc. may continue their search and rescue activities for said lost personnel as long as the safety of said units, etc. is ensured. (Article 8, Paragraph 6) 7 With regard to changes to the implementation details in 1 (except for changes that make the implementation area smaller pursuant to the provision in 4.), the same shall apply as 1. (Article 8, Paragraph 7) 8. With regard to the cooperation and support activities in III. 3. accompanying the implementation of search and rescue activities, the same shall apply as VII. (Article 8, Paragraph 8) **IX. Ensuring the Safety of SDF Units, etc.** In implementing the response measures, the Minister of Defense shall work to implement them smoothly and effectively and give consideration to ensuring the safety of SDF units, etc. (Article 9) **X. Cooperation of Relevant Administrative Organizations** 1. When it is deemed necessary for the implementation of response measures, the Minister of Defense shall be able to request heads of relevant administrative organizations to provide cooperation such as transferring control of goods belonging to them. (Article 10, Paragraph 1) 2. When the request pursuant to the provision in 1. is made, the heads of relevant administrative organizations shall provide the cooperation in 1. to the extent that it does not interfere with the affairs under their jurisdiction. (Article 10, Paragraph 2) **XI. Use of Weapons** 1. SDF personnel of the SDF units, etc. that have been ordered to provide SDF services under the cooperation and support activities pursuant to the provision in VII. 2. or VIII. 8 or that have been ordered to implement the search and rescue activities pursuant to the provision in VIII. 1. shall be able to use weapons (in cases where the SDF are implementing said cooperation and support activities or said search and rescue activities in foreign territories, weapons shall be limited to those that fall under equipment provided for in the basic plan pursuant to the provision in IV. 2. (3) (iv) or (4) (iv); hereinafter the same shall apply in XI.) to the extent that is considered reasonably necessary in proportions as the situation, when there are suff cient grounds for judging that the use of weapons is inevitable to protect the life or body of themselves, of other SDF personnel who are at the site with them (referring to personnel prescribed in Article 2, Paragraph 5 of the Self-Defense Forces Law; the same shall apply in 6.), or of those who are under their management for the implementation of their duty. (Article 11, Paragraph 1) 2. When a senior off cer is present at the site, the use of weapons pursuant to the provision in 1. shall adhere to his/her order; provided, however, that this shall not apply when there is imminent aggression or danger to life or body and there is no time to receive the order. (Article 11, Paragraph 2) 3. In the case of 1., said senior off cer at the site shall give the necessary orders to prevent causing any danger to life or body or confusion to the situation as a result of using weapons in the absence of disciplines, and to ensure that the use of weapons is conducted appropriately within the scope of its purpose in accordance with the provisions in 1. and 4. (Article 11, Paragraph 3) 4. The use of weapons pursuant to the provision in 1. shall not cause any harm to people, except for cases that fall under the provisions in Article 36 or Article 37 of the Penal Code. (Article 11, Paragraph 4) 5. SDF personnel of the SDF units, etc. that have been ordered to provide SDF services under the cooperation and support activities pursuant to the provision in VII. 2. or VIII. 8 or that have been ordered to implement the search and rescue activities pursuant to the provision in VIII. 1. shall be able to use weapons pursuant to the provision in 1. in the case of an attack against an encampment set up in a territory of a foreign country which accommodates the said units, etc. (referring to an area which is used for accommodation and which is distinguished from other areas through the installation of a fence; hereinafter the same shall apply in 5.) as well as the personnel of the armed forces of foreign countries, etc., and furthermore, there is no place to ensure the safety of SDF personnel, etc. in the vicinity other than said encampment, jointly with the personnel who are taking measures to protect the life or body of the people in said encampment. In this case, the application of the provisions in 1. to 3. and 6. shall take into account the status of the measures taken by said personnel. (Article 11, Paragraph 5) 6. With regard to SDF personnel of the SDF units, etc. that have been ordered to provide SDF services under the cooperation and support activities pursuant to the provision in VII. 2. or VIII. 8 (limited to services outside Japanese territory) or that have been ordered to implement the search and rescue activities pursuant to the provision in VIII. 1. (limited to activities outside Japanese territory), the provision i A i l 96 P h 3 f h S lf D f F A h ll ----- apply to crimes committed by non-SDF personnel. (Article 11, Paragraph 6) **XII. Transfer and Free Loan of Supplies** In the case that during the implementation of cooperation and support activities, the armed forces of foreign countries, etc. that are benef ciaries of the cooperation and support activities request the transfer or free loan of supplies belonging to the SDF (except for weapons) to provide for the activities prescribed in III. 1. (1) (hereinafter referred to as “activities to address the situation”), the Minister of Defense or the person entrusted by him/her shall be able to transfer to the armed forces of foreign countries, etc. for free or at prices lower than the actual values, or loan for free, the goods pertaining to said request to the extent that it does not interfere with the affairs under their jurisdiction, when it is deemed necessary for the smooth implementation of said activities to address the situation. (Article 12) **XIII. Cooperation by Non-State Actors** 1. When it is deemed that response measures cannot be adequately implemented with only the measures pursuant to the provisions in IV. to XI., the Minister of Defense shall be able to request the cooperation of non-state actors on the transfer or loan of goods or the provision of services, with the cooperation of the heads of relevant administrative organizations. (Article 13, Paragraph 1) 2. The Government shall pay a proper price to the non-state actor whose cooperation was requested pursuant to the provision in 1. In cases where said actor incurred losses as a result of said cooperation, the Government shall take the necessary f nancial measures concerning such losses. (Article 13, Paragraph 2) **XIV. Waiver of Right to Claim** In cases where the SDF are implementing cooperation and support activities or search and rescue activities (hereinafter referred to as “cooperation and support activities, etc.” in XIV.) and foreign countries with which the armed forces. of foreign countries, etc are aff liated request commitment to mutually waiving their right to claim damages for losses attributed to the activities to address the situation that are conducted by said armed forces, etc. of foreign countries or cooperation and support activities, etc., the Government shall be able to commit to waiving Japan’s right to claim damages for losses attributed to activities to address the situation to said foreign countries and their personnel, when it is deemed that agreeing to the request is necessary for the smooth implementation of the respective activities while ensuring mutual collaboration. (Article 14) **XV. Delegation to Cabinet Order** In addition to the matters provided for in this Law, the procedures for implementing this Law and other necessary matters concerning the enforcement of this Law shall be prescribed by cabinet order. (Article 15) **XVI. Supplementary Provisions** This Law shall come into effect as from the date of enforcement of the Law for Partial Amendments to the Self-Defense Forces Law and Other Laws to Contribute to Ensure Peace and Security of Japan and the International Community. (Supplementary Provisions) **Reference 8** **Responses to Foreign Naval Vessels Carrying Out** **Navigation through the Territorial Sea or the Internal** **Waters of Japan that Does Not Fall Under Innocent** **Passage in International Law** (Approved by the Cabinet on May 14, 2015) When a foreign naval vessel carries out navigation through the territorial sea or the internal waters of Japan that does not fall under innocent passage in international law, the Government shall, in order to ensure seamless and suff cient responses to any unlawful acts through closer cooperation between the relevant agencies, from the standpoint of safeguarding the sovereignty of Japan and securing the safety of Japanese nationals, respond as follows. If the foreign naval vessel is a foreign submarine carrying out submerged navigation through the territorial sea or the internal waters of Japan, the Government shall take responses pursuant to “Responses to Foreign Submarines Carrying Out Submerged Navigation through the Territorial Sea or the Internal Waters of Japan” (approved by the Cabinet on December 24, 1996). 1. Accurately gauge the situation If a foreign naval vessel may carry out navigation through the territorial sea or the internal waters of Japan that does not fall under innocent passage in international law, the Japan Coast Guard or the Ministry of Defense that gauges the situation shall swiftly inform and report to the Prime Minister, the Chief Cabinet Secretary, Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretaries, the Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary for Crisis Management, and the Secretary General of National Security Secretariat (hereinafter referred to as “the Prime Minister and others”) through the Cabinet Intelligence and Research Off ce. In addition, the Japan Coast Guard or the Ministry of Defense shall promptly notify this effect to the Cabinet Secretariat, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and other relevant ministries and agencies. The parties shall cooperate with each other to further gauge the situation. This shall not preclude the Japan Coast Guard or the Ministry of Defense from reporting to the Prime Minister and others through their respective channels, in addition to the above communication channel. 2. Deal with the situation The Government shall immediately take measures pursuant to international law against foreign naval vessels that carry out navigation through the territorial sea and the internal waters of Japan that does not fall under innocent passage in international law, such as calling on the vessels to leave Japan’s territorial sea. In order to ensure seamless and suff cient responses to any unlawful acts, said measures shall, in principle, be carried out by Self-Defense Force units through the issuance of an order concerning maritime security operations in accordance with Article 82 of the Self-Defense Forces Act. The Ministry of Defense, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the Japan Coast Guard shall share intelligence, coordinate, and cooperate with each other closely and swiftly. 3. Swiftly implement Cabinet procedures (1) When, for responding to foreign naval vessels deemed to be carrying out navigation through the territorial sea and the internal waters of Japan that does not fall under innocent passage in international law, due to special circumstances requiring the protection of lives or property or the maintenance of order at sea, a Cabinet meeting needs to be convened to receive the Prime Minister’s authorization on the issuance of an order concerning maritime security operations provided for in Article 82 of the Self-Defense Forces Act or for other purposes, and if the situation requires a particularly urgent decision and an extraordinary Cabinet meeting attended by all Ministers of State cannot be promptly held, a Cabinet decision shall be made with the consent of the Ministers of State by telephone or other means, presided over by the Prime Minister. In such cases, any Ministers of State who could not be contacted shall be promptly contacted after the fact. (2) Any National Security Council deliberations or other discussions to be held in association with the issuance of the order in (1) above may be held by telephone or other means. 4. Maintain close coordination prior to the occurrence of events In addition to the above, the Cabinet Secretariat and the relevant ministries and agencies shall coordinate closely prior to the occurrence of events. They shall share their recognition on responses to foreign naval vessels that carry out navigation through the territorial sea or the internal waters of Japan that does not fall under innocent passage in international law, and strive to enhance their capabilities to deal with said navigation through trainings and other means, and thereby, stand ready to take swift responses if an event should occur. **Reference 9** **The Government’s Responses to Illegal Landing on a** **Remote Island or its Surrounding Seas by an Armed Group** (Approved by the Cabinet on May 14, 2015) If there is a high risk of an armed group or a group with a high probability of being armed landing illegally, or if it lands illegally on a remote island or its surrounding seas (hereinafter referred to as “remote island or its surrounding seas”) (hereinafter referred to as “illegal landing on a remote island or its surrounding seas by an armed group”), the Government shall, in order to ensure seamless and suff cient responses to any unlawful acts through closer cooperation between the relevant agencies, from the standpoint of safeguarding the sovereignty of Japan and securing the safety of Japanese nationals, respond as follows: 1. Accurately gauge the situation When any illegal landing on a remote island or its surrounding seas by an armed group takes place, the relevant ministries and agencies listed in Annex 1 that gauge the situation (hereinafter referred to as “relevant ministries and agencies”) shall swiftly inform and report to the Prime Minister, the Chief Cabinet Secretary, Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretaries, the Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary for Crisis Management, and the Secretary General of National Security Secretariat (hereinafter referred to as “the Prime Minister and others”) through the Cabinet Intelligence and Research Off ce. In addition, the parties shall cooperate with each other to further gauge the situation. This shall not preclude the relevant ministries and agencies from reporting to the Prime Minister and others through their respective channels, in addition to the above communication channel. 2. Establish Response Headquarters If ill l l di i l d i di b ----- armed group takes place and the Government s responses need to be implemented comprehensively and robustly, the Government shall, at the decision of the Prime Minister, promptly establish within the Cabinet a Response Headquarters, in which the Prime Minister serves as Chair and in which the Chief Cabinet Secretary, and if necessary, any other person the Chair designates from among the Minister of State members of the Headquarters, serve as Deputy Chairs. The members of the Response Headquarters shall be those listed in Annex 2. The rules of operation shall be equivalent to those for the Response Headquarters pursuant to “Initial Measures of the Government in Case of a Serious Terrorist Attack” (approved by the Cabinet on April 10, 1998). 3. Responses when the situation intensif es If the situation intensif es and the issuance of a maritime security operations (maritime security operations provided for in Article 82 of the Self-Defense Forces Act; hereinafter the same shall apply) order or a public security operation (public security operation pursuant to the order provided for in Article 78 of the Self-Defense Forces Act; hereinafter the same shall apply) order is anticipated, the parties – primarily the Cabinet Secretariat, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Japan Coast Guard, the National Police Agency, and the Ministry of Defense, under the Response Headquarters, shall cooperate with each other in advance to the maximum extent on the issuance of the maritime security operations order or the public security operation order in: reviewing the response policy; dividing the roles among and conf rming coordination between the Self-Defense Forces, the Japan Coast Guard, the police, among other actors; conf rming consistency with international law; and sharing the necessary information. The parties shall stand ready to promptly take robust responses when the maritime security operations order or the public security operation order is issued. 4. Swiftly implement Cabinet procedures (1) Maritime security operations When it is deemed that the situation cannot be addressed by the Japan Coast Guard alone and a Cabinet meeting needs to be convened to receive the Prime Minister’s authorization on the issuance of the maritime security operations order or for other purposes, and if the situation requires a particularly urgent decision and an extraordinary Cabinet meeting attended by all Ministers of State cannot be promptly held, a Cabinet decision shall be made with the consent of the Ministers of State by telephone or other means, presided over by the Prime Minister. In such cases, any Ministers of State who could not be contacted shall be promptly contacted after the fact. (2) Public security operation When the situation cannot be addressed swiftly by police agencies, and furthermore, the situation intensif es, and a Cabinet meeting needs to be convened to receive the Prime Minister’s authorization on the public security operation standby order as well as the order concerning information gathering by weapons-carrying SelfDefense Force units that the Minister of Defense issues if the issuance of the public security operation order is anticipated, as well as to issue a public security operation order by the Prime Minister when a situation arises in which it is deemed that public security cannot be maintained by general police forces, and if the situation requires a particularly urgent decision and an extraordinary Cabinet meeting attended by all Ministers of State cannot be promptly held, a Cabinet decision shall be made with the consent of the Ministers of State by telephone or other means, presided over by the Prime Minister. In such cases, any Ministers of State who could not be contacted shall be promptly contacted after the fact. (3) Any National Security Council deliberations or other discussions to be held in association with the issuance of the order in (1) or (2) above may be held by telephone or other means. 5. Maintain close coordination prior to the occurrence of events In addition to the above, the Cabinet Secretariat and the relevant ministries and agencies shall coordinate closely prior to the occurrence of events. They shall collect and exchange information on cases that may evolve into cases of illegal landing on a remote island or its surrounding seas by an armed group, and share their recognition on responses to such events, and strive to enhance their capabilities to deal with events through trainings and other means, and thereby, stand ready to take swift responses if an event should occur. Annex 1 National Police Agency Ministry of Justice Public Security Intelligence Agency Ministry of Foreign Affairs Japan Coast Guard Ministry of Defense Other ministries and agencies deemed necessary by the Chair Annex 2 Ministers of State who head the relevant ministries and agencies (including Chairperson of the National Public Safety Commission) Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretaries Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary for Crisis Management Secretary General of National Security Secretariat Commissioner General of National Police Agency Commandant of Japan Coast Guard Others deemed necessary by the Chair **Reference 10** **Responses to Acts of Infringement When Self-** **Defense Force Ships or Aircraft Detect Foreign Ships** **Committing Said Acts Against Japanese Private Ships** **on the High Seas** (Approved by the Cabinet on May 14, 2015) When a foreign ship that is committing an illegal act of violence or detention, or an act of depredation (hereinafter simply referred to as “acts of infringement”) against a Japanese private ship (a private ship registered in Japan) on the high seas, which does not fall under piracy or any other armed attack against Japan by an external party, is detected while a SelfDefense Force ship or aircraft is conducting surveillance or other activities, the Government shall, in order to ensure seamless and suff cient responses to any unlawful acts through closer cooperation between the relevant agencies, from the standpoint of dealing with this situation, safeguarding the sovereignty of Japan, and securing the safety of Japanese nationals, respond as follows: 1. Accurately gauge the situation When foreign ships that are or may be committing said acts of infringement are detected, the Ministry of Defense that gauges the situation shall swiftly inform and report to the Prime Minister, the Chief Cabinet Secretary, Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretaries, the Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary for Crisis Management, and the Secretary General of National Security Secretariat (hereinafter referred to as “the Prime Minister and others”) through the Cabinet Intelligence and Research Off ce. In addition, the Ministry of Defense shall promptly notify this effect to the Cabinet Secretariat, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Japan Coast Guard, and other relevant ministries and agencies. The parties shall cooperate with each other to further gauge the situation. This shall not preclude the Ministry of Defense from reporting to the Prime Minister and others through their respective channels, in addition to the above communication channel. 2. Deal with the situation The Cabinet Secretariat, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Japan Coast Guard, the Ministry of Defense, and other relevant ministries and agencies shall deal with the acts of infringement by sharing intelligence, coordinating, and cooperating with each other closely and swiftly. 3. Swiftly implement Cabinet procedures (1) When it is deemed that the ongoing act of infringement cannot be addressed by the Japan Coast Guard alone and a Cabinet meeting needs to be convened to receive the Prime Minister’s authorization on A or B below or for other purposes, and if the situation requires a particularly urgent decision and an extraordinary Cabinet meeting attended by all Ministers of State cannot be promptly held, a Cabinet decision shall be made with the consent of the Ministers of State by telephone or other means, presided over by the Prime Minister. In such cases, any Ministers of State who could not be contacted shall be promptly contacted after the fact. A. Issuance of an order concerning counter-piracy actions provided for in Article 7, Paragraph 1 of the Act concerning the Punishment of Acts of Piracy and Measures to Deal with Acts of Piracy (provided, however, that this shall be limited to cases provided for in the proviso of Paragraph 2 of said article); or B. Issuance of an order concerning maritime security operations provided for in Article 82 of the Self-Defense Forces Act. (2) Any National Security Council deliberations or other discussions to be held in association with the issuance of the orders in (1) A or B above may be held by telephone or other means. 4. Maintain close coordination prior to the occurrence of events In addition to the above, the Cabinet Secretariat and the relevant ministries and agencies shall coordinate closely prior to the occurrence of events. They shall share their recognition on the responses to acts of infringement and strive to enhance their capabilities to deal with said acts through trainings and other means, and thereby, stand ready to take swift responses if an event should occur. ----- **Reference 11** **Main Operations of the Self-Defense Forces** |Operation|Applicable Situations|Conditions Required for Operations|Main Type of Authorized Actions| |---|---|---|---| |Defense operation (Article 76, Self-Defense Forces Law)|When necessary to defend Japan against an armed attack or when an armed attack is clearly imminent|(1) Authorized by: Prime Minister (2) Consent of the Diet: required (prior consent required in principle)|H Use of force (only if the case fulfi ls 3 conditions for exercising the right of selfdefense) H Maintenance of public order (same as for public security operation) H Others (including control over the Japan Coast Guard, emergency passage, appropriation of supplies, marine transportation restriction, treatment of prisoners, etc.)| |Establishment of defense facilities (Article 77-2, Self-Defense Forces Law)|When there are areas in which the deployment of SDF units under the order for defense operations is expected and the reinforcement of defensive preparations is deemed necessary (intended deployment area) before the deployment of SDF units for possible operation in cases where the situation has intensifi ed and the order for defense operations is likely|(1) Authorized by: Minister of Defense (2) Consent of the Diet: required (after the Cabinet decision on the Basic Response Plan)1 (3) Additional requirements: approval of the Prime Minister|H Establishment of positions and defense purpose facilities in the intended deployment area H Use of weapons to protect one’s own life or body or other personnel on duty| |Measures to be taken before a defense operation order (Article 77-3, Self-Defense Forces Law)|When a defense operation order is expected under a tense situation|(1) Authorized by: supplies — Minister of Defense or person — delegated authority by the Minister; services — Minister of Defense (2) Consent of the Diet: supplies — not required; services — required (after the Cabinet decision on the Basic Response Plan)1|H Provision of supplies to the U.S. military forces as a measure related to the actions based on the U.S. Military Actions Related Measures Law H Provision of services as an action measure H Use of weapons to protect one’ s own life or body or other personnel on duty| |Civil Protection Dispatch (Article 77-4, Self-Defense Forces Law)|When deemed unavoidable upon request by prefectural governors in accordance with the Civil Protection Law, or when requested by the Armed Attack Situation, etc., Task Force Chief or the Emergency Response Situation Task Force Chief in accordance with the Law|(1) Authorized by: Minister of Defense (2) Consent of the Diet: not required (3) Additional requirements: approval of the Prime Minister|H Measures concerning guidance of fl eeing residents provided for in the Civil Protection Law, emergent measures, traffi c control, etc. H Partial application of the Police Duties Law use of weapons)2 H Partial application of the Japan Coast Guard Law (requests for cooperation, on- the-spot inspections, use of weapons, etc.) H Use of weapons| |Public security operation by order (Article 78, Self-Defense Forces Law)|When it is deemed that the public security cannot be maintained by the civilian police force in the event of indirect aggression or other such emergency|(1) Authorized by: Prime Minister (2) Consent of the Diet: required (to be referred to the Diet within 20 days of the order’s issuance)|H Application of the Police Duties Law (interrogation, evacuation, crime prevention and control, etc.) H Partial application of the Japan Coast Guard Law (requests for cooperation, on- the-spot inspections, etc.) H Use of weapons H Control over the Japan Coast Guard| |Information gathering before public security operation order (Article 79-2, Self-Defense Forces Law)|When situations have intensifi ed and a public security operation order and illicit activity by those armed with rifl es, machine guns, or other weapons are expected; and there is a special need to gather information|(1) Authorized by: Minister of Defense (2) Consent of the Diet: not required (3) Additional requirements: approval of the Prime Minister after consulting with the National Public Safety Commission|H Use of weapons to protect one’s own life and body or other personnel on duty| |Public security operation by request (Article 81, Self-Defense Forces Law)|When deemed unavoidable if public peace is to be maintained in serious situations by the prefectural governors and by the Prime Minister|(1) Authorized by: Prime Minister (2) Consent of the Diet: not required (3) Additional requirements: prefectural governor makes a request to the Prime Minister after consulting with the prefectural Public Safety Commission|H Application of the Police Duties Law (interrogation, evacuation, crime prevention and control, etc.) H Partial application of the Japan Coast Guard Law (requests for cooperation, on- the-spot inspections, etc.) H Use of weapons| |Guarding operation (Article 81-2, Self-Defense Forces Law)|When special measures are deemed necessary to prevent damage due to likely large-scale terrorist attacks on SDF or U.S. forces facilities and areas in Japan|(1) Authorized by: Prime Minister (2) Consent of the Diet: not required (3) Additional requirements: Minister of Defense consults with the National Public Safety Commission after hearing opinions from the relevant prefectural governor|H Partial application of the Police Duties Law (interrogation; measures such as evacuation, etc.; entry (all only when police offi cers are not present); crime prevention and control) H Use of weapons| |Maritime security operations (Article 82, Self-Defense Forces Law)|When special measures are deemed necessary to protect lives and property or maintain order at sea|(1) Authorized by: Minister of Defense (2) Consent of the Diet: not required (3) Additional requirements: approval of the Prime Minister|H Partial application of the Japan Coast Guard Law (requests for cooperation, on- the-spot inspections, etc.) H Use of weapons| |Counter-Piracy Operations (Article 82-2, Self-Defense Forces Law and Anti-Piracy Law)|When special measures are deemed necessary to combat acts of piracy|(1) Authorized by: Minister of Defense (2) Consent of the Diet: not required (to be reported to the Diet when the Prime Minister has approved the counterpiracy operation or when a mission has been completed) (3) Additional requirements:approval of the Prime Minister (the Minister of Defense submits the response procedures to the Prime Minister)|H Partial application of the Japan Coast Guard Law (requests for cooperation, on- the-spot inspections, etc.) H Use of weapons| |Destruction measures against ballistic missiles, etc. (Article 82-3, Self-Defense Forces Law)|When it is anticipated that ballistic missiles are fl ying toward Japan and the measures are deemed necessary to protect lives and properties in Japan’s territory from the damage caused by missiles|(1) Authorized by: Minister of Defense (2) Consent of the Diet: not required (after-the fact report required) (3) Additional requirements: approval of the Prime Minister (for an urgent case, the order can be made in advance according to the emergency response procedures approved by the Prime Minister)|H Use of weapons| |Disaster relief dispatch (Article 83, Self-Defense Forces Law)|When judged necessary in order to protect lives and property in the event of natural calamities or other disasters3|(1) Authorized by: Minister of Defense or those designated by the Minister (2) Consent of the Diet: not required (3) Additional requirements: at the request of prefectural governors or other parties designated by Government ordinance (excluding particularly urgent situations when it is deemed there is no time to wait for a request to be made)|H Partial application of the Police Duties Law evacuation, entry, etc.) (all only when police offi cers are not present) H Partial application of the Japan Coast Guard Law (request for cooperation) H Authority provided for under the Disaster Measures Basic Law (designation of alert zones, guarantee of passage for emergency vehicles, etc.; restricted to cases when no municipal mayor or police offi cer is present)| |Earthquake disaster relief dispatch (Article 83-2, Self-Defense Forces Law)|When the Director-General of the Earthquake Disaster Warning Headquarters deems the support of the SDF to be necessary for the swift and appropriate implementation of emergency measures to deal with earthquakes and other disasters (Article 13-2 of the Special Law Concerning Countermeasures for Large- Scale Earthquakes)|(1) Authorized by: Minister of Defense (2) Consent of the Diet: not required (3) Additional requirements: request of the Director- General of the Earthquake Disaster Warning Headquarters (Prime Minister)|H Partial application of the Police Duties Law (the same as in the case of a disaster relief dispatch) H Partial application of the Japan Coast Guard Law (the same as in the case of a disaster relief dispatch)| ----- |Operation|Applicable Situations|Conditions Required for Operations|Main Type of Authorized Actions| |---|---|---|---| |Nuclear disaster relief Dispatch (Article 83-3, Self-Defense Forces Law)|When the Director-General of the Nuclear Disaster Response Headquarters deems the support of the SDF to be necessary for the swift and appropriate implementation of measures to deal with emergency situations (Article 20-4 of the Special Law Concerning Countermeasures for Nuclear Disasters)|(1) Authorized by: Minister of Defense (2) Consent of the Diet: not required (3) Additional requirements: request of the Director- General of the Nuclear Disaster Response Headquarters (Prime Minister)|H Same as in disaster dispatch| |Action against violation of territorial airspace (Article 84, Self-Defense Forces Law)|When a foreign aircraft intrudes Japan’s territorial airspace in violation of international law and/or the provisions of the Aviation Law or other relevant laws and regulations|(1) Authorized by: Minister of Defense (2) Consent of the Diet: not required|H The action necessary to make intruding aircraft land or withdraw from the territorial airspace of Japan (guiding intruders away, issuing radio transmission warnings, use of weapons, etc.)4| |Elimination of mines and other dangerous objects (Article 84-2, Self-Defense Forces Law)||(1) Authorized by: Minister of Defense (2) Consent of the Diet: not required|H Elimination and disposition of mines and other dangerous explosive objects found on the sea| |Evacuation of Japanese nationals residing abroad (Article 84-3, Self-Defense Forces Law)|When a disaster, commotion, or other emergency situation occurs in a foreign country|(1) Authorized by: Minister of Defense (2) Consent of the Diet: not required (3) Additional requirements: request of the Minister for Foreign Affairs to evacuate Japanese nationals whose lives and bodies are threatened|H Use of weapons to protect one’s own life or body or other personnel on duty| |Rear area support (Self-Defense Forces Law Article 84-4, Law Concerning Measures to Ensure the Peace and Security of Japan in Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan, Ship Inspections Operations Law)|When a situation that may seriously affect the peace and security of Japan occurs in an area surrounding Japan|(1) Authorized by: supplies—Minister of Defense or person delegated authority by the Minister; services/rear area search and rescue activities/ ship inspection operations—Minister of Defense (2) Consent of the Diet: required (prior to taking any response measure, in principle) (3) Additional requirements: approval of the Prime Minister (in accordance with the implementation guidelines formulated based on the Basic Plan)|H Provision of supplies and services for rear area support; rear area search and rescue activities; and ship inspection operations H Use of weapons to protect one’s own life or body or other personnel on duty| |International disaster relief activities (Self-Defense Forces Law Article 84-4, International Disaster Relief Law)||(1) Authorized by: Minister of Defense (2) Consent of the Diet: not required (3) Additional requirements:request of the government of the disaster-stricken country to dispatch international disaster relief teams, and consultation with the Minister for Foreign Affairs|H International disaster relief activities by units and the like or personnel of the SDF, and transportation of personnel and goods necessary for the activities| |International peace cooperation activities (Self-Defense Forces Law Article 84-4, International Peace Cooperation Law)|When a request is made from the United Nations to take part in international peace cooperation activities compatible with the International Peace Cooperation Law|(1) Authorized by: Minister of Defense (2) Consent of the Diet: required if units or other groups of the SDF implement so-called core operations of the peacekeeping force (prior consent required in principle) (3) Additional requirements: Request of the Chief of the International Peace Cooperation Headquarters (Prime Minister)|H International peace cooperation activities by units and the like of the SDF, and transportation operations entrusted to Japan H Use of weapons to protect one’s own life or body or other personnel on duty| (All authority referred to in the table is prescribed by applicable law) Notes: 1. If the Prime Minister gives approval to services in connection with defense facility construction, as well as U.S. military actions before a defense operations order is issued, such approval is specifi ed in the Basic Response Plan and presented to the Diet for consent (Article 9, Law Concerning Measures to Ensure National Independence and Security in aSituation of Armed Attack). 2. Full title: Law Concerning the Execution of Duties of Police Offi cials. The law shall apply mutatis mutandis only when police offi cers are not present. 3. Moreover, SDF unit commanders are authorized to dispatch units, should a fi re or other disaster occur in or near the Defense Ministry’s facilities. 4. The use of weapons is not specifi cally defi ned, but is generally covered under “necessary actions.” **Reference 12** **Statutory Provisions about the Use of Armed Force and Weapons by SDF Personnel** |Type of Operation|Provision|Content| |---|---|---| |Defense operation|Article 88, Self-Defense Forces Law|SDF personnel and units under defense operations may take necessary military action to defend Japan.| ||Article 92 (2), Self-Defense Forces Law|Article 7 of the Law Concerning the Execution of Duties of Police Offi cials, Article 90 (1) of the Self-Defense Forces Law and Article 20 (2) of the Japan Coast Guard Law apply mutatis mutandis to the execution of duties to maintain public order by SDF personnel under defense operations.| |Establishment of defense Facilities|Article 92-4, Self- Defense Forces Law|SDF personnel engaged in construction of defense facilities may use weapons to the extent that is considered proper and necessary in light of the situation when there are reasonable grounds for judging that no appropriate means of overcoming such danger exists other than the use of weapons to protect their own lives and bodies and those of other SDF personnel engaged in duties together. The use of weapons shall not cause harm to persons, except for cases falling under Article 36 (self defense) or Article 37 (averting present danger) of the Penal Code.| |Civil protection dispatch|Article 92-3 (2), Self- Defense Forces Law|Article 7 of the Law Concerning the Execution of Duties of Police Offi cials applies mutatis mutandis to SDF personnel ordered to civil protection dispatches only when police offi cers, Japan Coast Guard Offi cers, including petty offi cers, are not present.| |Public security operation|Article 89 (1), Self-Defense Forces Law|Article 7 of the Law Concerning the Execution of Duties of Police Offi cials applies mutatis mutandis to the execution of duties of SDF personnel under public security operations.| ||Article 90 (1), Self-Defense Forces Law|SDF personnel who are ordered into public security operations may, in addition to cases where they use weapons under Article 7 of the Law Concerning the Execution of Duties of Police Offi cials, use weapons under certain cases, such as when they reasonably consider that persons to be guarded in the line of duty and others may suffer violence or infringement or are apparently exposed to such danger and no appropriate means of overcoming it exist other than the use of weapons.| ||Article 91 (2), Self-Defense Forces Law|Article 20 (2) of the Japan Coast Guard Law, which allows shooting with risk of injury to stop boats that meet certain conditions, applies mutatis mutandis to the execution of duties of SDF personnel under public security operations.| |Information- gathering duties before public security operation order|Article 92-5, Self-Defense Forces Law|SDF personnel engaged in information-gathering duties before public security operation order may use weapons to the extent considered proper and necessary in light of a situation when there are reasonable grounds for judging that no appropriate means of overcoming such danger exists other than the use of weapons to protect their own lives and bodies and those of other SDF personnel engaged in duties together. The use of weapons shall not cause harm to persons, except for cases falling under Article 26 (self-defense) or Article 37 (averting present danger) of the Penal Code.| |Guarding operation|Article 91-2 (2), Self- Defense Forces Law|Article 7 of the Law Concerning the Execution of Duties of Police Offi cials applies mutatis mutandis to the execution of duties of SDF personnel under guarding operations.| ||Article 91-2 (3), Self- Defense Forces Law|SDF personnel who are ordered into guarding operations may, in addition to cases where they use weapons under Article 7 of the Law Concerning the Execution of Duties of Police Offi cials, use weapons in execution of their duties to the extent considered proper and necessary in light of the situation when a clear danger of devastating destruction to the installation being guarded exists and there are reasonable grounds for judging that no appropriate means of overcoming such danger exists other than the use of weapons.| |Maritime security Operation|Article 93 (1), Self-Defense Forces Law|Article 7 of the Law Concerning the Execution of Duties of Police offi cials applies mutatis mutandis to the execution of duties of SDF personnel under maritime security operations.| ||Article 93 (3), Self-Defense Forces Law|Article 20 (2) of the Japan Coast Guard Law, which allows shooting with risk of injury to stop boats that meet certain conditions, applied mutatis mutandis to the execution of duties of SDF personnel under maritime security operations.| |||Article 7 of the Law Concerning the Execution of Duties of Police Offi cials applies mutatis mutandis to the execution of duties of SDF personnel under counter-piracy operations.| Counter-piracy Article 8 (2), Anti- Piracy If any party perpetrating acts of piracy, including approaching excessively close to a ship or trailing around a ship, continues their acts despite operations Law the counter-piracy measures of the other party, and there are reasonable grounds to believe that no other means are available to stop the passage of the ship in question, the use of weapons is permitted to the extent that is considered reasonably necessary in accordance with the situation. ----- |Type of Operation|Provision|Content| |---|---|---| |Destruction of ballistic missiles|Article 93-3, Self-Defense Forces Law|SDF units ordered to destroy ballistic missiles which are headed toward Japan may use weapons as required.| |Action against violation of Territorial airspace|Article 84, Self-Defense Forces Law|The use of force that falls under Article 36 (self-defense) or Article 37 (averting present danger) of the Penal Code is allowed as part of necessary actions to make aircraft land or withdraw from the territorial airspace of Japan.1| |Transportation of Japanese National Oversea|Article 94-5, Self-Defense Forces Law|SDF personnel engaged in evacuation of Japanese nationals and others overseas may use weapons to the extent considered proper and necessary in light of the situation when there are reasonable grounds for the use of weapons to protect their own lives and bodies, those of other SDF personnel engaged in the evacuation, or of Japanese nationals to be evacuated under the management of SDF personnel or of those granted permission to ride the same means of transport. The use of weapons shall not cause harm to persons, except for cases falling under Article 36 (self-defense) or Article 37 (averting present danger) of the Penal Code.| |Article 11, Law Concerning Measures to Ensure Peace and Security of Japan in Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan Rear area support activities||SDF personnel ordered to provide services, etc., as rear area support or to implement rear area search and rescue activities may use weapons to the extent considered proper and necessary in light of the situation when there are reasonable grounds for the use of weapons to protect their own lives and bodies and those of others engaged in duties together. The use of weapons shall not cause harm to persons, except for cases falling under Article 36 (self-defense) or Article 37 (averting present danger) of the Penal Code.| |Article 6, Ship Inspection Operations Law Ship inspection operations||SDF personnel and others ordered to execute ship inspection operations may use weapons to the extent considered proper and necessary in light of the situation when there are reasonable grounds for the use of weapons to protect their own lives and bodies and those of others engaged in duties together. The use of weapons shall not cause harm to persons, except for cases falling under Article 36 (self-defense) or Article 37 (averting present danger) of the Penal Code. SDF personnel and others engaged.| |Article 24, International Peace Cooperation Law International peace cooperation assignments||SDF personnel engaged in international peace cooperation assignments may use weapons to the extent considered proper and necessary in light of the situation when there are reasonable grounds for the use of weapons to protect their own lives and bodies, those of other SDF personnel and international peace cooperation personnel who are with them on the scene or those who have come under their control while conducting their duties. The use of weapons shall not cause harm to persons, except for cases falling under Article 36 (self-defense) or Article 37 (averting present danger) of the Penal Code.| |Guarding weapons, etc.|Article 95, Self-Defense Forces Law|SDF personnel engaged in duties of guarding weapons, etc. of the SDF may use weapons to the extent considered proper and necessary in light of the situation when there are reasonable grounds for the use of weapons to protect the weapons, etc. The use of weapons shall not cause harm to person, except for cases falling under Article 36 (self-defense) or Article 37 (averting present danger) of the Panel Code.| |Guarding facilities|Article 95-2, Self-Defense Forces Law|SDF personnel that meet certain conditions, engaged in duties of guarding facilities of the SDF in Japan may use weapons to the extent considered proper and necessary in light of the situation when there are reasonable grounds for the use of weapons to execute their duties or to protect themselves or others. The use of weapons shall not cause harm to persons, except for cases falling under Article 36 (self-defense) or Article 37 (averting present danger) of the Penal Code.| |Maintenance of internal order|Article 96 (3), Self-Defense Forces Law|Article 7 of the Law Concerning the Execution of Duties of Police Offi cials applies mutatis mutandis to the execution of duties of SDF personnel exclusively engaged in maintaining order within the SDF| |Article 12, Related Measures Law U.S. Military Actions||SDF personnel and others ordered to provide services in accordance with measures related to U.S. military actions may use weapons to the extent considered proper and necessary in light of the situation when there are reasonable grounds for the use of weapons to protect their own lives or bodies, those of other Self-Defense personnel who are with them, or of those who, while conducting their duties, have come under the protection of SDF personnel. The use of weapons shall not cause harm to persons, except for cases falling under Article 36 (self-defense) or Article 37 (averting present danger) of the Penal Code.| |Article 37, Marine Transportation Restriction Law||Article 7 of the Law Concerning the Execution of Duties of Police Offi cials applies mutatis mutandis to MSDF personnel ordered to execute the measures in line with the Marine Transportation Restriction Law. If the crew of the vessel does not obey repeated orders to halt, persistently resists or tries to escape and when there is a considerable reason to believe that there are no other means to halt the vessel, said personnel may use their weapons within an extent that is judged to be reasonably necessary, following the orders of the Captain, etc.| |Article 152, Prisoners of War Law||SDF personnel ordered into defense operations and engaged in imprisonment and SDF personnel engaged in guarding prisoners may use weapons to the extent considered proper and necessary in light of the situation. The use of weapons shall not cause harm to persons, except for cases falling under Article 36 (self-defense) or Article 37 (averting present danger) of the Penal Code.| Notes: 1. The use of weapons is not specifi cally defi ned, but is generally covered under “necessary actions.” **Reference 13** **Record of Joint Exercises for Civil Protection Implemented** **by the National and Local Governments (FY2014)** |Types of Exercise|Date|Location| |---|---|---| |Field exercise|October 1, 2014|Toyama Prefecture| ||November 10, 2014|Tochigi Prefecture| ||November 12, 2014|Oita Prefecture| ||January 20, 2015|Fukuoka Prefecture| |Simulation exercise|November 18, 2014|Ibaraki Prefecture| ||January 13, 2015|Fukui Prefecture| ||January 15, 2015|Yamagata Prefecture| ||January 23, 2015|Gifu Prefecture| ||January 26, 2015|Miyazaki Prefecture| ||January 28, 2015|Ehime Prefecture| ||January 29, 2015|Shiga Prefecture| ||February 4, 2015|Tokushima Prefecture| ||February 6, 2015|Saga Prefecture| Notes: Implemented in 15 Prefectures in FY2007. Implemented in 18 Prefectures in FY2008. Implemented in 14 Prefectures in FY2009. Implemented in 10 Prefectures in FY2010. Implemented in 12 Prefectures in FY2011. Implemented in 11 Prefectures in FY2012. Implemented in 12 Prefectures in FY2013. **Reference 14** **National Security Strategy** (Approved by the National Security Council and the Cabinet on December 17, 2013) **I. Purpose** Maintaining the peace and security of Japan and ensuring its survival are the primary responsibilities of the Government of Japan. As Japan’s security environment becomes ever more severe Japan needs to identify **Prefectures that Conducted Joint Exercises More than Once** |Number of Times Conducted|Location| |---|---| |Twice|Hokkaido Prefecture (2006, 2011), Iwate Prefecture (2009, 2010), Akita Prefecture (2008, 2009), Tochigi Prefecture (2009, 2014), Chiba Prefecture(2007, 2013), Kanagawa Prefecture (2008, 2010), Nagano Prefecture (2007, 2008), Aichi Prefecture (2007, 2013), Mie Prefecture (2008,2012), Kyoto Prefecture(2007, 2010), Hyogo Prefecture (2009, 2011), Okayama Prefecture (2008, 2012), Yamaguchi Prefecture (2007, 2008), Kagawa Prefecture (2009, 2013), Nagasaki Prefecture (2008, 2011), Oita Prefecture (2008, 2014), Kagoshima Prefecture (2007, 2012)| |Three times|Aomori Prefecture (2008, 2010, 2013), Saitama Prefecture (2005, 2006, 2010), Tokyo (2006, 2009, 2013), Niigata Prefecture (2008, 2011, 2013), Gifu Prefecture (2007, 2011, 2014), Shiga Prefecture (2008, 2012, 2014), Fukuoka Prefecture (2006, 2011, 2014), Kumamoto Prefecture (2007, 2010, 2013), Okinawa Prefecture (2009, 2012, 2013)| |Four times|Yamagata Prefecture (2008, 2011, 2012, 2014), Ibaraki Prefecture (2006, 2007, 2010, 2014), Tottori Prefecture (2005, 2006, 2006, 2008), Saga Prefecture (2005, 2006, 2011, 2014), Miyazaki Prefecture (2008, 2011, 2012, 2014)| |Five times|Toyama Prefecture (2005, 2010, 2012, 2013, 2014)| |Seven times|Tokushima Prefecture (2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014), Ehime Prefecture (2006, 2007, 2008, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014)| |Nine times|Fukui Prefecture (2005, 2006, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014)| its national interests from a long-term perspective, determine the course it should pursue in the international community, and adopt a wholegovernment approach for national security policies and measures in order to continue developing a prosperous and peaceful society. Japan has contributed to peace, stability and prosperity of the region and the world. In a world where globalization continues, Japan should play an even more proactive role as a major global player in the international community. ----- forth this National Security Strategy (hereinafter referred to as the Strategy”) in order to set out Japan’s fundamental policies pertaining to national security. The Strategy f rst elaborates on Japan’s peaceful orientation to date and the policy of “Proactive Contribution to Peace” based on the principle of international cooperation, examines its national interests and identif es its national security objectives. Furthermore, the Strategy identif es national security challenges Japan faces, taking into account the trends of the security environment surrounding Japan. Finally, the Strategy presents strategic approaches to be taken for national security, with diplomatic and defense policies at their core, based on the recognition that in order to overcome the challenges and achieve its objectives, Japan needs to effectively utilize its diverse resources and promote comprehensive measures, strengthen the domestic foundation for national security and seek deeper understanding both at home and abroad, and advance efforts at various levels in a multifaceted and coordinated manner. The Strategy, as fundamental policies pertaining to national security, presents guidelines for policies in areas related to national security, including sea, outer space, cyberspace, off cial development assistance (ODA) and energy. Pursuant to the Strategy, and with the National Security Council (NSC) serving as the control tower, as well as with strong political leadership, the Government of Japan will implement national security policies in a more strategic and structured manner through a whole-government approach. In addition, when implementing policies in other areas, the Government of Japan will give due consideration to national security so that Japan can utilize its strengths, such as its diplomatic ability and defense capability, in a smooth and fully-functional way as a whole, based on the Strategy. The Strategy will guide Japan’s national security policy over the next decade. Through the implementation of concrete policies, the NSC will regularly carry out systematic evaluation and upgrade the Strategy in a timely and appropriate manner. Should any major changes in the situation occur, the NSC will review this Strategy in consideration of the security environment at the time, and make necessary revisions. **II. Fundamental Principle of National Security** 1. Principles Japan Upholds Japan is a country with rich culture and tradition, and upholds universal values, such as freedom, democracy, respect for fundamental human rights and the rule of law. Japan has a wealth of highly educated human capital and high cultural standards, and is an economic power with strong economic capacity and high technological capabilities. Japan has achieved its development benef ting from an open international economic system. Surrounded by the sea on all sides and blessed with an immense exclusive economic zone and an extensive coastline, Japan as a maritime state has achieved economic growth through maritime trade and development of marine resources, and has pursued “Open and Stable Seas.” Japan has consistently followed the path of a peace-loving nation since the end of World War II. Japan has adhered to a basic policy of maintaining an exclusively national defense-oriented policy, not becoming a military power that poses a threat to other countries, and observing the Three Non-Nuclear Principles. In addition, Japan has maintained its security, and contributed to peace and stability in the Asia-Pacif c region, by enhancing its alliance with the United States (U.S.) with which it shares universal values and strategic interests, as well as by deepening cooperative relationships with other countries. Moreover, Japan has contributed to the realization of stability and prosperity in the international community through initiatives for supporting the economic growth of developing countries and for addressing global issues based on the principle of human security, as well as through trade and investment relations with other countries. In particular, Japan’s cooperation contributed to realizing stability, economic growth and democratization in many countries, especially those in Asia, including the member states of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Furthermore, as a peace-loving nation, complying with the United Nations (U.N.) Charter, Japan has been cooperating with the U.N. and other international organizations, and has actively contributed to their activities. In particular, Japan has continuously participated in U.N. peacekeeping operations (PKO), as the role of military forces diversif ed after the end of the Cold War. In addition, as the only country to have ever suffered atomic bombings in war, Japan has consistently engaged in disarmament and non-proliferation efforts, playing a leading role in international initiatives to realize “a world free of nuclear weapons.” The course that Japan has taken as a peace-loving nation has garnered signif cant praise and respect from the international community, and Japan must continue these steps to further consolidate such a position. At the same time, surrounded by an increasingly severe security environment and confronted by complex and grave national security challenges, it has become indispensable for Japan to make more proactive efforts in line with the principle of international cooperation. Japan cannot secure its own peace and security by itself, and the international community expects Japan to play a more proactive role for peace and stability in the world, in a way commensurate with its national capabilities. Against this backdrop, under the evolving security environment, Japan will continue to adhere to the course that it has taken to date as a peace-loving nation, and as a major player in world politics and economy, contribute even more proactively in securing peace, stability, and prosperity of the international community, while achieving its own security as well as peace and stability in the Asia-Pacif c region, as a “Proactive Contributor to Peace” based on the principle of international cooperation. This is the fundamental principle of national security that Japan should stand to hold. 2. Japan’s National Interests and National Security Objectives In order to achieve the fundamental principle of national security by implementation of concrete policies, the Government of Japan needs to def ne our national interests and national security objectives, examine them in the context of the constantly evolving security environment, and mobilize all possible means. Japan’s national interests are, f rst of all, to maintain its sovereignty and independence; to defend its territorial integrity; to ensure the safety of life, person, and properties of its nationals, and to ensure its survival while maintaining its own peace and security grounded on freedom and democracy and preserving its rich culture and tradition. In addition, Japan’s national interests are to achieve the prosperity of Japan and its nationals through economic development, thereby consolidating its peace and security. To this end, especially in the AsiaPacif c region, it is essential that Japan, as a maritime state, strengthens the free trade regime for accomplishing economic development through free trade and competition, and realizes an international environment that offers stability, transparency and predictability. Similarly, the maintenance and protection of international order based on rules and universal values, such as freedom, democracy, respect for fundamental human rights, and the rule of law, are likewise in Japan’s national interests. In order to safeguard these national interests and to fulf ll our responsibility in the international community, Japan, adopting the policy of “Proactive Contribution to Peace” based on the principle of international cooperation as a fundamental principle, will seek to achieve the following national security objectives. The f rst objective is to strengthen the deterrence necessary for maintaining its peace and security and for ensuring its survival, thus deterring threats from directly reaching Japan; at the same time, if by any chance a threat should reach Japan, to defeat such threat and to minimize the damage. The second objective is to improve the security environment of the Asia-Pacif c region, and prevent the emergence of and reduce direct threats to Japan, through strengthening the Japan-U.S. Alliance, enhancing the trust and cooperative relationships between Japan and its partners within and outside the Asia-Pacif c region, and promoting practical security cooperation. The third objective is to improve the global security environment and build a peaceful, stable, and prosperous international community by strengthening the international order based on universal values and rules, and by playing a leading role in the settlement of disputes, through consistent diplomatic efforts and further personnel contributions. **III. Security Environment Surrounding Japan and National Security Challenges** 1. Global Security Environment and Challenges (1) Shift in the Balance of Power and Rapid Progress of Technological Innovation Since the beginning of the twenty f rst century, the balance of power in the international community has been changing on an unprecedented scale, and this has substantially inf uenced the dynamics of international politics. The primary drivers of this change in the balance of power are the emerging countries, including China and India. In particular, China is further increasing its presence in the international community. On the other hand, though its relative inf uence in the international community is changing, the U.S. remains the country that has the world’s largest power as a whole, composed of its soft power originating from its values and culture, on top of its military and economic power. Furthermore, the U.S. has manifested its policy to shift its emphasis of national security and economic policy towards the Asia-Pacif c region (the “rebalance” policy). While the change in the balance of power has encouraged the shift of the center of gravity of world politics and economy from the Atlantic to the Pacif c, it has also been a reason for a weakening leadership in global governance, as exemplif ed by the stalled negotiations in the World Trade Organization (WTO) and ----- of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). In addition, while the rapid advancement of globalization and technological innovation has deepened interdependence among states, it has also invited a change in the relative inf uence between states and non-state actors, and brought about a complex impact on the global security environment. Sovereign states remain the principal actors in the international community, and conf ict and coordination between states continue to be the most signif cant factors affecting global stability. However, as cross-border f ow of people, goods, capital, information and other items have been facilitated more easily by the advancement of globalization, non-state actors are beginning to play a more important role in decision-making in the international community. In addition, the advancement of globalization and technological innovation bears negative impact. Terrorism and crimes committed by non-state actors are posing serious threats to the security of any country. Today, these threats, irrespective of where they originate in the world, could instantly have a direct inf uence on the security of Japan. (2) Threat of the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and Other Related Materials As the only country to have ever suffered atomic bombings in war, Japan best understands the tragedy of the use of nuclear weapons and shoulders the responsibility to realize “a world free of nuclear weapons.” The issue of the transfer, proliferation, and performance improvement of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), including nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons (NBC), and their means of delivery, such as ballistic missiles, remain major threats to Japan and the international community. In particular, the issue of nuclear and missile development by North Korea and the nuclear issue of Iran continue to pose grave threats to peace and stability, not only in each region but also in the entire international community. Moreover, there remain concerns over the acquisition and the use of WMD and related items by non-state actors, including international terrorist organizations, against which traditional deterrence may not function effectively. (3) Threat of International Terrorism Terrorist attacks continue to occur around the world, and the threat of terrorism by international terrorist organizations remains serious. The advancement of globalization has made it easier for those organizations to share information and conspire within their own organizations and with other groups, and to secure geographical access and acquire arms. International terrorism has spread and become diverse in its forms. International terrorist organizations are utilizing politically unstable and weakly governed countries and regions as bases for operation and training for terror activities. The ideologies of such terrorist organizations are also motivating other groups and individuals to commit terrorist acts. Some international terrorist organizations designate Japan as their target. Terrorist attacks against Japanese nationals and interests have actually taken place overseas. Japan and its people face the threat of international terrorism both at home and abroad. Diversity of nationality of the perpetrators and victims in recent international terrorism cases has underscored the increasing importance of combating terrorism through international cooperation. (4) Risks to Global Commons In recent years, risks that can impede the utilization of and free access to global commons, such as the sea, outer space, and cyberspace, have been spreading and become more serious. While the seas are governed by international maritime law, in particular the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), there have been an increasing number of cases of unilateral actions in an attempt to change the status quo by coercion without paying respect to existing international law. With regard to outer space and cyberspace, applicable norms remain to be developed due to the different positions among relevant countries. Against such a backdrop, not only for economic development but also for the national security of each country, it has therefore become even more important to promote appropriate international rule-making over global commons and to make concerted efforts by the international community while respecting such rules. “Open and Stable Seas” constitute the basis for peace and prosperity of the international community as a whole. In this regard, each state has been tackling on its own or with others various issues including piracy, unidentif ed vessels, illegal dumping, contraband, human smuggling, maritime disasters, and the removal of hazardous substances, for maintaining the stability of sea lanes of communication. interests between or among states over natural resources and the security of respective states is increasing. As a result, there is a growing risk of incidents at sea, and of possible escalation into unexpected situations. In the South China Sea in particular, disputes that have arisen over sovereignty between coastal states and China cause concerns over the maintenance of the rule of law at sea, freedom of navigation, and stability in the Southeast Asian region. In addition, vulnerability is also increasing in sea lanes of communication, spanning between Japan and the Middle East, on which Japan is largely dependent for its natural and energy resources, due to various problems including regional conf icts and international terrorism in and around the coastal states, as well as piracy. Therefore, advancing efforts to address these issues is also important for securing the sea lanes. Furthermore, the Arctic Sea is deemed to have enormous potential for developing new shipping routes and exploration of natural resources. While it is expected that states concerned work together under relevant international rules, such potential could provide new causes of friction among them. While outer space has been utilized for civil purposes, from security perspective, the importance of outer space has dramatically increased in recent years, given its use for the reinforcement of capabilities for information gathering and surveillance, as well as for securing communication means for military purposes. On the other hand, the congestion of outer space has heightened as more countries utilize outer space. There exist risks that could impede the continuous and stable use of outer space with an increasing amount of space debris caused by anti-satellite tests and satellite collisions amongst others, as well as with the development of counter-space weapons. Cyberspace, a global domain comprised of information systems, telecommunications networks and others, provides a foundation for social, economic, military and other activities. Meanwhile, risks of cyber-attacks with the intent to steal classif ed information, disrupt critical infrastructure and obstruct military systems, are becoming more serious. In Japan, with an increasing level of connecting networks of social systems and various other elements, cyberspace is necessary for promoting both economic growth and innovation through the free f ow of information in cyberspace. Protecting cyberspace from the above-mentioned risks is vital to secure national security. (5) Challenges to Human Security Globalization has enabled people, goods, capital, and information to instantaneously move across borders in large quantities. As a result, international economic activities have expanded, thereby bringing prosperity to the international community. In contrast, global issues that cannot be dealt with by a single country —namely, poverty, widening inequality, global health challenges including infectious diseases, climate change and other environmental issues, food security, and humanitarian crises caused by civil wars and natural disasters – are emerging as critical and urgent issues of human security, threatening the very survival and dignity of individuals. The Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), common goals in the development f eld to be achieved by the international community, are not likely to be achieved in some regions and sectors. In addition, the increasing demand for energy, food, and water resources due to the population growth in developing countries and the expansion of economic scale could cause new conf icts. These challenges could have repercussions on peace and stability of the international community; therefore, Japan needs to promote necessary measures based on the principle of human security. (6) The Global Economy and Its Risks In today’s global economy, no economy is self-suff cient and isolated from the world economy; thus the risk of the expansion of an economic crisis from one country to the entire global economy is growing. While this trend is conspicuous in the f nancial economy, today, it is also witnessed in the real economy, as value chains and supply chains are established across borders with increasing international specialization. Under these circumstances, there are concerns over f scal problems and the slowdown in the growth of emerging economies. In some emerging economies and developing countries, visible signs of protectionism as well as reluctance towards the creation of new trade rules have been observed. Furthermore, in recent years, with the advancement of technological innovation in energy sector, one has seen the rise of resource nationalism in resource rich countries and growing global demand, especially in emerging economies, for energy and mineral resources, followed by the intensif ed competition for the ----- environmental problems arising from climate change, there are risks of crunches in global supply and demand as well as temporary shortages of supply in food and water. 2. Security Environment and Challenges in the Asia-Pacif c Region (1) Characteristics of the Strategic Environment of the Asia-Pacif c Region The shift in the global power balance has elevated the importance of the Asia-Pacif c region in the international community. While this shift provides opportunities for security cooperation, it has also given rise to regional issues and tensions. In particular, the region of Northeast Asia is home to a host of actors, such as countries with large-scale military forces, or those possessing nuclear weapons or continuing with nuclear development. Yet a regional cooperation framework in the security realm has not been suff ciently institutionalized. Countries in the region have contrasting political, economic, and social systems, and thus their security views are diverse, which constitutes another characteristic of the strategic environment of this region. In this context, in addition to the issues and tensions arising from the shift in the balance of power, the Asia-Pacif c region has become more prone to so-called “gray-zone” situations, situations that are neither pure peacetime nor contingencies over territorial sovereignty and interests. There is a risk that these “gray-zone” situations could further develop into grave situations. On the other hand, the Asia-Pacif c region is also witnessing a rise in opportunities for bilateral exchanges and cooperation among countries in the region. In addition, there have been multilateral security dialogues, including the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), and bilateral and multilateral joint exercises. These initiatives are contributing to the development of mutual understanding and enhancement of joint response capabilities. Therefore, it is important to further promote and develop these multilayered initiatives for regional stability. (2) North Korea’s Military Buildup and Provocative Actions In the Korean Peninsula, the large-scale military forces of the Republic of Korea (ROK) and North Korea confront each other. While North Korea continues to face serious economic diff culties without any improvement in its human rights situation, North Korea heavily allocates its resources on military affairs today. In addition, North Korea has enhanced the capability of WMDs including nuclear weapons and that of ballistic missiles. At the same time, North Korea has repeatedly taken provocative military actions in the Korean Peninsula including the use of provocative rhetoric, some of which are directed at Japan, thereby increasing the tension in the region. In particular, North Korea’s ballistic missiles development, including those with ranges covering the mainland of the U.S., along with its continued attempts to miniaturize nuclear weapons for warheads and equipping them to ballistic missiles, substantially aggravate the threat to the security of the region, including Japan. These concerns pose a serious challenge to the entire international community from the viewpoint of the non-proliferation of WMD and related materials. As Kim Jong-un, First Chairman of the National Defense Commission, has been making efforts to consolidate his regime, the domestic situation in North Korea needs to be closely monitored. Furthermore, North Korea’s abduction is a grave issue affecting Japan’s sovereignty as well as the lives and safety of Japanese nationals. It is an urgent issue for the Government of Japan to resolve under its responsibility and a universal issue for the international community to address as a violation of fundamental human rights. (3) China’s Rapid Rise and Intensif ed Activities in Various Areas There is an expectation for China to share and comply with international norms, and play a more active and cooperative role for regional and global issues. On the other hand, China has been rapidly advancing its military capabilities in a wide range of areas through its continued increase in its military budget without suff cient transparency. In addition, China has taken actions that can be regarded as attempts to change the status quo by coercion based on their own assertions, which are incompatible with the existing order of international law, in the maritime and aerial domains, including the East China Sea and the South China Sea. In particular, China has rapidly expanded and intensif ed its activities in the seas and airspace around Japan, including intrusion into Japan’s territorial waters and airspace around the Senkaku Islands. Moreover, China has shown the move that appears to unduly infringe the freedom of overf ight above the high seas by establishing its own “Air Defense Identif cation Zone” over the East China Sea. Such an external stance and military activities by China, coupled with a lack of transparency in its military affairs and security policy, have become an issue of concern to the international community careful attention to this situation. The relationship between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait has deepened in recent years, primarily in economic areas. Meanwhile, the military balance between the two sides has been changing. Thus, the cross-strait relationship contains both orientations towards stability and potential instability. **IV. Japan’s Strategic Approaches to National Security** To ensure national security, Japan needs to f rst and foremost strengthen its own capabilities and the foundation for exercising those capabilities. Japan must also steadily fulf ll the role it should play and adapt its capabilities to respond to future developments. Enhancing Japan’s resilience in national security, through reinforcing its diplomatic power and defense force, as well as bolstering its economic strengths and technological capabilities, contributes to peace and stability in the Asia-Pacif c region and the international community at large. This belief forms the core of the strategic approaches in the Strategy. Moreover, in order to overcome national security challenges and achieve national security objectives, as well as to proactively contribute to peace in cooperation with the international community, Japan needs to expand and deepen cooperative relationships with other countries, with the Japan-U.S. Alliance as the cornerstone. At the same time, Japan needs to make effective use of its diverse resources and promote comprehensive policies. In light of this, Japan will take the following concrete strategic approaches, centering on diplomatic policy and defense policy. 1. Strengthening and Expanding Japan’s Capabilities and Roles (1) Strengthening Diplomacy for Creating a Stable International Environment The key of national security is to create a stable and predictable international environment, and prevent the emergence of threats. It is thus necessary for Japan to realize an international order and security environment that are desirable for Japan, by playing an even more proactive role in achieving peace, stability and prosperity of the international community as a “Proactive Contributor to Peace” based on the principle of international cooperation. This strategic approach f rst requires the capability to analyze the constantly changing security environment and the course that the international community is taking. On top of this, Japan must have the power to take the lead in setting the international agenda and to proactively advance its national interests, without being conf ned to a reactionary position to events and incidents after they have already occurred. In doing so, it is necessary to enhance diplomatic creativity and negotiating power to deepen the understanding of and garner support for Japan’s position in the international community, through effectively utilizing all strengths and features of the nation. In addition, by highlighting Japan’s attractiveness, Japan needs to strengthen its soft power that would benef t the international community. Japan also needs to strengthen its capacity to promptly and accurately identify the needs of Japanese nationals and f rms to support their overseas activities. Furthermore, it is the responsibility of Japan as a “Proactive Contributor to Peace” to make even more proactive contributions to international organizations such as the U.N., including through increasing the number of Japanese staff in such institutions. In order to advance such vibrant diplomacy, Japan will strengthen the institutional capabilities through which it undertakes diplomacy. Such overall strengthening of diplomatic capability is critical to ensure the security of Japan. (2) Building a Comprehensive Defense Architecture to Firmly Defend Japan Japan’s defense force is the f nal guarantee of its national security which deters direct threats from reaching Japan and defeats any threat that reaches it. Japan will steadily develop its defense force. To ensure peace and security in Japan amid the severe security environment surrounding the country, Japan will eff ciently develop a highly effective and joint defense force, adapting to the change in strategic environment with consideration of its national power and the political, economic, and social situations; and strive to ensure operations with f exibility and readiness based on joint operations. Japan will also advance not only the coordination within the government, but also coordination with local governments and the private sector. In doing so, even in peacetime, Japan will maintain and improve a comprehensive architecture for responding seamlessly to an array of situations, ranging from armed attacks to large-scale natural disasters. In developing the structure of the Japan Self-Defense Forces (SDF), which plays a central role in the above-mentioned efforts, Japan will develop a streamlined planning and programming process, which includes the National Defense Program Guidelines and the Medium Term Defense Program, based on the Strategy to enhance its defense structure for deterrence and response to various situations, prioritizing important functions from a joint and ----- In addition, with regard to the threat of nuclear weapons, the extended deterrence of the U.S. with nuclear deterrence at its core is indispensable. In order to maintain and enhance the credibility of the extended deterrence, Japan will work closely with the U.S., and take appropriate measures through its own efforts, including ballistic missile defense (BMD) and protection of the people. (3) Strengthening Efforts for the Protection of Japan’s Territorial Integrity To fully protect its territories, in addition to building a comprehensive defense architecture, Japan will enhance the capabilities of the law enforcement agencies responsible for territorial patrol activities and reinforce its maritime surveillance capabilities. Furthermore, Japan will strengthen coordination among relevant ministries and agencies to be able to respond seamlessly to a variety of unexpected situations. Japan will also make a constant review on issues that are relevant to ensuring the security of its territories, and take effective measures. In addition, Japan will proactively engage in the protection, management, and development of remote islands near national borders. Furthermore, from a national security viewpoint, Japan will study the situation of land ownership in areas such as remote islands near national borders and areas surrounding defense facilities, and review issues related to the use of such land. (4) Ensuring Maritime Security As a maritime state, Japan will play a leading role, through close cooperation with other countries, in maintaining and developing “Open and Stable Seas,” which are upheld by maritime order based upon such fundamental principles as the rule of law, ensuring the freedom and safety of navigation and overf ight, and peaceful settlement of disputes in accordance with relevant international law. More concretely, Japan will take necessary measures to address various threats in sea lanes of communication, including anti-piracy operations to ensure safe maritime transport and promote maritime security cooperation with other countries. Japan will strengthen its maritime domain awareness capabilities that are necessary for the above-mentioned measures, in a comprehensive manner that involves the use of outer space, while paying attention to the establishment of international networks. At the same time, Japan will strive to enhance the frequency and the quality of bilateral and multilateral cooperation on maritime security such as joint exercises. In particular, sea lanes of communication, stretching from the Persian Gulf, the Strait of Hormuz, the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden to the surrounding waters of Japan, passing through the Indian Ocean, the Straits of Malacca, and the South China Sea, are critical to Japan due to its dependence on the maritime transport of natural and energy resources from the Middle East. In this regard, Japan will provide assistance to those coastal states alongside the sea lanes of communication and other states in enhancing their maritime law enforcement capabilities, and strengthen cooperation with partners on the sea lanes who share strategic interests with Japan. (5) Strengthening Cyber Security Japan as a whole will make concerted efforts in comprehensively promoting cross-cutting measures to defend cyberspace and strengthen the response capability against cyber-attacks, so as to protect cyberspace from malicious activities threatening cyber security; to ensure the free and safe use of cyberspace; and to guard its critical infrastructure against cyber-attacks, including those in which state involvement is suspected. To this end, Japan will strengthen public-private partnership in the areas of system design, development and operations based on risk assessment, as well as identifying incidents, minimizing damages and their expansion, and analyzing the causes of and preventing similar incidents. In addition, Japan will comprehensively consider and take necessary measures with regard to expanding the pool of human resources in the security f eld, protection of control systems, and response to the issues of supply chain risk. Furthermore, Japan will strengthen inter-agency cooperation and def ne the roles of relevant agencies so that it can reinforce its capability to protect cyberspace and respond to incidents as a nation at large. At the same time, Japan will promote a range of measures, including enhancing the ability and function to oversee, assess, apprehend, analyze, and internationally coordinate on cyber incidents, as well as reinforcing relevant agencies in charge of those tasks. In promoting these measures, strengthening international partnership in a wide range of areas is essential. For this, Japan will take measures at technical and operational levels to enhance international cooperation. Japan will also strengthen information sharing and promote cyber defense cooperation with relevant (6) Strengthening Measures against International Terrorism Japan will f rst and foremost strengthen its domestic measures against international terrorism such as ensuring the security of nuclear facilities in Japan. Moreover, in order to ensure the safety of Japanese nationals living abroad, Japan will strengthen such measures as building a network where risk information held by private sectors can be shared more effectively and eff ciently; and reinforcing the structure for analyzing the situation of international terrorism and overseas information-collecting capabilities. (7) Enhancing Intelligence Capabilities In order to appropriately support decision-making on national security policies, Japan will fundamentally strengthen its information-collecting capabilities from a diverse range of sources, including human intelligence, open source intelligence, signals intelligence, and imagery intelligence. In addition, Japan will promote the utilization of geospatial intelligence with which various types of intelligence are combined. Moreover, Japan will enhance its intelligence analysis, consolidation, and sharing capabilities by bolstering its human resources, including developing highly-skilled intelligence experts. Japan will thereby promote all-source analysis that makes use of the array of information-collecting means at the Government’s disposal. Furthermore, Japan will operate the intelligence cycle more effectively through the timely provision of materials and intelligence to the NSC, which serves as the control tower of foreign and security policy, and through the appropriate utilization of intelligence in policy formulation. In addition, under the Act on the Protection of Specially Designated Secrets (*provisional English translation), Japan will strengthen its counter intelligence functions by developing such intelligence protection system in order to facilitate intelligence functions throughout the Government. (8) Defense Equipment and Technology Cooperation In cases that contribute to peace and international cooperation, there are increasing opportunities to cooperate in a more effective manner, including through the utilization and provision of heavy machinery and other defense equipment carried to disaster-stricken countries and sites by the SDF. Moreover, internationally, it has become mainstream to participate in international joint development and production projects in order to improve the performance of defense equipment, while dealing with the rising costs of defense equipment. In this context, from the perspective of “Proactive Contribution to Peace” based on the principle of international cooperation, Japan is required to contribute more proactively to peace and international cooperation including through utilizing defense equipment, and to participate in joint development and production of defense equipment and other related items. Against this backdrop, while giving due consideration to the roles that the Three Principles on Arms Exports and their related policy guidelines have played so far, the Government of Japan will set out clear principles on the overseas transfer of arms and military technology, which f t the new security environment. In this context, considerations will be made with regard to def ning cases where transfers are prohibited; limiting cases where transfers could be allowed with strict examination; and ensuring appropriate control over transfers in terms of unauthorized use and third party transfer. (9) Ensuring the Stable Use of Outer Space and Promoting Its Use for Security Purposes The stable use of outer space is not only fundamental to the lives of the people and the economy, but is also crucial for national security. Japan will therefore maintain and improve the foundation of science, technology and industry that supports the development and utilization of outer space, and promote the utilization of outer space from a security perspective. In particular, Japan will engage itself in enhancing the functions of information-gathering satellites and in making effective use of satellites, including ones Japan possesses for the operation of the SDF units, information-gathering and analysis, maritime domain awareness, telecommunication, positioning, navigation and timing. In addition, Japan will enhance a system for space situational awareness. Furthermore, Japan will promote the development and utilization of outer space in a manner that contributes to national security in the medium- to long-term, including the development of technologies such as satellite manufacturing. (10) Strengthening Technological Capabilities The advanced technology of Japan constitutes the foundation of its economic strength and defense forces, and is also a valuable resource that the international community strongly seeks from Japan. Therefore, Japan should encourage the further promotion of ----- Japan s technological capabilities. In promoting measures for strengthening its technological capabilities from a national security viewpoint, Japan will constantly grasp science and technology trends, including information on technology development. Japan will also make effective use of technology in the area of security, by combining the efforts of industries, academia, and the Government. Furthermore, Japan’s outstanding energy-saving and other environment-related technologies play an important role in Japan’s efforts to tackle global issues together with the international community. Therefore, Japan will proactively utilize these technologies in diplomacy as well. 2. Strengthening the Japan-U.S. Alliance For more than 60 years, the Japan-U.S. Alliance, with the Japan-U.S. security arrangements at its core, has played an indispensable role for peace and security in Japan as well as peace and stability in the AsiaPacif c region. In recent years, the Alliance has also played a more critical role for peace, stability, and prosperity in the international community. The Japan-U.S. Alliance is the cornerstone of Japan’s security. Likewise, for the U.S., the Alliance has served as the core of its alliance network with countries in the region, including the Republic of Korea (ROK), Australia, Thailand, and the Philippines. In this context, the Japan-U.S. Alliance has been serving as a foundation for the U.S. strategy in the Asia-Pacif c region. Such close alliance between Japan and the U.S. is underpinned by various factors, including that the two countries share common strategic interests and universal values, such as freedom, democracy, respect for fundamental human rights, and the rule of law. Furthermore, Japan’s geostrategic importance in supporting the U.S. engagement in the Asia-Pacif c region underlies the close alliance of the two countries. With the above-mentioned Japan-U.S. Alliance serving as the foundation, the two countries have been working closely at various levels, including at the summit and ministerial levels. The two countries address not only bilateral issues, but also the situation in the AsiaPacif c region, including North Korea, as well as global security issues, including counterterrorism measures and non-proliferation of WMD. In the area of economy, Japan and the U.S. aim to achieve economic prosperity in the Asia-Pacif c region in a rules-based and transparent manner, including through the Trans-Pacif c Partnership (TPP) negotiations, which will be mentioned later in this document. Thus, Japan and the U.S. have persistently strengthened and expanded their cooperation on a wide range of areas for peace, stability, and prosperity of not only the two countries themselves, but also the Asia-Pacif c region and the broader international community. As Japan strengthens its efforts in security as elaborated above, the U.S., based on its Defense Strategic Guidance emphasizing a rebalancing towards the Asia-Pacif c region, aspires to enhance its presence in the region and strengthen cooperation with its allies, including Japan and its partners. In order to ensure the security of Japan and to maintain and enhance peace, stability, and prosperity in the Asia-Pacif c region and the international community, Japan must further elevate the effectiveness of the Japan-U.S. security arrangements and realize a more multifaceted Japan-U.S. Alliance. Based on this recognition, Japan will undertake the following initiatives: (1) Further Strengthening of Japan-U.S. Security and Defense Cooperation in a Wide Range of Areas Japan ensures its national security by enhancing deterrence through the strengthening of its own defense capability, as well as by the deterrence of the Japan-U.S. Alliance, including the extended deterrence provided by the U.S. Japan will work with the U.S. to revise the Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation, through discussions on a variety of issues such as the concrete manner of defense cooperation and basic concepts of bilateral roles, missions, and capabilities (RMC), while ensuring consistency with various policies in line with the Strategy. In addition, Japan will strive to enhance the deterrence and response capability of the Japan-U.S. Alliance through the following efforts: advancing joint training, joint intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) activities, and joint/shared use of facilities by the SDF and the U.S. forces; working closely with the U.S. on operational cooperation and policy coordination on issues such as response to contingencies and the medium- to long-term strategy; strengthening its security cooperation with the U.S. in such broad areas as BMD, maritime affairs, outer space, cyberspace and largescale disaster response operations. Moreover, in order to strengthen the foundation of the Alliance, including enhanced interoperability, Japan will advance multilayered initiatives with the U.S. such as defense equipment (2) Ensuring a Stable Presence of the U.S. Forces To maintain and enhance the Japan-U.S. security arrangements, it is important for Japan to cooperate proactively with the U.S. to realize the optimal force posture of the U.S. forces in the Asia-Pacif c region. At the same time, it is also important for Japan to reduce the impact of the U.S. forces in Japan on local communities, including Okinawa, while maintaining and enhancing the deterrence of the Japan-U.S. Alliance. As part of this effort, while f rmly supporting the smooth and effective stationing of the U.S. forces in Japan through various measures, including Host Nation Support, Japan will steadily implement the realignment of the U.S. forces in Japan including the relocation of the U.S. Marine Corps in Okinawa to Guam in accordance with the existing bilateral agreements. In addition, Japan will further promote the joint/shared use of facilities by the SDF and the U.S. forces, while taking into consideration relations with local communities. Furthermore, Japan will steadily implement measures to reduce the impact on people living near the facilities and areas of the U.S. forces in Japan. In particular, Okinawa Prefecture is situated in a critically important location in terms of national security, and the stationing of the U.S. forces there signif cantly contributes to the deterrence of the Japan-U.S. Alliance. In the meantime, as a large part of the facilities and areas for the exclusive use of the U.S. forces in Japan are concentrated in the prefecture, Japan will make utmost efforts to reduce the impact on Okinawa, including through the relocation of Marine Corps Air Station Futenma. 3. Strengthening Diplomacy and Security Cooperation with Japan’s Partners for Peace and Stability in the International Community As elaborated above, strengthening the Japan-U.S. alliance in all its aspects, including in political, economic and security areas is indispensable to improve the security environment surrounding Japan. On top of that, Japan will engage itself in building trust and cooperative relations with other partners both within and outside the Asia-Pacif c region through the following approaches, as it plays an important role in enhancing Japan’s security environment. (1) Japan will strengthen cooperative relations with countries with which it shares universal values and strategic interests, such as the ROK, Australia, the countries of ASEAN, and India: — The ROK is a neighboring country of the utmost geopolitical importance for the security of Japan. Close cooperation with the ROK is of great signif cance for peace and stability of the region, including in addressing North Korean nuclear and missile issues. For this reason, Japan will construct future-oriented and multilayered relations and strengthen the foundation for security cooperation with the ROK. In particular, trilateral cooperation among Japan, the U.S. and the ROK is a key framework in realizing peace and stability in East Asia. Japan will strengthen this trilateral framework, including in cooperation on North Korean nuclear and missile issues. With regard to the issue over the sovereignty of Takeshima, Japan will make persevering diplomatic efforts, based on the principle of peaceful resolution of conf icts in accordance with international law. — Australia is an important regional partner that shares not only universal values but also strategic interests with Japan. In addition to strengthening the mutually complementary economic relations between the two countries, Japan will also strengthen its strategic partnership by steadily sharing strategic recognition and advancing security cooperation. Japan will also promote a wide range of cooperation with Australia in its efforts to shape a regional order in the Asia-Pacif c and to maintain and reinforce peace and stability in the international community. In so doing, Japan will utilize the trilateral framework among Japan, the U.S. and Australia, as necessary. — The countries of ASEAN, where economic growth and democratization have been progressing and which embraces great cultural diversity, are located in the critical areas of sea lanes of communication of Japan. Japan will further deepen and develop cooperative relations with the ASEAN countries in all sectors, including politics and security based on the traditional partnership lasting more than 40 years. Given the inf uence ASEAN has on peace, stability and prosperity of the Asia-Pacif c region as a whole, Japan will provide further assistance to their efforts towards maintaining and strengthening the unity of ASEAN. Furthermore, Japan appreciates the efforts by the countries concerned to settle disputes in the South China Sea not by force, but in accordance with the law and rules, as shown in their efforts towards the formulation of a Code of Conduct (COC) with China. Japan will support these efforts so that an effective and legally binding code of conduct is formulated. — India is becoming increasingly inf uential, due to what is projected ----- growth and potential. India is also geopolitically important for Japan, as it is positioned in the center of sea lanes of communication. Japan will strengthen bilateral relations in a broad range of areas, including maritime security, based on the bilateral Strategic and Global Partnership. (2) Stable relations between Japan and China are an essential factor for peace and stability of the Asia-Pacif c region. From a broad, as well as a medium- to long-term perspective, Japan will strive to construct and enhance a Mutually Benef cial Relationship Based on Common Strategic Interests with China in all areas, including politics, economy, f nance, security, culture and personal exchanges. In particular, Japan will continue to encourage China to play a responsible and constructive role for the sake of regional peace, stability and prosperity, to adhere to international norms of behavior, as well as to improve openness and transparency in its advancing military capabilities through its rapidly increasing military budget. As a part of such efforts, through continuing and promoting defense cooperation, Japan will seek to urge improvement in transparency of China’s military and security policies, and promote measures such as establishing a framework to avert or prevent unexpected situations. Furthermore, with regard to China’s recent attempts to change the status quo by coercion based on its unique assertion in its relations with neighboring countries, including Japan, Japan will urge China to exercise self-restraint and will continue to respond f rmly but in a calm manner without escalating the situation. (3) With regard to the issues of North Korea, Japan will cooperate closely with relevant countries to urge North Korea to take concrete actions towards its denuclearization and other goals, based on the Joint Statement of the Six-Party Talks and relevant U.N. Security Council (UNSC) Resolutions. Concerning Japan-North Korea relations, Japan will endeavor to achieve a comprehensive resolution of outstanding issues of concern, such as the abduction, nuclear and missile issues, in accordance with the Japan-North Korea Pyongyang Declaration. In particular, it is the basic recognition of Japan that normalization of relations with North Korea will not be possible without resolving the abduction issue. Japan will make every effort to realize the safety and prompt return of all abductees at the earliest possible date, investigate the truth regarding the abductions, and transfer those who executed the abductions. (4) Under the increasingly severe security environment in East Asia, it is critical for Japan to advance cooperation with Russia in all areas, including security and energy, thereby enhancing bilateral relations as a whole, in order to ensure its security. Based on this recognition, Japan will cooperate with Russia in securing peace and stability of the Asia-Pacif c region. With regard to the issue of the Northern Territories, the most important pending issue between the two countries, Japan will vigorously negotiate with Russia under a consistent policy of resolving the issue of the attribution of the four islands and concluding a peace treaty. (5) In promoting the efforts mentioned above, Japan will actively utilize and engage in the further development of functional and multilayered frameworks for regional cooperation, starting from Asia-Pacif c Economic Cooperation (APEC), the East Asia Summit (EAS), ASEAN+3, ARF, the ASEAN Defense Ministers’ MeetingPlus (ADMM-Plus), to the Trans-Pacif c Partnership (TPP) and trilateral frameworks, such as Japan-U.S.-ROK, Japan-U.S.Australia and Japan-U.S.-India, as well as Japan-China-ROK, a grouping of three large neighboring economic powers. In addition, Japan will appropriately contribute to the creation of a more institutional security framework in East Asia in the future. (6) Japan will also cooperate with other partners of the Asia-Pacif c region towards ensuring the stability of the region. These partners include Mongolia, Central Asian countries, Southwest Asian nations, the Pacif c Island Countries (PICs), New Zealand, Canada, Mexico, Colombia, Peru and Chile. In particular, Japan will deepen its cooperation with the PICs, which possess vast exclusive economic zones and abundant maritime resources in the Pacif c Ocean, in many areas including maritime cooperation, through such fora as the Pacif c Islands Leaders’ Meeting (PALM). (7) Furthermore, Japan will strengthen cooperative relations with countries outside the Asia-Pacif c region that play an important role in ensuring the peace and stability of the international community. — Europe has the inf uence to formulate international public opinions, the capacity to develop norms in major international frameworks and a large economy. Japan and European countries, especially the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Italy, Spain and Poland, share universal values of freedom, democracy, respect for fundamental human rights and the rule of law, and principles such as market economy. They are partners for Japan which together take a leading role in ensuring the peace, stability and prosperity of the international community. At a time when the power balance of the international based on universal values and rules, to effectively address global challenges, and to accomplish Japan’s initiatives for a peaceful and prosperous international community, Japan will further strengthen its relations with Europe, including cooperation with the European Union (EU), the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). Japan has contributed to the democratization of East European countries and Baltic countries, and will engage in strengthening relations with them, as well as the Caucasus countries. — Emerging countries such as Brazil, Mexico, Turkey, Argentina and South Africa have been increasing their presence not only in the international economy, but also in international politics. Japan will therefore endeavor to further develop relations with such countries, not merely on a bilateral basis, but in cooperative efforts in tackling global challenges. — Stability in the Middle East is an issue that is inseparably linked to the stable supply of energy, and therefore Japan’s very survival and prosperity. Given that the Gulf States are the largest source of crude oil for Japan, in order to ensure the stability of the Middle East, Japan will engage in constructing multilayered cooperative relations with these countries, encompassing wide-raging economic cooperation beyond resources and energy, as well as politics and security. In this context, Japan will play a proactive role in the resolution of major issues affecting the stability of the Middle East, including the issue of democratization in Arab countries that stems from the “Arab Spring,” the situation in Syria, Iran’s nuclear issue, the Middle East peace process and peacebuilding in Afghanistan. In the same vein, Japan will also collaborate with other countries that play important roles in the Middle East, such as the U.S., European countries, Saudi Arabia and Turkey. — Africa is a prospective economic frontier with abundant strategic natural resources and sustained economic growth. In addition, Africa has been increasing its inf uence in the international community. Japan will continue to contribute to the development and the consolidation of peace in Africa through various avenues, especially through the Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD) process, and promote cooperation in international fora. 4. Proactive Contribution to International Efforts for Peace and Stability of the International Community As a “Proactive Contributor to Peace” based on the principle of international cooperation, Japan will play an active role for the peace and stability of the international community. (1) Strengthening Diplomacy at the United Nations The U.N. was established with the UNSC as the core of a collective security system for maintaining international peace and security. However, the system has not fully functioned as originally anticipated. Nevertheless, the U.N. has taken the lead on various efforts for peace and security of the world, backed by its legitimacy through universal participation by the Member States and its expertise. In particular, since the end of the Cold War, the role played by the U.N. in maintaining international peace and security has continued to grow. Building on the invaluable experiences of having served on numerous occasions as a non-permanent member of the UNSC, Japan will further engage in active efforts by the U.N. for the maintenance and restoration of international peace and security. Moreover, Japan will actively contribute to diverse U.N.led efforts, including U.N. peacekeeping operations (PKO) and collective security measures; diplomatic efforts such as preventive diplomacy and mediation; seamless assistance efforts from the phase of post-conf ict emergency humanitarian relief to recovery and reconstruction, as well as assistance through the U.N. Peacebuilding Commission. At the same time, one must be mindful that realizing the enhancement of the effectiveness and legitimacy of the U.N., including the strengthening of collective security functions, is an urgent challenge. Therefore, Japan will continue to strive to achieve the UNSC reform, including through an expansion of both permanent and non-permanent categories, with Japan becoming a permanent member of the Council. (2) Strengthening the Rule of Law Japan will continue to faithfully comply with international law as a guardian of the rule of law. In addition, in order to establish the rule of law in the international community, Japan will participate proactively in international rule-making from the planning stage, so that Japan’s principles and positions based on fairness, transparency and reciprocity are duly ref ected. Furthermore, Japan will actively support international judicial organs in terms of both human capital and f nance. In addition, ----- systems in other countries. In particular, Japan will involve itself in realizing and strengthening the rule of law relating to the sea, outer space and cyberspace. While advancing policy coordination with countries with shared interests, Japan will contribute proactively to the development of international rules in the above-mentioned areas, and to the promotion of conf dence building measures among countries of mutual interest. In addition, Japan will further strengthen capacity building efforts for developing countries in these f elds. More concretely: — With regard to the sea, Japan will promote regional efforts and play a leading role in creating a shared recognition that reinforcement of the maritime order governed by law and rules and not by coercion is indispensable for peace and prosperity of the international community as a whole. — With regard to outer space, emphasizing the concept of ensuring freedom of access and utilization of space, Japan will participate proactively in the efforts to formulate an international code of conduct that aims to prevent experiments of anti-satellite weapons (ASAT) and avoid collision of satellites, and consequently strive to ensure safe and stable use of outer space. — With regard to cyberspace, based on the recognition of ensuring the free f ow of information in cyberspace, Japan will actively cooperate with like-minded countries in the development of international rules on the premise that existing international law applies to cyberspace. Japan will also vigorously support the capacity building efforts of developing countries in this area. (3) Leading International Efforts on Disarmament and Non-Proliferation Japan, as the only country in the world to have suffered atomic bombings in war, will continue its vigorous efforts to seek “a world free of nuclear weapons.” In view of the threat posed by progress in nuclear and missile development by North Korea, and being mindful of future trends in the balance of nuclear forces in the Asia-Pacif c region together with the rapid advancement of military technologies, Japan will lead international efforts on disarmament and non-proliferation, including those towards the resolution of North Korea’s nuclear and missile development issues and Iran’s nuclear issues, in a manner consistent with the maintenance of the credibility of extended deterrence under the Japan-U.S. alliance. Furthermore, Japan will steadily implement export control measures from a security perspective, including active participation in the discussions in the international export control regime, in coordination with other relevant countries, to prevent the proliferation of arms, as well as dual use items or technologies to countries of proliferation concern. In addition, Japan will engage in international efforts on conventional weapons, such as small arms and light weapons, and anti-personnel mines. (4) Promoting International Peace Cooperation Over the course of more than 20 years, Japan has dispatched SDF units and other personnel to various regions on international peace cooperation assignments, including in Cambodia, the Golan Heights, Timor-Leste, Nepal, and South Sudan. These contributions have been deeply appreciated both in Japan and by the international community. Japan will further step up its cooperation with U.N. PKO and other international peace cooperation activities with its determination to contribute even more proactively to peace based on the principle of international cooperation, taking into account the appreciation and expectation Japan receives from the international community. In addition, when participating in PKO, Japan will endeavor to ensure effective implementation of its operations, through coordination with other activities, including ODA projects. Moreover, in order to implement seamless assistance in security-related areas, including through further strategic utilization of ODA and capacity building assistance, as well as coordination with non-governmental organizations (NGOs), Japan will develop a system that enables assistance to potential recipient organizations that cannot receive Japan’s assistance under the current schemes. Furthermore, Japan as a whole will proactively engage in training for peacebuilding experts and PKO personnel in various countries. When engaging in such efforts, Japan will consult closely with countries or organizations that have experience in the same f elds, including the U.S., Australia and European countries. (5) Promoting International Cooperation against International Terrorism Acts of terrorism are unjustif able regardless of their motivation and must be f rmly condemned. It is important for the international community as a whole to take a f rm position against them. Japan will promote international counter-terrorism efforts with the international community for national security. Japan will promote consultations and exchanges of views with other countries on the situation on international terrorism and international legal framework to stringently punish terrorists; and assistance to developing countries which do not have suff cient capacity for counter-terrorism and other measures. Furthermore, Japan must be aware that terrorism and transnational organized crime are closely linked in light of the situation whereby the proceeds of organized crime, such as illicit traff cking, the trade of arms and drugs, and kidnapping, form an important source of funding for terrorists. Therefore, Japan will enhance international cooperation and assistance for developing countries to prevent and combat transnational organized crime. 5. Strengthening Cooperation Based on Universal Values to Resolve Global Issues Japan will endeavor to share universal values and reinforce an open international economic system, which form the basis of peace, stability and prosperity of the international community. At the same time, Japan will advance the following measures towards the resolution of development issues and global issues that could hinder peace and stability of the international community, such as poverty, energy issues, widening disparity, climate change, natural disasters, and food-related issues, through the active and strategic utilization of ODA, as necessary. (1) Sharing Universal Values Through a partnership with countries with which Japan shares universal values, such as freedom, democracy, respect for fundamental human rights including women’s rights, and the rule of law, Japan will conduct diplomacy that contributes to addressing global issues. The wave of democratization that began in the countries of Eastern Europe and ASEAN in the 1990s and spread to the countries of the Arab world at the beginning of the 2010s has become an irreversible tide, coupled with the rapid development of globalization and market-oriented economic reforms. On the other hand, as was observed in the “Arab Spring,” the process of democratization does not always proceed smoothly. As an advanced, liberal and democratic nation, based on the principle of human security, Japan will actively utilize its ODA in supporting democratization, the development of legal systems, and human rights, and contribute to the enhancement of the growing international trend towards the protection of human rights, including through dialogues in the area of human rights. Japan will also engage proactively in diplomatic issues on women, cooperating with the international community to implement measures to empower women in conf ict prevention and peacebuilding, and promote their social advancement. (2) Responding to Global Development and Global Issues and Realizing Human Security Japan has garnered high recognition by the international community, by its proactive contribution to global development in the world through utilizing ODA. Addressing development issues contributes to the enhancement of the global security environment, and it is necessary for Japan to strengthen its efforts as part of “Proactive Contribution to Peace” based on the principle of international cooperation. Against this backdrop, in order to contribute to the realization of human security, Japan will utilize its ODA in a strategic and effective manner. Japan will also strengthen efforts towards the achievement of the MDGs, in areas such as poverty eradication, global health, education and water, in cooperation with diverse stakeholders, including international organizations and NGOs. In addition, Japan will play a leading role in the formulation of new international development goals, namely the post-2015 development agenda. In this context, Japan will engage in further efforts in mainstreaming the concept of human security in the international community, building on our initiatives on this agenda to date. Moreover, Japan will share the lessons learned and experiences from the many natural disasters that it has experienced, including the Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake, the Great East Japan Earthquake and Tsunami. Given the expanding scale, impact and frequency of disasters globally, Japan will take the lead in international cooperation on disaster management and ensure that communities around the world have a high degree of resilience to disasters. (3) Cooperating with Human Resource Development Efforts in Developing Countries Japan will invite a broad range of personnel from developing countries, including eminent students and administrative off cials who are expected to become future leaders. Japan will make use of such opportunities to learn from their knowledge and experience, as well as providing them with opportunities to be familiarized with Japanese systems, technologies and expertise. Japan will further promote human resource development in order to enhance mutual understanding with Japan, and ensure that these personnel can contribute to sustainable economic and social development in their ----- Japan will engage in efforts to maintain and develop such human networks to expand and reinforce the foundations of cooperation. (4) Maintaining and Strengthening the Free Trade System The expansion of the open and rule-based international economic system, where Japan continues to be a major player, is essential for the world economy and Japan’s economic prosperity. In this regard, Japan will promote economic partnership, including through the Trans-Pacif c Partnership (TPP), the Japan-EU Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA), a Free Trade Agreement (FTA) among Japan, China and the ROK, and the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), so as to achieve comprehensive and high-level trade agreements. Through these efforts, Japan will contribute to the growth of the global economy, which in turn, will also bring economic growth to Japan. In addition, rule-making for trade and investment in the AsiaPacif c region through the above-mentioned efforts strengthens the vigor and prosperity in the region, and has a strategic importance of strengthening the foundation for a stable security environment in the region. It is expected that the conclusion of such 21st- century economic partnership agreements will set new and attractive precedents of trade liberalization, and promote global-scale trade liberalization in the multilateral trade regime based on the WTO. (5) Responding to Energy and Environmental Issues The stable supply of energy and other resources is essential for a vibrant Japanese economy and thus constitutes a challenge to national security. Promoting measures such as the diversif cation of supply sources is necessary for securing stable and low-cost resource supply. Japan will actively utilize diplomatic tools to gain the understanding of countries concerned in this course. In the area of climate change, Japan will increase its engagements towards emission reduction. Japan will implement a proactive strategy for countering global warming (the Actions for Cool Earth (ACE)) that utilizes its strengths in outstanding technologies on environment and energy, and its assistance to developing countries. At the same time, Japan will engage in establishing a fair and effective international framework with participation by all countries. Through these efforts, Japan will contribute to the achievement of emission reduction by the international community as a whole and to the resolution of climate change issues. (6) Enhancing People-to-people Exchanges People-to-people exchanges are signif cant as they enhance mutual understanding and friendship between countries and solidify national ties, while also helping to develop a stable and friendly security environment by deepening an appropriate understanding towards Japan in the international community. In particular, Japan will implement measures to expand twoway youth exchanges and will seek to strengthen relations with various countries into the future. For example, Japan has recently marked 40 years of friendship and cooperation with ASEAN, where regional integration is advancing while maintaining cultural diversity. By further vitalizing exchange programs with ASEAN, Japan will further promote mutual understanding. Moreover, through events of interest for the world, such as the 2020 Olympic and Paralympic Games in Tokyo, Japan will promote people-to-people exchanges through sport and culture, and will work to construct and deepen friendly relations at the individual level. 6. Strengthening the Domestic Foundation that Supports National Security and Promoting Domestic and Global Understanding In order to fully ensure national security, in addition to strengthening key capabilities with diplomatic power and defense force at their core, it is vital to reinforce the domestic foundation for these capabilities to be effectively demonstrated. Furthermore, considering the importance of seeking a deeper understanding for Japan’s security policies both at home and abroad to ensure national security, Japan will advance the following measures. (1) Maintaining and Enhancing Defense Production and Technological Bases Defense production and technological bases are one of the important factors that support defense forces through research, development, production, operation and maintenance of defense equipment. In order to develop, maintain and operate defense capability steadily with limited resources in the medium- to long-term, Japan will endeavor to engage in effective and eff cient acquisition of defense equipment, and will maintain and enhance its defense production and technological bases, including through strengthening international competitiveness. (2) Boosting Communication Capabilities In order to promote its security policy from a medium- to longterm perspective, it is imperative that Japan proactively and effectively communicate its policy to the world and its people, and increase transparency. In this regard, it is necessary to deepen the and build cooperative relations and trust with other countries. To this end, with the Prime Minister’s off ce serving as the control tower, Japan will enhance its public relations in an integrated and strategic manner through a government-wide approach. Fully utilizing various information technologies and diverse media, Japan will also strengthen its information dissemination in foreign languages. In addition, the Government as a whole will cooperate with educational institutions, key f gures, and think tanks. In doing so, Japan will promote Japanese language education overseas, and train personnel who are capable of contributing to strategic public relations efforts and other areas. At a time when the global security environment is becoming more complex and diverse, it becomes increasingly likely for countries to have conf icting interests. However, by precisely and effectively communicating information on Japan’s position based on objective facts, Japan will be able to gain accurate understanding in the forum of international opinion, and contribute to the stability of the international community. (3) Reinforcing the Social Base In order to support national security policy from a medium- to long-term perspective, it is essential that each and every Japanese national hopes to contribute to peace and stability in the region and the world, and to the improvement of the welfare of humanity. In addition, it is also essential that they perceive national security as a familiar and immediate issue for them, and have deep understanding of its importance and complexity. To that end, the Government of Japan will promote the following measures: foster respect for other countries and their people as well as love for the country and region; raise awareness with regard to security on such issues as territory and sovereignty; and ensure the understanding and cooperation of residents around defense facilities, which serve as the foundation for the activities of the SDF and the U.S. forces in Japan, through advancing measures that widen the understanding of the general public about the current status of such activities. (4) Enhancing the Intellectual Base In order to invigorate a national discussion and debate and contribute to high-quality policymaking on national security, Japan will seek to enhance and strengthen education on security-related subjects at institutions of higher education, including through the dispatch of off cials of relevant ministries. In addition, Japan will promote practical research on national security, and engage in deepening exchanges among the Government, higher education institutions and think tanks, thereby promoting the sharing of insight and knowledge. Furthermore, Japan will promote the creation of experts and government off cials that can make practical and constructive contributions to national security policy, thus broadening the pool of experts on national security. **Reference 15** **NATIONAL DEFENSE PROGRAM GUIDELINES for FY2014** **and beyond** (Approved by the National Security Council and the Cabinet on December 17, 2013) Stipulations regarding the National Defense Program Guidelines for FY2014 and Beyond are included in the reference. Accordingly, the National Defense Program Guidelines for FY2011 and Beyond (approved by the Cabinet on December 17, 2010) are discontinued as of the end of FY2013. (Additional reference) National Defense Program Guidelines for FY2014 and beyond **I. NDPG’s Objective** In light of the current security environment surrounding Japan, the Government of Japan sets out the “National Defense Program Guidelines for FY2014 and beyond” as new guidelines for Japan’s national defense, based on “Defense Capability Build-up in FY2013” (approved by the Security Council and the Cabinet on January 25, 2013) and the “National Security Strategy” (approved by the National Security Council and the Cabinet on December 17, 2013). **II. Security Environment Surrounding Japan** 1. As interdependence among countries expands and deepens, there is a growing risk that unrest in the global security environment or a security problem in a single country or region could immediately develop into a security challenge or destabilizing factor for the entire international community. The multi-polarization of the world continues as a result of shifts in the balance of power due to the further development of countries such as China and India and the relative change of inf uence of the United States (U.S.). At the same time, the U.S. is expected to continue to play the role in maintaining world peace and stability as it ----- retains the largest national power. There are ongoing regional conf icts involving various countries as well as an increase in the number of so-called “gray-zone” situations, that is, neither pure peacetime nor contingencies over territory, sovereignty and maritime economic interests. The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and ballistic missiles continues to be a deep concern despite nonproliferation efforts by the international community. The presence of countries with weak governance and failed states feeds the expansion and spread of international terrorism. These problems continue to pose imminent security challenges. In the maritime domain, piracy acts have taken place in various parts of the world, and there have been cases where coastal states unilaterally asserted their rights and took action based on their own assertion concerning international maritime law, thereby unduly infringing the freedom of the high seas. Securing the stable use of outer space and cyberspace as global commons is becoming a signif cant security challenge for the international community including Japan against the backdrop of rapid technology innovation. In addition, military strategies and military balance in the future are anticipated to be signif cantly affected by the progress and proliferation of technologies such as those related to precision guided munitions, unmanned vehicles, stealth capability and nanotechnology. 2. In the Asia-Pacif c region, including areas surrounding Japan, countries are enhancing and strengthening their cooperative relationships to resolve security challenges. Specif c and practical cooperation and collaboration have progressed to settle challenges particularly in nontraditional security f elds. In the meantime, gray-zone situations over territory, sovereignty and maritime economic interests tend to linger, raising concerns that they may develop into more serious situations. North Korea is military-focused and deploys a massive military force. It is also proceeding with the development, deployment and proliferation of WMDs including nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles which may be used to deliver such weapons, and it maintains a largescale special operations force. Through these activities, North Korea is maintaining and strengthening its asymmetrical military capabilities. North Korea has also repeatedly heightened tension in the region by conducting military provocations in the Korean Peninsula and by escalating its provocative rhetoric and behavior against Japan and other countries. Such North Korean military trend constitutes a serious destabilizing factor to the security not only of Japan but of the entire region and the international community. Therefore, Japan needs to pay utmost attention to such activities. In particular, North Korea’s ballistic missile development has presumably entered a new stage, as technological improvements have been made to extend the range and increase the accuracy of its missiles through a series of missile launches. Also, North Korea has conducted nuclear tests in def ance of calls for restraint from the international community, so the possibility cannot be ruled out that it has successfully miniaturized nuclear weapons for warheads and equipped them on ballistic missiles. North Korea’s nuclear and missile development, coupled with its provocative rhetoric and behavior, such as suggesting a missile attack on Japan, pose a serious and imminent threat to Japan’s security. As for China, while it is greatly expected to play an active role in a more cooperative manner in the region and the world, it has been continuously increasing its defense expenditures and has been rapidly reinforcing its military in a wide range of areas. As part of such effort, China is believed to be making efforts to strengthen its asymmetrical military capabilities to prevent military activity by other countries in the region by denying access and deployment of foreign militaries to its surrounding areas. However, China has not clearly stated the purposes and goals of the military buildup and therefore, transparency concerning its military and security is not fully achieved. In addition, China is rapidly expanding and intensifying its activities in the maritime and aerial domains in the region including in the East China Sea and the South China Sea. In particular, China has taken assertive actions with regard to issues of conf icts of interest in the maritime domain, as exemplif ed by its attempts to change the status quo by coercion. As for the seas and airspace around Japan, China has intruded into Japanese territorial waters frequently and violated Japan’s airspace, and has engaged in dangerous activities that could cause unexpected situations, such as its announcement of establishing an “Air Defense Identif cation Zone” based on its own assertion thereby infringing the freedom of overf ight above the high seas. China is also expanding and intensifying its activities in the maritime and aerial domains farther offshore than before. For example, Chinese military vessels and aircraft routinely enter the Pacif c Ocean, and are expanding their operational areas which include areas north of Japan. As Japan has great concern about these Chinese activities, it will concerns over regional and global security. As for Russia, it is observed that the country is proceeding to reform and modernize its military forces mainly by strengthening their readiness and introducing new equipment. The activities of Russian armed forces have been active. The U.S. has clearly manifested its strategic decision to put greater emphasis on the Asia-Pacif c region (the rebalance to the AsiaPacif c region) and is maintaining and strengthening its engagement and presence in the region despite f scal and various other constraints in order to maintain the stability and growth of the region while enhancing its relationships with its allies and expanding cooperation with partner countries. In addition, the U.S. has made its stance clear to prevent coercive actions that aim at changing the status quo in the region in cooperation with allies and partners. 3. Japan is surrounded by the sea, and has a long coastline, numerous remote islands and a vast Exclusive Economic Zone. Japan is a maritime state and dependent largely on international trade for its supply of food and natural resources. Therefore, securing the safety of maritime and air traff c, through strengthening an “Open and Stable Seas” order based upon such fundamental principles as the rule of law and the freedom of navigation, constitutes the basis of peace and prosperity. Japan also faces security vulnerabilities resulting from concentration of industry, population and information infrastructure in urban areas and from the presence of a large number of key facilities, such as nuclear power plants, in coastal areas. In the event of another massive earthquake like the Great East Japan Earthquake, Japan may suffer enormous damage and the impact may spread not only nationwide but also to other countries. The possibility of future huge earthquakes such as a Nankai Trough earthquake or a Tokyo inland earthquake makes it increasingly necessary to take every possible measure to prepare for large-scale disasters. 4. In light of the above, while the probability of a large-scale military conf ict between major countries, which was a concern during the Cold War era, presumably remains low, various security challenges and destabilizing factors are emerging and becoming more tangible and acute. As a result, the security environment surrounding Japan has become increasingly severe, since the formulation of “National Defense Program Guidelines, FY2011 and beyond” (approved by the Security Council and the Cabinet on December 17, 2010). As the security challenges and destabilizing factors are diverse and wideranging, it is diff cult for a single country to deal with them on its own. Under these circumstances, it is increasingly necessary not only that the military sector cooperate with the non-military sector but also that countries which share interests in responding to shared security challenges cooperate and actively respond to maintain regional and global stability. **III. Japan’s Basic Defense Policy** 1. Basic Policy In light of the National Security Strategy, Japan will strengthen its diplomatic and defense capabilities along the policy of “Proactive Contribution to Peace” based on the principle of international cooperation, thereby expanding the role it can play. At the same time, Japan will contribute even more proactively in securing peace, stability and prosperity of the international community while achieving its own security as well as peace and stability in the Asia-Pacif c region by expanding and deepening cooperative relationships with other countries, with the Japan-U.S. Alliance as its cornerstone. Under this basic principle, Japan will build a comprehensive defense architecture and strengthen its posture for preventing and responding to various situations. In addition, Japan will strengthen the JapanU.S. Alliance and actively promote bilateral and multilateral security cooperation with other countries while closely coordinating defense and diplomatic policies. Japan will also seek to establish an infrastructure necessary for its defense forces to fully exercise their capabilities. When implementing these measures, under the Constitution, Japan will eff ciently build a highly effective and joint defense force in line with the basic principles of maintaining an exclusively defenseoriented policy, not becoming a military power that poses a threat to other countries, while adhering to the principle of civilian control of the military and observing the Three Non-Nuclear Principles. With regard to the threat of nuclear weapons, the extended deterrence provided by the U.S. with nuclear deterrence at its core, is indispensable. In order to maintain and enhance the credibility of the extended deterrence, Japan will closely cooperate with the U.S. In addition, Japan will take appropriate responses through its own efforts, including ballistic missile defense (BMD) and protection of the people. At the same time, Japan will play a constructive and active role in international nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation efforts so as to achieve the long-term goal of creating a world free of nuclear weapons. 2. Japan’s Own Efforts Recognizing that a country’s security depends f rst and foremost on ----- its independent efforts, Japan will make full-scale efforts on its own initiative to prevent various situations and will seamlessly respond to them as the situation evolves with the National Security Council as the control tower, while maintaining cooperation with its ally, partners and other countries concerned. (1) Building a comprehensive defense architecture Given the increasingly severe security environment, Japan will eff ciently develop a highly effective joint defense force and make efforts to employ it with a high level of f exibility and readiness based on joint operations. Japan will also ensure close regular interagency cooperation in normal times. In the event of various situations, the Government, under strong political leadership, will appropriately and promptly make decisions. Japan will seamlessly respond to situations as they unfold, in a whole-of-the-government approach, to ensure the protection of the lives and property of its people and the sovereignty of Japan’s territorial land, waters and airspace, in coordination with local governments, private sectors, and others. Japan will also continue to develop various systems to respond to a variety of disasters and protect its people and will enhance the capability to quickly evacuate Japanese nationals from foreign countries in an emergency situation and ensure their safety. In order to take such approaches appropriately, Japan will increase the effectiveness of its situation and disaster response posture by systemizing various related plans and formulating and reviewing them as well as expanding the use of simulations, comprehensive training and exercises. (2) Japan’s defense forces – building a Dynamic Joint Defense Force Japan’s defense forces are the ultimate guarantee of national security, and represent Japan’s will and ability to deter threats from directly reaching Japan and defeat them if threats should reach Japan. In the times of an ever-changing security environment surrounding Japan, defense forces need to be constantly reviewed to adapt to the environment. To this aim, Japan needs to allocate limited resources in a focused and f exible way to prioritize the functions and capabilities from a comprehensive perspective, identif ed through joint operation-based capability assessments of the Self-Defense Force’s (SDF’s) total functions and capabilities against various situations. Amid the increasingly severe security environment surrounding Japan, the SDF, in addition to its regular activities, needs to respond to various situations, including “gray zone” situations which require SDF commitment. The frequency of such situations and the duration of responses are both increasing. Therefore, Japan will regularly conduct persistent intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (hereinafter “ISR”) activities. Moreover, the SDF will conduct strategic training and exercises in accordance with the development of the situation and swiftly build a response posture including advance deployment of units in response to the security environment and rapid deployment of adequate units. Thus Japan will demonstrate its will and highly developed capability to prevent further escalation. In dealing with situations, depending on their development, minimizing damage by effective response through achieving maritime supremacy and air superiority is essential in safeguarding the lives and property of the Japanese people, and the sovereignty of Japan’s territorial land, waters and airspace. Therefore, Japan will enhance its deterrence and response capability by improving the mission-capable rate of equipment and its employment to conduct tailored activities swiftly and sustainably based on joint operations, as well as by developing defense capabilities adequate both in quantity and quality that underpin various activities to realize a more robust defense force. At the same time, from the perspective of “Proactive Contribution to Peace” based on the principle of international cooperation, Japan will strengthen its bilateral and multilateral cooperative relationships in order to ensure the stability of the AsiaPacif c region, which is closely related to its own security. Japan will also engage in international peacekeeping and other similar activities (peacekeeping operations by the United Nations, nontraditional security initiatives including Humanitarian Assistance/ Disaster Relief (HA/DR), and other internationally collaborative activities to improve the international security environment) and other efforts more proactively than before as efforts to address the global security challenges, in light of the diversif ed roles and increased opportunities of the defense force. From these viewpoints, given the changes in the security environment, the defense force based on this NDPG should prioritize particularly important functions and capabilities through optimal resource allocation as a whole. The defense force also must be an effective one which enables conducting a diverse range of activities to be seamless as well as dynamic and adapting to situations as they Force, which emphasizes both soft and hard aspects of readiness, sustainability, resiliency and connectivity, reinforced by advanced technology and capability for C3I, with a consideration to establish a wide range of infrastructure to support the SDF’s operation. 3. Strengthening of the Japan-U.S. Alliance The Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements based on the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty, together with Japan’s own efforts, constitute the cornerstone for Japan’s national security. The Japan-U.S. Alliance centered on bilateral security arrangements functions as public goods that contribute to the stability and prosperity not only of Japan but also of the Asia-Pacif c region and the world at large. Under its policy of strategic rebalancing towards the Asia-Pacif c region, the U.S. is maintaining and strengthening its engagement and presence in the region while enhancing its partnerships and cooperation with its allies, including Japan, and partner countries. As the security environment surrounding Japan becomes increasingly severer, it has become more important than ever for Japan’s security to strengthen the Japan-U.S. Alliance and make it more balanced and effective. (1) Strengthening deterrence and response capabilities of the JapanU.S. Alliance In order to ensure Japan’s national security by maintaining and strengthening the commitment of the U.S. towards Japan and the Asia-Pacif c region, Japan will revise the Guidelines for JapanU.S. Defense Cooperation, further enhance Japan-U.S. defense cooperation and reinforce the deterrence provided by the Japan-U.S. Alliance and the alliance’s contingency response capabilities, while strengthening Japan’s own capabilities as a premise for these efforts. At the same time, in response to the increasingly severe security environment, while increasing the presence of Japan and the U.S. in the western Pacif c region, Japan will build seamless cooperation with the U.S. ranging from situations on a day-to-day basis to various situations, including cooperation in responding to “gray-zone” situations. To that end, Japan will continue to expand joint training and exercises, joint ISR activities and the joint/shared use of facilities and areas with the U.S. It will also tighten the JapanU.S. operational cooperation and policy coordination including contingency response and medium-to long-term strategies, such as BMD, bilateral planning, and Extended Deterrence Dialogue. (2) Strengthening and expanding cooperation in a broad range of f elds The Japan-U.S. Alliance will contribute to the peace and stability of the world, including the Asia-Pacif c region, by strengthening cooperation not only in the f elds of anti-piracy efforts, capacity building assistance, HA/DR, peacekeeping and counter terrorism but also in maritime affairs, outer space and cyberspace. As for disaster response, Japan will further strengthen its cooperation between the SDF and the U.S. forces within and outside Japan in light of the fact that the U.S. forces, including its USFJ facilities and areas, greatly contributed to the safety of the Japanese people during the Great East Japan Earthquake. In addition, Japan will constantly strengthen and expand the Japan-U.S. cooperative relationship over a broad range of f elds, including efforts for intelligence cooperation and information security, and cooperation in the f eld of defense equipment and technology, to build a f rmer and effective alliance. (3) Steady implementation of measures relating to the stationing of U.S. Forces in Japan Japan will provide stable support for the smooth and effective stationing of U.S. forces in Japan through various measures, including Host Nation Support (HNS). At the same time, efforts will be made to steadily implement the realignment of U.S. forces in Japan and mitigate the impact on local communities while maintaining the deterrence provided by U.S. forces. In particular, Japan will seek to mitigate the impact on Okinawa, located in a critically important location in terms of national security and where the stationing of U.S. forces signif cantly contributes to the deterrence of the Japan-U.S. Alliance, by realignment, consolidation and reduction of USFJ facilities and areas including through the relocation of Marine Corps Air Station Futenma as well as the dispersion of the impact and other measures, in light of the heavy concentration of such facilities and areas there. 4. Active Promotion of Security Cooperation (1) Cooperation in the Asia-Pacif c region In the Asia-Pacif c region, specif c cooperative measures have been taken mainly in non-traditional security f elds, including disaster relief. Multilateral frameworks such as the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), the ASEAN Defense Ministers’ Meeting-Plus (ADMMPlus) and the East Asia Summit (EAS) have been developed and the regional integration initiative led by ASEAN has been making progress. However, security challenges are becoming more serious than ever in North East Asia. Japan will promote a variety of ----- atmosphere of confrontation and the sense of curiosity toward one another in the region. Japan will promote close cooperation with the Republic of Korea (ROK), which is in a position to support the U.S. presence in North East Asia together with Japan, and will make efforts to establish a foundation for further cooperation with the ROK, for example by concluding an agreement on security information protection and an acquisition and cross-servicing agreement. Japan will further deepen its relationship with Australia, with which Japan shares security interests and security cooperation has been advancing, and strengthen cooperation in f elds such as international peacekeeping activities. Japan will also actively conduct joint training and other activities so as to improve interoperability with Australia. Moreover, efforts will be made to promote the partnerships among U.S. allies in the Asia-Pacif c region by strengthening cooperative relationships under trilateral frameworks among Japan, the U.S. and ROK and among Japan, the U.S. and Australia. As Chinese activities have a signif cant impact on regional security, Japan will promote security dialogue and exchanges with China in order to enhance mutual understanding and will develop conf dence-building measures to prevent unexpected situations. Japan will maintain a calm and f rm stance in dealing with the rapid expansion and intensif cation of Chinese activities on the sea and in the air surrounding Japan. Japan will promote security dialogues with Russia, including the Foreign and Defense Ministerial Consultations (“2+2”), high-level exchanges, and unit-to-unit exchanges in order to deepen understanding about the intention of Russian military activities and develop mutual trust with Russia. In addition, Japan will enhance bilateral training and exercises with Russia to promote regional stability. Japan will also further strengthen its relationships with partner countries in the region, including Southeast Asian countries, and will actively promote joint training and exercises and capacity building assistance. In addition, Japan will strengthen its cooperation with these countries in the f eld of disaster management in light of the increasing frequency and growing scale of disasters in the region. Japan will strengthen its relationship with India in a broad range of f elds, including maritime security, through joint training and exercises as well as joint implementation of international peacekeeping activities. As capacity building assistance is effective in stabilizing the security environment and strengthening bilateral defense cooperation, Japan will promote it in full coordination with diplomatic policy initiatives, including the Off cial Development Assistance, and aligning it with joint training and exercises and international peacekeeping activities. Japan will also strengthen cooperation with relevant countries which actively provide such support, thereby expanding the range of countries receiving support as well as its scope. Under ongoing multilateral security cooperation and dialogue in the Asia-Pacif c region, Japan in cooperation with the United States and Australia will proactively contribute to building cooperative relationships in the region. Moreover, Japan will actively participate in multilateral joint training and exercises and play a major role in enhancing conf dence-building measures among countries in the region, attaching importance to multilateral frameworks such as the ARF and the ADMM-Plus. (2) Cooperation with the international community It is very diff cult for a single country to respond to global security challenges on its own. Moreover, as the roles of military forces have diversif ed, there are increasing opportunities for such forces to play an important role not only in preventing and responding to conf icts and maintaining peace but also in supporting post-conf ict reconstruction, building peace and promoting conf dence-building and friendly relationships. Therefore, Japan will promote various initiatives to improve the global security environment on a regular basis in cooperation with the international community. Japan will continue and strengthen various initiatives concerning arms control, disarmament, nonproliferation and capacity building assistance in order to respond to global security challenges, including regional conf icts, expansion and spread of international terrorism, failed states, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and problems related to the sea, outer space and cyberspace, while regularly cooperating with its ally and relevant countries with which it shares security interests and with international organizations and other relevant bodies. In this respect, Japan will further strengthen its cooperation with the European Union (EU), North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe countries and will work with them in responding to these challenges. Japan will also promote cooperation and exchanges with regard to equipment and technology with these countries and organizations. In order to stabilize the security environment in the Asia-Pacif c region and improve the global security environment based on the policy of “Proactive Contribution to Peace” based on the principle of international cooperation, Japan will actively promote various international peace cooperation activities, including international peace cooperation assignments and emergency relief activities, in a multi-layered manner. To this end, Japan will ensure close cooperation between the defense and foreign affairs authorities, with comprehensive consideration given to the signif cance of the dispatch of SDF units, the situation of countries accepting SDF units and Japan’s political and economic relationships with recipient countries. With regard to international peace cooperation activities and other similar activities in particular, Japan will continue to actively conduct activities utilizing the SDF’s capabilities and will increase the number of SDF personnel it dispatches to assume positions of responsibility at organizations such as the local mission headquarters and the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations. In addition, Japan will conduct a study on various challenges it has to overcome to enable the dispatch of SDF personnel in a broad range of f elds, and take necessary measures. Japan will also contribute to the training of domestic and foreign personnel engaging in peacebuilding by making use of the SDF’s experience and knowledge. **IV. Future Defense Forces** 1. The Role of the Defense Force Japan’s future defense forces will be developed as described in III. 2 (2) above, and will be capable of effectively fulf lling the expected roles in the following f elds, and will maintain the necessary posture. (1) Effective deterrence of and response to various situations In order to respond to various situations in a timely and appropriate manner, and certainly protect the lives and property of its people and the sovereignty of its land, sea and airspace, Japan will achieve intelligence superiority through persistent ISR activities in an extensive surrounding area to constantly gain an understanding of military developments in other countries and to detect any signs of development at an early stage. Through such activities, Japan will clearly express its resolve not to tolerate the change of the status quo by force, thereby preventing various situations from occurring. At the same time, Japan will swiftly and seamlessly respond to situations including gray zone situations, and will establish the necessary posture to continuously address a protracted situation. Moreover, Japan will implement an effective response tailored to each situation, even in cases when multiple events occur in a consecutive or concurrent manner. When implementing the initiatives above, the following points are emphasized in particular: a. Ensuring security of the sea and airspace surrounding Japan In addition to persistent ISR in an extensive area around Japan, Japan will immediately take appropriate measures to deal with any incursions into its territorial airspace. Japan will respond effectively and promptly to gray-zone situations or any other acts that may violate its sovereignty. Furthermore, should the acts in question become protracted or escalate, Japan will respond seamlessly as the situation evolves, taking all possible measures for the defense and security of the sea and airspace surrounding Japan. b. Response to an attack on remote islands In responding to an attack on remote islands, Japan will intercept and defeat any invasion, by securing maritime supremacy and air superiority, with the necessary SDF units swiftly deployed to interdict, in addition to the units deployed in advance in accordance with the security environment. Moreover, should any remote islands be invaded, Japan will recapture them. In doing so, any ballistic missile or cruise missile attacks will be dealt with appropriately. c. Response to ballistic missile attacks Japan will promptly detect any signs of a ballistic missile launch and facilitate a swift, sustained response by establishing a multilayered defense posture. Should any damage result, Japan will take steps to minimize it. Moreover, in the event of an attack by guerrillas or special operations forces concurrent with a ballistic missile attack, Japan will protect key facilities including nuclear power plants and search and destroy the inf ltrating units. d. Responses in outer space and cyberspace In regard with outer space and cyberspace, Japan will build up persistent ISR capabilities to prevent any acts that could impede eff cient action by the SDF. Furthermore, should any situation ----- arise, Japan will identify the event without delay and swiftly repair any damage, while taking necessary steps to contain it. Moreover, in light of society’s growing dependence on outer space and cyberspace, Japan will make effective use of the SDF’s capabilities when endeavoring to strengthen collaboration with relevant organizations and clarify the division of roles, thereby contributing to comprehensive, government-wide initiatives. e. Responses to major disasters Should a major disaster occur, Japan will swiftly transport and deploy the requisite units and take all possible measures as part of its initial response, and maintain its presence in the longer term, when required. Moreover, as well as providing a meticulous response to the needs of disaster-stricken citizens and local government bodies, Japan will engage in appropriate partnerships and cooperation with local governments and the private sector, in order to save lives, carry out emergency repairs, and provide livelihood support. (2) Stabilization of the Asia-Pacif c and improvement of global security environments Through persistent ISR in the area surrounding Japan and the timely and appropriate implementation of training, exercises, and various other activities, Japan will ensure the stability of the security environment in the Asia-Pacif c region as a whole including the vicinity of Japan. Moreover, working in partnership with its ally and partners, Japan will promote multi-tiered initiatives, including bilateral and multilateral defense cooperation and exchange, joint training and exercises, and capacity building assistance, effectively fulf lling its key role in initiatives focused on the stabilization of the security environment, including the building and strengthening of intraregional cooperative frameworks in the Asia-Pacif c region. As the roles played by military capacity diversify, in order to respond appropriately to global security issues including regional conf icts, the expansion and spread of international terrorism, failed states, and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, Japan will strengthen various initiatives focused on arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation, as well as actively promote international peace cooperation activities, anti-piracy initiatives and capacity building assistance, thereby working on improvement of the global security environment. Japan will attach importance to the following in particular, when engaging in the aforementioned initiatives. a. Holding training and exercises As well as the timely and appropriate implementation of SDF training and exercises, Japan will promote bilateral and multilateral joint training and exercises in the Asia-Pacif c region, proactively and visibly demonstrating our nation’s resolve and advanced capabilities focused on regional stabilization. In addition, it will build and strengthen cooperative relationships with relevant countries. b. Promoting defense cooperation and exchange Enhancing mutual understanding and relationships of trust with other countries and international organizations is the cornerstone of efforts to stabilize the security environment. Japan will take further steps to promote multi-layered defense cooperation and exchange, such as building and strengthening cooperative relationships focused on wide-ranging security issues of common interest including HADR and ensuring the stable use of the seas, outer space and cyberspace. c. Promoting capacity building assistance Utilizing the capabilities of the SDF, Japan will continuously engage in capacity building assistance such as human resource development and technical support on a regular basis in order to enhance the ability of developing countries themselves, thereby improving the security environment with particular focus on active creation of stability in the Asia-Pacif c region. d. Ensuring maritime security As it is particularly vital for Japan as a maritime state to maintain an “Open and Stable Seas” order which serves as the cornerstone of peace and prosperity, Japan will take all possible measures to secure the safety of maritime traff c. Japan will also conduct anti-piracy activities in cooperation with countries concerned, and will promote various efforts including capacity building assistance of coastal states in this f eld and enhancement of joint training and exercises by taking various opportunities in waters other than those surrounding our country. e. Implementing international peace cooperation activities Working in partnership with non-governmental organizations and other relevant organizations, Japan will actively engage in international peace cooperation assignments and emergency relief activities to meet diverse needs, from peacekeeping to a leading role. In doing so, as well as enhancing its readiness posture to facilitate rapid overseas dispatch according to the situation, Japan will strengthen its sustainable preparedness for a protracted overseas deployment. f. Cooperating with efforts to promote arms control, disarmament, and nonproliferation Japan will be actively involved in arms control and disarmament activities undertaken by the United Nations and other bodies. In doing so, Japan will make active, effective use of the SDF’s knowledge, including through personnel contribution. Moreover, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and missiles that can serve as their means of delivery, as well as the proliferation of arms and goods and technology which could be diverted to military use pose severe threats to the peace and stability not only of Japan but also of the international community as a whole. Thus, Japan will cooperate with relevant countries and international organizations and other relevant bodies in promoting nonproliferation initiatives. 2. Priorities in strengthening architecture of the Self Defense Forces (1) Basic approach The SDF will maintain an appropriate structure to effectively fulf ll the abovementioned roles of defense forces. As such, Japan has conducted capability assessments based on joint operations in relation to various potential contingencies to identify the functions and capabilities that should be prioritized in order to pursue more effective build-up of the defense force. Based on the results of the capability assessments, in the defense capability buildup, the SDF will prioritize the development of capacities to ensure maritime supremacy and air superiority, which is the prerequisite for effective deterrence and response in various situations, including defense posture buildup in the southwestern region. Furthermore, the SDF will emphasize the establishment of rapid deployment capabilities with a consideration to establishing a wide-ranging logistical support foundation. At the same time, in terms of preparation for a Cold-War era style invasion such as the landing of large-scale ground forces, the SDF will possess the minimum necessary level of expertise and skills required to respond to unforeseen changes in the situation in the future and to maintain and inherit them, and thereby further promote efforts to achieve even greater eff ciency and rationalization. (2) Functions and capabilities to be emphasized From the perspective of eff ciently developing an effective defense force, the SDF will selectively strengthen the following functions and capabilities in particular, paying attention to enhance joint functions with interoperability with the U.S. forces. a. ISR capabilities In order to ensure effective deterrence and response to various situations, while utilizing unmanned equipment, Japan will implement extensive persistent ISR on objectives such as aircraft and vessels in the seas and airspace surrounding it, and the SDF will adopt a f exible approach to boosting its ISR posture according to the developments of situations. b. Intelligence capabilities Japan will strengthen its system for intelligence collection, processing information, and analyzing and sharing the collected information, so that the SDF can promptly detect and swiftly respond to signs of various situations and take necessary measures based on medium-to long-term military trends mainly in its vicinity. In doing so, the SDF will seek to augment its various information collection capabilities, including HUMINT, OSINT, SIGINT, and IMINT, as well as persistent ISR capabilities using unmanned aerial vehicles. Also, the SDF will engage in integrated efforts to strengthen its geospatial intelligence capabilities to combine various types of intelligence on images and maps to exploit them in a sophisticated manner, while establishing a framework for the integrated and systematic nurturing of highly capable personnel in information gathering analysis. c. Transport capability In order to secure swift and large-scale transport and deployment capability, and to swiftly deploy and move necessary units, the SDF will strengthen integrated transport capacity including maritime and airborne transport capacity, with collaboration with the civilian transport sector. In doing so, the SDF will avoid redundancy in functions by clarifying roles and assignments among various means of transport, considering their respective characteristics. d. Command and control, and information and communications capabilities In order to establish a command and control system that can manage units nationwide in a mobile, joint integrated manner, ----- Force (GSDF), Maritime Self-Defense Force (MSDF) and Air Self-Defense Force (ASDF) personnel in the main headquarters of each service, making effective use of the knowledge and experience held by each respective service. Furthermore, the SDF will facilitate swift, resilient nationwide operation of the GSDF’s units such as basic operational units (divisions and brigades) through the establishment of a new central headquarters to control all of the regional armies, as well as greater eff ciency and streamlining of the command and control function in each regional army headquarters, and other measures. Moreover, the SDF will strive to enhance and strengthen its information and communications capabilities that are prerequisites for supporting nationwide operation, starting with the communications infrastructure on remote islands and data link functions among the three services. e. Response to an attack on remote islands In order to ensure maritime supremacy and air superiority which is a prerequisite for effective response to an attack on remote islands, the SDF will strengthen its ability to deal with attacks by aircraft, naval vessels, and missiles, etc. Moreover, while strengthening the integrated capabilities to seek to interdict any attack on Japan’s remote islands at sea, the SDF will newly develop suff cient amphibious operations capability, which enables the SDF to land, recapture and secure without delay in the case of an invasion of any remote islands. Furthermore, the SDF will enhance its logistical support capabilities, so that SDF units can swiftly and continuously respond in the event of a situation in the southwestern region. In addition, the SDF will also examine the desirable air defense posture in remote islands in the Pacif c. f. Response to ballistic missile attacks To counter North Korea’s improved ballistic missile capability, Japan will pursue comprehensive improvement of its response capability against the threat of ballistic missiles. With regard to the BMD system, Japan will enhance readiness, simultaneous engagement capability and sustainable response capability to strengthen the capability to protect the entire territory. Based on appropriate role and mission sharing between Japan and the U.S., in order to strengthen the deterrent of the JapanU.S. Alliance as a whole through enhancement of Japan’s own deterrent and response capability, Japan will study a potential form of response capability to address the means of ballistic missile launches and related facilities, and take means as necessary. g. Responses in outer space and cyberspace While strengthening information collection capability using satellites equipped with a variety of sensors, and reinforcing command, control and telecommunications capabilities, the SDF will secure effective, stable use of outer space so that satellites can continuously exercise their capabilities even in contingencies by enhancing the survivability of satellites through such initiatives as space situational awareness. In implementing such initiatives, the SDF will form organic partnerships with research and development institutions in Japan, as well as with the U.S. As for cyberspace, Japan will enhance integrated persistent surveillance and response capabilities and expertise and latest equipment will be continuously developed and secured in order to prevent actions that hinder eff cient SDF activities. h. Responses to major disasters, etc. In the event of a large-scale natural disaster such as a Nankai Trough earthquake, or an atypical disaster such as a nuclear emergency, it is of vital importance to respond swiftly from the initial stages of the impact and carry out such tasks as information gathering on the extent and nature of the damage from the air by aircrafts, rescue operations and emergency repairs. In this regard, the SDF will develop a response posture sustainable for longterm operation, through swift transportation and deployment of appropriately size units, and by establishing a rotating staff ng posture based on a joint operational approach. i. Responses focused on international peace cooperation activities and other similar activities In international peace cooperation activities and other similar activities, the SDF will strengthen the necessary protective capabilities to carry out its operations, ensuring the safety of personnel and units. Moreover, the SDF will work on enhancing transport and deployment capability, information communication capability with a view to long term activities in Africa and other remote locations, and strengthening logistic and medical service structure for smooth and continuous operation. From the standpoint of carrying out international peace cooperation activities more effectively, Japan will consider measures Deployed Air Force for Anti-Piracy Operation in Djibouti. Furthermore, while strengthening intelligence gathering capability required for operations, the SDF will enhance its education, training and personnel management systems in order to facilitate the continuous dispatch of adequate personnel for overseas cooperation activities. 3. Architecture of each service of the Self-Defense Forces The organization, equipment and disposition in each service of the SDF are outlined in (1) to (3) below. The specif cs of major organizations and equipment in the future are as shown in the Annex table. (1) Ground Self-Defense Force (GSDF) a. In order to be able to respond swiftly and deal effectively and nimbly with an attack on offshore islands and various other situations, the GSDF will maintain rapidly deployable basic operational units (rapid deployment divisions, rapid deployment brigades and an armored division) furnished with advanced mobility and ISR capabilities. In addition, the GSDF will maintain mobile operating units sustaining specialized functions in order to effectively perform such operations as airborne operations, amphibious operations, special operations, air transportation, defense against NBC (nuclear, biological, and chemical) weapons, and international peace cooperation activities. Keeping in mind that the role of these highly-prof cient rapidly deployable basic operational units is to swiftly deploy and move via the integrated transport capacity referred to in 2 (2) c. above, the GSDF will maintain half of these in Hokkaido, given the excellent training environment there. The defense posture in the remote islands of the southwestern region will be enhanced and strengthened via the permanent stationing of the units where the SDF is not currently stationed, the deploy ability of the aforementioned units, and the establishment of organic partnerships and networks with the MSDF and ASDF. b. The GSDF will maintain surface-to-ship guided missile units in order to prevent invasion of Japan’s remote islands while still at sea, as far as possible. c. The GSDF will maintain surface-to-air guided missile units in order to effectively provide air defense to protect operational units and key areas, working in tandem with the surface-to-air guided missile units referred to in (3) d. below. d. The GSDF will review the organization and equipment of the basic operational units (divisions and brigades) other than the rapidly deployable ones referred to in a. above, with a particular focus on tanks/howitzers and rockets. Following thorough rationalization and streamlining, these units will be deployed appropriately, according to geographical characteristics. (2) Maritime Self Defense Force (MSDF) a. The MSDF will maintain destroyer units and ship-based patrol helicopter units strengthened by increased numbers of equipment, including the new destroyers, with additional multifunctional capability and with a compact-type hull, in order to effectively conduct persistent ISR and antisubmarine operations etc., thereby facilitating agile response in such areas as the defense of the seas surrounding Japan, the security of maritime traff c, and international peace cooperation activities etc. Along with the surface-to-air guided missile units referred to in (3) d. below, the destroyer units will maintain Aegis-equipped destroyers capable of providing Japan with multi-layered defense against ballistic missile attacks. b. The MSDF will maintain submarine units strengthened by increased numbers of them, in order to effectively conduct patrol and defense of the seas surrounding Japan, as well as regularly engage in broad underwater intelligence gathering and warning and surveillance in those seas. c. The MSDF will maintain f xed-wing patrol aircraft units in order to effectively conduct patrol and defense of the seas surrounding Japan, as well as regularly engage in broad maritime intelligence gathering and warning and surveillance in those seas. d. The MSDF will maintain minesweeper units in order to effectively conduct minesweeping operations in the seas surrounding Japan in collaboration with the new destroyers with additional multifunctional capability and with the compact-type hull referred to in a. above. (3) Air Self-Defense Force (ASDF) a. The ASDF will maintain air warning and control units consisting of warning and control units and air warning units. Warning and control units will be equipped with ground-based warning and control radar that can detect and track any ballistic missiles f ying into Japanese air space, as well as providing persistent ISR in most air space over Japan and the surrounding areas. Air warning units will be enhanced in order to conduct effective warning, ----- of gray zone situations. b. The ASDF will maintain f ghter aircraft units reinforced by highly capable f ghter aircrafts in order to provide aerial defense for Japan based on a comprehensive posture that brings together f ghter aircrafts and relevant support functions. In addition, the ASDF will maintain enhanced aerial refueling and transport units that will enable f ghter aircraft units and air warning units, etc. to carry out various operations sustainably in the air space surrounding Japan. c. The ASDF will maintain air transport units in order to effectively carry out the mobile deployment of ground-based units etc., and international peace cooperation activities etc. d. The ASDF will maintain surface-to-air guided missile units providing multi-layered defense for Japan against ballistic missile attacks, together with the Aegis destroyers referred to in (2) a. above, as well as protecting key areas in tandem with the surface-to-air guided missile units referred to in (1) c. above. **V. Basic Foundations for SDF** To ensure that the diverse activities required of the SDF are carried out in a timely and appropriate manner, it is not suff cient simply to upgrade the main elements of the organization and its equipment; it is also imperative to strengthen the various foundations underpinning the defense force, in order to ensure that it can function as effectively as possible. The key aspects of this are as follows. 1. Training and Exercises Through routine training and exercises, the SDF will ceaselessly review and examine various plans for dealing with situations, as well as strive to enhance and strengthen its training and exercises in order to improve the tactical skills in each of its branches. In doing so, as well as making more effective use of the excellent training environment in Hokkaido, the SDF will work in partnership with relevant organizations and the civilian sector, in order to ensure systematic implementation of more practical training and exercises. In the southwestern region, where there are limitations on the exercise areas, etc. of the SDF, the SDF will secure a favorable training environment through the joint use of U.S. military facilities and areas, while remaining sensitive to relationships with the local community, so that timely and appropriate training and exercises can be carried out, including Japan-U.S. bilateral training and exercises. 2. Operational Infrastructure The SDF will improve survivability, including the recovery capabilities of military camps and bases, etc., in order to maintain the support functions that serve as the operational infrastructure for units, so that units can be deployed swiftly and respond to various situations effectively. Moreover, in light of the fact that some SDF facilities are currently dilapidated, the SDF will implement a steady repair and maintenance program, as well as expansion of the necessary quarters in order to ensure an emergency call-up of personnel in the event of various situations, thereby enhancing readiness. The SDF will undertake necessary deliberations concerning civilian airports and ports, including approaches to the various systems on a dayto-day basis, in order to ensure that such facilities can be used as part of the operational infrastructure for the SDF, etc. from an early stage, depending on the situation. Furthermore, it will implement various family support measures, in order to alleviate the anxieties both of troops serving away from home and of their families while they are away. The SDF will enhance and strengthen the operational infrastructure in terms of equipment and materials, such as improving the operational availability of equipment, by taking all possible measures to maintain and upgrade SDF equipment, as well as securing and stockpiling the necessary ammunition. 3. Personnel and Education Given that equipment has become more advanced and complex, and missions more diverse and internationalized in recent years, the SDF will implement measures to reform the personnel management system, in order to ensure the edge of its troops and the effective use of human resources amid a severe f scal situation, taking into consideration a variety of elements, including skills, experience, physical strength and morale. Accordingly, the SDF will implement measures to ensure an appropriate composition of ranks and age distribution, taking into account the various missions and characteristics of each branch of the SDF. The SDF will implement measures to make effective use of human resources, such as more effective use of female SDF personnel and expansion of reappointment, and measures related to honors and privileges. In order to strengthen the joint operations structure, the SDF will enhance education and training, and, through secondments to the Joint Staff and relevant ministries and agencies, retain adequate personnel who have a broad outlook and ideas, as well as wide-ranging experience in Japan’s security-affairs, and who can respond f exibly and rapidly to various situations as part of the government. In light of the deterioration of the recruiting environment resulting from social factors such as the declining birthrate and popularization of higher education, the SDF will promote a diverse range of recruitment measures to spread the perception that the SDF is an attractive job option. Furthermore, as it is the responsibility of the Government of Japan to secure the livelihoods of the SDF personnel, who are compelled to resign at a younger age than ordinary civil servants, the SDF will promote support for re-employment by strengthening collaboration with local governments and relevant organizations. In order to support sustainable operation of units in situations that are becoming increasingly diversif ed and protracted, the SDF will promote utilization of reserve personnel in broad areas, including those with professional skills such as aviators, and will take measures to improve the suff ciency of reserve personnel. 4. Medical In order to keep SDF personnel in good health and enhance their ability to engage in a diverse range of missions, such as various situation responses and international peace cooperation activities, the SDF will establish an eff cient and high-quality medical care structure, through endeavors including upgrading of SDF hospitals into hubs with enhanced functions, and improvements in the management of the National Defense Medical College Hospital. The SDF will also attach greater importance to securing and training of such medical staff as medical off cers, nurses and emergency medical technicians. The SDF will consider such matters as revisions of regulations of emergency medical treatment on situation responses, and improve f rst aid capabilities on the frontline, and will put in place a posture for rapid medical evacuation that takes into account the viewpoints of enhanced joint capabilities. 5. Defense Production and Technological Bases Retaining an adequate level of defense production and technological bases is essential not only for the production, operation, maintenance and upkeep of equipment, but also for research and development of equipment that f ts the operational environment, and for the expected potential to contribute to enhancing deterrence. At the same time, against the backdrop of the severe f scal situation and rises in the equipment unit price as it becomes increasingly sophisticated and complex, the numbers of units of procured equipment are on the decline. Moreover, the environment surrounding Japan’s defense production and technological bases is becoming more severe. For instance, the competitiveness of foreign companies is growing, as a result of the advance of large-scale and cross-border restructuring and consolidation of the defense industry. In this kind of environment, the Ministry of Defense will formulate a strategy that sets forth its future vision for Japan’s defense production and technological bases as a whole and will promote participation in international joint development and production and adapting defense equipment to civilian use, in order to maintain and reinforce such bases without delay. With regard to contribution to peace and international cooperation, there are increasing opportunities to cooperate in a more effective manner through, for example, the utilization and provision to disasterstricken countries and others of heavy machinery and other defense equipment carried to sites by the SDF. Moreover, internationally, it has become the mainstream to participate in international joint development and production projects in order to improve the performance of defense equipment while dealing with the rising costs of the equipment. In this context, from the perspective of “Proactive Contribution to Peace” based on the principle of international cooperation, Japan is required to engage more proactively in peacebuilding efforts and international cooperation by utilizing defense equipment in various ways, and to participate in joint development and production of defense equipment and other related items. Against this backdrop, while giving due consideration to the roles that the Three Principles on Arms Exports and their related policy guidelines have played so far, the Government of Japan will set out clear principles on the overseas transfer of arms and military technology, which f t the new security environment. In this context, considerations will be made with regard to def ning cases where transfers are prohibited; limiting cases where transfers could be allowed with strict examination; and ensuring appropriate control over transfers in terms of unauthorized use and third party transfer. 6. Eff cient Acquisition of Equipment In order to achieve effective and eff cient acquisition of equipment, including in research and development activities, the Ministry of Defense will strengthen project management throughout the life-cycle of equipment through introducing a project manager system, as well as through considering the possibility of further introducing longterm contracts and further upgrading the contract system to provide cost reduction incentives to companies, aiming to improve costeffectiveness throughout the life-cycle of equipment. Moreover, the Ministry of Defense will try to improve readiness and response capabilities through reforms of the logistics posture ----- will ceaselessly pursue greater transparency in the acquisition process and increased rationalization of the contract system, and strive to achieve more rigorous procedures for the acquisition of equipment. 7. Research and Development The Ministry of Defense will ensure consistency with the priorities for upgrading defense capability when commencing research and development, in order to guarantee that research and development that meets the operational needs of the SDF is prioritized in view of the severe f scal situation. In conjunction with this, the Ministry of Defense will promote research and development based on a medium- to long-term perspective, taking into account the latest trends in science and technology, changes in combat modality, cost-effectiveness and the potential for international joint research and development, with a view to implementing research and development that can ensure Japan’s technological superiority against new threats in strategically important areas. From the aspect of security, it is necessary to utilize civilian technology effectively also in the f eld of security through regularly assessing the trend in science and technology including information related to technological development as well as consolidating the capabilities of the government, industry and academia. Under such recognition, the Ministry of Defense will strive to make effective use of civilian technology that can also be applied to defense (dualuse technologies), by enhancing partnerships with universities and research institutes, while strengthening technology control functions to prevent the outf ow of advanced technologies. The Ministry of Defense will examine its research and development initiative for achieving the aforementioned objectives. 8. Collaboration with Local Communities The Ministry of Defense and the SDF will further strengthen collaboration with relevant organizations, including local governments, the police and the f re service, in order to enable the SDF to provide accurate response to various situations. Such close partnerships with local governments, etc. are exceedingly important from the perspective not only of the effective improvement and smooth operation of defense facilities, but also of the recruitment of SDF personnel, as well as the provision of re-employment support for them. Accordingly, as well as continuing to advance measures targeting the areas around defense facilities, with a view to their improvement and operation, the Ministry of Defense and SDF will routinely engage in various measures such as intensive public relations activities focused on their policies and activities, in order to secure the understanding and cooperation of local governments and communities. Given that the presence of SDF units makes a substantial contribution to the maintenance and revitalization of local communities in some areas, and supports community medicine through emergency patient transport using SDF search and rescue aircraft in others, the Ministry of Defense and the SDF will give consideration to the attributes of each area in the reorganization of units and deployment of military camps and bases, etc., in order to secure the understanding of local governments and residents. At the same time, in operating the military camps and bases, etc., the Ministry of Defense will pay attention to the contribution of the operation to the local economy. 9. Boosting Communication Capabilities The Ministry of Defense and SDF will strengthen strategic public relations and communication to enhance the dissemination of information via a diverse range of media, in order to secure domestic and overseas understanding which is vital to effectively conduct SDF duties. 10. Enhancing the Intellectual Base The Ministry of Defense will promote education on security-related matters at educational institutions, in order to enhance understanding of security and crisis management among the populace. Moreover, in addition to strengthening the Ministry of Defense and SDF research systems, with a particular focus on the National Institute for Defense Studies, the Ministry of Defense will promote various partnerships, including education and research exchange with other research and educational institutions within the government, as well as universities and think-tanks both within Japan and overseas. 11. Promoting Reform of the Ministry of Defense The Ministry of Defense will further promote reforms by constantly reviewing its work methods and organization in order to foster a sense of unity among civilian off cials and uniformed personnel, total optimization in building up defense capability, strengthening SDF’s joint operation functions and enhancing policy-making and communication functions. **VI. Additional Points** 1. These Guidelines set out the form of Japan’s defense force over the next decade or so. The National Security Council will conduct regular, systematic review over the course of implementation of the various measures and programs. Smooth, swift and accurate transition to the future defense force will be facilitated through validations based on joint operational capability assessment while advancing such initiatives in a timely and appropriate manner. 2. When major changes in the situation are anticipated during the review and verif cation process, necessary examination of the security environment at that time will be taken into account and these guidelines will be revised adequately. 3. In light of the increasingly tough f scal conditions, Japan will strive to achieve greater eff ciency and streamlining in the defense capability buildup to curb costs, and harmonize with other initiatives in other f elds to ensure that Japan’s defense force as a whole can smoothly fulf ll its expected function. |Category|Col2|Col3|Present (as of the end of FY2013)|Future| |---|---|---|---|---| |GSDF|Authorized Number of personnel Active-Duty Personnel Reserve-Ready Personnel||approx. 159,000 approx. 151,000 approx. 8,000|159,000 151,000 8,000| ||Major units|Rapid Deployment Units|Central Readiness Force 1 armored division|3 rapid deployment divisions 4 rapid deployment brigades 1 armored division 1 airborne brigade 1 amphibious rapid deployment brigade 1 helicopter brigade| |||Regional Deployment Units|8 divisions 6 brigades|5 divisions 2 brigades| |||Surface-to-Ship Guided Missile Units|5 surface-to-ship guided missile regiments|5 surface-to-ship guided missile regiments| |||Surface-to-Air Guided Missile Units|8 anti-aircraft artillery groups/regiments|7 anti-aircraft artillery groups/regiments| |MSDF|Major units|Destroyer Units Submarine Units Minesweeping Units Patrol aircraft Units|4 fl otillas (8 divisions) 5 divisions 5 divisions 1 fl otilla 9 squadrons|4 fl otillas (8 divisions) 6 divisions 6 divisions 1 fl otilla 9 squadrons| ||Major equipment|Destroyers (Aegis-Equipped Destroyers) Submarines Combat Aircraft|47 (6) 16 approx.170|54 (8) 22 approx.170| |ASDF|Major units|Air Warning & Control Units Fighter Aircraft Units Air Reconnaissance Units Air Refueling/Transport Units Air Transport Units Surface-to-Air Guided Missile Units|8 warning groups 20 warning squadrons 1 AEW group (2 squadrons) 12 squadrons 1 squadron 1 squadron 3 squadrons 6 groups|28 warning squadrons 1 AEW group (3 squadrons) 13 squadrons — 2 squadrons 3 squadrons 6 groups| ||Major equipment|Combat aircraft Fighters|approx. 340 approx. 260|approx. 360 approx. 280| Notes: The current number of tanks and howitzers/rockets (authorized number as of the end of FY2013) are respectively approx. 700 and approx. 600, which will be reduced respectively to approx. 300 and approx. 300 in the future. Regarding major equipment/units that may also serve for BMD missions, their acquisition/formation will be allowed within the number of Destroyers (Aegis-Equipped Destroyers), Air Warning & Control Units and Surface-to-Air Guided Missile Units specifi ed above. **Reference 16 Medium Term Defense Program (FY2014-FY2018)** (December 17, 2013 Approved by National Security Council and the Cabinet) The Five-Year Defense Program (FY2014-FY2018) in accordance with the National Defense Program Guidelines for FY2014 and beyond (approved by the National Security Council and the Cabinet on December 17, 2013) has been established as shown in the attached document. (Attachment) Medium Term Defense Program (FY2014-FY2018) **I. Program Guidelines** In carrying out the Defense Program for FY2014 to FY2018 in accordance with the National Defense Program Guidelines for FY2014 and beyond (approved by the National Security Council and the Cabinet on December 17, 2013) (hereinafter “NDPG2013”), Japan will develop a Dynamic Joint Defense Force. It will provide an effective defense which enables the SDF to conduct a diverse range of activities based on joint operations seamlessly and dynamically, adapting to situations as they demand, while prioritizing particularly important functions and capabilities through optimal resource allocation At the same time the Dynamic Joint Defense Force ----- will serve as a defense force which emphasizes soft and hard readiness capabilities, sustainability, resiliency and connectivity, reinforced by advanced technology and Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence (C3I) capabilities, with a consideration to establish a wide range of infrastructure to support operations by the Self-Defense Forces (SDF). In strengthening the SDF structure, a highly effective joint defense force will be eff ciently developed by comprehensively prioritizing particularly important functions and capabilities identif ed through joint operation-based capability assessments of the SDF’s overall functions and capabilities against various scenarios. Given the considerations mentioned above, the SDF will effectively and eff ciently build, maintain and operate defense forces based on the following program guidelines: 1. The defense forces will seamlessly and dynamically fulf ll its responsibilities including providing an effective deterrence and response to a variety of security situations, supporting stability in the Asia-Pacif c, and improving the global security environment. With a focus on enhancement of joint operability, the SDF will place particular emphasis on Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR), intelligence, transport, and C3I capabilities. In addition, defense forces will enhance their capabilities to respond to an attack on remote islands, ballistic missile attacks, outer space and cyberspace threats, large-scale disasters, and international peace cooperation efforts (activities cooperatively carried out by the international society to improve the international security environment such as U.N. Peace Keeping Operations, Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief (HA/ DR), and others in the f elds of non-traditional security). The SDF will steadily develop the foundations for maximizing the effectiveness of these functions and capabilities. 2. In relevant efforts, the SDF will prioritize the development of capacities to ensure maritime supremacy and air superiority, which is the prerequisite for effective deterrence and response to various situations, including defense posture buildup in Japan’s southwestern region. Furthermore, the SDF will emphasize the establishment of rapid deployment capabilities. At the same time, regarding preparation for a Cold-War era style invasion such as the landing of large-scale ground forces, the SDF will establish the minimum necessary level of expertise and skill required to respond to unforeseen changes in its security situation in the future and to maintain them, and thereby further promote efforts to achieve even greater eff ciency and rationalization of its activities. 3. Regarding equipment acquisition and maintenance, by properly combining the introduction of new, high-performance equipment, with life extension and improvement of existing equipment etc., the SDF will eff ciently secure defense capabilities adequate both in quantity and quality. In this effort, the Ministry of Defense (MOD) will strengthen its project management throughout its equipment lifecycle, including during its research and development activities, and reduce the life-cycle costs to improve cost-effectiveness. 4. Given the more advanced and complex equipment, and more diverse and internationalized missions in recent years, to ensure SDF’s strength and the effective use of defense force personnel, the SDF will implement measures, including the more effective use of female SDF personnel and reserve personnel, in order to reform its personnel management system. 5. In order to address an increasingly severe security environment and to strengthen deterrence and response capabilities of the Japan-U.S. Alliance, in conjunction with the U.S. policy of strategic rebalancing towards the Asia-Pacif c region, Japan will further promote a variety of cooperation and consultations with the United States in a wide range of areas including the revision of the Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation. Japan will also actively facilitate measures for furthering smooth and effective stationing of U.S. forces in Japan. 6. Considering the increasingly diff cult situation in Japan’s public f nance, Japan will strive to achieve greater eff ciencies and streamline the buildup of its defense forces, while harmonizing these efforts with other measures taken by the Government. **II. Reorganization of the Major SDF Units** 1. Regarding the reorganization of the Ground Self-Defense Force (GSDF), given the changes in the security environment surrounding Japan, for the purpose of carrying out swift and f exible nation-wide operations of basic operational units (rapid deployment divisions/ brigades, an armored division, and divisions/brigades) and various units under the joint operations, the GSDF will establish the Ground Central Command. In addition, the GSDF promote eff ciency and rationalize the command and control function of each regional army headquarters, as well as review other functions of some regional army headquarters. As part of such efforts, the Central Readiness Force will be disbanded and its subsidiary units will be integrated into the Ground Central Command. In order to be able to respond swiftly to and deal effectively and nimbly with an attack on remote islands and various other situations, the GSDF will transform two divisions and two brigades respectively into two rapid deployment divisions and two rapid deployment brigades that are furnished with advanced mobility and ISR capabilities. By establishing a coast observation unit, area security units in charge of initial response activities and so on, the defense posture of the remote islands in the southwest region will be strengthened. In a bid to develop suff cient amphibious operational capabilities, which enable the SDF to land, recapture and secure without delay any remote islands that might be invaded, an amphibious rapid deployment brigade consisting of several regiment-scale units specializing in amphibious operations will be established. From the perspective of enabling swift and f exible operations, while thoroughly facilitating eff ciency and rationalizing preparations for invasion, such as the landing of large-scale ground forces, the GSDF will steadily implement programs towards successive formation of units equipped with newly-introduced mobile combat vehicles and removal of tanks deployed in basic operational units stationed in locations other than Hokkaido and Kyushu. It will also concentrate tanks located in Kyushu into newly organized tank units under direct command of the Western Army. In addition, the GSDF will steadily carry out programs that concentrate howitzers deployed in basic operational units stationed in locations other than Hokkaido into f eld artillery units to be newly organized under the direct command of the respective regional armies. 2. For the purpose of defending the seas surrounding Japan and ensuring the security of maritime traff c in the region, through the effective conduct of various operations such as persistent ISR operations and anti-submarine operations, as well as for agile response in international peace cooperation activities, the Marine Self-Defense Force (MSDF) will retain four f otillas mainly consisting of one helicopter destroyer (DDH), and two Aegis-equipped destroyers (DDG). Five divisions will consist of other destroyers as well. Necessary measures to increase the number of submarines will also be continued. 3. To enhance the air defense posture in the southwestern region, the Air Self-Defense Force (ASDF) will relocate one f ghter squadron to Naha Air Base, and newly organize and deploy one airborne early warning squadron at Naha Air Base. To prevent the relative decline of Japan’s air defense capabilities and ensure sustained air superiority, ASDF units equipped with training support functions will be integrated for further effective enhancement of advanced tactical skills. 4. The total number of authorized GSDF personnel at the end of FY2018 will be approximately 159,000, with approximately 151,000 being active-duty personnel, and approximately 8,000 being reserve-ready personnel. The authorized number of active-duty personnel of the MSDF and ASDF through FY2018 will be approximately at the same levels as at the end of FY2013. **III. Major Programs regarding SDF’s Capabilities** 1. Effective Deterrence and Response to Various Situations (1) Ensuring Security of the Sea and Airspace Surrounding Japan In order to strengthen the posture to conduct persistent ISR in broad areas and to detect any signs of signif cant development at an early stage, the SDF will procure additional Aegis-equipped destroyers (DDG), destroyer (DD), submarines, f xed-wing patrol aircraft (P1) and patrol helicopters (SH-60K), and conduct service-extension work on existing destroyers, submarines, f xed-wing patrol aircraft (P-3C) and patrol helicopters (SH-60J), as well as take necessary measures after fully reviewing the value of ship-based unmanned aerial vehicles with patrol capabilities. With a view to increasing the number of destroyers, the SDF will also introduce new, compacttype hull destroyers with additional multifunctional capabilities. The SDF will procure new airborne early warning and control aircraft or airborne early warning aircraft, and f xed air defense radar, as well as continuously improve its existing airborne warning and control systems (AWACS) (E-767). In addition, the introduction of unmanned aerial vehicles will support the establishment of a joint unit with persistent ISR capabilities in broad areas. The SDF will also undertake organizational reform that integrate groundbased aerial search and rescue functions into the ASDF, which are currently performed by both the MSDF and ASDF. (2) Response to an Attack on Remote Islands (a) Development of a Persistent ISR Structure With a view to organizing the structure required to carry out regular and persistent ISR activities which enable an immediate response in the case of various contingencies, the SDF will deploy a coast observation unit to Yonaguni Island. Considering the current operational situation of the existing AWACS (E-767) and airborne early warning aircraft (E-2C), the SDF will procure new airborne early warning and control aircraft or airborne early warning aircraft as stated in (1), and ----- establish one squadron consisting of airborne early warning aircraft (E-2C) in the air warning unit and deploy it at Naha Air Base as stated in Section II-3. By preparing a deployment structure for mobile air defense radar on remote islands in the southwestern region, a fully-prepared surveillance posture will be maintained. (b) Obtaining and Securing Air Superiority For overall improvement of air defense capabilities including cruise missile defense capability, the SDF will increase the number of f ghter aircraft units at Naha Air Base from one squadron to two as stated in Section II-3, continue to facilitate procurement of f ghter aircraft (F-35A), modernize its f ghter aircraft (F-15), and improve the air-to-air combat capabilities and network functions of its f ghter aircraft (F-2). In addition, after considering its options, it will take necessary measures to replace f ghter aircraft (F-15) unsuitable for modernization with more capable f ghter aircraft. Along with continuing to procure middle-range surface-to-air guided missiles, the SDF will further improve its surface-to-air guided missile PATRIOT systems by equipping them with new advanced interceptor missiles (PAC-3 MSE) that can be used both for response to cruise missiles and aircraft and for ballistic missile defense (BMD). The SDF will also procure new aerial refueling/ transport aircraft, and continuously work to equip transport aircraft (C-130H) with aerial refueling capabilities and procure rescue helicopters (UH-60J). In addition, the SDF will examine what is the appropriate air defense posture in remote islands in the Pacif c. (c) Obtaining and Securing Maritime Supremacy In defense of the seas surrounding Japan and to ensure the security of maritime traff c, the SDF will effectively conduct various activities including holding persistent ISR and antisubmarine operations; procuring Aegis-equipped destroyers (DDG), destroyer (DD), submarines, f xed-wing patrol aircraft (P-1) and patrol helicopters (SH-60K); and conducting serviceextension activities on existing destroyers, submarines, f xed-wing patrol aircraft (P-3C) and patrol helicopters (SH60J) as stated in (1). At the same time, it will introduce new compact-type hull destroyers with multifunctional capabilities. In addition, the SDF will introduce ship-based multipurpose helicopters required for enabling destroyer units to sustainably conduct activities as situations demand, and continue to procure Mine Sweeper Ocean (MSO) vessels, amphibious rescue aircraft (US-2), and surface-to-ship guided missiles. (d) Improvement of Capabilities for Rapid Deployment and Response In order to secure capabilities for swift and large-scale transportation and deployment operations and improve effective response capabilities, transport aircraft (C-2) and transport helicopters (CH-47JA) will continue to be procured. Besides the ship-based multipurpose helicopters mentioned in (c), the SDF will introduce tilt-rotor aircraft that complement and strengthen the capabilities of transport helicopters (CH47JA) in terms of cruising speed and range. In addition, the SDF will take necessary measures after considering the possibility of new multipurpose helicopters that will success the existing multipurpose helicopters (UH-1J). In developing such aerial transport capabilities, the SDF will avoid functional redundancy by clarifying the roles and assignments among the various means of transportation. The SDF will reinforce transportation and deployment capabilities, by such means as acquiring amphibious vehicles that support units’ amphibious landing efforts on remote islands, and ref tting existing Tank Landing Ships (LST). The SDF will consider what the role should be of a multipurpose vessel with capabilities for command and control, large-scale transportation, and aircraft operations, which can be utilized in various operations such as amphibious operations, and reach a conclusion regarding its acquisition. With a view to eff ciently conducting large-scale transportation movements in coordination with the SDF’s transport capabilities, the SDF will take necessary measures after considering active utilization of civilian transport capabilities including methods for utilizing the funds and know-how of the private sector and reserve personnel. Mobile combat vehicles transportable by airlift will be introduced in the rapidly deployable basic operational units (rapid deployment divisions/brigades) highlighted in Section II-1, and rapid deployment regiments that immediately respond to various situations will be organized. The SDF will also establish area security units in charge of initial responses on maneuver deployment training for prompt unit deployment to remote islands. While improving guidance capability of existing precision-guided bombs and procuring surface-to-ship guided missiles, the SDF will also promote the development of improved capabilities of ship-to-ship guided missiles, such as increasing their f ring range. (e) Development of C3I From the perspective of improving joint force capabilities, aimed at establishing a command and control system which enables the dynamic operation of units across the country so as to immediately concentrate necessary units into the area to be dealt with, such as remote islands, the SDF will take steps to station GSDF, MSDF and ASDF personnel in the main headquarters of each of the other services, making effective use of the knowledge and experience held by each respective service. In addition, as stated in Section II-1, the SDF will expedite the establishment of the Ground Central Command, while promoting eff ciency and rationalizing the command and control functions of each regional army headquarters, as well as reviewing the functions of some regional army headquarters. With regard to the information and communications capabilities which serve as a foundation for nation-wide operations, and the goal of strengthening the communications infrastructure on remote islands, the SDF will extend the secured exclusive communication link for the SDF to Yonaguni Island, and newly deploy mobile multiplex communication equipment at Naha Air Base. The SDF will strive to enhance data link functions among the three services, upgrade the f eld communications systems, continue to promote the utilization of outer space for defense-related purposes, and develop an X-Band communications satellite with high performance. The SDF will take additional necessary measures after considering the necessity of further enhancements to its communications systems. (3) Response to Ballistic Missile Attacks Given North Korea’s improved ballistic missile capabilities, the SDF will pursue the comprehensive improvement of its response capabilities against the threat of ballistic missiles. For reinforcing its multi-layered and sustainable defense posture for the entire territory of Japan against ballistic missile attacks, the SDF will procure additional Aegis-equipped destroyers (DDG), and continue to improve the capabilities of its existing DDGs. As stated in (2)(b), the SDF will pursue further improvement of its surface-to-air guided missile PATRIOT system so as to equip it with new advanced interceptor missiles (PAC-3 MSE) that can be used both for response to cruise missiles and aircraft and for BMD. In addition, to reinforce its ballistic missile detecting and tracking capabilities, the SDF will promote the improvement of its automated warning and control systems (Japan Aerospace Defense Ground Environment), as well as procurement and improvement of its f xed air defense radar (FPS-7) systems. Along with the continuous promotion of Japan-U.S. cooperative development of advanced interceptor missiles for BMD (SM-3 Block IIA), the MOD will, after examining options, take necessary measures for the transition to the production and deployment phases. The SDF will conduct bilateral training and exercises to enhance the effectiveness of the Japan-U.S. bilateral BMD response posture, and make an effort to establish the basis for deployment of the SDF to respond to a ballistic missile attack. The MOD will conduct studies on the best mix of the overall posture of its future BMD system, including the new BMD equipment. Also, based on appropriate role-sharing between Japan and the U.S., with a view to strengthening the deterrence capacity of Japan-U.S. Alliance as a whole by enhancing Japan’s own deterrence and response capabilities, the MOD will study its possible response capability to address the means of ballistic missile launches and related facilities, and will take necessary measures. In preparation for an attack by guerrilla or special operations forces concurrent with a ballistic missile attack, the SDF will continue to procure a variety of surveillance equipment, light armored vehicles, NBC reconnaissance vehicles, and transport helicopters (CH-47JA) in order to improve its ISR posture, and its ability to protect key facilities such as nuclear power plants, and search and destroy inf ltrating units. In sensitive locations such as where a number of nuclear power plants are located, the SDF will conduct training with relevant agencies to conf rm coordination procedures, and take necessary measures after considering the basis for deployment in areas neighboring nuclear power plants. (4) Response in Outer Space and Cyberspace (a) Promoting Utilization of Outer Space The SDF will continue to enhance information gathering ----- equipped with diverse sensors, and strengthen C3I capabilities by continuing to develop a sophisticated X-Band satellite communications system. With a view to ensuring the constant availability of these capabilities in a variety of contingencies, the SDF will actively promote space situational awareness efforts, and research on satellite protection, and work to enhance the resiliency of its satellites. In making such efforts, given that relevant domestic organizations and the United States possess the latest technologies and knowledge related to outer space, the MOD will facilitate cooperation including in the area of personnel development with such organizations. (b) Response to Cyber Attacks To continuously ensure suff cient security against cyber attacks, with consideration to enhancing capabilities through joint operations and eff ciency in resource allocations, the SDF will establish the necessary system by such measures as to enhance the survivability of the command and control systems and information communication networks of the three services, to strengthen capabilities for information gathering and research and analysis, and to develop a practical training environment where response capabilities against cyber attacks can be tested. Through its efforts to secure response capabilities in cyberspace where attackers have an overwhelming advantage, the SDF may consider the acquisition of capabilities to prevent them from using cyberspace. In addition, the SDF will strive to keep abreast of the latest risks, response measures and technological trends, including through cooperation with the private sector, and strategic talks and joint exercises with allies. Given that it is essential to employ personnel with expertise on a continuing basis and that methods of cyber attack are increasingly sophisticated and complicated, the SDF plans to develop personnel with strong cyber security expertise, through efforts such as improving the in-house curriculum for specialized education, expanding learning opportunities at institutions of higher education at home and abroad, and cultivating expertise through personnel management efforts. To enable a comprehensive response to cyber attacks through a whole-of-government approach, the SDF will enhance close coordination with relevant government agencies by regularly providing expertise and MOD/SDF personnel, and improve training and exercises. (5) Response to Large-scale Disasters In the event of a large-scale natural disaster such as the Nankai Trough earthquake, or a special disaster such as a nuclear emergency, the SDF will respond by immediately transporting and deploying suff cient numbers of SDF units, as well as establishing a rotating staff posture based on a joint operational approach. These efforts will enable a sustained response over the long term. In these efforts, the SDF will leverage lessons of vital importance learned from the Great East Japan Earthquake, to gather information on the extent and nature of the damage by aircraft from the initial stages of the impact and immediately engage in rescue activities, for the purpose of protecting people’s lives, In addition, it will implement prompt emergency reconstruction activities including elimination of road obstacles indispensable for the private sector’s efforts including the smooth transportation of relief materials. With close coordination and cooperation with relevant government agencies, local governments and private sector organizations, the MOD will promote such measures as to establish contingency planning and to conduct training and exercises, and secure alternative capabilities when the basis for the SDF’s disaster and deployment operations is affected. (6) Strengthening Intelligence Capabilities Given that advanced intelligence functions lay the foundation for MOD/SDF to suff ciently fulf ll their roles, the MOD will strengthen all stages of its intelligence capabilities, including gathering, analyzing, sharing and securing intelligence. With regards to the methods for intelligence gathering and analysis, with a view to f exibly meeting the demands of changes in the security environment, the MOD will promote the development and improvement of its intelligence gathering facilities, and actively utilize the outer space and unmanned aerial vehicles so as to drastically reinforce its capability to gather intelligence from the diverse sources including SIGINT and IMINT. In a related move, the MOD will develop the ability to utilize sophisticated GEOINT by such means as visualization and prediction of situations with a variety of information and intelligence overlaid on a map or image, while promoting the comprehensive and eff cient geospatial database development. The MOD will take measures to enhance its HUMINT gathering capabilities including by increasing the number of personnel to be newly dispatched as Defense Attachés. It will from overseas through cooperation with the ally and partners, and use of advanced system for collecting public information. In an effort to meet the increasingly complex and diverse needs from policy departments and operational sides, in a timely and precise manner, in the increasingly severe security environment surrounding Japan, the MOD will strengthen its comprehensive information gathering and analysis capabilities, through such efforts as the review of its recruitment efforts and the composition of its human resources to develop highly competent analysts, integration and enhancement of its cross-organizational intelligence curriculum, and regularization of the efforts to place the intelligence side personnel for a given period in the policy departments and operational sides. Considering the importance of information security, under the current severe f scal situation, and in pursuit of more eff cient intelligence gathering, the MOD will promote the all-source analysis expected to create great synergies, through seeking to enhance the posture of and the effective collection management, and facilitating complete information sharing between those who need to know, including relevant government agencies. 2. Stabilization of the Asia-Pacif c Region and Improvement of the Global Security Environments From the perspective of “Proactive Contribution to Peace” based on the principle of international cooperation, aimed at stabilizing the Asia-Pacif c region, Japan will enhance bilateral and multilateral cooperative relations and conduct various activities including training and exercises in a timely and appropriate manner, as well as actively engage in international peace cooperation activities to properly address global security challenges. The following elements will be particularly important to these efforts: (1) Holding Training and Exercises In addition to timely and appropriate implementation of SDF training and exercises, Japan will promote bilateral and multilateral combined training and exercises in the Asia-Pacif c region, proactively and visibly demonstrating our nation’s resolve and advanced capabilities focused on regional stabilization. In addition, it will seek to improve interoperability and build and strengthen practical cooperative relationships with relevant countries. (2) Promoting Defense Cooperation and Exchanges Enhancing mutual understanding and relationships of trust with other countries and international organizations is important as the cornerstone of efforts to stabilize the security environment. Japan will take further steps to promote bilateral and multilateral defense cooperation and exchanges on various levels not limited to high-level exchanges, but including unit-level exchanges, such as building and strengthening cooperative relationships focused on wide-ranging security issues of common interest including HA/DR, maritime security, and ensuring the stable use of outer space and cyberspace. (3) Promoting Capacity Building Assistance By utilizing the capabilities the SDF has accumulated, the MOD will help countries concerned to enhance their military capabilities in such f elds as HA/DR, disposal of landmines and unexploded ordnance, and military medicine, so as to stabilize the security environment, as well as strengthen relations with defense authorities of those countries. Cooperating with partners actively engaged in capacity building such as the United States and Australia, with due consideration for coordination with diplomatic policies such as the Off cial Development Assistance (ODA), Japan will provide effective and eff cient support in capacity building. (4) Ensuring Maritime Security For the purpose of maintaining “Open and Stable Seas”, which serve as the cornerstone of Japan’s peace and prosperity efforts as a maritime state, and ensuring security of maritime traff c, the MOD will further cooperate with allies to engage in anti-piracy activities off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden, as well as help gulf countries improve their own capabilities. In other ocean not surrounding Japan such as the Indian Ocean and the South China Sea, the SDF will also leverage a variety of opportunities to promote combined training and exercises with countries which share Japan’s goal of maintaining maritime security. (5) Implementing International Peace Cooperation Activities To immediately commence international peace cooperation activities, the SDF will reinforce its emergency response and transport capabilities. To steadily engage in its activities for the long term, the SDF will work to further ensure the safety of its activities by strengthening information-gathering and equipment protection capabilities, as well as continue efforts to improve communications, supplies, military medicine, and support for families of military personnel. By improving the capacity of the engineer units which are highly appreciated at the SDF’s activity areas, the SDF will ----- more effectively meet the needs of the SDF s activity areas. Japan will strengthen the development of personnel who can play an active role in the f eld of international peace cooperation activity, and will send more personnel to mission headquarters of the U.N. Peace Keeping Operation and U.N. Department of peacekeeping operations which would help Japan in making more contribution in the f eld. The Japan Peacekeeping Training and Research Center will expand its curriculum, and strengthen cooperation with relevant government agencies, foreign countries, and non-governmental organizations through efforts such as providing educational opportunities to not only SDF personnel, but also candidates from various backgrounds. To correspond to the reality of the U.N. peacekeeping operations, Japan will continue to consider how it might expand its participation in such operations. (6) Cooperating to Promote Arms Control, Disarmament and Nonproliferation In order to contribute to various activities in the f eld of arms control and disarmament undertaken by the United Nations and other organizations, Japan will continue its active engagement including its contribution of personnel to these efforts. Given that proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and missiles that serve as their means of delivery pose a severe threat to the peace and stability not only to Japan, but also to the international community as a whole, in cooperation with relevant countries and international organizations, Japan will facilitate efforts towards nonproliferation such as participation in the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI). 3. Basic Structure to Maximize Defense Capability (1) Training and Exercises To effectively respond to various contingencies and enhance its deterrence effectiveness, the SDF’s joint training and exercises and Japan-U.S. bilateral training and exercises will be conducted in a tailored and visible way. Leveraging the lessons learned from these training and exercises, the SDF will conduct regular studies and reviews of its plans to address contingencies. Along with these efforts, the SDF will expand the use of the good training environment in Hokkaido, by SDF units across the country, to conduct effective training and exercises. In addition, the SDF will facilitate active use of LSTs and transport capabilities of the civilian sector, and improve unit mobility. Doing so will enable nation-wide deployment of welltrained units stationed in Hokkaido. To carry out effective training and exercises in the SDF’s southwestern region, where only limited space is available for SDF training, and accounting for relations with local communities, the MOD will continue effort to expand the joint/shared use of U.S. Forces facilities with the SDF. In addition, actively engaging in bilateral trainings at home and abroad with U.S. Forces such as the U.S. Marines, the SDF will strive to promptly develop suff cient amphibious operational capabilities. Seeking to respond to various situations with a wholeof-government approach, coordination with relevant agencies including police and f ref ghters, and the Japan Coast Guard will be reinforced. In addition, the government will conduct various simulation exercise and comprehensive training and exercises regarding various situations including civil protection on a regular basis in a tailored manner. (2) Operational Infrastructure Given that SDF camps and bases are indispensable for rapid deployment and response to various contingencies as well as for ensuring a sustained response posture for the long term, the resiliency of military camps and bases will be enhanced. In particular, the SDF will strengthen its capabilities to immediately rebuild various camp and base support functions such as runways, information-communication infrastructure, and stable fuel supply. For the SDF to immediately utilize civilian airports and ports in contingency situations, necessary measures will be taken with consideration especially to developing a deployment structure in the southwestern region. In addition, for the purpose of establishing readiness capabilities, the SDF will store necessary ammunition and spare ports in locations most appropriate for operations, as well as steadily construct and maintain necessary living quarters surrounding SDF camps and bases. From the perspective of enabling a sustained response posture over the long term, various measures supporting families of military personnel will be promoted. To keep availability ratio of equipment at higher standards with lower costs, the MOD will conduct research as to what activities hamper improvement of availability ratio. In addition, given that longer-term contracts raise predictability and enhance costeffectiveness, the MOD will expand the use of its new contract system, Performance Based Logistics (PBL), under which the price is to be determined according to realized performance. (3) Personnel and Education Given the more advanced and complex equipment, and more diverse and internationalized missions in recent years, the SDF will, from a long-standing perspective, promote feasible measures to ensure the strength of its troops and the effective use of personnel amid the severe f scal situation, taking into consideration a variety of elements, including skills, experience, physical strength and morale. (a) Composition of Ranks and Age Distribution Given the characteristics of respective units, for the purpose of achieving a composition of ranks that enables the three services to accomplish their respective missions in the most appropriate and sustainable way, the SDF will promote measures to secure and nurture appropriate-numbers of off cers, warrant off cers and sergeants/petty off cers equipped with necessary capabilities, as well as recruit in a planned manner high-quality privates/seaman/airman. To ensure an appropriate age distribution, in addition to reviewing the retirement age of 60, the SDF will work to adjust the age distribution in the respective off cer, warrant off cer, sergeant/petty off cer, and private/seaman/airman ranks, by encouraging early retirement and more appropriately managing its privates/seaman/airman. While taking into consideration the status guarantee of SDF personnel, the SDF will conduct research on new systems for early retirement including systems used by other countries. With a view to maintaining the proper age distribution among airplane pilots, the SDF will take measures to allow them to be re-employed in the private sector. In addition, the SDF will review the f nal promotion rate of off cers, warrant off cers and sergeants/petty off cers, and manage personnel more appropriately with consideration to personnel’s physical strength so as to maintain SDF’s strength. (b) Effective Utilization of Human Resources In order to more effectively make use of its personnel, including its female personnel, the SDF will actively reappoint retiring personnel possessing advanced knowledge, skills and experience where such personnel prove benef cial to the overall SDF’s strength. To enable SDF personnel to pursue their missions with high morale and a strong feeling of pride, the SDF will promote measures related to honors and privileges including expansion of the Defense Meritorious Badge program. In order to strengthen the joint operations structure, the SDF will enhance education and training, and, through secondment to the Joint Staff Off ce and relevant ministries and agencies, retain adequate personnel in the government who have a broad outlook and ideas, as well as wide-ranging experience in Japan’s security-affairs, and who can respond f exibly and rapidly to a variety of situations. (c) Recruitment and Re-employment Support In light of the deteriorating recruiting environment, resulting from social factors such as the declining birthrate and the increased pursuit of higher education, in order to continue to secure competent personnel in the coming years, the SDF will work to enhance public understanding of national defense and security issues, effectively engage in public relations to adjust to the changing times, and coordinate and cooperate with relevant ministries and agencies and local governments, so as to spread the perception that the SDF is an attractive job option. As it is the responsibility of the Government of Japan (GOJ) to provide f nancially for SDF personnel, compelled to resign at a younger age than ordinary civil servants, by strengthening collaboration with local governments and relevant organizations, through sharing the knowledge, skills and experience of retired SDF personnel with society, the GOJ will facilitate such efforts as measures to provide more incentives for companies to employ retired SDF personnel, and encourage employment of retired SDF personnel in the public sector, so as to improve their re-employment environment. (d) Utilization of Personnel including Reserve Staff In order to support sustainable unit operations in situations that are becoming increasingly diversif ed and protracted, the SDF will promote the use of ready reserve personnel and reserve personnel in broad areas To that end, the SDF will facilitate the appointment of reserve personnel and their assignment to duties commensurate with their specialized knowledge and skills including possible opportunities to work at headquarters, and will also improve training for call-ups. Aiming at active use of the private sector’s transport capabilities, necessary measures will be taken to utilize reserve personnel including those who ----- appointment of reserve personnel equipped with specialized skills, including airplane pilots who the SDF releases to the private sector for re-employment. Other necessary measures will be taken as well with broad consideration to using reserve personnel, including for call-ups in various situations. Furthermore, to increase the adequacy of reserve personnel, the SDF will seek to increase public awareness of the reserve program, and take measures to provide more incentives for reserve personnel themselves and companies to employ reserve personnel. (4) Medical In order to keep SDF personnel in good health and enhance its military medicine capabilities to enable the SDF to cope with a diverse range of missions in responses to various situations and international peace cooperation activities, the SDF will upgrade its hospitals to hubs with enhanced functions, and promote the formation of networks across hospitals and medical treatment rooms. Along with contributions to medical services in local communities, the SDF will establish an eff cient and high-quality medical care structure, including improvements in the management of the National Defense Medical College Hospital. By reinforcing education for medical off cers, nurses and emergency medical technicians, the SDF will make efforts to secure personnel with more specialized and advanced skills. In addition, the SDF will consider such matters as revision of regulations of emergency medical treatment on situation responses, and improve frontline f rst aid capabilities, and will put in place a posture for rapid medical evacuation that takes into account the need for enhanced joint service capabilities. Furthermore, the SDF will also reinforce the functions of the National Defense Medical College, establishing it as a hub for education, and research in the f eld of defense medical science. (5) Defense Production and Technology Base Retaining an adequate level of defense production and a technology base is essential not only for the production, operation, sustainment of equipment, but also for research and development of equipment that f ts the operational environment in Japan, and for the expected potential to contribute to enhancing deterrence. Given that and Japan’s intention to maintain and reinforce above-mentioned base, the MOD will formulate a strategy that sets forth its future vision for Japan’s defense production and technology base as a whole. With a view to enhancing the technological capability and improving productivity of Japan’s defense production and technology base, as well as increasing global competitiveness, Japan will actively promote cooperation on defense equipment and technology development, such as through international joint development and production with other countries including the United States and the United Kingdom, utilizing the technological f elds where Japan enjoys an advantage. In coordination with relevant government agencies, the MOD will promote adapting defense equipment, such as aircraft developed by the MOD/SDF, to civilian uses. The MOD will promote international joint development and production and civilian uses of defense equipment in a way that benef t both manufacturers and the government. (6) Eff cient Acquisition of Equipment To carry out effective and eff cient acquisition of equipment, a project manager system will be introduced so as to enhance consistent project management including insertion of a technological perspective throughout the life-cycle of equipment design, R&D, full rate production, acquisition, sustainment, capability upgrade and eventual disposal. In relevant efforts, the MOD will establish a database of past contracts, which it will use to develop a simulation model for price estimation, so as to enable independent estimates of more appropriate acquisition prices. While utilizing the private sector’s knowledge, the MOD will actively train and appoint personnel to positions that require knowledge, skills and specialized expertise in the acquisition of equipment, such as specialists in cost analysis. In addition, the MOD will develop a system that allows for reconsideration, including review of specif cations and project plans, when there is a signif cant discrepancy between the estimated life-cycle cost derived from the analysis concerned and the real value of the life-cycle costs. To allow for prompt and eff cient acquisitions, while ensuring transparency and fairness, parties available for negotiated contracts will be sorted and ranked as necessary so as to be useful. To diversify contract types and allow for the eff cient acquisition of various equipment, the government will take necessary measures after considering further development of its contract system, to incentivize companies to lower prices, introduce longer-term contracts, which raise the predictability for companies and lead to as, the use of a consortium that enables convergence of technologies from respective, globally competitive companies. (7) Research and Development (R&D) Taking cost-effectiveness into account under Japan’s severe f scal situation, the MOD will prioritize R&D projects that best meet the operational needs of the SDF. In order to strengthen its air defense capabilities, the MOD will promote technical review of next-generation surface-to-air guided missiles in view of replacing the functions both of the GSDF middle-range surface-to-air guided missile and the ASDF PATRIOT surface-to-air guided missiles. In addition, the MOD will promote strategic studies including empirical research to accumulate and enhance f ghter aircraft-related technologies in Japan so as to keep an option for development of next-generation f ghter aircraft including the possibility of international joint development of an aircraft to replace the F-2 when it is time to retire it. Based on the f ndings, the MOD will take necessary measures. In an effort to improve ISR capability, the MOD will promote development of SIGINT aircraft as well as research on new f xed air defense radar, and sonars with higher detecting capabilities through simultaneous use of multiple sonars. In addition, the MOD will conduct research on unmanned equipment available for f exible operations in case of various contingencies including large-scale natural disasters, and promote R&D to improve existing equipment including vehicles, ships and aircraft. With a view to addressing emerging threats and securing technological advantage in the areas of strategically important f elds, the MOD will set a vision of future equipment which shows a direction of medium- and long-term R&D with regard to development of major equipment, in order to systematically conduct advanced research from medium and long term perspectives. It will do this while considering the latest trends in science and technology, changes in battle f eld techniques, the potential for international joint research and development, and availability of effective joint operations among major pieces of equipment. From a security standpoint, the MOD will also make an effort to actively utilize civilian technologies applicable to defense needs (dual-use technologies) by such means as enhancement of coordination with universities and research institutions, while strengthening the function of technology control to prevent outf ow of advanced technologies. In doing so, the MOD will always pay attention to keeping abreast of scientif c technological trends including information relevant to technological development and gathering industry-academic-government strengths. In a related effort, the MOD will also promote to have military technologies employed in civilian activities. In order to achieve effective and eff cient R&D in consideration of the items stated above, the MOD will re-examine its research and development posture, and take necessary measures. (8) Collaboration with Local Communities As it is essential to closely coordinate with local governments in such efforts as effective response to various contingencies, and recruitment and re-employment support for SDF personnel, in pursuit of facilitated harmonization between defense facilities and their surrounding local communities, the MOD will continue to advance measures targeting the areas around defense facilities, as well as engage in various measures such as intensive public relations activities focused on their policies and activities, in order to secure the understanding and cooperation of local governments and communities. Given that the presence of SDF units makes a substantial contribution to the maintenance and revitalization of local communities in some areas, and supports medical services in communities through emergency patient transport by SDF search and rescue aircraft, etc., the MOD/SDF will give consideration to the attributes of each area in the reorganization of units, and deployment and administration of SDF camps and bases, etc. in order to secure the understanding of local governments and residents. In these efforts, based on the governmental contract policies vis-a-vis small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), while considering eff ciencies, the MOD will promote various measures conducive to local economies such as securing opportunities for local SMEs to receive orders. (9) Boosting Communication Capabilities Given that understanding and support from Japanese people and foreign countries are of utmost importance for successful accomplishment of SDF missions, the MOD will strive to provide information actively and effectively via various media sources such as social media networks with due consideration to consistency in the information content. Efforts to provide information to foreign countries about MOD/SDF activities abroad will be facilitated by ----- (10) Enhancing its Intellectual Base To enhance understanding among Japanese citizens on security and crisis management, the MOD will contribute to the promotion of education on security-related matters at educational institutions, including by MOD personnel presenting academic papers and sending MOD lecturers as experts in security and crisis management. The role of the National Institute for Defense Studies (NIDS) as a think tank associated with the MOD will be strengthened, through such efforts as facilitating coordination with policy-making divisions by relocating the institute to the Ichigaya district (where the MOD’s headquarters is located), and to by promoting academic exchanges with foreign research institutions. The MOD will also strive to administer the NIDS in such a way that it is capable of dealing with policy issues that the MOD faces in a timely and appropriate manner. (11) Promoting Reform of the MOD The MOD will further promote its reforms by regularly reviewing its work methods and organization in order to foster a sense of unity among civilian off cials and uniformed personnel, and to optimize the build-up of defense capabilities, promote SDF joint operation functions and enhance policy-making and communication functions. In doing so, with the intention of optimizing its defense force buildup, the MOD will establish a planning system for defense build-up with a focus on joint operation-based capability assessments, and take measures to facilitate eff ciency and optimization in acquisition of equipment, keeping in mind an option to establish a new agency in the MOD. Also, to enhance the prompt and eff cient operation of the SDF, by such effort as integration of duties related to actual unit operations into the Joint Staff Off ce, the MOD will eliminate overlapping duties in the Internal Bureau and the Joint Staff Off ce, and conduct an organizational review including the reorganization or disbanding of the Bureau of Operational Policy. **IV. Measures for Strengthening the Japan-U.S. Alliance** 1. Strengthening Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation In order to maintain and strengthen the U.S. commitment to Japan and the Asia-Pacif c region and to ensure Japan’s national security, Japan will continue the revision of and revise the Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation while strengthening Japan’s own capabilities as a premise for these efforts. Meanwhile, Japan will expand bilateral training and exercises, joint ISR activities and the joint/shared use of facilities and areas by the SDF and the U.S. forces. In addition, Japan will further deepen various Japan-U.S. operational cooperation and policy coordination in areas such as BMD, bilateral planning, and bilateral Extended Deterrence Dialogue. Japan will also strengthen cooperation not only in the f elds of counter-piracy, capacity building assistance, HA/DR, peacekeeping and counter-terrorism, but also in maritime affairs, outer space and cyberspace. Furthermore, Japan will strengthen and expand Japan-U.S. cooperative relationship over a broad range of f elds, including intelligence cooperation and information security, and defense equipment and technology cooperation. 2. Measures for furthering Smooth and Effective Stationing of U.S. Forces in Japan From the perspective of making the stationing of the U.S. Forces in Japan more smooth and effective, Japan will steadily ensure the Host Nation Support (HNS). **V. Quantities of Major Procurement** The Annex Table shows details of the quantities of major procurement described in Section III. With a view to developing the defense forces described in the Annex Table of NDPG2013 over 10-year time frame, this program will focus on build-up of defense forces the best adapted to the current security environment. **VI. Expenditures** 1. The expenditures required to implement the defense force developments described in this program amount to approximately ¥24, 670 billion in FY2013 prices. 2. For the duration of this program, in harmony with other measures taken by the Government, approximately ¥700 billion will be secured by means of further streamlining and rationalization through efforts such as equipment procurement reform. The annual defense budgets for the implementation of this program will be allocated within a limit of approximately ¥23, 970 billion over the next f ve years. 3. This program will be reviewed after three years as necessary, with consideration to such factors at home and abroad as the international security environment, trends in technological standards including information communication technology, and f scal conditions. **VII. Other** While maintaining the deterrence of U.S. Forces, Japan will steadily implement specif c measures including the realignment of the U.S. forces in Japan and SACO (Special Action Committee on Okinawa) related programs to mitigate the impact on local communities, including those |in Okinawa.|Col2|Col3| |---|---|---| |Service|Equipment|Quantity| |GSDF|Mobile Combat Vehicles Armored Vehicles Amphibious Vehicles Tilt-Rotor Aircraft Transport Helicopters (CH-47JA) Surface-to-Ship Guided Missiles Mid-Range Surface-to-Air Guided Missiles Tanks Howitzers (expect mortars)|99 24 52 17 6 9 companies 5 companies 44 31| |MSDF|Destroyers (Aegis-Equipped Destroyers) Submarines Other Ships Total (Tonnage) Fixed-Wing Patrol Aircraft (P-1) Patrol Helicopters (SH-60K) Multipurpose Helicopters (Ship-Based)|5 (2) 5 5 15 (approx. 52,000 t) 23 23 9| |ASDF|New Airborne Early Warning (Control) Aircraft Fighters (F-35A) Fighter Modernization (F-15) New Aerial Refueling/Transport Aircraft Transport Aircraft (C-2) Upgrade of PATRIOT Surface-to-Air Guided Missiles (PAC-3 MSE)|4 28 26 3 10 2 groups & education| |Joint units|Unmanned Aerial Vehicles|3| Note: Acquisition of ship-based unmanned aerial vehicles will be allowed within the number of Patrol Helicopters (SH-60K) specifi ed above. **Reference 17 Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment and** **Technology** (Approved by the National Security Council and the Cabinet on April 1, 2014) The Government has made it its basic policy to deal with overseas transfer of defense equipment and technology in a careful manner in accordance with Prime Minster Eisaku Sato’s remarks at the Diet in 1967 (hereinafter referred to as “the Three Principles on Arms Exports”) and the collateral policy guideline by the Miki administration in 1976. These policy guidelines have played a certain role as Japan has been following the path of a peace-loving nation. On the other hand, these policy guidelines including the non-permission of arms exports to communist bloc countries have increasingly proved unsuitable for the current situation. Also, the Government has repeatedly taken exemption measures depending on the individual necessity of each case since arms exports to substantially all areas were not permitted, as a result of not promoting arms exports regardless of the destinations,. Japan has consistently followed the path of a peace-loving nation since the end of World War II. Japan has adhered to a basic policy of maintaining an exclusively national defense-oriented policy, not becoming a military power that poses a threat to other countries, and observing the Three Non-Nuclear Principles. At the same time, surrounded by an increasingly severe security environment and confronted by complex and grave national security challenges, it has become essential for Japan to make more proactive efforts in line with the principle of international cooperation. Japan cannot secure its own peace and security by itself, and the international community expects Japan to play a more proactive role for peace and stability in the world commensurate with its national capabilities. Against this backdrop, under the evolving security environment, Japan will continue to adhere to the course that it has taken to date as a peace-loving nation, and as a major player in world politics and the world economy, contribute even more proactively in securing peace, stability and prosperity of the international community, while achieving its own security as well as peace and stability in the Asia-Pacif c region, as a “Proactive Contributor to Peace” based on the principle of international cooperation. From the view point of achieving the fundamental principle of national security by implementing concrete policies, the Government, in accordance with the National Security Strategy adopted on December 17, 2013, decided to review the Government’s existing policy guidelines on overseas transfer of defense equipment and technology, and set out clear principles which f t the new security environment while giving due consideration to the roles that the existing policy guidelines have played so far and by consolidating the policy guidelines comprehensively with consideration on the past exemption measures. ----- An appropriate overseas transfer of defense equipment and technology contributes to further active promotion of the maintenance of international peace and security through timely and effective implementation of contribution to peace and international cooperation such as international peace cooperation, international disaster relief, humanitarian assistance, responses to international terrorism and piracy, and capacity building of developing countries (hereinafter referred to as “peace contribution and international cooperation”). Such transfer also contributes to strengthening security and defense cooperation with Japan’s ally, the United States as well as other countries. Furthermore, it contributes to maintaining and enhancing Japan’s defense production and technological bases, thereby contributing to Japan’s enhancement of defense capability, given that international joint development and production projects have become the international mainstream in order to improve the performance of defense equipment and to deal with their rising costs. On the other hand, since the distribution of defense equipment and technology has signif cant security, social, economic and humanitarian impact on the international community, the need for each government to control the transfer of defense equipment and technology in a responsible manner while taking various factors into account is recognized. In light of the above, while maintaining its basic philosophy as a peace-loving nation that conforms to the Charter of the United Nations and the course it has taken as a peace-loving nation, Japan will control the overseas transfer of defense equipment and technology based on the following three principles. The overseas transfer of facilities related to arms production will continue to be treated in the same manner as defense equipment and technology. **1. Clarifi cation of cases where transfers are prohibited** Overseas transfer of defense equipment and technology will not be permitted when: 1) the transfer violates obligations under treaties and other international agreements that Japan has concluded, 2) the transfer violates obligations under United Nations Security Council resolutions, or 3) the defense equipment and technology is destined for a country party to a conf ict (a country against which the United Nations Security Council is taking measures to maintain or restore international peace and security in the event of an armed attack). **2. Limitation to cases where transfers may be permitted as well as strict** **examination and information disclosure** In cases not within 1. above, cases where transfers may be permitted will be limited to the following cases. Those cases will be examined strictly while ensuring transparency. More specif cally, overseas transfer of defense equipment and technology may be permitted in such cases as the transfer contributes to active promotion of peace contribution and international cooperation, or to Japan’s security from the viewpoint of—implementing international joint development and production projects with countries cooperating with Japan in security area including its ally, the U.S. (hereinafter referred to as “the ally and partners”), —enhancing security and defense cooperation with the ally and partners, as well as—supporting the activities of the Self-Defense Forces including the maintenance of its equipment and ensuring the safety of Japanese nationals. The Government will conduct strict examination on the appropriateness of the destination and end user, and the extent the overseas transfer of such equipment and technology will raise concern for Japan’s security. Then the Government will make a comprehensive judgment in light of the existing guidelines of the international export control regime and based on the information available at the time of export examinations. Signif cant cases that require especially careful consideration from the viewpoint of Japan’s security will be examined at the National Security Council (NSC). As for the cases that were deliberated at the NSC, the Government will disclose their information in accordance with the Act on Access to Information Held by Administrative Organs (Law No. 42 of 1999). **3. Ensuring appropriate control regarding extra-purpose use or transfer** **to third parties** In cases satisfying 2. above, overseas transfer of defense equipment and technology will be permitted only in cases where appropriate control is ensured. More concretely, the Government will in principle oblige the Government of the recipient country to gain its prior consent regarding extra-purpose use and transfer to third parties. However, appropriate control may be ensured with the conf rmation of control system at the destination in such cases as those where the transfer is judged to be appropriate for active promotion of peace contribution and international cooperation, when the transfer involves participation in an international system for sharing parts etc., and when the transfer involves delivery of parts etc. to a licenser. Implementation guidelines for the policy described above will be decided by the NSC. The Minister of Economy, Trade and Industry will i l h i h d i d A ( 228 of 1949) appropriately in accordance with the decision. For the purpose of this policy, “defense equipment and technology” refers to “arms and military technologies”; “arms” refers to items listed in Section 1, Annexed List 1 of the Export Trade Control Order (Cabinet Order No. 378 of 1949), and are to be used by military forces and directly employed in combat; and “military technologies” refers to technologies for the design, production or use of arms. The Government will contribute actively to the peace and stability of the international community as a “Proactive Contributor to Peace” based on the principle of international cooperation. Under such policy, it will play a proactive role in the area of controlling defense equipment and technology as well as sensitive dual-use goods and technologies to achieve the early entry into force of the Arms Trade Treaty and further strengthen the international export control regimes. **Reference 18 The Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation** **(April 27, 2015)** **I. Defense Cooperation and the Aim of the Guidelines** In order to ensure Japan’s peace and security under any circumstances, from peacetime to contingencies, and to promote a stable, peaceful, and prosperous Asia-Pacif c region and beyond, bilateral security and defense cooperation will emphasize: - seamless, robust, fl exible, and effective bilateral responses; - synergy across the two governments’ national security policies; - a whole-of-government Alliance approach; - cooperation with regional and other partners, as well as international organizations; and - the global nature of the Japan-U.S. Alliance. The two governments will continuously enhance the JapanU.S. Alliance. Each government will maintain its individual defense posture based on its national security policy. Japan will possess defense capability on the basis of the “National Security Strategy” and the “National Defense Program Guidelines”. The United States will continue to extend deterrence to Japan through the full range of capabilities, including U.S. nuclear forces. The United States also will continue to forward deploy combat-ready forces in the Asia-Pacif c region and maintain the ability to reinforce those forces rapidly. The Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation (“the Guidelines”) provide the general framework and policy direction for the roles and missions of Japan and the United States, as well as ways of cooperation and coordination, with a view to improving the effectiveness of bilateral security and defense cooperation. In this way, the Guidelines advance peace and security, deter conf ict, secure the basis for economic prosperity, and promote domestic and international understanding of the signif cance of the Japan-U.S. Alliance. **II. Basic Premises and Principles** The Guidelines, as well as actions and activities under the Guidelines, are and will be consistent with the following basic premises and principles. A. The rights and obligations under the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between Japan and the United States of America (the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty) and its related arrangements, as well as the fundamental framework of the Japan-U.S. Alliance, will remain unchanged. B. All actions and activities undertaken by Japan and the United States under the Guidelines will be consistent with international law, including the Charter of the United Nations and its provisions regarding the peaceful settlement of disputes and sovereign equality of States, as well as other relevant international agreements. C. All actions and activities undertaken by Japan and the United States will be in accordance with their respective constitutions, laws, and regulations then in effect, and basic positions on national security policy. Japan will conduct actions and activities in accordance with its basic positions, such as the maintenance of its exclusively national defense-oriented policy and its three non-nuclear principles. D. The Guidelines do not obligate either government to take legislative, budgetary, administrative, or other measures, nor do the Guidelines create legal rights or obligations for either government. Since the objective of the Guidelines, however, is to establish an effective framework for bilateral cooperation, the two governments are expected to ref ect in an appropriate way the results of these efforts, based on their own judgment, in their specif c policies and measures. **III. Strengthened Alliance Coordination** Effective bilateral cooperation under the Guidelines will require the two governments to conduct close, consultative dialogue and sound policy and operational coordination from peacetime to contingencies. The two governments must be well informed and coordinate at multiple levels to ensure successful bilateral security and defense cooperation. To that end, the two governments will take advantage of ll il bl h l t h i f ti h i d t ----- seamless and effective whole-of-government Alliance coordination that includes all relevant agencies. For this purpose, the two governments will establish a new, standing Alliance Coordination Mechanism, enhance operational coordination, and strengthen bilateral planning. A. Alliance Coordination Mechanism Persistent and emerging threats can have a serious and immediate impact on the peace and security of Japan and the United States. In order to address seamlessly and effectively any situation that affects Japan’s peace and security or any other situation that may require an Alliance response, the two governments will utilize the Alliance Coordination Mechanism. This mechanism will strengthen policy and operational coordination related to activities conducted by the Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces in all phases from peacetime to contingencies. This mechanism also will contribute to timely information sharing as well as the development and maintenance of common situational awareness. To ensure effective coordination, the two governments will establish necessary procedures and infrastructure (including facilities as well as information and communication systems) and conduct regular training and exercises. The two governments will tailor to the situation the procedures for coordination as well as the exact composition of participating agencies within the Alliance Coordination Mechanism structure. As part of these procedures, contact information will be shared and maintained from peacetime. B. Enhanced Operational Coordination Enhanced bilateral operational coordination for f exible and responsive command and control is a core capability of critical importance to Japan and the United States. In this context, the two governments recognize the continued importance of collocating operational coordination functions to strengthen cooperation between the Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces. The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will exchange personnel to ensure robust information sharing, to facilitate coordination from peacetime to contingencies, and to support international activities. The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces, in close cooperation and coordination, will take action through their respective chains-of-command. C. Bilateral Planning The two governments will continue to develop and update bilateral plans to ensure smooth and effective execution of coordinated operations by the Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces. To ensure the effectiveness of the plans and the ability to make f exible, timely, and appropriate responses, the two governments will exchange relevant information, including identifying operational and logistic support requirements and sources in advance, as appropriate. The two governments will conduct bilateral planning in peacetime for contingencies relevant to Japan’s peace and security through an upgraded Bilateral Planning Mechanism, which includes relevant agencies of the respective governments. Bilateral plans will be developed with input from relevant agencies, as appropriate. The Security Consultative Committee (SCC) will continue to be responsible for presenting directions, validating the progress of the planning under the mechanism, and issuing directives as necessary. The SCC will be assisted by an appropriate subordinate body. Bilateral plans are to be ref ected appropriately in the plans of both governments. **IV. Seamlessly Ensuring Japan’s Peace and Security** Persistent and emerging threats can have a serious and immediate impact on Japan’s peace and security. In this increasingly complex security environment, the two governments will take measures to ensure Japan’s peace and security in all phases, seamlessly, from peacetime to contingencies, including situations when an armed attack against Japan is not involved. In this context, the two governments also will promote further cooperation with partners. The two governments recognize that these measures need to be taken based on f exible, timely, and effective bilateral coordination tailored to each situation and that interagency coordination is essential for appropriate Alliance responses. Therefore, the two governments will utilize the whole-of-government Alliance Coordination Mechanism, as appropriate, to: - assess the situation; - share information; and - develop ways to implement the appropriate Alliance response, including f exible deterrent options, as well as actions aimed at deescalation. To support these bilateral efforts, the two governments also will coordinate strategic messaging through appropriate channels on issues that could potentially affect Japan’s peace and security. A. Cooperative Measures from Peacetime In order to ensure the maintenance of Japan s peace and security, the two governments will promote cooperation across a wide range of areas, including through diplomatic efforts, to strengthen the deterrence and capabilities of the Japan-U.S. Alliance. The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will enhance interoperability, readiness, and vigilance to prepare for all possible situations. To these ends, the two governments will take measures, including, but not limited to, the following: 1. Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance In order to identify at the earliest possible stage any indications of threats to Japan’s peace and security and to ensure a decisive advantage in intelligence gathering and analysis, the two governments will share and protect information and intelligence, while developing and maintaining common situational awareness. This will include enhancing coordination and cooperation among relevant agencies. The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will conduct intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) activities based on the capabilities and availability of their respective assets. This will include conducting bilateral ISR activities in a mutually supportive manner to ensure persistent coverage of developments that could affect Japan’s peace and security. 2. Air and Missile Defense The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will maintain and strengthen deterrence and their defense postures against ballistic missile launches and aerial incursions. The two governments will cooperate to expand early warning capabilities, interoperability, network coverage, and real-time information exchange and to pursue the comprehensive improvement of capabilities to respond to the threat of ballistic missiles. Moreover, the two governments will continue to coordinate closely in responding to provocative missile launches and other aerial activities. 3. Maritime Security The two governments will cooperate closely with each other on measures to maintain maritime order based upon international law, including freedom of navigation. The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will cooperate, as appropriate, on various efforts such as maintaining and enhancing bilateral presence in the maritime domain through ISR and training and exercises, while further developing and enhancing shared maritime domain awareness including by coordinating with relevant agencies, as necessary. 4. Asset Protection The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will provide mutual protection of each other’s assets, as appropriate, if engaged in activities that contribute to the defense of Japan in a cooperative manner, including during training and exercises. 5. Training and Exercises The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will conduct effective bilateral and multilateral training and exercises both inside and outside of Japan in order to strengthen interoperability, sustainability, and readiness. Timely and realistic training and exercises will enhance deterrence. To support these activities, the two governments will cooperate to ensure that training areas, facilities, and associated equipment are available, accessible, and modern. 6. Logistic Support Japan and the United States are primarily responsible for providing logistic support for their respective forces in all phases. The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will provide mutual logistic support where appropriate, including, but not limited to, supply, maintenance, transportation, engineering, and medical services, for such activities as set forth in the Agreement between the Government of Japan and the Government of the United States of America Concerning Reciprocal Provision of Logistic Support, Supplies and Services between the Self-Defense Forces of Japan and the Armed Forces of the United States of America (the Acquisition and CrossServicing Agreement) and its related arrangements. 7. Use of Facilities In order to expand interoperability and improve f exibility and resiliency of the Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces, the two governments will enhance joint/shared use and cooperate in ensuring the security of facilities and areas. Recognizing the importance of being prepared for contingencies, the two governments also will cooperate in conducting site surveys on facilities including civilian airports and seaports, as appropriate. B. Responses to Emerging Threats to Japan’s Peace and Security The Alliance will respond to situations that will have an important ----- be def ned geographically. The measures described in this section include those that may be taken, in accordance with the two countries’ respective laws and regulations, in circumstances that have not yet amounted to such a situation. Early recognition and adaptable, resolute decision-making on bilateral actions will contribute to deterrence and de-escalation of such situations. In addition to continuing cooperative measures from peacetime, the two governments will pursue all avenues, including diplomatic efforts, to ensure the peace and security of Japan. Utilizing the Alliance Coordination Mechanism, the two governments will take additional measures, based on their own decisions, including, but not limited to, those listed below. 1. Noncombatant Evacuation Operations When Japanese and U.S. noncombatants need to be evacuated from a third country to a safe haven, each government is responsible for evacuating its own nationals, as well as dealing with the authorities of the affected area. As appropriate, the two governments will coordinate in planning and cooperate in carrying out evacuations of Japanese or U.S. noncombatants. These evacuations will be carried out using each country’s capabilities such as transportation means and facilities in a mutually supplementary manner. The two governments may each consider extending evacuation assistance to third-country noncombatants. The two governments will conduct early-stage coordination through the Alliance Coordination Mechanism, as appropriate, to carry out cooperation in f elds such as the safety of evacuees, transportation means and facilities, customs, immigration and quarantine processing, safe havens, and medical services. The two governments will enhance coordination in noncombatant evacuation operations from peacetime, as appropriate, including by conducting training and exercises. 2. Maritime Security Taking into account their respective capabilities, the two governments will cooperate closely to enhance maritime security. Cooperative measures may include, but are not limited to, information sharing and inspection of ships based on a United Nations Security Council resolution or other basis under international law. 3. Measures to Deal with Refugees If a situation develops such that a f ow of refugees into Japan becomes likely or actually begins, the two governments will cooperate to maintain Japan’s peace and security while handling refugees in a humane manner consistent with applicable obligations under international law. Primary responsibility for such refugee response lies with Japan. The United States will provide appropriate support upon a request from Japan. 4. Search and Rescue The two governments will cooperate and provide mutual support, as appropriate, in search and rescue operations. The Self-Defense Forces, in cooperation with relevant agencies, will provide support to combat search and rescue operations by the United States, where appropriate, subject to Japanese laws and regulations. 5. Protection of Facilities and Areas The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces are responsible for protecting their own facilities and areas in cooperation with relevant authorities. Upon request from the United States, Japan will provide additional protection for facilities and areas in Japan in close cooperation and coordination with the United States Armed Forces. 6. Logistic Support The two governments will enhance mutual logistic support (which includes, but is not limited to, supply, maintenance, transportation, engineering, and medical services), as appropriate, to enable effective and eff cient operations. This includes rapid validation and resourcing of operational and logistic support requirements. The Government of Japan will make appropriate use of the authorities and assets of central and local government agencies as well as private sector assets. The Government of Japan will provide logistic or other associated support where appropriate, subject to Japanese laws and regulations. 7. Use of Facilities The Government of Japan will provide, as needed, temporary use of facilities, including civilian airports and seaports, in accordance with the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty and its related arrangements. The two governments will enhance cooperation in joint/shared use of facilities and areas. C. Actions in Response to an Armed Attack against Japan Bilateral actions in response to an armed attack against Japan remain a core aspect of Japan-U.S. security and defense cooperation. governments will take steps to deter the armed attack and to deescalate the situation, while making preparations necessary for the defense of Japan. When an armed attack against Japan occurs, the two governments will conduct appropriate bilateral actions to repel it at the earliest possible stage and to deter any further attacks. The two governments also will take necessary measures including those listed earlier in Chapter IV. 1. When an Armed Attack against Japan is Anticipated When an armed attack against Japan is anticipated, the two governments will intensify, through a comprehensive and robust whole-of-government approach, information and intelligence sharing and policy consultations, and will pursue all avenues, including diplomatic efforts, to deter the attack and to de-escalate the situation. The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will assume appropriate postures for bilateral operations, including the execution of necessary deployments. Japan will establish and maintain the basis for its support of U.S. deployments. The preparations by the two governments may include, but would not be limited to: joint/shared use of facilities and areas; mutual logistic support, including, but not limited to, supply, maintenance, transportation, engineering, and medical services; and reinforced protection of U.S. facilities and areas in Japan. 2. When an Armed Attack against Japan Occurs a. Principles for Coordinated Actions If an armed attack against Japan occurs despite diplomatic efforts and deterrence, Japan and the United States will cooperate to repel promptly the attack and deter any further attacks to return peace and security to Japan. Such coordinated actions will contribute to the reestablishment of peace and security in the region. Japan will maintain primary responsibility for defending the citizens and territory of Japan and will take actions immediately to repel an armed attack against Japan as expeditiously as possible. The Self-Defense Forces will have the primary responsibility to conduct defensive operations in Japan and its surrounding waters and airspace, as well as its air and maritime approaches. The United States will coordinate closely with Japan and provide appropriate support. The United States Armed Forces will support and supplement the Self-Defense Forces to defend Japan. The United States will take actions to shape the regional environment in a way that supports the defense of Japan and reestablishes peace and security. Recognizing that all instruments of national power will be required to defend Japan, the two governments respectively will employ a whole-of-government approach, utilizing their respective chains-of-command, to coordinate actions through the Alliance Coordination Mechanism. The United States will employ forward-deployed forces, including those stationed in Japan, and introduce reinforcements from elsewhere, as required. Japan will establish and maintain the basis required to facilitate these deployments. The two governments will take actions as appropriate to provide defense of each other’s forces and facilities in response to an armed attack against Japan. b. Concept of Operations i. Operations to Defend Airspace The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will conduct bilateral operations to defend airspace above and surrounding Japan. The Self-Defense Forces will have primary responsibility for conducting air defense operations while ensuring air superiority. For this purpose, the Self-Defense Forces will take necessary actions, including, but not limited to, defense against attacks by aircraft and cruise missiles. The United States Armed Forces will conduct operations to support and supplement the Self-Defense Forces’ operations. ii. Operations to Counter Ballistic Missile Attacks The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will conduct bilateral operations to counter ballistic missile attacks against Japan. The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will exchange real-time information for early detection of ballistic missile launches. When there is an indication of a ballistic missile attack, the Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will maintain an effective posture to defend against ballistic missile attacks heading for Japan and to protect forces participating in ballistic missile defense operations. ----- responsibility for conducting ballistic missile defense operations to defend Japan. The United States Armed Forces will conduct operations to support and supplement the Self-Defense Forces’ operations. iii. Operations to Defend Maritime Areas The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will conduct bilateral operations to defend waters surrounding Japan and to secure the safety of sea lines of communication. The Self-Defense Forces will have primary responsibility for the protection of major ports and straits in Japan and of ships and vessels in waters surrounding Japan and for other associated operations. For this purpose, the Self-Defense Forces will take necessary actions, including, but not limited to, coastal defense, anti-surface warfare, anti-submarine warfare, mine warfare, anti-air warfare, and air interdiction. The United States Armed Forces will conduct operations to support and supplement the Self-Defense Forces’ operations. The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will cooperate in the interdiction of shipping activities providing support to adversaries involved in the armed attack. The effectiveness of these activities will be enhanced through information sharing and other forms of cooperation among relevant agencies. iv. Operations to Counter Ground Attacks The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will conduct bilateral operations to counter ground attacks against Japan by ground, air, maritime, or amphibious forces. The Self-Defense Forces will have primary responsibility for conducting operations to prevent and repel ground attacks, including those against islands. If the need arises, the Self-Defense Forces will conduct operations to retake an island. For this purpose, the Self-Defense Forces will take necessary actions, including, but not limited to, operations to prevent and repel airborne and seaborne invasions, amphibious operations, and rapid deployment. The Self-Defense Forces, in cooperation with relevant agencies, also will have primary responsibility for defeating attacks by special operations forces or any other unconventional attacks in Japan, including those that involve inf ltration. The United States Armed Forces will conduct operations to support and supplement the Self-Defense Forces’ operations. v. Cross-Domain Operations The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will conduct bilateral operations across domains to repel an armed attack against Japan and to deter further attacks. These operations will be designed to achieve effects across multiple domains simultaneously. Examples of cooperation across domains include the actions described below. The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces, in cooperation with relevant agencies, as appropriate, will strengthen their respective ISR postures, enhance the sharing of intelligence, and provide protection for each other’s ISR assets. The United States Armed Forces may conduct operations involving the use of strike power, to support and supplement the Self-Defense Forces. When the United States Armed Forces conduct such operations, the Self-Defense Forces may provide support, as necessary. These operations will be based on close bilateral coordination, as appropriate. The two governments will cooperate to address threats in the space and cyberspace domains in accordance with bilateral cooperation set out in Chapter VI. The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces’ special operations forces will cooperate during operations, as appropriate. c. Operational Support Activities The two governments will cooperate in the following activities in support of bilateral operations. i. Communications and Electronics The two governments will provide mutual support to ensure effective use of communications and electronics capabilities, as appropriate. Forces will ensure effective communication between the two forces and maintain a common operational picture for bilateral operations under common situational awareness. ii. Search and Rescue The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces, in cooperation with relevant agencies, will cooperate and provide mutual support in search and rescue operations, including combat search and rescue, as appropriate. iii. Logistic Support When operations require supplementing their respective logistics resources, the Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will provide f exible and timely mutual logistic support, based on their respective capabilities and availability. The two governments will make appropriate use of the authorities and assets of central and local government agencies, as well as private sector assets, to provide support. iv. Use of Facilities The Government of Japan will provide, as needed, additional facilities in accordance with the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty and its related arrangements. The two governments will enhance cooperation in joint/shared use of facilities and areas. v. Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Protection The Government of Japan will maintain primary responsibility for emergency responses to chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) incidents or attacks in Japan. The United States retains primary responsibility for maintaining and restoring the mission capability of the United States Armed Forces in Japan. At Japan’s request, the United States will support Japan in CBRN incident or attack prevention and response-related activities in an effort to ensure the protection of Japan, as appropriate. D. Actions in Response to an Armed Attack against a Country other than Japan When Japan and the United States each decides to take actions involving the use of force in accordance with international law, including full respect for sovereignty, and with their respective Constitutions and laws to respond to an armed attack against the United States or a third country, and Japan has not come under armed attack, they will cooperate closely to respond to the armed attack and to deter further attacks. Bilateral responses will be coordinated through the whole-of-government Alliance Coordination Mechanism. Japan and the United States will cooperate as appropriate with other countries taking action in response to the armed attack. The Self-Defense Forces will conduct appropriate operations involving the use of force to respond to situations where an armed attack against a foreign country that is in a close relationship with Japan occurs and as a result, threatens Japan’s survival and poses a clear danger to overturn fundamentally its people’s right to life, liberty, and pursuit of happiness, to ensure Japan’s survival, and to protect its people. Examples of cooperative operations are outlined below: 1. Asset Protection The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will cooperate in asset protection, as appropriate. Such cooperation will include, but not be limited to, protection of assets that are engaged in operations such as Noncombatant Evacuation Operations or Ballistic Missile Defense. 2. Search and Rescue The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces, in cooperation with relevant agencies, will cooperate and provide support in search and rescue operations, including combat search and rescue, as appropriate. 3. Maritime Operations The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will cooperate in minesweeping, as appropriate, including to secure the safety of sea lines of communication. The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces, in cooperation with relevant agencies, will cooperate in escort operations to protect ships and vessels, as appropriate. The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces, in cooperation with relevant agencies, will cooperate in the interdiction of shipping activities providing support to adversaries involved in the armed attack, as appropriate. 4. Operations to Counter Ballistic Missile Attacks The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will cooperate in intercepting ballistic missiles, as appropriate, in accordance with their respective capabilities. The two governments will exchange information to ensure early detection ----- 5. Logistics Support When operations require supplementing their respective logistics resources, the Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will provide f exible and timely mutual logistic support, based on their respective capabilities and availability. The two governments will make appropriate use of the authorities and assets of central and local government agencies, as well as private sector assets, to provide support. E. Cooperation in Response to a Large-scale Disaster in Japan When a large-scale disaster takes place in Japan, Japan will have primary responsibility for responding to the disaster. The SelfDefense Forces, in cooperation with relevant agencies, local governments, and private actors, will conduct disaster relief operations. Recognizing that immediate recovery from a large-scale disaster in Japan is essential for Japan’s peace and security and that such a disaster could affect the activities of the United States Armed Forces in Japan, the United States, in accordance with its own criteria, will provide appropriate support for Japan’s activities. Such support may include search and rescue, transportation, supply, medical services, incident awareness and assessment, and other specialized capabilities. The two governments will coordinate activities through the Alliance Coordination Mechanism, as appropriate. To improve the effectiveness of the United States Armed Forces’ cooperation in humanitarian assistance and disaster relief activities in Japan, the two governments will work together closely, including through information sharing. In addition, the United States Armed Forces also may participate in disaster-related drills, which will increase mutual understanding in responding to largescale disasters. **V. Cooperation for Regional and Global Peace and Security** In an increasingly interconnected world, Japan and the United States will take a leading role in cooperation with partners to provide a foundation for peace, security, stability, and economic prosperity in the Asia-Pacif c region and beyond. For well over half a century, both countries have worked together to deliver effective solutions to challenges in diverse regions of the world. When each of the two governments decides to participate in international activities for the peace and security of the region and beyond, the two governments, including the Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces, will cooperate closely with each other and with partners, as appropriate, such as in the activities described below. This cooperation also will contribute to the peace and security of both countries. A. Cooperation in International Activities The two governments will participate in international activities, based on their own judgment. When working together, the SelfDefense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will cooperate to the maximum extent practicable. The two governments may coordinate the activities through the Alliance Coordination Mechanism, as appropriate, and also will pursue trilateral and multilateral cooperation in these activities. The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will share procedures and best practices, as appropriate, for smooth and effective cooperation. While the two governments will continue to cooperate on a broad array of issues that may not be explicitly included in the Guidelines, common areas for cooperation by the two governments in regional and international activities will include: 1. Peacekeeping Operations When the two governments participate in peacekeeping operations authorized by the United Nations (UN) in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, the two governments will cooperate closely, as appropriate, to maximize interoperability between the Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces. The two governments also may cooperate in providing logistic support for and protecting UN and other personnel who participate in the same mission, as appropriate. 2. International Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief When the two governments conduct international humanitarian assistance/disaster relief (HA/DR) operations in response to requests from governments concerned or international organizations in the wake of large-scale humanitarian and natural disasters, the two governments will cooperate closely to provide mutual support, as appropriate, maximizing interoperability between participating Self-Defense Forces and United States Armed Forces. Examples of cooperative activities may include mutual logistic support and operational coordination, planning, and execution. 3. Maritime Security When the two governments conduct activities for maritime security, the two governments will cooperate closely, as appropriate. Examples of cooperative activities may include efforts for: safe and secure sea lines of communication such as counter-piracy and minesweeping; non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; and counterterrorism activities. 4. Partner Capacity Building Proactive cooperation with partners will contribute to maintaining and enhancing regional and international peace and security. The two governments will cooperate in capacity building activities, as appropriate, by making the best use of their capabilities and experience, with the objective of strengthening the capability of partners to respond to dynamic security challenges. Examples of cooperative activities may include maritime security, military medicine, defense institution building, and improved force readiness for HA/DR or peacekeeping operations. 5. Noncombatant Evacuation Operations In circumstances when international action is required for the evacuation of noncombatants, the two governments will utilize, as appropriate, all possible avenues including diplomatic efforts to ensure the safety of noncombatants, including those who are Japanese or U.S. nationals. 6. Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance When the two governments participate in international activities, the Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will cooperate in ISR activities, as appropriate, based on the respective capabilities and availability of their assets. 7. Training and Exercises In order to enhance the effectiveness of international activities, the Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will conduct and participate in joint training and exercises, as appropriate, to strengthen interoperability, sustainability, and readiness. The two governments also will continue to pursue opportunities to work with partners in training and exercises to contribute to enhancing interoperability with the Alliance and the development of common tactics, techniques, and procedures. 8. Logistic support When participating in international activities, the two governments will cooperate to provide mutual logistic support. The Government of Japan will provide logistic support where appropriate, subject to Japanese laws and regulations. B. Trilateral and Multilateral Cooperation The two governments will promote and improve trilateral and multilateral security and defense cooperation. In particular, the two governments will reinforce efforts and seek additional opportunities to cooperate with regional and other partners, as well as international organizations. The two governments also will work together to strengthen regional and international institutions with a view to promoting cooperation based upon international law and standards. **VI. Space and Cyberspace Cooperation** A. Cooperation on Space Recognizing the security aspects of the space domain, the two governments will maintain and strengthen their partnership to secure the responsible, peaceful, and safe use of space. As part of such efforts, the two governments will ensure the resiliency of their space systems and enhance space situational awareness cooperation. The two governments will provide mutual support, as appropriate, to establish and improve capabilities and will share information about actions and events that might affect the safety and stability of the space domain and impede its use. The two governments also will share information to address emerging threats against space systems and will pursue opportunities for cooperation in maritime domain awareness and in space-related equipment and technology that will strengthen capabilities and resiliency of the space systems, including hosted payloads. To accomplish their missions effectively and eff ciently, the SelfDefense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will continue to cooperate and to contribute to whole-of-government efforts in utilizing space in such areas as: early-warning; ISR; positioning, navigation, and timing; space situational awareness; meteorological observation; command, control, and communications; and ensuring the resiliency of relevant space systems that are critical for mission assurance. In cases where their space systems are threatened, the Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will cooperate, as appropriate, in mitigating risk and preventing damage. If damage occurs, they will cooperate, as appropriate, in reconstituting relevant capabilities. B. Cooperation on Cyberspace To help ensure the safe and stable use of cyberspace, the two governments will share information on threats and vulnerabilities in cyberspace in a timely and routine manner, as appropriate. The ----- two governments also will share, as appropriate, information on the development of various capabilities in cyberspace, including the exchange of best practices on training and education. The two governments will cooperate to protect critical infrastructure and the services upon which the Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces depend to accomplish their missions, including through information sharing with the private sector, as appropriate. The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will: - maintain a posture to monitor their respective networks and systems; - share expertise and conduct educational exchanges in cybersecurity; - ensure resiliency of their respective networks and systems to achieve mission assurance; - contribute to whole-of-government efforts to improve cybersecurity; and - conduct bilateral exercises to ensure effective cooperation for cybersecurity in all situations from peacetime to contingencies. In the event of cyber incidents against Japan, including those against critical infrastructure and services utilized by the SelfDefense Forces and the United States Armed Forces in Japan, Japan will have primary responsibility to respond, and based on close bilateral coordination, the United States will provide appropriate support to Japan. The two governments also will share relevant information expeditiously and appropriately. In the event of serious cyber incidents that affect the security of Japan, including those that take place when Japan is under an armed attack, the two governments will consult closely and take appropriate cooperative actions to respond. **VII. Bilateral Enterprise** The two governments will develop and enhance the following areas as a foundation of security and defense cooperation, in order to improve further the effectiveness of bilateral cooperation: A. Defense Equipment and Technology Cooperation In order to enhance interoperability and to promote eff cient acquisition and maintenance, the two governments will: - cooperate in joint research, development, production, and test and evaluation of equipment and in mutual provision of components of common equipment and services; - strengthen the basis to repair and maintain common equipment for mutual eff ciency and readiness; - facilitate reciprocal defense procurement to enhance effi cient acquisition, interoperability, and defense equipment and technology cooperation; and - explore opportunities for cooperation with partners on defense equipment and technology. B. Intelligence Cooperation and Information Security Recognizing that common situational awareness is essential, the two governments will enhance intelligence cooperation and information sharing at all levels, including the national strategic level. In order to enable robust intelligence cooperation and information sharing, the two governments will continue to promote cooperation in strengthening policies, practices, and procedures related to the protection of classif ed information. The two governments also will explore opportunities for cooperation with partners on information sharing. C. Educational and Research Exchanges Recognizing the importance of intellectual cooperation concerning security and defense, the two governments will deepen exchanges of members of relevant organizations and strengthen communication between each side’s research and educational institutions. Such efforts will serve as the enduring foundation for security and defense off cials to share their knowledge and reinforce cooperation. **VIII. Processes for Review** The SCC, assisted by an appropriate subordinate body, will regularly evaluate whether the Guidelines remain adequate in light of the evolving circumstances. The two governments will update the Guidelines in a timely and appropriate manner when changes in situations relevant to the Japan-U.S. Alliance relationship occur and if deemed necessary in view of the circumstances at that time. **Reference 19 United States–Japan Roadmap for Realignment** **Implementation** (Washington, DC, May 1, 2006) **Overview** On October 29, 2005, the U.S.–Japan Security Consultative Committee (SCC) members approved recommendations for realignment of U.S. forces in Japan and related Japan Self-Defense Forces (SDF) in their document, “U.S.– Japan Alliance: Transformation and Realignment for the Future.” In that document, the SCC members directed their respective staffs “to f nalize these specif c and interrelated initiatives and develop l i l di t i l t ti h d l l t th M h 2006. This work has been completed and is ref ected in this document. **Finalization of Realignment Initiatives** The individual realignment initiatives form a coherent package. When implemented, these realignments will ensure a life-of-the-alliance presence for U.S. forces in Japan. The construction and other costs for facility development in the implementation of these initiatives will be borne by the Government of Japan (GOJ) unless otherwise specif ed. The U.S. Government (USG) will bear the operational costs that arise from implementation of these initiatives. The two Governments will f nance their realignment associated costs consistent with their commitments in the October 29, 2005 SCC document to maintain deterrence and capabilities while reducing burdens on local communities. **Key Implementation Details** 1. Realignment on Okinawa (a) Futenma Replacement Facility (FRF)  The United States and Japan will locate the FRF in a conf guration that combines the Henoko-saki and adjacent water areas of Oura and Henoko Bays, including two runways aligned in a “V”-shape, each runway having a length of 1,600 meters plus two 100-meter overruns. The length of each runway portion of the facility is 1,800 meters, exclusive of seawalls (see attached concept plan dated April 28, 2006). This facility ensures agreed operational capabilities while addressing issues of safety, noise, and environmental impacts.  In order to locate the FRF, inclusive of agreed support facilities, in the Camp Schwab area, necessary adjustments will be made, such as reconf guration of Camp Schwab facilities and adjacent water surface areas.  Construction of the FRF is targeted for completion by 2014.  Relocation to the FRF will occur when the facility is fully operationally capable.  Facility improvements for contingency use at ASDF bases at Nyutabaru and Tsuiki related to replacement of Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS) Futenma capabilities will be made, as necessary, after conducting site surveys and before MCAS Futenma is returned.  Requirements for improved contingency use of civilian facilities will be examined in the context of bilateral contingency planning, and appropriate arrangements will be made in order to realize the return of MCAS Futenma.  In principle, the construction method for the FRF will be landf ll.  The USG does not intend to operate f ghter aircraft from this facility. (b) Force Reductions and Relocation to Guam  Approximately 8,000 III Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) personnel and their approximately 9,000 dependents will relocate from Okinawa to Guam by 2014, in a manner that maintains unit integrity. Units to relocate will include: III MEF Command Element, 3rd Marine Division Headquarters, 3rd Marine Logistics Group (formerly known as Force Service Support Group) Headquarters, 1st Marine Air Wing Headquarters, and 12th Marine Regiment Headquarters.  The affected units will relocate from such facilities as Camp Courtney, Camp Hansen, MCAS Futenma, Camp Zukeran, and Makiminato Service Area.  The U.S. Marine Corps (USMC) forces remaining on Okinawa will consist of Marine Air-Ground Task Force elements, such as command, ground, aviation, and combat service support, as well as a base support capability.  Of the estimated $10.27 billion cost of the facilities and infrastructure development costs for the III MEF relocation to Guam, Japan will provide $6.09 billion (in U.S. FY2008 dollars), including $2.8 billion in direct cash contributions, to develop facilities and infrastructure on Guam to enable the III MEF relocation, recognizing the strong desire of Okinawa residents that such force relocation be realized rapidly. The United States will fund the remainder of the facilities and infrastructure development costs for the relocation to Guam estimated in U.S. FY2008 dollars at $3.18 billion in f scal spending plus approximately $1 billion for a road. (c) Land Returns and Shared Use of Facilities  Following the relocation to the FRF, the return of MCAS Futenma, and the transfer of III MEF personnel to Guam, the remaining facilities and areas on Okinawa will be consolidated, thereby enabling the return of signif cant land areas south of Kadena Air Base.  Both sides will develop a detailed consolidation plan by March 2007. In this plan, total or partial return of the following six candidate facilities will be examined:  Camp Kuwae: Total return -----  Camp Zukeran: Partial return and consolidation of remaining facilities and infrastructure to the extent possible.  MCAS Futenma: Total return (see FRF section above).  Makiminato Service Area: Total return.  aha Port: Total return (relocated to the new facilities, including additional staging constructed at Urasoe).  Army POL Depot Kuwae Tank Farm No. 1: Total return.  All functions and capabilities that are resident in facilities designated for return, and that are required by forces remaining in Okinawa, will be relocated within Okinawa. These relocations will occur before the return of designated facilities.  While emphasizing the importance of steady implementation of the recommendations of the Special Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO) Final Report, the SACO relocation and return initiatives may need to be reevaluated.  Camp Hansen will be used for GSDF training. Shared use that requires no facility improvements will be possible from 2006.  ASDF will use Kadena Air Base for bilateral training with U.S. forces, taking into account noise impacts on local communities. (d) Relationships among Initiatives  Within the overall package, the Okinawa-related realignment initiatives are interconnected.  Specif cally, consolidation and land returns south of Kadena depend on completing the relocation of III MEF personnel and dependents from Okinawa to Guam.  The III MEF relocation from Okinawa to Guam is dependent on: (1) tangible progress toward completion of the FRF, and (2) Japan’s f nancial contributions to fund development of required facilities and infrastructure on Guam. 2. Improvement of U.S. Army Command and Control Capability  U.S. Army command and control structure at Camp Zama will be transformed by U.S. FY2008. The headquarters of the GSDF Central Readiness Force subsequently will arrive at Camp Zama by Japan FY2012; SDF helicopters will have access to Kastner Heliport on Camp Zama.  Along with the transformation of Army headquarters in Japan, a battle command training center and other support facilities will be constructed within Sagami General Depot (SGD) using U.S. funding.  In relation to this transformation, the following measures for eff cient and effective use of Camp Zama and SGD will be implemented.  Some portions of land at SGD will be returned for local redevelopment (approximately 15 hectares (ha)) and for road and underground rail (approximately 2ha). Affected housing units will be relocated to Sagamihara Housing Area.  A specif ed area of open space in the northwest section of SGD (approximately 35ha) will be provided for local use when not required for contingency or training purposes.  Portions of the Chapel Hill housing area of Camp Zama (1.1ha) will be returned to the GOJ following relocation of affected housing units within Camp Zama. Further discussions on possible additional land returns at Chapel Hill will occur as appropriate. 3. Yokota Air Base and Airspace  ASDF Air Defense Command (ADC) and relevant units will relocate to Yokota Air Base in Japan FY2010. A bilateral master plan for base use will be developed to accommodate facility and infrastructure requirements.  A bilateral, joint operations coordination center (BJOCC), established at Yokota Air Base, will include a collocated air and missile defense coordination function. The USG and GOJ will fund their own required equipment and systems, respectively, while both sides will coordinate appropriate funding of shared use equipment and systems.  The following measures will be pursued to facilitate movement of civilian aircraft through Yokota airspace while satisfying military operational requirements.  Establish a program in Japan FY2006 to inform commercial aviation entities of existing procedures to transit Yokota airspace.  Return portions of Yokota airspace to Japanese control by September 2008; specif c portions will be identif ed by October 2006.  Develop procedures in Japan FY2006 for temporary transfers of air traff c control responsibility to Japanese authorities for portions of Yokota airspace, when not required for military purposes.  Study the conditions required for the possible return of the entire Yokota airspace as part of a comprehensive study of options for related airspace reconf gurations and changes in air traff c control procedures that would satisfy future patterns of Japanese airspace. The study will take into account both the lessons learned from the Kadena radar approach control (RAPCON) transfer experience and the lessons learned from experiences with collocation of U.S. forces and Japanese controllers in Japan. This study will be completed in Japan FY2009.  The USG and GOJ will conduct a study of the specif c conditions and modalities for possible civilian-military dual use of Yokota Air Base, to be completed within 12 months from commencement.  The study will be conducted on the shared understanding that dual-use must not compromise military operations and safety or the military operational capabilities of Yokota Air Base.  Based upon the outcome of this study, the two governments will consult and then make appropriate decisions on civilianmilitary dual-use. 4. Relocation of Carrier Air Wing from Atsugi Air Facility to Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS) Iwakuni  The relocation of Carrier Air Wing Five (CVW-5) squadrons from Atsugi Air Facility to MCAS Iwakuni, consisting of F/A-18, EA6B, E-2C, and C-2 aircraft, will be completed by 2014, subsequent to the following: (1) completion of necessary facilities, and (2) adjustment of training airspace and the Iwakuni RAPCON airspace.  Necessary facilities will be developed at Atsugi Air Facility to accommodate MSDF E/O/UP-3 squadrons and other aircraft from Iwakuni, taking into account the continued requirement for U.S. operations from Atsugi.  The KC-130 squadron will be based at MCAS Iwakuni with its headquarters, maintenance support facilities, and family support facilities. The aircraft will regularly deploy on a rotational basis for training and operations to MSDF Kanoya Base and Guam. To support the deployment of KC-l30 aircraft, necessary facilities will be developed at Kanoya.  U.S. Marine Corps CH-53D helicopters will be relocated from MCAS Iwakuni to Guam when the III MEF personnel relocate from Okinawa to Guam.  Training airspace and Iwakuni RAPCON airspace will be adjusted to fulf ll safely the training and operational requirements of U.S. forces, Japan SDF, and commercial aircraft (including those in neighboring airspace) through coordination by the Joint Committee.  A bilateral framework to conduct a study on a permanent f eldcarrier landing practice facility will be established, with the goal of selecting a permanent site by July 2009 or the earliest possible date thereafter.  Portions of the future civilian air facility will be accommodated at MCAS Iwakuni. 5. Missile Defense  As both sides deploy additional capabilities and improve their respective ballistic missile defense capabilities, close coordination will continue.  The optimum site for deployment of a new U.S. X-Band radar system has been designated as ASDF Shariki Base. Necessary arrangements and facility modif cations, funded by the USG, will be made before the radar becomes operational in summer 2006.  The USG will share X-Band radar data with the GOJ.  U.S. Patriot PAC-3 capabilities will be deployed to Japan within existing U.S. facilities and areas, becoming operational at the earliest possible time. 6. Training Relocation  Both sides will develop annual bilateral training plans beginning in Japan FY2007. As necessary, a supplemental plan for Japan FY2006 can be developed.  Initially, aircraft from three U.S. facilities — Kadena, Misawa, and Iwakuni — will participate in relocated training conducted from the following SDF facilities: Chitose, Misawa, Hyakuri, Komatsu, Tsuiki, and Nyutabaru. Both sides will work toward expanding use of SDF facilities for bilateral training and exercises in the future.  The GOJ will improve infrastructure for training relocation at SDF facilities as necessary after conducting site surveys.  Relocated training will not diminish the quality of training that is currently available to U.S. forces in Japan, taking into account facilities and training requirements.  In general, bilateral training will commence with participation of 1–5 aircraft for the duration of 1–7 days, and develop over time to participation of 6–12 aircraft for 8–14 days at a time.  At those SDF facilities at which terms of joint use are stipulated by Joint Committee agreements, limitations on the number of joint training events will be removed. Limitations on the total days and period per training event for joint use of each SDF facility will be maintained.  The USG and GOJ will share costs for bilateral training as appropriate, bearing in mind the priority of maintaining readiness. ----- **Reference 20 Joint Statement of the Security Consultative Committee** **(April 27, 2012)** **Joint Statement of the Security Consultative Committee (Outline)** **Preamble** (1) The U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee decided to adjust the plans outlined in the May 2006 Realignment Roadmap. (2) The Ministers decided to delink both the relocation of the Marine Corps from Okinawa to Guam and resulting land returns south of Kadena from progress on the Futenma Replacement Facility. (3) The Ministers aff rmed that the new posture of the U.S. Marine Corps, coupled with the enhancement of Japan’s defense posture and promotion of bilateral dynamic defense cooperation, would strengthen the deterrence capabilities of the overall U.S.-Japan Alliance. **I. Unit Composition in Guam and Okinawa** (1) The United States will locate Marine Air-Ground Task Forces (MAGTF) in Okinawa, Guam, and Hawaii and establish rotational deployment in Australia. (2) Approximately 9,000 Marines will be relocated from Okinawa to locations outside of Japan. (3) The end-state for the Marine Corps presence in Okinawa will be consistent with the levels in the Realignment Roadmap. (4) There will be approximately 5,000 Marines in Guam. (5) The preliminary cost estimate by the U.S. Government for the relocation of Marines to Guam is $8.6 billion. Japan’s f nancial commitment will be the f scal spending in the 2009 Guam International Agreement (up to $2.8 billion in U.S. f scal year 2008 dollars). Other forms of f nancial support (investment or loan) will not be utilized. Any contributions under the cooperation in 2. (2) below will be a part of the aforementioned commitment. **II. New Initiatives to Promote Regional Peace, Stability, and Prosperity** (1) The Ministers conf rmed the importance of promoting peace, stability, and prosperity in the Asia-Pacif c region. The government of Japan **Reference 21 Japan–U.S. (Minister-Level) Consultations (Since 2012)** will take various measures, including strategic use of ODA (ex: providing coastal states with patrol boats). (2) The two governments will consider cooperation for developing training areas in Guam and the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands for shared-use by the two countries, and will identify areas of cooperation by the end of 2012. **III. Land Returns in Okinawa** (1) (i) Areas eligible for immediate return upon completion of procedures: Portions of Camp Zukeran (West Futenma Housing area and a portion of the warehouse area of the Facilities and Engineering Compound), portions of Makiminato Service Area (north access road, area near Gate 5) (ii) Areas eligible for return following relocation within Okinawa: Portions of Makiminato Service Area (including the preponderance of the storage area), portions of Camp Zukeran (Industrial Corridor, etc.), Camp Kuwae, Naha Port, Army Petroleum, Oil, and Lubricant Depot Kuwae Tank Farm No.1 (iii) Areas eligible for return following Marine Corps’ relocation to locations outside of Japan: Portions of Camp Zukeran, the remainder of Makiminato Service Area (2) The two countries will jointly develop a consolidation plan for facilities and areas remaining in Okinawa by the end of 2012. **IV. Futenma Replacement Facility (FRF) and MCAS Futenma** (1) The Ministers reconf rmed that the existing relocation proposal is the only viable solution. (2) The two countries will contribute mutually to refurbishment projects necessary to safely operate MCAS Futenma until the FRF is fully operational and to protect the environment. (END) For the full text of the Joint Statement, see the MOD website. (http://www.mod.go.jp/j/approach/anpo/kyougi/js20120427.html) |Date|Type of Consultation/Place|Participants|Outline and Results| |---|---|---|---| |Aug. 3, 2012|Japan–U.S. Defense Ministers Meeting/ Washington, D.C.|Minister of Defense Morimoto Secretary of Defense Panetta|• Agreed on the importance of future research and discussion on the Guidelines • Agreed to accelerate deliberations on Japan-U.S. dynamic defense cooperation • Exchanged opinions on cooperation in equipment and technology, and BMD • Agreed to implement agreements in the “2+2” joint statement on realignment of U.S. Forces in Japan • Exchanged opinions on Ospreys| |Sep. 17, 2012|Japan–U.S. Defense Ministers Meeting/ Tokyo|Minister of Defense Morimoto Secretary of Defense Panetta|• Reaffi rmed Japan-U.S. collaboration on dynamic defense cooperation • Reaffi rmed the importance of research and discussion on the Guidelines • Agreed to continue Japan-U.S. adjustments concerning X-Band radars(TPY-2 radar) • Exchanged opinions on Ospreys • Agreed to make every effort to implement agreements in the “2+2” joint statement on realignment of U.S. Forces in Japan| |Apr. 29, 2013|Japan-U.S. Defense Ministers Meeting/ Washington, D.C.|Minister of Defense Onodera Secretary of Defense Hagel|• Agreed on the signifi cance of taking the Japan-U.S. cooperative relationship up to the next step • Confi rmed from the U.S that Article 5 of the U.S.-Japan security treaty applies to the Senkaku Islands and statement against unilateral actions forcefully trying to change the status quo on it • Welcomed the progress of discussion on perceptions of strategic environment, which were presupposed for reviewing the Guidelines, and agreed to continue intensive discussions • Confi rmed the establishment of defense ISR working group and confi rmed progress in deliberation on joint warning and surveillance activities from peacetime • Agreed to accelerate the works toward early deployment of TPY-2 radar to Japan • Agreed to steadily make progress on the USFJ realignment| |Aug. 28, 2013|Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting/ Brunei|Minister of Defense Onodera Secretary of Defense Hagel|• Reaffi rmed U.S. position on the Senkaku Islands issue • Confi rmed the importance of further promotion of Japan-U.S. defense cooperation in the area of cyber security • Welcomed the progress of bilateral discussions on strategic environment perspective, which serve as a basis for the revision of the Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation, and agreed to vigorously continue their discussion • Agreed to steadily make progress on the realignment of U.S. Forces in Japan • Following the crash accident of an HH-60 helicopter, Japan requested the U.S. to pay due consideration for public safety, take safety measures and investigate the cause of the accident. Secretary Hagel stated that he will ensure utmost safety of local areas • Exchanged views on safe operation of the MV-22 Osprey.| |Oct. 3, 2013|Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting/ Tokyo|Minister of Defense Onodera Secretary of Defense Hagel|• Reaffi rmed U.S. position on the Senkaku Islands issue • Confi rmed to develop trilateral cooperation among Japan, the U.S. and Australia as well as among Japan, the U.S. and the ROK • Welcomed the establishment of the “Cyber Defense Policy Working Group (CDPWG)” as a framework between Japanese and U.S. defense offi cials • Agreed to vigorously continue their discussion on the revision of the Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation • Agreed to accelerate work for the early deployment of a TPY-2 radar system • Agreed to steadily make progress on the realignment of U.S. Forces in Japan • Exchanged views on safe operation of the MV-22 Osprey| Oct. 3, 2013 Japan-U.S. Security Minister of Defense - Resolve to be full partners in a more balanced and effective Alliance Consultative Onodera - Welcomed Japanese efforts to prepare to establish its National Security Council (NSC) and issue its National Security Strategy (NSS), Committee (“2+2”)/ Minister of Foreign to reexamine the legal basis for its security, to expand its defense budget, to review its National Defense Program Guidelines, and to Tokyo Affairs Kishida strengthen its capability to defend its sovereign territory Secretary of Defense - Directed the Subcommittee for Defense Cooperation (SDC) to complete work on the revision of the Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Hagel Cooperation before the end of 2014 Secretary of State Kerry - Agreed to strengthen bilateral cooperation in security and defense, including cyberspace and space - Agreed to strengthen cooperation in the region, including trilateral cooperation among Japan, the U.S. and Australia as well as among Japan, the U.S. and the ROK - Confi rmed that the plan to construct the Futenma Replacement Facility (FRF) at Camp Schwab-Henokosaki area is the only solution that avoids the continued use of Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS) Futenma - Announced the signing of a Protocol to amend the 2009 Guam International Agreement - Confi rmed that deployment of more advanced capabilities in Japan, such as U.S. Navy P-8 maritime patrol aircraft and Global Hawk d i ft h t t i i ifi ----- |Date|Type of Consultation/Place|Participants|Outline and Results| |---|---|---|---| |Apr. 6, 2014|Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting/ Tokyo|Minister of Defense Onodera Secretary of Defense Hagel|• Reaffi rmed U.S. position on the Senkaku Islands issue • Agreed to oppose any coercive attempt to alter the status quo in the East China Sea and other areas • Agreed to advance trilateral cooperation, including cooperation among Japan, the U.S. and Australia and among Japan, the U.S. and the ROK, and also to strengthen cooperation with Southeast Asian countries • Agreed to strengthen deterrence and response capabilities of the Japan-U.S. Alliance by steadily making progress in broad bilateral defense cooperation, including the revision of the Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation • Secretary Hagel stated that he plans to deploy two additional BMD (ballistic missile defense)-equipped Aegis ships to Japan by 2017 • Minister Onodera explained the gist of “Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology,” and secretary welcomed Japan’s effort in this area • Confi rmed that Japan and the U.S. would further accelerate specifi c cooperation in efforts to mitigate the impact on Okinawa • Welcomed the recent progress in the realignment of U.S. Forces in Japan| |May. 31, 2014|Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting/ Singapore|Minister of Defense Onodera Secretary of Defense Hagel|• Agreed that they would oppose any coercive attempt to alter the status quo in the East China Sea and other areas • Minister Onodera welcomed the temporary deployment of Global Hawk to Misawa Air Base and the additional deployment of a second AN/TPY-2 radar system to Japan • Agreed to continue to strengthen cooperation with Southeast Asian countries • Minister Onodera explained that the Japanese government has begun domestic discussions on Japan’s defense policy. The U.S. welcomed and supported such efforts by Japan • Agreed to strengthen deterrence and response capabilities of the Japan-U.S. Alliance by steadily making progress in broad bilateral defense cooperation, including the revision of the Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation • Agreed to steadily make progress on the realignment of U.S. Forces in Japan • Agreed to promptly and steadily make progress on the realignment of U.S. Forces in Japan, including construction of the Futenma Replacement Facility • Confi rmed that Japan and the U.S. will accelerate specifi c cooperation in mitigating the impact on Okinawa| |Jul. 11, 2014|Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting/ Washington, D.C.|Minister of Defense Onodera Secretary of Defense Hagel|• Confi rmed U.S. position on the Senkaku Islands • Agreed to oppose any coercive attempt to alter the status quo in the East China Sea and other areas • Agreed in addition to close bilateral cooperation between Japan and the U.S. to advanc trilateral cooperation among Japan, the U.S., and the ROK and Japan, the U.S., and Australia • The Japanese side explained the purport of the Cabinet decision on the development of a new security legislation. The U.S. side welcomed and supported this effort. • Agreed to release an interim report on the work to revise the Guidelines at an appropriate timing • Agreed to further deepen bilateral cooperation on equipment and technology in light of the Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology • Agreed to proceed swiftly and steadily with the realignment of the U.S. Forces in Japan, including the relocation of MCAS Futenma to Camp Schwab • Welcomed the relocation of KC-130 squadron from MCAS Futenma to MCAS Iwakuni • The Japanese side raised the issue of noise caused by the fl ight of transient aircrafts at MCAS Futenma, among other matters. The U.S. side expressed its commitment to discuss measures to mitigate the impact of the presence of the U.S. Forces in Okinawa.| |Apr. 8, 2015|Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting/ Tokyo|Minister of Defense Nakatani Secretary of Defense Carter|• Confi rmed U.S. position on the Senkaku Islands • Agreed that they would continue to oppose any coercive attempt that would alter the status quo in any area, including the East China Sea • Confi rmed strong intent to further deepen the Japan-U.S. Alliance through the process of the revision of the Guidelines • The Japanese side explained the status of discussions pertaining to the development of the security legislation. The U.S. side welcomed and supported this effort. • Instructed their respective authorities to consider establishing a new framework for cooperation related to space between the two defense authorities, bearing in mind that risks to the stable use of space and cyberspace are common security challenges to the two countries • Welcomed the progress on the efforts to develop a maintenance base shared by the two countries, namely, the U.S. decision to establish a regional depot for the F-35 in Japan, and agreed to further deepen bilateral cooperation on equipment and technology • Reaffi rmed that the relocation to Camp Schwab is the only solution that avoids the continued use of MCAS Futenma • The Japanese side requested continued cooperation to mitigrate impact on Okinawa. The U.S. side expressed its commitment to discuss measures to mitigate the impact of the presence of the U.S. Forces in Okinawa.| |Apr. 27, 2015|Japan-U.S. Security Consultative Committee (“2+2”) Meeting/ New York|Minister of Defense Nakatani Minister for Foreign Affairs Kishida Secretary of Defense Carter Secretary of State Kerry|• Released the new Guidelines, and confi rmed that they would further strengthen the deterrence and response capabilities of the Japan- U.S. Alliance • Reaffi rmed U.S. position on the Senkaku Islands (reiterated in the Joint Statement) • Shared recognition on the importance of “rule of law,” including the recent situation in the South China Sea, and agreed that unilateral attempts to alter the status quo cannot be neglected and they would work with the international community to advance various efforts • Reaffi rmed that the relocation to Camp Schwab is the only solution that avoids the continued use of MCAS Futenma • The Japanese side requested cooperation to mitigaty the impact on Okinawa. The U.S. side is committed to mitigating impact. • Confi rmed intent to continue negotiation on the ancillary documents of a supplementary Agreemet on cooperation in the Field of Environmental Stewardship as quickly as possible| |Apr. 28, 2015|Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting/ Washington, D.C.|Minister of Defense Nakatani Secretary of Defense Carter|• Exchanged views on the situation in the South China Sea, and agreed to continue to strengthening cooperation with Southeast Asian countries • Agreed to further advance Japan-U.S.-ROK defense cooperation • Confi rmed that the new Guidelines will strengthen the deterrence and response capabilities of the Japan-U.S. Alliance and the importance of swiftly implementing the new Guidelines • The Japanese side explained the development of the security legislation. The U.S. side welcomed and supported Japan’s efforts in this regard. • Welcomed the establishment of the “Space Cooperation Working Group” as a framework for cooperation related to space between the two defense authorities • Reaffi rmed that the relocation to Camp Schwab is the only solution that avoids the continued use of MCAS Futenma • The Japanese side explained the importance of mitigating the impact on Okinawa and requested U.S. cooperation. The U.S. side stated that it would continue efforts such as realizing bilateral plans pertaining to U.S. base the consolidation in Okinawa. • Agreed to seek early agreement on a framework for reciprocal defense procurement and to further deepen equipment and technology cooperation.| May 30, 2015 Japan-U.S. Defense Minister of Defense - Agreed that they would oppose any coercive attempt that would alter the status quo in the East China Sea, South China Sea, and other Ministerial Meeting/ Nakatani areas Singapore Secretary of Defense - Agreed to further advance trilateral defense cooperation, such as Japan-U.S.-ROK and Japan-U.S.-Australia cooperation Carter - Agreed to continue strengthening cooperation with Southeast Asian countries in terms of contributing to regional peace and stability - The Japanese side explained the recent Cabinet decision on the Peace and Security Legislation and the commencement of Diet deliberations. Confi rmed that the legislation would lead to ensuring the effectiveness of the new Guidelines. - Confi rmed that they would continue to make steady efforts to ensure the effectiveness of the new Guidelines, such as establishing the new Alliance Coordination Mechanism, developing bilateral plans, and expeditions negotiations on an Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement - Welcomed the fact that the outcome of the discussions in the Cyber Defense Policy Working Group was compiled, and agreed to further strengthen bilateral cooperation on cyberspace - The Japanese side explained that it will continue to make every effort to realize the return of MCAS Futenma and its relocation to Camp Schwab as quickly as possible, and stated that the relocation to Camp Schwab is the only solution that avoids the continued use of MCAS Futenma - The Japanese side explained the importance of mitigating the impact on Okinawa and requested U.S. cooperation. The U.S. side stated that it would continue to cooperate on mitigating the impact on Okinawa. - The Japanese side stated that it is explaining to the Japanese people that the deployment of the CV-22 Osprey to Japan from 2017 would enhance deterrence and response capabilities of the Japan-U.S. Alliance and contribute to stability in the Asia-Pacifi c region. However, in light of the accident in Hawaii, the Japanese side requested provision of necessary information focused on ensuring safety, including information on the accident. The U.S. side stated that it would provide necessary information and ensure safe operation of the ----- **Reference 22 Joint Statement of the Security Consultative Committee** **(October 3, 2013)** **Toward a More Robust Alliance and Greater Shared Responsibilities** **(Outline)** **I. Overview** **(1) Strategic vision of the U.S.-Japan Alliance** G The United States and Japan resolve to be full partners in a more balanced and effective Alliance. G The two countries will ref ect their shared values of democracy, among others. They will promote peace, security, stability, and economic prosperity in the region. G Basic initiatives: (i) Revising the Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation; (ii) Expanding security and defense cooperation; and (iii) New measures that support the realignment of U.S. forces in Japan. **(2)** The Ministers reiterated the United States’ continued implementation **of its rebalance to the Asia-Pacif c region and their commitment** towards the realignment of U.S. forces in Japan. **(3) Japan’s security policy** G Japan will make more proactive contributions to addressing the challenges faced by the international community. G Japan will continue coordinating closely with the United States to expand its role within the framework of the U.S.-Japan Alliance. G Concrete efforts: (i) Prepare to establish the National Security Council (NSC) and to issue the National Security Strategy (NSS); (ii) Re-examine the legal basis for Japan’s security including the matter of exercising its right of collective self-defense; (iii) Expand the defense budget; (iv) Review the National Defense Program Guidelines; (v) Strengthen defense capability; and (vi) Broaden regional contributions. G The United States welcomed these efforts and reiterated its commitment to collaborate closely with Japan. **(4) Recognition of the regional situation** G Threats to peace and security and challenges to international norms: (i) North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs and humanitarian concerns; (ii) Coercive and destabilizing behaviors in the maritime domain; (iii) Disruptive activities in space and cyberspace; and (iv) Proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, among others. The Ministers continue to encourage China to play a responsible and constructive role in regional stability and prosperity, to adhere to international norms of behavior, as well as to improve openness and transparency in its military modernization with its rapid expanding military investments. **II. Bilateral Security and Defense Cooperation** **(1) Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation** G The two countries will revise the 1997 Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation. G Objectives include: (i) Ensuring the capacity to respond to an armed attack against Japan, which is a core aspect of U.S.-Japan defense cooperation; (ii) Expanding the scope of cooperation to ref ect the global nature of the Alliance; (iii) Promoting deeper security cooperation with regional partners; (iv) Enhancing mechanisms for consultation and coordination; (v) Describing appropriate role-sharing based on the enhancement of mutual capabilities; (vi) Evaluating the concepts that guide defense cooperation in contingencies to ensure effective, eff cient, and seamless response; and (vii) Exploring additional ways in which the Alliance can be strengthened. G The Ministers directed that this task for the Subcommittee for Defense Cooperation (SDC) be completed before the end of 2014. **(2) BMD cooperation: The Ministers conf rmed their intention to** designate the base at Kyogamisaki as the deployment site for a second TPY-2 radar. **(3) Cooperation in cyberspace: The Ministers stressed the need for** close coordination with the private sector. The two countries will promote a whole-of-government approach. The Ministers welcomed the signing of a Terms of Reference for a Cyber Defense Policy Working Group. **(4) Cooperation in space: The Ministers welcomed the conclusion of** the U.S.-Japan space situational awareness (SSA) Sharing Agreement and an early realization of the Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency’s (JAXA) provision of SSA information to the United States. **(5) Joint ISR (Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance): The** Ministers welcomed the establishment of a Defense ISR Working Group. **(6) Joint/shared use of facilities: In order to strengthen the Self-** Defense Forces posture in areas, including the southwestern islands, among other objectives, the Ministers welcomed the efforts of the J i /Sh d U W ki G P h j i / h d strengthens the Alliance s deterrent capabilities while building a stronger relationship with local communities. **(7) Planning: The Ministers welcomed progress on bilateral planning** and reaff rmed efforts toward ref ning the plans. **(8) Defense equipment and technology cooperation: The Ministers** welcomed the linkage between discussions on equipment and technology cooperation and dialogue on Roles, Missions, and Capabilities. Through collaboration such as the participation of Japanese industries in the production of the F-35 aircraft, cooperation should deepen as Japan examines its Three Principles on Arms Exports and their related policy guidelines. **(9) Extended Deterrence Dialogue: The Ministers noted with** satisfaction the outcome of Extended Deterrence Dialogues. The dialogue will be held on a regular basis. **(10) Information security: The SCC members welcomed the serious** efforts by Japan in establishing a legal framework for information security. **(11) Joint training and exercises: The Ministers decided to take** advantage of various opportunities to increase training outside of Okinawa. They include Osprey’s participation in operations in mainland Japan and elsewhere to reduce the amount of time located and training in Okinawa. **(12) Host Nation Support (HNS): The Ministers aff rmed the importance** of HNS. **III. Regional Engagement** **(1) Capacity building:** The SCC members resolved to collaborate on capacity building. The Ministers welcomed the strategic use of Off cial Development Assistance by Japan. **(2) Maritime security: The Ministers aff rmed their intent to cooperate** further in maritime security and counter-piracy. **(3) Humanitarian assistance/disaster relief:** The two countries will extend bilateral cooperation. The Ministers encouraged efforts to promote trilateral and multilateral coordination. **(4) Trilateral cooperation:** The Ministers noted the success of the trilateral dialogues carried out regularly with Australia and the Republic of Korea. **(5) Multilateral cooperation:** The Ministers noted the importance of efforts to strengthen institutions that promote economic and security cooperation. **IV. Realignment of U.S. forces in Japan** **(1) Realignment on Okinawa** G Land returns: The Ministers welcomed the progress on land returns based on the April 2013 Consolidation Plan. G Relocation of Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS) Futenma: The Ministers conf rmed that the relocation of MCAS Futenma to Camp Schwab-Henokosaki area is the only solution that avoids its continued use. The SCC members reaff rmed the strong commitment of both governments. The United States welcomed recent developments including the submission of the request for approval of public water reclamation permit to Okinawa Prefecture by the government of Japan in March 2013. G Hotel-Hotel training area: The Ministers gave directions to reach an arrangement in principle for the partial lifting of restrictions for a portion of said area by the end of November 2013. The two countries will continue to consult on other possible measures. G Environment: The Ministers decided to reach a substantial understanding by the end of November 2013 on a framework for access to U.S. facilities and areas slated for return, for the purpose of facilitating planning of land use prior to its return. **(2) Iwakuni** G The Ministers conf rmed that the consultations on the relocation of a KC-130 squadron from MCAS Futenma to MCAS Iwakuni would be accelerated. G The SCC Members aff rmed that the Maritime Self-Defense Force would continue to have a presence at MCAS Iwakuni. G The Ministers acknowledged that the relocation of Carrier Air Wing Five to MCAS Iwakuni should be completed by around 2017. **(3) Guam** G The Ministers conf rmed the importance of relocating U.S. Marine Corps in Okinawa to locations outside of Japan (mitigates the impact on Okinawa, sustains the forward presence of U.S. forces, and facilitates the development of Guam as a strategic hub). G The Ministers announced the signing of a Protocol to amend the 2009 Guam International Agreement. G The Ministers noted the signif cance of Japanese cash contributions to the development of training areas in Guam and the Commonwealth of Northern Mariana Islands, which benef t the Alliance by supporting the relocation of U.S. Marine Corps to Guam and by enabling the shared use of these training areas by U.S. forces and the Self-Defense Forces. G The Ministers completed work refecting the breakdown of costs ----- supports the ongoing efforts to develop the legislation, which is to ref ect Japan’s policy of “Proactive Contributions to Peace” and its July 2014 cabinet decision. The core of the Guidelines continues to be the steadfast commitment to Japan’s peace and security. The new Guidelines detail the ways and means through which the two governments continue to strengthen their ability to fulf ll that commitment through seamless, robust, f exible, and effective Alliance responses while expanding bilateral cooperation across a range of other areas, such as: Alliance Coordination Mechanism: Under the new Guidelines the two countries are establishing a standing, whole-of-government mechanism for Alliance coordination, enabling a seamless response in all phases, from peacetime to contingencies. Regional and Global Cooperation: The new Guidelines enable the Alliance to make greater contributions to international security initiatives wherever appropriate in a way consistent with Japanese laws and regulations, such as peacekeeping operations, maritime security, and logistic support. The Ministers reiterated the importance of cooperating with regional and other partners as well as with international organizations. New Strategic Cooperation: A dynamic world requires a modern Alliance, and the new Guidelines lay a foundation for the two countries to cooperate in space and cyberspace and in conducting operations intended to have effects across domains. Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief: The new Guidelines describe ways the two governments can work together to improve further the effectiveness of bilateral cooperation in responding to a large-scale disaster in Japan or around the world. A Strong Foundation: The new Guidelines also describe programs and activities that pay dividends in every aspect of bilateral cooperation, including defense equipment and technology cooperation, intelligence cooperation and information security, and educational and research exchanges. The Ministers conf rmed their intention to start bilateral work under the new Guidelines. In this context, the SCC directed the SDC to implement the new Guidelines, including establishing the standing Alliance Coordination Mechanism and upgrading the Bilateral Planning Mechanism, thereby strengthening bilateral planning. The Ministers also expressed their intention to negotiate expeditiously an acquisition and cross-servicing agreement to operationalize the mutual logistics cooperation envisioned by the new Guidelines. **3. BILATERAL SECURITY AND DEFENSE COOPERATION** The Ministers noted with satisfaction ongoing progress to strengthen the Alliance’s deterrence and response capabilities by enhancing bilateral security and defense cooperation in a variety of areas. The Ministers: - conf rmed the strategic importance of deploying the most modern and advanced U.S. capabilities to Japan, which enhances Alliance deterrence and contributes to the security of Japan and the Asia-Pacif c region. In this context, the Ministers welcomed the deployment of U.S. Navy P-8 maritime patrol aircraft to Kadena Air Base, the rotational deployment of U.S. Air Force Global Hawk unmanned aerial vehicles to Misawa Air Base, the deployment of the USS Green Bay, an upgraded amphibious transport ship, and U.S. plans to deploy Marine Corps F-35B aircraft to Japan in 2017. In addition, the Ministers welcomed U.S. plans to deploy additional Aegis ships to Yokosuka Naval Base by 2017, as well as the swap-out of the aircraft carrier USS George Washington with the more advanced USS Ronald Reagan later this year; - committed to continued engagement through the bilateral Extended Deterrence Dialogue, which reinforces the credibility of the U.S. defense commitment to Japan, including through discussion of nuclear and conventional capabilities; - stressed the importance of sustained cooperation in enhancing Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) capabilities, particularly the deployment of a second AN/TPY-2 radar (X-band radar) system to Kyogamisaki in December 2014 and the planned deployment of two additional BMDcapable destroyers to Japan by 2017. Working in concert, these assets are to directly contribute to the defense of Japan and the United States; - highlighted enhanced collaboration on space security, particularly in the areas of resiliency and developing capabilities, through the wholeof-government Japan-U.S. Comprehensive Dialogue on Space and the Space Security Dialogue. The Ministers also highlighted increased cooperation resulting from the Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency’s provision of space situational awareness (SSA) information to the United States, as well as the establishment of a new framework to discuss space-related issues between the two defense authorities; - called for continued progress in cooperation on cyberspace issues, particularly in the areas of threat information sharing, mission assurance, and critical infrastructure protection, through the whole-ofgovernment Japan-U.S. Cyber Dialogue and the Cyber Defense Policy Working Group; - lauded enhanced Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) cooperation, particularly the rotational deployment of U.S. Air Force associated with developing facilities, including training areas, and infrastructure. G The Ministers announced that the relocation of U.S. Marine Corps units from Okinawa to Guam will begin in the f rst half of the 2020s. **(4) Advanced capabilities** G The Ministers conf rmed the importance of deploying and utilizing more advanced capabilities in Japan: (i) MV-22; (ii) P-8 (after December 2013); (iii) Global Hawk (after spring 2014); and (iv) F-35B (2017). For the full text of the Joint Statement, see the MOD website. (http://www.mod.go.jp/j/approach/anpo/kyougi/js20131003_e.html) **Reference 23 Joint Statement of the Security Consultative Committee** **(April 27, 2015)** **A STRONGER ALLIANCE FOR A DYNAMIC SECURITY ENVIRONMENT** **The New Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation** **1. OVERVIEW** Minister for Foreign Affairs Fumio Kishida, Minister of Defense Gen Nakatani, Secretary of State John Kerry, and Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter convened the Japan-U.S. Security Consultative Committee (SCC) in New York on April 27, 2015. In light of the evolving security environment, the Ministers reconf rmed the Alliance’s commitment to the security of Japan and to the maintenance of international peace and security. The Ministers announced the approval and release of new, revised “Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation” (the Guidelines), which update the roles and missions of the two countries and promote a more balanced and effective Alliance to meet the emerging security challenges of the 21st century. The Ministers discussed a variety of regional and global challenges, initiatives to enhance bilateral security and defense cooperation in various areas, promotion of enhanced regional cooperation, and moving forward on the realignment of U.S. forces in Japan. As articulated in its 2015 National Security Strategy, the United States is actively implementing its rebalance to the Asia-Pacif c region. Central to this is the ironclad U.S. commitment to the defense of Japan, through the full range of U.S. military capabilities, including nuclear and conventional. Japan highly values U.S. engagement in the region. In this context, the Ministers reaff rmed the indispensable role of the Japan-U.S. Alliance in promoting regional peace, security, and prosperity. As Japan continues its policy of “Proactive Contribution to Peace,” based on the principle of international cooperation, the United States welcomes and supports Japan’s recent monumental achievements. Among these are: the cabinet decision by the Government of Japan on July 1, 2014, for developing seamless security legislation; the creation of its National Security Council; the Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology; the Act on the Protection of Specially Designated Secrets; the Basic Act on Cybersecurity; the new Basic Plan on Space Policy; and the Development Cooperation Charter. The Ministers aff rmed that the Japan-U.S. Alliance, strengthened by the new Guidelines and the two countries’ respective security and defense policies, continues to serve as the cornerstone of peace and security in the Asia-Pacif c region as well as a platform for promoting a more peaceful and stable international security environment. The Ministers also reaff rmed that the Senkaku Islands are territories under the administration of Japan and therefore fall within the scope of the commitments under Article 5 of the Japan-U.S. Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security, and that they oppose any unilateral action that seeks to undermine Japan’s administration of these islands. **2. THE NEW GUIDELINES FOR JAPAN-U.S. DEFENSE COOPERATION** The Guidelines, which were f rst approved on November 27, 1978, and revised on September 23, 1997, have provided a general framework and policy direction for the roles and missions of the two countries, as well as ways of cooperation and coordination. At the SCC meeting in Tokyo on October 3, 2013, the Ministers shared views on the evolving security environment and directed the Subcommittee for Defense Cooperation (SDC) to draft recommended changes to the 1997 Guidelines to ensure that the Alliance continues its vital role in deterring conf ict and advancing peace and security. Today, the SCC approved the SDC’s recommended new Guidelines, which accomplishes the objectives outlined by the Ministers in October 2013. The new Guidelines, which replace the 1997 Guidelines, update the general framework and policy direction for the roles and missions of the two countries and manifest a strategic vision for a more robust Alliance and greater shared responsibilities by modernizing the Alliance and enhancing its deterrence and response capabilities in all phases, from peacetime to contingencies. Recognizing the signif cance of ensuring consistency between the new Guidelines and Japan’s efforts to develop seamless security legislation, the Ministers acknowledged that such legislation would make bilateral efforts under the new Guidelines more effective The United States welcomes and ----- Global Hawk unmanned aerial vehicles to Misawa Air Base and Japan s plans to procure advanced ISR platforms; - praised expanded logistics and defense equipment cooperation, as ref ected by Japan’s new Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology and the recent U.S. decision to establish an F-35 regional maintenance, repair, overhaul, and upgrade capability in Japan. The Ministers highlighted strengthened defense equipment cooperation through the linkage of the Systems and Technology Forum and the Alliance Roles, Missions, and Capabilities dialogue, which facilitates joint research and development of advanced capabilities; and - aff rmed the importance of enhanced information security cooperation, as ref ected by continued progress through the Bilateral Information Security Consultations and by Japan’s implementation of the Act on the Protection of Specially Designated Secrets. As a result of this legislation, the Government of Japan has put in place the policies, practices, and procedures necessary to facilitate the secure exchange of sensitive information in peacetime and during contingencies. In addition, the Ministers aff rmed that host nation support has demonstrated continued Japanese support for the forward-deployed presence of U.S. forces in Japan, which contributes to Japan’s peace and security in an increasingly complex security environment. The Ministers, noting that the current host nation support commitment, as stipulated in June 2011 SCC documents, expires in March 2016, expressed their intention to start consultations on future arrangements to provide an appropriate level of host nation support. Recognizing the expanding scope of bilateral activities, the Ministers aff rmed their intent to consider at the earliest opportunity an appropriate bilateral consultation framework that would enhance the eff ciency and effectiveness of Alliance management processes. **4. REGIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION** Recognizing the Japan-U.S. Alliance as the cornerstone of peace and security in the Asia-Pacif c region as well as a platform for promoting a more peaceful and stable international security environment, the Ministers highlighted recent progress in the following areas: - Increased cooperation in Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief operations, as ref ected by close coordination in responding to the November 2013 typhoon in the Philippines; - Continued close coordination on partner capacity building, particularly in Southeast Asia, including through the provision of coastal patrol vessels and other maritime security capacity building endeavors; and - Expanded trilateral and multilateral cooperation, particularly with key partners such as the Republic of Korea (ROK) and Australia, as well as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations. The Ministers highlighted the recent signing of a trilateral information sharing arrangement with the ROK concerning the nuclear and missile threats posed by North Korea, and resolved to utilize the framework as the foundation for expanded trilateral cooperation into the future. The Ministers also aff rmed their intention to pursue closer cooperation with Australia on capacity building activities in Southeast Asia, and on security and defense issues through the Security and Defense Cooperation Forum. **5. REALIGNMENT OF U.S. FORCES IN JAPAN** The Ministers reaff rmed the two governments’ continued commitment to implement the existing arrangements on the realignment of U.S. forces in Japan as soon as possible, while ensuring operational capability, including training capability, throughout the process. The Ministers underscored their commitment to maintaining a robust and f exible force posture that enhances deterrence by strengthening the capability to respond effectively to future challenges and threats, while also mitigating the impact of U.S. forces on local communities. In this context, the Ministers welcomed the relocation of the KC-130 squadron from Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS) Futenma to MCAS Iwakuni and conf rmed their commitment to continue aviation training relocation, including to locations outside of Okinawa, through efforts such as the development of training areas and facilities. As an essential element of this effort, the Ministers reconf rmed that the plan to construct the Futenma Replacement Facility (FRF) at the Camp Schwab-Henokosaki area and adjacent waters is the only solution that addresses operational, political, f nancial, and strategic concerns and avoids the continued use of MCAS Futenma. The Ministers reaff rmed the two governments’ unwavering commitment to the plan and underscored their strong determination to achieve its completion and the long-desired return of MCAS Futenma to Japan. The United States welcomes the steady and continuing progress of FRF construction projects. The Ministers also reconf rmed the importance of land returns south of Kadena Air Base based on the 2006 “Roadmap” and the April 2013 Consolidation Plan, and reiterated the two governments’ determination to work continuously on the implementation of the plan and anticipated the update of the plan by Spring 2016. The Ministers highlighted the on-time return of the West Futenma Housing Area of Camp Zukeran on March 31 of this year, which marked the most signif cant land return completed to date in accordance with the plan The Ministers conf rmed that the two governments are steadily implementing the relocation of U.S. Marine Corps personnel from Okinawa to locations outside of Japan, including Guam, based upon the amended Guam International Agreement. The Ministers reaff rmed their commitment to strengthening cooperation to protect the environment and conf rmed the importance of making further efforts in environmental matters. To that end, the Ministers welcomed progress on a supplementary Agreement on Cooperation in the Field of Environmental Stewardship and conf rmed their intention to continue negotiating the ancillary documents of the Agreement as expeditiously as possible. ----- **Reference 24 Record of Japan U.S. Bilateral Exercises in FY2014** |Joint Training|Col2|Col3|Col4|Col5|Col6| |---|---|---|---|---|---| |Training Designation|Date|Location|Japan|United States|Reference| |Japan-U.S. Joint Exercise (fi eld exercise)|Nov. 8–19, 2014|Japan’s surrounding seas and airspace, bases of the SDF and U.S. Forces, etc.|Joint Staff Offi ce of GSDF, MSDF and ASDF; Defense Intelligence Headquarters; District Armies; Central Readiness Force (CRF); Self Defense Fleet; Air Defense Command; Air Support Command, etc. Totaling approximately 30,700 personnel|Headquarters, U.S. Forces, Japan; U.S. Army, Japan; U.S. Seventh Fleet; U.S. Pacifi c Air Forces; III Marine Expeditionary Force, etc. Totaling approximately 10,000 personnel|Exercise and training for Japan-U.S. coordination| |Ground Self-Defense Force|Col2|Col3|Col4|Col5|Col6| |---|---|---|---|---|---| |Training Designation|Date|Location|Japan|United States|Reference| |Japan-U.S. joint District Army command post exercise (YS-66)|Jun. 17–28, 2014|Fort Shafter|Eastern Army, Ground Staff Offi ce, etc. Totaling approximately 130 personnel|First Army; U.S. Army, Pacifi c Command, etc. Totaling approximately 100 personnel|Exercise and training for Japan-U.S. coordination| |Field training with U.S. Army in the U.S.|Aug. 29–Sep. 28, 2014|Yakima Training Center, Washington|Twelfth Brigade Totaling approximately 350 personnel|2-2 Stryker Brigade Combat Team, major units of 4-23 Infantry Battalion Approximately 300 personnel|Exercise and training for Japan-U.S. coordination| |Field training with U.S. Marines in Japan Part 1|Dec. 1–12, 2014|Oyanohara training area, Camp Takayuubaru|Eighth Division Totaling approximately 250 personnel|Major units of 2nd Battalion, 9th Regiment, 3rd Marine Division Totaling approximately 250 personnel|Exercise and training for Japan-U.S. coordination| |Japan-U.S. joint District Army fi eld training (YS-67)|Dec. 2–15, 2014|Camp Asaka, etc.|Eastern Army, etc. Totaling approximately 4,500 personnel|First Army; U.S. Army, Pacifi c Command; U.S. Army, Japan; III Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF), etc. Totaling approximately 2,000 personnel|Exercise and training for Japan-U.S. coordination| |Field training with U.S. Army in Japan Part 1|Oct. 27–Nov. 7, 2014|Hokkaido-Dai Maneuver Area|Seventh Division Totaling approximately 900 personnel|Seventh Division, 2-2 Brigade Totaling approximately 850 personnel|Exercise and training for Japan-U.S. coordination| |Field training with U.S. Marines in the U.S.|Jan. 19–Mar. 7, 2015|Camp Pendleton, California, etc.|Western Army Infantry Regiment, etc. Totaling approximately 270 personnel|I Marine Expeditionary Force Totaling approximately 500 personnel|Exercise and training for Japan-U.S. coordination| |Field training with U.S. Marines in Japan Part 2|Jan. 28–Feb. 8, 2015|Iwatesan training area, Camp Iwate, etc.|Ninth Division Totaling approximately 250 personnel|1st Battalion, 4th Regiment, 3rd Marine Division Totaling approxim 270 personnel|Exercise and training for Japan-U.S. coordination| |Field training with U.S. Army in Japan Part 2|Feb. 9–22, 2015|Yausubetsu training area|Fifth Brigade Totaling approximately 150 personnel|1-501 Infantry Battalion, 4-25 Brigade Combat Team Totaling approximately 50 personnel|Exercise and training for Japan-U.S. coordination| **Maritime Self-Defense Force** |Training Design|Date|Location|Japan|United States|Reference| |---|---|---|---|---|---| |Minesweeping special training|Jul. 18–30, 2014|Mutsu Bay|22 vessels, 13 aircraft|One vessel, two aircraft, approximately eight underwater disposal personnel|Minesweeping training| |Antisubmarine special training|Aug. 20–24, 2014|Sea areas surrounding Okinawa|Two vessels, several aircraft|Four vessels, several aircraft|Antisubmarine training| |Sanitation special training|Oct. 8, 2014|Areas managed by units and U.S. Naval Hospital Yokosuka|Yokosuka District, etc. Totaling approximately 100 personnel|U.S. Naval Hospital Yokosuka, etc. Totaling approximately 350 personnel|Sanitation training| |Minesweeping special training|Nov. 20–30, 2014|Hyuga-nada|23 vessels, 3 aircraft|Approximately six underwater disposal personnel|Minesweeping training| |Base security special training|Dec. 8–12, 2014|U.S. Naval Base Yokosuka and Yokosuka Port|Yokosuka District, etc. Totaling approximately 170 personnel|U.S. Naval Base Yokosuka Military Police Totaling approximately 40 personnel|Japan-U.S. coordination in base security, etc.| |Antisubmarine special training|Feb. 8–16, 2015|Sea areas from off the Shikoku region to southern Kyushu|Seven vessels, several aircraft|One vessel|Antisubmarine training| |BMD special training|Feb. 24–27, 2015|U.S. Naval Base Yokosuka and premises of U.S. Fleet Activities Sasebo, etc.|Self-Defense Fleet Headquarters, two vessels, etc.|Seventh Fleet Headquarters, several vessels, etc.|BMD training| |Japan-U.S. joint command post exercise|Mar. 2–12, 2015|U.S. Naval Academy|Maritime Staff Offi ce, etc. Totaling approximately 30 personnel|U.S. Navy, Japan, Headquarters, etc. Totaling approximately 40 personnel|Training and exercise for Japan-U.S. coordination| |Air Self-Defense Force|Col2|Col3|Col4|Col5|Col6| |---|---|---|---|---|---| |Training Design|Date|Location|Japan|United States|Reference| |Air defense combat training|Apr. 4 2014|Airspace around Okinawa|Aircraft 6|Aircraft 6|Enhancement of joint response capabilities, enhancement of combat skills| |Air defense combat training Aerial fueling training|May 30 2014|Airspace around Okinawa|Aircraft 10|Aircraft 11|Enhancement of joint response capabilities, enhancement of combat skills| |Air defense combat training Aerial fueling training|Jun. 5 2014|Airspace off Komatsu|Aircraft 10|Aircraft 1|Enhancement of joint response capabilities, enhancement of combat skills| |Fighter combat training Air-to-surface shooting training|Jun. 12–24, 2014|Airspace east of Misawa, airspace west of Akita, and Misawa Firing Range|Aircraft 6|Aircraft 10|Enhancement of joint response capabilities, enhancement of combat skills| |Air defense combat training Aerial refueling training Tactical air transport training|Jun. 17–28, 2014|Elmendorf Air Force Base and Eielson Air Force Base, Alaska, as well as surrounding airspace, etc.|Aircraft 12|Aircraft –|Enhancement of joint response capabilities, enhancement of combat skills| |Fighter combat training|Oct. 18–31, 2014|Airspace off Shikoku and airspace west of Kyushu|Aircraft 12|Aircraft 12|Enhancement of joint response capabilities, enhancement of combat skills| |Fighter combat training|Nov. 7–20, 2014|Airspace off Komatsu|Aircraft 16|Aircraft 8|Enhancement of joint response capabilities, enhancement of combat skills| Enhancement of joint Mar. 9–21, Fighter combat training Airspace off Hyakuri Aircraft 8 Aircraft 5 response capabilities, 2015 ----- **Reference 25 Japan U.S. Joint Research and Development Projects** |Item|Summary|Time the intergovernmental agreement was concluded to implement joint research and development|Time of completion| |---|---|---|---| |Ducted Rocket Engine, Advanced Steel Technology, Fighting Vehicle Propulsion Technology Using Ceramic Materials, Eye-Safe Laser Radar, Ejection Seat, Advanced Hybrid Propulsion Technology, Shallow Water Acoustic Technology, Ballistic Missile Defense Technology, Low-Vulnerability Gun Propellant for Field Artillery, Avionics Aboard the Follow on Aircraft to the P-3C, Software Radio, Advanced Hull Material/Structural Technology, Sea-Based Radar System, Combat System for Ship, Palm-sized automated chemical agent detector, Human effects of exposure to aircraft fuel and their engine exhaust, Image gyro for airborne applications||Completed|| |SM-3 Block IIA|Development of advanced missile interceptor|June 2006|Ongoing| |Hybrid electric propulsion|Research on technologies that enable vehicles to be electrically powered using a motor, and technologies that enable both an engine and a battery to function as power sources for the motor|November 2012|Ongoing| |High-speed multi-hull vessel optimization|Research aiming to design a multi-hull (trimaran, in particular) vessel featuring high-speed, adequate stability and large deck area|March 2014|Ongoing| **Reference 26 Outline of Cost Sharing of the Stationing of the USFJ** |Item|Outline|Ground| |---|---|---| |Costs for Facilities Improvement Program (FIP)1|Barracks, family housing, environmental facilities, etc., have been constructed in the USFJ facilities and areas by the GOJ since FY1979 and provided to the USFJ|Within the Framework of the Status of Forces Agreement| |Labor costs|Welfare costs, etc., since FY1978 and portion of pay that exceeds the pay conditions of national public employees since FY1979 have been borne by the GOJ (USFJ differential, language allowance, and portion of the retirement allowance which exceeds the pay standard of national public employees were abolished in FY2008, upon the provision of measures to avoid drastic changes in payments)|Within the Framework of the Status of Forces Agreement| ||Eight kinds of allowances such as adjustment allowance have been borne by the GOJ since FY1987|Special Measures Agreement (FY1987)| ||Basic pay, etc., have been borne by the GOJ since FY1991 (by gradually increasing the costs borne by the GOJ, the total amount has been borne within the scope of the upper limit of the number of workers since FY1996)|Special Measures Agreement (FY1991)| ||The upper limit of the number of workers that the GOJ funds is to be reduced in stages from 23,055 to 22,625 during the SMA period|Special Measures Agreement (FY2011)| |Utilities costs|Electricity, gas, water supply, sewage and fuel costs (for heating, cooking or hot water supply) have been borne by the GOJ since FY1991 (by gradually increasing the costs borne by the GOJ, the total amount has been borne within the scope of the upper limit of the procured quantity since FY1995)|Special Measures Agreement (FY1991)| ||The upper limit of the procured quantity provided in the Special Measures Agreement (FY1996) has been cut by 10% after subtracting the quantity of the off-base U.S. residential housing since FY2001|Special Measures Agreement (FY2001)| ||The GOJ will bear the costs for fuel, etc., equivalent to 24.9 billion yen, a reduction of 1.5% from the FY2007 budget for FY2009 and 2010|Special Measures Agreement (FY2008)| ||The GOJ will provide the annual utilities costs up to 24.9 billion yen each year. The adjustment borne by the GOJ, will be phased in from current 76% (approximate) to 72% over the new SMA period|Special Measures Agreement (FY2011)| |Training relocation costs|Additionally required costs incident to the relocation of the training requested by the Government of Japan have been borne by the GOJ since FY1996|Special Measures Agreement (FY1996)| Notes: 1. Concerning the costs for FIP, the Government of Japan formulated the “Criteria for adopting FIP projects” to make an effort for effi ciency in the implementation of FIP as follows: 1) Concerning facilities contributing to the improvement of foundation for the stationing of USFJ (bachelor housing, family housing, and others), the Government of Japan improves those facilities steadily considering necessity, urgency, and other factors. 2) Concerning welfare facilities such as recreational facilities and entertainment-oriented facilities, the Government of Japan especially scrutinizes the necessity and refrains from newly adopting facilities regarded as entertainment-oriented and profi t-oriented (shopping malls and others). ----- **Reference 27 Outline of 23 Issues** |Col1|Col2|Col3|Col4|Col5|Col6|Col7|(As of March 31, 2015)| |---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---| |Facility|Scope|Area (ha)|Classifi cation||||Remarks| ||||SCC|Gun-Ten- Kyo|Governor|U.S. Forces|| ||||||||| |Army POL Depots|1. Pipeline between Urasoe and Ginowan City|4|||◎||Returned on December 31, 1990| |Camp Zukeran|2. Manhole, etc., for underground communication system (Noborikawa)|0.1||◎|||Returned on September 30, 1991| ||20. Awase Meadows Golf Course|47|||◎||Returned on July 31, 2010| |Northern Training Area|3. Kunigami-son (Mt. Ibu) district, Higashi-son (Takae) district|480||◎|||Returned on March 31, 1993| ||4. A part of southern area of the prefectural highway Nago- Kunigami line|(256)|◎||||| |Camp Schwab|5. A part of area along National Highway 329 (Henoko)|1|◎||||Returned on March 31, 1993| |Makiminato Service Area Annex|6. In whole|0.1||||◎|Returned on March 31, 1993| |Naha Cold Storage|7. In whole|Building|◎||||Returned on March 31, 1993| |Sunabe Warehouse|8. In whole|0.3||||◎|Returned on June 30, 1993| |Yaedake Communication Site|9. Southern part (Nago City) and northern part (Motobu-cho)|19|◎||||Returned on November 30, 1994| |Onna Communication Site|10. In whole|62|||||Returned on September 30, 1995| ||11. Eastern part|(26)|◎||||| |Kadena Air Base|12. A part of southern area (Tobaru)|2||◎|||Returned on January 31, 1996| |Chibana Site|13. In whole|0.1||||◎|Returned on December 31, 1996| |Camp Hansen|14. A part of Kin-cho (Kin)|3||◎|||Returned on December 31, 1996| |Kadena Ammunition Storage Area|(22. Eastern Side of National Highway 58 (Kino–Hija), Southwestern corner (Yamanaka Area))|74|○||||Returned on March 25, 1999| ||15. Kadena bypass (west side of Route 58)|3|○|◎|||Returned on March 25, 1999| ||(22. Kurahama: site for waste incineration facilities)|9|○||||Returned on March 31, 2005| ||(22. Continuing use area for GSDF)|58|○||||Returned on October 31, 2006| |Torii Communication Station|16. Kadena bypass|4||◎|||Returned on March 31, 1999| |Deputy Division Engineer Offi ce|17. In whole|4|◎||||Returned on September 30, 2002| |Camp Kuwae|(19. Southern side of the eastern part)|2|○|○|||Returned on December 31, 1994| ||18. Northern part (Ihei)|38||◎|||Returned on March 31, 2003| ||(19. Along Route 58)|(5)|○||||| ||16 facilities, 19 issues|811|6|7|3|3|| ||||||||| |Camp Kuwae|19. Northern side of eastern part (Kuwae)|0.5|◎||||Change agreed on December 21, 2001| |Futenma Air Station|21. Lands along eastern side|4||◎|||Release agreed on March 28, 1996| |Kadena Ammunition Storage Area|22. Old Higashionna Ammunition Storage Area|43|◎||||Release agreed on March 28, 1996| |Camp Hansen|23. A part of East China Sea side slope (Nago City)|162|◎||||Release agreed on September 5, 2013| ||4 facilities, 4 issues|210|3|1|0|0|| |Total|17 facilities, 23 issues|1,021|9|8|3|3|| Notes: 1. For the “Area” column, the value within parentheses is a portion of the value indicated immediately above. 2. A single circle in the “Classifi cation” column expediently indicates that the scope of the case overlaps that of another issue. 3. The numbers in the “Scope” column were assigned only for the purpose of classifying 23 issues. 4. “SCC” in the “Classifi cation” column indicates issues for which release was not achieved by June 1990 with respect to realignment, consolidation, and reduction plans of facilities and areas in Okinawa which were approved by the 15th and 16th Japan–U.S. Security Consultative Committee meetings. “Gun-Ten-Kyo” indicates issues for which release was requested by the Council for promotion of dezoning and utilization of military land and consultation of problems accompanying bases in Okinawa Prefecture chaired by Okinawa’s governor. “Governor” indicates issues for which then-Governor Nishime of Okinawa requested the U.S. government to release facilities and areas. “U.S. Forces” indicates issues in which the U.S. side declared to be returnable with respect to facilities and areas in Okinawa. **Reference 28 The SACO Final Report** (December 2, 1996) The Special Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO) was established in November 1995 by the Governments of Japan and the United States. The two Governments launched the SACO process to reduce the burden on the people of Okinawa and thereby strengthen the Japan–U.S. alliance. The mandate and guidelines for the SACO process were set forth by the Governments of Japan and the United States at the outset of the joint endeavor. Both sides decided that the SACO would develop recommendations for the Security Consultative Committee (SCC) on ways to realign, consolidate and reduce U.S. facilities and areas, and adjust operational procedures of U.S. forces in Okinawa consistent with their respective obligations under the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security and other related agreements. The work of the SACO was scheduled to conclude after one year. The SCC which was held on April 15, 1996, approved the SACO Interim Report which included several signif cant initiatives, and instructed the SACO to complete and recommend plans with concrete implementation schedules by November 1996. The SACO, together with the Joint Committee, has conducted a series of intensive and detailed discussions and developed concrete plans and measures to implement the recommendations set forth in the Interim Report. Today, at the SCC, Minister Ikeda, Minister Kyuma, Secretary Perry and Ambassador Mondale approved this SACO Final Report. The plans and measures included in this Final Report, when implemented, will reduce the impact of the activities of U.S. forces on communities in Okinawa. At the same time, these measures will fully maintain the capabilities and ----- protection requirements. Approximately 21 percent of the total acreage of the U.S. facilities and areas in Okinawa excluding joint use facilities and areas (approx. 5,002ha/12,361 acres) will be returned. Upon approving the Final Report, the members of the SCC welcomed the successful conclusion of the yearlong SACO process and underscored their strong resolve to continue joint efforts to ensure steady and prompt implementation of the plans and measures of the SACO Final Report. With this understanding, the SCC designated the Joint Committee as the primary forum for bilateral coordination in the implementation phase, where specif c conditions for the completion of each item will be addressed. Coordination with local communities will take place as necessary. The SCC also reaff rmed the commitment of the two governments to make every endeavor to deal with various issues related to the presence and status of U.S. forces, and to enhance mutual understanding between U.S. forces and local Japanese communities. In this respect, the SCC agreed that efforts to these ends should continue, primarily through coordination at the Joint Committee. The members of the SCC agreed that the SCC itself and the Security Sub-Committee (SSC) would monitor such coordination at the Joint Committee described above and provide guidance as appropriate. The SCC also instructed the SSC to seriously address the Okinawa-related issues as one of the most important subjects and regularly report back to the SCC on this subject. In accordance with the April 1996 Japan–U.S. Joint Declaration on Security, the SCC emphasized the importance of close consultation on the international situation, defense policies and military postures, bilateral policy coordination and efforts towards a more peaceful and stable security environment in the Asia-Pacif c region. The SCC instructed the SSC to pursue these goals and to address the Okinawa related issues at the same time. **Return Land:** — Futenma Air Station — See attached. — Northern Training Area Return major portion of the Northern Training Area (approx. 3,987ha/9,852 acres) and release U.S. joint use of certain reservoirs (approx. 159ha/393 acres) with the intention to f nish the process by the end of March 2003 under the following conditions: - Provide land area (approx. 38ha/93 acres) and water area (approx. 121ha/298 acres) with the intention to f nish the process by the end of March 1998 in order to ensure access from the remaining Northern Training Area to the ocean. - Relocate helicopter landing zones from the areas to be returned to the remaining Northern Training Area. — Aha Training Area Release U.S. joint use of Aha Training Area (approx. 480ha/1,185 acres) and release U.S. joint use of the water area (approx. 7,895ha/19,509 acres) with the intention to f nish the process by the end of March 1998 after land and water access areas from the Northern Training Area to the ocean are provided. — Gimbaru Training Area Return Gimbaru Training Area (approx. 60ha/149 acres) with the intention to f nish the process by the end of March 1998 after the helicopter landing zone is relocated to Kin Blue Beach Training Area, and the other facilities are relocated to Camp Hansen. — Sobe Communication Site Return Sobe Communication Site (approx. 53ha/132 acres) with the intention to f nish the process by the end of March 2001 after the antenna facilities and associated support facilities are relocated to Camp Hansen. — Yomitan Auxiliary Airf eld Return Yomitan Auxiliary Airf eld (approx. 191ha/471 acres) with the intention to f nish the process by the end of March 2001 after the parachute drop training is relocated to Ie Jima Auxiliary Airf eld and Sobe Communication Site is relocated. — Camp Kuwae Return most of Camp Kuwae (approx. 99ha/245 acres) with the intention to f nish the process by the end of March 2008 after the Naval Hospital is relocated to Camp Zukeran and remaining facilities there are relocated to Camp Zukeran or other U.S. facilities and areas in Okinawa. — Senaha Communication Station Return Senaha Communication Station (approx. 61ha/151 acres) with the intention to f nish the process by the end of March 2001 after the antenna facilities and associated support facilities are relocated to Torii Communication Station. However, the microwave tower portion (approx. 0.1ha/0.3 acres) will be retained. — Makiminato Service Area Return land adjacent to Route 58 (approx. 3ha/8 acres) in order to widen the Route, after the facilities which will be affected by the return are relocated within the remaining Makiminato Service Area. — Naha Port Jointly continue best efforts to accelerate the return of Naha Port (approx. 57ha/140 acres) in connection to its relocation to the Urasoe Pier area (approx. 35ha /87 acres). — Housing consolidation (Camp Kuwae and Camp Zukeran) Consolidate U.S. housing areas in Camp Kuwae and Camp Zukeran and return portions of land in housing areas there with the intention to f nish the process by the end of March 2008 (approx. 83ha/206 acres at Camp Zukeran; in addition, approx. 35ha/85 acres at Camp Kuwae will be returned through housing consolidation. That land amount is included in the above entry on Camp Kuwae.). **Adjust Training and Operational Procedures:** — Artillery live-f re training over Highway 104 Terminate artillery live-f re training over Highway 104, with the exception of artillery f ring required in the event of a crisis, after the training is relocated to maneuver areas on the mainland of Japan within Japanese FY1997. — Parachute drop training Relocate parachute drop training to Ie Jima Auxiliary Airf eld. — Conditioning hikes on public roads Conditioning hikes on public roads have been terminated. **Implement Noise Reduction Initiatives:** — Aircraft noise abatement countermeasures at Kadena Air Base and Futenma Air Station Agreements on aircraft noise abatement countermeasures at Kadena Air Base and Futenma Air Station announced by the Joint Committee in March 1996 have been implemented. — Transfer of KC-130 Hercules aircraft and AV-8 Harrier aircraft Transfer 12 KC-130 aircraft currently based at Futenma Air Station to Iwakuni Air Base after adequate facilities are provided. Transfer of 14 AV-8 aircraft from Iwakuni Air Base to the United States has been completed. — Relocation of Navy aircraft and MC-130 operations at Kadena Air Base Relocate Navy aircraft operations and supporting facilities at Kadena Air Base from the Navy ramp to the other side of the major runways. The implementation schedules for these measures will be decided along with the implementation schedules for the development of additional facilities at Kadena Air Base necessary for the return of Futenma Air Station. Move the MC-130s at Kadena Air Base from the Navy ramp to the northwest corner of the major runways by the end of December 1996. — Noise reduction baff es at Kadena Air Base Build new noise reduction baff es at the north side of Kadena Air Base with the intention to f nish the process by the end of March 1998. — Limitation of night f ight training operations at Futenma Air Station Limit night f ight training operations at Futenma Air Station to the maximum extent possible, consistent with the operational readiness of U.S. forces. **Improve Status of Forces Agreement Procedures:** — Accident reports Implement new Joint Committee agreement on procedures to provide investigation reports on U.S. military aircraft accidents announced on December 2, 1996. In addition, as part of the U.S. forces’ good neighbor policy, every effort will be made to insure timely notif cation of appropriate local off cials, as well as the Government of Japan, of all major accidents involving U.S. forces’ assets or facilities. — Public exposure of Joint Committee agreements Seek greater public exposure of Joint Committee agreements. — Visits to U.S. facilities and areas Implement the new procedures for authorizing visits to U.S. facilities and areas announced by the Joint Committee on December 2, 1996. — Markings on U.S. forces off cial vehicles Implement the agreement on measures concerning markings on U.S. forces off cial vehicles. Numbered plates will be attached to all nontactical U.S. forces vehicles by January 1997, and to all other U.S. forces vehicles by October 1997. — Supplemental automobile insurance Education programs for automobile insurance have been expanded. Additionally, on its own initiative, the U.S. has further elected to have all personnel under the SOFA obtain supplemental auto insurance beginning in January 1997. — Payment for claims Make joint efforts to improve payment procedures concerning claims under paragraph 6, Article XVIII of the SOFA in the following manner: - Requests for advance payments will be expeditiously processed and evaluated by both Governments utilizing their respective procedures. Whenever warranted under U.S. laws and regulatory guidance, advance payment will be accomplished as rapidly as possible. - A new system will be introduced by the end of March 1998, by which Japanese authorities will make available to claimants no interest l i i d f h f l dj di i f l i ----- by U.S. authorities. - In the past there have been only a very few cases where payment by the U.S. Government did not satisfy the full amount awarded by a f nal court judgment. Should such a case occur in the future, the Government of Japan will endeavor to make payment to the claimant, as appropriate, in order to address the difference in amount. — Quarantine procedures Implement the updated agreement on quarantine procedures announced by the Joint Committee on December 2, 1996. — Removal of unexploded ordnance in Camp Hansen Continue to use USMC procedures for removing unexploded ordnance in Camp Hansen, which are equivalent to those applied to ranges of the U.S. forces in the United States. — Continue efforts to improve the SOFA procedures in the Joint Committee **The SACO Final Report on Futenma Air Station** **(an integral part of the SACO Final Report)** (Tokyo, Japan, December 2, 1996) 1. Introduction a. At the Security Consultative Committee (SCC) held on December 2, 1996, Minister Ikeda, Minister Kyuma, Secretary Perry, and Ambassador Mondale reaff rmed their commitment to the Special Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO) Interim Report of April 15, 1996 and the Status Report of September 19, 1996. Based on the SACO Interim Report, both Governments have been working to determine a suitable option for the return of Futenma Air Station and the relocation of its assets to other facilities and areas in Okinawa, while maintaining the airf eld’s critical military functions and capabilities. The Status Report called for the Special Working Group on Futenma to examine three specif c alternatives: 1) incorporate the heliport into Kadena Air Base; 2) construct a heliport at Camp Schwab; and 3) develop and construct a sea-based facility (SBF). b. On December 2, 1996, the SCC approved the SACO recommendation to pursue the SBF option. Compared to the other two options, the SBF is judged to be the best option in terms of enhanced safety and quality of life for the Okinawan people while maintaining operational capabilities of U.S. forces. In addition, the SBF can function as a f xed facility during its use as a military base and can also be removed when no longer necessary. c. The SCC will establish a bilateral U.S.–Japan working group under the supervision of the Security Sub-Committee (SSC) entitled the Futenma Implementation Group (FIG), to be supported by a team of technical experts. The FIG, working with the Joint Committee, will develop a plan for implementation no later than December 1997. Upon SCC approval of this plan, the FIG, working with the Joint Committee, will oversee design, construction, testing, and transfer of assets. Throughout this process, the FIG will periodically report to the SSC on the status of its work. 2. Decisions of the SCC a. Pursue construction of an SBF to absorb most of the helicopter operational functions of Futenma Air Station. This facility will be approximately 1,500 meters long, and will support the majority of Futenma Air Station’s f ying operations, including an Instrument Flight Rules (IFR) — capable runway (approximately 1,300 meters long), direct air operations support, and indirect support infrastructure such as headquarters, maintenance, logistics, quality-of-life functions, and base operating support. The SBF will be designed to support basing of helicopter assets, and will also be able to support short-f eld aircraft operations. b. Transfer 12 KC-130 aircraft to Iwakuni Air Base. Construct facilities at this base to ensure that associated infrastructure is available to support these aircraft and their missions. c. Develop additional facilities at Kadena Air Base to support aircraft, maintenance, and logistics operations which are currently available at Futenma Air Station but are not relocated to the SBF or Iwakuni Air Base. d. Study the emergency and contingency use of alternate facilities, which may be needed in the event of a crisis. This is necessary because the transfer of functions from Futenma Air Station to the SBF will reduce operational f exibility currently available. e. Return Futenma Air Station within the next f ve to seven years, after adequate replacement facilities are completed and operational. 3. Guiding Principles a. Futenma Air Station’s critical military functions and capabilities will be maintained and will continue to operate at current readiness levels throughout the transfer of personnel and equipment and the relocation of facilities. b. To the greatest extent possible, Futenma Air Station’s operations and activities will be transferred to the SBF. Operational capabilities and contingency planning f exibility which cannot be supported by the shorter runway of the SBF (such as strategic airlift, logistics, emergency alternate divert, and contingency throughput) must be fully supported elsewhere. Those facilities unable to be located on the SBF, due to operational cost, or quality-of-life considerations, will be located on existing U.S. facilities and areas. c. The SBF will be located off the east coast of the main island of Okinawa, and is expected to be connected to land by a pier or causeway. Selection of the location will take into account operational requirements, airspace and sea-lane deconf iction, f shing access, environmental compatibility, economic effects, noise abatement, survivability, security, and convenient, acceptable personnel access to other U.S. military facilities and housing. d. The design of the SBF will incorporate adequate measures to ensure platform, aircraft, equipment, and personnel survivability against severe weather and ocean conditions; corrosion control treatment and prevention for the SBF and all equipment located on the SBF; safety; and platform security. Support will include reliable and secure fuel supply, electrical power, fresh water, and other utilities and consumables. Additionally, the facility will be fully selfsupporting for short-period contingency/emergency operations. e. The Government of Japan will provide the SBF and other relocation facilities for the use of U.S. forces, in accordance with the U.S.– Japan Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security and the Status of Forces Agreement. The two Governments will further consider all aspects of life-cycle costs as part of the design/acquisition decision. f. The Government of Japan will continue to keep the people of Okinawa informed of the progress of this plan, including concept, location, and schedules of implementation. 4. Possible Sea-Based Facility Construction Methods Studies have been conducted by a “Technical Support Group” comprised of Government engineers under the guidance of a “Technical Advisory Group” comprised of university professors and other experts outside the Government. These studies suggested that all three construction methods mentioned below are technically feasible. a. Pile Supported Pier Type (using f oating modules) — supported by a number of steel columns f xed to the sea bed. b. Pontoon Type — platform consisting of steel pontoon type units, installed in a calm sea protected by a breakwater. c. Semi-Submersible Type — platform at a wave free height, supported by buoyancy of the lower structure submerged under the sea. 5. The Next Steps a. The FIG will recommend a candidate SBF area to the SCC as soon as possible and formulate a detailed implementation plan no later than December 1997. This plan will include completion of the following items: concept development and def nitions of operational requirements, technology performance specif cations and construction method, site survey, environmental analysis, and f nal concept and site selection. b. The FIG will establish phases and schedules to achieve operational capabilities at each location, including facility design, construction, installation of required components, validation tests and suitability demonstrations, and transfer of operations to the new facility. c. The FIG will conduct periodic reviews and make decisions at signif cant milestones concerning SBF program feasibility. ----- **Reference 29 State of Progress of the SACO Final Report** |Name of Facility (Project)|State of Progress| |---|---| |Aha Training Area (Return of total area)|• Completed in December 1998 (cancellation of joint use)| |Gimbaru Training Area (Return of total area)|• January 2008: The Japan–U.S. Joint Committee came to agreement on land return after the HLZ was relocated to Kin Blue Beach Training Area, and the other facilities were relocated to Camp Hansen • July 2011: Totally returned (approximately 60 ha)| |Sobe Communication Site (Return of total area)|• April 1999: The Japan–U.S. Joint Committee came to an agreement on land return after the relocation of communication systems including communication facilities such as antennas and others to Camp Hansen • June 2006: Land to which the Special Measure Law for USFJ Land was applied (approx. 236 m2) was returned • December 2006: Remaining portion (approximately 53 ha) returned (Sobe Communication Site totally returned [approximately 53 ha])| |Yomitan Auxiliary Airfi eld (Return of total area)|• October 2002: The Japan–U.S. Joint Committee came to an agreement on land return after the return of the Sobe Communication Site • July 2006: Partially returned (approximately 138 ha) • December 2006: Remaining portion (approximately 53 ha) returned (Yomitan Auxiliary Airfi eld totally returned [approximately 191 ha])| |Senaha Communication Station (Return of most areas)|• March 2002: The Japan–U.S. Joint Committee came to an agreement on land return after the relocation of communication systems including antennas and others to Torii Communication Station • September 2006: Partially returned (approximately 61 ha excluding the microwave tower portion) • October 2006: The microwave tower portion consolidated into Torii Communication Station| |Northern Training Area (Return of major portion)|• April 1999: The Japan–U.S. Joint Committee came to an agreement on land return following the relocation of seven helicopter landing zones (HLZ) and others • December 1998–March 2000: Environmental survey (past year survey) • November 2002–March 2004: Environmental survey (continuous environmental survey) • February 2006: The Japan–U.S. Joint Committee came to an agreement on the change of agreement in April 1999 (HLZs: from 7 HLZs to 6 HLZs, reduction of the scale of the site preparation from 75 m to 45 m in diameter) • February–March 2007: Environmental impact assessment document was released and examined • March 2007: The Japan–U.S. Joint Committee came to an agreement on the construction of the HLZs (three out of six) • January 2008: The Japan–U.S. Joint Committee came to an agreement on the construction of the HLZs (the remaining three) • January 2015: HLZs (two sites) were furnished| |MCAS Futenma (Return of total area → Return of total area)*|* May 2006: Described as total return in the United States–Japan Roadmap for Realignment Implementation| |Camp Kuwae (Return of most areas → Return of total area)*|• July 2002: Youth center was furnished • March 2003: Part of northern side returned (approximately 38 ha) • January 2005: The Japan–U.S. Joint Committee came to an agreement on the relocation and construction of the Naval Hospital and other related facilities • December 2006: The Japan–U.S. Joint Committee came to an agreement on the construction of the Naval Hospital • February 2008: The Japan–U.S. Joint Committee came to an agreement on the construction of support facilities (HLZ, etc.) of the Naval Hospital • December 2008: The Japan–U.S. Joint Committee came to an agreement on the construction of support facilities (Utility) of the Naval Hospital • May 2009: The Japan–U.S. Joint Committee came to an agreement on the construction of related facilities of the Naval Hospital (BEQ, etc.) • October 2009, The Japan–U.S. Joint Committee came to an agreement on the construction of related facilities of the Naval Hospital (First water tank facility) • October 2010: The Japan–U.S. Joint Committee came to an agreement on the construction of related facilities of the Naval Hospital (Second water tank facility) • September 2011: The Japan–U.S. Joint Committee came to an agreement on the construction of related facilities of the Naval Hospital (BOQ and blood storage facility, etc.) * May 2006: Described as total return in the United States–Japan Roadmap for Realignment Implementation| |Makiminato Service Area (Return of partial area → Return of total area)*|* May 2006: Described as total return in the United States–Japan Roadmap for Realignment Implementation| |Naha Port Facility (Return of total area → Return of total area)*|* May 2006: Described as total return in the United States–Japan Roadmap for Realignment Implementation| |Housing Consolidation Camp Zukeran (Return of partial area → Return of partial area)*|(Phase I: Golf Range Area) • April 1999: The Japan–U.S. Joint Committee came to an agreement on the relocation and construction of housing and others • July 2002: Two high rises were furnished • July 2006: An underpass was furnished (Phase II: Sada Area) • February 2002: The Japan–U.S. Joint Committee came to an agreement on the relocation and construction of housing and others • September 2005: Two high rises, 38 townhouses, and others were furnished (Phase III: Eastern Chatan Area) • March 2004: The Japan–U.S. Joint Committee came to an agreement on the relocation and construction of housing and others • June 2008: 35 townhouses and others were furnished (Phase IV: Futenma and Upper Plaza Area) • March 2005: The Japan–U.S. Joint Committee came to an agreement on the relocation and construction of housing and others • February 2010: 24 townhouses constructed in Futenma and Upper Plaza Area were furnished * May 2006: Camp Zukeran was described as partial return in the United States–Japan Roadmap for Realignment Implementation| |Relocation of Artillery Live-fi re Training over Highway 104|• Relocated to fi ve maneuver areas on the mainland of Japan in FY1997| |Parachute Drop Training|• Relocation training conducted at Iejima Auxiliary Airfi eld since July 2000| |Installation of Noise Reduction Baffl es at Kadena Air Base|• July 2000: Furnished| |Relocation of the U.S. Navy Ramp at Kadena Air Base|• September 2008: Rinse Facility was furnished • February 2009: The Japan–U.S. Joint Committee came to agreement on the relocation of Navy Ramp • October 2010: The Japan–U.S. Joint Committee came to an agreement on site preparation, implementation of construction of parking apron and taxiway. • April 2011: The Japan–U.S. Joint Committee came to an agreement on implementation of construction of parking and utilities.| |Transfer of KC-130 aircraft to Iwakuni Air Base*|* May 2006: United States–Japan Roadmap for Realignment Implementation stated that the KC-130 squadron would be based at MCAS Iwakuni with its headquarters, maintenance support facilities, and family support facilities, and that the aircraft would regularly deploy on a rotational bases for training and operations to MSDF Kanoya Base and Guam. * August 2014: Relocation of all 15 aircraft from MCAS Futenma to Iwakuni Air Base was completed| ----- **Reference 30 Estimated Timelines for the Return of Facilities and Areas South of Kadena** |List of Estimated Timelines for the Return of Facilities and Areas|Col2|Col3| |---|---|---| |Areas Eligible for Immediate Return Upon Completion of Necessary Procedures West Futenma Housing area of Camp Zukeran (Camp Foster) Returned The north access road of Makiminato Service Area (Camp Kinser) Returned Area near Gate 5 on Makiminato Service Area (Camp Kinser) JFY2014 or later A portion of the warehouse area of the Facilities and Engineering Compound in Camp Zukeran (Camp Foster) JFY2019 or later 1||| ||West Futenma Housing area of Camp Zukeran (Camp Foster)|Returned| ||The north access road of Makiminato Service Area (Camp Kinser)|Returned| ||Area near Gate 5 on Makiminato Service Area (Camp Kinser)|JFY2014 or later| ||A portion of the warehouse area of the Facilities and Engineering Compound in Camp Zukeran (Camp Foster)|JFY2019 or later 1| |Areas Eligible for Return Once the Replacement of Facilities in Okinawa are Provided Camp Kuwae (Camp Lester) JFY2025 or later Lower Plaza Housing area, Comp Zukeran (Camp Foster) JFY2024 or later A part of Kishaba Houising area, Camp Zukeran (Camp Foster) JFY2024 or later The Industrial Corridor, Camp Zukeran (Camp Foster) JFY2024 or later 2,3 Elements of Makiminato Service Area (Camp Kinser), including the preponderance of the storage area JFY2025 or later Naha Port JFY2028 or later Army Petroleum, Oil, and Lubricant Depot Kuwae Tank Farm No.1 JFY2022 or later Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS) Futenma JFY2022 or later||| ||Camp Kuwae (Camp Lester)|JFY2025 or later| ||Lower Plaza Housing area, Comp Zukeran (Camp Foster)|JFY2024 or later| ||A part of Kishaba Houising area, Camp Zukeran (Camp Foster)|JFY2024 or later| ||The Industrial Corridor, Camp Zukeran (Camp Foster)|JFY2024 or later 2,3| ||Elements of Makiminato Service Area (Camp Kinser), including the preponderance of the storage area|JFY2025 or later| ||Naha Port|JFY2028 or later| ||Army Petroleum, Oil, and Lubricant Depot Kuwae Tank Farm No.1|JFY2022 or later| ||Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS) Futenma|JFY2022 or later| |Areas Eligible for Return as USMC Forces Relocate from Okinawa to Locations Outside of Japan Additional elements of Camp Zukeran (Camp Foster) － The remainder of Makiminato Service Area (Camp Kinser) JFY2024 or later 4||| ||Additional elements of Camp Zukeran (Camp Foster)|－| ||The remainder of Makiminato Service Area (Camp Kinser)|JFY2024 or later 4| Note: 1: Shirahi River area can be returned at the same timing. 2: Part of the logistics support units in this area are scheduled to be relocated to locations outside of Japan. Efforts will be made to minimize the impact of the relocation on the approximate timing for return. However, the relocation sequence is subject to change depending on the progress of relocation. 3: Area south of the Industrial Corridor (Camp Foster) can be returned at the same timing. 4: Plans for USMC relocation to locations outside of Japan have not yet been determined. The relocation sequence is subject to change depending on the progress of relocation. **Reference 31 Agreement between the Government of Japan and** **the Government of the United States of America** **Concerning the Implementation of the Relocation of** **III Marine Expeditionary Force Personnel and Their** **Dependents from Okinawa to Guam** (Signed on February 17, 2009) The Government of Japan and the Government of the United States of America, Aff rming that Japan–the United States security arrangements, based on the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between Japan and the United States of America signed at Washington on January 19, 1960, are the cornerstone for achieving common security objectives, Recalling that, at the meeting of Japan–the United States Security Consultative Committee on May 1, 2006, the Ministers recognized that the implementation of the realignment initiatives described in the Security Consultative Committee Document, “United States – Japan Roadmap for Realignment Implementation” (hereinafter referred to as “the Roadmap”) will lead to a new phase in alliance cooperation, and reduce the burden on local communities, including those on Okinawa, thereby providing the basis for enhanced public support for the security alliance, Emphasizing their recognition of the importance of Guam for forward presence of United States Marine Corps forces, which provides assurance of the United States’ commitment to security and strengthens deterrent capabilities in the Asia-Pacif c region, Reaff rming that the Roadmap emphasizes the importance of force reductions and relocation to Guam in relation to the realignment on Okinawa and stipulates that approximately 8,000 III Marine Expeditionary Force (hereinafter referred to as “III MEF”) personnel and their approximately 9,000 dependents will relocate from Okinawa to Guam by 2014, in a manner that maintains unit integrity, and recognizing that such relocation will realize consolidation and land returns south of Kadena, Recalling that the Roadmap stipulates that United States Marine Corps CH-53D helicopters will be relocated from Marine Corps Air Station Iwakuni to Guam when the III MEF personnel relocate from Okinawa to Guam, the KC-130 squadron will be based at Marine Corps Air Station Iwakuni with its headquarters, maintenance support facilities, and family support facilities, and the aircraft will regularly deploy on a rotational basis for training and operations to Maritime Self- Defense Forces Kanoya Base and Guam, Reaff rming that the Roadmap stipulates that, of the estimated ten billion, two hundred seventy million United States dollar ($10,270,000,000) cost of the facilities and infrastructure development costs for the III MEF relocation to Guam, Japan will provide six billion, i t illi U it d St t d ll ($6 090 000 000) (i U S Fi l Y 2008 dollars), including two billion, eight hundred million United States dollars ($2,800,000,000) in direct cash contributions, to develop facilities and infrastructure on Guam to enable the III MEF relocation, recognizing the strong desire of Okinawa residents that such force relocation be realized rapidly, Reaff rming further that the Roadmap stipulates that the United States will fund the remainder of the facilities and infrastructure development costs for the relocation to Guam-estimated in U.S. Fiscal Year 2008 dollars at three billion, one hundred eighty million United States dollars ($3,180,000,000) in f scal spending plus approximately one billion United States dollars ($1,000,000,000) for a road, Recalling that the Roadmap stipulates that, within the overall package, the Okinawa-related realignment initiatives are interconnected, specif cally, consolidation and land returns south of Kadena depend on completing the relocation of III MEF personnel and dependents from Okinawa to Guam, and the III MEF relocation from Okinawa to Guam is dependent on: (1) tangible progress toward completion of the Futenma Replacement Facility, and (2) Japan’s f nancial contributions to fund development of required facilities and infrastructure on Guam, Have agreed as follows: Article 1 1. The Government of Japan shall make cash contributions up to the amount of two billion, eight hundred million United States dollars ($2,800,000,000) (in U.S. Fiscal Year 2008 dollars) to the Government of the United States of America as a part of expenditures for the relocation of approximately 8,000 III MEF personnel and their approximately 9,000 dependents from Okinawa to Guam (hereinafter referred to as “the Relocation”) subject to paragraph 1. of Article 9 of this Agreement. 2. The amount of Japanese cash contributions to be budgeted in each Japanese f scal year shall be determined by the Government of Japan through consultation between the two Governments and ref ected in further arrangements that the two Governments shall conclude in each Japanese f scal year (hereinafter referred to as “the further arrangements”). Article 2 The Government of the United States of America shall take necessary measures for the Relocation, including funding for projects of the Government of the United States of America to develop facilities and infrastructure on Guam subject to paragraph 2 of Article 9 of this Agreement. ----- Article 3 The Relocation shall be dependent on tangible progress made by the Government of Japan toward the completion of the Futenma Replacement Facility as stipulated in the Roadmap. The Government of Japan intends to complete the Futenma Replacement Facility as stipulated in the Roadmap in close cooperation with the Government of the United States of America. Article 4 The Government of the United States of America shall use Japanese cash contributions and their accrued interest only for projects to develop facilities and infrastructure on Guam for the Relocation. Article 5 The Government of the United States of America shall ensure that all participants in the process of acquisition for projects to be funded by Japanese cash contributions for the Relocation shall be treated fairly, impartially and equitably. Article 6 The Government of Japan shall designate the Ministry of Defense of Japan as its implementing authority, and the Government of the United States of America shall designate the Department of Defense of the United States of America as its implementing authority. The two Governments shall hold consultations at the technical level on implementation guidance to be followed by the implementing authorities, and on the specif c projects referred to in paragraph 1. (a) of Article 7 of this Agreement. Through such consultations, the Government of the United States of America shall ensure that the Government of Japan shall be involved, in an appropriate manner, in the implementation of the said specif c projects. Article 7 1. (a) Specif c projects to be funded in each Japanese f scal year shall be agreed upon between the two Governments and ref ected in the further arrangements. (b) The Government of the United States of America shall maintain a United States Treasury account to which the Government of Japan shall provide cash contributions. The Government of the United States of America shall open and maintain, under the said account, a sub-account for Japanese cash contributions in each Japanese f scal year. 2. Japanese cash contributions and their accrued interest that is contractually committed to pay for specif c projects shall be credited, based on the method of calculation using an index to be agreed upon between the implementing authorities referred to in Article 6 of this Agreement, to the total amount of Japanese cash contributions, which is up to the amount of two billion, eight hundred million United States dollars ($2,800,000,000) (in U.S. Fiscal Year 2008 dollars). 3. (a) In case there remains an unused balance of Japanese cash contributions after the completion of all contracts, as evidenced by receipt of documents releasing the Government of the United States of America from any further f nancial and contractual liability, for all specif c projects funded in the same Japanese f scal year, the Government of the United States of America shall return the said unused balance to the Government of Japan, except as provided in paragraph 3. (b) of this Article. (b) The Government of the United States of America may use, with the consent of the implementing authority of the Government of Japan, the unused balance for other specif c projects funded in the same Japanese f scal year. 4. (a) The Government of the United States of America shall return interest accrued from Japanese cash contributions to the Government of Japan, except as provided in paragraph 4. (b) of this Article, after the completion of all contracts, as evidenced by receipt of documents releasing the Government of the United States of America from any further f nancial and contractual liability, for the last specif c projects funded by Japanese cash contributions. (b) The Government of the United States of America may use, with the consent of the implementing authority of the Government of Japan, interest accrued from Japanese cash contributions for projects funded by Japanese cash contributions. 5. The Government of the United States of America shall provide the Government of Japan with a report, every month, on transactions in the United States Treasury account, including all the sub-accounts related to Japanese cash contributions. Article 8 The Government of the United States of America shall consult with the States of America considers changes that may signif cantly affect facilities and infrastructure funded by Japanese cash contributions, and shall take appropriate actions, taking Japanese concerns into full consideration. Article 9 1. Japanese cash contributions referred to in paragraph 1. of Article 1 of this Agreement shall be subject to funding by the Government of the United States of America of measures referred to in Article 2 of this Agreement. 2. United States’ measures referred to in Article 2 of this Agreement shall be subject to: (1) the availability of funds for the Relocation, (2) tangible progress made by the Government of Japan toward the completion of the Futenma Replacement Facility as stipulated in the Roadmap, and (3) Japan’s f nancial contributions as stipulated in the Roadmap. Article 10 The two Governments shall consult with each other regarding the implementation of this Agreement. Article 11 This Agreement shall be approved by Japan and the United States of America in accordance with their respective internal legal procedures. This Agreement shall enter into force on the date when diplomatic notes indicating such approval are exchanged. **Reference 32** **Protocol amending the Agreement between the** **Government of Japan and the Government of** **the United States of America Concerning the** **Implementation of the Relocation of III Marine** **Expeditionary Force Personnel and Their Dependents** **from Okinawa to Guam** (Signed on October 3, 2013) The Government of Japan and the Government of the United States of America, Recalling the Joint Statement of Japan-the United States Security Consultative Committee, dated April 27, 2012, which announced, inter alia, that the two governments are to consult regarding further actions to be taken in light of the Agreement between the Government of Japan and the Government of the United States of America Concerning the Implementation of the Relocation of III Marine Expeditionary Force Personnel and Their Dependents from Okinawa to Guam, signed at Tokyo on February 17, 2009 (hereinafter referred to as “the Agreement”), Desiring to amend the Agreement, Have agreed as follows: Article 1 The f fth to ninth paragraphs of the preamble of the Agreement shall be deleted, and the following six paragraphs shall be inserted immediately after the fourth paragraph: “Recalling that Japan-the United States Security Consultative Committee decided to adjust the plans outlined in the Roadmap and, as part of the adjustments, decided to delink both the relocation of the III Marine Expeditionary Force (hereinafter referred to as “III MEF”) personnel from Okinawa to Guam and resulting land returns south of Kadena Air Base from progress on the Futenma Replacement Facility, in its Joint Statement dated April 27, 2012 (hereinafter referred to as “the Joint Statement”), Recognizing that the Joint Statement conf rmed that a total of approximately 9,000 personnel of III MEF, along with their dependents, are to be relocated from Okinawa to locations outside of Japan, Reaff rming that the Joint Statement conf rmed that, of the preliminarily estimated eight billion, six hundred million United States dollars ($8,600,000,000) (in U.S. Fiscal Year 2012 dollars) cost of the facilities and infrastructure development costs for the III MEF relocation to Guam, Japan is to provide up to the amount of two billion, eight hundred million United States dollars ($2,800,000,000) (in U.S. Fiscal Year 2008 dollars) (equivalent to three billion, one hundred twenty-one million, eight hundred eighty-seven thousand, eight hundred f fty-f ve United States dollars ($3,121,887,855) in U.S. Fiscal Year 2012 dollars) in direct cash contributions, to develop facilities and infrastructure in Guam and the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands to enable the III MEF relocation, recognizing the strong desire of Okinawa residents that such force relocation be completed as soon as possible, Reaff rming further that the Joint Statement conf rmed that the United States is to fund the remaining costs and any additional costs for the III MEF relocation to Guam, Recalling that the Joint Statement announced that the two Governments are to consider cooperation in developing training areas i G d h C l h f h N h M i I l d ----- as shared-use facilities by the Japan Self-Defense Forces and United States forces, Recalling that, under the plans outlined in the Roadmap as adjusted, the Joint Statement, and the Consolidation Plan for Facilities and Areas in Okinawa published in April, 2013, a part of the consolidation and land returns south of Kadena depends on the relocation of III MEF personnel and dependents from Okinawa, and the III MEF relocation from Okinawa to Guam is dependent on Japan’s direct cash contributions to fund development of required facilities and infrastructure as well as necessary measures by the Government of the United States of America,” Article 2 The phrase “approximately 8,000 III MEF personnel and their approximately 9,000 dependents” in paragraph 1. of Article 1 of the Agreement shall be replaced by the phrase “the III MEF personnel and their dependents”. Article 3 The phrase “facilities and infrastructure on Guam” in Article 2 of the Agreement shall be replaced by the phrase “facilities and infrastructure in Guam and the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands”. Article 4 Article 3 of the Agreement shall be deleted. Article 5 The phrase “facilities and infrastructure on Guam” in Article 4 of the Agreement shall be replaced by the phrase “facilities and infrastructure in Guam and the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands”, and the following sentence shall be inserted at the end of Article 4 of the Agreement: “Such facilities may include training areas in Guam and the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands.” Article 6 Article 4 of the Agreement shall be renumbered as Article 3, and the following Article shall be inserted immediately after renumbered Article 3: “Article 4 The Government of the United States of America, with the intent to provide reasonable access, shall favorably consider requests by the Government of Japan to use training areas in Guam and the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, including those whose development has been funded with Japanese cash contributions and their accrued interest.” Article 7 Paragraph 2. of Article 9 of the Agreement shall be deleted and replaced by the following: “2. United States’ measures referred to in Article 2 of this Agreement shall be subject to the availability of funds for the Relocation, which may include (1) United States funds and (2) Japanese cash contributions referred to in paragraph 1. of Article 1 of this Agreement. Article 8 It is conf rmed that the Agreement as amended by this Protocol applies to cash contributions made either before or after the entry into force of this Protocol by the Government of Japan in accordance with paragraph 1. of Article 1 of the Agreement, their accrued interest, and the projects funded by the cash contributions. Article 9 This Protocol shall be approved by Japan and the United States of America in accordance with their respective internal legal procedures. This Protocol shall enter into force on the date when diplomatic notes indicating such approval are exchanged and shall remain in force for the period of the Agreement. **Reference 33 Direction of the MOD Reform** August 30, 2013 Ministry of Defense **1. Regarding the Previous MOD Reform (2007–2009)** 1. Details In response to the frequent incidence of scandals within the MOD and the SDF, the Council for Reforming the Ministry of Defense was established in the Prime Minister’s Off ce in December 2007. The Council engaged in repeated discussions, and in July 2008, compiled a report which detailed the analysis of scandals and the direction of Ministry of Defense ) In August of that year, the Ministry of defense decided upon the “Implementation Plan for Realizing Reform of the Ministry of Defense” and the “Basic Policy for Organizational Reform of the Ministry of Defense,” based on the direction for reform presented by the Council for Reforming the Ministry of Defense. In accordance with these, efforts were made to prevent the recurrence of scandals through the execution of reforms in the three areas of ensuring thorough observance of rules and regulations, establishment of professionalism, and establishment of operational management in a form that focused on the execution of duties, with the aim of optimization across the board. At the same time, in an effort to advance drastic realignment of the central organization in two stages, the Defense Council was f rst to be established in law as of FY2009, the post of the Director of Defense was abolished and the post of the Special Adviser to the Minister of Defense newly created. Furthermore, incorporated into the FY2010 budget request of the end of August 2009 as the second stage of reorganization, was a reorganization proposal detailing plans to unify defense capabilities build-up departments in the MOD central organization, into the Internal Bureau, and to unify the operational departments into the Joint Staff (hereinafter the “2010 Reorganization Proposal”). However, due to the administrative changeover to the Democratic Party in September of that year, the proposal was relinquished after the budget request scheduled in October had been suspended. 2. Ministry of Defense Central Reorganization Proposal Scheduled for FY2010 The contents of the 2010 Reorganization Proposal included (1) establishment of permanent posts for uniformed personnel in the Internal Bureau in order to foster a sense of unity among civilian off cials and uniformed personnel, (2) reorganization of the Bureau of Defense Policy and strengthening of its functions, (3) creation of a new Buildup Plan Bureau (provisional title) in the Internal Bureau, through the fusion of the Internal Bureau and the departments involved in defense capabilities build-up in each of the Staff Off ces, in order to achieve optimization across the whole of defense capabilities build-up, which had be optimized individually for each of the Ground, Maritime and Air Self-Defense Forces, and (4) abolition of the Bureau of Operational Policy and the incorporation of its work into the Joint Staff, to eliminate the de facto duplication of duties of operational departments. Meanwhile, the Proposal thoroughly mixed the civilian off cials and uniformed personnel in the Internal Bureau and Joint Staff, and established their positions appropriated according to expertise. The main point was to facilitate the construction of a system that would allow civilian off cials and uniformed personnel to work together. With this in mind, the organizational structure of the Ministry of Defense was to undergo a large-scale review, which resulted in many points needing further examination regarding considerations and detailed planning. Two specif c shortcomings in the 2010 Reform Proposal with respect to the unif cation of defense capabilities build-up, were the fact that the system had not necessarily ref ected the viewpoint of joint operation fully, on which defense capabilities build-up is predicated, and that considerations had yet to reach the point of actual reform of departments involved in equipment acquisition, which hold an important role in defense capabilities build-up. In regard to the unif cation of operational functions into the Joint Staff, the fact was that the 2010 Reform Proposal required further consideration of the specif c scopes of the duties that were to be concentrated into the Joint Staff. For example, no conclusion had been reached, despite deliberations taking place, about whether it was appropriate to transfer all of the duties of the Bureau of Operational Policy into the Joint Staff after its abolition, even including the duty of planning and drafting laws and regulations pertaining to SDF operation. Moreover, during the validation of the 2010 Reform Proposal in its recent deliberations, the point was raised that if the jurisdiction of the Joint Staff extended to duties relating to operational policy and dealing with the Diet, then it was possible that the attribute of the Minister as “top-level specialist adviser” in “military matters” would undergo change. **2. Considerations in the Committee for the Deliberations on the MOD** **Reform** 1. Minister of Defense instructions Due to the changeover in administration to a Liberal Democratic Party-New Komeito coalition, in February of this year, the Minister of Defense’s instructions to accelerate deliberations regarding the MOD reform were issued. Subsequently, it was determined in the Committee for the Deliberations on the MOD Reform, headed by the Senior ViceMinister of Defense (hereinafter, the “Committee”), that (1) from the perspective not only of preventing the recurrence of scandals, but of making the SDF operate more actively and eff ciently through ----- the effective use of human resources, and accomplishing the civilian control over the SDF under the severe security environment facing Japan, (2)with regard to the business operation and structure of the central organization, the Committee is giving necessary consideration, taking into account the lessons learned from handling recent incidents such as the Great East Japan Earthquake and the launch of missiles by North Korea, and in tandem with the discussion to strengthen the commanding function of the Prime Minister’s Off ce concerning national security such as the establishment of the Japanese National Security Council, and (3) that a report would be made to the Defense Council, with its target time being the period when the FY2014 budget request is made. 2. Situation regarding considerations (1) System of consideration The Committee is composed of the Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Defense, the Vice-Minister of Defense, the Director General of the Minister’s Secretariat, the various other director generals and the Chiefs of Staff, with the Parliamentary Senior Vice-Minister of Defense as chairman. Under this is a board of executives composed of the ViceMinister of Defense, the Director General of the Minister’s secretariat and the various Chiefs of Staff. Furthermore, as forums for conducting practical, cross-organizational considerations regarding the matters of “defense capabilities build-up,” “operations,” “policy-planning” and “public relations,” project teams, composed of members at the level of deputy director general, Assistant Vice-Minister of the Minister’s secretariat, and the directors of the Staff Off ces, and work team composed of members at the level of Internal Bureau and Staff Off ce manager were established. (2) Course of considerations At the establishment of the Committee in February, seven preliminary discussions were held under the Senior Vice-Minister of Defense. Then from February through March, the points for discussion were determined by the Committee, regarding which, since April of this year, earnest discussions and deliberations have been carried out by each of the project teams and work teams. Specif cally, a number of discussions and deliberations at a variety of levels were carried out, through the staging of six meetings by the Committee, four by the board of executives, 12 by the project teams and 21 by the work teams. Moreover, although a certain degree of success was achieved through the solid implementation of the efforts to prevent the recurrence of scandals proposed in the Report by the Council for Reforming the Ministry of Defense, incidents still occurred in some cases regarding procurement. It was therefore determined that, measures to prevent recurrence would be considered and the related efforts checked, at forums for deliberations established separately of the Committee (expert committees such as the Committee for Investigation of Incidents and Consideration of Recurrence Prevention in the Selection of Companies to Carry Out a Development Project for the New GSDF Multi-Use Helicopter (UH-X), and the Committee for Investigation and Consideration of Incidents of Overcharging, etc.). Based on the above discussions and deliberations, the seventh Committee meeting was held on August 29 of this year, the direction for the MOD reform was compiled, and reported to the Defense Council on the 30th of the month. **3. Basic Concept and Direction of Reform** The security environment surrounding Japan has increasingly grown severe; China has rapidly expanded and intensif ed its activities in the waters and airspace surrounding Japan as exemplif ed by its instruction into Japan’s territorial waters and airspace; North Korea has been such provocative actions as its launch of the missile and its nuclear test. Above all else, so-called gray zone situations relating to territorial land and economic interests are becoming evident and long-term, and the possibility is feared that the situation will get more acute and serious, leading to more serious incidents. Through the handling of recent incidents, exemplif ed by the Great East Japan Earthquake, the lessons learned in relation to the use of units have been recognized. Furthermore, changes have been occurring in the political environment, such as the move toward establishing the NSC, and taking comprehensive, exceptional measures relating to the Three Principles on Arms Exports. These various changes in the situation pertaining to the Ministry of Defense and Self-Defense Forces served as a basis for the recent considerations regarding MOD reform, during which the points of optimization of defense capabilities build-up across the board, rationalization of duplicated work regarding operations, and strengthening the functions of planning, proposing and transmitting defense policies, as highlighted in the advice of the Report by the Council for Reforming the Ministry of Defense were taken into adequate account, in the determination that the ideal format for the Ministry of Defense and Self-Defense Forces’ duties would be reviewed from the perspective of how to ensure their functions are executed effectively, and the ideal format of the organization would be reviewed, including the viewpoint of making it more eff cient and rational. The direction of the full-f edged reform, including reorganization, is as follows. (1) Remove the barriers to civilian off cials and uniformed personnel It is essential to prompt decision-making to foster a sense of unity among civilian off cials and uniformed personnel in the MOD central organization. For this reason, permanent posts for uniformed personnel will be in established in the Internal Bureau while permanent posts for civilian off cials will be established in each of the Staff Off ces and major commands. (2) From partial to total optimization (defense capabilities build-up) In order to eliminate defense capabilities build-up based on individual, vertically-divided optimization for each of the Ground, Maritime and Air Self-Defense Forces, and ensure that the build-up is instead conducted through total optimization, a procedure will be established for defense capabilities build-up, emphasizing the assessment of the performance of defense capabilities based on joint operations, which has not necessarily been given adequate attention in the past, while further eff ciency and optimization in equipment acquisition will be attempted, based on consistent management across the life-cycle of the equipment, and the organization that contributes to total optimization of defense capabilities realigned. (3) Make accurate decisions more swiftly (joint operations) In order to ensure the accuracy of decision-making relating to the operation of the SDF and make the process swifter, a review of the organization will be conducted so that affairs concerning actual operations will be unif ed into the Joint Staff off ce as well as eff cient coordination body for situation response will be established under the Defense Council. (4) Enhancement of policy-planning and public relations capability The enhancement of the functions of the Bureau of Defense Policy has made certain progress since the 2010 Reform Proposal. Going forward, the systems will be enhanced further still, to respond to the drastic increase in international affairs-related work recently in the Ministry of Defense, such as the expansion of the Cabinet-Level Discussion on Foreign Affairs and Defense (“2 + 2”). At the same time, the enhancement of the functions of the Bureau of Defense Policy will be advanced, in response to the enhancement of the strategic functions of the Prime Minister’s Off ce (resulting from the founding of the NSC). Together with this, efforts will be made to enhance the public relations capability of the Ministry of Defense. In order to ensure that reforms are truly effective, it is vital to change the mentality of each and every member of both the civilian off cials and the uniformed personnel. Furthermore, in the present serious security environment, it is necessary to advance reforms smoothly, to avoid disruption and stagnation in response to contingencies. Accordingly, it is important to establish a series of reforms through steady and phased implementation while Internal Bureau and Staff off ces equally support the Minister of Defense. Reform is, ultimately, something that is implemented without end. It is natural that it should be constantly examined, while efforts are made for further reform and improvement. **4. Specifi c reform efforts** The matters addressed as a part of the MOD reform are, specif cally, as follows (including, in addition to items (1) to (4) of 3. above, matters newly derived in relation to the progress of recent considerations). “Shortterm (FY2014),” “Medium-term” and “Long-term” time schedules will be established for these, and implemented steadily and gradually. (1) Mutual assignment of civilian off cials and uniformed personnel a. By the revision of the relevant articles of the Act for Establishment of the Ministry of Defense (1954 Law No. 164), permanent posts within the Internal Bureau for uniformed personnel, mainly Lieutenant Colonel and Major will be established while permanent posts for civilian off cials will be established in the Joint Staff and major SDF commands. (FY2014) b. Subsequently, permanent posts for uniformed personnel and civilian off cials will be mutually established in high-ranked staffs of the Internal Bureau and the respective Staff Off ce and major command. (Medium-long term) (2) Total optimization of defense capabilities build-up and strengthening of equipment acquisition functions a. Based on the results of implementing optimization method across the board for defense capabilities build-up, in considerations of a review of approaches to defense capabilities which is currently undergoing progress, new procedure will be established for defense capabilities build-up. (FY2014) Rigorous mutual cooperation is being undertaken between the Internal Bureau and each of the Staff Off ces, and in the following ----- step, defense capabilities build-up will be advanced. 1) The Director General of the Bureau of Defense Policy and the Chief of Joint Staff will implement a unif ed assessment of the performance of defense capabilities from the perspective not of the Ground, Maritime and Air Defense Forces separately, but the needs of joint operation, based on envisioned contingencies. 2) The Chief of Joint Staff will present the matters which are to be emphasized in defense capabilities build-up from the perspective of the needs of joint operation, based on the results of 1). 3) The Director General of the Bureau of Defense Policy will clarify the priority matters in defense capabilities build-up from a more comprehensive perspective including attitude and policy, in reference to 2). b. In addition to a procedure reform for the purpose of the above total optimization of defense capabilities build-up, the following measures will be taken so that equipment acquisition duties can be carried out in a form that is more fair, eff cient and optimized. (a) In regard to projects for the improvement of equipment and supplies, the establishment of cross-functional Integrated Project Teams (IPT), headed by a Project Manager (PM) responsible for summarizing the project in question and ensuring its consistent advance, will be increased, and project management strengthened throughout the life-cycle of the equipment, from acquisition including its research and development through to disposal. (FY2014 –) (b) In order that project management across the entire life-cycle, as mentioned above, can be implemented organizationally and appropriately, and can even contribute to the maintenance and strengthening of defense production and technological bases, as well as the total optimization of defense capabilities build-up, departments involved in equipment acquisition in the Internal Bureau, various Staff Off ces, Technical Research and Development Institute and Equipment Procurement and Construction Off ce shall be integrated in accordance with future discussions, and reorganization that keeps the establishment of the “Defense Equipment Agency” (provisional title) in mind carried out. At that time, the strengthening of surveillance functions will also be considered, in order that procurement is conducted with greater fairness. (Medium-term) (3) Strengthening of joint operation functions a. In order to ensure the accuracy of decision-making relating to the operation of the SDF and make the process swifter, f rst for fostering a sense of unity among civilian off cials and uniformed personnel, permanent posts for uniformed personnel will be established in the Internal Bureau, while permanent posts for civilian off cials will be established. (FY2014 –) [Reposted] b. In order to increase swiftness and eff ciency of operations, affairs concerning actual operations will be unif ed into the Joint Staff off ce. Meanwhile, because functions such as the planning and proposal of laws and regulations pertaining to operations are administrative and institutional works, they will continue to come under the jurisdiction of the Internal Bureau. Due to this, the de facto duplication of duties between the Internal Bureau and Joint Staff, resulting from accountability to the Diet, regarding the duties associated with actual force operations, will be eliminated. With these points in mind, the Bureau of Operational Policy will be reviewed its organization based on new challenges as for response to cyber attacks and externally-related tasks referring in (4). (Mediumterm) c. When responding to emergency events, since the Defense Council headed by the Minister of Defense and the Emergency Headquarter are functioning effectively, an organization for eff cient coordination will be constructed under the Defense Council, to deal with emergencies consisting of relevant top off cials among the Internal Bureau and the Joint Staff, in order to ensure the further acceleration of decision-making procedures pertaining to emergencies. (Medium-term) d. Based on the lessons learned at the time that the Self-Defense Forces were mobilized in response to the Great East Japan Earthquake, that duties relating to supporting the Minister of Defense from an expert military perspective in the Joint Staff, and relating to the enforcement of orders from the Minister of Defense became strained, and that the burden on the Joint Staff suddenly increased, cooperation and collaboration will be pursued in areas such as consideration of a review of approaches to defense capabilities, as it relates to ensuring effective command and control in the Ground, Maritime and Air Self-Defense Forces (including considerations regarding the establishment of a central command organization in the Ground Self-Defense Force and the ideal format of relations between the relevant organizations and regional unites of GSDF), such as the Joint Staff, thereby raising the effectiveness of joint operations further. (Medium-long term) (4) Enhancement of policy-planning and public relation capability a. In order to enhance strategic discussions and dialog with partner countries, Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs will be newly established to provide general arrangements for the international affairs-related work in the Ministry of Defense. (FY2014) b. In order to form a strong connection with the soon-to-be-established NSC, and contribute to the drafting of Japanese security strategies, as well as draft and execute defense policies in their response, the function of the Bureau of Defense Policy to draft strategies will be enhanced based, amongst other things, on the situation regarding the activity of the NSC after its establishment. (FY2014 –) c. Implementing the following measures to enhance reporting capability (a) A mechanism will be established for the unif ed coordination of information gathering and public relations in urgent operations, the SDF’s growing international tension and conducting other crisis management by the Ministry of Defense and the SelfDefense Forces, when the latter is mobilized, the international situation becomes strained, and other crisis management is required (Reporting Center). (FY2014) (b) As the security environment surrounding Japan becomes ever more serious, in order that the Ministry of Defense and SelfDefense Forces can transmit information strategically and effectively the reporting organization will be reviewed, so that spokespersons of the Minister’s Secretariat and the Joint Staff, that have been assigned as specialists to deal with reporting requirements can wield their knowhow to the maximum level and function as a key position in the transmission of information by the Ministry of Defense. (Medium-term) (5) Enhancement of collaboration with the local community In order to promote understanding of the local area with camps and bases and to enhance the functions of liaison and coordination with local governments in a state of emergency such as large-scale disasters, efforts will be made to cooperate and collaborate in areas such as consideration of a review of approaches to defense capabilities as it pertains to the format of the relevant regional organizations that can, at all times, collaborate closely with local governments and relevant ministries and agencies (Regional Defense Bureaus, Provincial Cooperation Off ces, GSDF Headquarters, MSDF District Headquarters, etc.). (Medium-long term) (6) Thorough management of information In order to prevent leaks of, not only conf dential information, but information of any kind that is not to be disclosed externally, and thereby maintain the reliability of the MOD as an organization that protects the safety of Japan, and ensure that no obstruction to the execution of its duties arises, efforts are to be made to ensure the thorough management of information at all levels including a review of the specif c scope of management, and methods and systems are to be established for investigation when leaks occur. (FY2014 –) (7) Enhancement of the general coordination function of the Minister’s Secretariat A continuous review will be made regarding the business operation, from the perspective of ensuring the accuracy of decision-making by the Ministry, and the Minister’s secretariat-centered assistant system for political appointee, will be enhanced so that reports for political appointee are made promptly and appropriately by the relevant bureau at all times. (FY2014) **5. Summary** As previously stated, the MOD reform must be implemented soundly, in a manner that brings with it, a reform of the mentality of each and every member. With this in mind, discussions are to be continually pursued in earnest, mainly in the Committee, regarding the specif c efforts of the MOD reform described in section 4, so that they may be made concrete. The problem of scandals in procurement is to be eagerly considered in the relevant committees, and the thoroughness of measures to prevent recurrence ensured. ----- **Reference 34 The Number of Tanks and Major Artillery Owned** |Number|Col2|Col3|Col4|Col5|Col6|Col7|(As of March 31, 2015)| |---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---| |Type|Recoilless Guns|Mortars|Field Artillery|Rocket Launchers, etc.|Anti-aircraft Machine Guns|Tanks|Armored Vehicles| |Approximate number owned|2,500|1,100|500|100|50|690|970| Notes: Each type of gun, except those of tanks and armored vehicles, includes self-propelled guns. **Reference 35 Number of Major Aircraft and Performance Specifi cations** |Col1|Col2|Col3|Col4|Col5|Col6|Col7|Col8|Col9|(As of March 31, 2015)| |---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---| |Service|Type|Model|Use|Number Owned|Maximum Speed (knots)|Crew (number)|Full Length (m)|Full (m)|Engine| |GSDF|Fixed-wing|LR-1|Liaison and Reconnaissance|1|290|2(5)|10|12|Turboprop, twin-engines| |||LR-2|Liaison and Reconnaissance|7|300|2(8)|14|18|Turboprop, twin-engines| ||Rotary-wing|AH-1S|Anti-tank|60|120|2|14|3|Turboshaft| |||OH-6D|Observation|48|140|1(3)|7|2|Turboshaft| |||OH-1|Observation|38|140|2|12|3|Turboshaft, twin-engines| |||UH-1H /J|Utility|131|120|2(11)|12/13|3|Turboshaft| |||CH-47J/JA|Transport|55|150/140|3(55)|16|4/5|Turboshaft, twin-engines| |||UH-60JA|Utility|36|150|2(12)|16|3|Turboshaft, twin-engines| |||AH-64D|Combat|11|150|2|18|6|Turboshaft, twin-engines| |MSDF|Fixed-wing|P-1|Patrol|9|450|11|38|35|Turbofan, quadruple- engine| |||P-3C|Patrol|69|400|11|36|30|Turboprop, quadruple- engine| ||Rotary-wing|SH-60J|Patrol|42|150|3|20/15|16/3|Turboshaft, twin-engine| |||SH-60K|Patrol|44|140|4|20/16|16/3|Turboshaft, twin-engine| |||MH-53E|Minesweeping and transport|5|150|8|30/22|24/8|Turboshaft, triple engine| |||MCH-101|Minesweeping and transport|6|150|4|23/20|19/5|Turboshaft, triple engine| |ASDF|Fixed-wing|F-15J/DJ|Fighter|201|mach 2.5|1/ 2|19|13|Turbofan, twin-engine| |||F-4EJ|Fighter|55|mach 2.2|2|19|12|Turbojet, twin-engine| |||F-2A/B|Fighter|92|mach 2|1/2|16|11|Turbofan, single-engine| |||RF-4E/EJ|Reconnaissance|13|mach 2.2|2|19|12|Turbojet, twin-engine| |||C-1|Transport|24|440|5(60)|29|31|Turbofan, twin-engine| |||C-130H|Transport|15|340|6(92)|30|40|Turboprop, quadruple- engine| |||KC-767|Aerial refueling Transport|4|460|4-8(200)|49|48|Turbofan, twin-engine| |||KC-130H|Addition of aerial refueling functions|1|340|6(92)|30|40|Turboprop, quadruple- engine| |||E-2C|Early warning|13|330|5|18|25|Turboprop, twin-engine| |||E-767|Early warning and control|4|450|20|49|48|Turbofan, twin-engine| ||Rotary-wing|CH-47J|Transport|15|150|3(55)|16|4|Turboshaft, twin-engine| Notes: 1. The number of aircraft possessed indicates numbers registered in the national property ledger as of March 31, 2015. 2. Parenthetical figures in the item “Crew” represents the number of people transported. 3. F-4EJs include 48 improved versions of the F-4EJ. **Reference 36 Number of Major Ships Commissioned into Service** |Number of Ships|Col2|Col3|Col4|Col5|Col6|(As of March 31, 2015)| |---|---|---|---|---|---|---| |Category|Destroyer|Submarine|Mine warfare ship|Patrol combatant craft|Amphibious ship|Auxiliary ship| |Number (vessels)|47|16|27|6|11|30| |Standard Displacement (1,000 tons)|240|45|26|1|28|126| Note: Figures are rounded off, so the totals may not tally. ----- **Reference 37 Guided Missile Specifi cations** |Col1|Col2|Col3|Col4|Col5|Col6|(As of March 31, 2015)| |---|---|---|---|---|---|---| |Use|Name|Service|Weight (kg)|Full Length (m)|Diameter (cm)|Guidance System| |Antiballistic|Patriot (PAC-3)|ASDF|Approx.300|Approx.5.2|Approx.26|Program + command + radar homing| ||SM-3|MSDF|Approx.1,500|Approx.6.6|Approx.35|Command + IR image homing| |Antiaircraft and antimissile|Patriot (PAC-2)|ASDF|Approx.900|Approx.5.3|Approx.41|Program + command + TVM| ||Improved Hawk|GSDF|Approx.640|Approx.5.0|Approx.36|Radar homing| ||Type-03 medium-range surface-to-air missile (Middle-range SAM)||Approx.570|Approx.4.9|Approx.32|Radar homing| ||Type-81 short-range surface-to-air missile (C) (SAM-1C)||Approx.100|Approx.2.7/ 2.9|Approx.16|Image + IR homing Radar homing| ||Type-81 short-range surface-to-air missile (SAM-1)|GSDF/ ASDF|Approx.100|Approx.2.7|Approx.16|IR homing| ||Type-91 portable surface-to-air missile (SAM-2)||Approx.12|Approx.1.4|Approx.8|Image + IR homing| ||Type-91 portable surface-to-air missile (B) (SAM-2B)||Approx.13|Approx.1.5|Approx.8|IR image homing| ||Type-93 short-range surface-to-air missile (SAM-3)|GSDF|Approx.12|Approx.1.4|Approx.8|Image + IR homing| ||Type-11 short-range surface-to-air missile||Approx.100|Approx.2.9|Approx.16|Active radar homing| ||Surface-to-air missile for base air defense|ASDF|Approx.100|Approx.2.9|Approx.16|Active radar homing| ||Standard (SM-1)|MSDF|Approx.590|Approx.4.6|Approx.34|Radar homing| ||Standard (SM-2)||Approx.710|Approx.4.7|Approx.30|Command + radar homing| ||Sea Sparrow (RIM-7F/M)||Approx.230|Approx.3.7|Approx.20|Radar homing| ||Sea Sparrow (RIM-162)||Approx.300|Approx.3.8|Approx.25|Inertial guidance + radar homing| ||RAM (RIM-116)||Approx.73|Approx.2.8|Approx.13|Passive radar homing + IR homing| ||Sparrow (AIM-7E/F/M)|ASDF|Approx.230|Approx.3.7|Approx.20|Radar homing| ||Sidewinder (AIM-9L)||Approx.89|Approx.2.9|Approx.13|IR homing| ||Type-90 air-to-air missile (AAM-3)||Approx.91|Approx.3.0|Approx.13|IR homing| ||Type-99 air-to-air missile (AAM-4)||Approx.220|Approx.3.7|Approx.20|Radar homing| ||Type-99 air-to-air missile (B) (AAM-4B)||Approx.220|Approx.3.7|Approx.20|Radar homing| ||Type-04 air-to-air missile (AAM-5)||Approx.95|Approx.3.1|Approx.13|IR homing| |Antiship|Type-88 surface-to-ship missile (SSM-1)|GSDF|Approx.660|Approx.5.1|Approx.35|Inertial guidance + radar homing| ||Type-12 surface-to-ship missile||Approx.700|Approx.5.0|Approx.35|Inertial guidance + radar homing + GPS| ||Harpoon (SSM)|MSDF|Approx.680|Approx.4.6|Approx.34|Inertial guidance + radar homing| ||Harpoon (USM)||Approx.680|Approx.4.6|Approx.34|Inertial guidance + radar homing| ||Harpoon (ASM)||Approx.530|Approx.3.8|Approx.34|Inertial guidance + radar homing| ||Type-90 ship-to-ship missile (SSM-1B)||Approx.660|Approx.5.1|Approx.35|Inertial guidance + radar homing| ||Type-91 air-to-ship missile (ASM-1C)||Approx.510|Approx.4.0|Approx.35|Inertial guidance + radar homing| ||Type-80 air-to-ship missile (ASM-1)|ASDF|Approx.600|Approx.4.0|Approx.35|Inertial guidance + radar homing| ||Type-93 air-to-ship missile (ASM-2)||Approx.540|Approx.4.0|Approx.35|Inertial guidance + IR image homing| ||Type-93 air-to-ship missile (B) (ASM-2B)||Approx.530|Approx.4.0|Approx.35|Inertial guidance + IR image homing + GPS| |Antitank|Type-87 anti-tank missile|GSDF|Approx.12|Approx.1.1|Approx.11|Laser homing| ||Type-01 light anti-tank missile||Approx.11|Approx.0.9|Approx.12|IR image homing| ||TOW||Approx.18|Approx.1.2|Approx.15|IR semi-automatic wire guidance| |Antilanding craft and antitank|Type-79 anti-landing craft and anti-tank missile|GSDF|Approx.33|Approx.1.6|Approx.15|IR semi-automatic wire guidance| ||Type-96 multipurpose guided missile system (MPMS)||Approx.59|Approx.2.0|Approx.16|Inertial guidance + IR image Optic fi ber TVM| ||Middle range multi-purpose missile||Approx.26|Approx.1.4|Approx.14|IR image homing Laser homing| ||Hellfi re|MSDF|Approx.47|Approx.1.6|Approx.18|Laser homing| ||Maverick||Approx.300|Approx.2.5|Approx.31|IR image homing| ----- **Reference 38 Pattern of Defense Related Expenditures (Original Budget Basis)** (Unit: 100 million yen, %) |IItteemm FFiissccaallyyeeaarr|GNP/GDP (Original Estimates) (A)|Annual Expenditures on General Account (B)|Growth Rate from Previous Year|General Annual Expenditures (C)|Growth Rate from Previous Year|Defense- Related Expenditures (D)|Growth Rate from Previous Year|Ratio of Defense- Related Expenditures to GNP/GDP (D/A)|Ratio of Defense- Related Expenditures to Annual Expenditures on General Account (D/ B)|Ratio of Defense- related Expenditures to General Annual Expenditures (D/C)| |---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---| |1955|75,590|9,915|△0.8|8,107|△2.8|1,349|△3.3|1.78|13.61|16.6| |1965|281,600|36,581|12.4|29,198|12.8|3,014|9.6|1.07|8.24|10.3| |1975|1,585,000|212,888|24.5|158,408|23.2|13,273|21.4|0.84|6.23|8.4| |1985|3,146,000|524,996|3.7|325,854|△0.0|31,371|6.9|0.997|5.98|9.6| |1995|4,928,000|709,871|△2.9|421,417|3.1|47,236|0.86|0.959|6.65|11.2| |2007|5,219,000|829,088|4.0|469,784|1.3|47,818 48,016|△0.2 △0.3|0.916 0.916|5.77 5.79|10.2 10.2| |2008|5,269,000|830,613|0.2|472,845|0.7|47,426 47,796|△0.8 △0.5|0.900 0.907|5.71 5.75|10.0 10.1| |2009|5,102,000|885,480|6.6|517,310|9.4|47,028 47,741|△0.8 △0.1|0.922 0.936|5.31 5.39|9.1 9.2| |2010|4,752,000|922,992|4.2|534,542|3.3|46,826 47,903|△0.4 0.3|0.985 1.008|5.07 5.19|8.76 8.96| |2011|4,838,000|924,116|0.1|540,780|1.2|46,625 47,752|△0.4 △0.3|0.964 0.987|5.05 5.17|8.62 8.83| |2012|4,796,000|903,339|△2.2|512,450|△5.2|46,453 47,138|△0.4 △1.3|0.969 0.983|5.14 5.22|9.06 9.20| |2013|4,877,000|926,115|2.5|527,311|2.9|46,804 47,538|0.8 0.8|0.975|5.05 5.13|8.88 9.02| |2014|5,004,000|958,823|3.5|564,697|7.1|47,838 48,848|2.2 2.8|0.956 0.976|4.99 5.09|8.47 8.65| |2015|5,049,000|963,420|0.5|573,555|1.6|48,221 49,801|0.8 2.0|0.955 0.986|5.01 5.17|8.41 8.68| Notes: 1. The figures provided show GNP in and before FY1985, and GDP from FY1995 onward, in each case based on original estimates. 2. The upper figures for defense-related expenditures for FY2007 and thereafter exclude SACO-related expenses (12.6 billion yen in FY2007, 18 billion yen in FY2008, 11.2 billion yen in FY2009, 16.9 billion yen in FY2010, 10.1 billion yen in FY2011, 8.6 billion yen in FY2012, 8.8 billion yen in FY2013, 12 billion yen in FY2014, and 4.6 billion yen in FY2015), U.S. Forces realignment-related expenses (portion meant to reduce the burden on the local community) (7.2 billion yen in FY2007, 19.1 billion yen in FY2008, 60.2 billion yen in FY2009, 90.9 billion yen in FY2010, 102.7 billion yen in FY2011, 59.9 billion yen in FY2012, 64.6 billion yen in FY2013, 89.0 billion yen in FY2014, and 142.6 billion yen in FY2015), as well as expenses associated with the introduction of a new government aircraft (FY2015: 10.8 billion yen), while the lower figures include them. **Reference 39 Changes in Major Area of Expenditures on General Account Budget (Original Budget Basis)** (Unit: 100 million yen, %) |IItteemm FFiissccaall yyeeaarr|Annual Expenditures on General Account|National Defense|Composition Ratio|Social Security|Composition Ratio|Education and Science|Composition Ratio|Public Works|Composition Ratio| |---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---| |2007|829,088|47,818 48,016|5.8 5.8|211,409|25.5|52,743|6.4|69,473|8.4| |2008|830,613|47,426 47,796|5.7 5.8|217,824|26.2|53,122|6.4|67,352|8.1| |2009|885,480|47,028 47,741|5.3 5.4|248,344|28.0|53,104|6.0|70,701|8.0| |2010|922,992|46,826 47,903|5.1 5.2|272,686|29.5|55,872|6.1|57,731|6.3| |2011|924,116|46,625 47,752|5.0 5.2|287,079|31.1|55,100|6.0|49,743|5.4| |2012|903,339|46,453 47,138|5.1 5.2|263,901|29.2|54,057|6.0|45,734|5.1| |2013|926,115|46,804 47,538|5.1 5.1|291,224|31.4|53,687|5.8|52,853|5.7| |2014|958,823|47,838 48,848|5.0 5.1|305,175|31.8|54,421|5.7|59,685|6.2| |2015|963,420|48,221 49,801|5.0 5.2|315,297|32.7|53,613|5.6|59,711|6.2| Notes: 1. The education and science expenditures for FY2010 are post-overhaul figures. 2. The upper figures for defense expenditures exclude SACO-related expenses (12.6 billion yen in FY2007, 18.0 billion yen in FY2008, 11.2 billion yen in FY2009, 16.9 billion yen in FY2010, 10.1 billion yen in FY2011, 8.6 billion yen in FY2012, 8.8 billion yen in FY2013, 12.0 billion yen in FY2014, and 4.6 billion yen in FY2015), U.S. Forces realignment-related expenses (portion meant to reduce the burden on the local community) (7.2 billion yen in FY2007, 19.1 billion yen in FY2008, 60.2 billion yen in FY2009, 90.9 billion yen in FY2010, 102.7 billion yen in FY2011, 59.9 billion yen in FY2012, 64.6 billion yen in FY2013, 89.0 billion yen in FY2014, and 142.6 billion yen in FY2015), as well as expenses associated with the introduction of a new government aircraft (FY2015: 10.8 billion yen), while the lower figures include them. ----- **Reference 40 Changes in Composition of Defense Related Expenditures (Original Budget Basis)** (Unit: 100 million yen, %) |FFiissccaall yyeeaarr IItteemm|2011|Col3|2012|Col5|2013|Col7|2014|Col9|2015|Col11| |---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---| ||Budget|Composition Ratio|Budget|Composition Ratio|Budget|Composition Ratio|Budget|Composition Ratio|Budget|Composition Ratio| |Personnel and provisions|20,916|44.9 43.8|20,701|44.6 43.9|19,896|42.5 41.9|20,930|43.8 42.8|21,121|43.8 42.4| |Materials|25,709 26,836|55.1 56.2|25,751 26,437|55.4 56.1|26,908 27,642|57.5 58.1|26,909 27,918|56.2 57.2|27,100 28,680|56.2 57.6| |Equipment acquisition|7,800|16.7 16.3|7,565|16.3 16.0|7,442|15.9 15.7|7,964|16.6 16.3|7,404|15.4 14.9| |R&D|851|1.8 1.8|944|2.0 2.0|1,541|3.3 3.2|1,477|3.1 3.0|1,411|2.9 2.8| |Facility improvement|1,198|2.6 2.5|999|2.1 2.1|950|2.0 2.0|950|2.0 1.9|1,293|2.7 2.6| |Maintenance|10,713|23.0 22.4|11,057|23.8 23.5|11,134|23.8 23.4|11,361|23.7 23.3|11,808|24.5 23.7| |Base countermeasures|4,337|9.3 9.1|4,418|9.5 9.4|4,381|9.4 9.2|4,397|9.2 9.0|4,425|9.2 8.9| |The cost for SACO-related projects|101|0.2|86|0.2|88|0.2|120|0.2|46|0.1| |U.S. Forces realignment related expenses (reduction of burden on local communities)|1,027|2.1|599|1.3|646|1.4|890|1.8|1,426|2.9| |Introduction of government aircraft|—|—|—|—|—|—|—|—|108|0.2| |Others|810|1.7 1.7|769|1.7 1.6|1,460|3.1 3.1|760|1.6 1.6|758|1.6 1.5| |Total|46,625 47,752|100|46,453 47,138|100|46,804 47,538|100|47,838 48,848|100|48,221 49,801|100| Notes: 1. Personnel and food provisions expenses include personnel wage and food expenditures. 2. Equipment acquisition expenses include the purchase of arms, vehicles and aircraft, and the construction of ships. 3. R&D expenses include those of equipment. 4. Facility improvement expenses include those of airfields and barracks. 5. Maintenance costs include those for housing, clothing and training. 6. Base countermeasures expenses include those for areas surrounding base countermeasures and burden by the USFJ. 7. The “others” category in FY2013 includes an expenditure amounting to 68.9 billion yen which is necessary to be carried over to the Special Account for Reconstruction from the Great East Japan Earthquake. 8. Figures are rounded off, so the totals may not tally. 9. The upper figures for Budgets and Composition Ratio exclude the cost for SACO-related expenses (10.1 billion yen in FY2011, 8.6 billion yen in FY2012, 8.8 billion yen in FY2013, 12.0 billion yen in FY2014, and 4.6 billion yen in FY2015), U.S. Forces realignment-related expenses (portion meant to reduce the burden on the local community; 102.7 billion yen in FY2011, 59.9 billion yen in FY2012, 64.6 billion yen in FY2013, 89.0 billion yen in FY2014, and 142.6 billion yen in FY2015), as well as expenses associated with the introduction of a new government aircraft (FY2015: 10.8 billion yen), while the lower figures include them. **Reference 41 Trend of Defense Expenditures of Major Countries** |FFiissccaall yyeeaarr CCoouunnttrryy|2011|2012|2013|2014|2015| |---|---|---|---|---|---| |Japan (100 million yen)|46,625 47,752 △0.4% △0.3%|46,453 47,138 △0.4% △1.3%|46,804 47,538 0.8% 0.8%|47,838 48,848 2.2% 2.8%|48,221 49,801 0.8% 2.0%| |U.S. (U.S. $1 million)|678,064 1.7%|650,851 △4.0%|607,795 △6.6%|577,897 △4.9%|567,703 △1.8| |China (100 million yuan)|5,836 12.4%|6,503 11.4%|7,202 10.7%|8,082 12.2%|8,896 10.1%| |Russia (RR 100 million)|15,170.906 20.7%|18,465.847 21.7%|21,064.619 14.1%|24,881.341 18.1%|31,168 25.3%| |Republic of Korea (100 million won)|314,031 6.2%|329,576 5.0%|344,970 4.7%|357,057 3.5%|374,560 4.9%| |Australia (1 million Australian dollar)|26,560 △1.3%|24,217 △8.8%|25,434 5.0%|29,303 15.2%|32,695 11.6%| |U.K. (GBP 1 million)|37,169 △5.8%|34,260 △7.8%|34,800 1.6%|34,500 △0.9%|35,400 2.6%| |France (€1 million)|37,409 0.7%|38,001 1.6%|38,124 0.3%|38,921 2.1%|—| Notes: 1. Data sources are national budget books, defense white papers and others. 2. % represents a rate of growth over the previous year. 3. U.S. defense expenditures represent the expense narrowly defined by the historical table. Figures for FY2015 are estimated values. 4. The figures for China are based on the initial budget for the central government expenditure in the Finance Budget Report to the National People’s Congress (However, in FY2015, only the defense expenditure in the central ministry expenditure [a portion of the central government expenditure] was released. Therefore, the defense expenditure of the central government expenditure was calculated by combining the local transfer expenditure, etc. that were separately released.) 5. Russia’s FY2015 defense expenditure is based on materials released by the Committee on Defence, State Duma of Russia and other sources. 6. The figures for Australia are based on the initial budget in the Defence Portfolio Budget Statements published by the Australian Department of Defence. 7. The figures for the United Kingdom up to FY2012 are based on U.K. Defence Statistics 2013 published by the Ministry of Defence. The figures for FY2013 and after are based on the initial budget in the budget message. 8. French defense expenditures for FY2014 are undisclosed as of June 2014. 9. In Japan, the figures in the upper row exclude SACO-related expenditures (10.1 billion yen for FY2011, 8.6 billion yen for FY2012, 8.8 billion yen for FY2013, 12.0 billion yen for FY2014, and 4.6 billion yen for FY2015), the expenditures associated with the U.S. Forces realignment from which the expenses to reduce the burden on the local community (102.7 billion yen for FY2011, 59.9 billion yen for FY2012, 64.6 billion yen for FY2013, 89.0 billion yen for FY2014, and 142.6 billion yen for FY2015), as well as expenses associated with the introduction of a new government aircraft (FY2015: 10.8 billion yen), while the figures in the lower row are based on the initial budget and include them. ----- **Reference 42 Record of Disaster Relief Dispatches (Past Five Years)** |FY|2010|2011|2012|2013|2014| |---|---|---|---|---|---| |Number of Dispatches|529|586|520|555|521| |Personnel|39,646|43,494|12,410|89,049|66,267| |Vehicles|6,637|12,177|2,068|7,949|9,621| |Aircraft|649|968|684|1,255|1,232| |Vessels|2|2|1|51|0| **The Scale of the SDF’s Engagement in Disaster Relief Operations Associated with the Great East Japan Earthquake (2010 – 2011)** |Col1|Total| |---|---| |Personnel|10,664,870| |Aircraft|50,179| |Vessels|4,818| **Reference 43 Implementation and participation record of major drills concerning disaster dispatch (FY2014)** (1) Implementation of integrated disaster prevention exercises by the Self-Defense Forces (training to respond to earthquakes along the Nankai Trough) (2) Implementation of operational training by the Ministry of Defense Disaster Countermeasures Headquarters (3) Participation in “Disaster Prevention Day” operational training by the Government Headquarters (4) Participation in government’s role-playing simulation exercise (5) FY2014 integrated nuclear disaster prevention training (6) Participation in tsunami disaster prevention training (7) Participation in nuclear disaster prevention training (8) Participation in wide-area medical transport training (9) Participation in training in collaboration with the Shizuoka Prefecture comprehensive disaster reduction drills (10) Participation in training in collaboration with the Nine Cities and Prefectures joint disaster prevention training (11) Participation in training in collaboration with the Kinki Region joint disaster prevention training (12) Participation in training in collaboration with the Tokai Region widearea collaboration disaster prevention training (13) Participation in other general disaster prevention training implemented by local government, etc. **Reference 44 Employment situation of retired uniformed SDF Personnel in disaster prevention-related bureaus in local government (as of March 31,** **2015: 334 persons)** Government, Hakodate City Government (two persons), Muroran City Government, Shiga Shiga Prefectural Government, Takashima City Government Ibaraki Ibaraki Prefectural Government, Ushiku City Government (two persons), Ryugasaki City Government Okayama Okayama Prefectural Government, Kurashiki City Government, Asakuchi City Government Tokyo Metropolitan Government (fi ve persons), Itabashi Ward Offi ce (two Kochi Kochi Prefectural Government, Konan City Government Toyama Toyama Prefectural Government, Toyama City Government Nagasaki persons), Nagasaki City Government, Omura City Government (two persons), |Prefectural Government|Employment situation| |---|---| |Hokkaido|Hokkaido Prefectural Government (three persons), Obihiro City Government (two persons), Chitose City Government (three persons), Bibai City Government, Sapporo City Government (two persons), Shikabe Town Government, Bihoro Town Government (two persons), Tomakomai City Government, Hokuto City Government, Iwamizawa City Government (two persons), Asahikawa City Government (two persons), Eniwa City Government (two persons), Kushiro City Government, Kushiro Town Government, Nayoro City Government, Kitami City Government, Nanae Town Government, Rumoi City Government, Engaru Town Government, Takigawa City Government, Akabira City Government, Kitahiroshima City Government, Noboribetsu City Government, Shibecha Town Government, Shiraoi Town Government, Teshikaga Town Government, Shikaoi Town Government, Hakodate City Government (two persons), Muroran City Government, Memuro Town Government, Shinhidaka Town Government, Naganuma Town Government, Ashibetsu City Government| |Aomori|Aomori Prefectural Government, Hachinohe City Government (two persons), Aomori City Government (three persons), Hirosaki City Government, Oirase Town Government, Misawa City Government| |Iwate|Iwate Preferctual Government, Hanamaki City Government, Shiwa Town Government, Takizawa City Government, Tono Town Government, Hachimantai City Government, Kuji City Government, Morioka City Government| |Miyagi|Miyagi Prefectural Government, Sendai City Government (two persons), Ishinomaki City Government (two persons), Tagajo City Government, Oohira Village Offi ce| |Akita|Akita Prefectural Government, Daisen City Government, Yokote City Government, Senboku City Government, Odate City Government| |Yamagata|Yamagata Prefectural Government (two persons), Higashine City Government, Sakata City Government, Tendo City Government| |Fukushima|Fukushima Prefectural Government, Fukushima City Government (two persons), Ashibetsu City Government| |Ibaraki|Ibaraki Prefectural Government, Ushiku City Government (two persons), Ryugasaki City Government| |Tochigi|Tochigi Prefectural Government, Utsunomiya City Government| |Gunma|Gunma Prefectural Government, Maebashi City Government (three persons), Shibukawa City Government| |Saitama|Saitama Prefectural Government, Soka City Government, Saitama City Government, Wako City Government, Asagiri City Government, Fukaya City Government| |Chiba|Chiba Prefectural Government, Urayasu City Government, Ichikawa City Government, Nagareyama City Government, Isumi City Government, Narashino City Government, Funabashi City Government, Matsudo City Government, Katsuura City Government, Narita City Government, Oamishirasato City Government, Nagareyama City Government| |Tokyo|Tokyo Metropolitan Government (fi ve persons), Itabashi Ward Offi ce (two persons), Arakawa Ward Offi ce, Adachi Ward Offi ce, Shinagawa Ward Offi ce| |Kanagawa|Kanagawa Prefectural Government (three persons), Yokohama City Government (nine persons), Kawasaki City Government (two persons), Fujisawa City Government (two persons), Chigasaki City Government, Zushi City Government, Sagamihara City Government, Zama City Government, Ebina City Government| |Niigata|Niigata Prefectural Government, Tainai City Government, Jouetsu City Government, Sado City Government| |Toyama|Toyama Prefectural Government, Toyama City Government| |Ishikawa|Ishikawa Prefectural Government, Kanazawa City Government, Komatsu City Government, Kaga City Government| |Fukui|Fukui Prefectural Government, Fukui City Government, Awara City Government| |Yamanashi|Yamanashi Prefectural Government (two persons), Minami-alps City Government, Fujiyoshida City Government| |Nagano|Nagano Prefectural Government, Ina City Government, Matsumoto City Government| |Gifu|Gifu Prefectural Government (two persons), Kaizu City Government, Kakamigahara City Government| |Prefectural Government|Employment situation| |---|---| |Aichi|Aichi Prefectural Government, Seto Town Government, Kitanagoya City Government (two persons), Miyoshi City Government, Mihama Town Government, Taketoyo Town Government, Aisai City Government, Toyohashi City Government, Gamagori City Government, Tobishima Village Offi ce, Ama City Government, Obu City Government, Kiyosu City Government, Oharu Town Offi ce, Ama County, Nishio City Government, Tokai City Government, Handa City Government, Toyoake City Government, Toyoyama Town Offi ce, Minamichita Town Offi ce, Yatomi City Government, Nagakute City Government| |Mie|Mie Prefectural Government, Tsu City Government, Ise City Government, Kameyama City Government, Nabari City Government, Shima City Government, Toba City Government, Kuwana City Government, Yokkaichi City Government| |Shiga|Shiga Prefectural Government, Takashima City Government| |Kyoto|Kyoto Prefectural Government, Seika Town Government, Kizugawa City Government, Yawata City Government| |Osaka|Osaka Prefectural Government, Sakai City Government, Ikeda City Government, Osaka City Government (two persons), Kawachinagano City Government, Matsubara City Government, Izumi City Government, Hirakata City Government, Izumisano City Government, Toyono Town Government, Toyono County, Sayama City Government| |Hyogo|Hyogo Prefectural Government, Akashi City Government, Toyooka City Government, Miki City Government, Yabu City Government| |Nara|Nara Prefectural Government, Nara City Government (four persons), Gojo City Government| |Wakayama|Wakayama Prefectural Government, Wakayama City Government| |Tottori|Tottori Prefectural Government (two persons), Tottori City Government| |Shimane|Shimane Prefectural Government, Matsue City Government, Izumo City Government, Hamada City Government| |Okayama|Okayama Prefectural Government, Kurashiki City Government, Asakuchi City Government| |Hiroshima|Hiroshima Prefectural Government (two persons), Hatsukaichi City Government| |Yamaguchi|Yamaguchi Prefectural Government, Yamaguchi City Government, Iwakuni City Government, Shimonoseki City Government, Shunan City Government, Hohu City Government, Nagato City Government| |Tokushima|Tokushima Prefectural Government (two persons), Komatsushima City Government (three persons), Anan City Government, Yoshinogawa City Government| |Kagawa|Kagawa Prefectural Government, Marugame City Government, Sakade City Government, Zentsuji City Government| |Ehime|Ehime Prefectural Government (two persons), Matsuyama City Government, Imabari City Government| |Kochi|Kochi Prefectural Government, Konan City Government| |Fukuoka|Fukuoka Prefectural Government, Kurume City Government, Iizuka City Government, Nogata City Government, Kasuga City Government, Tagawa City Government, Nakagawa Town Government, Dazaifu City Government, Chikuzen Town Government, Onojo City Government, Munakata City Government, Kasuya Town Government, Itoshima City Government| |Saga|Saga Prefectural Government (two persons), Karatsu City Government| |Nagasaki|Nagasaki Prefectural Government (fi ve persons), Sasebo City Government (two persons), Nagasaki City Government, Omura City Government (two persons), Minamishimabara City Government, Shimabara City Government, Matsuura City Government| |Kumamoto|Kumamoto Prefectural Government (three persons), Kumamoto City Government, Kikuchi City Government, Ozu Town Government| |Oita|Oita Prefectural Government (two persons), Saiki City Government, Kitsuki City Government| |Miyazaki|Miyazaki Prefectural Government (two persons), Miyazaki City Government, Miyakonojo City Government, Nobeoka City Government, Ebino City Government, Tsuno Town Offi ce, Kobayashi City Government, Saito City Government, Hyuga City Government| |Kagoshima|Kagoshima Prefectural Government (three persons), Satsuma-Sendai City Government, Kirishima City Government, Tarumizu City Government| Shizuoka Prefectural Government (four persons), Ito City Government, Hamamatsu City Government, Gotenba City Government (two persons), Susono Shizuoka City Government, Oyama Town Government, Fukuroi City Government, Shizuoka City Government Makinohara City Government Izunokuni City Government ----- **Reference 45 Breakdown of Ministry of Defense Personnel** |(As of March 31, 2015)|Col2|Col3|Col4|Col5| |---|---|---|---|---| |Personnel of the Ministry of Defense||||| |Special Service|||Regular Service|| |Minister of Defense State Minister of Defense Parliamentary Vice-Ministers of Defense (2) Senior Adviser to the Minister of Defense Special Advisers to the Minister of Defense (up to 3)|Authorized Strength|Non-Authorized Strength|Authorized Strength|Non-Authorized Strength| ||Private Secretary of the Minister of Defense||Administrative Offi cials, and others 29|Part-Time Offi cials| ||SDF Personnel|||| ||Administrative Vice-Minister of Defense|Candidates for SDF Personnel||| ||Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs|Reserve Personnel 47,900||| ||Director General, and others 660|Ready Reserve Personnel 8,175||| ||Administrative Offi cials, and others 20,586|Candidate Reserve Personnel 4,600||| ||SDF Regular Personnel 247,160|National Defense Academy students||| |||National Defense Medical College students||| |||GSDF High Technical School students||| |||Part-Time Offi cials||| Notes: 1. Number of personnel refers to the numbers specified in the laws and regulations 2. The law to add partial revision to the National Public Service Act, etc. (Act No. 22 of 2014) was enacted on May 30, 2014, and Senior Adviser to the Ministry of Defense was newly established (for one person if particularly necessary) as a joint position across each Government ministry. 3. Based on the law (Act No. 65 of 2014) enacted on June 13, 2014, which added partial revision to the Act for the Establishment of the Ministry of Defense, etc., Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs will be established in the Ministry of Defense. **Reference 46 Authorized and Actual Strength of Uniformed SDF Personnel** |Col1|Col2|Col3|Col4|Col5|(As of March 31,| |---|---|---|---|---|---| |Category|GSDF|MSDF|ASDF|Joint Staff etc.|Total| |Authorized|151,023|45,494|47,073|3,570|247,160| |Actual|138,168|42,209|43,099|3,266|226,742| |Staffing Rate (%)|91.5|92.8|91.6|91.5|91.7| |Category|Non-Fixed-Term Personnel|Col3|Col4|Col5|Fixed-Term Personnel| |---|---|---|---|---|---| ||Offi cer|Warrant Offi cer|Enlisted (upper)|Enlisted (lower)|| |Authorized|45,396|4,877|140,461|56,426|| |Actual|42,544 (2,046)|4,517 (28)|137,603 (7,276)|19,370 (1,183)|22,708 (2,425)| |Staffing Rate (%)|93.7|92.6|98.0|74.6|| Notes: 1. Figures in parentheses denote the number of females included in the preceding value. 2. The number of authorized personnel is determined based on the budget. ----- **Reference 47 Status of Recruiting and Employing Uniformed SDF Personnel (FY2014)** |Classifi cation|Col2|Col3|Col4|Number Recruited|Number Employed|Multiple| |---|---|---|---|---|---|---| |Candidates for general, technical staff|||GSDF|3,922 ( 512)|150 ( 9)|26.1 ( 56.9)| ||||MSDF|1,946 ( 261)|85 ( 5)|22.9 ( 52.2)| ||||ASDF|2,647 ( 453)|57 ( 12)|46.4 ( 37.8)| ||||Total|8,515 (1,226)|292 ( 26)|29.2 ( 47.2)| |Non- commissioned offi cer|Technical Petty Offi cer||MSDF|100 ( 24)|12 ( 4)|8.3 ( 6.0)| ||Technical Sergeant||ASDF|1 ( 1)|—|| ||GSDF personnel (Nursing)||GSDF|9 ( 5)|4 ( 4)|2.3 ( 1.3)| |Aviation students|||MSDF|948 ( 97)|82 ( 6)|11.6 ( 16.2)| ||||ASDF|2,908 ( 233)|50 ( 4)|58.2 ( 58.3)| ||||Total|3,856 ( 330)|132 ( 10)|29.2 ( 33.0)| |Candidates for non-commissioned offi cers|||GSDF|18,887 (2,485)|2,655 (151)|7.1 ( 16.7)| ||||MSDF|4,967 ( 717)|1,001 ( 42)|5.0 ( 17.1)| ||||ASDF|7,291 (1,208)|780 ( 95)|9.5 ( 12.5)| ||||Total|31,145 (4,410)|4,457 (288)|7.0 ( 15.3)| |Privates|||GSDF|21,224 (2,482)|5,948 (499)|3.6 ( 4.9)| ||||MSDF|4,451 ( 622)|789 ( 79)|6.0 ( 7.9)| ||||ASDF|5,686 ( 938)|1,502 (270)|3.8 ( 3.6)| ||||Total|31,361 (4,042)|8,239 (848)|3.8 ( 4.8)| |National Defense Academy students||Recommended|Social sciences|169 ( 54)|23 ( 6)|7.3 ( 9.0)| ||||Science and engineering|265 ( 29)|85 ( 5)|3.1 ( 5.8)| ||||Total|434 ( 83)|108 ( 11)|4.0 ( 7.5)| |||Integrated selection system|Social sciences|123 ( 28)|14 ( 3)|8.8 ( 9.3)| ||||Science and engineering|143 ( 11)|34 ( 2)|4.2 ( 5.5)| ||||Total|266 ( 39)|48 ( 5)|5.5 ( 7.8)| |||General fi rst term|Social sciences|6,192 (2,529)|66 ( 16)|93.8 (158.1)| ||||Science and engineering|9,578 (1,887)|275 ( 15)|34.8 (125.8)| ||||Total|15,770 (4,416)|341 ( 31)|46.2 (142.5)| |||General second term|Social sciences|212 ( 51)|16 ( 3)|13.3 ( 17.0)| ||||Science and engineering|447 ( 44)|30 ( 1)|14.9 ( 44.0)| ||||Total|659 ( 95)|46 ( 4)|14.3 ( 23.8)| |National Defense Medical College students||||7,240 (2,240)|85 ( 24)|85.2 ( 93.3)| |National Defense Medical College nursing students (SDF regular personnel candidate and nursing school students)||||2,654 (2,159)|75 ( 68)|35.4 ( 31.8)| |Technical High School students||Recommended||231|61|3.8| |||General||3,565|267|13.4| |||Total||3,769|328|11.6| Notes: 1. Figures in parentheses indicate number of females. 2. The numbers are for SDF regular personnel recruited in FY2014. ----- **Reference 48 Major Exercises Conducted in FY2014** |H Integrated training|Col2|Col3|Col4|Col5|Col6| |---|---|---|---|---|---| |Exercise|Period|Location|Main Participating Forces||Remarks| ||||Ministry of Defense/SDF|Relevant external organizations|| |SDF Joint Exercise (command post exercise)|Jan. 26 – 30, 2015|Camp Ichigaya, the locations of participating units, etc.|Internal bureau, each Joint Staff, Defense Intelligence Headquarters, Armies of the GSDF, Central Readiness Force, Self-Defense Fleet, JMSDF Districts, Air Defense Command, Air Support Command, etc.||Plan to maintain and enhance the SDF’s joint operations capabilities through studying and practicing SDF joint operations.| |H GSDF|Col2|Col3|Col4|Col5|Col6| |---|---|---|---|---|---| |Exercise|Period|Location|Main Participating Forces||Remarks| ||||Ministry of Defense/SDF|Relevant external|| |Army Corps fi eld training exercise|Sep. 25 – Oct. 15, 2014|Northern District|JGSDF Northern Army Headquarters, 2nd Division, 7th Division, 5th Brigade, 11th Brigade, JGSDF 1st Artillery Brigade, JGSDF 1st Antiaircraft Artillery Brigade, etc. Approximately 6,600 personnel||Plan to maintain and enhance Army’s capability to respond to various military situations| |Army Corps fi eld training exercise|Oct. 27 – Nov. 26, 2014|Western District|JGSDF Western Army, Central Readiness Force, 2nd Division, JGSDF North Eastern Army Artillery Unit, etc. Approximately 16,000 personnel||Plan to maintain and enhance Army’s capability to respond to various military situations| |Joint relocation exercises (camp relocation for divisions)|Jun. 26 – Jul. 25, 2014|Central-Northern Districts (Yausubetsu Training Area, etc.)|10th Division Headquarters Approximately 3,200 personnel and 1,100 vehicles||Plan to enhance control capability and adjustability necessary for long-range mobility| |Joint relocation exercises (camp relocation for regiments)|Sep. 25 – Oct. 14, 2014|Northeastern- Northern Districts (Yausubetsu Training Area, etc.)|One Infantry Regiment of the 9th Division Approximately 1,750 personnel and 500 vehicles||Plan to enhance control capability and adjustability necessary for long-range mobility| |Joint relocation exercises (camp relocation for regiments)|Oct. 14 – Oct. 29, 2014|Northern-Eastern Districts (Higashifuji Training Area, etc.)|One Infantry Regiment of the 11th Brigade Approximately 400 personnel and 140 vehicles||Plan to enhance control capability and adjustability necessary for long-range mobility| |Joint relocation exercises (camp relocation for regiments)|Oct. 27 – Nov. 26, 2014|Northern-Western Districts (Hijudai Training Area, etc.)|One Infantry Regiment of the 2nd Division Approximately 1,000 personnel and 320 vehicles||Plan to enhance control capability and adjustability necessary for long-range mobility| |Joint relocation exercises (camp relocation for regiments)|Oct. 11 – Nov. 22, 2014|Northeastern-Western Districts (Hijudai Training Area, etc.)|One squadron of the 5th Antiaircraft Artillery Group Approximately 230 personnel and 100 vehicles||Plan to enhance control capability and adjustability necessary for long-range mobility| |H MSDF|Col2|Col3|Col4|Col5|Col6| |---|---|---|---|---|---| |Exercise|Period|Location|Main Participating Forces||Remarks| ||||Ministry of Defense/SDF|Relevant external|| |Self Defense Fleet Practical Exercise (maritime defense map exercise)|Sep. 2 – 5, 2014|MSDF Staff College and the locations of other participating units|Maritime Staff Offi ce, Self Defense Fleet command, regional headquarters, etc.||Plan to have senior commanders and others practice their assessment of the situations and the operation of units in times of peace and contingencies, as well as to acquire the necessary knowhow for executing the duties of the JMSDF.| **Reference 49 Results of Firing Training and Related Training by Dispatch of Each of the Self-Defense Forces to the United States (FY2014)** |Col1|Name of Training|Date|Location|Dispatched Unit| |---|---|---|---|---| |GSDF|Training in the U.S. by dispatch|Jun. 22 – Aug. 6, 2014|Marine Corps Air Station Kaneohe Bay in Oahu Island, Hawaii, U.S., Pohakuloa Training Area in Hawaii Island, and their surrounding sea areas and airspace|Western Army Headquarters, Western Army Infantry Regiment, etc. Approximately 40 personnel| ||HAWK/Medium-range SAM unit level live- fi re training|Sep. 22 – Dec. 23, 2014|McGregor Range in New Mexico, U.S.|17 anti-aircraft companies Approximately 570 personnel| ||Surface-to-surface missile unit level live-fi re training|Oct. 4 – Nov. 7, 2014|Point Mugu Range in California, U.S.|Each Surface-to-Ship Missile Regiment, GSDF Artillery School Unit Approximately 220 personnel| |MSDF|Training in the U.S. by dispatch of destroyer and others|Jun. 7 – Aug. 21, 2014|Hawaii, Guam, U.S. West Coast, and their surrounding sea areas and airspace|2 destroyers 3 aircraft Approximately 10 Explosive Ordnance Disposal divers| ||(First) Training in the U.S. by dispatch of group of destroyers|Jun. 25 – Jul. 16, 2014|Sea areas and airspace surrounding Guam|7 destroyers 1 training support ship 2 aircraft| ||(First) Training in the U.S. by dispatch of submarine|Aug. 22 – Nov. 22, 2014|Sea areas surrounding Hawaii|1 submarine| ||(Second) Training in the U.S. by dispatch of submarine|Feb. 6 – May. 9, 2015|Hawaii and the sea areas surrounding Guam|1 submarine| ||(Second) Training in the U.S. by dispatch of group of destroyers|Mar. 14 – Apr. 4, 2015|Sea areas and airspace surrounding Guam|3 destroyers 1 training support ship 2 aircraft| |ASDF|Annual practice by antiaircraft units|Aug. 20 – Nov. 26, 2014|White Sands Range and McGregor Range in New Mexico, U.S.|12 Air Defense Missiles (6 groups), Air Defense Missile Training Group Approximately 380 personnel| ----- |eference 50|History of Efforts for BMD Development in Japan| |---|---| |1995|Commenced a comprehensive study on the posture of the air defense system of Japan and a Japan-U.S. joint study on ballistic missile defense| |1998|North Korea launched a ballistic missile over Japanese territory| ||The Security Council and the Cabinet meeting approved the commencement of the Japan-U.S. joint cooperative technical research on ballistic missile defense (BMD) for parts of the sea-based upper-tier system| |1999|Started the Japan-U.S. joint cooperative technical research on four major components for advanced interceptor missiles| |2002|Decision by the United States on the initial deployment of BMD| |2003|The Security Council and the Cabinet meeting approved the introduction of BMD system and other measures, and the deployment of BMD in Japan started| |2005|Amendment of the Self-Defense Forces Act (ballistic missile destruction measures) The Security Council and the Cabinet meeting approved the Japan-U.S. cooperative development of advanced interceptors for BMD| |2006|North Korea launched seven ballistic missiles toward the Sea of Japan| |2007|The deployment of Patriot PAC-3 units started SM-3 launch tests by Aegis destroyers started| |2009|North Korea launched one ballistic missile toward the Pacifi c Ocean in April and seven toward the Sea of Japan in July. Orders for ballistic missile destruction measures were issued for the fi rst time (March).| |2012|North Korea launched missiles which it called “Satellites” in April and December April: The missile was in fl ight for over a minute before disintegrating and landing in the Yellow Sea December: Passed through Okinawa airspace toward the Pacifi c The Minister of Defense issued the operation order for the implementation of destruction measures against ballistic missiles, etc.| |2014|North Korea launched several ballistic missiles in March, June, and July March 3: Two missiles were launched and landed in the Sea of Japan March 26: Two missiles were launched and fl ew over 600 km before landing in the Sea of Japan June 29: Several missiles were launched and fl ew approx. 500 km at most before landing in the Sea of Japan July 9: Several missiles were launched and fl ew approx. 500 km at most before landing in the Sea of Japan July 13: Two missiles were launched and fl ew about 500 km before landing in the Sea of Japan July 26: One missile was launched and fl ew approx. 500 km before landing in the Sea of Japan| |2015|March 2: Two missiles were launched and fl ew approx. 500 km before landing in the Sea of Japan| **Reference 51 Flow of Responce to Ballistic Missiles** |SDF takes measures on the order of the Minister of Defense|Col2|SDF takes measures on the order| |---|---|---| |||of the Minister of Defense| Not recognized as armed attack When the possibility that ballistic Although the ballistic missiles are not expected to missiles may fly toward Japan is fly over Japan, a rapid change in circumstances acknowledged may create an emergency situation which makes it difficult to obtain an approval from the Prime Minister in time Minister of Defense orders destruction Minister of Defense orders destruction measures measures upon approval of in advance as provided in the emergency response the Prime Minister procedure (approved by the Cabinet in 2007) Article 76 of the SDF Act (Paragraph 1) Article 82-3 of the SDF Act (Paragraph 3) (Issuance of Defense Operations Orders) (Destruction measures against ballistic missiles) If armed attack is recognized (Declared intent to attack, imminent missile launch) An armed attack situation is recognized and a defense operation order is issued Take measures in the framework of defense operation Article 76 of the SDF Act (Issuance of Defense Operations Orders) Concept of ensuring civilian control of the military H Response against ballistic missiles requires the government to assess the possibility of missiles fl ying toward Japan by comprehensively analyzing and evaluating the specifi c situation and international circumstances. In addition to the SDF destroying the missile, interagency actions are required, for example, measures for civil protection such as alert and evacuation, diplomatic activities, information gathering by related agencies, and enhancement of readiness for emergencies. H In view of the importance of the matter and the necessity of action by the Japanese government as a whole, the Cabinet and Minister of Defense can suffi ciently fulfi ll their responsibilities upon the Prime Minister’s approval (Cabinet decision) and orders by the Minister of Defense. Furthermore, the supervision of the Diet is also defi ned with a provision in the law stipulating reporting to the Diet. ----- **Reference 52 MOD/SDF Comprehensive Measures to Deal with Cyber Attacks** 2) Upgrading of cyber defense systems (Upgrading of network monitoring systems and analysis devices for cyber defense etc.) 1) Increasing safety of information and communications systems (Introduction of firewall and virus detection software, etc.) |ternet|Col2|Col3| |---|---|---| |DII open The Six Pillars of Comprehensive Defensive network Measures against Cyber Attacks DII closed network 4) Development of human resources 6) Research of cutting-edge technology (Studying abroad at organizations affiliated with Carnegie|The Six Pillars of Comprehensive Defensive Measures against Cyber Attacks|| |||4) Development of human resources| |6) Research of cutting-edge technology||| Internet DII open network DII closed network (Research on technology to develop the cyber training environment, etc.) Cyber Training Environment Simulated attacks Simulated environment Defense Control and evaluation Research ・Allows for counter-cyber attack training in a simulated environment **Reference 53 Main Measures for Re-employment Support** 3) Development of rules, etc. (Implementation of “Ministry of Defense directives relating to information assurance,” and strengthening of the system, etc.) Raising awareness, self-examination, and inspection, etc. The Six Pillars of Comprehensive Defensive Measures against Cyber Attacks 4) Development of human resources (Studying abroad at organizations affiliated with Carnegie Mellon University, and graduate schools in Japan; professional education at the National Defense Academy, etc.) 5) Enhancement of information sharing (Coordination with relevant ministries and agencies such as the National center of Incident readiness and Strategy for Cybersecurity, and with relevant nations such as the U.S.) |Items|Measures for employment support|Description| |---|---|---| |Measures for retiring uniformed SDF personnel|Occupational aptitude testing|Testing aimed to provide retiring uniformed SDF personnel with guidance based individual aptitudes| ||Technical training|Provide retiring uniformed SDF personnel with skills usable in society after retirement (large sized vehicle operation, large sized special motor vehicle operation, information processing, crane operation, motor vehicle repair, boiler maintenance, nursing care [home helper], etc.)| ||Disaster prevention and risk control training|Provide uniformed SDF personnel who will take early retirement with technical knowledge on disaster prevention administration and the Civil Protection Plan| ||Correspondence courses|Provide retiring uniformed SDF personnel with the capability to acquire public certifi cation (certifi ed insurance labor consultant, health supervisor, real estate transaction specialist, etc.)| ||Business management training|Support uniformed SDF personnel who will take early retirement to cultivate social adaptability, as well as provide knowhow to lead a stable life after retirement or reemployment| ||Career guidance|Prepare soon-retiring uniformed SDF personnel to fi nd new employment and provide them with knowhow to choose new occupation| ||Outsourcing career counseling, etc.|Outsource career counseling, etc. to external experts to meet the needs of each SDF personnel who plans to retire| |Measures for internal support personnel|Training for support personnel|Training of labor administration, support activities, etc. to improve quality of support personnel| |Measures for promotion outside of SDF|Support publicizing to business owners|Publicizing to companies, etc. the effectiveness of uniformed SDF personnel who plan to retire| ||Inviting business owners on unit tours|Invite business owners to units, etc. and provide them with tours, explanations of the employment support situation, etc.| ----- **Reference 54 Record of Major Multinational Security Dialogues (Asia Pacifi c Region, Last Five Years)** |Col1|Col2|Col3|(Apr. 1, 2010 – May. 31, 2015)| |---|---|---|---| ||Dialogue||Date| |Participation in Security Dialogues in the Asia- Pacifi c Region|Intergovernmental|H ASEAN Defense Ministers’ Meeting Plus (ADMM-Plus) • Ministerial Meeting • Senior Offi cials’ Meeting (ADSOM Plus) • Senior Offi cials’ Meeting Working Group (ADSOM Plus WG) • Experts’ Working Group (EWG) • Maritime Security EWG • Military Medicine EWG • Counter-Terrorism EWG • Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief EWG • Peacekeeping Operations EWG • Humanitarian Mine Action EWG H ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) • Senior Offi cials’ Meeting (ARF-SOM) • Inter-Sessional Support Group on Confi dence Building Measures and Preventive Diplomacy (ARF-ISG)|(Oct. 10, Aug.13) (Apr. 11, Apr. 12, Apr. 13, Apr. 14) (Dec. 10, Feb. 11, Feb. 12, Feb. 13, Mar. 13, Feb. 14, Jan. 15) (Jul. 11, Feb. 12, Sep. 12, Nov.12, May 13, Sep.13, Jan.14, Jun.14, Oct. 14, Feb. 15) (Jul. 11, Jul. 12, Oct. 13, Jun. 14, Oct. 14) (Sep. 11, Apr. 12, Mar.13, Oct. 14, Feb. 15) (Nov. 11, Aug. 12, Jan.14, Jul.14, Dec.14) (Nov. 11, Jun. 12, Nov.12, Apr.13, Feb.14, Sep.14, Mar.15) (Jun. 14, Dec. 14) (May 10, Jun. 11, May 12, May 13, Jun 14) (Nov. 10, Apr. 11, Dec. 11, May 12, Mar. 13, Apr. 14, Nov. 14, May. 15)| ||Hosted by the private sector|• IISS Asia Security Summit (Shangri-La Dialogue)|(Jun 10, Jun. 11, Jun. 12, Jun. 13, Jun. 14)| |Security Dialogue hosted by the Ministry of Defense|H Japan-ASEAN Defense Vice-Ministerial Forum H Tokyo Seminar on Common Security Challenges H Forum for Defense Authorities in the Asia-Pacifi c Region (Tokyo Defense Forum) H Subcommittee of Forum for Defense Authorities in the Asia-Pacifi c Region (Subcommittee of the Tokyo Defense Forum) H International Seminar for Military Science H International Conference of Cadets||(Sep. 11, Mar. 13, Feb.14, Oct.14) (Sep. 11, Mar. 13) (Sep. 10, Mar. 12, Oct. 12, Oct. 13, Mar. 15) (Jul. 10, Jul. 11, Jul. 12) (Mar. 11, Feb. 12, Feb. 13)| **Reference 55 Exchange Student Acceptance Record (Number of Newly Accepted Students in FY2014)** (Apr. 1, 2010 – May. 31, 2015) (Number of students) |CCoouunnttrryy IInnssttiittuuttiioonn|Thailand|Philippines|Indonesia|Singapore|Viet Nam|Cambodia|Timor- Leste|Laos|India|Pakistan|Republic of Korea|Mongolia|Australia|New zealand|United States|United Kingdom|Germany|France|Sub total| |---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---| |National Institute for Defense Studies|1||1||||||1||||||2|||1|6| |National Defense Academy|5|2|4||9|3|2|2|||2|5|1||8|||6|49| |Ground Self- Defense Force (Staff College, etc.)|2|||1||1|||1|4|3|1|||3||||16| |Maritime Self- Defense Force (Staff College, etc.)|1||||||||||2||||1|1|||5| |Air Self-Defense Force (Staff College, etc.)|3||||||||1||3||1||1||||9| |Joint Staff College|2||||1||||||2||3|1||1|1||11| |Total|14|2|5|1|10|4|2|2|3|4|12|6|5|1|15|2|1|7|96| ----- **Reference 56 Multilateral Security Dialogues Hosted by the Ministry of Defense** |Col1|Col2|Col3|Col4|(Apr. 1, 2010 – May. 31, 2015)| |---|---|---|---|---| |Security Dialogue|||Outline|Recent Situations| |Hosted by Ministry of Defense|Internal Bureau and others|Japan-ASEAN Defense Vice- Minister-level Meeting|Hosted by the Ministry of Defense, since 2009. Vice -ministerial level offi cials from Defense authorities of ASEAN countries are invited to Japan to hold candid dialogues on regional security issues. The objective is to strengthen multilateral and bilateral relations by building close interpersonal relationships.|The 6th consultation was held in Yokohama in October 2014, with the participation of 10 countries in the ASEAN region and the ASEAN secretariat. Frank and constructive opinions were exchanged among participants regarding the topics of “To Promote Maritime Defense Cooperation” and “Possible Maritime Cooperation – From Perspective of Equipment and Technology Cooperation and Capacity Building.”| |||Tokyo seminar on common security challenges|Hosted by the Ministry of Defense, since 2009. It is a seminar open to the general public where experts and defense authorities from Japan and overseas are invited to discuss themes such as common security challenges and policies for promoting regional cooperation thereby making a venue for open discussion toward the promotion of regional cooperation.|With the participation of intellectuals from inside and outside Japan and defense authorities, discussions were held on the topic entitled “Security in the Asia-Pacifi c Region: The Future Role of Japan and ASEAN.” The event contributed to efforts to improve the security environment and promoted regional dialogue and cooperation in March 2013.| |||Forum for Defense Authorities in the Asia-Pacifi c Region (Tokyo Defense Forum)|Hosted by the Ministry of Defense, this forum has been held annually since 1996 with Director-General-level offi cials in charge of defense policy and defense exchanges, all of who are from the Asia-Pacifi c region, participating. The forum is designed to provide defense offi cials with opportunities to exchange views on ways to promote confi dence building focusing on the defense fi eld.|With the participation of 24 countries in the Asia-Pacifi c region (including Japan), the ASEAN secretariat, the EU, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), as well as the United Nations Offi ce for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), the 19th Forum was held in March 2015. Opinions were exchanged on “Enhancing Maritime Security” and “Synergy Among the Frameworks for Multilateral Cooperation.”| ||GSDF|Multinational Cooperation program in the Asia Pacifi c|Hosted by the GSDF, these talks have been held annually since 2014, inviting offi cers in charge of actual work of the militaries from major countries in the Asia-Pacifi c region to provide them with opportunities to exchange multinational views on concrete cooperation and initiatives toward issues each country in the region has in common.|In November 2014, with the participation of a record 26 countries in the Asia-Pacifi c region as well as government and other organizations, group discussions took place on the theme of “multilateral coordination in the fi eld for humanitarian assistance and disaster relief.” In addition, earthquake response exercise “Michinoku ALERT 2014” and other activities were held.| |||Multilateral Logistics Staff Talks (MLST)|Hosted by the GSDF, these talks have been held annually since 1997, inviting offi cers in charge of logistics support from major countries in the Asia-Pacifi c region and Europe to provide them with opportunities to exchange views on logistic system.|The 18th MLST meeting was held in November 2014. The participants were working-level offi cers in charge of logistics sent from armies in 14 countries in the Asia-Pacifi c region and the EU. Keynote speech and opinion exchanges were held on topics regarding logistic cooperation on humanitarian assistance and disaster relief in the Asia-Pacifi c region.| |||Army Command and General Staff College seminar|Hosted by the GSDF, this seminar has been held annually since 2001 with students of army academies from the Asia-Pacifi c region participating. The seminar is designed to provide them with opportunities to exchange views on training of military units.|With the participation of students from air force colleges in 15 countries in Asia-Pacifi c region, the 13th Army Command and General Staff College Seminar was held on August 2013. Opinions were exchanged on the theme of the leadership teamwork in the multinational peace cooperation activities in the multilateral environment.| ||MSDF|Multi-national seminar for students of the Command and Staff Course (Western Pacifi c Naval Symposium Short Term Exchange Program for Offi cers of the Next Generations (WPNS STEP))|Hosted by the MSDF, this seminar has been held annually since 1998 with staffs of naval colleges from the Asia-Pacifi c region as participants. The seminar is designed to provide them with opportunities to exchange views on the roles of naval forces with a view to encouraging school education/ research and contributing to the promotion of defense exchange between participating countries and mutual understanding.|The 17th seminar was held in February 2014 with participants from 14 countries, and the main theme of the event was “the challenges to the future of maritime security in Asia-Pacifi c region.” Opinions were exchanged on the theme of traditional security and transnational issues, humanitarian support, disaster relief, PKO. Japan Coast Guard also participated as a part of interministerial cooperation.| ||ASDF|International Air Force Education Seminar|Hosted by the ASDF, this seminar has been held annually since 1996, with participation by offi cials related to air force academies mainly from the Asia-Pacifi c region. The seminar is designed to provide them with opportunities to exchange views on offi cer’s education.|The 19th International Air Force Education Seminar was held in February 2015, inviting seven countries. Opinions were exchanged on the main theme of “Mid- to long-term education and of senior offi cers and research at air force academics in each country.”| |||Air Command and Staff Course Student Exchange Program|Hosted by the ASDF, this seminar has been held annually since 2001 with students of air force academies from the Asia-Pacifi c region participating. This program is designed to provide them with opportunities to exchange views on security and roles of nations.|With the participation of students from air force colleges in 14 countries in the Asia-Pacifi c region, the 14th seminar was held in September 2014. Opinions were exchanged on the theme of “The current status, issues and future direction of the Air Force in each country” and “The roles that Air Forces should assume in the Asia-Pacifi c region.”| ||National Defense Academy|International Seminar on Defense Science|Hosted by the National Defense Academy since 1996, this seminar provides an opportunity to invite instructors of military academies in the Asia-Pacifi c regions and to discuss international affairs and security.|The 19th International Seminar on Defense Science was held in July 2014, inviting 16 countries. Opinions were exchanged on the theme of “Education of military academy that provides the foundation for executing duties in diverse environments.”| |||International Cadets’ Conference|Hosted by the National Defense Academy, this conference has been held annually since 1998 with cadets from the Asia-Pacifi c region participating. The conference is designed to provide them with opportunities to exchange views on militaries in the 21st century.|In March 2015, 19 countries were invited to the 18th conference, and opinions were exchanged on the theme of “Near future: When we are commanders.”| ||National Institute for Defense Studies|International Security Symposium|Hosted by the National Institute for Defense Studies, this symposium has been held annually since 1999 with researchers and experts participating. The symposium is designed to provide opportunities to hold debates and offer reports on security in the public for the purpose of promoting public understanding of current security issues.|In November 2013, researchers and businesspersons were invited from the United States, Australia, ROK, U.K., India and Singapore, along with specialists in Japan, to exchange opinions on the theme of “Potential multilateral cooperation in the Asia-Pacifi c region beyond the differences in viewing security.”| |||International Security Colloquium|Hosted by the National Institute for Defense Studied, this seminar has been held annually since 1999 with offi cials at home and abroad knowledgeable about defense being invited. The seminar is designed to provide them with opportunities for advanced and professional reports and discussions on security issues.|In October 2012, researchers and businesspersons were invited from the United States, Australia, ROK, U.K., Sweden and India, along with specialists in Japan, to exchange opinions on the theme of “Directions and challenges to overcome for innovation of military capabilities.”| |||International Forum on War History|Hosted by the National Institute for Defense Studies, this forum has been held annually since 2002 with participation by military historians. The forum is designed to deepen the mutual understanding of its participants by making comparative studies of military history.|In September 2013, researchers were invited from the United States, U.K. Australia and Japan to exchange opinions on the theme of “Defense of the Wider Realm :the Diplomacy and Strategy of the Protection of Islands in War.”| |||Asia-Pacifi c Security Workshop|Giving workshop-style group study sessions to discuss arising security issues that the Asia-Pacifi c region faces in common.|In January 2013, researchers were invited from Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Cambodia, Myanmar, India, Pakistan and China, to exchange opinions on the theme of “Security outlook of the Asia Pacifi c countries and its implications for the defense sector.”| ----- **Reference 57 Other Multilateral Security Dialogue** |Other Multilateral Security Dialogue|Col2|Col3|Overview| |---|---|---|---| |Hosted by the Government|Internal Bureaus and others|Asia-Pacifi c Military Operations Research Symposium (ARMORS)|ARMORS is a forum held by Asia-Pacifi c countries on a rotational basis to exchange views on defense operations and research technology. Japan has participated on the forum since the second meeting in 1993.| ||Putrajaya Forum||This event, hosted by the Malaysian Institute of Defence and Security and participated in by national defense experts from ADMM- Plus countries, provides a place for exchanging opinions regarding regional security. Japan has been a participant since its fi rst event in 2010.| ||Jakarta International Defense Dialogue (JIDD)||This event, hosted by the Ministry of Defence of Indonesia (organized by the Indonesian Defence University) and participated in by the defense ministers and chiefs of the general staff from ADMM-Plus countries, provides a place for exchanging opinions regarding regional security. Japan has been a participant since its fi rst event in 2011.| ||Seoul Defense Dialogue (SDD)||This event, hosted by the Ministry of National Defense of the ROK and participated in by the defense vice ministers of Asia-Pacifi c and Western countries, is a forum for exchanging opinions regarding regional security issues, including the issues of the Korean Peninsula. Japan has been a participant since the fi rst meeting in 2012.| ||Joint Staff|Asia-Pacifi c Chief of Defense Conference (CHOD)|CHOD is an annual conference hosted either by the United States or jointly with other participating countries on a rotational basis. Senior defense offi cials and others of Asia-Pacifi c countries meet to exchange views on security issues. Japan has participated in the conference since the fi rst meeting in 1998.| |||Pacifi c Area Senior Offi cer Logistics Seminar (PASOLS)|PASOLS is a seminar hosted by an Asia-Pacifi c country on a rotational basis mainly to exchange information on logistic- support activities. Japan’s participation in the seminar as an offi cial member started in 1995 when the 24th session was held. The 36th Seminar will be held in Japan with participation of nearly 30 countries.| ||GSDF|Pacifi c Armies Chiefs Conference (PACC)|PACC is a conference hosted jointly by the United States and a member country on a rotational basis every other year when PAMS is held. Army chiefs of Asia-Pacifi c countries and others meet to exchange views. Japan has participated in the conference since the fi rst meeting in 1999. The conference was held in Japan for the fi rst time in 2009.| |||Pacifi c Armies Management Seminars (PAMS)|PAMS is a forum held jointly by the U.S. and the participating countries in rotation. It provides opportunities for exchanging information about effi cient and economical management techniques so that armies in the Asia-Pacifi c region can develop their ground troops. The GSDF has been participating in PAMS since the 17th meeting in 1993. The 33rd seminar was held in Japan in 2009 at the same time as PACC.| |||Land Forces Pacifi c (LFP)|LANPAC is a symposium hosted by AUSA, the fi rst event of which was held in April 2013. The JGSDF Chief of Staff was offi cially invited to the second symposium held in 2013 as a guest speaker and he gave a speech on the theme of the “Current situation and the future of Japan-U.S. Cooperation on HA/DR,” which gained support from the U.S. Army Pacifi c Commander and other participants from different countries.| |||Chief of Army’s Exercise (CAEX)|CAEX is an exercise hosted by the Australian Army every other year. Senior offi cers of the Australian Army as well as the heads of land forces in the Asia-Pacifi c region and experts attend and exchange a wide range of views on the issues facing the land forces in the region. The JGSDF participated in CAEX for the fi rst time in 2012. In September 2014, the JGSDF Chief of Staff attended for the fi rst time and delivered an address.| ||MSDF|International Sea Power Symposium (ISS)|ISS is a symposium hosted by the United States every other year. Navy chiefs of member countries and others meet to exchange views on common issues for their navies. Japan has participated in the symposium since the fi rst meeting in 1969.| |||Western Pacifi c Naval Symposium (WPNS)|WPNS is a symposium hosted by a member country on a rotational basis every other year when ISS in not held. Senior navy offi cials and others of Western Pacifi c countries meet to exchange views. Japan has participated in the symposium since the second meeting in 1990.| |||International MCM Seminar|This seminar is hosted by a WPNS member country on a rotation basis to exchange views on minesweeping in a year when minesweeping exercises are not conducted in the Western Pacifi c. Japan has participated in the seminar since the fi rst meeting in 2000. Japan’s MSDF hosted this seminar in Yokosuka in October 2007.| |||Asia Pacifi c Submarine Conference|Hosted either by the United States or jointly with other participating countries in the Asia-Pacifi c region on a rotational basis to exchange views on issues centering around submarine rescue. Japan has participated on the conference since the fi rst meeting in 2001. The JMSDF hosted the conference in October 2006.| |||Indian Ocean Naval Symposium|This symposium is held every two years hosted by a different participating country on a rotational basis. It is a platform for the Navy Chief of Staff from the Indian Ocean coastal countries to exchange their opinions concerning the maritime security of the Indian Ocean. Japan has participated since the third event in 2012.| ||ASDF|Pacifi c Air Chiefs Conference (PACC)|PACC is a conference hosted jointly by the United States every other year with senior air force offi cials and others of member countries exchanging views on common issues. Japan has participated in the conference since the fi rst meeting in 1989.| |||PACRIM Airpower Symposium|This symposium is held every year and hosted by the U.S. and other participating countries on a rotational basis (it was held twice in 1996 and 1997). It is a platform for the Chiefs of Air Operations in the Pacifi c Rim to exchange their opinions. Japan has participated in this symposium since the fi rst event held in 1995.| |||Air Power Conference (APC)|APC is a conference hosted by Australia every other year to exchange international views on air power. Japan has participated in this conference six times since 2000.| |||International Conference on Air & Space Power (ICAP)|These international conferences on air and space are hosted by Turkish Air War College. ICAP, on the theme of the future of the air forces, and ISAW, on the theme of the history of the air forces, are respectively held every other year. Japan has participated since their fi rst conferences in 2013.| |||International Symposium on the history of Air Warfare (ISAW)|| ||Department of Current and Crisis Intelligence|Asia-Pacifi c Intelligence Chiefs Conference (APICC)|Hosted in turn by the United States Pacifi c Command and participating countries, the Conference serves as a place for the exchange of opinions among intelligence chiefs and other offi cials from the defense ministries of countries in the Asia Pacifi c region and other areas. Alongside exchanges of opinions on issues pertaining to regional security, the Conference is also aimed at contributing to the nurturing of relationships of trust between the respective countries, as well as at the sharing of information. It was hosted for the fi rst time in February 2011 by the Department of Current and Crisis Intelligence, and was attended by 28 countries.| ||IISS Asia Security Conference (Shangri-la Dialogue)||Hosted by the International Institute for Strategic Studies in the United Kingdom, this conference has been held since 2002 with defense ministers and others of the Asia-Pacifi c region and other areas participating to exchange views on issues centering around regional security. Japan has participated in the conference since the fi rst meeting in 2002.| ||Regional Security Summit (Manama Dialogue)||Hosted by the International Institute for Strategic Studies in the United Kingdom, this conference has been held since 2004. Foreign and defense ministers, national security advisors and chiefs of intelligence from the Gulf countries participated to exchange views on issues centering around regional security. Japan participated at the senior offi cial’s level for the fi rst time in the 6th conference in 2009, sending the Senior Vice-Minister of Defense. The Parliamentary Vice-Minister of the Defense participated in the 7th Conference in 2010. The Summit did not take place in 2011.| ||Munich Security Conference||Hosted by the International Institute for Strategic Studies in the United Kingdom, this conference has been held since 2004. Foreign and defense ministers, national security advisors and chiefs of intelligence from the Gulf countries participated to exchange views on issues centering around regional security. Japan participated at the senior offi cial’s level for the fi rst time in the 6th conference in 2009, sending the Senior Vice-Minister of Defense. The Parliamentary Vice-Minister of the Defense participated in the 7th Conference in 2010.| ||Halifax International Security Forum||Hosted by Halifax International Security Forum with the support of the Canadian Department of National Defense, the Forum is attended by many government offi cials from the United States and Europe (including NATO Ministers and Defense Ministers from each country), who exchange opinions on security at the Forum. Japan has participated since the fi rst Conference in 2009.| Organized mainly by the Institute of Global Confl ict and Cooperation (IGCC) of the University of California in San Diego, this dialogue The Northeast Asia Cooperation Dialogue is designed for participants — private-sector researchers and government offi cials from member countries (China, DPRK, Japan, (NEACD) ROK, Russia and the United States) — to freely exchange their views on security situations and confi dence-building measures in the ----- **Reference 58 Status of Invitation Program** |Country|Period|Description|Benefi ciary|Dispatched personnel| |---|---|---|---|---| |Vietnam|March 5-8, 2013|Introduction of SDF’s UN PKO activities, etc. for the Vietnam People’s Army’s dispatch of personnel to PKO|Ministry of National Defence and People’s Army of Vietnam|6 personnel| ||September 19-26, 2013|Underwater Medicine training at related MSDF units and facilities.|Navy of Vietnam|5 personnel| ||February 4-5, 2014|HA/DR training|Ministry of National Defence of Vietnam|3 personnel| ||March 3-5, 2014|Training in fl ight safety and other fi elds|Ministry of National Defence of Vietnam and Air Defence-Air Force of Vietnam|5 personnel| |Mongolia|November 20-23, 2013|Military Medicine training at related GSDF units and facilities.|Medical Department, General Staff, Mongolian Armed Forces|6 personnel| ||March 10-13, 2014|Engineering training|General Staff, Mongolian Armed Forces|5 personnel| ||March 4-9, 2015|Military Medicine training at GSDF Sapporo Hospital|General Staff, Mongolian Armed Forces and Mongolian Armed Forces and Police Hospital|5 personnel| ||February 23-March 20, 2015|Engineering training at GSDF Engineer School|Mongolian Armed Forces|6 personnel| |Indonesia|February 3-7, 2014|Oceanography and Marine Charting training at related MSDF units, facilities of Japan Coast Guard’s Hydrographic and Oceanographic Department, and private company|Oceanography and Marine Charting Department, Indonesian Navy|5 personnel| |Timor-Leste|June 10-13, 2014|Training on GSDF logistic support troops|Timor-Leste Defence Force|6 personnel| |Cambodia|September 21-October 5, 2014|Engineering training at related GSDF units and facilities|Engineering Department Royal Cambodian Armed Forces|5 personnel| |Philippines|February 17-20, 2015|Airlift training at related GSDF and ASDF units and facilities.|Philippine Air Force|4 personnel| **Reference 59 Participation in Multilateral Training (Last Three Years)** (March 2013–May 31, 2015) Dispatched personnel 6 personnel 5 personnel 3 personnel 5 personnel 6 personnel 5 personnel 5 personnel 6 personnel 5 personnel 6 personnel 5 personnel 4 personnel |Col1|Col2|Col3|Col4|(April 1, 2012–May 31, 2015)| |---|---|---|---|---| |Exercise||Period (Venue)|Participating countries|Participating SDF units, etc.| |Cobra Gold||February 2013 (Thailand)|Japan, U.S., Thailand, Indonesia, ROK, Malaysia, Singapore, etc.|Joint Staff Offi ce, Ground Staff Offi ce, Air Support Command, Central Readiness Force, Internal Bureau, etc.| |||February 2014 (Thailand)|Japan, U.S., Thailand, Indonesia, ROK, Malaysia, Singapore, China, etc.|Joint Staff Offi ce, Ground Staff Offi ce, Air Support Command, Central Readiness Force, Internal Bureau, etc.| |||February 2015 (Thailand)|Japan, U.S., Thailand, Indonesia, ROK, Malaysia, Singapore, China, India, etc.|Joint Staff Offi ce, Ground Staff Offi ce, Maritime Staff Offi ce, Self-Defense Fleet, Air Support Command, Central Readiness Force, Internal Bureau, etc.| |Pacifi c Partnership||June – July 2012 (Philippines, Vietnam)|Japan, U.S., Australia, Canada, Chile, Malaysia, Netherlands, New Zealand, Singapore, etc.|1 vessel 6 aircraft (personnel transportation) Approximately 50 personnel| |||June – July 2013 (Tonga, Papua New Guinea)|Japan, U.S., Australia, New Zealand, Canada, France, Malaysia, Singapore, etc.|1 vessel, 2 aircraft Approximately 40 personnel| |||May – July 2014 (Vietnam, Cambodia, Philippines)|Japan, U.S., Australia, Malaysia, Chile, ROK|1 vessel, 1 aircraft (personnel transportation), Approximately 40 personnel| |ARF-DiREx||May 2013 (Thailand)|Japan, Thailand, ROK, ARF countries|1 aircraft Approximately 50 participants from Joint Staff Offi ce, Ground Staff Offi ce, Internal Bureau, Central Readiness Force, Middle Army, and Air Support Command, SDF Hanshin Hospital| |||May 2015 (Malaysia)|Japan, Vietnam, Malaysia, Thailand, Singapore, Philippines, Mongolia, Laos, China, India, Cambodia, U.S., etc.|Approximately 10 personnel from Joint Staff Offi ce, Internal Bureau, Eastern Army, Air Training Command, SDF Yokosuka Hospital, SDF Ominato Hospital| |Asean Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief Exercises||April – May 2014 (Thailand)|Thailand, Malaysia, Japan, Cambodia, Brunei, Singapore, Indonesia, Philippines, Myanmar, Laos, Vietnam, China, U.S., France, EU, Canada|7 personnel| |ADMM-Plus Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief/ Military Medicine Exercise Military Medicine Meeting||June 2013 (Brunei)|Japan, Brunei, Singapore, China, Vietnam, Australia, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Myanmar, New Zealand, Philippines, ROK, Thailand, U.S., Cambodia, Russia, Laos|Joint Staff Offi ce, Ground Staff Offi ce, Maritime Staff Offi ce, Air Staff Offi ce, Central Readiness Force, Self- Defense Fleet, Northeastern Army| ||Military Medicine Meeting|October 2013 (Singapore)|Japan, Brunei, Singapore, China, Vietnam, Australia, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Myanmar, New Zealand, Philippines, ROK, Thailand, U.S., Cambodia, Russia, Laos|Joint Staff Offi ce, Ground Staff Offi ce, Air Staff Offi ce| |ADDM Counter Terrorism Exercise||September 2013 (Indonesia)|Australia, Brunei, Cambodia, China, India, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, New Zealand, Vietnam, Thailand, Singapore, Russia, U.S., ROK, Philippines, Myanmar, Japan|3 personnel from Joint Staff Offi ce, Central Readiness Force, Internal Bureau| |Global Peace Operations Initiative Capstone Exercise|Shanti Prayas-2|March – April 2013 (Nepal)|Japan, Bangladesh, Cambodia, India, Indonesia, Jordan, Malaysia, Mongolia, Philippines, Sri Lanka, ROK, Thailand, Vietnam, etc.|Approximately 40 personnel from Joint Staff Offi ce, Joint Staff College, Central Readiness Force, Northern Army| ||Garuda Canti Dharma|August – September 2014 (Indonesia)|Japan, U.S., Indonesia, Australia, Bangladesh, Cambodia, Jordan, Malaysia, Mongolia, Nepal, Philippines, ROK, Vietnam, Pakistan, etc.|Approximately 40 personnel from Joint Staff Offi ce, Joint Staff College, Central Readiness Force| |Multilateral Training (Khaan Quest)||August 2012 (Mongolia)|Japan, U.S., Mongolia, ROK, Australia, Canada, Germany, New Zealand, India, Singapore|2 personnel| |||August 2013 (Mongolia)|Japan, U.S., Mongolia, ROK, Australia, Canada, Germany, U.K., France, India, Vietnam, Tajikistan, Nepal|Approximately 4 personnel including observers| |||June – July 2014 (Mongolia)|Japan, U.S., Mongolia, Canada, Germany, U.K., India, Indonesia, ROK, Nepal, Australia, Pakistan, Singapore, Thailand, France, Tajikistan|Approximately 8 personnel including observers| Japan, U.S., Philippines, Australia, Indonesia, ROK, American-Filipino Bilateral Training (Balikatan 12) April 2012 (Philippines) 3 personnel M l i ----- |Exercise|Period (Venue)|Participating countries|Participating SDF units, etc.| |---|---|---|---| |Australian Army–Hosted Shooting Convention|May 2012 (Australia)|Japan, Australia, U.S., Brunei, Canada, France, Indonesia, Malaysia, New Zealand, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Timor-Leste, U.K.|Approximately 20 personnel| ||May 2013 (Australia)|Japan, Australia, U.S., Brunei, China, Canada, France, Indonesia, Malaysia, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Timor-Leste, Tonga, U.K.|Approximately 40 personnel| ||May 2014 (Australia)|Japan, Australia, U.S., Brunei, Canada, France, Indonesia, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Timor-Leste, Tonga, U.K.|Approximately 30 personnel| ||April 2015 (Australia)|Japan, Australia, U.S.|Approximately 30 personnel| |Australian Navy-Hosted Multilateral Training (Triton Centenary 2013)|September 8 – November 8 2013 (Australia)|Japan, Brunei, Singapore, Australia, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, New Zealand, Thailand, U.S., France, Spain, Tonga, Micronesia, Papua New Guinea, Pakistan|1 vessel| |ADMM Plus Maritime Security Field Training Exercise (part of the Australian Navy-Hosted Multilateral Training described above)|September 29 – October 1 2013 (Australia)|Japan, Australia, U.S., New Zealand, China, Thailand, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Brunei, Philippines, Singapore|1 vessel| |Western Pacifi c Submarine Rescue Exercise|September 20 – 28, 2013 (Yokosuka, Sagami Bay)|Japan, U.S., ROK, Australia, Singapore, etc.|3 vessels, etc.| |Western Pacifi c Mine Countermeasures Exercise|February 12 – March 8, 2013 (New Zealand)|Japan, U.S., China, ROK, Australia, Singapore, etc.|7 personnel| |KOMODO Multilateral Joint Naval Exercise organized by the Indonesian Navy|March 20 – April 9, 2014 (Indonesia)|Japan, U.S., Russia, China, Singapore, Malaysia, Vietnam, etc.|1 vessel| |Japan-U.S.-Australia Trilateral Training|June 2012 (Kyushu, southeastern waters)|Japan, U.S., Australia|2 vessels 1 aircraft| ||September 2012 (Waters around Australia)||2 aircraft| ||June 22 – 26, 2013 (Waters and airspace around Guam)||1 vessel 2 aircraft| ||August 9-15, 2014 (Waters and airspace around Guam)||2 aircraft| ||September 20-21, 2014 (Waters and airspace around Hawaii)||1 vessel| |Japan-U.S.-Korea Trilateral Training|June 2012 (Korean peninsula, southern waters)|Japan, U.S., ROK|3 vessels| ||August 2012 (Waters around Hawaii)||2 vessels| ||May 15, 2013 (Waters west of Kyushu)||2 vessels| ||October 10 –11, 2013 (Waters west of Kyushu)||1 vessel| ||December 11, 2013 (Waters around Arabian Peninsula)||2 vessels| ||July 21 –22, 2014 (Waters west of Kyushu)||1 vessel| |Australian Navy-Hosted Multinational Maritime Exercise (Kakadu)|August-September 2012 (Waters around Australia)|Japan, Australia, etc.|1 vessel 2 aircraft| ||August-September 2014 (Waters around Australia)||1 vessel 2 aircraft| |U.S.-Hosted International Mine Countermeasures Exercise|September 2012 (Waters around Arabian Peninsula)|Japan, U.S., etc.|2 vessels| ||May 4 – 29, 2013 (Waters around Arabian Peninsula)|Japan, U.S., etc.|6 personnel| ||October 27 – November 13, 2014 (Waters around Arabian Peninsula)|Japan, U.S., etc.|2 vessels| |Japan-U.S.-Australia Trilateral Training (Cope North Guam)|February 2013 (U.S. Guam Island and surrounding airspace)|Japan, U.S., Australia|20 aircraft Approximately 430 personnel| ||February 2014 (U.S. Guam Island and surrounding airspace)||20 aircraft Approximately 430 personnel| ||February 2015 (U.S. Guam Island and surrounding airspace)||20 aircraft Approximately 460 personnel| |Japan-U.S.-Australia Joint Training (Exercise Southern Jackaroo)|May 2013, May 2014, May 2015 (Australia)|Japan, U.S., Australia|Approximately 45 personnel| |Japan-U.S.-Australia Joint Training (Michinoku Alert)|November 2014 (Tohoku)|Japan, U.S., Australia|Northeastern Army Headquarters Approximately 12,500 personnel, approximately 1,700 vehicles| |RIMPAC (Rim of the Pacifi c Joint Exercise)|June-August 2012 (Waters and airspace around Hawaii, and waters around U.S. West Coast)|Japan, U.S., Australia, Canada, France, ROK, Russia, U.K., etc.|3 vessels 3 aircraft| ||June-August 2014 (Waters and airspace around Hawaii, and waters around U.S. West Coast)|Japan, U.S., Australia, Canada, France, China, ROK, U.K., etc.|2 vessels, 3 aircraft Western Army, etc.| |Japan-Australia-New Zealand Joint Training|August 30, 2014 (Surrounding airspace of Darwin)|Japan, Australia, New Zealand|2 aircraft| |Multilateral training hosted by French Forces in New Caledonia (Exercise Croix du Sud)|August 25-September 5, 2014 (New Caledonia)|Japan, France, U.S., Australia, Canada, New Zealand, Tonga, U.K., Vanuatu|4 personnel| |Japan-U.S.-France Joint Training|May 2015 (Waters west of Kyushu)|Japan, U.S., France|1 vessel, 2 aircraft| ----- **Reference 60 Recent Defense Cooperation and Exchanges with Australia (Past Three Years)** |Col1|Col2|(April 1, 2012–May 31, 2015)| |---|---|---| |High-level talks between heads of state and defense|Jun. 2012 Sep. 2012 Sep. 2012 Sep. 2012 Jun. 2013 Jul. 2013 Apr. 2014 Apr. 2014 May 2014 Jun. 2014 Jun. 2014 Jul. 2014 Oct. 2014 May 2015|Meeting between Parliamentary Senior Vice-Minister of Defense (Japan) and Australian Defense Minister (Singapore (11th Shangri-La Dialogue)) ☆ Agreement reached to promote international peace cooperation and technical Cooperation 4th Japan-Australia “2+2” meeting (Sydney) ☆ Exchanged opinions concerning 1) regional security situation and 2) Japan-Australia security and defense cooperation Japan-Australia Defense Ministerial Meeting (Sydney) ☆ Exchanged opinions concerning 1) their security policies, and 2) Japan-Australia defense cooperation Japan-Australia Defense Ministerial Meeting (Tokyo) ☆ Exchanged opinions concerning 1) Japan-Australia defense cooperation and 2) Japan-U.S.-Australia trilateral cooperation Japan-Australia Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore (12th Shangri-La Dialogue)) ☆ Agreement reached to advance Japan-Australia defense cooperation Japan-Australia Defense Ministerial Meeting (Tokyo) ☆ Confi rmed the regional situations and the progress of Japan-Australia defense cooperation, and exchanged views regarding the future Japan-Australia defense cooperation as well as Japan-U.S.-Australia trilateral cooperation Attendance of Prime Minister of Australia to Japan-Australia Summit Meeting (Tokyo) and a special meeting of the National Security Council (Four Ministers Meeting) ☆ Agreement was reached on 1) Strengthening of defense cooperation in a real term, 2) Commencement of negotiation towards the agreement of a framework regarding defense equipment and technical cooperation Japan-Australia Defense Ministerial Meeting (Perth) ☆ Exchanged opinions concerning Japan-Australia defense cooperation including the areas of equipment and technologies Japan-Australia Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore (13th Shangri-La Dialogue)) ☆ Exchanged opinions concerning Japan-Australia defense cooperation 5th Japan-Australia “2+2” Meeting (Tokyo) ☆ 1) Agreement reached to strongly oppose the use or force of power to change the status quo unilaterally, 2) Confi rmed a substantive agreement on the Agreement negotiation regarding the transfer of the defense equipment and technology Japan-Australia Defense Ministerial Meeting (Tokyo) ☆ Agreement reached to promote the strengthening of Japan-Australia and Japan-U.S.-Australia defense cooperation such as an expansion of Japan- Australia and Japan-U.S.-Australia joint training Japan-Australia Summit Meeting (Canberra) ☆ Issued Joint Statement (signed defense equipment transfer agreement, approved proposals to enhance bilateral defense cooperation, and decided to commence negotiations to create an agreement for facilitating Japan-Australia joint activities and training, etc.) Japan-Australia Defense Ministerial Meeting (Tokyo) ☆ Examined possibility of potential cooperation on F-35, examined possibility of submarine cooperation, technical exchanges (e.g., marine hydrodynamics), etc. Japan-Australia Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore (14th Shangri-La Dialogue)) ☆ Exchanged opinions concerning Japan-Australia defense cooperation| ||Visit to Australia by GSDF Chief of Staff (Jun 2012, Sep 2014 (twice)), Visit to Australia by MSDF Chief of Staff (Jun 2012, Nov 2014), Visit to Australia by ASDF Chief of Staff (Feb 2013, Mar 2014, Feb 2015), Visit to Australia by Chief of Joint Staff (Aug 2014)|| ||Visit to Japan by Chief of Australian Defence Force (Jun 2013), Visit to Japan by Australian Chief of Navy (May 2012, Mar 2015), Visit to Japan by Australian Chief of Air Force (Oct 2014), Visit to Japan by Australian Chief of Ground Force (Oct 2012)|| |Regular discussions between defense ministry representatives|13th Japan-Australia Politico-Military Consultations (PM) (Aug. 2012), 17th Japan-Australia Military-Military Consultations (MM) (Nov. 2012), 18th Japan-Australia Military- Military Consultations (MM) (Feb. 2014)|| |Unit-level exchange, etc.|Implementation of Japan-Australia joint exercises (MSDF) (Jun. 2012, Jun. 2013, Sep. 2013, Aug. 2014), Dispatching ASDF aerial refueling/transport aircraft (KC-767) to Australia (Feb. 2013, Feb. 2015), Shooting competition organized by the Australian Army (May 2013, May 2014, May 2015)|| ||Sep. 2012 Sep. 2013 Aug. 2014 Aug. – Sep. 2014|Participation in the Australian hosted multinational joint maritime exercise “Kakadu 12” Participation of an Australian Navy fl eet in the Western Pacifi c Submarine Rescue Training hosted by Japan. Japan participated in the International Fleet Review to commemorate the centenary of the Royal Australian Navy’s fl eet into Sydney, Australian Navy-hosted Multilateral Training (Triton Centenary 2013) and ADMM Plus Visit to Hamamatsu and Chitose Air Bases by Royal Australian Air Force aircraft (E-7A) Participation in the Royal Australian Navy hosted multinational joint maritime exercise “Kakadu 14”| |Japan – U.S.– Australia trilateral cooperation|Jun. 2012 Jun. 2013 May 2014 May 2015|Japan-U.S.-Australia Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore (11th Shangri-La Dialogue)) ☆Joint Statement issued and trilateral cooperation in regional security and stability confi rmed Japan-U.S.-Australia Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore (12th Shangri-La Dialogue)) ☆Japan-U.S.-Australia Joint Statement issued and promotion of dynamic and versatile trilateral defense cooperation confi rmed Japan-U.S.-Australia Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore (13th Shangri-La Dialogue)) ☆Japan-U.S.-Australia Joint Statement issued Japan-U.S.-Australia Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore (14th Shangri-La Dialogue)) ☆Joint Statement issued and agreement reached to further deepen the trilateral defense cooperation| ||Feb. 2013 Oct. 2014|Japan-U.S.-Australia Security and Defense Cooperation Forum (SDCF) Japan-U.S.-Australia Security and Defense Cooperation Forum (SDCF)| ||Japan-U.S.-Australia trilateral exercises (GSDF) (May 2013, May 2014, May 2015), Japan-U.S.-Australia trilateral exercises (MSDF) (Jun. 2012, Sep. 2012, Jun. 2013, Aug. 2014, Sep. 2014), Japan-U.S.-Australia trilateral exercises (ASDF) (Feb. 2013, Feb. 2014, Feb. 2015)|| ||Dec. 2012 Feb. 2013 Jul. 2013 Mar. 2014 Jul. 2014 Feb. 2015|Participation of Major General of Australian Army as Vice Commander of U.S. Pacifi c Command in Japan-U.S. bilateral command post exercises Japan-U.S.-Australia High-level Trilateral Discussions (Melbourne) (ASDF Chief of Staff, Commander, U.S. Pacifi c Air Forces, Australian Chief of Air Force) 1st Japan-U.S.-Australia Senior-level Seminar (Hawaii) (GSDF Chief of Staff) Japan-U.S.-Australia High-level Trilateral Discussions (Canberra) (ASDF Chief of Staff, Commander, U.S. Pacifi c Air Forces, Australian Chief of Air Force) 2nd Japan-U.S.-Australia Senior-level Seminar (Hawaii) (GSDF Chief of Staff, MSDF Chief of Staff) Japan-U.S.-Australia High-level Trilateral Discussions (Melbourne) (ASDF Chief of Staff, Commander, U.S. Pacifi c Air Forces, Australian Chief of Air Force)| **Reference 61 Recent Defense Cooperation and Exchanges with the ROK (Past Three Years)** (April 1, 2012–May 31, 2015) |Col1|Col2|(April 1, 2012–May 31, 2015)| |---|---|---| |High-level talks between heads of state and defense|Nov. 2013 Mar. 2014 Oct. 2014 Nov. 2014 May 2015|Japan-ROK Defense Vice Ministerial Meeting (Seoul) Japan-ROK Defense Vice Ministerial Meeting (Jakarta) Japan-ROK Defense Vice Ministerial-Level Meeting (Seoul) Japan-ROK Defense Vice Ministerial-Level Meeting (Halifax) Japan-ROK Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore (14th Shangri-La Dialogue))| |Regular discussions between defense ministry representatives|May 2013 Sep. 2014 Apr. 2015|20th Japan-ROK Working-level Defense Dialogue (Assistant Vice Minister-level talks) (Tokyo) 5th Japan-ROK Working-level Defense Dialogue Working Group Meeting (Director-level talks) (Seoul) 10th Japan-ROK Security Dialogue (Seoul)| Nov. 2013 Japan-ROK Defense Vice Ministerial Meeting (Seoul) Mar. 2014 Japan-ROK Defense Vice Ministerial Meeting (Jakarta) High-level talks between heads Oct. 2014 Japan-ROK Defense Vice Ministerial-Level Meeting (Seoul) of state and defense Nov. 2014 Japan-ROK Defense Vice Ministerial-Level Meeting (Halifax) May 2015 Japan-ROK Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore (14th Shangri-La Dialogue)) May 2013 20th Japan-ROK Working-level Defense Dialogue (Assistant Vice Minister-level talks) (Tokyo) Regular discussions between Sep. 2014 5th Japan-ROK Working-level Defense Dialogue Working Group Meeting (Director-level talks) (Seoul) defense ministry representatives Apr. 2015 10th Japan-ROK Security Dialogue (Seoul) Apr. 2012 Visit to Japan by the ROK Army Second Field Army Commander (GSDF) Nov. 2012 Japan-ROK commander’s course student exchange (ROK) (MSDF) Japan-ROK mid-level offi cer exchange (Japan) (ASDF) Dec. 2012 Japan-ROK basic level offi cer exchange (Japan) (GSDF) Apr. 2013 Japan-ROK mid-level offi cer exchange (ROK) (ASDF) Sep. 2013 Participation of Korean Navel vessel in a submarine rescue training in the western Pacifi c Ocean hosted by Japan Japan-ROK commander’s course student exchange (ROK) (ASDF) Oct. 2013 Japan-ROK commander’s course student exchange (ROK) (MSDF) Oct. 2013 Japan-ROK lower enlisted exchange (Japan) (GSDF) Unit-level exchange, etc. Dec. 2013 Japan-ROK bilateral search and rescue exercise (MSDF) Japan-ROK mid-level offi cer exchange (Japan) (ASDF) Mar. 2014 Japan-ROK mid-level offi cer exchange (ROK) (ASDF) Sep. 2014 Japan-ROK commander’s course student exchange (ROK) (ASDF) Oct. 2014 Japan-ROK commander’s course student exchange (ROK) (MSDF) Dec. 2014 Japan-ROK mid-level offi cer exchange (Japan) (ASDF) Mar. 2015 Japan-ROK lower enlisted exchange (ROK) (GSDF) Mar – Apr Japan-ROK mid-level officer exchange (ROK) (ASDF) ----- Jun. 2012 Japan-U.S.-ROK Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore (11th Shangri-La Dialogue)) ☆ A press release was issued. The three ministers shared a common recognition on the regional security situation while reaffi rming the value of trilateral defense cooperation. Jan. 2013 Japan-U.S.-ROK Defense Trilateral Talks Jun. 2013 Japan-U.S.-ROK Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore (12th Shangri-La Dialogue)) ☆ A joint statement of the Japan-U.S.-ROK Defense Ministerial Meeting was issued. The three ministers shared a recognition on the regional security situation, while agreeing to expand the Japan-U.S.-ROK trilateral defense cooperation. Apr. 2014 Japan-U.S.-ROK Defense Trilateral Talks Japan – U.S.– ROK trilateral May 2014 Japan-U.S.-ROK Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore (13th Shangri-La Dialogue)) cooperation ☆ A joint statement of the Japan-U.S.-ROK Defense Ministerial Meeting was issued. The Ministers shared a recognition on the regional security situation including North Korea, while agreeing to continue the close Japan-U.S.-ROK trilateral cooperation. Jul. 2014 Japan-U.S.-ROK Chief of Staff level Meeting May 2015 Japan-U.S.-ROK Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore (14th Shangri-La Dialogue)) ☆ The three ministers once again emphasized their resolute position that they do not accept North Korea’s continued possession and development of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery. They agreed to continue to hold consultations on the security issues facing the three countries and to coordinate among the three countries. Japan-U.S.-ROK Trilateral Exercise (MSDF) (Jun. 2012, Aug. 2012, May 2013, Oct. 2013, Dec. 2013, Jul. 2014) Japan-U.S.-ROK Basic Level Offi cer Exchange (GSDF) (Apr. 2013 (ROK), Dec. 2013 (Japan), Apr. 2014 (ROK), Dec. 2014 (Japan), Apr. 2015 (ROK)) **Reference 62 Recent Defense Cooperation and Exchanges with India (Past Three Years)** |Col1|Col2|(April 1, 2012–May 31, 2015)| |---|---|---| |High-level talks between heads of state and defense|May 2013 Jan. 2014 Sep. 2014 Mar. 2015|Japan-India Summit Meeting (Tokyo) ☆ Japan-India Joint Statement issued, and establishment of working group to facilitate bilateral cooperation concerning regular exercises between MSDF and Indian Navy as well as US-2 decided. Japan-India Defense Ministerial Meeting (Delhi) ☆ Opinions exchanged widely and frankly regarding defense policies of both countries, bilateral defense cooperation and exchange, as well as regional and global security issues, etc. Japan-India Summit Meeting (Delhi) Japan-India Summit Meeting (Tokyo) ☆ Japan-India Joint Statement issued, and both sides reaffi rmed the importance of their bilateral defense relationship and agreed to launch working-level consultations on defense equipment cooperation. Memorandum on Japan-India defense cooperation and exchanges was signed. Japan-India Defense Ministerial Meeting (Tokyo) ☆ Opinions exchanged widely and frankly regarding defense policies of both countries which have shared interests in the maritime security domain, as well as defense cooperation and exchange, etc.| ||Oct. 2012 Nov. 2012 Feb. 2013 May 2013 Oct. 2014|2nd Japan-India Vice-Ministerial “2+2” Dialogue (Tokyo) 3rd Japan-India Defense Policy Dialogue (Tokyo) Visit to India by the ASDF Chief of Staff Visit to India by the MSDF Chief of Staff Visit to India by the GSDF Chief of Staff Visit to Japan by the Chief of the Air Staff, Indian Air Force| |Unit-level exchange, etc.|Jun. 2012 Dec. 2013 Jul. 2014|First Japan-India bilateral exercise (MSDF) Second Japan-India bilateral exercise (MSDF) Exercise Malabar| **Reference 63 Recent Defense Cooperation and Exchanges with China (Past Three Years)** |Col1|Col2|(April 1, 2012–May 31, 2015)| |---|---|---| |High-level talks between heads of state and defense|Mar. 2015|13th Japan-China Security Dialogue (Discussions by foreign affairs/defense deputy ministers) (Tokyo)| |Regular discussions between defense ministry representatives|Jun. 2012 Jan. 2015 May 2015|3rd Joint Working Group meeting on the Maritime and Air Communication Mechanism between Japan and China’s defense authorities (Beijing) 4th Joint Working Group meeting on the Maritime and Air Communication Mechanism between Japan and China’s defense authorities (Tokyo) 2nd Japan-China defense director-general-level consultations (Tokyo) Japan-China vice-ministerial meeting (Singapore (14th Shangri-La Dialogue))| |Unit-level exchange, etc.|Apr. 2013 Apr. 2014|First Japan-China defense director-general-level consultations (Beijing) Visit to China by the MSDF Chief of Staff (WPNS (Qingdao))| **Reference 64 Recent Defense Cooperation and Exchanges with Russia (Past Three Years)** (April 1, 2012–May 31, 2015) (April 1, 2012–May 31, 2015) |Col1|Col2|(April 1, 2012–May 31, 2015)| |---|---|---| |High-level talks between heads of state and defense|Sep. 2012 Apr. 2013 Nov. 2013 Nov. 2013 Feb. 2014 May 2015|Japan-Russia Summit Meeting (Russia (Vladivostok APEC)) ☆ Concurred on deepening Japan-Russia cooperation in the fi elds of security and defense Japan-Russia Summit Meeting (Moscow) ☆ Agreement reached to hold Ministerial Dialogue (2+2) Agreement reached to expand exchanges between defense offi cials and forces of the two countries as well as to seek new areas of cooperation including counter-terrorism and counter-piracy measures Japan-Russia Defense Ministerial Meeting ☆ Exchanged opinions regarding future Japan-Russia defense cooperation and exchange as well as defense policies of both countries Japan-Russia Foreign and Defense Ministerial Meeting (2+2) ☆ Exchanged opinions regarding security and defense policies of both countries based on the security situation in Asia-Pacifi c region, cooperation within the region based on a multilateral framework, and deployment of a missile defense system in the region, etc. Japan-Russia Summit Meeting (Sochi) Japan-Russia vice-ministerial meeting (Singapore (14th Shangri-La Dialogue))| ||Visit to Russia by the Chief of Joint Staff (Jun. 2012), Visit to Russia by the ASDF Chief of Staff (Aug. 2012), Visit to Russia by the MSDF Chief of Staff (Aug. 2013), Visit to Russia by the GSDF Chief of Staff (Feb. 2014)|| |Regular discussions between defense ministry representatives|Apr. 2012 Sep. 2012|6th Japan-Russia Security Talks 11th Japan-Russia Consultation between defense authorities| |Unit-level exchange, etc.|Aug. 2012 Jul. 2013 Mar. 2014 Dec. 2014|Visit to Japan by Russian Navy’s vessels Visit to Japan by the delegation of the Russian Ground Forces, Eastern Military District Visit to the Eastern Military District by Commanding General of the GSDF Northern Army Visit to the Eastern Military District by Commander of the ASDF Northern Air Defense Force| ||13th bilateral Japan-Russia search and rescue exercises (Sep. 2012), 14th bilateral Japan-Russia search and rescue exercises (Dec. 2013), 15th bilateral Japan-Russia search and rescue exercises (Dec. 2014)|| ----- **Reference 65 Recent Defense Cooperation and Exchanges with ASEAN Countries (Past Three Years)** |Col1|Col2|Col3|(April 1, 2012–May 31, 2015)| |---|---|---|---| |High-level talks between heads of state and defense|Brunei|May 2012 Aug. 2013|Visit to Japan by the Bruneian Deputy Minister of Defense Visit to Brunei by the Minister of Defense| ||Cambodia|Aug. 2013 May 2015|Japan-Cambodia Defense Ministerial Meeting (Brunei (Second ADMM-Plus)) Japan-Cambodia Vice-Ministerial Meeting (Singapore (14th Shangri-La Dialogue))| ||Indonesia|Jun. 2012 Sep. 2012 Jun. 2013 Mar. 2014 Apr. 2014 Jun. 2014 Oct. 2014 Mar. 2015 May 2015|Meeting between the Parliamentary Senior Vice-Minister of Defense and the Indonesian Minister of Defence (Singapore (11th Shangri-La Dialogue)) ☆ Exchanged opinions on ADMM-Plus-related cooperation and memorandum on defense cooperation and exchanges Visit to Japan by the Chief of Staff of the Indonesian Air Force Japan-Indonesia Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore (12th Shangri-La Dialogue)) ☆ Agreement reached to advance cooperation in the area of defense Visit to Indonesia by the Administrative Vice-Minister of Defense Visit to Indonesia by the Parliamentary Senior Vice-Minister of Defense Visit to Indonesia by the ASDF Chief Visit to Japan by the Indonesian Chief of Air Force Japan-Indonesia Summit Meeting (Tokyo) ☆ Signed memorandum on defense cooperation and exchange Visit to Indonesia by the Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs| ||Laos|Jun. 2012 Aug. 2013 Jan. 2014 Feb. 2015|Meeting between the Administrative Vice-Minister of Defense and the Laotian Vice-Minister of National Defense (Singapore (11th Shangri-La Dialogue)) Japan-Laos Defense Ministerial Meeting (Brunei (Second ADMM-Plus)) Visit to Laos by the Administrative Vice-Minister of Defense Visit to Laos by the Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs| ||Malaysia|Jan. 2013 Apr. 2014 Jun. 2014 May 2015|Visit to Malaysia by the ASDF Chief of Staff Japan-Malaysia Defense Ministerial Meeting (Kuala Lumpur) Visit to Malaysia by the MSDF Chief of Staff Visit to Malaysia by the Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs Japan-Malaysia Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore (14th Shangri-La Dialogue))| ||Myanmar|Apr. 2014 May 2014 Jul. 2014 Sep. 2014 Nov. 2014 Nov. 2014|Visit to Myanmar by the Administrative Vice-Minister of Defense Visit to Myanmar by the Chief of Joint Staff Visit to Myanmar by the Parliamentary Senior Vice-Minister of Defense Visit to Japan by the Commander-in-Chief of Defence Services of Myanmar Visit to Myanmar by the Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs Visit to Myanmar by the Minister of Defense (Japan-ASEAN Defense Ministers’ Roundtable)| ||Philippines|Apr. 2012 Jun. 2012 Jul. 2012 Sep. 2012 May 2013 Jun. 2013 Dec. 2013 Sep. 2014 Jan. 2015 Feb. 2015 Mar. 2015 May 2015|Visit to Japan by the Flag Offi cer in Command of the Philippine Navy Visit to the Philippines by the Chief of Joint Staff Visit to the Philippines by the Parliamentary Senior Vice-Minister of Defense (Visit to the Pacifi c Partnership 2012, etc.) Japan-Philippines Defense Ministerial Meeting ☆ Signed statement of intent on defense cooperation and exchanges Visit to Japan by the Chief of Staff Armed Forces of the Philippines Visit to the Philippines by the ASDF Chief of Staff Japan-Philippines Defense Ministerial Meeting (Manila) Visit to Japan by the Flag Offi cer in Command of the Philippine Navy Visit to the Philippines by the Minister of Defense (Visit to international disaster relief operations) Visit to the Philippines by the GSDF Chief of Staff Japan-Philippines Defense Ministerial Meeting (Tokyo) ☆ Signed memorandum on defense cooperation and exchanges Visit to the Philippines by the MSDF Chief of Staff Visit to the Philippines by the Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs Visit to Japan by the Commanding General of the Philippine Air Force Visit to the Philippines by the ASDF Chief of Staff Japan-Philippines Vice-Ministerial Meeting (Singapore (14th Shangri-La Dialogue))| ||Singapore|Jun. 2012 Jul. 2012 Oct. 2012 Jan. 2013 Jun. 2013 Aug. 2013 Sep. 2013 Dec. 2013 Feb. 2014 May 2014 Oct. 2014 May 2015|Meeting between the Parliamentary Senior Vice-Minister of Defense and the Singaporean Minister of Defence (Singapore (11th Shangri-La Dialogue)) ☆ Confi rmed that both countries would work cooperatively as co-chairs of ADMM-Plus military medicine EWG Japan-Singapore Vice-Ministerial Meeting (Tokyo) Japan-Singapore Defense Ministerial Meeting (Tokyo) ☆ Agreed to work together on bilateral exercises, multilateral exercises, logistics supports, etc. Visit to Singapore by the ASDF Chief of Staff Japan-Singapore Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore (12th Shangri-La Dialogue)) Japan-Singapore Defense Ministerial Meeting (Brunei (Second ADMM-Plus)) Visit to Japan by the Chief of Navy of the Republic of Singapore Navy Visit to Singapore by the Parliamentary Senior Vice-Minister of Defense Visit to Singapore by the ASDF Chief of Staff Visit to Singapore by the Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Defense Japan-Singapore Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore (13th Shangri-La Dialogue)) Visit to Japan by the Chief of Air Force of the Republic of Singapore Air Force Japan-Singapore Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore (14th Shangri-La Dialogue)) Japan-Singapore Vice-Ministerial Meeting (Singapore (14th Shangri-La Dialogue))| ||Thailand|Nov. 2012 Jan. 2013 Sep. 2013 Oct. 2013 Nov. 2014|Visit to Japan by the Royal Thai Army Commander Visit to Thailand by the GSDF Chief of Staff Visit to Thailand by the ASDF Chief of Staff Japan-Thailand Defense Ministerial Meeting (Bangkok) ☆ Exchanged opinions regarding the regional situation as well as Japan-Thailand defense cooperation and exchange Visit to Japan by the Royal Thai Air Force Commander Visit to Japan by the Thai Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Defence| ||Timor-Leste|Mar. 2012 Mar. 2015|Visit to Japan by Timor-Leste’s Prime Minister and Minister of Defense and Security Japan-Timor-Leste Defense Ministerial Meeting (Tokyo)| ||Vietnam|May 2012 Jun. 2012 Nov. 2012 Apr. 2013 May 2013 Aug. 2013 Sep. 2013 Jun. 2014 Oct. 2014 Feb. 2015 May 2015|Visit to Vietnam by the Chief of Joint Staff Japan-Vietnam Vice-Ministerial Meeting (Singapore (11th Shangri-La Dialogue)) Visit to Japan by the Vietnam Commander of Air Defense and Air Force 1st Japan-Vietnam Defense Vice-Ministerial Meeting (Hanoi) Visit to Japan by the Chief of the General Staff of the Vietnam People’s Army Visit to Vietnam by the MSDF Chief of Staff Visit to Vietnam by the ASDF Chief of Staff Visit to Vietnam by the GSDF Chief of Staff Japan-Vietnam Defense Ministerial Meeting (Brunei (Second ADMM-Plus)) Japan-Vietnam Defense Ministerial Meeting (Hanoi) ☆ Exchanged opinions regarding the regional situation as well as Japan-Vietnam defense cooperation and exchanges Japan-Vietnam Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore (13th Shangri-La Dialogue)) Visit to Japan by the Vietnam Commander of Air Defense and Air Force Visit to Vietnam by the Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs Visit to Japan by the Commander-in-Chief of the Vietnam People’s Navy Visit to Vietnam by the ASDF Chief of Staff| ----- Jun. 2012 Sep. 2012 11th Shangri-La Dialogue (Singapore, Chief of Joint Staff-level meetings are as follows) Chief of the General Staff of the Filipino National Armed Forces, Commander of the Singaporean National Military 13th Western Pacifi c Naval Symposium (Kuala Lumpur, MSDF Chief of Staff-level meetings are as follows) |High-level talks between heads of state and defense|Multilateral National Security Talks etc., Held at Bilateral Meetings|Nov. 2012 Mar. 2013 May 2013 Jul. 2013 Dec. 2013 Feb. 2014 Feb. 2014 Apr. 2014 Sep. 2014|Chief of the Royal Malaysian Navy, Chief of Navy of the Republic of Singapore Navy, Chief of Staff of the Indonesian Navy, Flag Offi cer in Command of the Philippine Navy 15th CHOD (Sydney, Chief of Joint Staff-level meetings are as follows) Thailand, Malaysia, Brunei, Indonesia, Singapore, Philippines 4th Japan-ASEAN Defense Vice Ministerial Forum (Tokyo, vice ministerial-level meetings are as below) Vice ministers of Brunei, Indonesia, Laos, and Malaysia IMDEX2013 (Singapore, MSDF Chief of Staff-level meetings are as follows) Singapore Navy Commander, Indonesian Navy Chief of Staff 8th PACC (New Zealand, GSDF Chief of Staff-level meetings are as follows) Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army, Chief of Australian Air Force, New Zealand Army Commander, Royal Thai Army Commander International Maritime Security Symposium (Jakarta, MSDF Chief of Staff-level meeting are as follows) Indonesian Navy Chief of Staff, U.S. Chief of Naval Operation, Pakistan Navy Chief of Staff 5th Japan-ASEAN Defense Vice-Ministerial Forum (Okinawa, Vice-Minister-level meetings are as follows) Malaysia Deputy Secretary of Defense, Brunei Deputy Secretary of Defense, Cambodia Deputy Secretary of Defense, Myanmar Vice-Defense Minister, Philippine Deputy Secretary of Defense, Vietnam Deputy Secretary of Defense ASDF Chief of Staff participated in the Asia-Pacifi c Region Security Meeting and Singapore Air Show 14th Western Pacifi c Naval Symposium (Qingdao, MSDF Chief of Staff-level meetings are as follows) Chief of Naval Operation, Australian Chief of Navy, Flag Offi cer in Command of the Philippine Navy, New Zealand Royal Navy Commander, etc. CA EX 2014 (Brisbane, GSDF Chief of Staff-level meetings are as follows) Chief of Army of the Australian Army, Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. Pacifi c Command, Commanding General of the U.S. Marine Corps Forces Pacifi c, Deputy Commander of the Malaysian Army, Commander of the Papua New Guinea Defence Force, Chief of Army of the New Zealand Defence Force, Deputy Commander of the Timor-Leste Defence Force, etc.| |---|---|---|---| |Regular discussions between defense ministry High-level talks between heads of state and defense representatives|Cambodia|May 2013 Sep. 2014|2nd Japan-Cambodia Politico-Military Consultation (PM), 3rd Japan-Cambodia Politico-Military Consultation (PM) (Brisbane) 3rd Japan-Cambodia Politico-Military Consultation (PM), 4th Japan-Cambodia Politico-Military Consultation (PM) (Tokyo)| ||Indonesia|Jul. 2013 Nov. 2014|2nd Japan-Indonesia Politico-Military Consultation (PM), 5th Japan-Indonesia Military-Military Consultation (MM) (Jakarta) 6th Japan-Indonesia Military-Military Consultation (MM) (Tokyo)| ||Philippines|May 2013 Apr. 2014|6th Japan-Philippines Politico-Military Consultation (PM), 6th Japan-Philippines Military-Military Consultation (MM) (Tokyo) 7th Japan-Philippines Politico-Military Consultation (PM) (Manila)| ||Singapore|Jul. 2013 Dec. 2014|13th Japan-Singapore Military-Military Consultation (MM) (Tokyo) 14th Japan-Singapore Military-Military Consultation (MM) (Singapore)| ||Thailand|Mar. 2013 Mar. 2015|11th Japan-Thailand Politico-Military Consultation (PM), 11th Japan-Thailand Military-Military Consultation (MM) (Bangkok) 12th Japan-Thailand Politico-Military Consultation (PM), 12th Japan-Thailand Military-Military Consultation (MM) (Tokyo)| ||Vietnam|Dec. 2012 Nov. 2013 Oct. 2014|3rd Japan-Vietnam Strategic Partnership Dialogue (Hanoi) 4th Japan-Vietnam Strategic Partnership Dialogue (Tokyo) 5th Japan-Vietnam Strategic Partnership Dialogue (Hanoi)| ||Malaysia|Nov. 2012 Oct. 2013|4th Japan-Malaysia Military-Military Consultation (MM) (Kuala Lumpur) 5th Japan-Malaysia Military-Military Consultation (MM) (Tokyo)| ||Myanmar|Nov. 2013|1st Japan-Myanmar-Military Consultation (MM) (Naypyidaw)| |Unit-level exchange, etc.|Southeast Asian Member States and Multilateral Exchanges etc.|Feb. 2013 Mar. 2013 Feb. 2014 Feb. 2015 May 2015|Participation in Cobra Gold 13 hosted by the United States and Thailand (Thailand) Exchange between Japanese and Singapore troops (Japan) (GSDF) Participation in Cobra Gold 14 hosted by the United States and Thailand (Thailand) Participation in Cobra Gold 15 hosted by the United States and Thailand (Thailand) Participation in 4th ARF Disaster Relief Exercise (ARF-DiREx2015) hosted by Malaysia and China (Malaysia)| **Reference 66 Recent Defense Cooperation and Exchanges with the United Kingdom (Past Three Years)** |Col1|Col2|(April 1, 2012–May 31, 2015)| |---|---|---| |High-level talks between heads of state and defense|Apr. 2012 Jun. 2012 Jan. 2013 Jun. 2013 Jul. 2013 Sep. 2013 May 2014 May 2014 Jul. 2014 Jan. 2015 Jan. 2015|Japan-U.K. Summit Meeting (Tokyo) ☆Decision reached to start negotiations on a government to government information security agreement, endorse signing of the Defence Cooperation Memorandum, identify a range of appropriate defence equipment for joint development and production, etc. Meeting between the Parliamentary Senior Vice-Minister of Defense and U.K. Defence Minister (Singapore (11th Shangri-La Dialogue)) ☆Exchanged memorandum relating to defense exchange. Confi rmed to work to deepen cooperation in areas including equipment and technologies. Visit to the U.K. by the Administrative Vice-Minister of Defense ☆Exchanged views on Japan-U.K. defense cooperation, including the fi elds of equipment and cyberspace Japan-U.K. Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore (12th Shangri-La Dialogue)) ☆Exchanged views on progress of defense cooperation and exchange between Japan and the U.K. and on regional situation Visit to Japan by the U.K. Parliamentary Under Secretary of State for Defence Equipment, Support and Technology Visit to the U.K. by the Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Defense Visit to the U.K. by the Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Defense Japan-U.K. Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore (13th Shangri-La Dialogue)) ☆Exchanged views on progress of defense cooperation and exchange between Japan and the U.K. and on regional situation Visit to the U.K. by the Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Defense Visit to the U.K. by the State Minister of Defense Japan-U.K. foreign and defense ministers’ meeting, Japan-U.K. Defense Ministerial Meeting (London) ☆Confi rmed progress of cooperation on defense equipment and technology, and exchanged views on strengthening cooperation on global security issues, regional situation, etc.| ||Jun. 2012 Dec. 2013 Mar. 2014 Apr. 2014 Jul. 2014 Oct. 2014|Visit to the U.K. by the GSDF Chief of Staff Visit to Japan by the First Minister of Navy and the U.K. Royal Navy Chief of Staff Visit to Japan by the Chief of the General Staff of the U.K. Army Visit to Japan by the U.K. Chief of the Defence Staff Visit to the U.K. by the ASDF Chief of Staff Visit to Japan by the U.K. Chief of the Air Staff| |Regular discussions between defense ministry representatives|Jan. 2013 Dec. 2013|12th Japan-U.K. Consultation between foreign affairs and defense authorities, 8th Japan-U.K. Consultation between defense authorities (Tokyo) 13th Japan-U.K. Consultation between foreign affairs and defense authorities, 9th Japan-U.K. Consultation between defense authorities (London)| |Unit-level exchange, etc.|Exchange between Japan and U.K. troops (Japan) (GSDF) (Sep. 2014, Oct. 2014), Exchange between Japan and U.K. troops (Japan) (MSDF) (Nov. 2013, May 2014), Exchange between Japan and U.K. troops (ASDF) (Jul. 2013 (Japan), Jul. 2014 (U.K.))|| ----- **Reference 67 Recent Defense Cooperation and Exchanges with European Nations and Others (Past Three Years)** |Col1|Col2|Col3|(April 1, 2012–May 31, 2015)| |---|---|---|---| |High-level talks between heads of state and defense|Belgium|Mar. 2014|Visit to Belgium by the Chief of Joint Staff| ||France|Jun. 2012 Jun. 2013 Aug. 2013 Jan. 2014 Jan. 2014 Mar. 2014 Jun. 2014 Jun. 2014 Jul. 2014 Jul. 2014 Mar. 2015|Meeting between the Parliamentary Senior Vice-Minister of Defense and French Minister of Defence and Veterans Affairs (Singapore (11th Shangri-La Dialogue)) ☆ Concurred pursuing possible cooperation in the areas of equipment and technologies Japan-France Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore, (12th Shangri-La Dialogue)) ☆ Exchanged opinions regarding the situation of Japan-France defense cooperation exchange and regional situations Visit to France by the MSDF Chief of Staff Japan-France Defense Ministerial Meeting (Paris) ☆ Exchanged opinions regarding the regional situations and Japan-France defense cooperation and exchange Japan-France foreign and defense ministers’ meeting (Paris) ☆ Exchanged opinions regarding the regional situations and Japan-France security and defense cooperation Visit to France by the Chief of Joint Staff Japan-France Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore (13th Shangri-La Dialogue)) ☆ Exchanged opinions regarding the regional situations and security policies Visit to France by the Parliamentary Senior Vice-Minister of Defense Visit to France by the Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Defense Japan-France Defense Ministerial Meeting (Tokyo) Japan-France foreign and defense ministers’ meeting, Japan-France Defense Ministerial Meeting (Tokyo) ☆ Signed defense equipment and technology transfer agreement, and exchanged opinions regarding Japan-France security and defense cooperation, security policies, regional situations, etc.| ||Germany|Apr. 2013 Mar. 2014 May 2015|Visit to Japan by the Chief of Staff of German Army Visit to Japan by the Chief of Staff of German Navy Japan-Germany Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore (14th Shangri-La Dialogue))| ||Italy|Jun. 2012 May 2013 Mar. 2014 May 2014|Japan-Italy Defense Ministerial Meeting (Tokyo) ☆ Signed Statement of Intent on defense exchanges and cooperation. Concurred on advancing the bilateral cooperation into a new level. Visit to Italy by the Parliamentary Senior Vice-Minister of Defense Visit to Italy by the Chief of Joint Staff Visit to Italy by the Minister of Defense| ||Spain|Jan. 2013 Nov. 2014|Visit to Spain by the Administrative Vice-Minister of Defense Japan-Spain Defense Ministerial Meeting (Tokyo)| ||Poland|Mar. 2013|Japan-Poland Defense Ministerial Meeting (Tokyo)| ||Norway|May 2012|Visit to Norway by the Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Defense| ||Sweden|May 2012 Mar. 2015|Visit to Sweden by the Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Defense Visit to Japan by the Supreme Commander of the Swedish Armed Forces| ||Finland|Jul. 2013 Sep. 2013 Oct. 2014 Feb. 2015 Mar. 2015|Visit to Finland by the Minister of Defense Visit to Japan by the Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Defence of Finland Japan-Finland Defense Ministerial Meeting (Tokyo) Visit to Finland by the Administrative Vice-Minister of Defense Visit to Japan by the Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Defence of Finland| ||Estonia|May 2015|Visit to Estonia by the State Minister of Defense| ||Lithuania|Feb. 2014|Japan-Lithuania Defense Ministerial Meeting (Tokyo)| ||Bulgaria|May 2015|Visit to Bulgaria by the State Minister of Defense| ||Turkey|Jul. 2012 Mar. 2013 May 2015|Visit to Turkey by the Administrative Vice-Minister of Defense ☆ Signed statement of intent on defense cooperation and exchanges Japan-Turkey Defense Ministerial Meeting (Tokyo) Visit to Japan by the Commander of the Turkish Naval Forces| ||Kazakhstan|Jul. 2012|Visit to Kazakhstan by the Administrative Vice-Minister of Defense| ||Azerbaijan|Aug. 2013|Visit to Azerbaijan by the Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Defense| ||Canada|Jun. 2012 Mar. 2014 Nov. 2014|Japan-Canada Vice-Ministerial Meeting (Singapore (11th Shangri-La Dialogue)) Japan-Canada Vice-Ministerial “2+2” Dialogue (Ottawa) Japan-Canada vice-ministerial meeting (Halifax)| ||Latvia|May 2015|Visit to Japan by the State Secretary of Defence of Latvia| ||Mongolia|Nov. 2012 Aug. 2013 Nov. 2013 Apr. 2014 Jun. 2014 Mar. 2015 May 2015|Japan-Mongolia Vice-Ministerial Meeting (Ulan Bator) Visit to Mongolia by the Chief of Joint Staff Japan-Mongolia Vice-Ministerial Meeting (Tokyo) Japan-Mongolia Defense Ministerial Meeting (Tokyo) Visit to Mongolia by the GSDF Chief of Staff Visit to Japan by the Vice Minister of Defense of Mongolia (19th Tokyo Defense Forum) Japan-Mongolia Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore (14th Shangri-La Dialogue))| ||New Zealand|May 2013 Jul. 2013 Aug. 2013 Jun. 2014 Aug. 2014 Apr. 2015 May 2015|Visit to Japan by the New Zealand Air Force Commander Visit to New Zealand by the GSDF Chief of Staff Japan-New Zealand Defense Ministerial Meeting (Brunei (Second ADMM-Plus)) Japan-New Zealand Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore (13th Shangri-La Dialogue)) Visit to New Zealand by the Chief of Joint Staff Visit to Japan by the Chief of Army of the New Zealand Defence Force Visit to New Zealand by the Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Defense Japan-New Zealand Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore (14th Shangri-La Dialogue))| ||Pakistan|Feb. 2013|Visit to Pakistan by the MSDF Chief of Staff| ||Sri Lanka|Jun. 2014|Visit to Sri Lanka by the MSDF Chief of Staff| ||Brazil|Aug. 2014|Visit to Brazil by the Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Defense| ||Colombia|Mar. 2015|Japan-Colombia Defense Ministerial Meeting (Tokyo)| ||Middle East/ Africa|Apr. 2012 May 2012 Nov. 2012 Feb. 2013 Mar. 2013 Apr. 2013 Feb. 2014 May 2014 Aug. 2014 Nov. 2014 Jan. 2015 May 2015|Visit to Israel by the Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Defense Visit to Bahrain by the Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Defense Visit to Djibouti, Jordan, and Israel by the Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Defense Visit to Japan by the Saudi Arabian Commander of the RSNF Visit to Japan by the Saudi Arabian Deputy Defense Minister Visit to South Sudan and Djibouti by the Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Defense Visit to UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Oman by the MSDF Chief of Staff Visit to South Sudan and Djibouti by the Minister of Defense Visit to South Africa by the Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Defense Visit to Japan by the Chief of Djibouti Navy Visit to Djibouti and South Sudan by the Minister of Defense Visit to Uganda, Djibouti, South Sudan, and Bahrain by the Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Defense| ||Multi-country|Sep. 2012 May 2013 Sep. 2013 Dec. 2013 Apr. 2014 Sep. 2014 Apr. 2015 May 2015|13th Western Pacifi c Naval Symposium (Kuala Lumpur) IMDEX2013 (Singapore) 8th PACC (New Zealand) International Maritime Security Symposium (Jakarta) 14th Western Pacifi c Naval Symposium (Qingdao) 21st International Seapower Symposium (Newport) Navy League Sea-Air-Space (Maryland) IMDEX2015 (Singapore)| ----- |Col1|New Zealand|Oct. 2013 Sep. 2014|7th Japan- New Zealand Bilateral Defence Talks (Tokyo) 8th Japan- New Zealand Bilateral Defence Talks (Auckland)| |---|---|---|---| ||Canada|Apr. 2012 Jun. 2014|7th Japan-Canada Consultation between foreign affairs and defense authorities, 8th Japan-Canada Consultation between defense authorities (Tokyo) 8th Japan-Canada Consultation between foreign affairs and defense authorities, 9th Japan-Canada Consultation between defense authorities (Tokyo)| ||France|Feb. 2013 Nov. 2014|16th Japan-France Consultation between foreign affairs and defense authorities,15th Japan-France Consultation between defense authorities (Paris) 17th Japan-France Consultation between foreign affairs and defense authorities,16th Japan-France Consultation between defense authorities (Tokyo)| ||Germany|Sep. 2012 Oct. 2014|11th Japan-Germany Consultation between defense authorities (Berlin) 14th Japan-Germany Consultation between foreign affairs and defense authorities, 12th Japan-Germany Consultation between defense authorities (Tokyo)| ||Italy|Sep. 2012 Jun. 2013|1st Japan-Italy Consultation between defense authorities (Rome) 2nd Japan-Italy Consultation between defense authorities (Tokyo)| ||Poland|Sep. 2014|1st Japan-Poland Consultation between defense authorities (Tokyo)| ||NATO|May 2012 Feb. 2014|12th Japan-NATO Senior Offi cials Meeting (Tokyo) 13th Japan-NATO Senior Offi cials Meeting (Tokyo)| ||Sweden|Dec. 2012|2nd Japan-Sweden Consultation between defense authorities (Stockholm)| ||Norway|Feb. 2013 Nov. 2014|1st Japan-Norway Consultation between defense authorities (Oslo) 2nd Japan-Norway Consultation between defense authorities (Tokyo)| ||Pakistan|Aug. 2012 Nov. 2014|6th Japan-Pakistan Consultation between defense authorities (Islamabad) 7th Japan-Pakistan Consultation between defense authorities (Tokyo)| ||Turkey|Jan. 2015|2nd Japan-Turkey Consultation between defense authorities (Tokyo)| ||Mongolia|Jan. 2013 Dec. 2014|1st Consultation between foreign affairs, defense, and security authorities, 1st Japan-Mongolia Consultation between defense authorities (Tokyo) 2nd Consultation between foreign affairs, defense, and security authorities, 2nd Japan-Mongolia Consultation between defense authorities (Ulan Bator)| |Unit-level exchange, etc.|New Zealand|Aug.2014|Japan-Australia-New Zealand joint exercise| ||NATO|Sep.2014 Nov.2014|Japan-NATO bilateral exercise Japan-NATO bilateral exercise| ||EU|Oct.2014 Nov.2014 Mar.2015|Japan-EU bilateral exercise Japan-EU bilateral exercise (twice) Japan-EU bilateral exercise| ||Turkey|Nov.2014|Japan-Turkey bilateral exercise| ||Pakistan|Mar.2015|Japan-Pakistan bilateral exercise| **Reference 68 Outline of a Bill Concerning Punishment of and** **Response to Acts of Piracy** **1. Purpose of the Legislation** To establish matters necessary for the punishment of and proper and effective response to acts of piracy in order to maintain public safety and order at sea, in light of the importance of ensuring the safety of maritime navigation for the economy of Japan and the people’s lives. **2. Defi nition of Acts of Piracy** Acts of Piracy: the following acts conducted by those who are crew members of or are aboard a vessel (excluding a war vessel, etc.) for private purposes on high seas (including exclusive economic zones) or Japan’s territorial waters, etc.: (1) robbery of vessel/operation control, (2) robbery of the property, etc., on a vessel, (3) kidnapping of a person(s) on board, (4) taking of a hostage(s), or (5) for the purpose of (1) to (4); (i) invasion/destruction of a vessel, (ii) excessive access, etc., to another vessel, (iii) unlawful navigation with dangerous weapons **3. Punishment Concerning Acts of Piracy** A person who has conducted an act of piracy shall be punished as follows: (1) 2 (1) – (4): imprisonment, with work, for life or for a def nite term of not less than 5 years; imprisonment, with work, for a def nite term of not less than 6 years when the person concerned causes injury; death penalty or life imprisonment, with work, when the person concerned causes death. (2) 2 (5) (i) and (ii): imprisonment, with work, for a def nite term of not less than 5 years (3) 2 (5) (iii): imprisonment, with work, for a def nite term of not less than 3 years **4. Response by the Japan Coast Guard to Acts of Piracy** (1) The Japan Coast Guard carries out necessary measures to respond to acts of piracy. (2) Maritime safety off cials may use weapons in accordance with the provisions of Article 7 of the Act concerning Execution of Off cial Police Duties. In addition, while they are in action to prevent 2 (5) (ii), as is currently conducted, if the pirates do not obey the preventive action and continue to attempt the act of 2 (5) (ii), and there is probable cause to believe there are no other means, maritime safety off cials may use weapons to the extent that is found reasonably necessary in accordance with the situation. **5. Response by the Self-Defense Forces to Acts of Piracy** (1) When there is a special need to respond to acts of piracy, the Minister of Defense may order action against such acts upon approval by the Prime Minister. In order to obtain approval, the Minister of Defense shall create a response guideline and submit it to the Prime Minister (just notifying the outline of the action suff ces when the situation demands expediency). (2) The response guideline shall include the need and area of the action against pirates, size of the unit, period, and other important matters. (3) The Prime Minister shall report to the Diet when he/she gave approval and when the action against pirates was concluded. (4) Necessary provisions of the Japan Coast Guard Law, those of Article 7 of the Act concerning Execution of Off cial Police Duties and 4 (2) shall apply mutatis mutandis to SDF regular personnel. ----- |eference 69|Summary Comparison of Laws Concerning|International Peace Cooperation Activities|Col4| |---|---|---|---| |Item|International Peace Cooperation Law|Law Concerning Special Measures on Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance in Iraq (Expired on July 31, 2009)|Replenishment Support Special Measures Law (Expired on January 15, 2010)| |Purpose|○ Proactive contribution to U.N.-centered efforts toward international peace|○ Proactive contribution to the efforts by the international community to support and encourage the self-reliant efforts by the Iraqi people toward the prompt reconstruction of the State of Iraq ○ Contribution to ensuring peace and security of the international community including Japan through the reconstruction of Iraq|○ Proactive contribution to the international community to prevent and eradicate international terrorism ○ Contribution to ensuring peace and security of the international community including Japan| |Provisions in the SDF Law|○ Provision under Article 84-4 (Chapter 6) of the SDF Law|○ Supplementary provisions of the SDF Law|○ Supplementary provisions of the SDF Law| |Major Activities|○ International peacekeeping activities ○ International humanitarian assistance ○ International election monitoring activities ○ Supplies cooperation for the abovementioned activities|○ Humanitarian and reconstruction assistance activities ○ Support activities for ensuring security|○ Replenishment support activities| |Areas of Operation|○ Areas excluding Japan (including the high seas) (A ceasefi re agreement between the parties of the dispute and an agreement by the receiving country are required)|○ Territories of Japan ○ Territories of foreign countries (consent of the agency in charge of administration is required in such countries and in Iraq)1 ○ High seas and the airspace above1|○ Territories of Japan ○ Territories of foreign countries (limited to the Indian Ocean States) (consent of such countries is required)1 ○ High seas (limited to the Indian Ocean, etc.) and the airspace above1| |Diet Approval|○ In principle, prior approval in the Diet session is required for the SDF to conduct peace keeping missions2|○ To be discussed in the Diet within 20 days from the day since the SDF initiates such measures2|(Note 3)| |Diet Report|○ Prompt report on the details of the operation plan is required|○ Report on the details of operation plan is required without delay|○ Report about the details of operation plan is required without delay| Notes: 1. Limited to areas where combat is not taking place or not expected to take place while Japan’s activities are being implemented. 2. In case the Diet is closed, an approval shall be promptly requested in the Diet at the earliest session. 3. As prescribed by Law, (1) The category and nature of operations shall be limited to supply. (2) The area of operations is prescribed, including foreign territories, it is not considered necessary to once again obtain the approval of the Diet. Therefore there are no provisions relating to the Diet approval. **Reference 70 The SDF Record in International Peace Cooperation Activities** **(1) Activities based on the Special Measures Law for Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance in Iraq** (As of May 31, 2015) |Col1|Place of Dispatch|Period of Dispatch|Number of Personnel|Description of Principal Tasks| |---|---|---|---|---| |GSDF|Southeast Iraq, etc.|Jan. 2004 – Jul. 2006|Approx. 600|• Medical treatment, water supply, reconstruction and maintenance of public facilities, etc.| ||Kuwait, etc.|Jun.– Sep. 2006|Approx. 100|• Operations required for evacuation of vehicles, equipment and others| |MSDF|Persian Gulf, etc.|Feb. 20 – Apr. 8, 2004|Approx. 330|• Maritime transport of vehicles and other equipment required for the GSDF’s activities| |ASDF|Kuwait, etc.|Dec. 2003 – Feb. 2009|Approx. 210|• Transportation of materials for humanitarian and reconstruction assistance| **(2) Cooperative activities based on the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law** |Col1|Place of Dispatch|Period of Dispatch|Number of Personnel|Description of Principal Tasks| |---|---|---|---|---| |MSDF|Indian Ocean|Nov. 2001– Nov. 2007|Approx. 320|• Materials supplies for foreign vessels| |ASDF|U.S. Forces in Japan, etc.||−|• Transportation of materials| **(3) Replenishment activities based on the Replenishment Support Special Measures Law** |Col1|Place of Dispatch|Period of Dispatch|Number of Personnel|Description of Principal Tasks| |---|---|---|---|---| |MSDF|Indian Ocean|Jan. 2008 – Feb. 2010|Approx. 330|• Materials supplies for foreign vessels| **(4) Anti-Piracy Operations (including dispatches as Maritime Security Operations)** |Col1|Place of Dispatch|Period of Dispatch|Number of Personnel|Description of Principal Tasks| |---|---|---|---|---| |MSDF (Maritime Force)|Off the coast of Somalia / Gulf of Aden|Mar. 2009 –|Approx. 400|• Escort of vessels, zone defense, etc.| |MSDF (Air Unit)|Off the coast of Somalia / Gulf of Aden Djibouti|May 2009 – Jul.2014|Approx. 120 (*)|• Surveillance activities in the Gulf of Aden and tasks related to general affairs, accounting, public relations, health, etc.| ||Off the coast of Somalia / Gulf of Aden Djibouti|Jul.2014 –|Approx. 70|• Surveillance activities in the Gulf of Aden, etc.| |MSDF (Support Unit)|Djibouti|Jul.2014 –|Approx. 40|• Communication and coordination with the relevant authorities of the Republic of Djibouti and other authorities and supports necessary for Air Unit to conduct anti-piracy operation, etc.| |MSDF (Combined Task Force 151 Command Unit)|Bahrain|Aug.2014 –|Under 20|• Communication and coordination with units of various countries participating in CTF151| |MSDF (Local Coordination Center)|Djibouti|Jul.2012 – Jul.2014|3|• Communication and coordination with the relevant authorities of the Republic of Djibouti and other authorities necessary for Maritime Force and Air Unit to conduct anti-piracy operation| |GSDF (Air Unit)|Djibouti|May. 2009 – Jul.2014|Approx. 70 (*)|• Security of activity base and P-3C| |GSDF (Support Unit)|Djibouti|Jul.2014 –|Approx. 70|• Security of activity base and P-3C| *Number of personnel as of July 2014 ----- **(5) International Peace Cooperation Activities** |Col1|Col2|Col3|Period of Dispatch|Number of Personnel|Total Number of Personnel|Description of Principal Tasks| |---|---|---|---|---|---|---| |PKO|United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC)|Ceasefi re monitors|Sep. 1992 – Sep. 1993|8|16|• Monitor custody of weapons collected and observance of ceasefi re • Monitor observance of ceasefi re at the border| |||Engineer unit|Sep. 1992 – Sep. 1993|600|1200|• Repair roads, bridges and other infrastructure • Supply fuel and water to UNTAC components and other groups • Supply food and accommodation, provide facilities| |PKO|United Nations operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ)|Headquarters staff|May 1993 – Jan. 1995|5|10|• Draft mid-and long-term plans, plan and coordinate transport operations at UNUMOZ Headquarters| |||Transport coordination unit|May 1993 – Jan. 1995|48|144|• Support customs clearance work and provide other transport related technical coordination in the allocation of transport| |Humanitarian aid|Humanitarian Relief Operation for Rwandan Refugees|Rwandan refugee relief unit|Sep.– Dec. 1994|260||• Medical care, prevention of epidemics, water supplies| |||Air transport unit|Sep.– Dec. 1994|188||• Air transport of Rwandan refugee relief unit personnel and supplies between Nairobi (in Kenya) and Goma (in former Zaire and current Republic of the Congo) • Make use of spare capacity to airlift personnel and supplies of humanitarian international organizations engaged in refugee relief operations| |PKO|United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) (Golan Heights)|Headquarters staff|Feb. 1996 – Feb. 2009|1st-3th personnel: 2|38|• Create PR and budgets for UNDOF operations, plan and coordinate transport, maintenance and other operations at UNDOF Headquarters| ||||Feb. 2009 – Jan. 2013|14th-17th personnel: 3||| |||Transport unit|Feb. 1996 – Aug. 2012|1st-33rd personnel: 43|1463|• Transport food and other supplies • Store goods at supply warehouses, repair roads and other infrastructure, maintain heavy machinery, conduct fi refi ghting and snow clearance| ||||Aug. 2012 – Jan. 2013|34th personnel: 44||| |Humanitarian aid|Humanitarian Relief Operations in Timor-Leste|Air transport unit|Nov. 1999 – Feb. 2000|113||• Air transport of aid materials for UNHCR • Make use of spare capacity for the air transportation of UNHCR related personnel| |Humanitarian aid|Humanitarian Relief Operations for Afghanistan Refugees|Air transport unit|Oct. 2001|138||• Air transport of relief supplies for UNHCR| |PKO|United Nations Transitional Administration in Timor- Leste (UNTAET) (United Nations Mission in Timor- Leste (UNMISET) from May 20, 2002)|Headquarters staff|Feb. 2002 – Jun. 2004|1st personnel: 10 2nd personnel: 7|17|• Plan and coordinate engineering and logistics operations at military headquarters| |||Engineer unit|Mar. 2002 – Jun. 2004|1st and 2nd personnel: 680 3rd personnel: 522 4th personnel: 405|2287|• Maintain and repair roads and bridges that are necessary for PKO unit activities • Maintain reservoirs used by units of other nations and local inhabitants that are in Dili and other locations Civic assistance • Public welfare support operations| |Humanitarian aid|Humanitarian Relief Operations for Iraqi Refugees|Air transport unit|Mar. – Apr. 2003|50||• Air transport of relief supplies for UNHCR| |Humanitarian aid|Humanitarian Relief Operations for Iraqi Victims|Air transport unit|Jul. – Aug. 2003|98||• Air transport of materials for the relief of Iraqi victims| |PKO|United Nations Mission in Nepal (UNMIN)|Arms monitors|Mar. 2007– Jan. 2011|6|24|• Monitor management of weapons of Maoist soldiers and those of the Nepalese government force| |PKO|United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS)|Headquarters staff|Oct. 2008– Sep. 2011|2|12|• Coordination in UNMIS concerning overall logistics of the military sector • Database management| |PKO|United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH)|Headquarters staff|Feb. 2010 – Jan. 2013|2|12|• MINUSTAH headquarters carries out coordination of overall military logistics, which includes the prioritization of engineering activities such as coordinating facility- related duties, and procurement and transport of military items| |||Engineer unit|Feb. 2010 – Jan. 2013|1st personnel: 203 2nd personnel: 346 3rd and 4th personnel: 330 5th and 6th personnel: 317 7th personnel: 297 Removal support personnel: 44|2184|• Remove rubble, repair roads, construct simple facilities, etc.| |PKO|United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT)|Military liaison offi cer|Sep. 2010 – Sep. 2012|2|8|• Intelligence gathering on the security situation across Timor-Leste| |PKO|United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS)|Headquarters staff|Nov. 2011 –|4|19|• Coordination within the UNMISS units regarding the demand of overall military logistics • Management of database • Planning and coordination of engineering duties| |||Engineer Unit|Jan. 2012 –|1st personnel: approx. 210 2nd – 4th personnel: approx. 330 5th and 6th personnel: approx. 400 7th personnel: approx. 350|2348|• Development of infrastructure such as roads (The following duties were added after 5th personnel) • Consultation and coordination with UNMISS regarding engineer unit activities • Coordination regarding logistics| |||Joint Coordination Center|Jan. 2012 – Dec. 2013|1st personnel: approx. 30 2nd – 4th personnel: approx. 20|approx. 90|• Consultation and coordination with UNMISS regarding engineer unit activities • Coordination regarding logistics| Notes: 1. Other operations have included support activities in the areas of transport and supply carried out by units of the MSDF (in Cambodia and Timor-Leste) and the ASDF (in Cambodia, Mozambique, the Golan Heights, Timor-Leste, and Afghanistan). 2. An advance unit of 23 people was additionally sent as part of the Rwandan refugee relief effort. ----- |(6) International Disaster Relief Activities by the SDF|Col2|Col3|Col4|Col5| |---|---|---|---|---| |||Period of Dispatch|Number of Personnel|Description of Principal Tasks| |International disaster relief activities in Indonesia (earthquake disaster)|Medical support unit|Jun. 1 – 22, 2006|149|• Medical treatment and prevention of epidemics| ||Air transport unit||85|• Air transport of GSDF International Disaster Relief Teams| |International disaster relief activities in Indonesia (earthquake disaster)|Medical support unit|Oct. 5 – 17, 2009|12|• Medical treatment| ||Joint liaison offi ce||21|• Coordination with relevant Indonesian organizations and others| |International disaster relief activities in Haiti (earthquake disaster)|Medical support unit|Jan. 18 – Feb. 16, 2010|104|• Medical treatment| ||Air transport unit||97|• Air transportation of International Disaster Relief Teams • Air transportation of victims from Haiti to the United States as part of international disaster relief activities on the return trips of said unit| ||Joint liaison offi ce||33|• Coordination with relevant Haitian organizations and others| |International disaster relief activities in Pakistan (fl oods)|Air support unit|Aug. 20 – Oct. 10, 2010|184|• Transportation of personnel and relief supplies by air| ||Joint operations coordination center||27|• Coordination with related organizations in Pakistan and other related countries| ||Marine convoy||154|• Transportation of GSDF international disaster relief teams by sea| ||Air transport unit||149|• Transportation of GSDF international disaster relief teams by air| |Transportation of resources and personnel necessary for the implementation of international disaster relief activities in New Zealand (earthquake disaster)|Air transport unit|Feb. 23 – Mar. 3, 2011|40|• Transportation of international disaster relief teams by air| |International disaster relief activities in Philippines (typhoon disaster)|Local operations coordination center|Nov. 12 – Dec. 13, 2013|1,086|• Coordination with relevant Philippine organizations and others| ||Medical assistance unit/Air support unit|||• Medical treatment, prevention of epidemics and air transportation of personnel and aid materials| ||Maritime dispatched unit|||• Transportation of personnel and relief supplies, etc.| ||Airlift unit|||• Air transportation of personnel and relief supplies, etc.| |International disaster relief activities for the missing Malaysian airplane (search)|Local support coordination center|Mar. 11– Apr. 28, 2014|137|• Coordination with relevant Malaysian organizations and relevant countries.| ||MSDF Patrol aircraft unit|||• Rescue operations including searching| ||ASDF Airlift unit|||• Rescue operations including searching| |International disaster relief activities in response to Ebola virus disease outbreak in West Africa (infectious disease)|Local coordination center|Dec. 5 – 11, 2014|4|• Coordination with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, JICA, UNMEER, and other relevant organizations engaged in international disaster relief activities| ||Air transport unit||10|• Transport activities| ||Epidemiological study support|Apr. 21 – May 29, 2015|1|• Support for WHO’s epidemiological study and other activities in Sierra Leone| |International disaster relief activities in Indonesia (airplane accident)|Local support coordination center|Jan. 3 – 9, 2015|3|• Information gathering related to rescue operations including search of missing AirAsia Flight 8501, coordination with relevant organizations and countries| ||International disaster relief surface force||Approx. 350|• Rescue operations including search of missing AirAsia Flight 8501| |International disaster relief activities in Nepal (earthquake disaster)|Joint operations coordination center|Apr. 27 – May 22, 2015|4|• Coordination with relevant organizations of the Federal Democratic Republic of Nepal and relevant countries| ||Medical support unit||Approx. 110|• Medical treatment for affected people| ||Air transport unit||Approx. 30|• Transport of equipment and supplies needed for medical treatment| Notes: 1. For international disaster relief activities in Iran, a fixing tram was sent to Singapore separately because of a mechanical problem with transport aircraft on the way to Iran. 2. Eleven officers dispatched by GSDF, MSDF, and ASDF are included in the number of personnel of the liaison office in Indonesia for the international disaster relief activities. **Reference 71 Dispatch of Ministry of Defense Personnel to International Organizations** |Col1|Col2|(As of June 31, 2015)| |---|---|---| |Period of Dispatch|Position in the Dispatched Organization|Dispatched Personnel| |Jun. 9, 1997 – Jun. 30, 2002, Aug. 1, 2004 – Aug. 1, 2007|Inspectorate Division Director, Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) (The Hague, the Netherlands)|1 GSDF personnel (Major General)1| |Jun. 23, 1997 – Jun. 25, 2000|Inspector, Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) (The Hague, the Netherlands)|1 GSDF offi cer (Captain)| |Oct. 1, 2002 – Jun. 30, 2007|Head, Operations and Planning Branch, Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) (The Hague, the Netherlands)|1 GSDF personnel (Colonel)| |Jul. 11, 2005 – Jul. 11, 2009|Inspector, Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) (The Hague, the Netherlands)|1 GSDF personnel (Major)| |Jan. 9, 2009 – Jan. 8, 2013|Inspector, Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) (The Hague, the Netherlands)|1 GSDF personnel (Major)| |Aug. 27, 2013 –|Inspector, Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) (The Hague, the Netherlands)|1 GSDF offi cer (Captain)| |Dec. 2, 2002 – Jun. 1, 2005|Military Planning Service, Offi ce of Military Affairs, Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UNDPKO) (New York)|1 GSDF personnel (Lieutenant Colonel)| |Nov. 28, 2005 – Nov. 27, 2008|Military Planning Service, Offi ce of Military Affairs, Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UNDPKO) (New York)|1 GSDF personnel (Lieutenant Colonel)| |Jan. 16, 2011 – Jan. 15, 2014|Military Planning Service, Offi ce of Military Affairs, Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UNDPKO) (New York)|1 GSDF personnel (Lieutenant Colonel)| |Sep. 18, 2013 –|Force Generation Service, Offi ce of Military Affairs, Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UNDPKO) (New York)|1 GSDF personnel (Lieutenant Colonel)| |Jun. 1, 2015 –|Senior Communications Offi cer, Senior Africa Division I, Offi ce of Operations, Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UNDPKO) (New York)|1 GSDF personnel (Captain)| Notes: 1 The OPCW Inspectorate Division Director served in office until July 2009 after his retirement from the SDF on August 1 2007 ----- **Reference 72 Activities in Civic Life** |Items|Details of Activities and Their Past Records| |---|---| |Disposal of Unexploded Bombs1| The GSDF disposes of such bombs at the request of municipal governments and others.  Disposal operations in last fi scal year: a total of 1,560 disposal operations (average of approximately 30 operations per week), weighing approximately 57.1 tons in total; in particular, the amount of unexploded bombs that were disposed of in Okinawa Prefecture totaled approximately 22.9 tons, (accounting for about 40 % of such bombs removed across the nation). (If unexploded bombs are chemical bombs, their disposal is basically beyond the disposal capability of the SDF. However, the SDF is prepared to extend as much cooperation as possible in regard to disposal of such bombs by identifying them and checking for attached fuses.)| |Removal of Mines2| The MSDF undertakes in minesweeping operations in waters designated as dangerous areas because underwater mines had been laid there during World War II.  Minesweeping has been almost completed in the dangerous areas. At present, the MSDF has been removing and disposing of explosives after receiving reports from municipal governments.  Disposal operations in the last fi scal year: a total 333 units were disposed of, weighing approximately 4.8 tons in total. (If explosive hazardous materials are chemical bombs, their disposal is basically beyond the disposal capability of the SDF. However, the SDF is prepared to extend as much cooperation as possible for disposal of such bombs by identifying them and checking for attached fuses.)| |Medical Activities3| Medical services are provided to general citizens at the National Defense Medical College in Tokorozawa, Saitama Prefecture, and some hospitals affi liated with the SDF (six out of 16 such hospitals, including the SDF Central Hospital in Setagaya Ward, Tokyo).  The National Defense Medical College runs an emergency medical center, which is in charge of providing emergency medical services to seriously injured patients and patients in critical condition. The center is designated as a medical facility providing tertiary emergency services.  In the wake of a disaster, medical units belonging to major SDF units, acting on a request from municipal governments, provide travelling clinics, quarantines and so forth when a disaster occurs.  The GSDF Medical School (Setagaya Ward, Tokyo), MSDF Underwater Medical Center (Yokosuka City, Kanagawa Prefecture), and ASDF Aviation Medicine Laboratory (Tachikawa City, Tokyo and Sayama City, Saitama Prefecture) undertake study on outdoor sanitation, underwater medicine, and aviation medicine, respectively.  The National Defense Medical College Research Institute (Tokorozawa City, Saitama Prefecture) undertakes study on emergency medicine.| |Cooperation in Supporting Athletic Meetings4| At the request of concerned organizations, the SDF helps operations of the Olympics and Asian games in Japan as well as national sports meetings in the fi elds of ceremonies, communications, transportation, music performance, medical services, and emergency medical services.  The SDF provides transportation and communication support to marathon events and ekiden road relays.| |Exchanges with Local Communities| Sports facilities such as grounds, gyms and swimming pools at many of the SDF garrisons and bases are open to general citizens in response to requests from local communities.  Participation in various events sponsored by general citizens and municipal governments or taking part as sports referees and instructors on an individual basis.| Notes: 1. Supplementary provisions of the Self-Defense Forces Law. 2. Article 84-2 of the Self-Defense Forces Law. 3. Article 27 of the Self-Defense Forces Law, Article 4-10 of Defense Ministry Establishment Law, and others. 4. Article 100-3 of the Self-Defense Forces Law, etc. **Reference 73 Activities Contributing to Society** |Items|Details of Activities and Their Past Records| |---|---| |Offering of Education and Training on Consignment from Other Parties1|H The SDF, acting on requests from third parties, provides education and training to people other than SDF personnel H Basic ranger training, underwater search and rescue training, education on chemical disasters response, and aircraft-maneuvering training are provided to police offi cers and Japan Coast Guard personnel. The National Institute for Defense Studies and the graduate school of the National Defense Academy offer education to employees at private-sector companies and personnel of other government ministries on a consignment basis.| |Transportation Work2|H GSDF, MSDF and ASDF helicopters and government planes transport state guests and the Prime Minister. H SDF units operate government planes which are used when the Emperor and other members of the Imperial Family make overseas visits or the Prime Minister makes overseas trips to attend international conferences. (Partial revision in July 2005 of ordinances of the Self-Defense Forces Law has enabled the use of an SDF plane for the transport of state ministers if doing so is deemed necessary for the execution of important duties.)| |Ceremonial Work at National Events3|H The SDF provides support for state-sponsored ceremonial events involving the Emperor, other members of the Imperial Family, and state guests, with its personnel serving as an honor guard4 forming a line for guests5 and fi ring a gun salute for them6 H Honor guards and gun salutes are offered at welcoming ceremonies for state guests.| |Cooperation in Antarctic Exploration7|H Since the seventh observation in 1965 Japan has lent its cooperation such as through the use of icebreaking ships. Japan has contributed signifi cantly to South Pole observation projects, which marked their 50th anniversary in FY2007, and will continue to provide support for such projects in the future through the launch of the new Shirase in 2009. H In the 56th South Pole for Antarctic Expedition cooperation provided since November 2014, the SDF has transported expedition members and approximately 1,040 tons of supplies to Showa Station, and provided cooperation for the hydrographic survey planned by the expedition team.| |Other Cooperation|H Acting on requests from the Japan Metrological Agency, the SDF supports various meteorological observations, such as volcanic observation using aircraft and marine-ice observation in Hokkaido coastal regions. H Acting on requests from a liaison council formulating anti-radiation measures, the SDF collects high-altitude fl oating dusts and makes radiation analysis of them. The SDF, also acting on requests from the Geographical Survey Institute, supports it in aerial measurement aimed at making maps. H Entrusted by the state and municipal governments and others, the SDF undertakes civil engineering work. (Such support is provided only if doing so is deemed to serve training purposes)8 H Other support activities by the SDF include sea ice observation, support for fl ights of private chartered aircraft to Iwoto island, and the dispatch SDF of music bands.| Notes: 1. Article 100-2 of the Self-Defense Forces Law. 2. Article 100-5 of the Self-Defense Forces Law and others. 3. Article 6 of the Self-Defense Forces Law and Article 13 of rules aimed at implementing the Self-Defense Forces Law and others. 4. Honor guard: Officers of the honor guard, salute guests while carrying a gun as a mark of state respect. 5. Formation of line: SDF officers form a line on the road to show respect to guests and salute them. 6. Gun salute: SDF officers fire a blank canon salute to show respect to guests. 7. Article 100-4 of the Self-Defense Forces Law. 8. Article 100 of the Self-Defense Forces Law. ----- **Reference 74 Outline of Measures to Improve the Living Environment in the Areas Surrounding Defense Facilities** (Cause of Disturbance) Activities by SDF and others Establishment and operation of defense facilities (Cause of Disturbance) (Measures) Devastation of training areas Subsidy for disturbance prevention (Noise abatement works): Subsidy for noise-abatement work for schools, hospitals, etc. Class 1 Area Subsidy for noise-abatement work for housing[1] Compensation for relocation and others Subsidy for improvements of public facilities at relocation site noise Class 2 Area Purchase of land Free use of purchased land Class 3 Area Maintenance of greenbelts Loss sustained in running agricultural, fisheries, and forestry businesses Compensation for loss[2] (Restricted to loss resulting from SDF activities) Disruption of everyday life or business activities Subsidy for improvement of public welfare facilities Effect on living environments and development projects Cities, towns, and villages related to Specified Defense Facilities Provision of Specified Defense Facility Environs Improvement Adjustment Grant Notes: 1. (1) Class 1 Area, Class 2 Area, Class 3 Area Areas around bases are classified as follows according to the degree of disturbance caused by aircraft noise: Class 1 Area: Areas where WECPNL is 75 or higher Class 2 Area: Section of Class 1 Areas where WECPNL is 90 or higher Class 3 Area: Section of Class 2 Areas where WECPNL is 95 or higher - Criteria used for area classifications until 2012 are: WECPNL at 75 or higher, 90 or higher, and 95 or higher for Class 1 Areas, Class 2 Areas, and Class 3 Areas, respectively. Criteria used for area classifications in 2013 and beyond are: Lden at 62 or higher, 73 or higher, and 76 or higher for Class 1 Areas, Class 2 Areas, and Class 3 Areas, respectively. (2) WECPNL (Weighted Equivalent Continuous Perceived Noise Level) represents the unit by which the impact of aircraft noise on human life is evaluated, taking into account various factors including intensity, as well as frequency of occurrence and duration, with particular emphasis on nighttime noise levels. (3) Lden The equivalent noise level over a day being assessed by weighing noises measured early evening and at night. Notes: 2. If losses are caused due to acts of the U.S. Forces in Japan, they are compensated according to the Act on Compensation of Special Losses Caused by Act of United States Forces and Other Forces. ----- **Reference 75 Partial Amendment of the Law Concerning Adjustment, etc. of the Living Environment in the Environs of Defense Facilities** **Review of the calculation of the ordinary amount issued under the Financial** **Equalization Grants for Improvement of Surroundings of Specified Defence** **Institutions** (1) Revision of calculation method  Change in the budget allocation for calculation elements (budget allocation for “operation” will be increased)  Establishment of new training points relating to large-scale or specific training (amount will be increased if joint Japan-US training, large scale exercises, etc., are held) Before revision After revision 5/10 Operation 5/10 Operation 2.5/10 points 2.5/10 points **Review of the uses of Financial Equalization Grants for Improvement of** **Surroundings of Specified Defence Institutions** Background Diversification of local needs (demand for allocation to soft business) Evaluation results of the “business classification” by the Government Revitalization Unit  “To make the uses more free and improve usability” Special grant Special grant amount: 30% 5/10 Operation points Ordinary grant amount: 70% 2.5/10 Area points Population 2.5/10 points Special grant 5/10 Operation points 0.5/10 Training points 2.0/10 Area points Population 2.5/10 points (2) Consideration for cities, towns and villages with high population density (population density points will be added) (3) Consideration for the particularity of US Forces operations (points will be added to facilities used by stationed forces) (4) Appropriate reflection of the effects of operations (number of flights point and exercising personnel points will be subdivided) **Before revision** Improvement of public-use facilities Public-use facilities: Transportation and communications facilities, sports and recreational facilities, environmental health facilities, education and cultural facilities, medical facilities, social welfare facilities, facilities associated with fire-fighting, facilities that contribute to the stimulation of industry **After revision** Improvement of public-use facilities So-called soft business (Newly added) Soft businesses such as the following are envisioned: - Assistance for medical expenses (medical expenses for elementary school pupils and younger, examination costs for pregnant women, etc.) - Assistance for the cost of running community buses (operational costs for welfare buses, etc.) - Assistance for the cost to conduct a diagnosis of earthquake resistance for schools and other facilities (cost of diagnosing the earthquake resistance of elementary / junior-high school buildings, etc.) Defense facilities and cities, towns and villages newly designated as Specified Defense Facilities and Specified Defense Facility-Related Cities, Towns and Villages, respectively |Specifi ed Defense Facilities|Specifi ed Defense Facility- Related Cities, Towns and Villages| |---|---| |Matsushima Air Field|Ishinomaki| |Iwo Jima Airport|Ogasawara, Tokyo| |Naval Air Facility Atsugi|Fujisawa| |Ashiya Air Field|Mizumaki, Onga District, Fukuoka Prefecture| |Torishima Range|Kumejima, Shimajiri District, Okinawa Prefecture| |Shimokita Test Center|Higashido¯ri, Shimokita District, Aomori Prefecture| |Specifi ed Defense Facilities|Specifi ed Defense Facility- Related Cities, Towns and Villages| |---|---| |Sagami General Depot|Sagamihara| |Tokushima Airfi eld|Matsushige, Itano District, Tokushima Prefecture| |Metabaru Air Field|Yoshinogari, Kanzaki District, Saga Prefecture| ||Kamimine, Miyaki District, Saga Prefecture| |Camp Gonsalves|Kunigami, Kunigami District, Okinawa Prefecture| ||Higashi, Kunigami District, Okinawa Prefecture| |Specifi ed Defense Facilities|Specifi ed Defense Facility- Related Cities, Towns and Villages| |---|---| |Kasumigaura Air Field|Tsuchiura| ||Ami, Inashiki District, Ibaraki Prefecture| |Utsunomiya Air Field|Utsunomiya| |Soumagahara Airfi eld|Shinto¯, Kitagunma District, Gunma Prefecture| |Kisarazu Air Field|Kisarazu| |Camp Zama|Sagamihara| ||Zama| ----- **Reference 76 Public Opinion Survey on the Self Defense Forces and Defense Issues (excerpt) (Public Relations Offi ce of Cabinet Offi ce:** **as of January 2015)** Outline of the survey period: January 8–18, 2015 Respondents: Japanese citizens aged 20 years or older in Japan Valid responses (rate): 1,680 (56.0%) Survey method: Individual interview by survey personnel For details, refer to http://survey.gov-online.go.jp/h26/h26-bouei/index.html 1 Interest in the SDF and defense issues (%) 80 60 50 40 30 20 10 2 Impression toward the SDF (%) 60 50 40 0 Good impression (subtotal)[1] 91.7 82.2 84.9 92.2 75.4 74.3 [76.7] 76.8 80.5 80.3 80.9 68.8 69.2 71.3 67.5 58.9 Bad impression (subtotal)[2] 24.3 17.5 19.4 11.7 12.9 14.1 14.1 17.6 13.4 16.7 15.6 13.4 10.5 10.0 4.8 5.3 Notes: 1. Total of “good impression” and “not bad impression” until the survey of February 2006. 2. Total of “not good impression” and “bad impression” until the survey of February 2006. Interested (subtotal)[1] 69.8 71.5 67.3 67.4 57.0 57.8 64.7 59.4 50.4 49.6 50.3 54.9 56.8 47.7 48.1 47.8 43.4 40.8 41.6 41.2 38.9 34.4 31.9 30.2 29.2 28.2 Not Interested (subtotal) Notes: 1. Total of “very interested” and “somewhat interested” until the survey of November 1984. 2. For gender- and age-specific information, see: http://survey.gov-online.go.jp/h26/h26-bouei/zh/z01.html. 3 Defense capabilities of the SDF 4 Evaluation of the SDF disaster relief activities Appreciate (Total) 98.0 Do not appreciate (Total) 1.3 Highly Appreciate to Do not appreciate Do not (Eligible number of people) Total (1,680) (Eligible number of people) |very mu appreciated a certain degree|Col2|uch apprecia| |---|---|---| |Don’t know||－| |64.9|33.2|| |||| 6 Efforts in international peace cooperation activities |Should be decreased|Col2|Col3|Col4| |---|---|---|---| |Should be decreased Should be increased Current strength is sufficient|||| ||||| |29.9|59.2||| ||||| 5 Evaluation of overseas activities by the SDF Appreciate (Total) 89.8 Do not appreciate (Total) 7.3 Highly Appreciate to Do not appreciate Do not of people) 0.7 1.3 － (Eligible number of people) Total (1,680) 0.8 6.5 1.0 |apprec|very muc ciated a certain degree|Col3|Col4| |---|---|---|---| ||Don’t know||| |39.2||50.6|| |2.9|||| |Should make more efforts Should maintain Should reduce the amount|Col2|Col3|Col4| |---|---|---|---| |more efforts maintain the amount in engaging current of efforts in proactively engagement engaging from level current level|||| ||||3.| |25.9|65.4||| |4.6|||| ----- **Reference 77 Record of Information Disclosure by the Ministry of Defense (FY2014)** |Col1|Col2|Ministry of Defense Headquarters|Regional Defense Bureaus and Branches|Total| |---|---|---|---|---| |1. Number of disclosure requests||1,797|1,765|3,562| |2. Number of decisions regarding disclosure Number of all ASDF decisions Requests accepted Requests partially accepted Requests declined||1,914|1,855|3,769| ||Number of all ASDF decisions Requests accepted|1,111|984|2,095| ||Requests partially accepted|678|860|1,538| ||Requests declined|125|11|136| |3. Number of administrative protests||596|5|601| |4. Number of lawsuits||0|0|0| **Reference 78 MOD Contacts for Information Disclosure and Personal Information Protection** |Name|Address|Col3|Phone| |---|---|---|---| |Japan Ministry of Defense|162-8801|5-1 Honmura-cho, Ichigaya, Shinjuku-ku, Tokyo|03-5366-3111 (switchboard)| |Hokkaido Defense Bureau|060-0042|Sapporo third government offi ce building, Odorinishi 12-chome, Chuo-ku, Sapporo-shi, Hokkaido|011-272-7578| |Obihiro Defense Branch|080-0016|Obihiro Regional Joint Government building, 3, Nishi 6-jo minami 7-chome, Obihiro-shi, Hokkaido|0155-22-1181| |Tohoku Defense Bureau|983-0842|Sendai third government offi ce building, 3-15, Gorin 1-chome, Miyagino-ku, Sendai-shi, Miyagi|022-297-8209| |North Kanto Defense Bureau|330-9721|Saitama-shintoshin government offi ce building No.2, 2-1, Shintoshin, Chuo-ku, Saitama-shi, Saitama|048-600-1800| |South Kanto Defense Bureau|231-0003|Yokohama second government offi ce building, 57, Kitanakadori 5-chome, Naka-ku, Yokohama-shi, Kanagawa|045-211-7129| |Kinki-Chubu Defense Bureau|540-0008|Osaka government offi ce building No.2, 1-67, Otemae 4-chome, Chuo-ku, Osaka-shi, Osaka|06-5945-4951| |Tokai Defense Branch|460-0001|Nagoya government offi ce building No.1, 2-1, Sannomaru 2-chome, Naka-ku, Nagoya-shi, Aichi|052-952-8212| |Chugoku-Shikoku Defense Bureau|730-0012|Hiroshima government offi ce building No.4, 6-30, Kamihatchobori, Naka-ku, Hiroshima-shi, Hiroshima|082-223-8284| |Kyushu Defense Bureau|812-0013|Fukuoka second government offi ce building, 10-7, Hakataeki Higashi 2-chome, Hakata-ku, Fukuoka-shi, Fukuoka|092-483-8811| |Kumamoto Defense Branch|862-0901|1-11, Higashimachi 1-chome, Higashi-ku, Kumamoto shi, Kumamoto|096-368-2171| |Nagasaki Defense Branch|850-0862|2-25, Dejimamachi, Nagasaki-shi, Nagasaki|095-825-5303| |Okinawa Defense Bureau|904-0295|290-9, Kadena, Kadena-cho, Nakagami-gun, Okinawa|098-921-8131| ----- Defense Chronology |Year|Defense|Col3|Domestic|Col5|International|Col7| |---|---|---|---|---|---|---| |1945|||Aug. 15 Aug. 17 Sep. 2 Oct. 9 Oct. 15 Nov. 30|World War II ends Higashikuninomiya Cabinet established GHQ established Shidehara Cabinet established General Staff Offi ce and Military Command abolished Army and Navy Ministries abolished|Aug. 17 Aug. 28 Oct. 24|Republic of Indonesia declares independence Provisional government of People’s Republic of Vietnam established United Nations established| |1946|||Jan. 4 Jan. 27 Feb. 26 Apr. 5 Apr. 24 May 3 May 22 Nov. 3|GHQ orders purge from public offi ce GHQ orders the suspension of Japanese administrative right over Ryukyu and Ogasawara Islands Far East Commission formed First meeting of Allied Council on Japan Civil administration of Okinawa established International Military Tribunal for the Far East opened Yoshida Cabinet established The Constitution of Japan promulgated|Jan. 10 Mar. 5 Oct. 1 Dec. 19|First session of U.N. General Assembly (London, through February 14) Churchill’s “Iron Curtain” speech International War Crimes Tribunal in Nuremberg delivers verdicts First Indochina War starts (through 1954)| |1947|||May 3 Jun. 1 Dec. 17|The Constitution of Japan takes effect Katayama Cabinet established Police Law promulgated (National Rural Police and municipal police forces established)|Mar. 12 Jun. 5 Aug. 15 Oct. 5|Truman Doctrine announced Marshall Plan announced India and Pakistan gain independence First India–Pakistan confl ict (through 1965) Cominform established| |1948|||Mar. 10 Apr. 27 Oct. 19 Nov. 12|Ashida Cabinet established Japan Coast Guard Law promulgated Second Yoshida Cabinet established International Military Tribunal for the Far East delivers verdicts|Apr. 1 May 14 Jun. 11 Jun. 26 Aug. 15 Sep. 9|USSR imposes Berlin blockade (through May 12, 1949) Israel gains independence First Middle East War starts (through February 24, 1949) U.S. Senate Vandenberg resolution Berlin airlift starts Republic of Korea (ROK) declares independence North Korea established| |1949|||Feb. 16 Jul. 5 Jul. 15 Aug. 17|Third Yoshida Cabinet established Shimoyama incident Mitaka incident Matsukawa incident|Jan. 25 Apr. 4 Apr. 21 May 6 Sep. 24 Oct. 1 Oct. 7 Dec. 7|Council for Mutual Economic Cooperation (COMECON) established North Atlantic Treaty signed by 12 nations (becomes effective August 24) (NATO established) Nationalist-Communist talks break up; Chinese Communist Army launches general offensive Federal Republic of Germany established (West Germany) USSR declares possession of atomic bomb People’s Republic of China established German Democratic Republic established (East Germany) Chinese Nationalist Party takes refuge in Taiwan| |1950|Jul. 8 Aug. 10 Aug. 13 Aug. 14 Sep. 7|General MacArthur authorizes the establishment of the National Police Reserve, consisting of 75,000 men, and the expansion of the Japan Coast Guard by 8,000 men National Police Reserve Ordinance promulgated and put into effect Ordinary personnel recruitment for the National Police Reserve begins Masuhara appointed fi rst Director-General of the National Police Reserve National Police Reserve headquarters moves from the National Police Agency headquarters to Etchujima|Jun. 21 Jun. 28 Nov. 24|John Foster Dulles, adviser to the U.S. Department of State, visits Japan Reshuffl ed third Yoshida Cabinet established U.S. announces the seven principles for concluding a peace treaty with Japan|Jan. 27 Feb. 14 Jun. 25 Jul. 7 Sep. 15 Oct. 25 Dec. 18|U.S. signs MSA agreement with NATO countries Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance signed Korean War (ends July 27, 1953) United Nations Force formed for dispatch to Korea U.N. troops land at Inchon Chinese Communist volunteers join Korean War NATO Defense Commission agrees to establishment of NATO Forces| |1951|Jan. 23 Mar. 1 Oct. 20|Minister of State Ohashi takes charge of the National Police Reserve Special recruitment of Military and Naval Academy graduates to serve as police offi cers 1st and 2nd class begins Ozuki unit dispatched for the fi rst time on a rescue relief operation to Kita Kawachi Village, Yamaguchi Prefecture, in the wake of Typhoon Ruth|Jan. 29 Jul. 4 Sep. 8 Oct. 26 Dec. 26|First Yoshida-Dulles talks (peace treaty negotiations) Reshuffl ed third Yoshida Cabinet appointed (second term) 49 countries sign Peace Treaty with Japan; Japan–U.S. Security Treaty concluded House of Representatives approves Peace Treaty and Japan–U.S. Security Treaty (House of Councilors approval given November 18) Reshuffl ed third Yoshida Cabinet appointed (third term)|Apr. 11 Aug. 30 Sep. 1|MacArthur was dismissed as Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers dismissed U.S.–Philippines Mutual Defense Treaty signed Australia–New Zealand–U.S. sign ANZUS Treaty| |1952|Feb. 28 Apr. 26 Jul. 26 Jul. 31 Aug. 1 Oct. 15 Oct. 30 Nov. 12|Japan–U.S. Administrative Agreement signed Maritime Guard established within the Japan Coast Guard Japan–U.S. Facilities and Areas Agreement signed National Safety Agency Law promulgated National Safety Agency established; Prime Minister Yoshida concurrently appointed Director-General of the National Safety Agency; Coastal Safety Force inaugurated National Safety Force inaugurated Kimura appointed Director-General of the National Safety Agency Japan–U.S. Ship Leasing Agreement signed|Apr. 28 May 1 Jul. 21 Oct. 30|Japan–Taiwan Peace Treaty concluded Japan–U.S. Peace Treaty and Japan–U.S. Security Treaty enter into force Far East Commission, Allied Council, and GHQ Abolished May Day riot at Imperial Palace Plaza Subversive Activities Prevention Law promulgated and enters into force Fourth Yoshida Cabinet established|Jan. 19 May 26 May 27 Oct. 31 Nov. 1|ROK proclaims sovereignty over neighboring ocean areas (Rhee Line) U.S., U.K., and France sign peace agreement with Germany European Defense Community (EDC) Treaty signed U.K. carries out its fi rst atomic bomb test U.S. carries out its fi rst hydrogen bomb test| |1953|Jan. 1 Apr. 1 Sep. 27 Oct. 30|Security Advisory Group in Japan inaugurated National Safety Academy (predecessor of National Defense Academy) established Yoshida and Shigemitsu talk Ikeda–Robertson talks; joint statement issued on gradual increase in self-defense strength|May 21 Dec. 25|Fifth Yoshida Cabinet established Japanese administrative rule over Amami Islands restored|Jan. 20 Mar. 5 Jul. 27 Aug. 12 Oct. 1|Eisenhower becomes U.S. President USSR General Secretary Stalin dies (Malenkov takes over March 6) Korean War Armistice Agreement signed USSR carries out its fi rst hydrogen bomb test U.S.–ROK Mutual Defense Treaty signed| |1954|Mar. 8 May 14 Jun. 2 Jun. 9 Jul. 1 Dec. 10|Mutual Defense Assistance (MDA) agreement signed Japan and U.S. sign Land Lease Agreement on naval vessels House of Councilors passes resolution prohibiting dispatch of troops overseas Promulgation of Defense Agency Establishment Law, Self-Defense Forces Law and Protection of National Secrecy Law pertaining to the MDA Defense Agency established; Ground, Maritime and Air Self-Defense Forces inaugurated Omura appointed Minister of State for Defense|Mar. 1 Dec. 10|Daigo Fukuryu maru (Lucky Dragon V) incident Hatoyama Cabinet established|Jan. 21 Mar. 1 Mar. 14 Jul. 21 Sep. 3 Sep. 8 Dec. 2|U.S. launches world’s fi rst nuclear submarine (USS Nautilus) U.S. carries out hydrogen bomb test at Bikini Atoll Khrushchev becomes Soviet Union Communist Party General Secretary Geneva Agreement on armistice in Indochina signed Chinese People’s Liberation Army shells Quemoy and Matsu for the fi rst time South East Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) formed by signing of collective defense pact U.S.–Taiwan Mutual Defense Treaty signed| |1955|Mar. 19 May 6 Jul. 31 Nov. 22|Sugihara appointed Minister of State for Defense Live shell fi re by U.S. forces at Kita Fuji Maneuver Area; opposition to fi ring intensifi es Sunada appointed Minister of State for Defense Funada appointed Minister of State for Defense|Mar. 19 May 8 Aug. 6 Aug. 31 Nov. 14 Nov. 22 Dec. 19|Second Hatoyama Cabinet established Protests begin at Sunagawa Base First World Conference Against Atomic and Hydrogen Bombs held in Hiroshima Shigemitsu-Dulles meeting; joint statement issued on revision of Japan–U.S. Security Treaty Japan–U.S. Atomic Energy Agreement signed Third Hatoyama Cabinet established Atomic Energy Basic Law promulgated|Apr. 18 May 5 May 14|Africa–Asia conference held at Bandung West Germany formally admitted to NATO Signing of Warsaw Pact (WPO starts)| |1956|Mar. 23 Apr. 26 Jul. 2 Sep. 20 Dec. 23|Defense Agency moved to Kasumigaseki First Japan-made destroyer Harukaze completed National Defense Council Composition Law promulgated First domestically-produced F-86F fi ghter delivered Prime Minister Ishibashi concurrently becomes Minister of State for Defense|Feb. 9 Oct. 19 Dec. 18 Dec. 23|House of Representatives passes resolution to ban atomic and hydrogen bomb tests (House of Councilors, February 10) Joint declaration on restoration of Japanese–Soviet relations Japan joins the U.N. Ishibashi Cabinet established|Feb. 14 Apr. 17 Jul. 26 Oct. 23 Oct. 29|Stalin criticized at the 20th Congress of Soviet Communist Party in Moscow; Khrushchev proclaims policy of peaceful co-existence with the West USSR announces dissolution of Cominform Egyptian President Nasser nationalizes the Suez Canal Hungarian Revolution Second Middle East War (Suez War; through November 6)| ----- |Year|Col2|Defense|Col4|Domestic|Col6|International| |---|---|---|---|---|---|---| |1957|Jan. 31 Feb. 2 May 20 Jun. 14 Jun. 21 Jul. 10 Sep. 10|Acting Prime Minister Kishi concurrently becomes, ad interim, Minister of State for Defense Kotaki appointed Minister of State for Defense Basic Guidelines for National Defense adopted by the National Defense Council and the Cabinet First Defense Build-up Plan adopted by the National Defense Council and approved by the Cabinet Kishi–Eisenhower talks; joint statement on the early withdrawal of the USFJ issued Tsushima appointed Minister of State for Defense National Defense Council decision to produce P2V-7 42 aircraft domestically, Cabinet report on September 17|Feb. 25 Mar. 15 Jul. 10 Aug. 6 Aug. 27|Kishi Cabinet established House of Councilors passes resolution to ban atomic and hydrogen bombs Reshuffl ed Kishi Cabinet established Japan–U.S. Security Council inaugurated Trial startup of reactor at Tokaimura|May 15 Aug. 26 Oct. 4 Nov. 23|U.K. conducts its fi rst hydrogen bomb test USSR announces successful ICBM test USSR launches the world’s fi rst artifi cial satellite, Sputnik 1 World Congress of Communist Parties issues the Moscow Declaration| |1958|Jan. 14 Feb. 17 Jun. 12|First ocean training exercises (Hawaii, through February 28) ASDF begins airspace anti-intrusion measures Sato appointed Minister of State for Defense|Jan. 1 Apr. 18 Jun. 12 Sep. 11 Oct. 4|Japan becomes non-permanent member of the U.N. Security Council House of Representatives passes resolution to ban atomic and hydrogen bombs Second Kishi Cabinet established Fujiyama–Dulles talks (Washington); agreement on revision of the Japan–U.S. Security Treaty Commencement of Japan–U.S. talks on the revision of the Japan–U.S. Security Treaty|Jan. 1 Jan. 31 Aug. 23 Oct. 23 Dec. 17|European Economic Community (EEC) starts U.S. successfully launches an artifi cial satellite Chinese People’s Liberation Army attack on Quemoy intensifi es Dulles talks with Chiang Kaishek; joint statement issued denying counteroffensive against mainland China U.S. test-launches Atlas ICBM| |1959|Jan. 12 Jun. 18 Sep. 26 Nov. 6|Ino appointed Minister of State for Defense Akagi appointed Minister of State for Defense Dispatch of disaster relief units in response to Typhoon Vera National Defense Council decision to produce 200 F-104 aircraft domestically, approved by Cabinet on November 10|Mar. 30 Jun. 18 Dec. 16|Tokyo District Court ruled the stationing of U.S. forces to be unconstitutional in the Sunagawa case Second reshuffl ed Kishi Cabinet established Original ruling in the Sunagawa case was reversed by the Supreme Court|Mar. 31 Aug. 25 Sep. 18 Sep. 27 Dec. 1|14th Dalai Lama is exiled to India China–India border dispute USSR General Secretary Khrushchev proposes complete military reductions at U.N. U.S.–Soviet summit; joint statement issued at Camp David Antarctica Treaty signed| |1960|Jan. 11 May 24 Jul. 19 Dec. 8|Defense Agency moves to Hinoki-cho Dispatch of disaster relief units in response to the earthquake and tsunami in Chile Esaki appointed Minister of State for Defense Nishimura appointed Minister of State for Defense|Jan. 19 Jul. 19 Dec. 8|New Japan–U.S. Security Treaty signed (enters into force June 23) Ikeda Cabinet established Second Ikeda Cabinet established|Feb. 13 Apr. 27 May 1 Jul. 20 Dec. 20|France conducts its fi rst nuclear test in the Sahara Rhee resigns as President of ROK U-2 reconnaissance plane belonging to U.S. shot down in Soviet airspace U.S. conducts successful underwater launch of Polaris SLBM Formation of the South Vietnam National Liberation Front| |1961|Jan. 13 Jul. 18|National Defense Council decides to reorganize GSDF units (into 13 divisions); presented to Cabinet January 20 Fujieda appointed Minister of State for Defense; Second Defense Build-up Plan adopted by National Defense Council and Cabinet|Jul. 18|Reshuffl ed second Ikeda Cabinet established|Jan. 20 Apr. 12 May 16 Jul. 6 Jul. 11 Aug. 13|Kennedy becomes U.S. President USSR successfully launches manned spacecraft Military junta seizes power in a coup in ROK Soviet–North Korea Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance signed Sino–North Korean Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance signed Construction of Berlin Wall| |1962|Jul. 18 Aug. 15 Oct. 15 Nov. 1 Nov. 9|Shiga appointed Minister of State for Defense GSDF completes 13 division organization Type 61 tank fi rst introduced Defense Facilities Administration Agency established Shiga visits U.S. for fi rst time as Minister of State for Defense (through November 26)|Jul. 18|Reshuffl ed second Ikeda Cabinet appointed (second term)|Jul. 23 Oct. 20 Oct. 24 Oct. 28|International Agreement on the Neutrality of Laos signed in Geneva International Conference China–India border dispute (through November 22) U.S. Navy imposes sea blockade of Cuba (through November 20) Premier of the Soviet Union Khrushchev declares dismantling of missile bases in Cuba| |1963|Jul. 18|Fukuda appointed Minister of State for Defense|Jul. 18 Aug. 14 Dec. 9|Reshuffl ed second Ikeda Cabinet appointed (third term) Japan joins Limited Nuclear Test Ban Treaty Third Ikeda Cabinet established|Jun. 20 Aug. 8 Sep. 16 Nov. 22 Dec. 17|Agreement signed for U.S.–Soviet hotline Limited Nuclear Test Ban Treaty signed by U.S.–USSR–U.K. (enters into force on October 10) Malaysian Federation established President Kennedy assassinated, Johnson becomes President ROK transits to civilian government, Park Chung-hee becomes President| |1964|Jul. 18|Koizumi appointed Minister of State for Defense|Jun. 15 Jul. 18 Nov. 9 Nov. 12|Limited Nuclear Test Ban Treaty enters into force for Japan Third reshuffl ed Ikeda Cabinet established Sato Cabinet established U.S. nuclear submarine (Sea Dragon) enters a Japanese port (Sasebo) for the fi rst time|Aug. 2 Oct. 16|Gulf of Tonkin incident China successfully carries out its fi rst nuclear test Brezhnev becomes USSR General Secretary| |1965|Feb. 10 Jun. 3 Nov. 20|Diet debate on Mitsuya study Matsuno appointed Minister of State for Defense Icebreaker Fuji leaves on fi rst mission to assist Antarctic observation (through April 8, 1966)|Jun. 3 Jun. 22|Reshuffl ed Sato Cabinet established Japan–ROK Basic Treaty signed|Feb. 7 Sep. 1|U.S. starts bombing of North Vietnam Second India–Pakistan confl ict (to September 22)| |1966|Aug. 1 Nov. 29 Dec. 3|Kambayashiyama appointed Minister of State for Defense Outline of Third Defense Build-up Plan adopted by National Defense Council and Cabinet Masuda appointed Minister of State for Defense|Aug. 1 Dec. 3|Reshuffl ed Sato Cabinet appointed (second term) Reshuffl ed Sato Cabinet appointed (third term)|May 16 Jul. 1 Oct. 27|Cultural Revolution starts in China France withdraws from the NATO command (rejoined April 4, 2009) China successfully carries out its fi rst nuclear missile test| |1967|Mar. 14|Key matters for inclusion in Third Defense Build-up Plan agreed by National Defense Council; adopted by Cabinet on March 14|Feb. 17 Mar. 29 Nov. 25|Second Sato Cabinet established Sapporo District Court rules in Eniwa Case Reshuffl ed second Sato Cabinet established|Jan. 27 Jun. 5 Jun. 17 Jul. 1 Aug. 8|Outer Space Treaty signed Third Middle East War (through June 9) China successfully carries out its fi rst hydrogen bomb test Formation of European Community (EC) Formation of Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN)| |1968|Nov. 30|Arita appointed Minister of State for Defense|Jan. 19 Feb. 26 Jun. 26 Nov. 30|U.S. nuclear-powered aircraft carrier (Enterprise) enters a Japanese port (Sasebo) for the fi rst time New Japan–U.S. nuclear agreement signed Ogasawara Islands revert to Japan Reshuffl ed second Sato Cabinet appointed (second term)|Jan. 16 Jan. 23 May 13 Jul. 1 Aug. 20 Aug. 24|Prime Minister Wilson announces withdrawal of U.K. troops east of Suez Seizure of U.S. Navy intelligence vessel Pueblo by North Korea First formal Vietnamese peace talks held in Paris Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty signed Soviet and Eastern European troops invade Czechoslovakia France carries out its fi rst hydrogen bomb test in the South Pacifi c| |1969|Jan. 10 Apr. 4|National Defense Council decision to produce 104 F-4E aircraft domestically, approved by Cabinet Japan–U.S. memorandum signed for Japanese production of F-4EJ|Nov. 21|Sato–Nixon joint statement (extension of Japan-U.S. Security Treaty, return of Okinawa to Japan by 1972)|Jan. 20 Mar. 2 Apr. 15 Jun. 10 Jul. 25|Nixon becomes U.S. President Armed clashes between Chinese and Soviet forces on Chenpao Island (Damansky Island) North Korea shoots down U.S. EC-121 reconnaissance plane South Vietnam announces establishment of Provisional Revolutionary Government U.S. President Nixon announce Guam Doctrine (later the Nixon Doctrine)| |1970|Jan. 14 Oct. 20|Nakasone appointed Minister of State for Defense Publication of “The Defense of Japan,” the fi rst white paper on defense|Jan. 14 Feb. 3 Feb. 11 Mar. 31 Jun. 23 Nov. 25|Third Sato Cabinet established Japan signs Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty First domestically produced artifi cial satellite successfully launched Yodo hijacking Automatic extension of Japan–U.S. Security Treaty Yukio Mishima commits suicide by ritual disembowelment at the GSDF Eastern Army Headquarters in Ichigaya|Jan. 24 Mar. 5 Apr. 16 Apr. 24 Aug. 12|Formation of integrated WPO (Warsaw Pact) forces (involving seven countries) Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty comes into force U.S. and USSR begin SALT I strategic arms limitation talks China successfully launches its fi rst satellite West Germany–USSR sign non-aggression pact| |1971|Jun. 29 Jul. 5 Jul. 30 Aug. 2 Dec. 3 Dec. 5|Okinawa Defense Agreement (Kubo-Curtis Agreement) signed Masuhara appointed Minister of State for Defense All Nippon Airways plane collides with SDF aircraft (Shizukuishi) Nishimura appointed Minister of State for Defense Ezaki appointed Minister of State for Defense ASDF fi rst domestic supersonic aircraft ASDF XT-2 delivered|Jun. 17 Jul. 5 Nov. 24|Agreement on the Return of Okinawa signed Reshuffl ed third Sato Cabinet established House of Representatives resolution on nonnuclear weapons|Feb. 11 Aug. 9 Sep. 30 Oct. 25 Nov. 27 Dec. 3|Signing of treaty forbidding the use of the seabed for military purposes India–Soviet Friendship Treaty signed U.S. and USSR sign agreement on measures to reduce the danger of nuclear war U.N. General Assembly adopts resolution to admit China and expel Taiwan ASEAN declares SEA neutrality Third India–Pakistan confl ict| ----- |Year|Col2|Defense|Col4|Domestic|Col6|International| |---|---|---|---|---|---|---| |1972|Feb. 8 Apr. 18 Jul. 7 Oct. 9|National Defense Council adopts Outline of 4th Five- Year Defense Build-up Plan, approved by Cabinet on February 8 National Defense Council decision on SDF deployment in Okinawa, presented to Cabinet on April 18 Masuhara appointed Minister of State for Defense Situation Judgment and Defense Concepts in the Fourth Defense Build-up Plan, National Defense Council determines key matters for inclusion in Fourth Defense Build-up Plan and measures to enhance civilian control, adopted by Cabinet|Jan. 7 Apr. 10 May 15 Jul. 7 Sep. 29 Dec. 22|Sato–Nixon joint statement on the agreement of the return of Okinawa and the reduction of bases Japan signs Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC) Return of Okinawa Tanaka Cabinet established Prime Minister Tanaka visits China; normalization of diplomatic relations between Japan and China Second Tanaka Cabinet establishe|Feb. 27 Apr. 10 May 26 Jul. 3 Jul. 4 Dec. 21|U.S. President Nixon visits China; China–U.S. Joint Communique Biological Weapons Convention signed SALT I and agreement to limit ABM signed during the visit of U.S. President Nixon to USSR India–Pakistan truce signed ROK and North Korea make a Joint Statement for peaceful unifi cation East–West Germany Basic Treaty signed| |1973|Jan. 23 Feb. 1 May 29 Jul. 1|14th Japan–U.S. Security Consultative Committee meeting agrees on consolidation of U.S. bases in Japan (Kanto Program) Defense Agency publishes Peacetime Defense Strength Yamanaka appointed Minister of State for Defense Commencement of SDF air defense mission on Okinawa|Sep. 7 Sep. 21 Oct. 8 Nov. 25|Sapporo District Court rules SDF unconstitutional (Naganuma Judgment) Japan–North Vietnam establish diplomatic relations Japan–Soviet summit (Moscow) Reshuffl ed second Tanaka Cabinet established|Jan. 27 Feb. 21 Mar. 29 Jun. 22 Oct. 6 Oct. 17 Nov. 7|Vietnam peace agreement signed (ceasefi re takes effect on January 28) Laos Peace Treaty signed U.S. forces complete their withdrawal from Vietnam General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev of the Soviet Union visits U.S.; convention on the prevention of nuclear war signed Fourth Middle East War (ends October 25) Ten OPEC countries decide to reduce crude oil supplies Pakistan formally withdraws from SEATO| |1974|Apr. 25 Nov. 12 Dec. 9|National Defense Medical College opens Uno appointed Minister of State for Defense Sakata appointed Minister of State for Defense|Jan. 5 Apr. 20 Oct. 8 Nov. 11 Nov. 13 Dec. 9|Japan–China Trade Agreement signed Japan–China Aviation Agreement signed Eisaku Sato, former Prime Minister, receives Nobel Prize Reshuffl ed second Tanaka Cabinet appointed (second term) Japan–China Marine Transport Agreement signed Miki Cabinet established|Jan. 18 May 18 Jul. 3 Aug. 9 Nov. 15 Nov. 23|Israel and Egypt sign Egyptian-Israeli Disengagement Treaties India carries out its fi rst underground nuclear test U.S. President Nixon visits USSR, Treaty on the Limitation of Underground Nuclear Weapon Tests (Threshold Test Ban Treaty) signed Ford becomes U.S. President U.N. forces in Korea discovers a North Korean infi ltration tunnel U.S. President Ford visits USSR, makes joint statement on SALT II| |1975|Apr. 1|Director General instructs to create draft plan for defense forces after FY1977 (second instruction October 29)|||Apr. 23 Apr. 30 Aug. 1 Nov. 17|U.S. President Ford declares end of Vietnam War South Vietnamese Government surrenders unconditionally Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) adopts the Helsinki Declaration (Helsinki) First summit meeting of most industrialized nations (Rambouillet, through November 17), held annually since| |1976|Jun. 4 Jul. 8 Sep. 6 Oct. 29 Nov. 5 Dec. 24|Publication of second white paper on defense, “The Defense of Japan” (henceforth published annually) Sub-Committee for Defense Cooperation (SDC) established MiG-25 forced to land at Hakodate Airport National Defense Council, Cabinet decision on Defense Plan for Defense Build-up beyond FY1977 National Defense Council and Cabinet adopt Immediate-term Defense Build-up, National Defense Council, Cabinet decision on handling major items in preparations for defense forces Mihara appointed Minister of State for Defense|Jun. 8 Aug. 5 Sep. 15 Dec. 24|Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty comes into force for Japan Sapporo High Court decides Naganuma Nike suit Reshuffl ed Miki Cabinet established Fukuda Cabinet established|Apr. 5 Jul. 2 Aug. 18 Sep. 9 Oct. 6|Demonstrators and police clash in Tiananmen Square in Beijing, China (1st Tiananmen Incident) Socialist Republic of Vietnam (unifi ed Vietnam) proclaimed U.S. military offi cers slain at Panmunjom by North Korea Death of Chairman of Chinese Communist Party Mao Zedong Group of Four arrested (Cultural Revolution ends)| |1977|Aug. 10 Nov. 28 Dec. 29|Defense Agency starts Emergency Legislation Study Kanemaru appointed Minister of State for Defense National Defense Council decides on introduction of “F-15s and P-3C,” approved by Cabinet on December 29|Feb. 17 Jul. 1 Nov. 28|Mito District Court decides Hyakuri Base suit Implementation of two maritime laws, proclaiming a 200-mile fi shing zone and 12-mile territorial waters Reshuffl ed Fukuda Cabinet established|Jan. 2 Jun. 3 Aug. 1|Carter becomes U.S. President South East Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) dissolved (Treaty remains effective) North Korea establishes military demarcation lines in Sea of Japan and Yellow Sea| |1978|Sep. 21 Nov. 27 Dec. 7|Defense Agency announces modality and purpose of emergency legislation study (ASDF) First Japan–U.S. bilateral training exercises (east of Misawa and west of Akita, through December 1) Japan–U.S. Security Consultative Committee approves Guidelines for Japan–U.S. Cooperation, presented to and approved by Cabinet following deliberation by the National Defense Council on November 28 Yamashita appointed Minister of State for Defense|Aug. 12 Dec. 7|Treaty of Peace and Friendship between Japan and the People’s Republic of China signed in Beijing Ohira Cabinet established|Apr. 12 Nov. 3 Dec. 5 Dec. 25|Chinese fi shing fl eet infringes on waters around Senkaku Islands Vietnam–Soviet Friendship Agreement signed Afghanistan–Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Good Relations and Cooperation signed Vietnamese troops invade Cambodia (withdrawal completed on September 26, 1989)| |1979|Jan. 11 Jul. 17 Jul. 25 Nov. 9|Introduction of E-2C approved by National Defense Council and Cabinet Announcement of Mid-Term Defense Estimate (FY1980–FY1984) Minister of State for Defense Yamashita makes fi rst visit to ROK as an incumbent Minister (through July 26) Kubota appointed Minister of State for Defense|Nov. 9|Second Ohira Cabinet established|Jan. 1 Jan. 7 Feb. 11 Feb. 17 Mar. 26 Jun. 18 Oct. 26 Dec. 27|U.S. and China normalize diplomatic relations, U.S. notifi es termination of the U.S.–Taiwan Mutual Defense Treaty after one year Fall of Phnom Penh, establishment of Heng Samrin regime announced Islamic Revolution takes place in Iran Sino–Vietnamese War (through March 5) Egypt–Israel peace treaty signed SALT II signed Assassination of ROK President Park Chung Hee Soviet Union invades Afghanistan| |1980|Feb. 4 Feb. 26 Jul. 17 Aug. 18 Aug. 19 Sep. 3|Hosoda appointed Minister of State for Defense Maritime Self-Defense Force takes part in RIMPAC for the fi rst time (through March 18) Omura appointed Minister of State for Defense Interceptors begin to be armed with missiles Arming escorts with live torpedoes announced First meeting of the Japan–U.S. Systems and Technology Forum (Washington, through September 4)|Jul. 17|House of Councilors establishes special committee for Security Treaty, Okinawa, and Northern Islands issues Suzuki Cabinet established|Apr. 11 May 18 Aug. 21 Sep. 22|Sino–Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance lapses China tests an ICBM in the direction of the South Pacifi c Ocean for the fi rst time Soviet nuclear submarine has an accident off Okinawa main island Iran and Iraq enter into full-fl edged war| |1981|Apr. 22 Oct. 1 Nov. 30|Defense Agency announces classifi cation of the laws and regulations subject to the Studies on Emergency Legislation (GSDF) First Japan–U.S. bilateral exercises (in communications) staged at Higashi Fuji Maneuver Area (through October 3) Ito appointed Minister of State for Defense|Jan. 6 Jul. 7 Jul. 13 Nov. 30|February 7 decided as Northern Islands Day (Cabinet authorized) Tokyo High Court decides Hyakuri Base suit Hachioji branch of Tokyo District Court decides 1st and 2nd Yokota Air Base noise suits Reshuffl ed Suzuki Cabinet established|Dec. 13|Poland declares martial law and establishes the Military Council of National Salvation| |1982|Feb. 15 May 15 Jul. 23 Nov. 27|(GSDF) First Japan–U.S. bilateral command post exercise (staged at Takigahara, through February 19) Use of some sections of land within facilities and areas located in Okinawa starts under the Special Land Lease Law 1981 Mid-Term Defense Estimate presented to and approved by National Defense Council Tanigawa appointed Minister of State for Defense|Jun. 8 Jun. 9 Sep. 9 Oct. 20 Nov. 27|BWC enters into force in Japan Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW), Protocols I, II and III concluded Supreme Court ruled on Naganuma Nike Missile Base Case Yokohama District Court decides 1st Atsugi Air Facility noise suit Nakasone Cabinet established|Apr. 2 Apr. 25 Jun. 6 Jun. 29 Aug. 17 Oct. 12 Nov. 12|Falklands dispute (ends June 14) Israel returns all of Sinai Peninsula Israeli forces invade Lebanon Commencement of Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START-I) U.S.–Soviet Union (Geneva) U.S.–China Joint Statement about U.S. weapons sales to Taiwan China successfully tests SLBM water launch Andropov becomes Soviet General Secretary| |1983|Jan. 14 Jun. 12 Nov. 8 Dec. 12 Dec. 27|Government decides to pave the way for the transfer of military technologies to the U.S. (Statement by the Chief Cabinet Secretary) Director Tanigawa fi rst Defense Agency Director to inspect Northern Islands Signing of negotiation statement for sharing military technology with the U.S. based on the U.S. and Japan Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement (ASDF) First Japan–U.S. bilateral command post exercise (staged at Fuchu, through December 15) Kurihara appointed Minister of State for Defense|Dec. 27|Second Nakasone Cabinet established|Jan. 1 Mar. 23 Sep. 1 Oct. 9 Oct. 25|U.S. establishes new Unifi ed Combatant Command (Central Command) U.S. President Reagan announces Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) KAL airliner shot down by Soviet fi ghters near Sakhalin 19 ROK government offi cials, including cabinet ministers, killed in Burma by North Korean terrorists U.S. and six Caribbean nations send troops to Grenada| ----- |Year|Col2|Defense|Col4|Domestic|Col6|International| |---|---|---|---|---|---|---| |1984|Jun. 11 Oct. 16 Nov. 1|(MSDF) First Japan–U.S. bilateral command post exercise (staged at Yokosuka, through June 15) Defense Agency announces procedures, etc., of future Studies on Emergency Legislation in Studies on Legislation to Deal with Emergencies Kato appointed Minister of State for Defense|Nov. 1|Reshuffl ed second Nakasone Cabinet established|Jan. 1 May 23|Brunei gains independence from the U.K. (joins ASEAN on January 7) Kim Il-sung visits USSR (through May 26)| |1985|Apr. 2 Aug. 12 Sep. 18 Dec. 27|USAF begins to station F-16 fi ghters at Misawa JAL aircraft crashes, rescue team dispatched Mid-Term Defense Program approved by National Defense Council and Cabinet, National Defense Council decision to introduce Patriots, Cabinet agreement Detailed arrangements for the supply of military technologies to the U.S. concluded|Aug. 12 Dec. 28|Japan Airlines aircraft crashes Reshuffl ed second Nakasone Cabinet appointed (second term)|Mar. 12 Jun. 4 Nov. 19|U.S.–Soviet Union arms control talks begin China announces the reduction of one million personnel from the People’s Liberation Army U.S.–Soviet summit meeting, Joint Statement (Geneva, through November 21)| |1986|Feb. 24 Jul. 1 Jul. 22 Sep. 5 Oct. 27|First Japan–U.S. bilateral joint command post exercise (Hinoki-cho, headquarters of USFJ, etc., through February 28) Security Council Establishment Law enacted Kurihara appointed Minister of State for Defense Government approves the fi rst transfer of military technology to the U.S. First Japan–U.S. bilateral joint fi eld training exercise (eastern and southern part of Honshu island, etc., through October 31)|Apr. 9 Jul. 22 Aug. 15|Tokyo High Court rules on fi rst Atsugi Base noise suit Third Nakasone Cabinet established Japan, U.S., USSR open hotline operations|Apr. 26 Aug. 10 Sep. 22 Oct. 15|Accident at Chernobyl nuclear power plant in the Soviet Union U.S. announces suspension of its obligations to New Zealand under the ANZUS Treaty in treaty talks (San Francisco, through August 11) Conference on Disarmament in Europe (CDE) adopts fi nal documents (Stockholm) USSR announces partial withdrawal of its troops from Afghanistan| |1987|Jan. 24 Jan. 30 May 29 Oct. 21 Nov. 6 Dec. 18|Security Council of Japan and Cabinet agree on a program for the future build-up of defense capacity Special Measures Agreement concerning the cost sharing of the stationing of U.S. Forces in Japan signed (effective June 1) Director Kurihara fi rst incumbent Director to visit China (through June 4) Follow-on aircraft for F-1 study results decided and announced Kawara appointed Minister of State for Defense Security Council of Japan approves a study on the state of air defense on the high seas|May 27 Aug. 26 Oct. 6 Nov. 6|Metropolitan Police Department arrests two employees of Toshiba Machine Co., Ltd., in connection with unfair exports that breach the rules of the Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Strategic Export Controls (COCOM) to Communist areas Law Concerning the Dispatch of Japan Disaster Relief Teams enacted First Japan–U.S. Meeting on COCOM held (Tokyo, through October 7) Takeshita Cabinet established|Jul. 20 Nov. 29 Dec. 8|U.N. Security Council adopts Iran–Iraq Confl ict Cease Fire resolution (Number 598) KAL airliner blown up by North Korean terrorists over the Bay of Bengal INF Treaty signed| |1988|Mar. 2 Apr. 12 Jul. 23 Aug. 24 Sep. 20 Nov. 29|Revised protocol of the Special Measures Agreement concerning the cost sharing of the stationing of U.S. Forces in Japan signed (effective June 1) Signing of offi cial documents for the transfer of military technologies in certain areas of defense from the U.S. to Japan under the Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement between the two countries Submarine and civilian fi shing boat in collision (off Yokosuka) Tazawa appointed Minister of State for Defense First Japan-made T-4 medium trainer introduced Japanese and U.S. Governments sign memorandum and detailed arrangements relating to FS-X joint development|Mar. 13 Jun. 1 Dec. 27|Aomori–Hakodate Undersea Tunnel opens Supreme Court rules on an appeal against the enshrining of an SDF offi cer killed in an accident Reshuffl ed Takeshita Cabinet established|Mar. 14 May 29 Aug. 17 Aug. 20 Oct. 17 Dec. 7|Armed clashes between China and Vietnam in the waters around the Spratly Islands U.S.–Soviet Union summit talks (Moscow, through June 1, instruments of ratifi cation of INF Treaty exchanged) First joint verifi cation of an underground nuclear test carried out by U.S. and Soviet Union (Nevada) Ceasefi re agreement reached in Iran–Iraq War U.S. and Philippines sign negotiated agreement on revised Military Bases Agreement General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev delivers speech to the U.N. on the decommissioning of 500,000 Soviet troops| |1989|Mar. 30 Jun. 3 Aug. 10|New BADGE system begins operations Yamazaki appointed Minister of State for Defense Matsumoto appointed Minister of State for Defense|Jan. 7 Feb. 24 Mar. 15 Apr. 1 Jun. 3 Jun. 20 Jun. 22 Aug. 10|Emperor Showa dies Emperor Showa’s funeral Hachioji branch of the Tokyo District Court rules on the 3rd Yokota Air Base noise suit Consumption Tax Law enforced Uno Cabinet established Supreme Court rules on the Hyakuri Base suit Yokohama District Court decides on the Atsugi Air Facility suit to vacate the premises Kaifu Cabinet established|Feb. 15 Mar. 9 May 10 Jun. 4 Jun. 24 Sep. 26 Nov. 9 Dec. 2|Soviet Union completes the withdrawal of its forces from Afghanistan Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) started (Vienna) Confi dence and Security-Building Measures (CSBM) started (Vienna) START-I reopened at U.S.–Soviet foreign ministers conference, agreement achieved (Moscow, through May 11) Chinese martial law units fi re on demonstrators in Tiananmen Square in Beijing (2nd Tiananmen incident) Zhao Ziyang relieved of post as General Secretary of the Communist Party of China, and replaced by Jiang Zemin Vietnam completely withdraws from Cambodia GDR permits free departures to the West (virtual demolition of the Berlin Wall) U.S.–Soviet summit talks (Malta, through December 3)| |1990|Feb. 20 Feb. 28 Jun. 19 Jun. 21 Dec. 20 Dec. 29|Joint Military Technology Commission decides to provide “military technology related to FS-X” to U.S. Ishikawa appointed Minister of State for Defense Japan–U.S. Joint Committee confi rms moves to prepare necessary steps to return U.S. military facilities in Okinawa (23 items) Japan and the U.S. reach agreement in principle on the establishment of a ministerial conference on security Mid-Term Defense Program (FY1991–FY1995) approved by the National Security Council and the Cabinet Ikeda appointed Minister of State for Defense|Feb. 28 Mar. 3 May 29 Oct. 16 Nov. 10 Nov. 12 Nov. 23 Dec. 29|Reshuffl ed second Kaifu Cabinet established Japan–U.S. summit meeting (Kaifu, Bush (father) Palm Springs, through March 4) Naha District Court decides on administrative handling suit pertaining to Special Measures Law for USFJ Land Bill on Cooperation with United Nations Peacekeeping Operations submitted to Diet Bill on Cooperation with United Nations Peacekeeping Operations annulled Coronation of Emperor Great Thanksgiving Festival Reshuffl ed second Kaifu Cabinet formed|Feb. 13 Mar. 15 Aug. 2 Oct. 3 Oct. 24|U.S. and Soviet foreign ministers agree on upper limit of 195,000 U.S. and Soviet troops in Central Europe and 225,000 U.S. troops in Europe Gorbachev appointed fi rst president of USSR Iraq invades Kuwait G.H.W. Bush gives speech at Aspen German unifi cation USSR conducts underground nuclear tests in the Arctic| |1991|Jan. 25 Apr. 24 Apr. 26 Jun. 3 Sep. 26 Oct. 9|Cabinet approves ordinance on interim measures for the airlifting of Gulf Crisis refugees (promulgated and enacted on January 29, annulled April 19) Security Council and Cabinet decide on “Sending minesweepers to the Persian Gulf” Total of six MSDF vessels, including minesweepers, depart for the Persian Gulf Disaster relief dispatch with the eruption of Fugendake on Mount Unzen Aegis destroyer launching ceremony SDF personnel join U.N. teams carrying out inspections on Iraq chemical weapons for the fi rst time|Jan. 17 Jan. 24 Mar. 13 Sep.11 Nov. 5|Cabinet approves the establishment of the Gulf Crisis Countermeasures Headquarters Government pledges an additional U.S.$9 billion to efforts to restore peace in the Gulf region Kanazawa District Court rules on the fi rst and second trials for the lawsuit pertaining to noise generated by the Komatsu Air Base Miyazawa Cabinet established House of Representatives establishes the Committee on National Security|Jan. 17 Mar. 31 Apr. 11 Jul. 31 Sep. 6 Sep. 17 Nov. 26 Dec. 5 Dec. 8 Dec. 25|Coalition forces launch air attacks against Kuwait and Iraq, Operation Desert Storm WPO (Warsaw Pact structures) dismantled Gulf War formally ended U.S. and Soviet leaders sign START-I in Moscow Soviet State Council approves independence of three Baltic states U.N. General Assembly approves 7 member nations, including North and South Korea, and 3 Baltic nations Clark USAF Base formally returned to Philippines Ukrainian independence declared by Supreme Council of Ukrainian Republic CIS agreement signed by leaders of Russia, Belarus and Ukraine at summit (Brest, Belarus) Soviet President Gorbachev resigns| |1992|Apr. 1 Sep. 17 Sep. 19 Dec. 11 Dec. 18|Custody of government aircraft (B-747) transferred to the Defense Agency First female students enter National Defense Academy of Japan Departure commences of 1st Cambodia Dispatch Facilities Battalion (All units returned to Japan by September 26, 1993) Departure of Electoral Observer to Cambodia (Narita) Nakayama appointed Minister of State for Defense Modifi cation of the Mid-Term Defense Program (FY1991–FY1995) adopted by Security Council of Japan and Cabinet|Apr. 27 Jun. 19 Jun. 29 Aug. 10 Oct. 23 Dec. 11|Tokyo District Court rules on lawsuits pertaining to the surrender of land for Atsugi Air Base Announcement of “International Peace Cooperation Law” (enacted August 10), announcement and enactment of “Plan to Amend Law Concerning the Dispatch of Japan Disaster Relief Teams” Law Revising Part of the Law Concerning the Dispatch of International Disaster Relief Teams comes into force International Peace Cooperation Law comes into force Emperor and Empress visit China (through October 28) Inauguration of the Miyazawa Cabinet|Feb. 7 Feb. 25 May 22 May 23 May 25 Aug. 24 Sep. 30 Nov. 9 Nov. 24 Dec. 3 Dec. 16|Twelve EC countries sign the European Union Treaty (Maastricht Treaty) China promulgates and enacts Territorial Waters Act, designating the Senkaku Islands as an integral part of China North Korean soldiers invade the South Korean side of the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) and fi re guns START-I Treaty signed between the U.S. and four Soviet States including Russia IAEA offi cials make the fi rst designated inspection of North Korea’s nuclear facilities (through June 5) China and the ROK establish diplomatic relations U.S. returns Naval Base Subic Bay (Philippines) CFE Treaty becomes formally effective U.S. returns Air Station Cubi Point (Philippines) (withdrawal from Philippines complete) U.N. Security Council adopts resolution to allow military action by multinational forces in Somalia U.N. Security Council adopts resolution to deploy peacekeeping operations in Mozambique| ----- |Year|Col2|Defense|Col4|Domestic|Col6|International| |---|---|---|---|---|---|---| |1993|Mar. 25 May 11 May 14 Jun. 1 Jul. 12 Aug. 9 Oct. 13 Dec. 2|Aegis ship (Kongo) enters service Mozambique Dispatch Transport Coordination Unit begin departing for Mozambique (All units returned home by January 8, 1995) United Nations Operation in Mozambique headquarters staff depart for Mozambique Along with full operation of the private government plane (B-747), Special Air Transport Squadron newly established Disaster relief teams dispatched to Hokkaido in response to the earthquake off southwestern Hokkaido (through August 12) Nakanishi appointed Minister of State for Defense Japan–Russia agreement on prevention of marine accidents signed Aichi appointed Minister of State for Defense|Jan. 13 Apr. 8 May 4 Jun. 9 Aug. 9|Japan signs CWC Death of U.N. Volunteer (UNV) Atsuhito Nakata in Cambodia Death of Superintendent Haruyuki Takada, a civilian police offi cer in Cambodia Wedding ceremony of His Imperial Highness the Crown Prince Hosokawa Cabinet established|Jan. 3 Jan. 20 Mar. 12 May 4 May 29 Jun. 11 Aug. 4 Sep. 1 Sep. 13 Sep. 23 Nov. 1|U.S.–Russia summit (Moscow); START-II signed U.S. President Clinton assumes offi ce North Korea announces secession from NPT Multinational forces deployed to Somalia move to United Nations Operation in Somalia II (UNISOM II) North Korea conducts a ballistic missile test over the central Sea of Japan North Korea reserves the right to withdraw from the NPT in a joint statement issued during fi rst round of U.S.–North Korea consultations Signing of peace treaty in Rwandan civil war U.S. Department of Defense announces the Bottom Up Review Israel and PLO sign a declaration of the principles of provisional autonomy U.N. Security Council adopts resolution to establish the United Nations Mission in Haiti (UNMIH) Maastricht Treaty comes into effect; European Union established| |1994|Feb. 23 Feb. 25 Mar. 1 Mar. 23 Mar. 24 Apr. 28 Jun. 30 Nov. 9 Dec. 1 Dec. 20|“Advisory Group on Defense Issues” inaugurated under the Prime Minister Defense Agency’s “Defense Posture Review Board” inaugurated First Japan–China security dialogue (Beijing) First female aviation students join MSDF First female aviation students join ASDF Kanda appointed Minister of State for Defense Tamazawa appointed Minister of State for Defense First Japan-ROK working-level defense policy dialogue (Seoul) First Asia-Pacifi c Security Seminar (under the auspices of the National Institute for Defense Studies, through December 17) First visit to Japan by the ROK’s naval training vessel (Harumi, through December 23)|Apr. 28 Jun. 30|Hada Cabinet established Murayama Cabinet established|Jun. 8 Jul. 8 Jul. 25 Sep. 22 Oct. 21 Dec. 1 Dec. 5 Dec. 18|U.S. Department of Defense submits “Report on Activities and Programs for Countering Proliferation” pertaining to weapons of mass destruction such as nuclear weapons North Korean President Kim Il Sung dies First ASEAN Regional Forum (Bangkok) U.S. Department of Defense announces “Nuclear Posture Review” U.S.-North Korea talks, both sides sign “Framework Agreement” relating to support for North Korean light water reactors, and provision of substitute energy Commander of U.S.–ROK Combined Forces devolves operational control in peacetime to ROK forces START-I comes into force Russia starts military operations against Chechnya| |1995|Jan. 17 Mar. 20 May 19 Jun. 5 Aug. 8 Oct. 27 Nov. 28 Dec. 14|Disaster relief teams dispatched after the Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake (through April 27) SDF personnel dispatched teams to carry out rescue operations in the sarin gas attack on the Tokyo subway system (through March 23) Enactment of “Act on Special Measures Incidental to Reversion of Lands in Okinawa Prefecture Offered for Use by United States Forces in Japan” (effective June 20) The defense authorities of Japan and the ROK both issue the “letter concerning the prevention of accidents between aircraft of the Japan Self-defense Forces and military aircraft of the Republic of Korea” Eto appointed Minister of State for Defense Announcement of “Law Relating to the Treatment of Defense Agency Personnel Dispatched to International Organizations” (effective January 1, 1996) Security Council of Japan and Cabinet adopt National Defense Program Outline for the period from FY1996 Security Council of Japan adopts the Mid-Term Defense Program (FY1996–FY2000) (Cabinet Decision of December 15) Security Council of Japan makes decision “Regarding upgrading of Next-Generation Support Fighter” (December 15, Cabinet approval); Model of Next- Generation Support Fighter “F-2” decided|Aug. 8 Sep. 4 Sep. 15 Nov. 17 Nov. 19|Reshuffl ed Murayama Cabinet established Japanese schoolgirl assaulted by three U.S. soldiers based in Okinawa Ratifi cation of Chemical Weapons Convention Cabinet approves the establishment of a consultation forum to discuss issues relating to U.S. bases in Okinawa Prime Minister Murayama and U.S. Vice President Gore agree on the establishment of the Special Action Committee on Facilities and Areas in Okinawa (SACO)|Mar. 9 May 11 Jul. 11 Jul. 28 Aug. 1 Dec. 14 Dec. 15 Dec. 20|Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO) established NPT extended indefi nitely NATO, aerial bombing of Serbian forces Vietnam offi cially joins ASEAN 1st KEDO Meeting (Japan–U.S.–ROK) held (New York) Formal signing of the Bosnian Peace Agreement in Paris 10 Southeast Asian nations sign the South East Asia Non-Nuclear Zone Treaty at ASEAN summit meeting IFOR, consisting mainly of NATO troops, replaces UNPROFOR and formally commences operations| |1996|Jan. 11 Jan. 31 Apr. 15 Apr. 17 Jul. 26 Aug. 28 Oct. 29 Nov. 7 Dec. 13 Dec. 24|Usui appointed Minister of State for Defense SDF units dispatched to United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) Signing of Japan–U.S. Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement and its procedural arrangements (effective October 22) Japan–U.S. Joint Declaration on Security issued First visit to Russia by MSDF ships (Vladivostok, through July 30, Russian Navy’s 300th anniversary naval review) First visit by MSDF ships to ROK (Pusan, through September 6) First Forum for Defense Authorities in the Asia-Pacifi c Region (Tokyo, through October 31) Kyuma appointed Minister of State of Defense First Consultations Between Japanese and Russian Defense Authorities (Tokyo) Security Council and Cabinet decisions on responses to foreign submarines traveling underwater in Japanese territorial waters|Jan. 11 Apr. 12 Apr. 16 Jul. 20 Nov. 7 Dec. 2|Hashimoto Cabinet established Prime Minister Hashimoto meets U.S. Ambassador Mondale (agreement reached on the total return of Futenma Air Station, Okinawa, within fi ve to seven years after conditions are satisfi ed) Cabinet approves the promotion of solutions to issues relating to facilities and areas of U.S. forces in Okinawa Prefecture U.N. Treaty on the Law of the Seas goes into effect in Japan Second Hashimoto Cabinet established SACO fi nal report approved by Japan–U.S. Joint Security Council|Jan. 26 Mar. 8 Mar. 23 Jul. 12 Jul. 29 Sep. 10 Sep. 18 Sep. 26 Sep. 27 Oct. 3 Nov. 18|START-II ratifi ed by U.S. Senate China carries out three missile fi ring exercises in total, naval and air force live-fi re drills and, ground, naval and air force integrated exercises in the waters close to Taiwan March 8–25 Taiwan holds its fi rst direct presidential elections; Taiwan President Lee Teng-hui re-elected Inaugural meeting of Wassenaar Arrangement (Vienna) China conducts underground nuclear test (its 45th), then announces moratorium on nuclear testing U.N. General Assembly adopts the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) North Korean minisubmarine runs aground on the east coast of ROK, its crew intruding into ROK territory (clearing operation completed November 7) Hong Kong protest vessels (Baodiao) etc., intrude into Japan’s territorial waters around the Senkaku Islands Taliban gains control of the Afghan capital, Kabul, and declares the establishment of the provisional government Russia-Chechnya ceasefi re agreed Basic NATO agreement to keep a multinational stabilization force (SFOR) to succeed IFOR in Bosnia-Herzegovina| |1997|Jan. 2 Jan. 20 Jun. 9 Sep. 23 Dec. 19|Disaster dispatch for Russian Nakhodka Shipwreck and Oil Spill Disaster (through March 31) Establishment of Defense Intelligence Headquarters Self-Defense Offi cial (Director General of the Inspection Bureau) is dispatched to the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) (through June 2002) Guidelines for New Japan–U.S. defense cooperation approved by Security Consultative Committee (SCC) Review of the Mid-Term Defense Program (FY1996– FY2000) approved by the Security Council of Japan and the Cabinet|Jul. 3 Sep. 11 Dec. 3|The fi rst artillery live-fi re training by U.S. Marines stationed in Okinawa conducted on the mainland of Japan (at Kita Fuji, through July 9) Reshuffl ed second Hashimoto Cabinet established Japan signs Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Treaty Final Report of the Administrative Reform Committee|Apr. 29 May 12 Jul. 1 Jul. 16 Oct. 8 Nov. 10 Dec. 4|CWC enters into force Russia–Chechnya peace treaty signed Hong Kong reverts to China North Korean soldiers cross the Military Demarcation Line (MDL) and exchange fi re with ROK troops North Korean Workers’ Party Secretary Kim Jong II assumes the post of General Secretary China–Russia summit talks: China–Russian joint statement signed (Beijing), and demarcation of the China–Russian eastern border declared Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Treaty signing ceremony in Ottawa (121 nations)| |1998|Mar. 26 Apr. 28 Jun. 12 Jul. 29 Jul. 30 Aug. 31 Nov. 14 Nov. 15 Nov. 20 Dec. 25|Introduction of a system of SDF ready reserve personnel The signing of an agreement to revise the Japan–U.S. Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement Revision of the International Peace Cooperation Law promulgated and comes into force (the section concerning use of force enters into force July 12) Bilateral search and rescue exercise between MSDF/ ASDF and Russian Navy — the fi rst full-fl edged bilateral exercise between Japan and Russia Nukaga appointed Minister of State for Defense North Korea launches missile over and beyond Japanese airspace Departure of GSDF dispatch units to Honduras (operations in region November 18–December 1, return to Japan December 5) First joint exercise involving all three branches (a total of 2,400 personnel from the GSDF, MSDF and ASDF) (Iwo Jima) Norota appointed Minister of State for Defense Security Council approves Japan–U.S. Cooperative Research on Ballistic Missile Defense Technologies|May 12 Jun. 12 Jul. 30 Aug. 31 Sep. 1 Sep. 2 Sep. 24 Sep. 30 Oct. 21 Dec. 22|Fukuoka High Court Naha Branch, rules in the fi rst through third Kadena base noise suits Announcement and enactment of Basic Act on Central Government Reform Obuchi Cabinet established Government refuses to sign Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO) resolution on cost sharing after North Korean missile launch Temporary freezing of Japan–North Korea normalization talks Additional sanctions on North Korea (suspension of charter fl ights) implemented Japan–ROK Fisheries Agreement concluded (Takeshima Issue shelved) Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Treaty concluded KEDO signed Cabinet decision on the introduction of information gathering satellite Aha Training Area returned (the fi rst resolved issue of SACO)|May 11 May 28 Jun. 6 Jun. 22 Jul. 27 Dec. 17|India carries out underground nuclear tests (repeated May 13) Pakistan carries out underground nuclear tests (repeated May 30) U.N. Security Council, resolution adopted to condemn nuclear tests by India and Pakistan A North Korean submarine intrudes into the east coast of ROK, seized by ROK forces China publishes its fi rst comprehensive defense white paper, “Defense of China” U.S. and U.K. forces initiate Operation Desert Fox against Iraq as a punishment for refusal to cooperate with UNSCOM inspections (through December 20)| ----- |Year|Col2|Defense|Col4|Domestic|Col6|International| |---|---|---|---|---|---|---| |1999|Mar. 23 Mar. 29 May 24 May 28 Aug. 5 Aug. 16 Aug. 25 Sep. 23 Sep. 30 Oct. 5 Nov. 22 Dec. 27|Discovery of a suspicious ship off the Noto Peninsula (Maritime security operations ordered on March 24) GSDF establishes fi rst brigade Agreement between Japan and U.S. to amend the “Acquisition and Cross Servicing Agreement” (adding cooperation for operations to respond to situations in areas surrounding Japan) approved in Diet (effective September 25) Act Concerning the Measures for Peace and Safety of Japan in Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan promulgated (enters into force August 25), Act for Partial Revision of the Self-Defense Forces Act promulgated and enters into force First Bilateral Exercise of Search and Rescue Exercise between MSDF and ROK Navy (waters west of Kyushu) Signing of a memorandum on developing infrastructure for the development of exchange and dialogue between Japan’s and Russia’s Ministries of Defense (Moscow) Signing of the Memorandum of Understanding between the Governments of Japan and the U.S. on Japan–U.S. Cooperative Research on Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) The Law Concerning Measures to Ensure the Peace and Security of Japan in Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan comes into force SDF personnel dispatched to implement the transportation of necessary resources for international disaster relief operations in the Republic of Turkey (through November 22) Disaster dispatch for the accident at a uranium processing facility in Tokaimura (through October 3) Kawara appointed Minister of State for Defense SDF personnel dispatched to Indonesia for Timor-Leste Refugees Support (through February 8, 2000) Decision with the Japan Coast Guard on the “Joint Response Manual for Suspicious Ships”|Jan. 14 Mar. 1 Apr. 1 Jul. 23 Nov. 22 Dec. 27 Dec. 28|Reshuffl ed Obuchi Cabinet established Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Treaty enters into force in Japan Establishment of Committee for the Promotion of Information Gathering Satellites (Cabinet) Tokyo High Court judges in second Atsugi base noise suit Governor of Okinawa Prefecture declares the site proposed for the relocation of Futenma Air Station Mayor of Nago City, Okinawa Prefecture announces the acceptance of alternative facilities for Futenma Air Station Cabinet decision on Government Policy for the Relocation of Futenma Air Station|Mar. 1 Jun. 15 Sep. 2 Sep. 29 Dec. 17 Dec. 20|Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Treaty enters into force Shooting incident between North Korean Naval ships which had crossed the Northern Limit Line and South Korean Naval ships North Korea announces the invalidation of the Northern Limit Line in the Yellow Sea and the establishment of a new military demarcation line on the sea Russian military unit advances into the Republic of Chechnya U.N. Security Council adopts a comprehensive resolution relating to the Iraq issue and establishes UNMOVIC in place of UNSCOM Rule over Macao transferred to China| |2000|Jan. 17 Apr. 1 May 8 Jun. 16 Jul. 4 Sep. 13 Dec. 5 Dec. 15|Anti-personnel mine disposal begins Enactment of the “Self-Defense Forces Personnel Ethics Act” Defense Agency moves to the Ichigaya building The Special Law for Nuclear Emergency Preparedness (Establishment of nuclear disaster relief dispatch) comes into force Torashima appointed Minister of State for Defense SDF personnel dispatched to dispose of Abandoned Chemical Weapons (ACW) in China Saito appointed Minister of State for Defense Security Council of Japan and the Cabinet adopts the Mid-Term Defense Program (FY2001–FY2005)|Feb. 16 Apr. 5 Jul. 4 Jul. 21 Aug. 25 Nov. 20 Dec. 5|First assembly of the Research Commissions on the Constitution in the Upper House (Lower House on February 17) Mori Cabinet established Second Mori Cabinet established Kyushu-Okinawa Summit (through July 23) Replacement Facilities Council on the Relocation of Futenma Air Station established The 22nd Japanese Communist Party Convention decides to accept the SDF Reshuffl ed second Mori Cabinet established|Apr. 14 May 7 Jul. 21 Oct. 12|Russian Duma ratifi es the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty II (START-II) Russian Acting President Putin offi cially assumes duties as President U.S.–Russia summit meeting held, Cooperation on Strategic Stability announced U.S. and North Korea announce U.S.–North Korea Joint Communique Terrorist attack on the U.S.S Cole, an American destroyer, in Yemen| |2001|Feb. 5 Feb. 9 Mar. 1 Apr. 26 Aug. 8 Sep. 21 Oct. 6 Nov. 2 Nov. 25|SDF units dispatched to India for International Disaster Relief Operation (through February 11), following the major earthquake which hit western India on January 26 Personnel dispatched to UNMOVIC (through March, 2005) The Ship Inspection Operations Law comes into effect Nakatani appointed Minister of State for Defense Disaster dispatch for submarine rescue ship Chihaya to cooperate in raising the Ehime Maru (returned December 16) First Meeting of the Committee to Consider the Modality of National Defense International peace cooperation for the relief of Afghan refugees (through October 12) Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law and Law to Amend the Self-Defense Forces Law are promulgated and enforced (strengthening penalties to ensure secrecy is separately enforced on November 1, 2002) Based on the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law, an MSDF supply vessel, minesweeper tender, and destroyers depart for cooperation and support activities|Feb. 10 Mar. 7 Apr. 1 Apr. 26 Sep. 19 Oct. 8 Oct. 29 Nov. 16 Dec. 22|Collision between Ehime Maru and U.S. submarine Former Maritime Self-Defense offi cial is given a jail sentence for providing confi dential documents to offi cer of the Russian Embassy Information Disclosure Act (IDA) comes into force Koizumi Cabinet established Prime Minister Koizumi announces immediate measures in response to the September 11th terrorist attacks in the U.S. Government of Japan establishes the Emergency Anti-Terrorism Headquarters and decides upon Emergency Response Measures at the fi rst meeting Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law and other measures passed in the House of Councilors plenary session A Cabinet decision is made for a basic plan based on the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law Suspicious boat incident in waters southwest of Kyushu|Apr. 1 May 14 Jun. 15 Sep. 11 Sep. 12 Oct. 1 Oct. 2 Oct. 7 Nov. 27 Dec. 5 Dec. 20 Dec. 22 Dec. 29|Collision between U.S. and Chinese military planes Diplomatic relations established between North Korea and EU Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) established Terrorist attacks in the U.S. occur U.N. Security Council passes resolution condemning the terrorist attacks U.S. announces Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) In response to the September 11th terrorist attacks in the U.S., NATO invokes Article 5 (on collective self-defense) of the North Atlantic Treaty U.S. and U.K. forces begin attacks in Afghanistan (October 19, U.S. Forces sends special operation forces, fi rst ground fi ghting) Exchange of fi re in the Korean demilitarized zone (DMZ) U.S. and Russia complete implementation of START-I U.N. Security Council adopts a resolution establishing an International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) Afghanistan Interim Authority formed, with Hamid Karzai serving as Chairman Russia withdraws troops from its base in Cuba| |2002|Mar. 2 Mar. 27 Apr. 22 Sep. 30 Oct. 1 Nov. 1 Nov. 18 Dec. 2 Dec. 16|680 SDF personnel dispatched on the First Dispatch Engineering Group to Timor-Leste (through June 25, 2004) Introduction of Candidates for SDF Reserve Personnel System 2nd Western Pacifi c Submarine Rescue Exercise held (the fi rst multilateral exercise organized by Japan, through May 2) Ishiba appointed Minister of State for Defense Personnel deployed to the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) (Head of Operations and Planning Branch) (through July 6) Introduction of stricter penalties in order to protect classifi ed information (defense secrets) First SDF and police authority hold joint command post exercise in Hokkaido SDF personnel dispatched for the fi rst time to the U.N. Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UNDPKO) Kirishima, vessel equipped with Aegis air defense systems, departs the port of Yokosuka, according to revision (Dec. 5) in Implementation Plan based on the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law|Feb. 15 Jul. 29 Sep. 17 Sep. 30 Oct. 13 Oct. 15|Cabinet decision on international cooperation execution plan for Timor-Leste Basic Plan of the Futenma Replacement Facility agreed Japan–North Korea Summit held Kim Jong- Il, the North Korean President, admits and apologizes for abductions Reshuffl ed Koizumi Cabinet established First International Fleet Review in Japan (Tokyo Bay) Five of those abducted return to Japan|Jan. 29 May 4 May 20 May 24 Jun. 13 Jun. 29 Jul. 16 Sep. 20 Oct. 16 Nov. 14 Nov. 21 Dec. 12 Dec. 17|U.S. President Bush depicts “Axis of Evil” in the State of the Union Address Russian Army returns Cam Ranh Naval Base to Vietnam Independence of Timor-Leste The United Nations Transitional Administration in Timor-Leste (UNTAET) switches to the United Nations Mission Support in Timor-Leste (UNMISET) Signing of Treaty Between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Strategic Offensive Reductions U.S. withdraws from the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty Exchanges of fi re between ROK patrol boats and North Korean patrol boats which crossed the NLL U.S. government issues the “National Security Strategy” U.S. Government announces the National Security Strategy U.S. Government announces that North Korea admitted the fact that they had a uranium enrichment plan for nuclear weapons during Assistant Secretary of State Kerry’s visit KEDO Executive Board decides to freeze provision of heavy oil to North Korea from December NATO Summit decides new membership for seven countries in Central and Eastern Europe, announces the Prague Declaration, and agrees to establish its high-readiness unit North Korea announces it will resume operation and establishment of nuclear-related facilities U.S. announces deployment of a missile defense system| ----- |Year|Col2|Defense|Col4|Domestic|Col6|International| |---|---|---|---|---|---|---| |2003|Feb. 8 Mar. 27 Mar. 30 Apr. 21 Jul. 17 Sep. 11 Oct. 10 Nov. 3 Nov. 15 Dec. 19 Dec. 26 Dec. 30|Disposal of antipersonnel landmines complete (with some exceptions) Act for Partial Revision of the Defense Agency Establishment Act, etc. (changes in SDF personnel quota and number of Ready Reserve personnel) enters into force International peace cooperation activities are conducted for relief of Iraqi refugees (Airborne unit for Iraqi refugee relief returns to Japan on April 2) ASDF in-fl ight refueling training (through May 1) International peace cooperation activities are conducted for relief of affected people in Iraq (Airborne unit for relief of affected people in Iraq returns to Japan August 18) Ceremony to celebrate the completion of the Memorial Zone Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law remains in force for another two years Former SDF offi cials decorated for their engagement in dangerous activities SDF special research group dispatched to Iraq Government decides to introduce ballistic missile defense system (Security Council of Japan and Cabinet meeting) ASDF advance team leaves for Kuwait Relief materials transported by air in response to great earthquake in Iran under the Law concerning the Dispatch of Japan Disaster Relief Teams (January 1–2, 2004)|Jan. 28 Jun. 6 Jun. 13 Jul. 4 Jul. 26 Jul. 29 Sep. 14 Sep. 22 Sep. 30 Oct. 7 Nov. 19 Nov. 29|Establishment of Consultative Body on Construction of Futenma Replacement Facility concerning Futenma Air Station Replacement Three Armed Attack Situation Response related laws are passed at the Upper House plenary session and enacted Cabinet decision on the Bill Concerning the Special Measures on Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance in Iraq Cabinet approval for “Implementation Plan for International Peace Cooperation Assignment for Iraqi Affl icted Persons” Law concerning Special Measures on Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance in Iraq passed the House of Councilors plenary session Cabinet decision on changes to the implementation plan of the International Peace Cooperation Operations in the Golan Heights Government survey mission dispatched to Middle East countries, including Iraq Reshuffl ed Koizumi Cabinet appointed (second term) Cabinet decides to newly establish, in its decoration system, an award for people engaged in dangerous activities Joint communique signed for the fi rst time at Japan–China–ROK Summit meeting Second Koizumi Cabinet established Ambassador Oku and First Secretary Inoue shot to death in the central region of Iraq|Jan. 10 Jan. 24 Mar. 14 Mar. 20 May 1 May 31 Jun. 1 Aug. 27 Sep. 12 Oct. 15 Dec. 4 Dec. 13 Dec. 18 Dec. 19|North Korea announces it is leaving the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) U.S. Department of Homeland Security established President George W. Bush announces the lifting of economic sanctions against Pakistan U.S. and U.K. forces begin military operations in Iraq President Bush declares termination of major military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) proposed by U.S. President for the fi rst time U.S.–Russia leaders talk, enforcement of Treaty Between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Strategic Offensive Reductions First Round of the Six-Party Talks held (Beijing, through August 29) First joint exercise of PSI held in the Coral Sea northeast of Australia (through September 14) China launches its fi rst manned spacecraft Shenzhou 5 Australia decides to participate in missile defense program U.S. forces capture former President Hussein in Iraq Iran signs IAEA agreement Libya announces abandonment of weapons of mass destruction program| |2004|Jan. 22 Feb. 3 Feb. 9 Mar. 4 Mar. 26 Apr. 15 Oct. 25 Nov. 7 Nov. 10 Dec. 10 Dec. 28|ASDF main contingent leaves for Kuwait Departure of fi rst SDF contingent for Iraqi humanitarian and reconstruction support activities MSDF unit for marine transport leaves for Kuwait (return on April 8) Dispatch of disaster relief units in response to detection of bird fl u (Tanbacho, Kyoto Prefecture, through March 11) Diet decides on installation of ballistic missile defense system (FY2004 draft budget voted on and passed at the plenary session of the House of Councillors) First transport of Japanese nationals living overseas implemented, 10 nationals transported from Iraq to Kuwait PSI exercise for maritime interdiction operation hosted by Japan for the fi rst time (in the offi ng of Sagami Bay and in Yokosuka Harbor, through October 27) Defense Agency/SDF 50th anniversary commemorative troop review Intrusion of submerged Chinese nuclear powered submarine into Japan’s territorial waters–Maritime security operations order issued (through November 12) “National Defense Program Guidelines, FY2005” and “Mid-Term Defense Program for FY2005–FY2009” adopted by the Security Council and the Cabinet MSDF ships dispatched to the offi ng of Thailand’s Phuket Island to engage in the international disaster relief activities for Indonesia’s Sumatra earthquake and Indian Ocean tsunami disaster (through January 1, 2005)|Feb. 9 May 22 Jun. 14 Jun. 18 Aug. 13 Sep. 27|Implementation of Iraq-related response measures approved in Diet Japan–North Korea Summit held (Pyongyang). Five family members of abductees return to Japan Seven bills on legislation concerning contingency response measures passed in Upper House plenary session and conclusion of three treaties approved Special Measures Law for the Embargo on Specifi c Ships passed Cabinet agreement for SDF’s activities in Iraq for humanitarian and reconstruction assistance after reestablishment of Iraq sovereignty (joining multinational forces) U.S. helicopter crash at the university campus in Ginowan City, Okinawa 2nd Koizumi reshuffl ed Cabinet formed|Jan. 12 Feb. 25 Mar. 22 Apr. 28 May 20 Jun. 1 Jun. 23 Jun. 28 Jul. 20 Sep. 10 Oct. 6 Oct. 29 Nov. 16 Dec. 26 Dec. 27|Japan and India release Next Steps in Strategic Partnership (NSSP) statement Second Round of the Six-Party Talks held (Beijing, through February 29) EU General Affairs Council agrees upon development of the structure and organization of EU rapid response capabilities UNSC unanimously adopts Resolution 1540 calling for the nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction United Nations Mission of Support to East Timor (UNMISET) transfers defense and security authority to Timor-Leste Interim Iraqi Government inaugurated (sovereignty transferred on June 28), and Iraqi Governing Council dissolved UNSC unanimously adopts Resolution 1546 on reconstruction of Iraq Third Round of the Six-Party Talks held (Beijing, through June 26) Transfer of sovereignty to the Iraqi Interim Government In the Straits of Malacca and Singapore, patrols commenced by the navies of three countries, Indonesia, Singapore and Malaysia FPDA (Five Power Defence Arrangements) conducts the fi rst antimaritime terrorism exercise in the South China Sea (-September 25) The U.S. and ROK announce a plan of three stage reduction of 12,500 U.S. forces stationed in the ROK by 2008 EU leaders sign the EU Constitution Chinese Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs expresses regret over its nuclear submarine’s intrusion into Japan’s territorial waters Sumatra earthquake and Indian Ocean tsunami disaster China releases a white paper, “China’s National Defense in 2004”| |2005|Jan. 4 Feb. 19 Apr. 25 May 2 Aug. 5 Oct. 12 Oct. 20 Oct. 29 Oct. 31 Dec. 1 Dec. 24|SDF units dispatched to Indonesia to engage in the international emergency assistance in response to the major earthquake off the coast of Sumatra and tsunami in the Indian Ocean (All units returned home by March 23) Japan–U.S. Security Consultative Committee (“2+2,” Washington) — common strategic objectives confi rmed Dispatch of SDF units in response to railroad accident on JR West’s Fukuchiyama Line SDF offi cially takes part for the fi rst time in the multilateral joint exercise “Cobra Gold 05” conducted in Chiang Mai Thailand (through May 13) Dispatch of an MSDF vessel to conduct international disaster relief activity in Connection with the accident of a small submarine of the Russian Navy off Kamchatka (All units returned home by August 10) Dispatch of Japan Disaster Relief Team for international emergency assistance activities in response to large- scale earthquake in Pakistan, etc. (All units returned home by December 2) GSDF and Hokkaido Prefectural Police conduct joint fi eld training against terrorist attacks for the fi rst time Japan–U.S. Security Consultative Committee (“2+2,” Washington) joint announces “Japan–U.S. Alliance: Transformation and Realignment for the Future” Nukaga appointed Minister of State for Defense Partial revision of the Act on Remuneration of Defense Agency Personnel (revised remuneration) enters into force The Security Council and the Cabinet approve “Japan– U.S. Joint Development of Interceptor Missiles Having Improved Capability of Ballistic Missile Defense”|Jan. 19 Mar. 14 Mar. 16 Mar. 25 Jul. 14 Sep. 21 Oct. 31 Nov. 11 Nov. 27|The Japanese Government newly formulates measures to cope with intrusion of the submerged submarines in Japan’s territorial waters A Japanese boat attacked in the Straits of Malacca, and three crew abducted (Released on March 20) Shimane Prefecture establishes “Takeshima Day” Cabinet decision made on Basic Guidelines for the Protection of Civilians Minister of Economy, Trade and Industry announces permission granted to Teikoku Oil for trial drilling in the East China Sea Third Koizumi Cabinet established Reshuffl ed third Koizumi Cabinet established Partial amendment of the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law comes into force (validity is extended for one year) The Cabinet approves “the government’s actions to be taken for the time being in connection with the matters approved at the Japan–U.S. Security Consultation Committee held on October 29, 2005” Field training under the Civil Protection Law takes place for the fi rst time in Fukui Prefecture|Feb. 10 Mar. 8 Mar. 14 Sep. 9 Sep. 19 Nov. 9 Nov. 16 Dec. 14 Dec. 16|North Korean Foreign Ministry releases a statement implying its manufacture of nuclear weapons (May 11, announces the unloading of 8,000 spent nuclear fuel rods) “ROK’s government protest over Asahi Shimbun aircraft approaching Takeshima without authorization” National People’s Congress adopts “Anti-Secession Law” First China-Russia joint military exercises “Peace Mission 2005” (through August 25) Five destroyers of the Chinese Navy, including Sovremenny Class,are navigating in the sea area surrounding “Kashi” gas fi eld near the median line between Japan and China in the East China Sea Joint statement adopted at Fourth Round of Six-Party Talks First session of the Fifth Round of the Six-Party Talks held (Beijing,through November 11)” India and Pakistan complete the opening of fi ve areas on the effective control line in Kashmir to enable disaster rescue activities for the sufferers from the great earthquake in Pakistan etc. The fi rst East Asia Summit is held (Kuala Lumpur) U.N. General Assembly adopts resolution criticizing the human rights situation in North Korea| ----- |Year|Col2|Defense|Col4|Domestic|Col6|International| |---|---|---|---|---|---|---| |2006|Mar. 27 Apr. 23 May 1 May 29 Jun. 1 Jul. 31 Sep. 26|Partial amendment (measures for destructing ballistic missiles etc., establishment of Joint Staff Offi ce, etc.) of the Defense Agency Establishment Law is enacted. With the creation of the Joint Staff Offi ce, the SDF establishes a joint operations posture Japan and the United States agree to the sharing of expenses of relocation of U.S. Marine Corps in Okinawa to Guam as part of realignment of USFJ The Japan–U.S. Security Consultative Committee (“2+2,” Washington) announces the “United States– Japan Roadmap for Realignment Implementation” First P-3C visit to Australia Dispatch of SDF units to Indonesia to conduct international disaster relief activity for damages from the earthquake that occurred in central Java (through June 22) Partial enforcement of the Law for Partial Amendment of the Defense Agency Establishment Law (inc. reinforcement of facilities administration function of the agency, establishment of the Equipment headquarters and reorganization of the Prefecture Liaison Offi ces into the Provincial Cooperation Offi ces) Kyuma appointed Minister of State for Defense|Feb. 4 Mar. 6 May 11 Jun. 20 Jun. 29 Jul. 19 Aug. 16 Aug. 29 Sep. 26 Oct. 13|Japan–North Korea negotiations concerning abduction issue, normalization of diplomatic relations and nuclear/missile issues are held (through February 6) At the Japan–China intergovernmental conference, China makes a proposal of joint development of gas fi eld in East China Sea (through March 7) The Governor of Okinawa Prefecture and Minister of State for Defense sign a basic agreement on the realignment of USFJ The Government makes a decision to discontinue the activities of the GSDF contingent dispatched to Iraq. ASDF units continue to support the United Nations and the multinational forces Japan-U.S. Summit Meeting, joint document “The Japan-U.S. Alliance of the New Century” announced Decision made to transfer weapons and their technologies to the U.S. to jointly develop a Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) system, and the memorandum concluded with the U.S. A Russian patrol boat fi res on a Japanese fi shing boat, killing one of its crew members. The Government fi les a strong protest to Russia U.S. Navy, deploys Aegis ships equipped with SM-3 at Yokosuka naval facility The Council Meeting on Measures for Relocation of Futenma Air Station established, and its fi rst meeting held Abe Cabinet established Sanctions implemented against North Korea, which announced that it had conducted a nuclear weapon test|Jan. 10 Feb. 3 Mar. 16 May 5 May 15 May 27 Jun. 16 Jun. 19 Jul. 5 Sep. 20 Oct. 9 Dec. 19 Dec. 30|Iran begins an uranium enrichment experiment The United States issues the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) The United States announces the National Security Strategy Peace agreement between Sudanese government and certain rebel forces in Darfur Confl ict U.S. rescinds designation of Libya as a state sponsor of terrorism Large-scale earthquake takes place in the middle part of Java, Indonesia Nepalese government and Maoists sign peace accord Iraqi Prime Minister Maliki announces that the authority to maintain public order in the province of Muthannna is transferred from the multilateral forces to Iraq North Korea launches a total of seven ballistic missiles into the Sea of Japan Chinese Navy performs joint search and rescue exercises with U.S. Navy (sea around San Diego) North Korea conducts an underground nuclear test UN General Assembly, resolution adopted criticizing abduction of foreign citizens by North Korea Former Iraqi President Hussein execution Reference| |2007|Jan. 9 Mar. 5 Mar. 23 Mar. 28 Mar. 30 Apr. 11 Apr. 16 May 1 May 18 Jun. 1 Jun. 2 Jun. 6 Jul. 4 Aug. 27 Sep. 1 Sep. 26 Oct. 17 Nov. 1 Nov. 28 Dec. 18|Enforcement of the Law for Partial Amendment of the Defense Agency Establishment Law (reorganization of the Defence Agency into the Ministry of Defence and stipulation of the SDF’S international peace cooperation activities as its primary mission) First Aviation Training Relocation associated with realignment of the U.S. Forces in Japan (Tsuiki, through March 8) Emergency response procedures to destroy ballistic missiles prepared Establishment of the Central Readiness Force A Patriot PAC-3 system is deployed at the ASDF Iruma Base SDF personnel dispatched for the United Nations Mission in Nepal (UNMIN) as military observers (through January 18, 2011) First Japan-India Vice-Ministerial level talks on defense policy Japan–U.S.–India naval drill conducted for the fi rst time Japan–U.S. Security Consultative Committee (“2+2,” Washington) announces the joint statement “Alliance Transformation: Advancing United States–Japan Security and Defense Cooperation” ASDF controllers positioned at the Yokota RAPCON facility Partial amendment (abolition of the Defense Facilities Administration Agency and its consolidation into the Ministry of Defense, establishment of the Inspector General’s Offi ce of Legal Compliance and the Local Defense Bureau, joint units of GSDF, MSDF and ASDF, etc) of the Ministry of Defense Establishment Law and the Self-Defense Forces Law enacted Japan–U.S.–Australia Defense Ministers’ Meeting held for the fi rst time (Minister of Defense Kyuma, U.S. Secretary of Defense Gates, and Minister of Defense Nelson, in Singapore) Japan–Australia Joint Foreign and Defense Ministerial Consultations held for the fi rst time (“2+2,” Tokyo) Koike appointed Minister of State for Defense Koumura appointed Minister of State for Defense Local Cooperation Bureau, Equipment and Facilities Headquarters, Inspector General’s Offi ce of Legal Compliance, and Local Defense Bureau created Ishiba appointed Minister of State for Defense First Japan–U.S.–Australia trilateral exercises (MSDF, U.S. Navy and the Royal Australian Air Force) Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law expires Order issued on termination of response measures based on Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law Chinese naval vessel visits Japan for the fi rst time (through December 1) Review of USFJ Local Employee Wages (Abolishment of USFJ Differential, etc.) Aegis vessel MSDF Kongo conducts a successful test on counter-missile by ballistic missile|Mar. 13 Apr. 16 Jul. 20 Aug. 7 Aug. 10 Aug. 27 Aug. 29 Sep. 26 Nov. 16 Dec. 13 Dec. 19 Dec. 24|Australian Prime Minister Howard visits Japan, and the Japan–Australia Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation signed Nagoya District Court, Kanazawa Branch, rules on the third and fourth trials for the lawsuit pertaining to noise generated by the Komatsu Air Base Enactment of the “Basic Act on Ocean Policy” Minister for Foreign Affairs Aso and U.S. Ambassador Schieffer sign the General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA) Conclusion of the General Security of Military Information Agreement between the Government of Japan and the Government of the United States (GSOMIA) Reshuffl ed Abe Cabinet established Enactment of the USFJ Realignment Special Measures Law Fukuda Cabinet established Council for MOD Reform established Russia seizes four Japanese fi shing vessels off Kunashiri Island Front headquarters of 1st Corps headquarters of U.S. forces formed at USFJ Camp Zama in line with the USFJ realignment Cabinet decisions on “Improvement of next fi xed- wing aircraft,” “Important issues among contents of Defense Capability Buildup in FY2008,” “Changes of emergent response measures on destruction measures by ballistic missiles”|Jan. 12 Jan. 23 Feb. 13 May 28 May 29 Jun. 28 Jul. 14 Jul. 31 Sep. 27 Out. 3 Nov. 21|China conducts an anti-satellite test U.N. Security Council decides to set up the U.N. Mission in Nepal (UNMIN) to oversee disarmament in Nepal North Korea agrees to disable all of its nuclear facilities during the Six-Party Talks U.S and Iran begin offi cial talks for the fi rst time in 27 years (ambassador- level) Russia announces that it succeeded in launching a new intercontinental ballistic missile Russia succeeds in the experimental launch of new submarinelaunched ballistic missile (SLBM), Bulava. Russian President Putin signs presidential order on the termination of the execution of the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) The U.N. Security Council adopts Resolution 1769 on the dispatch of the U.N./AU Joint PKO Unit (UNMID) to the Darfur region in Sudan Second session of the Sixth Round of the Sixth Six-Party Talks held (Beijing) (through September 30) (October 3, Sixth Six-Party Talks Agreement “Second-Phase Actions for the Implementation of the Joint Statement” published) The Six-Party Talks Joint Statement, the “Second-Phase Actions for the Implementation of the Joint Statement,” is announced The USS Kitty Hawk is denied docking in Hong Kong and returns to Yokosuka via the Taiwan Strait (through November 25)| ----- |Year|Col2|Defense|Col4|Domestic|Col6|International| |---|---|---|---|---|---|---| |2008|Jan. 16 Jan. 25 Feb. 19 Feb. 21 Mar. 26 Jun. 24 Aug. 2 Aug. 29 Sep. 24 Sep. 25 Oct. 24 Dec. 20 Dec.23|Enactment of the Replenishment Support Special Measures Law (units depart for Indian Ocean on January 24, 25) New Special Measures Agreement concerning the Cost Sharing on the Stationing of U.S. forces in Japan signed Collision between Aegis vessel MSDF and fi shing boat Based on the Replenishment Support Special Measures Law, MSDF replenishment ships resume refueling U.S. ships in the Indian Ocean (through January 15, 2010) Enforcement of the Law for Partial Amendment of the Ministry of Defence Establishment Law (inc. reorganization of the SDF Command and Communication Unit) First visit of MSDF vessel to China (through June 28) Hayashi appointed Minister of Defense TRDI receives prototype of next-generation fi xed-wing patrol aircraft XP-1 no. 1 Hamada appointed Minister of Defense Commissioning of the nuclear-powered aircraft carrier USS George Washington SDF personnel dispatched to United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) (through September 30, 2011) Review of the Mid-Term Defense Program (FY2005– FY2009) adopted by Security Council of Japan and Cabinet ASDF Airlift Wing that was deployed under the Law Concerning Special Measures on Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance in Iraq returns to Japan|Mar. 18 Jun. 18 Jul. 7 Jul. 15 Aug. 2 Sep. 24 Oct. 22 Dec. 3|Cabinet approval for the “Basic Plan on Ocean Policy” Agreement reached between the Government of Japan and Government of China on the joint development of natural gas in the East China Sea G8 Hokkaido Toyako Summit (through Jul. 9) Report by the Council for Reforming the Ministry of Defense released Reshuffl ed Fukuda Cabinet established Aso Cabinet established Japan–India Summit Meeting: Japan–India Joint Statement on the Advancement of the Strategic and Global Partnership, and Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation signed Convention on Cluster Munitions signed|Feb. 20 Mar. 14 Apr. 24 May 12 May 30 Jun. 26 Jul. 12 Aug. 8 Aug. 10 Sep. 9 Sep. 25 Oct. 3 Oct. 10 Oct. 19 Nov. 2 Dec. 2 Dec. 26|U.S. Navy Aegis ship succeeds in shooting down out-of-control satellite outside the earth’s atmosphere with an SM-3 Demonstration by Buddhist monks in the regional capital of Lhasa in the Tibet Autonomous Region, China Announcement by U.S. Government that North Korea assisted with the construction by Syria of nuclear facilities destroyed in an air attack M7.8 earthquake occurs in Sichuan Province, China The Convention on Cluster Munitions is adopted at an international conference in Dublin North Korea submits its nuclear program Publication of the Press Communique of the Heads of Delegation Meeting of the Sixth Round of the Six-Party Talks Russian Armed Forces intervene in military clashes between Georgian and South Ossetian forces Armed groups attack public security facilities in Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, China U.S. President Bush announces reduction of U.S. troops stationed in Iraq and increase of troops in Afghanistan China launches a manned spacecraft “Shenzhou 7,” and conducts successful extravehicular activity for the fi rst time U.S. Department of Defense informs Congress of sale of PAC-3s, AH-64Ds, attack helicopters, etc., to Taiwan U.S. removes North Korea from its list of state sponsors of terrorism Four Chinese naval warships including a destroyer passed through the Tsugaru Strait for the fi rst time Four Chinese naval vessels sail through waters between the Okinawa main island and the Miyako Island to the Pacifi c Ocean for the fi rst time U.N. Security Council adopts resolution 1846 on countering piracy off the coast of Somalia Chinese naval fl eet of three destroyers sets off to Somalia for escort mission| |2009|Jan. 8 Jan. 15 Feb. 10 Mar. 13 Mar. 17 Mar. 27 Apr. 6 May 15 May 30 Jun. 11 Jul. 24 Aug. 1 Sep. 16 Oct. 5 Oct. 20 Oct. 27 Nov. 23 Dec. 17|ASDF deploys F-15s to Okinawa (Hyakuri) Ministry of Defense decides on “Basic Policy Relating to the Development and Use of Space” Order issued relating to the conclusion of withdrawal duties for the Iraq Reconstruction Support Group by the redeployment group SDF mobilization order issued for maritime security operations as part of anti-piracy measures off the Coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden The First Meeting of Senior Defense Offi cials on Common Security Challenges in the Asia-Pacifi c Region SDF mobilization order for implementation of destruction measures for ballistic missiles and other weapons Order issued to SDF for termination of destruction of ballistic missiles, and other objects Order issued for P-3Cs to be dispatched to Djibouti international airport First Japan–U.S.–ROK Defense Ministers’ Meeting (Hamada, Gates, Lee, in Singapore) Commencement of warning and surveillance fl ights in the Gulf of Aden by P-3Cs Anti-Piracy Measures Law enacted Order issued for anti-piracy operations Partial enforcement of the Law for Partial Amendment of the Ministry of Defense Establishment Law (inc. establishment of the Defense Council and the Special Advisors to the Minister of Defense, and abolition of the Defense Councilors System) Defense Minister Kitazawa assumes offi ce SDF units dispatched to aid international disaster relief activities after the Padang earthquake in Indonesia (though October 17) 1st Ministry of Defense Policy Meeting Destroyer Kurama collides with ROK cargo ship Carina Star in the Kammon Straits Deployment Surface Force for Counter Piracy Enforcement (DSPE) receives the IMO Award for Exceptional Bravery at Sea Security Council and Cabinet approve the document on the building up of defense capability for FY2010|Jan. 27 Feb. 17 Mar. 13 Apr. 3 May 19 Jun. 2 Jul. 14 Jul. 17 Sep. 16 Nov. 11 Nov. 12 Dec. 3|Japanese fi shing boat No. 38 Yoshimaru caught by Russian Coast Guard in Sea of Japan Signing of the “Agreement on the Relocation of USMC in Okinawa to Guam” Cabinet approval for Anti-Piracy Measures Law Foreign Minister Nakasone signs Status of Forces Agreement with Djibouti “Agreement on the Relocation of USMC in Okinawa to Guam” comes into force Basic Plan for Space Policy formulated Ratifi cation of Convention on Cluster Munitions Announcement of Law Concerning the Prohibition of Manufacture of Cluster Munitions and Regulation of their Possession Hatoyama Cabinet established Government Revitalization Unit “project screening” (through November 27) Celebration of the 20th Anniversary of the Emperor of Japan’s coronation Tokyo High Court rejects appeal by MSDF Lieutenant Commander in Aegis information leakage case (appeal to Supreme Court)|Jan. 31 Feb. 17 Mar. 6 Apr. 5 Apr. 11 May 4 May 25 Jun. 16 Jul. 4 Jul. 28 Jul. 31 Sep. 17 Sep. 30 Oct. 1 Nov. 10 Dec. 1 Dec. 5|Provisional government in Somalia, Ahmed elected as new president U.S. President Obama decides to increase the number of troops dispatched to Afghanistan by approximately 17,000 U.S.–Russia Foreign Ministers’ Meeting, agreement to “reset” bilateral relations (Geneva) North Korea launches a missile which fl ies over the territory of Japan President Obama speech in Prague Cancellation of ASEAN Summit due to invasion by protestors in Thailand. State of emergency declared in Bangkok on April 12 1st ARF Disaster Relief Training (Philippines) North Korea conducts the underground nuclear test Provisional government of Somalia declares a state of emergency due to outbreak of fi ghting North Korea launches a total of seven ballistic missiles into the Sea of Japan The exterior of the body of oil tanker “M. STAR” damaged in an explosion at the Straits of Hormuz Completion of withdrawal of non-American multinational forces from Iraq U.S. President Obama announces review of MD deployment in Europe M7.6 earthquake occurs off the coast of Sumatra, Indonesia China conducts 60th Anniversary Military Parade North and South Korean ships engage in fi re in the Yellow Sea Lisbon treaty comes into effect START I lapses| |2010|Jan. 17 Jan. 19 Feb. 5 Mar. 5 Mar. 26 Apr. 1 Apr. 26 May 1 May 19 May 28 Jul. 1 Aug. 26 Aug. 31 Sep. 7 Sep. 10|Dispatch of Japan Disaster Relief Team in response to earthquake in Haiti (February 14, operation completed) “2+2” joint statement on the 50th anniversary of Japan–U.S. Security Treaty Decision to dispatch SDF units to United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) (February 6, deployment commences) (January 25, 2013, operation completed) ASDF 1st Consultation on Replenishment Offi ce Equipment Establishment of investigation and review committee Partial enforcement of the Law for Partial Amendment of the Ministry of Defense Establishment Law (new establishment of the 15th Bridge and reorganization of the Youth Technical School) Partial enforcement of the Law for Partial Amendment of the Ministry of Defense Establishment Law (establishment of the job status of GSDF students) Patriots (PAC-3) deployed to 2nd Air Defense Missile Group 6th Air Defense Missile Unit (Ashiya) Disaster dispatch for foot and mouth disease in Miyazaki Prefecture (through July 27) Japan–Australia 2+2 (signing of Japan–Australia ACSA) Japan–Australia “2+2” Defense Ministers’ Meeting (Kitazawa and Faulkner, Tokyo) Joint Statement of Japan-U.S. Security Consultative Committee (“2+2”) Partial enforcement of the Law for Partial Amendment of the Ministry of Defense Establishment Law (establishment of the job status of SDF recruits) 1st Establishment of the “Council for the Promotion of MOD Reform” Air transport activities by helicopter in aid of fl ood disaster in Pakistan (through Oct. 10) Release of the “Future Direction of Procurement Reform” by the Comprehensive Procurement Reform Promotion Committee Cabinet approves dispatch of SDF offi cers as key military contact personnel (military observers) to the United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT) (dispatched on Sep. 27)|Mar. 11 May 26 Jun. 8 Jun. 25 Jul. 13 Sep. 17 Dec. 7|ASDF Hyakuri Base, joint civilian use of runway Enactment of the “Act on the Preservation of the Law-Water Line and Development of Basic Infrastructure of Remote Islands for the Maintaining and Promoting Utilization of the Exclusive Economic Zone and Continental Shelf” Kan Cabinet established Conclusion of the “Japan–NATO Information Security Agreement” Cabinet approves “Act on the Preservation of the Law-Water Line and Development of Basic Infrastructure of Remote Islands for the Maintaining and Promoting Utilization of the Exclusive Economic Zone and Continental Shelf” Reshuffl ed Kan Cabinet established Establishment of a governmental committee to review information security, as a result of the leakage of the video showing the fi shing boat collision off the Senkaku Islands|Jan. 11 Jan. 12 Jan. 29 Feb. 27 Mar. 7 Mar. 26 Apr. 2 Apr. 6 Apr. 12 May 27 Jun. 9 Jun. 28 Aug. 1 Sep. 7 Sep. 28 Oct. 19 Nov. 1 Nov. 19 Nov. 23|China announces that it has performed missile interception test M7 earthquake occurs in Haiti First test fl ight of Russian fi fth-generation fi ghter PAK FA U.S. announces “Quadrennial Defense Review” (QDR) and “Ballistic Missile Defense Review” (BMDR) Russia publishes new Navy doctrine ROK naval patrol ship “Cheonan” sank in the Yellow Sea by a torpedo attack from a North Korean submarine In Thailand, Thaksin supporters occupy the center of cities such as Bangkok. On April 10, they clash with Thai government security forces (through May 19) U.S. announces “Nuclear Posture Review” (NPR) First Nuclear Security Summit (Washington, D.C., through April 13) U.S. announces “National Security Strategy” (NSS) U.N. Security Council adopts Resolution 1929 regarding additional sanction on Iran Release of the United States’ National Space Policy (NSP) Coming into effect of the Convention on Cluster Munitions Chinese fi shing boat collides with Japan Coast Guard patrol vessel in waters near the Senkaku Islands North Korea holds conference of the Workers’ Party of Korea and a Plenary Meeting of Central Committee; Kim Jong-un is appointed Vice-Chairman of the Central Military Commission U.K. releases its Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR) Russian President Medvedev visits the Kunashiri Island NATO adopts New Strategic Concept North Korea shells the ROK’s Yeonpyeong island| ----- |Year|Col2|Defense|Col4|Domestic|Col6|International| |---|---|---|---|---|---|---| |2010|Sep. 24 Oct. 1 Oct. 12 Dec. 14 Dec. 17 Dec. 27|Minister of Defense issues directive on reform of the National Defense Academy Partial enforcement of the Law for Partial Amendment of the Ministry of Defense Establishment Law (abolition of the lowest enlisted ranks) 1st expanded ASEAN Defense Ministers’ Meeting plus (ADMM-Plus) convenes (Hanoi) Exploratory Committee for Bid-Rigging Issues in the ASDF 1st Depot for Offi ce Supplies holds its 8th meeting and releases investigation report on the bid-rigging case pertaining to the procurement of offi ce furniture by the ASDF 1st Air Depot Security Council and Cabinet approved the National Defense Program Guidelines for FY2011 and Beyond, and the Mid-term Defense Program (FY2011 to FY2015) Minister issues directive on the promotion of structural reform to enhance the effi cacy of defense capability||||| |2011|Jan. 21 Feb. 23 Mar. 11 Mar. 16 Apr. 15 Apr. 27 Jun. 1 Jun. 21 Aug. 29 Sep. 2 Oct. 14 Oct. 16 Oct. 24 Nov. 15 Dec. 20 Dec. 27 Dec. 28|Signing of the new Special Measures Agreement in connection with cost-sharing arrangements on the stationing of U.S.Forces in Japan (comes into effect on Apr. 1) Dispatch of international emergency disaster relief units in response to earthquake in New Zealand (through March 3) Dispatch of emergency relief units in response to the large-scale Great East Japan Earthquake disaster (through August 31) Dispatch of nuclear disaster units in response to the nuclear crisis resulted from the Great East Japan Earthquake disaster (through December 26) As a result of the Great East Japan Earthquake, the Cabinet passed the fi rst disaster call-up for SDF reserve personnel and ready reserve personnel Disaster relief call-up order issued to dispatch GSDF ready reserve personnel and reserve personnel (through August 31) Disaster relief call-up order issued to dispatch MSDF and ASDF reserve personnel (through August 31) Partial revision to the Environmental Improvement Law (extended target projects for subsidies to improve the environment surrounding specifi ed defense facilities) SDF activity base in Djibouti initiates operation Japan–U.S. Security Consultative Committee (“2+2” in Washington) joint statement; release of “Toward a Deeper and Broader Japan–U.S. Alliance: Building on 50 years of Partnership” First Japan-Canada vice-ministerial “2+2” consultation (Tokyo) Ichikawa becomes Minister of Defense Decision made on next transport plane (C-130R) replacing MSDF’s YS-11 Air review (Hyakuri Air Base) Japan-Vietnam Defense Ministerial Meeting (Tokyo) Memorandum signed regarding Japan-Vietnam defense cooperation and exchanges Cabinet decision made on dispatch of SDF personnel as headquarters staff for the United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS) (departing Japan on November 28) SDF personnel dispatch to the PKO Centers in Ghana as instructors (through November 20) Decision made by the Security Council and seconded by the Cabinet regarding “acquisition of the next- generation fi ghter aircraft” F-35A decided to be the next-generation fi ghter aircraft Decision made by the Cabinet on dispatching engineer units, etc. for United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan (deployed from on January 11, 2012) Statement by the Chief Cabinet Secretary on Guidelines for Overseas Transfer of Defense Equipment etc. Submission of the environmental impact statement on the Futenma replacement facility construction project to Okinawa Prefecture (through January 6, 2012)|Jan. 14 Jan. 28 Mar. 11 Apr. 11 Jun. 24 Jun. 28 Sep. 2 Sep. 19 Sep. 27 Sep. 30 Oct. 10 Oct. 24 Nov. 12 Dec. 31|Reshuffl ed Kan Cabinet appointed (second term) Prime Minister Kan attends the World Economic Forum Annual Meeting (Davos meeting) (through Jan. 30) Four pirates that had shot at Japanese vessels off the Oman Coast in the Arabian Sea were arrested under the Anti-Piracy Law Great East Japan Earthquake strikes Reconstruction Design Council in Response to the Great East Japan Earthquake established Exercise of the Basic Act on Reconstruction First meeting of the headquarters for reconstruction measures Noda Cabinet established Detection of cyber attacks against defense industry Japan-Philippines Summit (Tokyo), Japan- Philippines joint statement made Cabinet decision on “Promotion of the operational Quasi-Zenith Satellite System project” and “Promoting development and utilization of aerospace” ATR to Guam as part of the U.S. Forces realignment (through October 28) Conclusion of the “Japan-France Information Security Agreement” Japan-U.S. Summit meeting, opinions exchanged regarding full U.S. support to mitigate the impact on Okinawa including efforts for relocation of Futenma Air Station and steady advancement of relocation of USMC in Okinawa to Guam Third supplementary budget approved Japan-India Summit (Delhi), Joint statement on strengthening “Japan-India strategic global partnership” signed|Jan. 11 Jan. 14 Feb. 4 Feb. 5 Feb. 8 Feb. 12 Feb. 22 Mar. 5 Mar. 17 Mar. 19 Apr. 5 Apr. 14 May 2 Jun. 22 Jul. 1 Jul. 8 Jul. 9 Jul. 11 Jul. 14 Aug. 10 Aug. 24 Sep. 8 Sep. 9 Sep. 29 Oct. 31 Nov. 1 Nov. 11 Nov. 22 Dec. 18 Dec. 19|China conducts test fl ight of fi ghter aircraft touted as the nextgeneration stealth aircraft Tunisian President Ben Ali defects for Saudi Arabia amidst growing anti- government demonstrations, and the regime collapses U.N. Security Council chairman’s statement concerning the conclusion of the UNMIN mandate is adopted The United States releases the National Security Space Strategy (NSSS) Thai and Cambodia armies clash near the Temple of Preah Vihear (through February 7) New START comes into effect The United States releases the National Military Strategy Egyptian President Mubarak resigns Iranian military vessel passes through the Suez Canal M6.3 earthquake occurs in New Zealand China convenes its 11th National People’s Congress (through March 14) U.N. Security Council adopts Resolution 1973 allowing the use of military force against Libya The coalition force led by the U.S., U.K., and France commence military operations against Libya U.S. President Obama gives speech in Prague Convention of the BRICS Leaders’ Meeting Thai and Cambodia Armies clash near the Temple of Preah Vihear (through May 3) U.S. President Obama announces the killing of Osama bin Laden, leader of the international terrorist organization Al-Qaeda President Obama announces guidelines to withdraw U.S. troops from Afghanistan 90th anniversary of establishment of Chinese Communist Party Adoption of U.N. Security Council Resolution 1996 to establish UNMISS Independence of the Republic of South Sudan Adoption of U.N. Security Council Resolution 1997 to terminate UNMIS Release of “Department of Defense Strategy for Operating in Cyberspace” by U.S. Department of Defense Conducts its fi rst navigation Chinese aircraft carrier “Varyag“ The Chinese fi sheries patrol ships enter Japan’s territorial waters near the Senkaku Islands Russian bombers take the route that circles the area encompassing Japan 24 Russian naval vessels sail through the Soya Strait Chinese space laboratory “Tiangong 1” launched NATO ends operations in Libya London Conference on Cyberspace held (through November 2) U.S.-Philippines sign “Manila Declaration” Six Chinese naval vessels sail through waters between the Okinawa main island and the Miyako Island to the Pacifi c Ocean Completion of U.S. troop withdrawal from Iraq North Korea announces the death of Chairman of the National Defense Commission Kim Jongil (December 17)| |2012|Jan. 11 Jan. 13 Mar. 26 Mar. 30 Apr. 17 Apr. 27 Jun. 3 Jun. 4 Jun. 13 Jun. 28 Jul. 2 Jul. 3 Jul. 9 Sep. 7 Sep. 23|Japan-Mongolia Defense Ministerial Meeting (Ulan Bator) Signing of the memorandum regarding Japan-Mongolia defense cooperation and exchanges Advance party for UNMISS departs Japan Tanaka becomes Minister of Defense Transfer of ASDF Air Defense Command to Yokota Air Base SDF action order issued regarding implementation of measures to destroy a ballistic missile (April 13 end) Ten-month extension of SDF dispatch to support the United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT) (through February 28, 2013) Japan-U.S. Security Consultative Committee “2+2” joint statement Exchange of memorandum regarding Japan-U.K. defense cooperation Morimoto becomes Minister of Defense Japan-Italy Defense Ministerial Meeting (Tokyo) Signing of the Statement of Intent on Defense Exchange and Cooperation between Japan and Italy Third working-level talks on maritime communication mechanisms between Japan and China’s defense authorities (Beijing) (through June 29) Japan-Philippines Defense Ministerial meeting (Tokyo) Signing of the Statement of Intent on Defence Cooperation and Exchange between Japan and Philippines PSI Air Interdiction Exercise hosted by Japan (Hokkaido, through July 5) Japan-Turkey vice-ministerial meeting (Ankara) Signing of the Statement of Intent on Advancing Defense Cooperation and Exchange between Japan and Turkey Formulation and release of “Toward Stable and Effective Use of Cyberspace by the MOD/JSDF” SDF dispatch to the United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT) ended|Jan. 13 Feb.10 Mar. 27 Apr. 10 May 17 Jun. 4 Jul. 12 Sep.11 Oct. 1 Dec. 26|Reshuffl ed Noda Cabinet established Establishment of the Reconstruction Agency Prime Minister Noda attends the Nuclear Security Summit Japan-U.K. summit meeting (Tokyo), Japan-U.K. joint statement made “Japan-Australia Information Security Agreement” signed Reshuffl ed Noda Cabinet appointed (second term) Enforcement of the Law for Partial Amendment of the Law for Establishment of Cabinet Offi ce Government’s purchase of the three Senkaku Islands Inauguration of Noda’s (reshuffl ed) Cabinet (third term) Inauguration of the second Abe Cabinet|Jan. 5 Feb. 23 Mar. 16 Apr. 11 Apr. 13 Apr. 29 Apr.30 Jun. 27 Jul. 1 Jul. 5 Jul. 11 Jul. 12 Aug.10 Aug.19 Sep. 25 Oct. 16 Nov. 15 Dec. 12 Dec. 13 Dec. 31|U.S. announces the defense strategic guidance Adoption of U.N. Security Council resolution to extend the UNMIT mandate Chinese government ship “Haijian” enters Japan’s territorial waters near the Senkaku Islands Kim Jong-un becomes North Korea’s First Secretary of the Korean Workers’ Party North Korea launches a missile, which it calls a “Satellite” Kim Jong-un becomes the First Chairman of the National Defense Commission Three Chinese naval vessels sail through the Osumi Strait to the Pacifi c Ocean U.S.-Philippines Foreign and Defense Ministers’ Meeting (2+2 Meeting) Adoption of U.N. Security Council resolution to extend the UNDOF mandate 26 Russian naval vessels sail through the Soya Strait (through July 2) Resolution 2057 to extend the UNMISS mandate adopted by the U.N. Security Council Three vessels of Chinese Fishery Law Enforcement Command (FLEC) enter Japanese waters near the Senkaku Islands One FLEC vessel enters Japanese waters near the Senkaku Islands South Korean President Lee Myung-bak visits Takeshima UNSMIS ended The fi rst Chinese aircraft carrier “Liaoning” commissioned Seven Chinese warships pass through the waters between the Yonaguni Island and the Nakanokami Island for the fi rst time Xi Jinping elected as General Secretary of the Communist Party of China and Chairman of the Central Military Commission at the fi rst plenary session of the 18th Central ommittee of the Communist Party of China North Korea launches a missile which it called a “Satellite” A Chinese aircraft violates Japanese airspace for the fi rst time (airspace surrounding the Senkaku Islands) UNMIT ends| ----- |Year|Col2|Defense|Col4|Domestic|Col6|International| |---|---|---|---|---|---|---| |2012|Nov. 26 Dec. 4 Dec. 7 Dec. 26|First Japan-Vietnam vice-ministerial meeting (Hanoi) Promulgation and partial enforcement (regarding Japan-U.S. ACSA) of partially amended laws, including the Self-Defense Forces Act, etc. Launch of capacity building program in East Timor SDF action order issued regarding implementation of measures to destroy a ballistic missile (December 12 end) Onodera becomes Minister of Defense||||| |2013|Jan. 20 Jan. 25 Jan. 31 Feb. 1 Mar. 1 Mar. 15 Mar. 26 May 18 Jun. 5 Jun. 27 Jul. 5 Aug. 9 Aug. 28 Aug. 29 Aug. 30 Sep. 10 Sep. 16 Sep. 18 Oct. 3 Oct. 16 Nov. 1 Nov. 2 Nov. 12 Nov. 22 Dec. 13 Dec. 17 Dec. 24 Dec. 25|SDF dispatch to the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) ended (ceremony to return unit fl ag) As a measure for the Transportation of Japanese Nationals Overseas (TJNO) prescribed in the Self- Defense Forces Act, SDF transports Japanese victims of the Algerian hostage crisis from Algeria to Japan (return home on Jan. 24) Security Council and Cabinet approve the document on the building up of defense capability for FY2013 Defense Posture Review Commission established Japan–Australia ACSA enters into force Partial enforcement (regarding Japan-Australia ACSA) of partially amended laws, including the Self-Defense Forces Act, etc. Partial enforcement (regarding pilot allowance) of partially amended laws, including the Self-Defense Forces Act, etc. Statement by the Chief Cabinet Secretary on participation of Japan’s industries in the production of the F-35A SDF dispatch for the MINUSTAH mission ended (ceremony to return unit fl ag) Partial enforcement (regarding shift of Air Rescue Wing’s affi liation) of partially amended laws, including the Self-Defense Forces Act, etc. First Japan-U.S.-Australia joint training (Exercise Southern Jackaroo 2013) (through May 25) Participation in Pacifi c Partnership 2013 (through July 6) Japan-Philippines Defense Ministerial Meeting (Manila) Japan-Australia Defense Ministerial Meeting (Tokyo) 2nd Japan-Vietnam Vice Ministerial Level Consultation (Tokyo) Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting (Brunei) 2nd ASEAN Defense Ministers’ Meeting-Plus (ADMM- Plus) held (Bandar Seri Begawan) “Direction of the MOD Reform” released 1st meeting of MOD/SDF Special Action Committee on the Tokyo 2020 Olympic and Paralympic Games held Japan-Vietnam Defense Ministerial Meeting (Hanoi) Japan-Thailand Defense Ministerial Meeting (Bangkok) Japan-U.S. Security Consultative Committee (“2+2”, Tokyo) Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting (Tokyo) Japan-U.S. Cyber Defense Policy Working Group established Dispatch of disaster relief units in response to Typhoon No. 26 (through November 8) Japan-Russia Defense Ministerial Meeting (Tokyo) First Japan-Russia “2+2” (Tokyo) Dispatch of Japan Disaster Relief Team in response to typhoon disaster in the Philippines (through December 18) Japan-ROK Vice Defense Ministers’ Meeting (Seoul) Revisions of the Self-Defense Forces Act (e.g., expanded category of people who may be transported by the JSDF, in the event of disasters, insurgencies, and other emergencies overseas) promulgated and entered into force ASEAN-Japan Commemorative Summit (Tokyo) (through February 15) National Security Council and Cabinet approve on “National Security Strategy,”“National Defense Program Guidelines for FY2014 and beyond,” and “Medium Term Defense Program (FY2014-FY2018)” Defense Minister issues instructions on the promotion of building a Dynamic Joint Defense Force Self-Defense Forces Plan for Countermeasures against Nankai Trough Earthquakes established|Jan. 16 Jan. 17 Jan. 18 Jan. 28 Feb. 15 Feb. 20 Feb. 23 Mar. 22 Jun. 17 Jul. 4 Sep. 1 Sep. 5 Oct. 3 Dec. 4 Dec. 13 Dec. 15 Dec. 27|Japan-Vietnam summit meeting (Hanoi) Japan-Thailand summit meeting (Bangkok) Japan-Indonesia summit meeting (Jakarta) Opening of the 183rd Ordinary Diet First meeting of a panel of experts on the establishment of a Japanese National Security Council (NSC) Naha District Court issues judgment on Henoko environmental assessment case Meeting between U.S. President Obama and Prime Minister Abe Japan-Australia Information Security Agreement enters into force Japan-Russia summit meeting Japan-U.K. Information Security Agreement signed Council on Security and Defense Capabilities holds fi rst meeting Japan-U.S. summit meeting (St. Petersburg) Signing of the “Protocol to amend the agreement concerning the relocation of the U.S. Marine Corps from Okinawa to Guam” National Security Council established Act on the Protection of Specially Designated Secrets promulgated; ASEAN-Japan Commemorative Summit (Tokyo) (through February 15) Japan-Cambodia summit meeting (Tokyo) Japan-Cambodia Memorandum on Defense Cooperation and Exchanges signed Governor of Okinawa Prefecture approves application for public water reclamation for the Futenma Replacement Facility construction project|Jan. 10 Jan. 11 Jan. 16 Jan. 19 Jan. 23 Jan. 27 Jan. 30 Jan. 31 Feb. 7 Feb. 12 Mar. 7 Mar. 15 Mar. 30 Apr. 2 Apr. 29 May 3 May 7 May 14 May 27 Jun. 5 Jun. 17 Jun. 18 Jul. 1 Jul. 5 Jul. 13 Jul. 22 Jul. 24 Aug. 21 Aug. 22 Aug. 27 Sep. 8 Sep. 9 Sep. 27 Oct. 23 Oct. 25 Oct. 30 Nov. 8 Nov. 15 Nov. 23 Nov. 24 Dec. 5 – Dec. 8 Dec. 10 Dec. 13 Dec. 14 Dec. 15 – Dec. 19 Dec. 23|First Russian Borey-class SSBN commissioned France’s military intervention in Mali Abduction of Japanese nationals in Algeria A Chinese naval vessel may direct fi re-control radar at a helicopter based on a JMSDF destroyer Australia announces the National Security Strategy China announces that it has performed missile interception test A Chinese vessel directs fi re-control radar at a JMSDF destroyer in the East China Sea Three Chinese naval vessels sail through waters northeast of the Miyako Island to the Pacifi c Ocean Russian fi ghters intrude into Japan’s airspace North Korea’s underground nuclear test U.N. Security Council adopts Resolution 2094 on strengthening sanctions on North Korea Russian bombers take a route that circles the area encompassing Japan Four Chinese naval vessels sail through waters southwest of the Okinawa main island to the Pacifi c Ocean North Korea announces that it will readjust and restart the graphite moderated reactor that was mothballed and disabled under an agreement reached at the Six-Party Talks in October, 2007 France issues White Paper on Defence and National Security Australia issues Defence White Paper Two Chinese naval vessels sail through waters northeast of the Yonaguni Island and head to the Pacifi c Ocean Nigeria declares state of emergency in three Northeastern states Three Chinese naval vessels sail through waters between the Okinawa main island and the Miyako Island to the Pacifi c Ocean Inauguration of Pakistani Prime Minister Sharif G8 Summit (through June 18) Afghanistan starts fi nal phase of transition of security responsibilities from the International Security Assistance Force Croatia accedes to the EU China-Russia joint naval exercise. “Naval Interaction 2013” (through July 11) Surprise inspections conducted in Russia’s Eastern Military District, etc. (through July 20) Chinese naval fl eets pass through the Soya Strait to the Sea of Okhotsk China Coast Guard sign put up Chinese early warning aircraft fl y through airspace between the Okinawa main island and the Miyako Island U.S.-Philippines consultation on the framework agreement on the increased rotational presence of U.S. troops and military equipment in the Philippines start Many civilians die in outskirts of Damascus, Syria due to use of chemical weapons Three Chinese naval vessels sail through the Osumi Strait to the Pacifi c Ocean Russian bombers intrude into Japan’s airspace Two Chinese naval vessels sail through waters between the Okinawa main island and the Miyako Island to the Pacifi c Ocean Chinese bombers fl y through airspace between the Okinawa main island and the Miyako Island Unmanned aircraft (presumed) of unidentifi ed nationality fl ies over the East China Sea U.N. Security Council adopts Resolution 2118 on elimination of Syrian chemical weapons Five Chinese naval vessels sail through waters between the Okinawa main island and the Miyako Island to the Pacifi c Ocean Chinese early warning aircraft and bombers fl y through airspace between the Okinawa main island and the Miyako Island (through October 27) (three consecutive days) Three Chinese naval vessels sail through waters southwest of the Okinawa main island to the Pacifi c Ocean Typhoon No. 30 Haiyan hit Leyte Island, Philippines Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) decides on detailed terms of the destruction of Syrian chemical weapons, etc. China announces establishment of the “East China Sea Air Defense Identifi cation Zone” Iran and EU3 (U.K., France, Germany) +3 (U.S., China, Russia) reach fi rst phase agreement for the comprehensive settlement of the nuclear issue French forces launch military intervention in the Central African Republic The ROK announces establishment of new Air Defense Identifi cation Zone OPCW receives Nobel Peace Prize North Korea announces execution (December 12) of Vice-Chairman of the National Defense Commission Jang Song-thaek Chinese lunar probe successfully achieves soft lunar landing Armed confl ict in South Sudan between government forces aligned with the president, and anti-government forces aligned with the former vice president Russian patrol aircraft take a route that circles the areas encompassing Japan Three Chinese naval vessels sail through waters southwest of the Okinawa main island to the Pacifi c Ocean Second Russian Borey-class SSBN commissioned (incorporated into Pacifi c Fleet)| ----- Year Defense Domestic International Jan. 6 Japan-India Defense Ministerial Meeting (New Delhi) Jan. 1 Japan-U.K. Information Security Agreement enters Jan. 1 Chinese Hainan Province enforces revised provincial regulations to Jan. 9 First Japan-France Foreign and Defense Ministers’ into force implement the Fisheries Law of the People’s Republic of China Meeting (Paris) Jan. 7 National Security Secretariat launched Jan. 15 ASEAN Foreign Ministers’ Meeting (through January 18) Jan. 15 Collision accident between transport vessel and Jan. 24 Opening of the 186th Ordinary Diet Jan. 21 Thailand declares state of emergency (lifted on March 18) fi shing vessel Feb. 14 Council for Promoting the Mitigation of the Impact of Jan. 28 U.N. Security Council adopts Resolution 2134 that approves dispatch of Jan. 22 Committee for Promoting the Mitigation of the Impact MCAS Futenma on Okinawa established the EU force to the Central African Republic of Bases on Okinawa established Mar. 18 Japan-Vietnam summit meeting (Tokyo) State of the Union Address by U.S. President Obama Feb. 15 Dispatch of disaster relief units in response to heavy Mar. 24 Prime Minister Abe attends Nuclear Security Summit Feb. 11 First ministerial consultation between China and Taiwan snowfall disaster (through February 23) Mar. 25 Japan-U.S.-ROK summit meeting Mar. 1 Three Chinese naval vessels sail through waters between the Okinawa Feb. 18 Fifth Japan-ASEAN Defense Vice-Ministerial Forum Apr. 1 Cabinet decision on “Three Principles on Transfer of main island and the Miyako Island to the Pacifi c Ocean (Okinawa) Defense Equipment and Technology” Mar. 3 North Korea launches two ballistic missiles Mar. 11 Dispatch of Japan Disaster Relief Team in response to Apr. 7 Japan-Australia summit meeting (Tokyo) Mar. 4 The United States announces QDR, releases FY2014 budget proposal the missing Malaysian Airplane (through April 28) Apr. 24 Japan-U.S. summit meeting (Tokyo) Mar. 9 China’s Y-8 intelligence gathering aircraft and H-6 bomber fl y through Mar. 19 A submarine seen navigating underwater in Japan’s May 14 “Protocol to amend the agreement concerning the airspace between the Okinawa main island and the Miyako Island contiguous zone (waters east of Miyako Island) relocation of the U.S. Marine Corps from Okinawa to Mar. 13 China releases FY2014 defense spending Mar. 20 Japan-ROK Vice Defense Ministers’ Meeting Guam” comes into force Mar. 18 Russian “annexation” of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea Mar. 26 Cyber Defense Group inaugurated May 15 The Advisory Panel on Reconstruction of the Legal Mar. 24 Third Nuclear Security Summit (Hague, through March 25) Apr. 1 Partial enforcement (establishment of Faculty of Basis for Security submits its report Mar. 26 North Korea launches two ballistic missiles Nursing at National Defense Medical College) of Jul. 1 Cabinet decision on “Development of Seamless Apr.5 Afghanistan presidential election partially amended laws, including the Self-Defense Security Legislation to Ensure Japan’s Survival and Apr. 7 Indian general elections (through May 12) Forces Act, etc. Protect its People” Apr. 10 U.N. Security Council adopts Resolution 2147 that approves dispatch of Apr. 6 Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting (Tokyo) Japan-Macedonia summit meeting (Tokyo) PKO to the Central African Republic Apr. 14 Dispatch of disaster relief units in response to bird fl u Jul. 7 Japan-New Zealand summit meeting (Auckland) Apr. 12 Separatist armed groups occupy government buildings in Eastern Ukraine outbreak in Kumamoto Prefecture (through April 16) Jul. 8 Japan-Australia summit meeting (Canberra) Apr. 13 Russian aircraft fl y near Japanese airspace for seven consecutive days Apr. 17 Japan-Mongolia Defense Ministerial Meeting (Tokyo) Jul. 10 Japan-Papua New Guinea summit meeting (Port (through April 19) Apr. 28 Japan-Australia Defense Ministerial Meeting (Perth) Moresby) Apr. 28 U.S. and Philippines sign Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement: Apr. 29 Japan-Malaysia Defense Ministerial Meeting (Kuala Jul. 22 Japan-Mongolia summit meeting (Tokyo) (EDCA) Lumpur) Jul. 25 Japan-Mexico summit meeting (Mexico City) May 2 Two Chinese naval vessels sail through waters between the Okinawa main May 7 Japan-Italy Defense Ministerial Meeting (Rome) Jul. 29 Japan-Colombia summit meeting (Bogota) island and the Miyako Island to the Pacifi c Ocean May 8 Defense Minister Onodera meets with South Sudanese Jul. 31 Japan-Chile summit meeting (Santiago) May 7 Collision and confrontation between Chinese and Vietnamese vessels Defence Minister, etc. Aug. 1 Japan-Brazil summit meeting (Brasilia) occur May 9 Defense Minister Onodera meets with Djiboutian Sep. 1 Japan-Italy summit meeting (Tokyo) May 10 24th ASEAN Summit (through May 11) Defence Minister, etc. Sep. 3 Inauguration of the second term of Abe Cabinet May 19 U.S. Department of Justice indicts Chinese PLA offi cers and others for May 31 Prime Minister Abe and Defense Minister Onodera Sep. 6 Japan-Bangladesh summit meeting (Dhaka) conducting cyber attacks participate in 13th Asia Security Summit (held by IISS) Sep. 7 Japan-Sri Lanka summit meeting (Sri Lanka) May 20 Thailand declares martial law (Singapore) Sep. 26 Prime Minister Abe attends U.N. Summit Meeting on China-Russia joint maritime military exercise “Naval Interaction 2014” Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore) UN Peacekeeping Operations (New York) (East China Sea ) (through May 26) Japan-U.S.-ROK Defense Ministers’ Meeting and Oct. 3 Cabinet decision on “Establishment of the May 24 Chinese Su-27 fi ghter jets fl y excessively close to JSDF aircraft Japan-U.S.-Australia Defense Ministers’ Meeting Headquarters for Creating a Society where All May 27 President Obama announces schedule of troop withdrawal from (Singapore) Women Shine” Afghanistan Jun. 11 Japan-Australia “2+2” (Tokyo) Oct. 16 Tenth ASEM (Italy, through October 17) May 27 U.N. Security Council adopts Resolution 2155 for extending and modifying Japan-Australia Defense Ministerial Meeting (Tokyo) Oct. 24 Japan-Georgia summit meeting (Tokyo) the UNMISS mandate Jun. 19 Strategy on Defense Production and Technological Nov. 10 APEC Economic Leaders’ Meeting (Beijing, China, Jun. 7 Three Chinese naval vessels sail through waters between the Okinawa Bases released through November 11) main island and the Miyako Island to the Pacifi c Ocean Jun. 21 Partial enforcement of the Law for Partial Amendment Nov. 12 ASEAN-related summit meetings (Naypyidaw, Jun. 10 ISIL seizes Mosul of the Ministry of Defense Establishment Law Myanmar, through November 13) Jun. 11 Chinese Su-27 fi ghter jets fl y excessively close to JSDF aircraft (response to early retirement system) Nov. 16 Candidate Onaga defeats incumbent Governor Jun. 14 Ukrainian Air Force transport aircraft is shot down Jun. 22 GSDF participates in RIMPAC14 for the fi rst time Nakaima in Okinawa gubernatorial election Afghan presidential election (fi nal ballot) (through August 6) Nov. 20 Japan-Jordan summit meeting (Tokyo) Jun. 29 ISIL declares establishment of “Islamic State” and caliphate Jul. 11 Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting (Washington) Dec. 10 Act on the Protection of Specially Designated North Korea launches two ballistic missiles Jul. 25 Enforcement of the Law for Partial Amendment of the Secrets enters into force Jul. 8 – Israel Defense Forces start Operation Protective Edge against Gaza Ministry of Defense Establishment Law (establishment Dec. 17 Japan-Palau summit meeting (Tokyo) Jul. 9 U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue (through July 10) of Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs) Dec. 24 Inauguration of the third term of Abe Cabinet North Korea launches two ballistic missiles Jul. 29 Japan-France Defense Ministerial Meeting (Tokyo) Dec. 26 Deployment of U.S. Forces TPY-2 (“X-band radar”) to Jul. 13 North Korea launches two ballistic missiles Japan-France declaration of intent on defense Kyogamisaki is completed Jul. 14 Russia-India joint naval exercise (Indra-2014) (through July 19) cooperation and exchanges is signed Jul. 17 Malaysian airliner is shot down Aug. 1 Enforcement of the Law for Partial Amendment of the Jul. 17 – Israel Defense Forces begin ground invasion of Gaza Ministry of Defense Establishment Law (quota for SDF Jul. 26 North Korea launches one ballistic missile 2014 personnel posts of Internal Bureau, establishment of Air Aug. 8 WHO issues declaration of state of emergency over Ebola virus disease Tactics Development & Training Wing, etc.) Aug. 8 – U.S. Central Command begins airstrikes on ISIL in Northern Iraq Disposal of unexploded ordnances in Naha City, Aug. 12 U.S.-Australia Foreign and Defense Ministers’ Meeting (AUSMIN 2014) Okinawa Prefecture (Sydney) Aug. 6 Dispatch of disaster relief units in response to heavy Russian Armed Forces conduct exercises in the Northern Territories and rainfall in Yamaguchi Prefecture (through August 8) Chishima Islands Aug. 10 Dispatch of disaster relief units to provide water supply Aug. 19 OPCW announces the completion of the destruction of syria’s chemical supports in Kochi Prefecture (through August 14) weapons abroad the U.S. Maritime Vessel Cape Ray Aug. 17 Dispatch of disaster relief units for lifesaving activities Chinese J-11 fi ghter jets fl y excessively close to U.S. Forces’ patrol aircraft in Fukuchiyama City, Kyoto Prefecture Aug. 26 Israel and Hamas agree on ceasefi re Dispatch of disaster relief units for lifesaving activities Sep. 4 – 5 NATO Wales Summit in Tamba City, Hyogo Prefecture Sep. 5 Minsk agreement (ceasefi re in Ukraine, etc.) Aug. 20 Dispatch of disaster relief units for lifesaving activities Sep. 8 Iraq’s new Cabinet is formed in Hiroshima City, Hiroshima Prefecture (through Sep. 10 President Obama announces strategy to counter ISIL September 11) Sep. 18 U.N. Security Council adopts Resolution 2177 on Ebola virus disease Sep. 1 Memorandum on Japan-India Defense Cooperation and countermeasures; UNMEER’s establishment is announced Exchanges is signed Sep. 19 Russia begins large-scale exercise “Vostok 2014” (through September 25) Sep. 3 Eto becomes Minister of Defense Sep. 20 Ukrainian government and separatist armed groups reach ceasefi re Sep. 11 Dispatch of disaster relief units to provide water agreement supply supports in Ebetsu City, Hokkaido (through Sep. 22 – The United States and other coalition countries begin airstrikes on ISIL September 13) in Syria Sep. 27 Dispatch of disaster relief units in response to eruption Sep. 29 Afghanistan’s new government is launched of Mt. Ontake (through October 16) Sep. 30 U.S.-Afghanistan bilateral security agreement and NATO-Afghanistan Oct. 7 Sixth Japan-ASEAN Defense Vice-Ministerial Forum states of force agreement are signed (Yokohama) Oct. 2 The United States announces partial lifting of lethal weapons embargo Oct. 16 Japan-Australia Defense Ministerial Meeting (Tokyo) to Vietnam Oct. 26 Air Review commemorating the 60th anniversary of Oct. 3 Flight of China’s Y-9 information gathering aircraft in the East China Sea is the MOD/SDF confi rmed for the fi rst time Oct. 28 Japan-Finland Defense Ministerial Meeting (Tokyo) Oct. 5 – Shelling between India and Pakistan in Kashmir Oct. 29 Japan-ROK Vice Defense Ministers’ Meeting (Seoul) Oct. 7 U.S.-China-Australia joint exercise (KOWARI 2014) (through October 25) Nov. 4 Japan-Spain Defense Ministerial Meeting (Tokyo) Oct. 15 North-South Korea military talks Memorandum on Japan-Spain Defense Cooperation Oct. 22 Shooting incident at Canada’s Parliament and Exchanges is signed APEC Economic Leaders’ Meeting (Beijing, through November 11) Nov. 6 Japan-U.S.-Australia joint exercise (Michinoku ALERT Oct. 26 Ukrainian parliamentary elections; pro-Western parties win 2014) (through November 9) Nov. 12 U.S.-China summit meeting Nov. 19 First Japan-ASEAN Defense Ministerial Round Table Nov. 13 East Asia Summit (EAS), ASEAN Summit (through November 13) Meeting (Bagan) G20 Summit (through November 16) Nov. 21 “Global Hawk” is decided as the model of the Nov. 15 Iran EU3+3 nuclear talks unmanned aerial vehicle to be introduced as Nov. 24 ROK Armed Forces conduct military drill in waters near Takeshima determined in the Medium Term Defense Program Nov. 25 Resolution that extends UNMISS mandate is adopted (U.N. Security (FY2014-FY2018) Council resolution 2187) Nov. 23 Dispatch of disaster relief units in response to earthquake Dec. 1 Russia establishes the Northern Joint Strategic Command with an epicenter in northern Nagano Prefecture Over 60 countries attend Counter-ISIL Coalition Ministerial Meeting Nov. 28 Transport of supplies necessary for Japan Disaster (Brussels) Relief operations in response to the outbreak of the Dec. 4 Five Chinese naval vessels sail through the Osumi Strait to the Pacifi c Ebola virus disease in West Africa (Republic of Ghana, Ocean through December 11) Dec. 4 – Chinese People’s Liberation Army begins exercise in Western Pacifi c. Dec. 1 SDF personnel is dispatched to NATO for the fi rst time Subsequently, some vessels transit the Soya Strait (Dec. 24) and Tsushima Dec. 6 Dispatch of disaster relief units in response to heavy Strait (Dec. 27) and circle Japan snowfall in Tokushima Prefecture (through December 11) Dec. 6 Chinese Y-9 information gathering aircraft, Y-8 early warning aircraft, and Dec. 19 Joint Statement of the Japan-U.S. Security Consultative H-6 bomber fl y through airspace between the Okinawa main island and Committee (2+2) the Miyako Island (Dec. 7, 10, and 11) Dec. 24 Nakatani becomes Minister of Defense Dec. 9 GCC Summit Dec. 31 Dispatch of Japan Disaster Relief Team in response to Dec. 19 U.S. concludes North Korea responsible for cyber attacks against SPE disappearance of AirAsia plane (through January 11) Dec. 24 Arms Trade Treaty comes into effect Dec. 31 ISAF’s combat mission in Afghanistan ends The Palestinian Authority signs up to accede to the International Criminal ----- |2015|Jan. 12 Jan. 15 Jan. 18 Jan. 19 Jan. 21 Jan. 29 Feb. 2 Feb. 8 Feb. 20 Mar. 13 Mar. 19 Mar. 20 Mar. 23 Mar. 30 Apr. 8 Apr. 21 Apr. 27 Apr. 28 Apr. 30 May 29 May 30 May 31|Fourth Joint Working Group meeting on the “Maritime and Air Communication Mechanism” between Japanese and Chinese defense authorities (Tokyo) Dispatch of disaster relief units in response to bird fl u outbreak in Okayama Prefecture (through January 19) Dispatch of disaster relief units in response to bird fl u outbreak in Saga Prefecture (through January 20) Defense Minister Nakatani visits Djibouti Defense Minister Nakatani visits South Sudan First Japan-U.K. Foreign and Defense Ministers’ Meeting (London) Japan-U.K. Defense Ministerial Meeting Japan-Philippines Defense Ministerial Meeting (Tokyo) Memorandum on Japan-Philippines Defense Cooperation and Exchanges is signed Dispatch of disaster relief units to help remove snow to eliminate isolated areas as a result of severe snowstorm in Rausu Town, Hokkaido (through February 3) Inaugural airborne exercise under Japan-U.S. joint exercise (North Wind 2 (through February 22) Memorandum on Japan-Qatar Defense Exchange is signed Second Japan-France Foreign and Defense Ministers’ Meeting (2+2) (Tokyo) Agreement on defense equipment and technology transfer is signed Japan-China Security Dialogue (Tokyo) Japan-Timor Leste Defense Ministerial Meeting Memorandum on Japan-Indonesia Cooperation and Exchanges in the Field of Defense is signed Japan-India Defense Ministerial Meeting (Tokyo) Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting (Tokyo) National Defense Medical College instructor is dispatched to support WHO’s epidemiological studies on the outbreak of the Ebola virus disease in West Africa, etc. (through May 29) Dispatch of Japan Disaster Relief Team in response to earthquake in Nepal (through May 22) The new “Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation” is approved at the Japan-U.S. Security Consultative Committee meeting (“2+2,” New York) Japan-U.S. summit meeting (Washington) Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting (Washington) Promulgation and enforcement of the Special Measures Act on the Number of Years of the National Subsidization of Specifi c Defense Procurements (so- called “Long-term Contract Act”) Dispatch of disaster relief units in response to the eruption at Kuchinoerabu Island (through June 1) Defense Minister Nakatani participates in 14th Asia Security Summit (held by IISS) (Singapore) (through May 31) Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore) Japan-U.S.-ROK Defense Ministers’ Meeting and Japan- U.S.-Australia Defense Ministers’ Meeting (Singapore) MSDF personnel is appointed commander of Combined Task Force (CTF 151) for counter-piracy operations|Jan. 6 Jan. 16 Jan. 17 Jan. 18 Feb. 9 Feb. 10 Feb. 20 Feb. 27 Mar. 6 Mar. 9 Mar. 20 Mar. 23 Mar. 24 Mar. 27 May 14|Opening of the 189th Ordinary Diet Japan-Egypt summit meeting (Cairo) Japan-Jordan summit meeting (Amman) Japan-Israel summit meeting (Jerusalem, through January 19) Japan-Thailand summit meeting (Tokyo) Japan-Mongolia summit meeting (Tokyo) Cabinet decision on changes to the Implementation Plan of the International Peace Cooperation Assignment in South Sudan Japan-Qatar summit meeting (Tokyo) Japan-Poland summit meeting (Tokyo) Japan-Laos summit meeting (Tokyo) Japan-Germany summit meeting (Tokyo) The Ruling Coalition on the Development of Security Legislation presents “Concrete Vision for the Development of Security Legislation” Japan-Indonesia summit meeting (Tokyo) Japan-New Zealand summit meeting (Tokyo) Japan-Portugal summit meeting (Tokyo) Cabinet decision on two bills, namely, “Bill for the Development of Legislation for Peace and Security” and “International Peace Support Bill”; Cabinet decisions on “Responses to Foreign Naval Vessels Carrying Out Navigation through the Territorial Sea or the Internal Waters of Japan that Does Not Fall Under Innocent Passage in International Law,” “The Government’s Responses to Illegal Landing on a Remote Island or its Surrounding Seas by an Armed Group,” and “Responses to Acts of Infringement When Self-Defense Force Ships or Aircraft Detect Foreign Ships Committing Said Acts Against Japanese Private Ships on the High Seas”|Jan. 1 Jan. 7 Jan. 20 Jan. 23 Jan. 29 Feb. 2 Feb. 6 Feb. 12 Feb. 13 Feb. 14 Feb. 26 Mar. 2 Mar. 5 Mar. 7 Mar. 18 Apr. 1 Apr. 2 Apr. 23 May 5 May 8 May 21 May 26 May 28|NATO begins “Resolute Support Mission” Shooting incident against a publisher (Charlie Hebdo), etc. in Paris ISIL releases video of Japanese hostages (videos of the murder of the Japanese nationals subsequently released on January 24 and February 1) President Obama delivers States of the Union address Death of Saudi Arabia’s King Abdullah African Union decides to establish a Multinational Joint Task Force against Boko Haram President Obama presented his budget for fi scal year 2016 The United States releases the “National Security Strategy” (NSS) Minsk agreement II German, French, Russian, and Ukrainian leaders agree on new ceasefi re agreement Two Chinese naval vessels sail through waters between the Okinawa main island and the Miyako Island to the Pacifi c Ocean China’s Y-9 information gathering aircraft fl y through airspace between the Okinawa main island and the Miyako Island (February 15) Saudi Arabia begins airstrikes on Houthis in Yemen North Korea launches two ballistic missiles China announces FY2015 defense budget Nigeria’s Boko Haram pledges loyalty to ISIL (ISIL accepts on March 12) An armed group attacks Bardo Museum in Tunisia (three Japanese nationals killed) The Rome Statue entered into force for Palestine EU3+3 and Iran agree on “Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action” U.S. Department of Defense releases “The DoD Cyber Strategy” GCC Summit U.S. Department of Defense releases “Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China” China’s H-6 bomber fl y through airspace between the Okinawa main island and the Miyako Island to the Pacifi c Ocean China releases its defense white paper, “China’s Military Strategy” Resolution that extends UNMISS mandate is adopted (U.N. Security Council resolution 2223)| |---|---|---|---|---|---|---| Year Defense Domestic International ----- **Layout of the NSS and the NDPG** **National Defense Program Guidelines** **I. NDPG’s Objective** Formulated based on the National Security Strategy **II. Security Environment Surrounding Japan** States specific military matters based on the national security strategy **III. Japan’s Basic Defense Policy** 1. Basic Policy 2. Japan’s Own Efforts (1) Building a Comprehensive Defense Architecture (2) Japan’s Defense Forces – Building a Dynamic Joint Defense Force 3. Strengthening the Japan-U.S. Alliance (1) Strengthening Deterrence and Response Capabilities of the Japan-U.S. Alliance (2) Strengthening and Expanding Cooperation in a Broad Range of Fields (3) Steady Implementation of Measures Related to the Stationing of U.S. Forces in Japan 4. Active Promotion of Security Cooperation (1) Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific Region (2) Cooperation with the International Community **IV. Future Defense Forces** 1. The Role of the Defense Force (1) Effective deterrence of and response to various situations Ensuring security of the sea and airspace surrounding Japan, response to an attack on remote islands, response to a ballistic missile attack, etc. (2) Stabilization of the Asia-Pacific and Improvement of Global Security Environments Holding training and exercises, promoting defense cooperation and exchange, promoting defense cooperation and exchange, and ensuring maritime safety, etc. 2. Priorities in Strengthening Architecture of the Self Defense Forces (1) Basic Approach Priorities clarified using capacity assessments from the perspective of joint operations (2) Functions and Capabilities to be Emphasized ISR capabilities, intelligence capabilities, transport capability, command and control, and information communications capabilities, Response to an attack on remote islands, response to ballistic missile attacks, etc. 3. Architecture of Each Service of the Self Defense Forces **V. Basic Foundations for SDF** 1. Training and Exercises / 2. Operational Infrastructure / 3. Personnel and Education / 4. Medical / 5. Defense Production and Technological Bases / 6. Efficient Acquisition of Equipment / 7. Research and Development / 8. Collaboration with Local Communities / 9. Boosting Communication Capabilities / 10. Enhancing the Intellectual Base, and 11. Promoting Reform of the MOD **VI. Additional Points** **Annexes** **National Security Strategy** **I. Purpose** **II. Fundamental Principle of National Security** 1. Principles Japan Upholds / 2. Japan’s National Interests and National Security Objectives **III. Security Environment Surrounding Japan and National Security Challenges** 1. Global Security Environment and Challenges (1) Shift in the Balance of Power and Rapid Progress of Technological Innovation (2) Threat of Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and Other Related Materials (3) Threat of International Terrorism (4) Risks to Global Commons (5) Challenges to Human Security (6) The Global Economy and its Risks 2. Security Environment and Challenges in the Asia-Pacific Region (1) Characteristics of the Strategic Environment of the Asia-Pacific Region (2) North Korea’s Military Buildup and Provocative Actions (3) China’s Rapid Rise and Intensified Activities in Various Areas **IV. Japan’s Strategic Approaches to National Security** 1. Strengthening and Expanding Japan’s Capabilities and Roles (1) Strengthening Diplomacy for Creating a Stable International Environment (2) Building a Comprehensive Defense Architecture to Firmly Defend Japan (3) Strengthening Efforts for the Protection of Japan’s Territorial Integrity (4) Ensuring Maritime Security (5) Strengthening Cyber Security (6) Strengthening Measures against International Terrorism (7) Enhancing Intelligence Capabilities (8) Defense Equipment and Technology Cooperation (9) Ensuring the Stable Use of Outer Space and Promoting its Use for Security Purposes (10) Strengthening Technological Capabilities 2. Strengthening the Japan-U.S. Alliance (1) Further Strengthening of Japan-U.S. Security and Defense Cooperation in a Wide Range of Areas (2) Ensuring a Stable Presence of the U.S. Forces 3. Strengthening Diplomacy and Security Cooperation with Japan’s Partners for Peace and Stability in the International Community 4. Proactive Contribution to International Efforts for Peace and Stability of the International Community 5. Strengthening Cooperation Based on Universal Values to Resolve Global Issues Approaches to defense capabilities are discussed in the National Defense Program Guidelines 6. Strengthening the Domestic Foundation that Supports National Security and Promoting Domestic and Global Understanding (1) Maintaining and Enhancing Defense Production and Technological Bases (2) Boosting Communication Capabilities (3) Reinforcing the Social Base (4) Enhancing the Intellectual Base ----- **Changes of the Views regarding Defense Capability** (October 29, 1976 the National Defense Council/Cabinet Meeting) |g Defense Capability|Col2| |---|---| |Basic ideas in 1976 NDPG|| |• The concept of Basic Defense Capability • Maintain a minimum-necessary defense force as an independent nation preventing a power vacuum that destabilizes the region, rather than coping with a direct military threat to Japan|| [Background] Détente and Cold War coexisting in global community Balance relationships between the U.S., China and Soviet Union has attained in the vicinity of Japan Need to show the target of defense force buildup |19 years|Col2| |---|---| |1995 NDPG|| (November 28, 1995 the Security Council/ Cabinet Meeting) |9 years|Col2| |---|---| |2004 NDPG|| (December 10, 2004 the Security Council/ Cabinet Meeting) |Basic ideas in 1995 NDPG|Col2| |---|---| |• Basically follow the concept of Basic Defense Capability • “Dealing with various contingencies such as major disasters” and “contributing to building a more stable security environment” added to the roles of defense capability, joining the existing role of “defense of the nation”|| |Basic ideas in 2004 NDPG|Col2| |---|---| |• Being able to work independently and proactively on implementing international peace cooperation activities, as well as dealing effectively with new threats and diverse contingencies • Maintenance of the effective aspects of the concept of basic defense capability|| [Background] The end of Cold War International situation with unpredictability and uncertainty National expectations to international contribution [Background] New threats such as international terrorism and ballistic missile attacks Direct connection between world peace and Japan’s peace Necessity to convert the policy from putting weight on deterrence to handling the situation |6 years|Col2| |---|---| |2010 NDPG|| (December 17, 2010 the Security Council/ Cabinet Meeting) |3 years|Col2| |---|---| |2013 NDPG|| (December 17, 2013 the National Security Council/Cabinet Meeting) |Basic ideas in 2010 NDPG|Col2| |---|---| |• Build up of a Dynamic Defense Force (Not bound by the concept of Basic Defense Capability) • Facilitating effective deterrence of and responses to various contingencies, and making it possible to proactively conduct activities to further stabilize the security environment in the Asia-Pacific region and improve the global security environment in a dynamic manner|| |Basic ideas in 2013 NDPG|Col2| |---|---| [Background] Change in global power balance Complex military situation surrounding Japan Diversification of the military role in global society - Build up of a Dynamic Joint Defense Force - Respond to increasingly severe security environment, and carry out various activities, such as securing sea and air superiority seamlessly and flexibly based on joint operations in accordance with the situation through defense capability backed by the idea of joint operation [Background] Security situation surrounding Japan has become increasingly severe U.S. rebalance to the Asia-pacific region Lessons learned from the Self-Defense forces experience of the Great East Japan Earthquake ----- **Matrix of the Legislation for Peace and Security** Images of Situations and Conditions Transportation of Japanese nationals overseas, etc. Support activities (including logistics support) in situations Response to armed attack situations, etc (Existing) [Self-Defense Forces Law] that will have an important influence on Japan’s peace [Legislation for Responses to Situations] Rescue of Japanese nationals overseas, etc. (New) and security (Expansion) Responses to “situations where an armed attack against a [Law Concerning Measures to Ensure Peace and Security foreign country results in threatening Japan’s survival” of Japan in Situations that will Have an Important (New) Protection of SDF’s weapons/other equipment Influence on Japan’s Peace and Security] (Existing) [Self-Defense Forces Law] ・ “Use of force” permitted under the “Three New Conditions” (Revision of the Law Concerning Measures to Ensure Peace and Protection of weapons/other equipment of the U.S. and Security of Japan in Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan) other countries’ armed forces (New) ・ Clarification of the purpose of the revision（Revision of The “Three New Conditions” Provision of supplies and services to the U.S. Armed the purpose of the Law） (1) When an armed attack against Japan occurs or when an armed attack Forces in peacetime [Self-Defense Forces Law] (Expansion) ・ Support activities for armed forces of foreign countries against a foreign country that is in a close relationship with Japan occurs ・ Expand situations where supplies/services can be provided, such (not only the U.S.) and as a result threatens Japan’s survival and poses a clear danger to as the guarding of facilities of the U.S. Armed Forces stationed in ・ Expansion of the scope of support activities (2) When there is no other appropriate means available to repel the attack and fundamentally overturn people’s right to life, liberty and pursuit of happiness Japan ensure Japan’s survival and protect its people Ship Inspection Operations (3) Use of force limited to the minimum extent necessary (Expansion) [Ship Inspection Operations Law] ・ Enable operations for peace and security of the international community International Peace Cooperation Activities [International Peace Cooperation Law] U.N. PKO (Addition) ・ Additional roles by Japanese Corps in operation (e.g. security of specified areas including protection Support activities (including logistics support) to armed of local population) forces of foreign countries in situations that the ・ Review of authority to use weapons (small arms) to international community is collectively addressing for better align with current U.N. standard international peace and security (New) [International Peace Support Law (New)] Internationally coordinated operations for peace and security (Multinational cooperation outside U.N. PKO framework) Reorganizing the Agenda Items of the National Security Council (NSC) [Act for Establishment of the National Security Council] (Note) Cabinet Decisions on accelerating procedures to issue orders for public security operations and maritime security operations in cases of responding to a situation where an infringement that does not amount to an armed attack occurs in areas surrounding remote islands etc and police forces are not present nearby (Development of no new legislation) ----- **Trend in Defense-Related Expenditures Over the Past 15 Years** 50,000 49,000 48,000 47,000 46,000 49,385 49,392 49,262 48,760 48,221 48,297 47,815 47,838 47,903 47,426 47,028 46,804 46,826 46,625 46,453 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 (FY) Note: Does not include SACO-related expenses, portion meant to reduce the burden on the local community out of the U.S.forces realignment expenses, and expenses associated with the acquisition of a new government aircraft. The total defense expenditures when including these items are 4,955.0 billion yen for FY2001, 4,955.7 billion yen for FY2002, 4,952.7 billion yen for FY2003, 4,902.6 billion yen for FY2004, 4,856.0 billion yen for FY2005, 4,813.6 billion yen for FY2006, 4,801.3 billion yen for FY2007, 4,779.6 billion yen for FY2008, 4,774.1 billion yen for FY2009, 4,790.3 billion yen for FY2010, 4,775.2 billion yen for FY2011, 4,713.8 billion yen for FY2012, 4,753.8 billion yen for FY2013, 4,848.8 billion yen for FY2014, and 4,980.1 billion yen for FY2015. ----- **Trends in Incumbent Female SDF Personnel** (Number) 14,000 12,000 (%) 6.0 5.0 10,000 8,000 4.0 3.0 6,000 4,000 2.0 1.0 2,000 0 Female uniformed SDF personnel (Medical personnel) Recruitment of female uniformed SDF Female uniformed SDF personnel (Regular personnel) personnel started for aviation students of the MSDF and the ASDF Female uniformed SDF personnel (Total number) / Total number of uniformed SDF personnel Recruitment of female uniformed SDF personnel started for students of the National Defense Academy Recruitment of female uniformed SDF Recruitment of female personnel started for uniformed SDF students of the National Recruitment of female personnel started for the Defense Medical uniformed SDF position of medical College personnel started in the officer and dental officer regular service area of the MSDF and the ASDF Recruitment of female uniformed SDF personnel started in the regular service area of the GSDF 54 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 (FY) Note: As of the end of March 2015 the total number of female uniformed SDF personnel is 12 958 (approximately 5 7% of the total number of the current uniformed SDF personnel) 0.0 ----- **Record of Activities in the International Community by the Ministry of Defense and Self-Defense Forces** 16. Activities based on the former Iraq 1. Dispatch of minesweepers to the Persian Gulf (April - October 1991) Starting point for international cooperation by the SDF 2. United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (September 1992 - September 1993) First peacekeeping operations by the SDF Participation by GSDF, MSDF and ASDF personnel 3. United Nations activities in Mozambique May 1993 - January 1995) First dispatch to a United Nations operational headquarters Formed the first unit to consist of GSDF, MSDF and ASDF personnel 4. Relief for refugees in Rwanda (September - December 1994) First international humanitarian relief activities Highly praised by African and other countries 18. International disaster relief activities in Indonesia (January -March 2005) Large-scale rescue operation of approx. 1,000 people First deployment of GSDF helicopters Establishment of the first joint liaison and |Col1|Col2|29|Col4|Col5| |---|---|---|---|---| |||29 15 20 37 10 22||| |9 17 32 25 23 2|||28 27 6|: Dispatch of minesweepers to the Persian Gulf : United Nations peacekeeping operations : International disaster relief activities : Activities based on the former Anti-terrorism Special Measures Act (Act on Special Measures concerning Implementation of Replenishment Support Activities towards the Anti-Terrorism Maritime Interdiction Operation) : Activities based on the former Iraq Humanitarian Relief Support Special Measures Act : Anti-piracy activities off the coast of Somalia & in the Gulf of Aden| |||||| |||||| ||3 34|||| coordination center 19. International disaster relief activities in waters off the Kamchatka Peninsula in Russia (August 2005) Rapid response by an MSDF submarine rescue ship |9. International disaster relief activities in India (February 2001) Learned lessons concerning collaboration with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and nongovernmental organizations (NGO)|Col2| |---|---| ||| 17. International disaster relief activities in Thailand (December 2004 - January 2005) An MSDF destroyer en route home to Japan was swiftly diverted to conduct search and rescue and provide assistance : Dispatch of minesweepers to the Persian Gulf : United Nations peacekeeping operations : International disaster relief activities : Activities based on the former Anti-terrorism Special Measures Act (Act on Special Measures concerning Implementation of Replenishment Support Activities towards the Anti-Terrorism Maritime Interdiction Operation) : Activities based on the former Iraq Humanitarian Relief Support Special Measures : Anti-piracy activities off the coast of Somalia & 34. International disaster relief activities in Malaysia (March – April 2014) Provided search and rescue activities for a missing Malaysian airplane 35. International disaster relief activities in West Africa (December 2014) Airlift of personal protective equipment to the UN Mission for Ebola Emergency Response 36. International disaster relief activities in Indonesia Provided search and rescue activities for a missing AirAsia airplane 20. International disaster relief activities in Pakistan (October - December 2005) Deployment of GSDF helicopters and ASDF transport aircraft Collaboration on the ground with JICA 5. United Nations Disengagement 7. Transport of supplies required for a disaster 10. Relief for refugees in Afghanistan 12. United Nations Transitional Observer Force relief operation in Turkey (October 2001) Administration in East Timor (February 1996 - January 2013) (September - November 1999) Transport of relief supplies at the request of (February 2002 - June 2004) Contributing to the stabilization First time the MSDF had carried out duties based on a long UNHCR Largest peacekeeping operation in of the Middle East sea voyage (around 23 days) which the SDF had participated 17-year deployment of units 11. Cooperation and support activities First participation by female SDF personnel 8. Relief for refugees in Timor-Leste based on the former Anti-terrorism 13. Relief for refugees in Iraq 6. International disaster relief (November 1999 - February 2000) Special Measures Act activities in Honduras Transport of relief supplies by an ASDF transport unit (November 2001 - November 2007) (March - April 2003)Transport of supplies for humanitarian (November - December 1998) Efforts to eliminate terrorism relief using a government airplane First international disaster relief activities undertaken by the SDF 9. International disaster relief activities in India Strengthening of collaboration with armed forces from various other countries Carried out long-distance airlifts (February 2001) 14. Relief for victims in Iraq Learned lessons concerning collaboration with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and nongovernmental organizations (NGO) (July - August 2003) Japan-U.S. Alliance 19 Cooperation in activities at the request 7 of the World Food Programme (WFP) 14 13 29 16 15 20 37 5 10 22 1 28 9 27 17 6 35 32 25 23 2 24 11 36 18 34 33 30 4 26 12 34 21 8 Act 34 in the Gulf of Aden 3 34 28. United Nations Stabilization 34 31 Mission in Haiti 22. United Nations Mission in Nepal (March 2007 - January 2011)First duties involving monitoring the management of weapons and soldiers 25. Anti-piracy activities off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden (February 2010 - February 2013)Deployments in conjunction with the activities of the Japan Disaster Relief Team in Haiti Providing support for recovery and reconstruction following a major earthquake 31. International disaster relief (February - March 2011)Transport of police, fire brigade and coast activities in New Zealand 23. Replenishment support (March 2009 - present) guard teams, among others Escorting marine vessels not only from Japan activities based on the former but also various other countries 29. International disaster relief (UNMEER) Replenishment Support Special activities in Pakistan 32. United Nations Mission in South Measures Act 26. International disaster relief (August - October 2010) Sudan (January 2008 -January 2010) activities in Indonesia Establishment of the first joint operations (November 2011 - present) Resumed the activities that had been suspendedSupport for the counterterrorism activities of (October 2009) and coordination center on the groundCarried out duties in collaboration with Contributing to nation-building and to support Protection of Civilians in South Sudan (January 2015) other countries Provided swift medical support various other countries 21. Dispatch of Japan Disaster Relief Team to Indonesia (June 2006) Provided medical support and carried out epidemic prevention activities |Col1|Col2|Col3|28. United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (February 2010 - February 2013)|Col5| |---|---|---|---|---| |||||| |25. Anti-piracy activities off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden|||Deployments in conjunction with the activities of the Japan Disaster Relief Team in Haiti Providing support for recovery and reconstruction following a major earthquake|| |(March 2009 - present) Escorting marine vessels not only from Japan but also various other countries||||| 33. International disaster relief activities in the Philippines (November – December 2013) Provided medical care, epidemic prevention, and transportation of affected people in responding to the Philippine typhoon 27. International disaster relief activities in Haiti (January - February 2010) Provided rapid transport and carried out medical care activities following a major earthquake in Haiti 30. United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste (September 2010 –September 2012) Contributing to the maintenance of public order and recovery in Timor-Leste 37. International disaster relief activities in Nepal (April - May 2015) Conducted medical service assistance following a major earthquake in Nepal 24. United Nations Mission in the Sudan (October 2008 - September 2011) Dispatch of staff officers contributing to stabilization of Sudan ----- (As of March 31, 2015) **Organizational Diagram of the Self-Defense Forces** Minister of Defense Chief of Staff, Joint Staff Joint Staff Chief of Staff, GSDF Chief of Staff, MSDF Chief of Staff, ASDF Ground Staff Office Maritime Staff Office Air Staff Office Northern Army Headquarters (Sapporo) Middle Army Headquarters (Itami) Northern Army 2nd Division Division Headquarters (Asahikawa) Middle Army 3rd Division Division Headquarters (Senzo) Self-Defense Fleet Fleet Escort Force Escort Flotilla 1 (Yokosuka) Escort Division 1 (Yokosuka) Yokosuka District Minesweeper Division 41 Air Defense Command Northern Air Defense Force 2nd Air Wing (Chitose) Air Support Command 1st Tactical Airlift Group (Komaki) 3rd Infantry Regiment (Nayoro)25th Infantry Regiment (Engaru) 7th Infantry Regiment (Fukuchiyama)36th Infantry Regiment (Itami) Escort Division 5 (Sasebo) 3rd Air Wing (Misawa) 2nd Tactical Airlift Group (Iruma) 26th Infantry Regiment (Rumoi)2nd Tank Regiment (Kamifurano)2nd Field Artillery Regiment (Asahikawa) 37th Infantry Regiment (Shinodayama)3rd Field Artillery unit (Himeji)3rd Logistics Support Regiment (Senzo) Escort Flotilla 2 (Sasebo) Escort Division 2 (Sasebo)Escort Division 6 (Yokosuka) Kure District Sub Area Activity Hanshin (Kobe) Minesweeper Division 42 Northern Aircraft Control and Warning Wing (Misawa) 42nd Aircraft Control and Warning Group (Ominato)45th Aircraft Control and Warning Group (Tobetsu) 3rd Tactical Airlift Group (Miho)Air Traffic Control Service Group 2nd Logistics Support Regiment (Asahikawa) Other units Escort Flotilla 3 (Maizuru) Escort Division 3 (Ominato) 18th Aircraft Control and Warning Squadron (Wakkanai) (Fuchu, Each region) Other units 10th Division Division Headquarters (Moriyama) Escort Division 7 (Maizuru) Sasebo District Sub Area Activity Shimonoseki Minesweeper Division 43 26th Aircraft Control and Warning Squadron (Nemuro) Air Weather Service Group 5th Brigade Brigade Headquarters (Obihiro)4th Infantry Regiment (Obihiro)6th Infantry Regiment (Bihoro)27th Infantry Regiment (Kushiro)5th Field Artillery Regiment (Obihiro)5th Logistics Support Unit (Obihiro) 14th Infantry Regiment (Kanazawa)33rd Infantry Regiment (Hisai)35th Infantry Regiment (Moriyama)10th Field Artillery Regiment (Toyokawa)10th Logistics Support Regiment (Kasugai)Other units Escort Flotilla 4 (Kure)Fleet Training Command (Yokosuka) Escort Division 4 (Kure)Escort Division 8 (Sasebo)Kure Fleet Training GroupSasebo Fleet Training GroupYokosuka Fleet Training Group Maizuru District Sub Area Activity Okinawa (Uruma)Coastal Defense Group Tsushima Minesweeper Division 46Minesweeper Division 44 29th Aircraft Control and Warning Squadron (Okushiritou)33rd Aircraft Control and Warning Squadron (Kamo)36th Aircraft Control and Warning Squadron (Erimo)37th Aircraft Control and Warning Squadron (Yamada)28th Aircraft Control and Warning Squadron (Abashiri) (Fuchu, Each region)Flight Check Squadron (Iruma)Special Airlift Group (Chitose)Aeromedical Evacuation Squadron (Komaki) Other units 13th Brigade Brigade Headquarters (Kaitaichi) Maizuru Fleet Training Group 1st Mobile Aircraft Control and Warning Squadron (Chitose) 7th Division Division Headquarters (Higashi Chitose)11th Infantry Regiment (Higashi Chitose)71st Tank Regiment (Kita Chitose)72nd Tank Regiment (Kita Eniwa)73rd Tank Regiment (Minami Eniwa)7th Field Artillery Regiment (Higashi Chitose)7th Antiaircraft Artillery Regiment (Shizunai) 14th Brigade 8th Infantry Regiment (Yonago)17th Infantry Regiment (Yamaguchi)46th Infantry Regiment (Kaitaichi)13th Field Artillery unit (Nihonbara)13th Logistics Support Unit (Kaitaichi)Other unitsBrigade Headquarters (Zentsuji) Ominato Fleet Training Group (Mutsu)Missile System Training Center (Yokosuka)Escort Division 11 (Yokosuka)Escort Division 12 (Kure) Ominato District Sub Area Activity HakodateCoastal Defense Group YoichiBase Facility Wakkanai Minesweeper Division 45Patrol Guided Missile Boat Division 1 3rd Air Defense Missile Group (Chitose)6th Air Defense Missile Group (Misawa) 20th, 23rd Fire Unit (Yakumo)Other units9th, 10th Fire Unit (Chitose)11th, 24th Fire Unit (Naganuma)21st, 22nd Fire Unit (Shariki) Air Training Command 4th Air Wing (Matsushima)11th Flying Training Wing (Shizuhama)12th Flying Training Wing (Hofu-kita)1st Air Wing (Hamamatsu) 7th Logistics Support Regiment (Higashi Chitose)Other units 15th Infantry Regiment (Zentsuji)50th Infantry Regiment (Kochi)14th Field Artillery unit (Matsuyama) Escort Division 13 (Sasebo)Escort Division 14 (Maizuru) Air Training Command Air Training Group Shimofusa (Kashiwa) Air Training Squadron 203 Other unitsNorthern Air Civil Engineering Group (Misawa, Chitose) 13th Flying Training Wing (Ashiya) 11th Brigade Brigade Headquarters (Makomanai)10th Infantry Regiment (Takikawa)18th Infantry Regiment (Makomanai)28th Infantry Regiment (Hakodate) 8th Antiaircraft Artillery Group (Aonogahara) 14th Logistics Support Unit (Zentsuji)Other units Escort Division 15 (Ominato)Landing Ship Division 1 (Kure) Air Training Group Tokushima (Itano-gun Matsushige Town)Air Training Squadron Ozuki Air Training Squadron 202Air Training Squadron 201 Central Air Defense Force 6th Air Wing (Komatsu)7th Air Wing (Hyakuri) Air Basic Training Wing (Hofu-minami, Kumagaya)Fighter Training Group (Nyutabaru) 11th Field Artillery unit (Makomanai)11th Logistics Support Unit (Makomanai)Other units Middle Air Wing (Yao)4th Engineer Brigade (Okubo) 6th Engineer Group (Toyokawa) Replenishment-at-Sea Squadron 1 (Yokosuka) (Shimonoseki) Air Training Squadron 211 (Kanoya) Central Aircraft Control and Warning Wing (Iruma) 1st Aircraft Control and Warning Group (Kasatoriyama)23rd Aircraft Control and Warning Group (Wajima) Other units and organizations 1st Field Artillery Brigade (Kita Chitose)1st Antiaircraft Artillery Brigade (Higashi Chitose) 1st Surface-to-Ship Missile Regiment (Kita Chitose)2nd Surface-to-Ship Missile Regiment (Bibai)3rd Surface-to-Ship Missile Regiment (Kamifurano)1st Field Artillery Group (Kita Chitose)4th Field Artillery Group (Kamifurano)1st Antiaircraft Artillery Regiment (Higashi Chitose)4th Antiaircraft Artillery Regiment (Nayoro) Western Army Middle Army Combined Brigade (Otsu)Other unitsWestern Army Headquarters (Kengun)4th Division 7th Engineer Group (Okubo)47th Infantry Regiment (Kaitaichi)49th Infantry Regiment (Toyokawa)Division Headquarters (Fukuoka)16th Infantry Regiment (Oomura)40th Infantry Regiment (Kokura) Fleet Air Force Fleet Air Wing 1 (Kanoya)Fleet Air Wing 2 (Hachinohe)Fleet Air Wing 4 (Ayase)Fleet Air Wing 5 (Naha) Drone Support Squadron 1 (Kure)Air Patrol Squadron 1 (Kanoya)Air Patrol Squadron 2 (Hachinohe)Air Patrol Squadron 3 (Ayase)Air Station Iwo-to (Ogasawara)Air Patrol Squadron 5 (Naha) Training Squadron Communications Command (Ichigaya) Training Division 1 (Kure) 27th Aircraft Control and Warning Group (Ohtakineyama)5th Aircraft Control and Warning Squadron (Kushimoto)22nd Aircraft Control and Warning Squadron (Omaezaki)35th Aircraft Control and Warning Squadron (Kyogamisaki)44th Aircraft Control and Warning Squadron (Mineokayama)46th Aircraft Control and Warning Squadron (Sado)2nd Mobile Aircraft Control and Warning Squadron (Iruma)Other units Air Development and Test Command Electronics Development and Test Group (Fuchu, Iruma)Aero-Medical Laboratory (Iruma, Tachikawa)Air Development and Test Wing (Gifu) Northern Air Wing (Okadama) 41st Infantry Regiment (Beppu) Air Communications and System Northern Engineer Unit (Minami Eniwa) 12th Engineer Group (Iwamizawa)13th Engineer Unit (Horobetu) 4th Field Artillery Regiment (Kurume)4th Logistics Support Regiment (Fukuoka)Tsushima Guard Unit (Tsushima)* Fleet Air Wing 21 (Tateyama) Air ASW Helicopter Squadron 21 (Tateyama)Air ASW Helicopter Squadron 23 (Maizuru) MSDF Maritime Materiel Command (Jujo) MSDF Ship Supply Depot (Yokosuka)MSDF Air Supply Depot (Kisarazu) 1st Air Defense Missile Group (Iruma) 1st Fire Unit (Narashino)2nd Fire Unit (Takeyama)3rd Fire Unit (Kasumigaura) Wing (Ichigaya, Each region)Aero Safety Service Group (Tachikawa) Northern Army Combined Brigade (Higashi Chitose) 52nd Infantry Regiment (Makomanai) Other units Air ASW Helicopter Squadron 25 (Mutsu) 4th Fire Unit (Iruma) Air Material Command Other unitsNortheastern Army Headquarters (Sendai) 8th Division Division Headquarters (Kita Kumamoto)12th Infantry Regiment (Kokubu)24th Infantry Regiment (Ebino)42nd Infantry Regiment (Kita Kumamoto) Fleet Air Wing 22 (Omura) Helicopter Rescue Squadron 73 (Tateyama)Air ASW Helicopter 22 (Omura) Other units and organizations 4th Air Defense Missile Group (Gifu) 12th Fire Unit (Aibano)13th, 15th Fire Unit (Gifu) (Jujo, Each region)Other units and organizations Northeastern Army 6th Division Division Headquarters (Jinmachi) 43rd Infantry Regiment (Miyakonojo) Air ASW Helicopter 24 (Komatsushima) 14th Fire Unit (Hakusan) 20th Infantry Regiment (Jinmachi) 8th Field Artillery Regiment (Kita Kumamoto) Helicopter Rescue Squadron 72 (Omura) Central Air Civil Engineering Group (Iruma, Each region) 22nd Infantry Regiment (Tagajo)44th Infantry Regiment (Fukusima) 8th Logistics Support Regiment (Kita Kumamoto)Other units Fleet Air Wing 31 (Iwakuni) Air Rescue Squadron 71 (Iwakuni) Other units 6th Field Artillery Regiment (Koriyama)6th Logistics Support Regiment (Jinmachi) 15th Brigade Brigade Headquarters (Naha)51st Infantry Regiment (Naha) Air Reconnaissance Squadron 81 (Iwakuni)Air Training Support Squadron 91 (Iwakuni) Western Air Defense Force 5th Air Wing (Nyutabaru) Other units 15th Antiaircraft Artillery Regiment (Yaese) Air Development Squadron 51 (Ayase) 8th Air Wing (Tsuiki) 9th Division Division Headquarters (Aomori) 15th Helicopter Unit (Naha) 5th Infantry Regiment (Aomori) 15th Logistics Support Unit (Naha) Air Transport Squadron 61 (Ayase) Western Aircraft Control and 13th Aircraft Control and Warning Group (Takahatayama) 21st Infantry Regiment (Akita)39th Infantry Regiment (Hirosaki)9th Artillery Regiment (Iwate) Western Infantry Regiment (Ainoura) Other units Mine Countermeasure Helicopter Squadron 111 (Iwakuni) Warning Wing (Kasuga) 43rd Aircraft Control and Warning Group (Sefuriyama)7th Aircraft Control and Warning Squadron (Takaoyama) 9th Logistics Support Regiment (Hachinohe) Western Field Artillery Unit (Yufuin) 5th Surface-to-Ship Missile Regiment (Kengun) Fleet Submarine Force Headquarters (Yokosuka) 9th Aircraft Control and Warning Squadron (Shimo-Koshikijima) Other units 2nd Antiaircraft Artillery Brigade (Iizuka) 3rd Antiaircraft Artillery Group (Iizuka) Submarine Flotilla 1 (Kure) Submarine Division 1 (Kure) 15th Aircraft Control and Warning Squadron (Fukuejima) Northeastern Army Combined Brigade (Sendai) 38th Infantry Regiment (Tagajo) 7th Antiaircraft Artillery Group (Takematsu) Submarine Division 3 (Kure) 17th Aircraft Control and Warning Squadron (Mishima) Northeastern Field Artillery Unit (Sendai) 4th Surface-to-Ship Missile Regiment (Hachinohe) Western Air Wing (Takayubaru) Submarine Division 5 (Kure) 19th Aircraft Control and Warning Squadron (Unishima) 5th Antiaircraft Artillery Group (Hachinohe) 5th Engineer Brigade (Ogori) 2nd Engineer Group (Iizuka) Submarine Flotilla 2 Submarine Division 2 (Yokosuka) 3rd Mobile Aircraft Control and Warning Squadron (Kasuga) 9th Engineer Group (Ogori) (Yokosuka) Submarine Division 4 (Yokosuka) Other units Northeastern Air Wing (Kasuminome) Western Army Combined Brigade (Ainoura) 19th Infantry Regiment (Fukuoka) Training Submarine Division 1 (Kure) 2nd Air Defense Missile Group 5th, 6th Fire Unit (Ashiya) 2nd Engineer Brigade (Funaoka)Other units Other unitsCentral Readiness Force Headquarters (Zama) Submarine Training Center (Kure) (Kasuga) 7th Fire Unit (Tsuiki)8th Fire Unit (Kouradai) Eastern Army Eastern Army Headquarters (Asaka)1st Division Division Headquarters (Nerima)1st Infantry Regiment (Nerima) Central Readiness Force 1st Airborne Brigade (Narashino)Special Operation Group (Narashino) Mine Warfare Force (Yokosuka) Minesweeper Division 1 (Kure)Minesweeper Division 2 (Sasebo)Minesweeper Division 51 (Yokosuka) Other unitsWestern Air Civil Engineering Group (Ashiya, Each region) 32nd Infantry Regiment (Omiya)34th Infantry Regiment (Itazuma) 1st Helicopter Brigade (Kisarazu) Mine Warfare Support Center (Yokosuka)Minesweeper Division 101 (Kure) Southwestern Composite Air Division 83rd Air Wing (Naha) 1st Field Artillery unit (Kitafuji)1st Logistics Support Regiment (Nerima) Central Readiness Regiment (Utsunomiya) Fleet Intelligence Command Operational Intelligence Center (Yokosuka) Southwestern Aircraft Control and Warning Wing (Naha) 56th Aircraft Control and Warning Group (Yozadake)53rd Aircraft Control and Warning Squadron (Miyakojima) Other units Central NBC Weapon Defense Unit (Omiya) (Yokosuka) Basic Intelligence Center (Ichigaya) 54th Aircraft Control and Warning Squadron (Kumejima) 12th Brigade Brigade Headquarters (Somagahara) International Peace Cooperation Activities Training Unit (Komakado) Electronic Intelligence Center (Yokosuka) 55th Aircraft Control and Warning Squadron (Okinoerabujima) 2nd Infantry Regiment (Takada)13th Infantry Regiment (Matsumoto)30th Infantry Regiment (Shibata)12th Field Artillery unit (Utsunomiya)12th Helicopter Unit (Somagahara)12th Logistics Support Unit (Shinmachi) Other unitsSignal Brigade (Ichigaya)Ground Research & Development Command (Asaka) Oceanographic Command (Yokosuka) Weather Service Unit (Yokosuka)Oceanographic Observation Okinawa (Uruma)Oceanographic Observation Anti-Submarine Warfare Center (Yokosuka) 5th Air Defense Missile Group (Naha) 4th Mobile Aircraft Control and Warning Squadron (Naha)Other units16th, 18th Fire Unit (Chinen)17th Fire Unit (Naha) Other units Ground Material Control Command (Jujo) Shimokita (Higashidoori) 19th Fire Unit (Onna) 2nd Antiaircraft Artillery Group (Matsudo) Other units and organizations Fleet Research and C4I Systems Center (Yokosuka) Southwestern Air Civil Engineering Group (Naha) Eastern Air Wing (Tachikawa) Development Command (Yokosuka) Surface Systems Center (Yokosuka)Air Systems Programming Center (Ayase) Other units 1st Engineer Brigade (Koga) 4th Engineer Group (Zama) Air Rescue Wing (Iruma, Each region) 5th Engineer Group (Takada) Tactical Air Training Group (Yokota, Each region) Eastern Army Combined Brigade 31st Infantry Regiment (Takeyama) Tactical Reconnaissance Group (Hyakuri) (Takeyama) 48th Infantry Regiment (Somagahara) Airborne Warning and Control Wing (Hamamatsu, Each region) Other units Other units *Refers to a regional directly controlled unit, but is placed under the commander of the 4th division ----- Location of Principal SDF Units (As of March 31, 2015) ----- ###### Abbreviation List and Index (Note) 1. This index is complied aiming at terms used in the main text (including footnotes), columns, and figures. 2. Numbers indicate the page number where the term appears. For terms that are frequently used, only major page numbers are listed. A2/AD / anti-access/area-denial / 9, 34, 35, 42, 133 ACSA / Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement / 149, 171, 189, 190, 245, 279, 282, 288, 290, 303 ADIZ / Air Defense Indentif cation Zone / 3, 32, 44, 45, 83, 84, 118, 224, 226 ADMM / ASEAN Defense Ministers’ Meeting / 85, 270, 272, 296 ADMM Plus / ASEAN Defense Ministers’ Meeting-Plus / 4, 85, 270, 271, 272, 273, 285, 288, 296 AFISMA / African-led International Support Mission in Mali / 107, 108 AG / Australia Group / 305 AHR / ASEAN Militaries’ Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief Table-Top Exercise / 85 ALGS / Autonomic Logistics Global Sustainment / 134 AMISOM / African Union Mission in Somalia / 107 ANDSF / Afghan National Defense and Security Forces / 92, 102, 103 APEC / Asia-Pacif c Economic Cooperation / 52, 65 AQAP / al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula / 101, 105, 109, 110, 112 AQIM / al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb / 107, 108, 110, 112 ARF / ASEAN Regional Forum / 4, 26, 28, 53, 65, 85, 270, 271, 272, 273, 278, 285 ASBM / Anti-Ship Ballistic Missile / 38 ASD / Australian Signals Directorate / 132 ASEAN / Association of Southeast Asian Nations / 4, 26, 28, 46, 53, 65, 69, 72, 76, 78, 79, 83, 84, 85, 119, 122, 123, 155, 188, 231, 269, 270, 272, 273, 274, 285, 287, 288, 296 ASG / Abu Sayyaf Group / 78, 111 AU / African Union / 54, 97, 106, 108 AUSMIN / Australia United States Ministerial Consultations / 71 72 BMD / Ballistic Missile Defense / 9, 12, 14, 133, 155, 160, 161, 167, 168, 170, 185, 189, 192, 210, 211, 222, 229, 230, 231, 267 BMDR / Ballistic Missile Defense Review / 12 BWC / Biological Weapons Convention / 305 **C** CA EX / Chief of Army’s Exercise / 274 CAP / Combat Air Patrol / 45, 241 C[4]ISR / Command, Control, Communication, Computer, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance/ 123, 133 CARAT / Cooperation Af oat Readiness and Training / 76, 78, 79, 80 CCD COE / Cooperative Cyber Defense Centre of Excellence / 131 CCW / Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons which may be deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to have Indiscriminate Effects / 133, 305, 306 CDC / Cyber Defense Council / 233 CFE / Conventional Armed Forces in Europe / 68 CFSP / Common Foreign and Security Policy / 92 CHOD / Chief of Defense / 274 CIS / Commonwealth of Independent States / 64, 67 CMF / Combined Maritime Forces / 32, 120, 121, 291 COC / Code of the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea / 81, 83, 123 CPA / Comprehensive Peace Agreement / 106, 299 CPGS / Conventional Prompt Global Strike / 12 CSOC / Cyber Security Operations Centre / 132 ----- CSTO / Collective Security Treaty Organization / 67 CTBT / Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty / 113, 305 CTF151 / Combined Task Force151 / 120, 191, 291, 292, 293, 294, 295, 296 CUES / Code for Unplanned Encounters at Sea / 48, 119, 231, 295 CWC / Chemical Weapons Convention / 114, 115, 305 CYMAT / Cyber incident Mobile Assistanse Team / 233 DDR / Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration / 298 DMZ / Demilitarized Zone / 15, 17, 29 DOC / Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea / 81, 83, 123 DOD / Defence Off cials’ Dialogue / 273 **E** EAS / East Asia Summit / 65, 85 EEZ / Exclusive Economic Zone / 43, 48, 51, 52, 119, 121, 122, 152, 222, 223 EU / European Union / 5, 46, 54, 78, 90, 91, 92, 93, 94, 95, 99, 108, 117, 118, 121, 124, 125, 126, 144, 158, 270, 274, 290, 291, 295 EWG / Experts’ Working Group / 270, 272, 273, 288 **F** FACO / Final Assembly and Check Out / 267 FPDA / Five Power Defence Arrangements / 76, 79 **H** HA/DR / Humanitarian Assistance / Disaster Relief / 168, 179, 278, 288 HEU / Highly Enriched Uranium / 19 **I** IAEA / International Atomic Energy Agency / 19, 116, 117, 305 ICBM / Intercontinental Ballistic Missile / 12, 22, 38, 57, 59, 62, 136 ICRC / International Committee of the Red Cross / 274 ICT / Information and Communications Technology / 2, 5, 6, 128, 129, 130, 132, 133 IED / Improvised Explosive Device / 297 IISS / The International Institute for Strategic Studies / 82, 122, 186, 274 IMO / International Maritime Organization / 229 IMT / International Monitoring Team / 78 INF / Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces / 61 IPT / Integrated Project Team / 263 IRBM / Intermediate-Range Ballistic Missile / 21, 38 ISAF / International Security Assistance Force / 67, 74, 89, 92, 102 ISF / International Stabilisation Force / 73 ISIL / Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant / 1, 5, 7, 55, 71, 74, 78, 91, 92, 94, 95, 96, 97, 99, 100, 101, 102, 104, 106, 109, 110, 111, 112, 114, 288 ISM / Inter-Sessional Meeting / 272, 273, 296 ISR / Inteligence Surveillance Reconnaissance / 9, 10, 71, 94, 119, 156, 158, 159, 160, 162, 165, 166, 167, 168, 169, 175, 176, 177, 179, 180, 185, 188, 189, 190, 226, 227, 245, 265 JADGE / Japan Aerospace Defense Ground Environment / 229, 230 JI / Jemaah Islamiya / 75, 78 JICA / Japan International Cooperation Agency / 303, 306 JSF / Joint Strike Fighter / 70, 71, 82 JSOTF-P / Joint Special Operations Task Force-Philippines / 78 JWG / Joint Working Group / 269, 283, 284 **K** KFOR / Kosovo Force / 92 LCS / Littoral Combat Ship / 9, 14, 79, 82, 119 LJM / Liberation and Justice Movement / 107 ----- NSSS / National Security Space Strategy / 124 ODA / Off cial Development Assistance / 158, 297 OECD / Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development / 75, 248, 259 OEF / Operation Enduring Freedom / 102 OPCW / Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons / 97, 99, 114, 305, 306 OSCE / Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe / 66, 68, 158 **P** PAC-3 / Patriot Advanced Capability-3 / 55, 56, 167, 170, 193, 211, 229, 230, 245 PACS / Pacif c Air chiefs Symposium / 275 PBL / Performance Based Logistics / 264 PFI / Private Finance Initiative / 245, 262, 263 PKO / Peacekeeping Operations / 32, 33, 48, 54, 80, 86, 96, 97, 108, 139, 140, 141, 155, 168, 170, 173, 190, 282, 285, 297, 298, 300, 301, 302 PM / Project Manager / 263 PP / Pacif c Partnership / 277 PSI / Proliferation Security Initiative / 168, 191, 305, 306, 307 **Q** QDR / Quadrennial Defense Review / 7, 8, 9, 11, 51, 96, 130, 133, 174 RAP / Readiness Action Plan / 68, 91 ReCAAP / Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia / 122, 123 RMC / Role Mission Capability / 174 **S** S&TF / Systems and Technology Forum / 185, 192 SACO / Special Action Committee on Okinawa / 75, 170, 180, 181, 195, 200, 201, 203, 208, 246, 247, 248 MAGTF / Marine Air Ground Task Force / 196, 204 MCAP / Multinational Cooperation program in the Asia Pacif c / 278 MD / Missile Defense / 12, 57, 58, 67, 68 MEF / Marine Expeditionary Force / 14, 76, 196, 197, 202, 204 MILF / Moro Islamic Liberation Front / 78 MINUSMA / United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali / 98, 108 MIRV / Multiple Independently targetable Re-entry Vehicle / 38 MNLA / National Movement for the Liberation of the Azawad / 107, 108 MRBM / Medium-Range Ballistic Missile / 38 MSO / Maritime Security Operation / 32 MTCR / Missile Technology Control Regime / 305 NAC / North Atlantic Council / 131 NATO / North Atlantic Treaty Organization / 57, 58, 61, 66, 68, 89, 90, 91, 92, 93, 94, 95, 102, 104, 120, 121, 129, 131, 158, 233, 253, 254, 290, 291, 295 NBC / Nuclear, Biological and Chemical / 5, 113, 167, 216, 239, 240 NEO / Non-Combatant Evacuation Operation / 277 NGO / Non-Governmental Organization / 276, 277, 298 NISC / National center of Incident readiness and Strategy for Cybersecurity / 233 NLL / Northern Limit Line / 27 NPR / Nuclear Posture Review / 11 NPT / Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons / 72, 113, 116, 138, 305 NRC / NATO-Russia Council / 68 NSC / National Security Council / 93, 291 NSS / National Security Strategy / 7, 8, 9, 93, 130, 153, 154, 155, 231, 232 ----- SCC / Security Consultative Committee / 174, 183, 184, 185, 186, 202, 204, 211 SCO / Shanghai Cooperation Organization / 53, 65 SDC / Subcommittee for Defense Cooperation / 174, 183, 184, 185 SDCF / Security and Defense Cooperation Forum / 280 SDSR / Strategic Defence and Security Review / 93, 113 SEW / Shared Early Warning / 229, 230 SLBM / Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missile / 12, 21, 22, 38, 59, 62 SM-3 / Standard Missile-3 / 12, 167, 189, 229, 231, 245, 261 SNMG / Standing NATO Maritime Group / 93 SOFA / Status of Forces Agreement / 102, 186, 188, 194, 213 SOM / Senior Off cials Meeting / 270, 273 SRBM / Short-Range Ballistic Missile / 38 SSA / Space Situational Awareness / 124 SSBN / Ballistic Missile Submarine Nuclear-Powered / 38, 59, 62 SSC / Security Subcommittee / 183, 184 SSR / Security Sector Reform / 298 START / Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty / 5, 59, 113 START I / Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty I / 59, 113 **T** TEL / Transporter-Erector-Launcher / 21, 22, 23, 38 TFG / Transitional Federal Government / 107 TTP / Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan / 88, 111 UAE / United Arab Emirates / 32, 271, 307 UIC / Union of Islamic Courts / 107 UNAMID / AU/UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur / 98, 107 UNCLOS / United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea / 48, 118, 119, 123 UNDOF / United Nations Disengagement Observer Force / 98, 103 UNHCR / Off ce of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees / 298 UNIFIL / United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon / 98, 103 UNISFA / United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei / 98, 106 UNMEER / United Nations Mission for Ebola Emergency Response / 111, 303 UNMIS / United Nations Mission in Sudan / 299 UNMISS / United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan / 32, 48, 80, 98, 106, 170, 280, 299, 300, 301 UNOCHA / United Nations Off ce for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs / 274 UNSAS / U.N. Stand-by Arrangements System / 297 UNTSO / United Nations Truce Supervision Organization / 98, 103 **V** VJTF / Very High Readiness Joint Task Force / 68, 91 VPR / Verteidigungspolitischen Richtlinien / 95 **W** WPNS / Western Pacif c Naval Symposium / 48, 119, 231, 275, 284 -----