**On the Publication of Defense of Japan 2009** **Yasukazu Hamada** Minister of Defense The Ministry of Defense publishes a defense white paper every year so that more people can understand Japan’ s defense policies as well as major developments that have occurred over the past year involving the Ministry of Defense and the Self-Defense Forces. As evidence of the transparency of Japan’s defense policies, this white paper “Defense of Japan” plays an important role in enhancing other countries’ understanding of, and trust in, our country. During the period covered by the “Defense of Japan 2009,” anti-piracy measures off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden have been a focus of international attention. Amid various countries dispatching naval vessels to the area, Japan has also dispatched destroyers and P-3C patrol aircraft and is active in guarding Japan-related ships. Japan’s security environment remains severe as seen in North Korea’s ballistic missile launch in April of this year and its nuclear test in May, which were carried out despite opposition from the international community including our country. In the midst of this situation, the SDF plays an important role by steadily making full use of their high degree of proficiency and strength. Firstly, in this year’s white paper, the Ministry of Defense presents its perspective on the entire international situation, outlines foreign countries’ defense policies that could have an influence on Japan’s security, and discusses the situation in areas surrounding Japan. Secondly, there are new reports on measures for the development and utilization of space, which the Ministry of Defense is now working on following the enactment of the Basic Space Law, as well as the Ministry’s efforts for promoting ocean policy, including anti-piracy activities by the SDF off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden. In addition, along with an explanation of the SDF’s response to North Korea’s missile launch in April, we also present the proactive efforts to carry out international peace cooperation activities on Japan’s own initiative, such as lessons and reflections from the SDF international peace cooperation activities in Iraq and the Indian Ocean, and the dispatch of SDF members to the PKO center in Egypt as instructors. The SDF continues to make progress and develop while the field of their activities is expanding. I believe that gaining public trust is important for their future activities. In response to the fact that in recent years, a series of incidents have seriously undermined public trust in the Ministry of Defense and the SDF, the Council for Reforming the Ministry of Defense was established two years ago within the Prime Minister’s Office. In this white paper, one part is allocated for a detailed explanation of the reform of the Ministry of Defense in accordance with the Council’s report as well as directions for organizational reform in the future. We have written this white paper in an easy-to-understand manner so as to promote an understanding of the SDF activities at home and abroad among the people of Japan and other countries. Through columns that introduce SDF members engaged in their day-to-day duties and pick up important issues in considering national security, we have tried to give a real picture of the Ministry of Defense and the SDF, while also providing ----- materials for thinking about defense issues. National security is only ensured with the understanding and cooperation of the people. I sincerely hope that this white paper is read by as many people as possible and that it will help to deepen their understanding of national defense. ----- As seen ###### 2009 in photographs D I G E S ##### DEFENSE #### JAPAN OF Security Environment Surrounding Japan ###### Part l Overview Chapter 1 Issues in the International Community Chapter 2 National Defense Policies of Countries The Basics of Japan’s Defense Policy and ###### Part ll Build-up of Defense Capability Chapter 1 The Basic Concepts of Japan’s Defense Policy Chapter 2 The National Defense Program Guidelines and Build-up of Defense Capability ###### Part lll [Measures for Defense of Japan] Chapter 1 Operations of the Self-Defense Forces for Defense of Japan and Responses to Diverse Situations Chapter 2 Strengthening of the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements Chapter 3 Improvement of the International Security Environment Chapter 4 Citizens of Japan, the Ministry of Defense and the SDF ###### Part lV [Reform of the Ministry of Defense] Section 1 Council for Reforming the Ministry of Defense Section 2 Efforts for Realizing Reform of the Ministry of Defense Section 3 Other Efforts ----- T-90 tank training Ceremony marking the launch of submarine Unryu Airborne F-2 fighters ----- **DEFENSE** ###### JAPAN **OF** As seen in photographs # Part l Security Environment SurroundingJapan Chapter 1 Issues in the International Community Although various countries have continued the fight against terrorism, terrorism has still occurred in many places throughout the world. The United States has proceeded its policies to combat terrorism based on its new strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan. The transfer and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles would be regarded as a serious threat. In particular, the acquisition and the use of weapons of mass destruction by terrorists, against whom ISAF supplies in flames following an attack by Islamist armed groups [EPA/JIJI] ISAF supplies in flames following an attack by Islamist armed groups deterrence is less effective, should be seriously concerned. In Iraq, the security situation has been improved, and the Iraqi government has made their efforts to promote national unity and reconciliation. Complex and diverse regional conflicts are occurring around the world, and acts of piracy have frequently happened, particularly off the coast of Somalia. Competition for energy resources and the issue of climate change may possibly cause regional conflicts in the future. Moreover, outer space and cyber space activities and outbreaks of epidemics are considered security issues. The Iranian Shahab-3 medium-range ballistic missile [EPA/JIJI] An Israeli air strike on the town of Rafah in the autonomous Palestinian territories [EPA/JIJI] ----- In the current international community, states have deepened their mutual dependency, and it is important to work cooperatively for issues such as regional conflicts, international terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. In the Asia-Pacific region, elements of uncertainty and instability are persisting, and promoting and developing multi-level approaches is important Chapter 2 National Defense Policies of Countries The new Obama U.S. administration intends to strengthen and expand its alliances and use all elements of its national power to meet challenges. North Korea is advancing its development of nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles (such as nuclear tests and missile launches), and there are also concerns about their transfer or proliferation. China has modernized its military capabilities (such as missile forces and air forces), and has increased its maritime activities. Moreover, a number of military cadets have recently been expressing their support for the possession of aircraft carriers. Furthermore, efforts have been made in the areas of military use of space and improvement of cyber warfare capabilities. Meanwhile, details of the national defense budget and the future vision for its military forces remain uncertain. Russia has continued to promote military reforms. Russian military operations seem to be increasingly more active in the vicinity of Japan India has been making efforts to enhance international cooperation and expand military exchanges, thereby increasing its presence in the international community. Australia has been actively involved in resolving security issues in the Middle East and other regions, in addition to those in neighboring areas, by dispatching military forces. North Korea’s missile launch in April 2009 [KPS/JIJI] Route of the Chinese destroyer that passed through the Tsugaru Strait in October 2008 President Medvedev of Russia and U.S. President Obama shaking hands at a press conference after the G20 summit [AFP/ JIJI] ----- **DEFENSE** ###### JAPAN **OF** As seen in photographs # Part ll The Basics of Japan’s Defense Policy and Build-up of Defense Capability Chapter 1 The Basic Concepts of Japan’s Defense Policy Under the Constitution, Japan’s basic philosophy is to maintain an exclusively defense-oriented policy and not become a military superpower that poses a threat to other nations. In line with this basic philosophy, while continuing to maintain the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements, Japan continues to ensure civilian control, uphold the Three NonNuclear Principles, and voluntarily maintain appropriate defense capabilities. With the enactment of the Basic Space Law, the Ministry of Defense has been deliberating on measures, for example, about the feasibility of the development and use of space in The second meeting of the Strategic Headquarters for Space Policy the new security context, in coordination with discussions on the use of space of the entire government. Based on the Basic Act on Ocean Policy, a cabinet decision was made to adopt the Basic Plan on Ocean Policy, which stipulates the important measures for ensuring maritime security. In response to this Plan, the Ministry of Defense has been making efforts to conduct operations such as human resources development, development of equipment and joint naval exercises. Incidents caused by armed pirates off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden are frequent and the number of such incidents is rapidly increasing. These acts of piracy represent an issue requiring urgent action from the international community. The Self-Defense Forces have _Sazanami escorting a Japanese ship_ _Sazanami escorting a Japanese ship_ dispatched escort ships and patrol aircraft to this sea area, which is extremely important for Japan as it serves as a shipping route that connects Europe and the Middle East with East Asia, conducting necessary maritime security operations to protect Japan-related ships from acts of piracy. MSDF P-3C and U.S., German and Spanish patrol aircraft units responsible for counter-piracy operations off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden (at Djibouti International Airport) ----- Recognizing the important role played by its defense capabilities, Japan continues to do its utmost to protect national security, while working to achieve security in the Asia-Pacific region and beyond. Chapter 2 The National Defense Program Guidelines and Build-up of Defense Capability The security environment surrounding Japan continues to be faced with issues of new threats and diverse contingencies, such as the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and international terrorism. Amid this situation, Japan needs to act more flexibly or appropriately to respond to increasing expectations for Japan’s involvement in international peace cooperation activities. The National Defense Program Guidelines are subject to necessary revisions by the end of 2009. Accordingly, the Government held the Council on Security and Defense Shooting training from a light-armored vehicle Capabilities in order to conduct comprehensive deliberations on the visions for Japan’s security and defense capabilities from a wide range of perspectives. In order to contribute to reviews at the Government level on the revision of the Guidelines, the Defense Posture Review Board was established at the Ministry of Defense. These discussions are carried out organically linking with other discussions, such as the reform of the Ministry of Defense. The Ministry of Defense has set the goal of reducing expenditures for research and development, procurement and maintenance of defense equipment by 15% in FY2011 compared with FY2006. The reduction in FY2009 is US-2 search and rescue amphibian expected to be approximately 280 billion yen: about a 13.9% reduction. F-15 fighters ----- **DEFENSE** ###### JAPAN **OF** As seen in photographs # Part lll Measures for Defense of Japan Chapter 1 Operations of the Self-Defense Forces for Defense of Japan and Responses to Diverse Situations In order to ensure the peace and security of the country and its people in armed attack situations, the efforts to establish a legislative framework and the SDF operational structure have been continued. In the event of North Korea’s missile launch in April this year, the SDF deployed Aegis vessels and Patriot PAC-3 in order to be prepared for debris falling on Japanese territory, and promptly transmitted various information to the Prime Minister’s office and others. Aegis destroyer spraying water from its deck as part of the SDF’s nuclear weapons response Moreover, in order to respond to natural disasters with speed and accuracy, the SDF has actively participated in various disaster prevention trainings such as joint disaster prevention exercises, in addition to making efforts to ensure cooperation with local governments in peacetime. Furthermore, in response to the countermeasures against new-type flu from April this year, the SDF dispatched SDF doctors and nurses to airport quarantine stations to provide quarantine assistance. Patriot PAC-3 missiles deployed in Akita prefecture Earthquake ----- The Ministry of Defense and the SDF have been making consistent efforts to properly deal with new threats, diverse contingencies and a full-scale invasion under the joint operations posture. In addition, the Ministry of Defense and the SDF have strived to strengthen the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements, which have great significance for Japan’s national defense and the peace and security of the region. Chapter 2 Strengthening of the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements Japan and the United States have been engaged in security consultations on the future of the Japan-U.S. alliance. Japan and the United States are engaged in all types of efforts in close coordination based on the agreement on force posture realignment and others. Concerning the Relocation of the U.S. Marine Corps from Okinawa to Guam, the costs for on-base infrastructure projects and design projects (approximately 34.6 billion yen) were appropriated in the JFY2009 budget. Defense Gates (May 2009) Meeting between Minister of Defense Hamada and U.S. Secretary of Moreover, the Government of Japan signed an agreement concerning the relocation of U.S. Marine Corps from Okinawa to Guam with the United States of America. This agreement entered into force on May 19, 2009, after it was approved by the Diet. The deployment of the nuclear-powered aircraft carrier USS George Washington contributes to the security of Japan and to the maintenance of the peace and security of the region. Other than the above measures, we are making constant efforts to ensure the effectiveness and enhancement of credibility of the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements through, for example, the development of laws, Japan-U.S. bilateral The U.S. nuclear-powered aircraft carrier USS George Washington training exercises, exchange of equipment/technologies and entering the Port of Yokosuka [U.S. Navy] various measures concerning USFJ facilities and areas. GSDF and U.S. Marine Corps conducting field training exercises ----- **DEFENSE** ###### JAPAN **OF** As seen in photographs # Part lll Measures for Defense of Japan Chapter 3 Improvement of the International Security Environment Two years ago, international peace cooperation activities were stipulated as a primary mission of the SDF, together with the defense of Japan and the preservation of public order. As activities responding to international terrorism, MSDF has been conducting replenishment activities based on the Replenishment Support Special Measures Law for vessels of the countries engaged in counter-terrorism maritime interdiction operations in the Indian Ocean. The enclosed bridge of the French frigate displaying a banner with a thank-you message during the 100th replenishment operation As international peace cooperation activities, we dispatched headquarters personnel to the United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) while continuing the activities in the United Nations Mission in Nepal (UNMIN) and the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF). In November last year and May this year, instructors were dispatched to the PKO center in Egypt. We have also been proactively working to help improve the international security environment by deepening and broadening the scope of security dialogues and defense exchanges. In addition, we have been taking part in putting forth initiatives on the issues of arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation including the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI). GSDF personnel addressing the UNMIS Commander upon reporting for duty GSDF personnel addressing the UNMIS Commander upon reporting goodwill exercises _Suzunami (right) alongside an Indian vessel during Japan-India_ ----- Resolving global threats is difficult with the independent efforts of a single country and requires the concerted efforts of the international community. Furthermore, for the execution of the missions of the SDF that forms the core of our defense it is essential to gain the understanding and support of the people. Chapter 4 Citizens of Japan, the Ministry of Defense and the SDF It is indispensable for the SDF, as the core of Japan’s defense capabilities, to gain the understanding and support of the Japanese citizens in order to execute its missions and it is also important to improve its human and material resources. The Ministry of Defense is making efforts to employ and to promote more women while giving due consideration to maintaining the strength of the SDF as well as to the capability, aptitude and motivation of each individual. In September 2008, restrictions with regard to assignments to destroyers and others were lifted. A female member of the uniformed SDF personnel serving on an SDF naval destroyer The SDF is carrying out support activities for residents in a number of fields linked with the people, based on requests from local governments and relevant organizations. The Ministry of Defense strives to minimize the impact of the presence and operation of defense facilities on the daily lives of local residents through various measures. The Ministry of Defense is proactively promoting various efforts for the environment based on various programs of the government. A facility that adopts an “all electricity” system is scheduled for completion in 2010. GSDF personnel disposing of unexploded ordnance The Ministry of Defense and the Self-Defense Forces offer SDF Life Experience Tours and Enlistment Experience Programs at the request of private companies. Enlistment Experience Program ----- **DEFENSE** Reform of the Ministry ###### JAPAN As seen in photographs of Defense # Part lV **OF** The Ministry of Defense and the Self-Defense Forces are advancing fundamental reforms so as to revitalize the organizations that are responsible for ensuring the peace and independence of the nation. Established at the Prime Minister’s Office two years ago, the Council for Reforming the Ministry of Defense compiled a report last July. The report proposed the following three principles for reform: (1) Thorough adherence to rules and regulations (2) Establishment of professionalism (professional awareness) (3) Establishment of a management of work that prioritizes execution of duties, with the aim of total optimization In line with the basic direction laid out in the report by the Council, the Ministry of Defense Reform Head Office headed by the Minister of Defense was established Report issued by the Council for Reforming the Ministry of Defense last July. This was followed by the development of the Implementation Plan for Realizing Reform of the Ministry of Fig. IV-2-2 Strengthening Support System for the Minister of Defense Defense last August. The Ministry of Defense is undertaking various efforts to fully implement the three principles for 【Current】 **【Revised】** |Senior Vice ense cDoefme|-Minister of npseiled th| |---|---| Defense Policy and of the Joint Staff, unification of defense *Nine Civilian Defense Counselors, among which 6 are |osed by the Council. Minister of Defense Senior Vice-Minister of istry of Defense cDoefmenpseiled the Organizational easures to be Implemented in FY2009 and Parliamentary Secretaries oncepfotr Dfoefre nsFeY2010 Organizational Reforms in 2008. In FY 2009, the advisory structure by Vice-Minister unselors will be abolished and the Defense be established by law foDlelfoenwsee Cdo ubnsye lomrs e*asures e establishment of the Special Advisor to the Defense in order to ensure civilian control. For haD ne Dp ciu ret ey mc tV oi erc se n GM te i non eis frt ae tlr h / e functioCnhsie fos fo ft hSeta ffBureau of|Minister of Defense (new) Senior Vice-Minister of Defense Council Parliamentary Secretaries (new) for Defense Defense Special Advisers to Minister of Defense Vice-Minister (not more than 3) Defense Counselors (revoked) De Dp iu rt ey c tV oi rc se GM ei nn eis rt ae lr / Chiefs of Staff| |---|---| capacity build-up sections, etc., are under consideration. allocated to the Deputy Vice-Minister and Directors General |Senior Vice- Defe|Minister of nse| |---|---| |Col1|Defense Council| |---|---| Strengthening the advisory system to the Minister of Defense Ministry of Defense Reform Head Office meeting ----- Table of Contents Part I Security Environment Surrounding Japan Overview 1. General Situation .......................................................................................................................................... 2 2. Security Environment in the Asia-Pacific Region ........................................................................................ 3 Chapter 1 Issues in the International Community Section 1. International Terrorism ...................................................................................................................... 8 1. General Situation .......................................................................................................................................... 8 2. Efforts to Struggle Against Terrorism in and around Afghanistan ............................................................... 8 3. Terrorist Attacks around the World .............................................................................................................. 9 Section 2. Transfer and Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction ......................................................... 11 1. Nuclear Weapons ........................................................................................................................................ 11 2. Biological and Chemical Weapons ............................................................................................................. 11 3. Ballistic Missiles ........................................................................................................................................ 11 4. Growing Concerns about Transfer or Proliferation of WMDs ................................................................... 12 5. Iran’s Nuclear Issue .................................................................................................................................... 13 Section 3. Situation in Iraq ................................................................................................................................. 14 1. Security and Political Situation in Iraq ...................................................................................................... 14 2. Trends of the Armed Forces of Foreign Countries in Iraq ......................................................................... 14 3. Efforts by the International Community toward the Stabilization of Iraq.................................................. 15 Section 4. Complex and Diverse Regional Conflicts .......................................................................................... 17 1. General Situation ........................................................................................................................................ 17 2. Present Condition of Local Conflicts.......................................................................................................... 17 3. Efforts to Stabilize the International Community....................................................................................... 19 Chapter2 National Defense Policies of Countries Section 1. The United States ............................................................................................................................... 28 1. Security and Defense Policies .................................................................................................................... 28 2. Military Posture .......................................................................................................................................... 33 3. Military Posture in the Asia-Pacific Region ............................................................................................... 34 Section 2. Korean Peninsula ............................................................................................................................... 35 1. North Korea ................................................................................................................................................ 35 2. The ROK .................................................................................................................................................... 44 3. U.S. Forces Stationed in the ROK ............................................................................................................. 46 COLUMN (COMMENTARY) Ballistic Missiles and Satellite Launch Vehicles ............................................................. 42 Section 3. China ................................................................................................................................................... 48 1. General Situation ........................................................................................................................................ 48 2. Military Affairs ........................................................................................................................................... 48 3. External Relations ...................................................................................................................................... 58 ----- 4. Military Capabilities of Taiwan .................................................................................................................. 62 Section 4. Russia ................................................................................................................................................. 65 1. General Situation ........................................................................................................................................ 65 2. Security and Defense Policies .................................................................................................................... 65 3. Military Posture .......................................................................................................................................... 67 4. Russian Forces in the Far East Region ....................................................................................................... 68 5. External Relations ...................................................................................................................................... 72 COLUMN (COMMENTARY) Security Issues between the United States and Russia .................................................... 74 Section 5. Southeast Asia ................................................................................................................................... 76 1. General Situation ........................................................................................................................................ 76 2. Defense Policy of Each Country ................................................................................................................ 76 3. Military Modernization in the Region ........................................................................................................ 78 4. Relations with China .................................................................................................................................. 79 5. Regional Cooperation ................................................................................................................................. 80 6. Regional Issues ........................................................................................................................................... 80 Section 6. South Asia ........................................................................................................................................... 82 1. India ............................................................................................................................................................ 82 2. Pakistan ...................................................................................................................................................... 85 Section 7. Australia .............................................................................................................................................. 87 1. General Situation ........................................................................................................................................ 87 2. Security and National Defense Policy ........................................................................................................ 87 3. Overseas Activities ..................................................................................................................................... 88 4. Relationship with Other Countries ............................................................................................................. 89 Section 8. Europe ................................................................................................................................................. 91 1. General Situation ........................................................................................................................................ 91 2. Enhancement and Enlargement of Security Frameworks .......................................................................... 91 3. Efforts by Individual Countries to Maintain the Capability to Respond to Various Situations ................. 94 Part II The Basics of Japan’s Defense Policy and Build-up of Defense Capability Chapter 1 The Basic Concepts of Japan’s Defense Policy and Related Issues Section 1. Measures to Ensure Japan’s Security ............................................................................................ 118 Section 2. The Constitution and the Right of Self-Defense ............................................................................ 119 1. The Constitution and the Right of Self-Defense ...................................................................................... 119 2. The Government’s View on Article 9 of the Constitution ........................................................................ 119 COLUMN (COMMENTARY) Report of the Council on Reconstruction of the Legal Basis for Security .................... 120 Section 3. The Basis of Defense Policy ............................................................................................................ 121 1. Basic Policy for National Defense ........................................................................................................... 121 2. Other Basic Policies ................................................................................................................................. 121 ----- Section 4. New Approaches to Space and Ocean ............................................................................................ 123 1. Efforts for Development and Use of Space .............................................................................................. 123 2. Efforts for Ocean Policy ........................................................................................................................... 126 COLUMN (VOICE) Voice of SDF Personnel Temporarily Assigned to the Secretariat of the Strategic Headquarters for Space Policy ...................................................................................................... 124 (VOICE) Voice of SDF Personnel Chosen as an Astronaut Candidate ......................................................... 125 (VOICE) Voice of SDF Personnel Engaged in Anti-piracy Maritime Patrol Operations off the Coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden ................................................................................................... 131 Chapter 2 The National Defense Program Guidelines and Build-up of Defense Capability Section 1. Basic Concepts of Formulating the National Defense Program Guidelines ................................. 136 1. Background to Formulating the NDPG .................................................................................................... 136 2. The Basic Concept of the National Defense Program Guidelines ........................................................... 137 Section 2. Contents of the National Defense Program Guidelines ................................................................. 141 1. Basic Principles of Japan’s Security Policy ............................................................................................. 141 2. Vision for Future Defense Capabilities .................................................................................................... 142 3. Specific Posture for Defense Capability .................................................................................................. 146 4. Additional Elements for Consideration .................................................................................................... 151 5. Three Principles on Arms Exports ........................................................................................................... 151 COLUMN (VOICE) Voice of SDF Personnel Serving in the Forefront of Defense (in Tsushima) ................................ 152 Section 3. Defense Posture Review .................................................................................................................. 153 1. Background of the Review of the National Defense Program Guidelines ............................................... 153 2. The Council on Security and Defense Capabilities .................................................................................. 153 3. The Defense Posture Review Board ......................................................................................................... 154 Section 4. Mid-Term Defense Program ............................................................................................................ 155 1. Policies for the Program ........................................................................................................................... 155 2. Organizational Review of the Defense Ministry and SDF ....................................................................... 155 3. Main Projects Concerning Capabilities of the SDF ................................................................................. 156 4. Measures to Strengthen the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements .............................................................. 156 5. Scale of Build-up and Necessary Budget ................................................................................................. 158 Section 5. Build-up of Defense Capability for FY 2009 ................................................................................... 161 COLUMN (COMMENTARY) New Organization of the 15th Brigade ......................................................................... 163 Section 6. Defense-Related Expenditures ........................................................................................................ 164 1. Defense-Related Expenditures and Changes ........................................................................................... 164 2. Breakdown of Defense-Related Expenditures ......................................................................................... 165 3. Comparison with Other Countries ........................................................................................................... 166 COLUMN (COMMENTARY) The Newly-commissioned Vessels: Hyuuga and Souryuu ............................................ 167 ----- Part lll Measures for Defense of Japan Chapter 1 Operations of Self-Defense Forces for Defense of Japan and Responses to Diverse Situations Section 1 Frameworks for Responses to Armed Attack Situations ................................................................ 172 1. The Framework for Responses to Armed Attack Situations .................................................................... 173 2. Measures Based on the Armed Attack Situation Response Law .............................................................. 175 3. Efforts for Civil Protection ....................................................................................................................... 177 4. The Joint Operational Structure of the Self-Defense Forces .................................................................... 180 COLUMN (COMMENTARY) Civil Protection Training in Preparation for Biological or Nuclear Terrorist Attacks .... 178 Section 2. Effective Responses to New Threats and Diverse Contingencies ................................................ 183 1. Response to Ballistic Missile Attacks ...................................................................................................... 183 2. Response to Attacks by Guerillas and Special Operations Forces ........................................................... 193 3. Response to Aggression on Japan’s Offshore Islands .............................................................................. 199 4. Warning and Surveillance of the Sea and Airspace Surrounding Japan and Response to Violation of Airspace and Armed Special Operations Vessels ..................................................................................... 199 5. Response to Large-Scale and Unconventional Disasters ......................................................................... 201 6. Response to Other Events ........................................................................................................................ 208 COLUMN (VOICE) Voice of SDF Personnel Engaged in PAC-3 Flight Test ................................................................ 186 (COMMENTARY) Opening of the New SDF Central Hospital as the Core SDF Hospital ......................... 198 (VOICE) Voice of SDF Personnel who was Engaged in Disaster Relief Dispatch (Iwate-Miyagi Inland Earthquake) ................................................................................................ 205 (VOICE) Voice of SDF Personnel of the Special Airlift Group ................................................................... 211 Section 3. Preparation against Full-Scale Aggression .................................................................................... 212 1. Air Defense Operations ............................................................................................................................ 212 2. Operations for the Defense of Surrounding Sea Areas ............................................................................ 214 3. Operations for Land Defense ................................................................................................................... 215 4. Operations for Ensuring the Safety of Maritime Traffic .......................................................................... 217 Chapter 2 Strengthening of the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements Section 1. The Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements .......................................................................................... 224 1. The Significance of the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements .................................................................... 225 2. Presence of U.S. Forces in Japan ............................................................................................................. 226 Section 2. Japan-U.S. Security Consultation on the Future of the Japan-U.S. Alliance and other Matters ... 228 1. Outline of Recent Japan-U.S. Consultations ............................................................................................ 228 2. Results Achieved by the Japan-U.S. Consultations ................................................................................. 232 3. Initiatives for Smooth Implementation of the Realignment of USFJ ...................................................... 249 4. Various Measures Concerning USFJ Facilities and Areas ....................................................................... 253 Section 3. Policies and Measures for Enhancing Credibility of the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements .... 260 1. Japan-U.S. Policy Consultations .............................................................................................................. 260 2. Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation and Policies to Ensure their Effectiveness .................. 263 3. Japan-U.S. Bilateral Training and Exercises ............................................................................................ 267 4. The Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement between Japan and the United States ......................... 269 5. Mutual Exchanges of Equipment and Technology .................................................................................. 269 ----- 6. Measures to Ensure the Smooth Stationing of USFJ ............................................................................... 270 COLUMN (VOICE) Voice of SDF Personnel who Participated in US-Japan Joint Training ........................................ 268 (COMMENTARY) Cooperation and Exchanges between the USFJ and Local Communities .................... 273 (VOICE) Voice of Recruit (MSDF Fixed-term Enlistee) .............................................................................. 274 Chapter 3 Improvement of the International Security Environment Section 1. Efforts to Support International Peace Cooperation Activities .................................................... 280 1. Proactive Efforts to Support International Peace Cooperation Activities on Japan’s Own Initiative ...... 281 2. Cooperation in Global Efforts to Reconstruct Iraq .................................................................................. 284 3. Activities Responding to International Terrorism .................................................................................... 287 4. Efforts to Support U.N. Peacekeeping Operations, etc. ........................................................................... 292 5. International Disaster Relief Operations .................................................................................................. 300 COLUMN (COMMENTARY) Exercises for Dispatch and Deployment for International Peace Cooperation Activities ....................................................................................................................... 283 (VOICE) Voice of SDF Personnel who Worked in the Iraq Reconstruction Support Airlift Squadron ........ 286 (VOICE) Voice of SDF Personnel who Worked for UNMIS ........................................................................ 295 (VOICE) Voice of SDF Instructor Dispatched to PKO Center in Egypt ...................................................... 300 Section 2. Promotion of Security Dialogue and Defense Exchanges ............................................................. 303 1. Significance of Security Dialogue and Defense Exchanges .................................................................... 303 2. Bilateral Defense Exchanges .................................................................................................................... 303 3. Multilateral Security Dialogue ................................................................................................................. 320 4. Multilateral Exercises ............................................................................................................................... 322 COLUMN (VOICE) Voice of SDF Personnel Serving as Defense Attaché ................................................................... 311 (VOICE) Voice of SDF Student Overseas .................................................................................................... 314 Section 3. Efforts for Arms Control, Disarmament and Non-Proliferation .................................................... 325 1. Efforts on Treaties related to Arms Control, Disarmament and Non-Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction ............................................................................................................................................... 326 2. Efforts on Arms Control-Related Treaties on Certain Conventional Weapons ........................................ 327 3. International Efforts for Non-Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and Others ....................... 328 COLUMN (VOICE) Voice of Recruit (General Officer Candidate, ASDF) ................................................................... 331 Chapter 4 Citizens of Japan, the Ministry of Defense and the SDF Section 1. Sustaining Defense Capabilities ..................................................................................................... 338 1. Organization of the Ministry of Defense and the SDF ............................................................................. 338 2. Recruitment and Employment of Personnel in the Ministry of Defense and the SDF ............................ 341 3. Daily Education and Training .................................................................................................................. 345 4. Working Conditions of Personnel, Measures on Personnel Matters, and Other Related Issues .............. 348 5. Retirement and Outplacement of Personnel, and Related Issues ............................................................. 351 6. Enhancing Information and Communications Capabilities ..................................................................... 353 7. Efforts for Effective and Efficient Acquisition of Defense Equipment .................................................... 354 8. Enhancement of Technical Research & Development ............................................................................. 357 ----- COLUMN (VOICE) Voice of SDF Personnel Engaged in Recruitment ......................................................................... 342 (VOICE) Voice of Female SDF Personnel Working on a Destroyer ............................................................ 350 (COMMENTARY) Fighter Aircraft Stealth Technology (Electro-Magnetic Waves) ................................... 358 (VOICE) Voice of Female Technical Officials Working in R&D.................................................................. 359 Section 2. Interaction between the Ministry of Defense & the SDF, and the Local Community & Japanese Citizens ............................................................................................................................. 361 1. Cooperation from Local Public Organizations and Other Related Organizations for the SDF ............... 361 2. Activities in Civic Life and Contributions to Society .............................................................................. 361 3. Harmony between Defense Facilities and the Local Community, and Environmental Conservation ..... 363 4. Public Relations Activities, Information Disclosure, and Related Activities ........................................... 365 COLUMN (VOICE) Voice of SDF Personnel Engaged in Disposal of Unexploded Ordnances (Okinawa) ................... 362 (COMMENTARY) SDF’s Movie Collaboration “Sora e – Sukui no Tsubasa RESCUE WINGS”.............. 367 (VOICE) Voice of Recruit (General Candidate for Enlistment, GSDF) ....................................................... 370 Part IV Reform of the Ministry of Defense Section 1. Council for Reforming the Ministry of Defense ............................................................................. 376 1. Background/Process of the Ministry of Defense Reform ........................................................................ 376 2. Report of the Reform Council .................................................................................................................. 376 Section 2. Efforts for Realizing Reform of the Ministry of Defense ............................................................... 380 1. Efforts for Thorough Conformity to Principles of Reform ...................................................................... 380 2. Fundamental Organizational Reform ....................................................................................................... 383 Section 3. Other Efforts ..................................................................................................................................... 389 1. Fundamental Reform of the Maritime Self-Defense Force ...................................................................... 389 2. Efforts for Adherence to SDF Code of Ethics .......................................................................................... 390 Reference ----- ## Part l **Security Environment Surrounding Japan** ### Overview A high-speed boat pursuing a Canadian vessel in the Gulf of Aden (taken from a SH-60K helicopter carried by a _Sazanami_ North Korea’s missile launch in April 2009 [KPS/JIJI] destroyer) ----- **Overview** **1 General Situation** **1. Trends in the International Community** In the international community today, although the recent economic crisis has spawned a certain degree of protectionism, interdependence among sovereign states could be said to be deep. Interdependence has brought stability and prosperity to many countries, but it also has a downside, in that economic crises, matters of security or elements of regional instability transcend national borders and spread globally. It is therefore in the interests of every nation to secure global and regional peace, stability and prosperity by creating a more stable international security environment. It is now more important than ever that the states concerned work cooperatively to resolve the problems that the international community faces. The United States, the world’s sole superpower, has played a leading role in addressing international issues. Now, although it has been pointed out that the relative superiority of the United States, including its military power, will decline in the future, it is considered that the United States will still be the most influential state in the international community. President Obama, inaugurated in January 2009, made it clear that the United States intends to strengthen the existing alliances, forge new alliances and use all elements of its national power in order to meet the common challenges of the international community, saying “America cannot meet the threats of this century alone, but the world cannot meet them without America.” In the meantime, China and India have established themselves as rising powers with their remarkable economic growth. Russia has recovered from the social and economic difficulties of the 1990’s, and its national power is on the rise. Although the global economic crisis appears to have engendered an economic slowdown, the relative international influence of these multi-polar-oriented countries is expected to increase. These trends should be seen as a great opportunity for international coordination and cooperation. At the same time, since developments in these countries may have a considerable impact on the security environment, these developments, as well as relations of mutual dependence and the question of what kind of relations should be forged with these countries, are receiving increasing attention. **2. Major Security Issues** The proliferation of nuclear, biological, chemical (NBC) and other weapons of mass destruction (WMD) as well as ballistic missiles and their means of delivery constitute a continued and significant threat to the international community. In particular, the proliferation of North Korea’s nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles and Iran’s nuclear program pose a concern. Also, concerns remain over the acquisition or use of WMD by non-state actors, including international terrorist organizations, against which deterrence works less effectively. Globally dispersed cells of international and local terrorist organizations as well as their ideological sympathizers continue to resort to acts of terrorism, which have been occurring in Southeast Asia, South Asia, the Middle East and Africa. The United States and other countries are continuing their efforts in the fight against terrorism, but it is becoming a long-standing issue. Regional conflicts with diverse and complex backgrounds are still present in every part of the world and proactive efforts are being made to manage and resolve conflicts through Peace Keeping Operations (PKO), regional frameworks and multinational forces, mainly in the Middle East and Africa. It has also been pointed out that new factors that influence the global security environment may possibly emerge when competition for energy resources between sovereign states and climate change become more prominent issues in the future. Ensuring the safety of maritime transportation, which, as the cornerstone of the international distribution of goods, has always been considered imperative, is becoming increasingly important in light of the recent increase ----- in acts of piracy. United Nations Security Council resolutions against acts of piracy off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden have been adopted, and the international community is making efforts to combat piracy by dispatching ships. Reflecting further advances in military science and technology, activities in areas that cannot be understood from a conventional geographic viewpoint, such as outer space and cyber space, are tending to be seen as security issues. Furthermore, it is being suggested that various functions of military forces should be used to deal with large-scale disasters and outbreak of epidemics such as the new strain of swine influenza. As seen above, today’s international community confronts a range of issues from traditional inter-state relations to the new threats and diverse contingencies. These issues could arise independently or in combination. In order to respond to such issues, the roles of military forces are diversifying beyond deterrence and armed conflicts to include a broad spectrum of activities from conflict prevention to reconstruction assistance. Moreover, unified responses that incorporate military as well as diplomatic, police, judicial, information and economic measures are becoming necessary. Accordingly, each state continues to enhance its military capabilities in line with its resources and circumstances, and pursue international cooperation and partnership in security areas. **2. Security Environment in the Asia-Pacific Region** The Asia-Pacific region has been getting more global attention, due to the rapid development of economies such as China and India resulting in enhanced coordination and cooperation among countries, mainly in economic affairs. On the other hand, this region is considerably rich in political, economic, ethnic, and religious diversity, and conflicts between countries/regions remain even after the end of the Cold War, unlike Europe. Because of these reasons major changes in the security environment have yet to emerge and long-standing issues of territorial rights and reunification continue to plague the region. On the Korean Peninsula, the Korean people have been divided for more than half a century, and the face off continues between the military forces of North Korea and the Republic of Korea. There are issues concerning Taiwan and the overlapping territorial claims on the Spratly Islands. Japan also confronts unresolved territorial disputes over the Northern Territories and Takeshima, both of which are integral parts of Japanese territory. Concerns over North Korea’s nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles have grown more serious, and in 2006, its ballistic missile launch and the announcement of an underground nuclear test further underscored the threat posed by North Korea, not only to the peace and security of Japan, but also to that of the international community. In response to these actions, the international community has adopted U.N. Security Council resolutions 1695 and 1718, imposing sanctions on North Korea. At the same time, although six-party talks were being carried out with the aim of achieving the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, a complete disablement of the Yongbyon nuclear facilities is still pending. In response to North Korea’s missile launch1 of April 5, 2009, the U.N. Security Council issued a presidential statement condemning North Korea’s launch, which is in contravention of Security Council resolution 1718, and demanding that North Korea not conduct any further launch. North Korea announced boycotting the six-party talks and restarting the reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel rod, and then announced that it would take strong steps unless the Security Council apologizes, including nuclear tests and test launches of intercontinental ballistic missiles as self-defensive measures, and that the second nuclear test was conducted on May 25, 2009. On June 13, the international community adopted U.N. Security Council resolution 1874 condemning North Korea’s nuclear test in the strongest terms and imposing additional measures against North Korea. In response to the UNSC resolution, North Korea announced that the whole amount of the newly extracted plutonium would be weaponized, that the process of uranium enrichment would be commenced, etc. Developments in North Korea need to be closely monitored including the possible impact on the regime of the health issues of Kim Jong-il and the issue of his successor. North Korea’s abduction of Japanese nationals is also yet to be resolved. It is a major threat to the lives and security of the Japanese public and its solution will require concrete actions by North Korea. ----- Many countries in this region have taken advantage of economic growth to expand and modernize their military forces by increasing their defense budgets and introducing new weapons systems. In particular, China, a major political and economic power in the region with important clout, is drawing the close attention of many countries. China has been modernizing its military forces, with the rapid and continuous increase in its total defense spending. However, with clarity on neither the present condition nor the future of its military power, there is concern how the military power of China will influence the regional state of affairs and the security of Japan. Moreover, due to the insufficient transparency, it is noted that other nations might have distrust and misunderstandings about China’s decision-making processes concerning the security and the military. For these reasons, improved in the transparency relating to China’s national defense policies are needed, and it has become an important task to promote dialogues and exchanges, and further strengthen the mutual understanding and trust relationship with China. Furthermore, several senior military officials recently made positive remarks on the possession of an aircraft carrier, and maritime activities in the sea surrounding Japan have been intensifying. Such events happened that Japan should keep a careful watch over . Under the administration of former President Vladimir Putin, Russia reemerged in the international community as a “strong state,” and backed by recent economic development under the administration of President Medvedev, Russia is developing a military posture appropriate to its national strength. The relationship between Russia and the United States and Europe deteriorated following the conflict in Georgia last year, but it appears that relations shaped by confrontation and cooperation will continue between Russia and the West. Recently, Russia has exhibited global development of military deployment, particularly of its Navy and Air Force, possibly as a means to improve its operational proficiency level and to strengthen its presence on the high seas. In the Far East, too, Russia continues to revitalize activities of its vessels and aircraft, in an attempt to recover its operational proficiency level. (See Fig. I-0-0-1) In the Asia-Pacific region, where elements of uncertainty and a lack of transparency still exist as described above, the presence of the U.S. military remains extremely important in order to achieve regional stability. Japan and other countries have established bilateral alliances and friendly relations with the U.S. and, accordingly, they allow the stationing or presence of U.S. forces in their territories. In addition, recent years have also seen an increase in opportunities for bilateral defense exchanges between countries in the region. Efforts are being made to engage in multilateral security dialogues, including the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and conferences hosted by non-governmental institutions with the participation of relevant defense ministers, as well as bilateral and multilateral joint exercises. Japan hosted the Meeting for Defense Authoritiy Senior Officials at the vice-ministerial level with Southeast Asian countries for the first time in March 2009. Promoting and developing such multi-layered approaches among countries is important to ensure security in the region. **Notes:** 1) The government regarded the launch by North Korea on April 5 as an activity related to the ballistic missile program that violates the U.N. Security Council resolutions, and decided to refer to said launch as the “missile launch by North Korea.” ----- ----- ## Part l **Security Environment Surrounding Japan** ### Chapter 1 **Issues in the International Community** **Section 1. International Terrorism** **Section 2. Transfer and Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction** **Section 3. Situation in Iraq** **Section 4. Complex and Diverse Regional Conflicts** U.S. President Obama (5th from left) held a meeting with President Karzai of Afghanistan (4th from left) and President Zardari of Pakistan (2nd from right)[AFP/JIJI] ISAF supplies in flames following an attack by Islamist armed groups [EPA/JIJI] An Israeli air strike on the town of Rafah in the autonomous Palestinian territories [EPA/JIJI] ----- **Section 1. International Terrorism** **1. General Situation** The 9/11 attacks that took place in 2001 prompted the entire world to reaffirm the threat of international terrorism, and became the spark that ignited the current fight against terrorism by the United States and other countries. In the military operation in Afghanistan led by U.S. and U.K. forces shortly after the 9/11 attacks, many of the leaders of Al Qaeda, who were believed to have directed the 9/11 attacks, and the Taliban, who harbored Al Qaeda, were killed or captured. However, Osama bin Laden, Mullah Mohammed Omar and the remnants of their respective organizations are believed still to be hiding in the Afghanistan-Pakistan border region1, and the U.S.-led multinational forces, the Afghan, the Pakistani and other militaries are continuously engaged in clearing operations. It is believed that Al Qaeda today is less capable and effective than it was a year ago, and that it has lost significant parts of its command structure in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) in Pakistan2. It is pointed out, however, that Al Qaeda and its affiliates and allies remain dangerous and adaptive enemies and there is the threat that they could inspire or orchestrate an attack on the United States or European countries3. With respect to the relation between Al Qaeda and its affiliates, while the Islamic extremism of Al Qaeda has been spreading throughout the world, the command and control capabilities of the core Al Qaeda group is believed to be declining. There seems to be no clear command and control structure between the core Al Qaeda, its affiliates and groups or individuals inspired by Al Qaeda[,]s ideology but rather it is a loose network. Therefore, recently, a trend has been seen of Al Qaeda affiliates and local terrorist groups or individuals sympathetic to its ideology conducting terrorist attacks. Al Qaeda affiliates that receive advice from Al Qaeda or those that include “Al Qaeda” in its name perpetrate terrorism mainly in North Africa and the Middle East4; however, it is pointed out that these affiliates have no single format and there are significant differences in the degree of control that the Al Qaeda core can exert over them5. Furthermore, some groups inspired by Al Qaeda ideology are currently a terrorist threat, such as the Madrid train attack group. It was judged, however, there was not sufficient evidence of a direct connection between these groups and Al Qaeda6. **2. Efforts to Struggle Against Terrorism in and around Afghanistan** The United States together with other countries has continued military operations against the Taliban and Al Qaeda in and around Afghanistan since October 2001, in the aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attacks. International operations are also under way in the Indian Ocean to interdict terrorists’ movements and the proliferation and inflow of related goods, such as drugs and arms, which finance their activities. In Afghanistan, attacks orchestrated by the Taliban are increasing, which increases instability, and the future outlook does not allow for premature conclusions. The security situation in the southern and eastern parts, which border Pakistan, is particularly worrying. In addition, there have also been terrorist bombings in Kabul, the capital of Afghanistan, and in the northern and western areas, which were relatively stable and peaceful. Amidst such instability, the Afghan government is trying to improve public security by, for instance, strengthening the military and police. Efforts are also being made by the international community. The Afghan National Army, multinational forces and others are collaborating in mopping-up operations. The International Security Assistance Force (ISAF)7 has set up five Regional Commands under the General Headquarters in Kabul, and provides support for the Afghan government in the maintenance of security in the whole of the country. There are also 26 Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) to improve the security environment and to conduct reconstruction ----- assistance projects in parts of Afghanistan. The United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) is also continuing its efforts. In Pakistan, which borders Afghanistan, the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) in the bordering area continue to be an important base for Al Qaeda, the Taliban and a number of other extremist groups, and it is believed that this is where, together with the Taliban, Al Qaeda conducts training operatives, supports attacks in Afghanistan and plans attacks targeting the interests of Pakistan and the West in Pakistan and other countries8. Against this backdrop, the Pakistani government implements terrorist mopping-up operations and other efforts in border areas. President Obama of the United States, who took office in January 2009, is taking a serious attitude toward the struggle against terrorism, as is shown, for example, in the new strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan announced in March 20099. **3. Terrorist Attacks around the World** In Algeria, there were a series of terrorist attacks in 2007 targeting the government and army, including simultaneous bomb attacks on government buildings, the attempted assassination of the President of Algeria, a suicide bombing on the barracks of the Algerian Coast Guard, and bombing of U.N. organizations. Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM)10 claimed responsibility for these attacks11. In 2008, there were also terrorist bombings in front of police stations and at police academies. Furthermore, the scope of activities of AQIM has not remained exclusively within Algerian borders, with it being pointed out that the group is recruiting and providing training12 for Islamic extremists in North African countries and plans to expand its mission throughout the entire region and beyond13. In Yemen, besides a terrorist attack in 2008 thought to be targeting the U.S. embassy, a suicide bombing occurred killing some South Korean tourists in March 2009. Both incidents are believed to have been carried out by Al Qaeda affiliates, indicating that the activities of Al Qaeda and its affiliates continue, even after the bombing of the USS Cole off the coast of Yemen in 200014. South Asia has long been suffering frequent terrorist attacks, and India was hit by a series of coordinated terrorist bombings in 200815. In the Mumbai terrorist attack in November 2008, multiple coordinated bombings and shootings occurred in more than 10 places across the city, including hotels, restaurants and stations, killing many foreigners, including a Japanese national. Pakistan has also, experienced a number of terrorist attacks since 2007, including the assassination of former prime minister Benazir Bhutto and attacks by armed groups targeting government and security organizations such as the military and the police. Southeast Asia is still subject to frequent terrorist threats, particularly by Islamic extremists, although some progress has been made in controlling terrorist organizations. Between 2002 and 2005, Indonesia suffered large-scale terrorist attacks, in which the involvement of Jemaah Islamiya (JI), a radical Muslim organization, is suspected16. Since 2006, however, there have been no large terrorist attacks. In 2007 the leaders of JI Zarkasi and Abu Dujana were arrested, which are notable successes in controlling terrorist activities. In the Philippines, the Communist group the New People[,]s Army (NPA) has long been the largest threat to domestic security. The Philippine government has conducted mopping-up operations against the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) - The Taj Mahal hotel in flames following the Mumbai terrorist attacks [AFP/JIJI] ----- an Islamic extremists organization - leading to a number of results, including the killing of ASG leaders and reduction in membership. However, ASG, similarly to JI, is still considered a threat in Southeast Asia17. The Philippine government signed a truce accord with the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) in 2003 and has continued to carry out peace negotiations; however, the peace process came to a stalemate when armed conflicts intensified between the two parties in August 200818. (See Fig. I-1-1-1) ----- **Section 2. Transfer and Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction** The transfer or proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, such as nuclear, biological and chemical (NBC) weapons, or ballistic missiles carrying such weapons has been recognized as a significant threat since the end of the Cold War. In particular, there still remain strong concerns that non-state actors, including terrorists, against whom traditional deterrence works less effectively, could acquire and use weapons of mass destruction (including radioactive materials). **1. Nuclear Weapons** During the Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union, the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962 made it clear that a nuclear war between the United States and the Soviet Union could take place. The Treaty on the NonProliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) that took effect in 1970 prohibited countries other than those that had conducted nuclear tests in or before 196619 from having nuclear weapons, and required nuclear-armed countries to control and reduce nuclear weapons through bilateral negotiations20. The NPT is currently signed by 190 countries21. While some countries that had previously possessed nuclear weapons became signatories of this treaty by abandoning these weapons22, other countries still refuse to sign this treaty23. There are other countries that have declared the development and possession of nuclear weapons, such as North Korea which announced it had conducted a nuclear test in October 2006 and May 2009. (See Reference 1) (See Chapter 2, Section2) **2. Biological and Chemical Weapons** Biological and chemical weapons are easy to manufacture at a relatively low cost, and easy to disguise because most of the materials, equipment and technology needed to manufacture these weapons can be used for both military and civilian purposes. Accordingly, biological and chemical weapons are attractive to states or terrorists who seek asymmetric means of attack24. Biological weapons have the following characteristics: 1) manufacturing is easy and inexpensive, 2) there is usually an incubation period of a few days between exposure and onset, 3) their use is hard to detect, 4) even the threat of use can create great psychological effects, and 5) they can cause heavy casualties depending on circumstances and the type of weapons25. As for chemical weapons, Iraq repeatedly used mustard gas, tabun and sarin26 in the Iran-Iraq War. In the late 1980s, Iraq used chemical weapons to suppress Iraqi Kurds27. It is believed that other chemical weapons28 included VX, a highly toxic nerve agent, and easy-to-manage binary rounds29. North Korea is, for example, one of the countries seeking such weapons. The Tokyo subway sarin attack in 1995, as well as incidents of anthrax bacillus being contained in a mail item in the United States in 2001 and those of ricin being contained in a mail item in February 2004, have showed that the threat of the use of weapons of mass destruction by terrorists is real and that these weapons could cause serious damage if used in cities. **3. Ballistic Missiles** Ballistic missiles enable the projection of heavy payloads over long distances and can be used as a means of delivering weapons of mass destruction, such as nuclear, biological and chemical weapons. Once launched, a ballistic missile makes a trajectory flight and falls at a steep angle at high speed, which makes it difficult to effectively defend against the missile. If ballistic missiles are deployed in a region where military confrontation is underway, the conflict could intensify or expand, and tension in a region where armed antagonism exists could be further exacerbated, leading ----- to destabilization of that region. Furthermore a country may use ballistic missiles as a means of attacking or threatening another country that is superior in terms of conventional forces. In recent years, in addition to the threat of ballistic missiles, attention has been increasingly paid to the threat of cruise missiles, because they are comparatively easy for terrorist and other non-state entities to procure30. Although the speed of a cruise missile is slower than that of a ballistic missile, it is difficult to detect when the cruise missile is launched and while in flight31. Because they are smaller than ballistic missiles, cruise missiles can be concealed on a ship to secretly approach a target, and if they carry weapons of mass destruction on their warheads, they present an enormous threat. (See Reference 2) **4. Growing Concerns about Transfer or Proliferation of WMDs** Even weapons that were purchased or developed for self-defense purposes could easily be exported or transferred once domestic manufacturing becomes successful. For example, certain states that do not heed political risks have transferred weapons of mass destruction and related technologies to other states that cannot afford to invest resources in conventional forces and instead intend to compensate for this with weapons of mass destruction. Some of these states seeking weapons of mass destruction do not hesitate to put their land and people at risk, and allow terrorist organizations to be active due to their poor governance. Therefore, the chance of actual use of weapons of mass destruction may generally be high in these cases. In addition, since there is a concern that such states may not be able to effectively manage the related technology and materials, the high possibility that chemical or nuclear substances will be transferred or smuggled out from these states has become a cause for concern. For example, because there is a danger that even terrorists who do not possess related technologies can use a dirty bomb32 as a means of attack once they acquire a radioactive substance, nations across the world share the concern regarding the acquisition and use of weapons of mass destruction by terrorists and other non-state entities33. Pakistan is suspected to have started its nuclear program in the 1970[,]s. In February 2004, it came to light that nuclear-related technologies, including uranium enrichment technology, had been transferred to North Korea, Iran and Libya by Dr. A.Q. Khan and other scientists34. It is pointed out that these transfers were carried out secretly using global networks covering Europe, Africa, the Middle East and Southeast Asia and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Director-General Mohammad El Baradei stated that this network reportedly involves more than 30 countries35. When then U.S. Assistant Secretary of State James Kerry visited North Korea in October 2002, the United States announced that North Korea had admitted the existence of a project to enrich uranium for use in nuclear weapons, pointing out the possibility that North Korea had pursued development not only of plutoniumbased weapons but also uranium-based nuclear weapons36. It was also pointed out that North Korea had given support to Syrian secret nuclear activities37. (See Chapter 2, Section 2) The international community[,]s uncompromising and decisive stance against the transfer and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction has put enormous pressure on countries engaged in related activities, leading to some of them accepting international institutions[,] inspections or abandoning their WMD programs altogether.38 The Iranian Shahab-3 medium-range ballistic missile [EPA/JIJI] The Iranian Shahab-3 medium-range ballistic missile ----- Ballistic missiles have been significantly proliferated or transferred as well. The former Soviet Union exported Scud-Bs to many countries and regions, including Iraq, North Korea and Afghanistan. China and North Korea also exported DF-3 (CSS-2) and Scud missiles, respectively. As a result, a considerable number of countries now possess ballistic missiles. In particular, Pakistan[,]s Ghauri and Iran[,]s Shahab-3 missiles are said to be based on North Korea[,]s Nodong missiles. Libya, which agreed to abandon its weapons of mass destruction programs, reportedly disclosed production lines for Scud-Cs and other facilities built with technological assistance of North Korea39. It has been reported that Ukraine illegally exported cruise missiles capable of carrying nuclear warheads to Iran and China around 200140. **5. Iran[,]s Nuclear Issue** Since the 1970s Iran has been pursuing a nuclear power plant construction project with cooperation from abroad, claiming that its nuclear-related activities would be for peaceful purposes in accordance with the NPT. In 2002, however, Iran[,]s covert construction of a large-scale uranium enrichment facility was exposed by a group of dissidents. Subsequent IAEA inspection revealed that Iran, without notifying the IAEA for a long time, had engaged in uranium enrichment and other activities potentially leading to the development of nuclear weapons. In September 2005, the IAEA Board of Governors found Iran[,]s breach of compliance with the NPT Safeguards Agreement in its resolution. The international community expressed strong concerns about the lack of concrete proof regarding Iran[,]s claim that it has no intent to develop nuclear weapons and that all of its nuclear activities are for peaceful purposes, and has demanded that Iran suspend all of its enrichment-related and reprocessing activities through a series of Security Council Resolutions and IAEA Board of Governors Resolutions. After concluding an accord (the Paris Accord) in November 2004 with the EU-3 (the United Kingdom, France and Germany), which are engaging for the settlement of the issue, Iran suspended its enrichmentrelated activities. However, in August 2005, it resumed uranium conversion activities - a precursor to uranium enrichment - and, in February 2006, resumed uranium enrichment activities. In response, a special session of the IAEA Board of Governors adopted a resolution to report the issue to the U.N. Security Council, and, in March 2006, the U.N. Security Council approved a Presidential Statement calling on Iran to halt its uranium enrichment and reprocessing activities. In June 2006, the EU-3, and the U.S., China and Russia (EU3+3) agreed and presented to Iran a comprehensive proposal, including possible cooperation in the event that Iran sufficiently resolves the international concerns41. However, Iran continued its nuclear activities. In response to these actions by Iran, the Security Council in July 2006 adopted Resolution 1696 demanding Iran suspend all of its uranium enrichment-related and reprocessing activities. The Security Council thereafter adopted a series of resolutions42 to impose stricter sanctions in accordance with Article 41, Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter43. However, Iran[,]s nuclear issue remains unresolved44. For example, IAEA Director-General Mohammad ElBaradei stated in the IAEA Board of Governors Meeting in March 2009 that Iran continues to be engaged in uranium enrichment activities. The international community including the U.N. Security Council is continuing to pursue peaceful and diplomatic solutions through negotiations. ----- **Section 3. Situation in Iraq** **1. Security and Political Situation in Iraq** Through the efforts to restore public security by Iraq itself together with the United States and other countries, the overall public security situation has been seen to improve since the latter half of 2007, with reductions in the number of security incidents against Iraqi citizens and casualties of terrorist attacks. Factors for such improvement include effective counter terrorism operations by multinational forces and Iraqi Security Forces, increasing capabilities of the Iraqi Security Forces and the rejection of violence and extremism by the people of Iraq45. On the other hand, such improvements in the public security situation remain fragile, and it has been pointed out that the security situation could stagnate or deteriorate46. In addition, the influence of neighboring countries has also been noted. In particular, it has been reported that Iran has provided weapons and training for Iraqi militia organizations, and that Syria is the major gateway to Iraq for terrorists47. For the stability of the nation, the Iraqi government has, on its own initiative, implemented political efforts for the promotion of national reconciliation, in addition to security measures. In 2008, the Iraqi National Assembly adopted a number of significant laws: the Accountability and Justice Law, which enables former Ba[,]ath Party members who were purged from public offices from 2003 onwards to reassume public positions; the Amnesty law; and the Provincial Powers law. In July 2008, the Iraqi Accord Front (Tawafuq), which had broken away from the government in August 2007, rejoined the government. The end of January 2009 saw Iraq[,]s first provincial elections since the establishment of the Iraqi constitution (excluding some provinces). This all represents a significant step toward the realization of national reconciliation in Iraq. On the other hand, there still are a number of problems. For example, the issue of the status of disputed areas including Kirkuk remains unsolved, and the hydrocarbon draft law has yet to be adopted. A woman casting her vote in Iraqﾕs provincial elections [EPA/JIJI] **2. Trends of the Armed Forces of Foreign Countries in Iraq** The transfer of security responsibilities from multinational forces to the Iraqi authorities is under way in the provinces where the capabilities of Iraqi Security Forces have been enhanced and local conditions have improved. Up until the end of 2008, security responsibility had been transferred in 13 out of 18 provinces, including southeastern Muthanna Province, in which the Ground Self-Defense Force was engaged in humanitarian and reconstruction assistance activities. (See Fig. I-1-3-1) The mandate of the multinational forces was extended until the end of 2008 by Security Council resolution 1790 adopted in December 2007. The Iraqi government and concerned countries including the United States have discussed the activities of multinational forces after the expiration of the mandate48. In November 2008, the Iraqi National Congress passed an agreement with the United States on the temporary presence, activities and withdrawal of the U.S. forces in/from Iraq, which entered into effect at the beginning of 200949. The Iraqi government also concluded similar agreements with other countries, including the United Kingdom and Australia. ----- In response to such developments, a number of countries have either withdrawn or drastically reduced their troop levels. As of November 2008, about 150,000 personnel from 21 countries were deployed in Iraq, but most countries - except the U.S. etc. - have withdrawn their troops by the end of 2008. By July 2008, the U.S. withdrew as many troops as had been “surged” since January 2007; and by February 2009 about 8,000 personnel had retreated50. U.S. President Obama, who took office in January 2009, announced in February that the combat mission in Iraq will end by the end of August 2010. shaking hands after signing the U.S.-Iraq Status of Forces Agreement U.S. ambassador to Iraq, Crocker, and Iraq Foreign Minister, Zebari, [AP Images] **3. Efforts by the International Community toward the Stabilization of Iraq** The stabilization of Iraq is a common challenge to the international community and countries and international organizations, including the United Nations, are making various efforts. Since 2005, the United States and others have deployed Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) made up of military and civilian personnel to provide support to local governments in Iraq. The United Nations has also been coordinating reconstruction, development and humanitarian assistance through the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI). ----- The International Compact with Iraq (ICI), an international framework to build a new partnership between the Iraqi government and the international community, was launched in May 2007. The Compact stipulates the common policy objectives and the measures to be taken, of both the Iraqi government and international community for the next five years in the areas of governance, security, and economic reconstruction. ----- **Section 4. Complex and Diverse Regional Conflicts** **1. General Situation** The characteristics of regional conflicts recently emerging around the world differ from one to another. They may result from various ethnic, religious, territorial, or resource-related issues, and some are entangled at multiple levels in each region. They also range in form from armed conflict to sustained armed confrontation. Furthermore, it has been pointed out that the impact of global-scale problems such as climate change could also constitute a cause of conflict. In addition, human rights violations, refugees, famine, poverty, and terrorism resulting from the conflicts sometimes evolve into international issues51 . For that reason, it has become increasingly important that the international community discern the character of such complex and diverse conflicts, consider international frameworks and involvements matched to their particular circumstances, and then seek out appropriate responses. (See Fig. I-1-4-1) **2. Present Condition of Local Conflicts** Between Israel and Palestine, the Oslo Agreement concluded in 1993 marked the beginning of a peace process through comprehensive negotiations; however, the Israelis and the Palestinians subsequently suspended negotiations due to the intifada that started in 2000 and resulted in reciprocal violence between the two parties. In 2003, the Israelis and the Palestinians agreed on a “Road Map” that laid out a course leading to the establishment of a Middle East peace initiative based on the principle of the peaceful coexistence between the two nations. However, the Road Map has yet to be implemented. On the Palestinian side, the Islamic fundamentalist organization Hamas, which does not recognize Israel and which advocates a continuation of armed conflict against Israel, established a Hamas-led administration in March 2006. The rivalry between Fatah, the largest faction of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), and Hamas has intensified, and in June 2007, ----- Hamas seized the Gaza Strip. In response to this, President Mahmoud Abbas declared a state of emergency for the entire autonomous region and established an emergency cabinet comprising non-Hamas ministers. Nevertheless, Hamas’ de facto control over Gaza continues, and political turmoil carries on. The United States hosted the Annapolis Conference in November 2007, where agreement was reached between Israel and Palestine to endeavor to conclude a peace treaty by the end of 2008. However, a peace treaty has yet to be concluded. Between December 2008 and January 2009, Israel carried out military air raids and ground assaults on Gaza, in response to the rockets fired at Israel from Gaza. Israel has yet to sign peace treaties with Syria and Lebanon52. Israel and Syria disagree on the return of the Golan Heights which Israel has occupied since the 1967 Arab-Israel War. The United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) is deployed in the Golan Heights region to observe the implementation of ceasefire and military disengagement between the two parties. Concerning Israel and Lebanon, the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) increased its presence following the 2006 clash between Israel and Hezbollah, a Shiite Muslim organization. Although there have not been any prominent conflicts since, political instability has continued in Lebanon, as was shown by their inability to elect a president between November 2007 and May 2008. Furthermore, it has been said that Hezbollah is enhancing its military strength again. In Nepal, armed conflict with the Maoist faction of the Nepal Communist Party has resulted in a significant number of casualties since 1996. As a result of the pro-democracy movement, a new government was formed in April 2006, and a Comprehensive Peace Agreement was signed in November between the Nepalese Government and the Maoists. In response to this agreement, the United Nations Political Mission in Nepal (UNMIN) has been deployed in accordance with Security Council Resolution 1740, and among its duties are to monitor the status of weapons and soldiers. In April 2008, an election for the Nepalese Constituent Assembly was held. In August, the Maoists won the majority of seats and launched a coalition government led by the Maoist faction; however, the confrontation between the political parties continued over the peace making process. In May 2009, the Maoists become the opposition and the coalition government led by UML (Unified Marxist-Leninist) was launched but there are still many issues to resolve in the peacemaking process. In Sudan, a 20-year north-south civil war broke out in 1983 between the Sudanese Government, which is predominantly composed of Muslim Arabs from northern Sudan, and anti-government forces comprising African Christians from southern Sudan. In response to the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) that was concluded between the north and the south in 2005, the United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS), established by Resolution 1590 of the Security Council, has been deployed and is conducting truce monitoring activities to assist the implementation of the CPA. However, issues still remain, such as preparations for a referendum on the independence of the south scheduled for 2011, the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of soldiers, and border demarcation between the north and the south. In the Darfur region of western Sudan, conflict intensified between the Arab government and the African anti-government forces in 2003. The conflict in Darfur has produced a large number of internally displaced persons, which the international community, including the United Nations, regards as a serious humanitarian crisis. Following the ceasefire agreement in 2004, the African Union (AU) dispatched the African Anti-government Islamist militants Hizb al-Islamiya in position at the Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS); however, their efforts police station in the Somali capital of Mogadishu [AFP/JIJI] ----- to halt the conflict were unsuccessful. After the government and a fraction of the major anti-government forces concluded Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) in May 2006, the U.N. Security Council adopted Resolution 1769 in July 2007, which stipulated the creation of the AU/UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID). However, instability in the Darfur region continues as some of the anti-government forces refuse to sign the DPA and the deployment of UNAMID units is insufficient to enable them to prevent attacks on UNAMID personnel. Furthermore, the International Criminal Court (ICC) issued an arrest warrant for Sudan[,]s President Omar Hassan al-Bashir on the charges of the crimes against humanity and war crimes committed in Darfur. Attention has been drawn to aspects such as the response of the government of Sudan, peace process and impact on peace keeping forces. Somalia had been in a state of anarchy since 1991, but in 2005, the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) was inaugurated. However, battle raged between the TFG and the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC), an Islamic fundamentalist organization opposed to TFG. The Ethiopian forces intervened to support the TFG and eliminated the UIC in December 2006. In January 2007, the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) was established, and in August 2008 in Djibouti, the peace agreement was concluded between the TFG and Alliance for the Reliberation of Somalia (ARS) which was formed by UIC and other groups. In January 2009, the ARS leader Sheikh Sharif was elected as President of the TFG and the withdrawal of the Ethiopian troops from Somalia was completed, which was the condition for the peace agreement. However, since the ruling power of the TFG is weak and the TFG does not yet have control of all the country, there is no prospect of restoring order to the country; the situation remains tense, with continued fighting between the TFG and new Islamist militia groups such as Al-Shabab. In the sea areas surrounding Somalia, the number of incidents of piracy and armed robbery increased rapidly in 200853. The Security Council has adopted four resolutions since the summer of 200854, calling on member states to dispatch ships as anti-piracy measures. Against this background, a number of countries have dispatched their ships to the coastal areas surrounding Somalia to undertake anti-piracy missions. **3. Efforts to Stabilize the International Community** The end of the Cold War was accompanied by rising expectations for the peacekeeping system by the U.N., which up to that time had not functioned adequately, and as a result, many U.N. Peacekeeping Operations (PKOs) were established. In recent years, efforts through regional frameworks such as the European Union (EU) and the African Union (AU) have been formed as a means of dealing appropriately with conflict. Other efforts include peacekeeping operations and humanitarian and reconstruction assistance by multinational forces mandated by Security Council Resolutions. Efforts aimed not only at peacekeeping but also at conflict prevention and peacebuilding are also increasing55. Traditionally, PKOs have mainly aimed at preventing reoccurrence of conflict by focusing on monitoring of ceasefires and other tasks after a ceasefire agreement has been reached. Since the end of the Cold War, however, the missions now cover a broad range of operations, including civilian activities such as monitoring of disarmament, monitoring of elections and administration, and humanitarian support for return of refugees56. (See Fig. I-1-4-2) However, the environment surrounding PKOs in recent years has grown increasingly harsh. Since Africa is the main deployment area for PKO missions, and their activities are carried out virtually in the absence of any agreements, they face difficult situations from time to time57. Although some of their activities have been vested with strong authority under Article 7 of the Charter of the United Nations58, there remain issues of securing equipment and materials, ensuring the security of personnel and the capability improvement of forces, all of which are essential for the effective performance of operations in areas with poor infrastructure. While countries in the regions where conflicts occur attempt to carry out voluntary peacekeeping activities such as AU, the capability improvement of forces is an important issue. ----- ----- ----- **Notes:** 1) The 2008 Annual Threat Assessment compiled by the U.S. Director for National Intelligence (DNI) in February 2009 and the United Kingdom[,]s Strategy for Countering International Terrorism compiled by the U.K. Government in March 2009 point out that the leaders of Al Qaeda are being harbored in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) of the Pakistan border region. 2) Annual Threat Assessment, DNI (February 2009) 3) Annual Threat Assessment, DNI (February 2009) 4) Country Reports on Terrorism 2007, U.S. (April 2008) 5) The United Kingdom[,]s Strategy for Countering International Terrorism, U.K. (March 2009) 6) The verdict of the first trial against the Madrid train terrorist attack (October 31, 2007) 7) Under U.N. Security Council Resolution 1386 (December 20, 2001), the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) was established with the principal mission of maintaining security in Kabul and surrounding areas. Based on U.N. Security Council Resolution 1510 (October 13, 2003), the ISAF has gradually expanded the area of deployment since December 2003. Since October 2006 the ISAF has deployed in the entire territory of Afghanistan. As of April 2009, approximately 58,000 troops from 42 countries have been dispatched to the ISAF. 8) Annual Threat Assessment of the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) (March 2009) 9) In the new strategy, the United States announces that it will, for example, (1) call upon Congress to pass a bill that authorizes $1.5 billion in support to Pakistan every year for the next five years, (2) start regular dialogue between the U.S., Afghanistan and Pakistan, (3) deploy approximately 4,000 troops to train Afghan security forces in addition to the deployment of 17,000 troops that had already been decided in February 2009 and (4) increase civilian personnel on the ground. 10) An Islamic extremist organization established in Algeria in 1998 as the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC). It then changed the name to the current one when it officially joined Al Qaeda in September 2006. 11) The security situation in Algeria has improved although in the 1990s it suffered from frequent terrorist activities by anti-government Islamic Extremists. 12) 2008 Annual Threat Assessment of the DNI (February 2009). 13) Testimony to the House Committee on Foreign Affairs on June 6, 2007, by then Assistant Secretary of State Welch. 14) It has been pointed out that Al-Qaeda in Yemen has grown since its formation in 2006. (The United Kingdom[,]s Strategy for Countering International Terrorism, U.K. (March 2009)) 15) In 2008, successive bomb attacks took place in Jaipur (North) in May, in Bangalore and Ahmadabad in July, in New Delhi in September, Assam in October and in Mumbai in November. 16) For instance, in October 2002, terrorist bomb attacks in two clubs on the island of Bali killed 202 people. In October 2005, terrorist bomb attacks against restaurants and other places on the island of Bali killed 23 people. 17) 2008 Annual Threat Assessment of the DNI (February 2009). 18) An agreement over ancestral domain between the Philippine government and the MIFL, which is the major controversial issue in the peace negotiations, was declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court. Immediately after the court decision, some commanders of the MILF, dissatisfied with the ruling, carried out an attack on civilians. This triggered acts of combat between the army and the MILF, which are still going on today. 19) The United States, the former Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, France and China. France and China signed the NPT in 1992. ----- 20) Article 6 of the NPT sets out the obligation of signatory countries to negotiate nuclear disarmament in good faith. 21) As of May 2009. 22) South Africa, Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Belarus. 23) Israel, India and Pakistan are major non-member states. 24) A means of attacking the counterpart[,]s most vulnerable points other than by conventional weapons of war. (e.g. weapons of mass destruction, ballistic missiles, terrorist attacks, cyber attacks) 25) Former Defense Agency, “Basic Concept for Dealing with Biological Weapons” (January 2002). 26) Mustard gas is a slow-acting erosion agent. Tabun and sarin are fast-acting nerve agents. 27) It was reported that a Kurdish village was attacked with chemical weapons in 1988, killing several thousand people. 28) Iraq joined the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) in February 2009. 29) A weapon that generates a lethal chemical agent by mixing two kinds of chemical agents through discharge or explosion. The handling and storage of this weapon is easy because of its low lethality before use. 30) In the July 2006 conflict between Israel and Lebanon, it is believed that Hezbollah used a cruise missile to attack an Israeli naval vessel. 31) U.S. Department of Defense “Proliferation: Threat and Response” (January 2001). 32) Dirty bombs are intended to cause radioactive contamination by spreading radioactive substances. 33) Based on these concerns, the United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 1540 in April 2004, declaring that all states should refrain from providing any form of support to non-state actors that attempt to develop, acquire, manufacture, possess, transport, transfer or use weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery and adopt and enforce appropriate and effective laws to prohibit these acts. The International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism also entered into force in July 2007. 34) U.S. President Bush said in a speech in February 2004: “Khan and his associates provided Iran and Libya and North Korea with designs for Pakistan's older centrifuges, as well as designs for more advanced and efficient models. The network also provided these countries with components of centrifuges and, in some cases, with complete centrifuges.” 35) Statement at a press conference with Japanese reporters (September 29, 2004). 36) Dennis C. Blair, DNI of the U.S., stated at the Senate Armed Services Committee in March 2009 that, “The IC continues to assess North Korea has pursued a uranium enrichment capability in the past. Some in the Intelligence Community have increasing concerns that North Korea has an ongoing covert uranium enrichment program.” 37) Then U.S. White House Press Secretary Dana Perino made an announcement that the facility located in eastern Syria bombed and destroyed by Israel in September 2007 was a nuclear reactor that was being secretly constructed for the purpose of producing weapons-grade plutonium with the support of North Korea (April 24, 2008). 38) Extensive behind-the-scenes negotiations began in March 2003 between Libya and the U.S. and U.K., and in December 2003, Libya agreed to dismantle all of its weapons of mass destruction and to allow international organization to carry out inspections. Later, in August 2006, Libya ratified the IAEA Additional Protocol. 39) Testimony of then Director of the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency George J. Tenet before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (February 24, 2004). 40) Accusation made by the Deputy Chairman of Ukraine[,]s Parliamentary Committee on Combating Organized Crime and Corruption (February 2, 2005). 41) This urged Iran to abandon its enrichment-related and reprocessing activities in exchange for assistance in a ----- civilian-use nuclear power program that would guarantee a fuel supply for a light-water reactor, assistance in the export of civilian aircraft to Iran, and support for Iran[,]s accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO), etc. 42) U.N. Security Council Resolution 1737 adopted in December 2006 (obliging prevention of the supply, sale or transfer to Iran of materials and technology that could contribute to Iran[,]s enrichment, reprocessing, or heavy water-related activities or to the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems, and obliging freezes of the financial assets of persons or entities supporting Iran[,]s proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities or the development of nuclear-weapons delivery systems), U.N. Security Council Resolution 1747 adopted in March 2007 (in addition to the above measures obliging a freezes of the financial assets of additional persons or entities, obliging a bans on the procurement of weapons and related items from Iran, and requesting monitoring and restricting the supply, sale or transfer of tanks, fighter aircrafts, missiles and other such armaments to Iran.), and U.N. Security Council Resolution 1803 adopted in March 2008 (in addition to the above measures, obliging a freezes of assets of additional persons or entities and obliging a bans on the entry of designated individuals into U.N. member states, for their involvement in Iran[,]s proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities.). Furthermore, U.N. Security Council Resolution 1835, calling for compliance with aforementioned Resolutions, was adopted in September 2008 43) The U.S. published its assessment as follows: “Iranian military entities were working under government direction to develop nuclear weapons. In fall 2003, Tehran halted its nuclear weapons program. Tehran at a minimum is keeping open the option to develop nuclear weapons.” (National Intelligence Estimate, National Intelligence Council, December 2007; Annual Threat Assessment, DNI, February 2009) 44) In February 2009, Iran started the trial operation of a light-water reactor that was being constructed with the cooperation of Russia, under the framework hat Russia supplies nuclear fuel and collecting spent nuclear fuel. U.S. Department of State Spokesman Robert Wood stated at a press conference that the Iranian lightwater reactor demonstrates that it does not need to develop an indigenous uranium enrichment capacity. 45) DoD Report to Congress, “Measuring Security and Stability in Iraq” (March 2009). 46) Ibid., Annual Threat Assessment of the DNI (February 2009). 47) Annual Threat Assessment of the DNI (February 2009). 48) In a document communicated to the Security Council in December 2007, which requested the extension of the deployment of multinational forces, Iraqi Prime Minister al-Maliki announced that the Government of Iraq considers this to be its final request for the extension of the mandate of multinational forces. 49) This agreement stipulates the withdrawal of U.S. combat forces from Iraqi cities, villages, and localities no later than June 30, 2009 and withdrawal of all the United States Forces from all Iraqi territory no later than December 31, 2011. 50) In March 2009, the U.S. forces announced further reduction of two army brigades in the next 6 months. 51) In April 2007, a panel discussion on the impact of climate change on security was held at the Security Council, in which 55 member and non-member States participated. This shows that the awareness that climate change may have an impact on the security environment is becoming increasingly pervasive. 52) Israel concluded peace treaties with Egypt in 1979 and with Jordan in 1994. 53) According to the International Maritime Bureau, 92 incidents occurred in the Gulf of Aden and 19 off the coast of Somalia in the Indian Ocean. 54) Resolution 1816 (adopted in June 2008), 1838 (adopted in October 2008), 1846 and 1851 (both adopted in December 2008). 55) This includes a proposal submitted in October 2007 calling for the enhancement of the U.N. Department of Political Affairs, which is in charge of conflict prevention and such. In addition, the Peacebuilding Commission, which gives advices on consolidation strategies for post-conflict peacebuilding, began fullscale operations in 2006, and Burundi, Sierra Leone, Guinea-Bissau and Central African Republic are ----- currently on the agenda. 56) The scale of participants in these operations has also seen a remarkable increase. The number of personnel dispatched was temporarily reduced to 12,000 after 1993, while large-scale PKO missions were sent to the Balkan Peninsula and Somalia. However, from around 2000, the number of personnel began to rise again following an increase in large-scale missions mainly in Africa and the Middle East. As of the end of February 2009, 16 PKO missions were being conducted in 120 countries, with about 90,000 participants from around the world. 57) In the conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea, a truce agreement was reached in 2000. In response, the United Nations Security Council set up and operated the United Nations Missions in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE). However, the mission was wrought with difficulties because of persistent sabotage by Eritrea. The U.N. Security Council finally decided to terminate the mandate of UNMEE in July 2008. 58) For example, some PKOs established in recent years are authorized to take all necessary measures to protect civilians, to guard U.N. facilities, and to maintain security. ----- ## Part l **Security Environment Surrounding Japan** ### Chapter 2 **National Defense Policies of Countries** **Section 1. The United States** **Section 2. Korean Peninsula** **Section 3. China** **Section 4. Russia** **Section 5. Southeast Asia** **Section 6. South Asia** **Section 7. Australia** **Section 8. Europe** The G-20 Leaders' Summit on Financial Markets and the World Economy, held in London [AFP/JIJI] ----- **Section 1. The United States** **1. Security and Defense Policies** The National Security Strategy1 released in March 2006 states that the United States can protect its nation by leading efforts of the international community to end tyranny and promote democracy. The United States, however, cannot achieve such idealistic goals alone, and so it is committed to taking a realistic approach that relies on cooperation with allies, partners, and the international community. The National Defense Strategy released in July 20082 stipulates that the national interests of the United States include protecting the nation and its allies from attack or coercion, promoting international security to reduce conflict and foster economic growth, and securing the Global Commons and, with them, access to world markets and resources. To pursue these interests, the U.S. intends to develop military capabilities, together with diplomacy and economic measures, and use force when necessary. In January 2009, Barack Obama became the 44th president of the United States. President Obama said in his inauguration speech, “our power alone cannot protect us. Instead, our power grows through its prudent use; our security emanates from the justness of our cause and the force of our example.” In his speech to Congress in February 2009, he said, “America cannot meet the threats of this century alone, but the world cannot meet them without America. To meet the challenges, we will strengthen old alliances, forge new ones, and use all elements of our national power.” U.S. President Barack Obama taking the presidential oath at his inaugural ceremony [AFP/JIJI] **1. Assessment of Security Environment** According to the 2008 National Defense Strategy, for the foreseeable future, the security environment will be defined by a global struggle against a violent extremist ideology that seeks to overturn the international state system. It also acknowledges that the world is facing various long-term threats, including irregular challenges, the quest by rouge states for nuclear weapons, and the rising military power of other states. The strategy points out that success in dealing with them will require the orchestration of national and international power over the years or decades to come. **2. Defense Strategy** The United States outlines the strategic objectives in the 2008 National Strategy as follows: 1) defending the homeland; 2) winning the “Long War” against violent extremism3; 3) promoting security; 4) deterring conflict4; and 5) winning the nation[,]s wars. In addition, it describes the following five measures to accomplish these strategic objectives: 1) Shape the choices of key states: In cooperation with allies and friends, the U.S. helps shape the international environment and the choices that strategic states face5 2) Prevent adversaries from acquiring or using weapons of mass destruction (WMD): There are few greater challenges than those posed by WMD. Preventing the spread and use of these weapons requires vigilance and obligates us to anticipate and counter threats6 3) Strengthen and expand alliances and partnerships: Alliance systems remain the key to our success. The United States will assist other countries in improving their capabilities through security cooperation and learn ----- valuable skills and information form others 4) Secure U.S. strategic access and retain freedom of action: The U.S. requires strategic access to important regions of the world to meet national security needs and thus will continue to foster access to and flow of energy resources vital to the world economy. The U.S. will also continue to transform overseas U.S. military presence 5) Integrate and unify our efforts: A new “Jointness”: Iraq and Afghanistan remind the U.S. that military success alone is insufficient to achieve victory. The United States as a nation must strengthen not only our military capabilities, but also reinvigorate other important elements of national power and develop the capability to integrate, tailor, and apply these tools as needed. **3. Priority Areas for Capability Development** The 2008 National Defense Strategy continues to emphasize the importance of improvements in capabilities build-up in the following four priority areas requiring particular attention identified in the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR)7 released in February 2006. 1) Defeating terrorist networks: In dealing with irregular challenges, it is necessary to deter the terrorist networks from securing their sanctuaries by attacking them relentlessly. Therefore, in addition to developing intelligence gathering capabilities and special operation capabilities, U.S. forces strengthen their cooperation with interagency partners and provide training to security forces of other countries. To defeat terrorist networks in a battle of ideas as well as in a battle of arms, U.S. forces will strengthen their Strategic Communication and improve language and cultural awareness. 2) Defending the homeland in depth: In order to cope with threats to the homeland of the United States, it is essential to strengthen cooperation with interagency partners as well as to maintain the posture to deter invasion. To implement this, U.S. forces need not only to strengthen their deterrence by missile defense and other defense measures, but also to increase capabilities of consequence management in response to emergencies. 3) Shaping the choices of countries at strategic crossroads: While the United States encourages the countries that have the potential to affect future security to become constructive partners by expanding its security cooperation and other measures, it hedges against the possibility that cooperative approaches may fail by strengthening the capabilities of allies and partners, further diversifying its basing posture, and maintaining its military primacy in key areas. 4) Preventing the acquisition or use of weapons of mass destruction: The United States needs to take both preventive and responsive measures so that it addresses the threat of WMD by adversaries. U.S. forces develop capabilities to lessen the damage in case of WMD attacks while they strengthen their capabilities to identify and track WMD and their related materials as preventive measures. **4. Force Planning** Since the lessons learned from recent operations suggest that U.S. forces need to operate around the globe and not only in and from the four critical regions and that “swiftly defeating” or “winning decisively” against adversaries may be less useful for some types of operations, such as a long duration, irregular warfare campaign, the 2006 QDR concludes that while continuing to take the capabilities-based approach8 in the 2001 QDR9, the United States has refined its force planning construct, dividing its activities into three objective areas: 1) homeland defense; 2) fight against terrorism/irregular (asymmetric) warfare; and 3) conventional campaigns. 1) Homeland defense: In steady state, U.S. forces deter external threats to the homeland of the United States and provide necessary support to interagency partners by conducting joint training and other measures so that they can contribute to homeland defense. In surge, they respond to attacks by means of WMD and other ----- weapons, and also take measures to minimize the damage from them. 2) War on terror/irregular warfare: In steady state, U.S. forces deter transnational terrorist attacks through forward-deployed forces, and also strengthen capabilities of allies and friends and conduct counterinsurgency operations. In surge they conduct a potentially long-duration irregular warfare campaign, whose level of effort is equal to that of the operations conducted in Iraq and Afghanistan. 3) Conventional campaigns: In steady state, U.S. forces deter invasions or coercion by other countries through forward-deployed forces, and also strengthen capabilities of allies and friends through security cooperation such as military exchanges and joint exercises. In surge, they wage two nearly simultaneous conventional campaigns (or one conventional campaign if already engaged in a large-scale, long-duration irregular campaign), while reinforcing deterrence against opportunistic acts of aggression. (See Fig. I-2-1-1) **5. Defense Posture Review of U.S. Forces** The United States is currently working on the review of its global defense posture. Part of this review was disclosed in August 2004, stating that, over the next 10 years, the plan “will bring home about 60,000 to 70,000 uniformed personnel and approximately 100,000 family members and civilian employees.” By reviewing the posture of its forces, the United States will redeploy most of its large-scale forces that have been stationed forward to cope with threats in the Cold War era to homeland, and strengthen its cooperation with allies and others, while making efforts to further improve rapid reaction capabilities by moving its most rapidly deployable forces forward in case of emergencies in unpredictable locations. Also, by capitalizing on force transformation, the United States aims to improve the capabilities of the forward-deployed force, while attempting to restore the morale and readiness of the military forces by sending many service members who are stationed abroad back to the United States. (See Fig. I-2-1-2) ----- As specific measures in this posture review, in Europe the United States will deploy Striker Brigade Combat Teams10, reinforce the airborne brigade, and create a joint task force as well as build new bases and training facilities in Eastern European countries. On the other hand, with regard to personnel, two army divisions will be sent back to the homeland and U.S. forces stationed in Europe will be reduced to 24,000 personnel11. However, as preparations for the living quarters of troops returning home remain unfinished, and due to security requisites in the European theater, it has been decided that the plan to reduce two U.S. brigade combat teams in Germany will be postponed for several years12. As for Asia, the United States announced that it would improve the capabilities of U.S. forces to deter, dissuade, and defeat challenges in the region through strengthened long-range strike capability, streamlined and consolidated headquarters, and a network of access agreements. Specifically, the United States is working on: 1) the forward stationing of additional expeditionary maritime capabilities in the Pacific13; 2) deployment of advanced strike assets in the Western Pacific14; 3) restructuring U.S. military presence and command structure in Northeast Asia (See Section 2-3 and Part II, Chapter 2); and 4) establishing a network of sites to provide training opportunities and contingency access in Central and Southeast Asia15. In Africa, in October 2008, the United States Africa Command (command: Germany) with the area of responsibility covering Africa, which had been previously covered by three Commands − the U.S. European Command, U.S. Central Command and U.S. Pacific Command became an independent unified command. U.S. Africa Command is a joint command that aims to improve the capacity of African nations to deal with conflicts in their own region, through the provision of military assistance in the form of training for peacekeeping, etc., and the purpose of its establishment is to help African leaders to deal with Africa[,]s problems16. **6. Nuclear Strategy** The Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) announced in 2002 declares a U.S. shift in nuclear force planning from an approach based on threats of Russia: the United States should maintain the minimum required nuclear forces ----- for the security of the United States, its allies, and friends, and the United States must have new deterrent force composed of nuclear forces, conventional forces, and defense systems (missile defense)17. The NPR asserts that deterrence should shift from the old triad in the Cold War era comprising: 1) intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM); 2) submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM); and 3) strategic bombers; to a new triad of: 1) nonnuclear and nuclear strike capabilities; 2) active and passive defense systems; and 3) defense infrastructure (defense industry, procurement system, and others). The new triad depends less on nuclear weapons by emphasizing the importance of missile defense and conventional forces (advanced weapons in particular), and makes deterrence more reliable in an environment where WMD are proliferating. The Secretary of Defense is to review the NPR within 2009 and to submit a report to Congress based on the National Defense Authorization Act of FY 200818. President Obama in his foreign policy sets a goal of a world without nuclear weapons and says that he will negotiate a verifiable global ban on the production of nuclear weapons material, while the United States will not disarm nuclear weapons unilaterally. **7. FY 2010 Budget** The United States faces the challenge of how to distribute limited resources between the dual requirements of resolving the current issues and securing its military advantage into the future19. The defense budget for FY 2010 is crafted to achieve four principle objectives: 1) strengthening the commitment to care for the all-volunteer force; 2) re-shaping the Department of Defense programs to enhance capabilities to execute U.S. soldiers assigned patrol duties in a village in eastern Afghanistan tasks of today and the future; 3) beginning a fundamental near the border with Pakistan [AFP/JIJI] overhaul of the Department of Defense[,]s approach to procurement, acquisition and contracting; 4) providing the necessary resources to support the troops in the field. The proposed budget for FY 2010, main contents are supporting the troops and their families, reshaping the forces, modernizing capabilities, reforming procurement20 and supporting troops in the field, amounts to $533.8 billion and represents an increase of about 4% over the FY 2009 enacted budget. That budget also has allocated $130 billion for overseas contingency operations21. (See Fig. I-2-1-3) ----- **2. Military Posture** Regarding nuclear forces, the United States completed the reduction of the number of its strategic nuclear weapons in accordance with the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty I (START I) by December 2001, the deadline set in the treaty22. The current nuclear forces of the United States consist of 500 ICBMs (Intercontinental Ballistic Missile), 14 SSBNs (Ballistic Missile Submarine, Nuclear-Powered), 432 SLBMs (Submarine-launched Ballistic Missile), 111 strategic bombers, and 5,951 nuclear warheads. In addition the United States intends to decrease the number of its operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads to between 1,700 and 2,200 by the end of 2012 in accordance with the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (“Moscow Treaty”). Furthermore, in December 2007, then President Bush approved a significant reduction in the U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile by the end of 200723. A report by the Secretary of Defense Task Force on Nuclear Weapons Management was issued in September and December 200824. In relation to this, the U.S. Air Force released a so-called roadmap, titled “Reinvigorating the Air Force Nuclear Enterprise,” to take measures including the establishment of the Global Strike Command having control over nuclear-capable bombers and all ICBMs. The U.S. ground forces consist of approximately 540,000 soldiers, and approximately 200,000 marines, which are forward-deployed in Germany, the ROK and Japan, among other countries. In order to prepare for prolonged overseas contingency operations, U.S. ground forces are reorganizing their combat and support troops into brigade-sized modular units25. The U.S. Marine Corps is enhancing its special operations forces, which have been playing an important role in the overseas contingency operations. It newly established the Marine Corps Special Operations Command (MARSOC)26 in February 2006, thereby improving its ability to cope with irregular warfare. U.S. maritime forces consist of approximately 950 vessels (including approximately 70 submarines) totaling about 6.02 million tons. The 2nd Fleet is deployed to the Atlantic Ocean, the 6th Fleet to the Mediterranean Sea, the 5th Fleet to the Persian Gulf, Red Sea and northwest Indian Ocean, the 3rd Fleet to the eastern Pacific, the 4th Fleet to Central and South America and the Caribbean Sea and the 7th Fleet to the western Pacific and Indian Ocean. The 2006 QDR announces that the United States will deploy at least six operationally available and sustainable carriers and 60% of its submarines in the Pacific in order to increase its military presence in the ocean. The U.S. air forces consist of roughly 3,890 combat aircraft across the Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps. In addition to carrier-based aircraft deployed at sea, part of the tactical air force is forward-deployed in Germany, the United Kingdom, Japan and the ROK. In the 2006 QDR, it is noted that the United States will strengthen its offensive capabilities with conventional weapons by developing a new land-based, penetrating long-range strike capability to be fielded by 2018, modernizing B-52, B-1, and B-2 bombers, and accelerating the procurement of unmanned aerial vehicles. On the other hand, it states that the number of the Air Force end strength will be reduced by about 40,000 full-time equivalent personnel27. As for mobility to deploy U.S. forces to distant locations, the United States is procuring C-17 transport aircraft and modernizing C-5 transport aircraft to improve the transport capabilities of the forces, and tries to preposition equipment at various theaters28. Furthermore, the former Bush Administration aimed to introduce a Missile Defense (MD) system to Europe around 2011 or 2012, and signed an agreement with the Czech Republic and Poland with regard to the partial deployment of the system in their territories29. The Obama Administration indicated that the United States would go forward with a MD system that is cost-effective and proven as long as the threat from Iran persists. However, if the Iranian threat is eliminated, the driving force for missile defense construction in Europe will be removed30. The U.S. forces are increasingly depending on space systems for intelligence collection and communications. The country announced the U.S. National Space Policy in 2006, in which it states that space capabilities are vital ----- to its national interests and that it will preserve its freedom of action in space, deter others from impeding its space systems, take those actions necessary to protect its space systems, and deny, if necessary, the use of space that is hostile to the United States. **3. Military Posture in the Asia-Pacific Region** The United States, which is also a Pacific nation, continues to play an important role in ensuring the peace and stability of the Asia-Pacific region by deploying the Pacific Command, a joint command consisting of the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps. The Army is composed of two divisions and deploys a total of approximately 17,000 personnel split between the 25th Infantry Division deployed in Hawaii, and the 2nd Infantry Division and 19th Sustainment Command in the ROK, in addition to approximately 3,000 personnel in Japan, including the I Corps (Forward) and the Commander, U.S. Army Japan31. The Navy consists of the 7th Fleet, which is in charge of the area including the western Pacific and Indian Ocean, and the 3rd Fleet, which is in charge of the area including the eastern Pacific Ocean and Bering Sea, under the Pacific Fleet, the headquarters of which is located in Hawaii, totaling approximately 180 vessels. The 7th Fleet is comprised mainly of one carrier strike group, with main bases in Japan and Guam. Its major mission is to defend and protect the territory, citizens, sea lanes, allies, and other vital interests of the United States, and ships assigned to the Pacific Fleet including carriers, amphibious ships, and Aegis cruisers. The Marine Corps deploys one Marine Expeditionary Force in each of the U.S. mainland and Japan under the Pacific Marine Corps, which has its headquarters in Hawaii. Of this force approximately 15,000 personnel are in the 3rd Marine Division and the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing, which is equipped with F/A-18 and other aircraft and are both deployed in Japan. In addition, maritime pre-positioning ships loaded with heavy equipment and others are deployed in the western Pacific. The Air Force deploys three air forces under the Pacific Air Force, the headquarters of which is in Hawaii. It deploys three air wings equipped with F-15, F-16, and C-130 aircraft in the 5th Air Force stationed in Japan, and two air wings equipped with F-16 fighters in the 7th Air Force stationed in the ROK. ----- **Section 2. Korean Peninsula** On the Korean Peninsula, people of the same ethnicity have been divided into two − north and south − for more than half a century. Even today, the Republic of Korea (ROK) and North Korea pit their ground forces of about 1.5 million against each other across the demilitarized zone (DMZ). Maintaining peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula is vital for the peace and stability of the entire East Asian region, to say nothing of Japan. (See Fig. I-2-2-1) **1. North Korea** North Korea has been advocating the construction of a “powerful and prosperous nation” as its basic national policy, aiming to create a strong socialist state in all areas − ideology, politics, military affairs, and economy − and it adopts “military-first politics” to realize this goal. The “military-first politics” has been defined as a form of leadership that advances the great undertaking of socialism by resolving all problems that arise in the revolution and national construction on the principle of military first and stressing the importance of the armed forces as the pillar of the revolution32. Indeed, General Secretary of the Korean Workers[,] Party Kim Jong Il is in a position to completely control North Korea[,]s military forces as Chairman of the National Defense Commission33 and regularly visits military forces34. It would appear that he intends to continue attaching importance to, and relying on, the military forces. Although North Korea faces serious economic difficulties to this day and depends on the international community for food and other resources, the country seems to be maintaining and enhancing its military capabilities and combat readiness by preferentially allocating resources to its military forces. For example, military personnel represent a high proportion of the population, with active-service military personnel estimated to account for nearly 5% of the overall population35. It is noteworthy that North Korea deploys most of its armed forces along the DMZ. According to the official announcement made at the Supreme People[,]s Assembly in April this year, the proportion of defense budget in this year[,]s national budget is 15.8%, but it is estimated that the official defense budget represents only a portion of real defense expenditures. Furthermore, North Korea seems to maintain and reinforce its so-called asymmetric military capabilities by making efforts to develop weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and ballistic missiles and by maintaining large-scale special operation forces. North Korea[,]s military behavior has increased tension over the Korean Peninsula, and constitutes a serious destabilizing factor for The April 2009 missile launch [JIJI (Courtesy of: Institute for Science and International Security [ISIS])] the entire East Asian region, including Japan. **1. WMD and Ballistic Missiles** Concerning WMD, issues of North Korea[,]s nuclear weapons program have been pointed out, as well as its chemical and biological weapons capabilities. In particular, North Korea[,]s nuclear issue has serious influence on Japan[,]s national security and it is also a critical problem for the entire international community in terms of nonproliferation of WMD36. As for ballistic missiles, North Korea seems to be conducting R&D for extending the range and for putting solid fuel to use37. Also, it continues to be pointed out that North Korea is proliferating ballistic missiles. ----- ----- Combined with the nuclear issue, North Korea[,]s missile issue constitutes a destabilizing factor for the entire international community, as well as for the Asia-Pacific region, and such moves are of great concern. **(1) Nuclear Weapons** With regard to the issue of North Korea[,]s development of nuclear weapons, Six-Party Talks38 have been held since August 2003 in pursuit of a peaceful solution to this problem and denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. At the fourth round of the Six-Party Talks in 2005, a joint statement was adopted for the first time, which stated the verifiable abandonment of “all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programs” by North Korea. Subsequently, however, North Korea strongly reacted to the United States[,] designation of a bank in Macao dealing with North Korea as a “financial institution of primary money laundering concern,” suspended its participation in the Six-Party Talks, and, in 2006, launched seven ballistic missiles and announced that it had implemented a nuclear test. Against these actions by North Korea, which further increased international tensions, the U.N. Security Council adopted Resolutions 1695 and 1718 imposing sanctions on North Korea. Finally, in December 2006, North Korea returned to the fifth round of the Six-Party Talks and, in February 2007, the parties reached an agreement on “Initial Actions for the Implementation of the Joint Statement” to implement the joint statement made at the fourth round of the Six-Party Talks. After the initial actions including shutting down of nuclear facilities in Yongbyon had been implemented, in October 2007, the “Second-phase Actions for the Implementation of the Joint Statement” were announced as the outcome of the sixth round of the Talks. The agreement includes completion of the disablement of nuclear facilities in Yongbyon and “a complete and correct declaration of all its (North Korea[,]s) nuclear programs” by the end of 2007. However, the implementation of the agreement has not been completed39. In the meantime, in response to North Korea[,]s missile launch of April 5, 2009, the U.N. Security Council issued a presidential statement condemning North Korea[,]s launch, which is in contravention of Security Council resolution 1718, and demanding that North Korea not conduct any further launch. North Korea suggested boycotting the six-party talks and announced restarting the reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel rod, and then announced that it would take steps unless the Security Council apologizes, including nuclear tests and test launches of intercontinental ballistic missiles as self-defensive measures, and that the second nuclear test was conducted on May 25, 2009. On June 13, the international community adopted U.N. Security Council resolution 1874, condemning North Korea[,]s nuclear test in the strongest terms and, imposing additional measures against North Korea. In response to the UNSC resolution, North Korea announced that the whole amount of the newly extracted plutonium would be weaponized, and the process of uranium enrichment would be commenced, etc. Regarding North Korea[,]s response to the nuclear issues described above, some people argue that it is resorting to a so-called brinkmanship policy by intentionally heightening tension to receive some compensation, while others argue that North Korea[,]s ultimate objective is to possess nuclear weapons. Considering that the ultimate goal of North Korea is said to be the maintenance of its existing regime, it appears that the two foregoing views are not incompatible with each other. In light of the series of North Korea[,]s words and deeds as well as the fact that the status of North Korea[,]s nuclear development so far is not yet elucidated, the possibility cannot be excluded that North Korea has already made considerable progress in its nuclear weapons program40. In addition, the fact that North Korea announced in May 2009 that it had conducted a nuclear test following the one in 2006 implies that there is a high possibility that North Korea has further advanced its nuclear weapons program. When taken together with North Korea’s enhancement of its ballistic missile capability, which could serve as a means of delivering weapons of mass destruction, it is totally unacceptable as it constitutes a grave threat to Japan’s security as well as seriously undermines the peace and security of Northeast Asia and the international community. In general, miniaturizing a nuclear weapon enough to be loaded on a ballistic missile requires an extremely high degree of technological capacity. However, considering the fact that the United States, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, France, and China succeeded in acquiring such technology by as early as the 1960s, it is ----- difficult to eliminate the possibility that North Korea, in a relatively short time, will achieve miniaturization of nuclear weapons and acquire nuclear warheads41. It is necessary to remain watchful of all related developments. **(2) Biological and Chemical Weapons** Because North Korea is an extremely closed regime and most materials, equipment, and technology used for manufacturing biological and chemical weapons are for both military and civilian use, which facilitates camouflage, details of North Korea[,]s biological and chemical weapons development and arsenals are not clear. However, it is believed that North Korea has a certain level of production base for biological weapons although it ratified the Biological Weapons Convention in 1987. As for chemical weapons, it is estimated that North Korea has several facilities capable of producing chemical agents and has a substantial amount of stocks of such agents. It has not acceded to the Chemical Weapons Convention42. **(3) Ballistic Missiles** It is believed that, since the middle of the 1980s, North Korea has manufactured and deployed Scud B and Scud C43, a variant of Scud B with extended range, and has exported these ballistic missiles to the Middle East and other countries. North Korea is considered to have begun developing longer-range ballistic missiles by the 1990s, such as Nodong, and it is highly probable that Nodong was used in the launch into the Sea of Japan in 1993. In 1998, North Korea used a ballistic missile based on Taepodong-1 in the launch over Japan. In the 2006 launch, which constituted a complete lifting of the freeze on ballistic missile launches announced by North Korea in 1999, North Korea fired seven ballistic missiles in total, the third of which was assessed to have been Taepodong-2 and others to be Scud and Nodong missiles44. North Korea appears to have used either a Taepodong-2 or a variant45 in the launch of April 5, 2009. North Korea is an extremely closed regime, and many of details of its ballistic missiles are still unclear. It, however, appears that North Korea gives high priority to ballistic missiles in terms of political and diplomatic consideration, and earning foreign currency, in addition to enhancing its military capabilities46. And at present, North Korea is believed to be developing a new intermediate-range ballistic missile and a new solid propellant ----- short-range ballistic missile47 in addition to existing inventory of ballistic missiles. Also, it is necessary to pay attention to the possibility that North Korea is making efforts for the improvement of existing Scuds and Nodongs, such as extending their ranges. (See Fig. I-2-2-2) It appears that Nodong, the deployment of which is believed to be ongoing, is a liquid propellant single stage ballistic missile. It is assessed to have a range of about 1,300km, and may reach almost all parts of Japan. Nodong specifications have not been confirmed in detail, but, as it is believed to be based on the Scud technology, it seems, for example, not to have the accuracy to carry out pinpoint attacks on specific target installations. Due to the fact that it is extremely difficult to verify the intention of North Korea[,]s military activities because of its closed regime, that it is believed that underground military facilities have been constructed across the territory, and that Nodong, as is the case with Scud, is thought to be loaded onto a transporter-erector-launcher (TEL) and operated with mobility, it is believed to be difficult to detect concrete signs of a Nodong launch in advance, such as its specific launch site and timing. Also, North Korea has been developing Taepodong-1 with an estimated range of at least approximately 1,500km. The Taepodong-1 is assumed to be a two-stage, liquid propellant ballistic missile with a Nodong as its first stage and a Scud as its second stage. The ballistic missile launched in 1998 is assessed to be based on Taepodong-1. North Korea is believed to have shifted its focus to the development of Taepodong-2, which has a longer range48: Taepodong-1 might have been a transitory product to develop Taepodong-2. In July 2006, North Korea launched a Taepodong-2 missile from the Taepodong district located in the northeastern coastal area. The missile is believed to be a two-stage missile with a new booster as its first stage and a Nodong as its second stage, and with a range of approximately 6,000km. The missile is believed to have been damaged during the flight at an altitude of several kilometers, several tens of seconds after launch without separating the first stage, and have fallen near the launch site. In the launch of April 5, 2009, it is thought that North Korea used Taepodong-2 or a variant from the Taepodong district again. Since it is estimated that it crossed over Japan, and flew more than 3000km before impacting in the Pacific Ocean, it is thought that North Korea had been able to extend the range of its ballistic missiles compared to its 2006 failed launch of the Taepodong-2. Through the April 5 launch, it is believed that North Korea might have tested the required technologies, such as increasing the size of propulsion, separation of multi-staged propulsion devices and attitude control. Thus, it is highly possible that North Korea will further develop ballistic missiles, including longer-range missiles. Moreover, a test launch of a long-range ballistic missile can contribute to extending the range, payload capability and CEP improvement, and the April 5 launch may lead to the performance improvement of other ballistic missiles possessed by North Korea, such as the Nodong. (See Fig. I-2-2-3) (See Fig.I-2-2-4) As the background of North Korea[,]s rapid strides in the development of its ballistic missiles with only a few test launches, it is assumed that the country imported various materials and technologies from outside. It is pointed out that North Korea transfers and proliferates ballistic missiles or related technologies including the transfer of Nodong airframes and related technologies to Iran and Pakistan, and that North Korea promotes the further development of missiles using funds procured by such transfer and proliferation49. In light of this, it is necessary to remain watchful of North Korea[,]s ballistic missiles, particularly in terms of transfer and proliferation, in addition to development and deployment. **2. Military Posture** **(1) General Situation** North Korea has been building up its military capabilities in accordance with the Four Military Guidelines (extensive training for all the soldiers, modernizing all the armed forces, arming the entire population, and fortifying the entire country)50. ----- ----- North Korea[,]s armed forces are comprised mainly of ground forces, with total troop strength of roughly 1.1 million. North Korea[,]s military forces are believed to have been maintaining and enhancing their capabilities and operational readiness, and it seems to have continued infiltration51 exercises. However, most of its equipment is outdated. Meanwhile, North Korea has large-scale special operations forces that can conduct various operations ranging from intelligence gathering and sabotage to guerrilla warfare. These forces are believed to reach approximately 100,000 personnel52. Moreover, North Korea seems to have many underground military-related installations across its territory. **(2) Military Capabilities** The North Korean Army comprises about one million personnel, and roughly two-thirds of them are believed to be deployed along the DMZ. The main body of the army is infantry, but the army also maintains armored and artillery forces including at least 3,500 tanks. North Korea is believed to regularly deploy long-range artillery along the DMZ, such as 240mm multiple launch rockets and 170mm self-propelled guns, which can reach cities and bases in the northern part of the ROK including the capital city of Seoul. The navy has about 650 ships with total displacement of approximately 107,000 tons and is chiefly made of small naval vessels such as high-speed missile crafts. Also, it has about 20 Romeo class submarines, about 60 midget submarines, and about 130 air cushioned landing crafts, the latter two of which are believed to be used for infiltration and transportation of the special operation forces. The Air Force has about 580 combat aircraft, most of which are out-of-date models made in China or the former Soviet Union, but some fourth-generation aircraft such as MiG-29s and Su-25s are also included. North Korea has a large number of outdated An-2s as well, which are believed to be used for transportation of special operation forces. North Korea[,]s military forces are vigorously conducting various types of training to maintain and enhance their operational readiness. Meanwhile, given the serious food situation, the military forces seem to be engaged in agricultural assistance as well. **3. Domestic Affairs** Some point out that in recent years North Korea[,]s regime is not as stable as in previous years due to loosening of social control resulting from both an increasing disparity between the rich and the poor and a trend of money-worshipping, and declining military morale. However, in view of the fact that national events53 and diplomatic negotiations have been held in an orderly manner, the regime based around Kim Jong II, Chairman of the National Defense Commission, is considered to be on the right track. On the other hand, there have been persistent rumors of his ailing health54 since he failed to appear at the military parade of the Worker/Peasant Red Guard celebrating North Korea[,]s 60th anniversary. Considering his age of 67, the possibiliby cannot be ruled out that the regime will become unstable upon the possible change in power structure in the near future. On the economic front, North Korea has been facing chronic economic stagnation and energy-food shortages in recent years as a result of a number of factors including fragility of its socialistic planned economy and decreased economic cooperation with the former Soviet North Korea,s Kim Jong Il casting his vote Union and East European countries following the end of the Cold War. during the Supreme Peopleﾕs Assembly elections [KPS/JIJI] ----- **[COLUMN]** **COMMENTARY** |Col1|Ballistic Missile and Satellite Launch Vehicle Wernher von Braun (1912-1977), who is called the “father of modern rocketry,” had nurtured dreams of outer space since his childhood. He went to work for the German Army to fulfill his desire of building a large and capable rocket, and he developed the V-2 ballistic missile, which is said to have established modern rocket technology during the Second World War. After the war he moved to the U.S. and it is said that he led the first satellite launch of the U.S. to success by taking advantage of the technology he cultivated through the development of the V-2. As the career of this scientist plainly suggests, the technology required for ballistic missiles and that for satellite launch vehicles (SLVs) have much in common. It is believed that the U.S. and the USSR obtained V-2 technology and developed intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and intermediate- range ballistic missiles (IRBMs) based on the technology and developed SLVs by using the technologies obtained in the development of the 「V-2」 missiles. Examples of converting a ballistic missile to an SLV include: Atlas and Titan, early ballistic missiles of the U.S.; the SS-25, a Russian ballistic missile; and Dong Feng 5, a Chinese ballistic missile. They are believed to have been converted or partially remodeled for satellite launching. Both ballistic missiles and SLVs basically consist of (1) an engine section (including a propellant tank), (2) an interstage section (for separation), (3) mounted equipment (storing guidance equipment, radio equipment and electronics for attitude control) and (4) a payload section. Though there is a difference, in that SLVs load satellites in the payload section while ballistic missiles load warheads, they have a virtually common structure. Consequently, the requisite technologies, such as those for increasing the size of propulsion, separation of multi-stage propulsion equipments, attitude control and propulsion control are the same. Therefore, it is possible to test by launching satellites these technological challenges that have to be met for the improvement of ballistic missile capabilities. In general, there is a difference in their trajectories. A ballistic missile has a parabolic trajectory and guides warheads to the objective points, whereas an SLV has a flat-shaped trajectory after reaching a certain altitude and injects satellites into earth orbit by giving them a certain speed (e.g. 7.8 km per second for an orbit at an altitude of about 200 km, and 7.5 km per second for an orbit at an altitude of about 700 km). Trajectory and orbit (Image)| |---|---| ----- In particular, it seems that North Korea still has to rely on food assistance from foreign countries55. It is also pointed out that many North Koreans are starving and their sense of morale has declined In response to these various economic difficulties, North Korea has tried some limited but realistic reform measures and changes in its economic management systems. It is believed that, since July 2002, North Korea has raised wages and commodity prices and devaluated exchange rates56. However, as North Korea is not likely to undertake a structural reform that could damage its current regime, North Korea would face various difficulties in fundamentally improving its current economic situation. **4. External Relations** Although North Korea has made efforts to improve its external relations, its activities related to nuclear and missile issues have raised international concerns. The United States made it clear that it would make efforts to persuade North Korea to abandon its nuclear program in close cooperation with other countries, aiming to resolve the issue through the Six-Party Talks. North Korea has claimed that the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula is the “dying wish” of Kim Il Sung and promised to abandon “all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programs.” North Korea, however, continues to criticize various policies of the United States, insisting that the United States has yet to abandon its “hostile policy” toward North Korea. Thus, there exists a significant gap between the two parties[,] stances.57 In addition, the United States has repeatedly expressed concerns over the possible proliferation of nuclear weapons and nuclear-related materials, and the development, deployment, and proliferation of ballistic missiles by North Korea. In addition, although the United States pointed out in its country reports on terrorism that the abduction issue of Japanese citizens is yet to be solved and that the hijackers of Yodo are still living in North Korea, in October 2008, the United States removed North Korea from its list of state sponsors of terrorism on the grounds that North Korea had agreed to a series of verification measures related to a declaration of its nuclear programs submitted in June 200858. While international concerns over North Korea have been increasing with regard to nuclear and other issues, North Korea and the ROK have continued talks as well as economic and human exchanges. However, following the inauguration of President Lee Myung Bak in the ROK, no further progress has been made in North-South dialogue or exchange. Particularly, the dialogue between authorities, including in the military area, is stagnant59. Concerning relations between North Korea and China, the “China-North Korea Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance” concluded in 1961 is still effective. Since China and the ROK established diplomatic relations in 1992, North Korea[,]s relations with China have seen a change from the close relationship they had enjoyed during the Cold War. Subsequently, however, the leaders of the two countries made mutual visits and the relationship has improved. Regarding North Korea[,]s nuclear issue, China has repeatedly expressed its support for the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and has played an active role in resolving this issue by, for example, acting as chairman of the Six-Party Talks and contributing to the conclusion of agreements. Some, however, point out that the relationship between China and North Korea seems not to be as close as it was. Although relations between North Korea and Russia have become less close since the end of the Cold War, the two countries signed the Russia-North Korea Treaty on Neighborly Friendship and Cooperation in February 2000, which lacked the articles on military alliance60 that were included in the previous treaty. Subsequently, Relations between North Korea and Russia have been improved in recent years, with the heads of both countries making mutual visits. Since 1999, North Korea has made an effort to establish relations with West European countries and others, including establishment of diplomatic relations with European countries and participation in ARF ministerial meetings61. Meanwhile, the EU and ASEAN have traditionally expressed concerns over North Korea[,]s nuclear ----- and other issues. In order to solve North Korea[,]s nuclear issue, it is important for Japan, the United States, and the ROK to work together. At the same time, other nations such as China and Russia, which are also participants in the SixParty Talks, and international organizations including the United Nations and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), play important roles in this regard. It is quite natural that it is intolerable for North Korea to possess nuclear weapons. However, we also have to pay attention to other security concerns regarding North Korea: it is necessary to closely monitor military antagonism on the Korean Peninsula and the development, deployment and proliferation of ballistic missiles by North Korea. Because North Korea is a closed regime, it is difficult to verify the trends of its policies and activities. It is, however, necessary to continue to pay close attention to such trends to discern the true intentions of North Korea. **2. The ROK** **1. General Situation** In the ROK, democracy has taken root through such means as the direct presidential election adopted by the 1987 amendment to the constitution. The administration of President Lee Myung Bak is showing its intention to promote its policy to pursue “co-existence and co-prosperity” with regard to North Korea, and upholds a policy of “Vision 3000: Denuclearization and Openness,” which aims to offer gradual economic assistance to North Korea in accordance with the progress of the abandonment of its nuclear program. U.S. forces, mainly the Army, have been stationed in the ROK since the ceasefire of the Korean War. The ROK has established close security arrangements with the United States primarily based on the United StatesRepublic of Korea Mutual Defense Treaty. In view of the progress in the North-South relations, improved national strength of the ROK, and changes in the U.S. strategy, the two countries have been committed to solving the issues such as realignment of the U.S. forces stationed in the ROK and transition of the operational control authority in wartime62 over ROK forces to the ROK. As for the realignment of U.S. forces in the ROK, the relocation of U.S. forces Camp Yongsan located in the center of Seoul to the Pyongtek area in the south of Seoul and the relocation of U.S. forces stationed in the northern side of Han Gang to the southern side of the river were agreed upon in 2003. However, it seems that the relocation to the Pyongtek area is being delayed. As for the transition of the operational control authority in wartime, the U.S. Secretary of Defense and the ROK Minister of National Defense agreed at their meeting in February 2007 that the two sides would disestablish the U.S.-ROK Combined Forces Command and complete the transition to the ROK on April 17, 2012. In talks between the leaders of the U.S. and ROK in April 2008, both countries agreed to develop the ROK-U.S. Alliance into a new strategic alliance conforming to the 21st century. This June[,]s summit agreed on a “Joint Vision for the United States of America and Republic of Korea63.” It is necessary to monitor how the transition to a new “supporting supported” command relationship between the U.S. and ROK forces will be implemented. In response to the request from the United States, the ROK dispatched its troops to Iraq, but in December 2008 it put an end to the mission and withdrew its troops. Since April 2009, the ROK has been sending naval vessels to the Somali coast where they have been engaged in escorting South Korean-flag ships and Maritime Security Operations (MSO) of the Combined Maritime Forces. Between the ROK and China, efforts have been made to promote military exchanges between the countries, including mutual visits of naval vessels and air force planes. In November 2008, hotlines between the naval and air forces of the two countries were established. At the ROK-China summit meeting held in May 2008, it was agreed for the two countries to upgrade the “all-around cooperative partnership” to a “strategic cooperative partnership.” Their relations in the security area, however, remain primitive compared with ones in the other ----- areas, including the economic area. Between the ROK and Russia, military exchanges have been made in recent years, including exchanges between senior military officers and mutual visits of naval vessels, and the two countries have also concluded agreements on cooperation in the areas of military technology, defense industry, and war materials. At the ROKRussia summit meeting in September 2008, it was agreed to upgrade the relationship between the two countries to a “strategic cooperative partnership.” In addition, the ROK has been importing tanks and armored vehicles from Russia since 1995 as a part of redemption of debt. **2. Military Affairs** **(1) Defense Policies** The ROK has a defensive weakness in that its capital Seoul, where a quarter of the country[,]s population is concentrated, is situated close to the DMZ. The ROK has set the defense objectives as follows: “defending the nation from external military threats and invasion, upholding the peaceful unification, and contributing to regional stability and world peace.” As one of the “external military threats,” the ROK had designated North Korea as its “main enemy,” but, since the Defense White Paper 2004, North Korea has no longer been described as such64. In addition to the defense objectives, the ROK has identified “fostering an elite, advanced, robust military” as its defense vision and the following eight items have been set as the defense policy focus to achieve these goals and the vision. (1) Establish defense posture to realize comprehensive security (2) Creative development of ROK-U.S. alliance (3) Strengthen advanced defense capability (4) Military support for creating a peaceful structure on the Korean Peninsula (5) Professional military development that plays its role in a given position (6) Establish pragmatic, advanced defense management system (7) Improve barracks and environment and welfare in accordance with the national development (8) Military of the people The ROK intends to promote “National Defense Reform 202065” to satisfy its defense needs such as maintenance of its military capabilities in line with the development of information and scientific technologies, balanced development of its Army, Navy, and Air Forces, elimination of inefficiency, and build-up of barrack culture in accordance with social trends. The bill on the National Defense Reform incorporating the main ideas was enacted in December 2006. **(2) Trends in Defense Build-up** As for the ROK military capacity, the ground forces consist of 22 army divisions and two marine divisions, totaling 590,000 personnel; the naval forces consist of about 190 vessels with a total displacement of approximately 154,000 tons; and the air forces (Air Force and Navy together) of approximately 530 combat aircraft. In recent years, the ROK has been trying to modernize its Navy and Air Force with the introduction of submarines, large transportation ships, multi-role helicopters, and F-15Ks. Also, the ROK plans to procure four Airborne Warning and Control Systems (AWACS) by 2012. The ROK is introducing domestically manufactured destroyers, and a KDX-III (an Aegis-equipped destroyer) was put into service in December 2008. In addition, the ROK is believed to be promoting domestic production of missiles. The 2009 defense budget amounts to approximately 29,130 billion won, approximately 9.3% over that of the previous fiscal year. (See Fig. I-2-2-5) ----- **3. U.S. Forces Stationed in the ROK** Combined with the ROK[,]s own defense efforts, U.S. forces stationed in the country play a vital role in preserving the military balance on the Korean Peninsula and providing a deterrent against large-scale armed conflicts on the peninsula. The United States has been changing the posture of its forces stationed in the ROK based on the agreement in June 2003 to reposition them to the southern side of Han Gang in two stages and the agreement in October 2004 to reduce the number of its stationed military personnel, approximately 37,500, by 12,500. As for the personnel reduction, at the U.S.-ROK leaders[,] meeting U.S. Army Corps of Engineers building a floating bridge across a in April 2008, it was agreed to retain the current level river during a U.S.-ROK joint military exercise [AFP/JIJI] of 28,500 personnel as an appropriate size. In the course of these changes, the United States has invested in modernization of the U.S. forces stationed in the ROK and made efforts to maintain and strengthen the deterrence capabilities of U.S.-ROK allied forces based on the United States-Republic of Korea Mutual Defense Treaty. (See Fig. I-2-2-6) The United States and the ROK have engaged in joint exercises in order to increase their combined defense capabilities in dealing with contingencies on the Korean Peninsula. Among these is the “Foal Eagle” exercise, a large-scale joint logistics support field exercise, which was staged in March 2009 concurrently with the “Key Resolve” joint wartime reinforcing exercise. ----- ----- **Section 3. China** **1. General Situation** China has the world[,]s largest population and a vast landmass surrounded by 14 countries. It has long borderlines and a long coastline. China is also a nation with various races, religions, and languages. Most of its ethnic minorities66 populate the borderlands often with the same ethnic groups living across the borders. China, with a long history, has been shaping and maintaining a distinct culture and civilization, and pride of its unique history and the experiences of semi-colonization after the 19th century is driving a desire for a strong nation as well as fueling their nationalism. China is a state with a socialist regime, and aims at building a modern socialist state under the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). In recent years, China has significantly increased its international trade, attracting considerable foreign investment; the economy has dramatically grown, especially in the coastal and urban areas. However, although the Chinese economy continues to be on a relatively high growth track, a slowdown and deteriorating employment conditions, brought about by the global financial crisis, is apparent particularly in the coastal areas. Domestically, China faces various hurdles including the great political problem of corruption within central and local communist party leadership. Furthermore, as a result of rapid economic growth, issues such as wealth gaps among urban residents and environmental pollution are emerging, in addition to a widening urban-rural and coastal-inland disparity. Moreover, issues associated with the rapid aging of the population are forecasted to arise in the future. China also has ethnic minority issues, such as the March 2008 clash between minorities and the authorities in the Tibet Autonomous Region that stemmed from minority protests. It has been reported that some ethnic minorities in the Xinjian Urgur Autonomous Region are undertaking campaigns seeking separation and independence. Under the guiding principle of the “Scientific Outlook on Development,” the Hu Jintao administration aims to build a “Harmonious Society” as its fundamental policy and is committed to giving priority to the solution of the aforementioned domestic problems67. China also aims to improve its current economic structure, where it is dependent on exports abroad and foreign investment creating a dearth of domestic demand, in order to maintain stable economic growth. On the diplomatic field, it is believed that in order to maintain national stability China is aiming to maintain stability in the strategic international environment by sustaining favorable relations with major powers such as the U.S. and Russia, to maintain favorable relations with neighboring countries and stable situations in those countries, to promote the multipolarization of the world, and to secure an energy supply and other interests necessary for economic development. On the military front, China has been modernizing its military forces, backed by the high and constant increase in defense budget. In its military modernization China appears to give particular priority to the Taiwan issue as an issue of national sovereignty and territorial integrity, and for the time being it will probably aim for the improvement of military capabilities to prevent Taiwan[,]s independence and other efforts, but in recent years, China has begun to work on acquiring capabilities for missions other than the Taiwan issue. The military trends of China draw attention from countries in the region, as the country has been steadily growing as a major political and economic power in the region. **2. Military Affairs** **1.National Defense Policy** China states that it prioritizes the defense of national sovereignty, security and territorial integrity, safeguarding of the interests of national development, and the interests of the Chinese people above all else. China proclaims that it endeavors to build a fortified national defense and strong military forces compatible with national security and ----- development interests and enrich the country and strengthen the military while building a moderately prosperous society68 in all aspects. China has a policy of the active promotion of the “Revolution in Military Affairs with Chinese Characteristics,” which mainly consists of the mechanization and informatization of its military power, based on its military strategy69 to win a local war under informatized conditions, according to global trends in military developments observed in the Gulf War, the Kosovo conflict, the Iraq War and others. Moreover, China appears to emphasize not only physical means but also non-physical means with respect to military affairs and warfare, incorporating the concept of “Three Warfares”−“Psychological Warfare,” “Media Warfare” and “Legal Warfare” −into the tasks of the political work by military70, and declaring a policy of “close coordination between military struggle and political, diplomatic, economic, cultural and legal endeavors71.” In China[,]s military modernization, backed by the stable relations with Russia and other neighboring states that share land borders with China, it is believed that China is giving the top priority to handling of the Taiwan issue, more specifically to improving the capability to hinder the independence of Taiwan and foreign military support for Taiwan. Furthermore, in recent years, China has begun to work on acquiring capabilities for missions other than the Taiwan issue72. As regards a long-term plan for China[,]s military modernization, China proclaims that “according to the requirements of national security and the level of economic and social development, […] it will lay a solid foundation by 2010, basically accomplish mechanization and make major progress in informatization by 2020, and by and large reach the goal of modernization of national defense and armed forces by the mid-21st century73.” In the long term, China appears to be aiming to develop a military force according to the development of national strength, as this is compliant with the development plan for the country as a whole74. China has reduced the number of its military personnel, mainly in the army, and has been modernizing equipment of its entire armed forces, especially its naval and air forces, and nuclear and missile capabilities. In addition, China is working to improve joint operational capabilities among services and branches, to conduct practical exercises, to cultivate and acquire highly-capable human resources for administering operations of an informatized force, and to improve the foundation of the domestic defense industry. Much of the equipment used in the People[,]s Liberation Army (PLA) is still outdated, and the current military modernization efforts are believed to be undertakings that intend wholly to improve the military[,]s capabilities. Nevertheless, China does not show a clear, specific future vision of its military modernization. From this perspective, there is concern about how China[,]s military strength will impact the regional situation and Japanese security, which is to be carefully analyzed. **2. Military Transparency** Historically, China has not disclosed specific information on its possession of weapons, procurement goals or past procurements, the organization and locations of major units, records of main military operations and exercises, or a detailed breakdown of the national defense budget. China has released defense white papers titled China[,]s National Defense every two years since 1998. In January 2009, China published China[,]s National Defense in 2008, and the nation also conducts a lot of dialogue with national defense authorities of other countries75. Furthermore, in August 2007, China expressed its will to return to the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms and to participate in the United Nations Instrument for Reporting Military Expenditures, and has submitted an annual report based on each system. China has regularly published compiled documents on its national security while reintegrating itself into and commencing participation in U.N. systems regarding armaments and military expenditures. These efforts can be appreciated as a contribution to improving the transparency of its military capabilities. However, China has ----- not yet achieved the levels of transparency expected of a major regional power. For example, as for a detailed breakdown of national defense spending, China basically announced only the total amount and general purposes for the three categories: personnel, training and maintenance, and equipment. Slight progress can be seen in China[,]s National Defense in 2008 in terms of information disclosure76 but it does not provide a basic breakdown such as procurement costs for major weapons. Moreover, the report for the United Nations Instrument for Reporting Military Expenditures submitted by China in 2007 was not filled out in accordance with the standard format used by Japan and many other nations, whereby a detailed breakdown of military expenditure is required: the information disclosed was almost as simple as that provided in China[,]s defense white papers. Details have yet to be disclosed regarding the cause of the breach of international law in November 2004, where a submerged Chinese nuclear-powered submarine navigated in Japanese territorial waters. Moreover, in January 2007, when China conducted an anti-satellite weapons test, the Chinese government gave an insufficient explanation of the details and intention of the test to allay Japan[,]s concerns. In addition, in November 2007, China sent notification indicating a refusal for U.S. naval vessels including U.S. aircraft carrier Kitty Hawk to pull into Hong Kong on the expected day of arrival, but then later revised their notice and allowed the vessels to port. However, the U.S. naval vessels had already abandoned their port and changed course. These incidents incite concern over China[,]s decision-making and behavior concerning its military. China is steadily growing as a major political and economic power in the region, and its military power also attracts attention from other countries in the region. In order to allay concerns over China, it is becoming more and more important for China itself to improve transparency of its national defense policy and military capability. It is hoped that China will increase transparency concerning its military affairs by disclosing specific information pertaining to its defense policies and military capabilities. **3. National Defense Budget** China announced a national defense budget for FY 2009 of approximately 472.9 billion yuan, 15.3% up from the previous year. Thus China[,]s official defense budget recorded a growth rate of over 10% for 21 consecutive years in terms of the initial defense budget. This pace of increase in official defense expenditures means that the defense budget has doubled every five years, and that the official national defense budget of China has nominally increased twenty-two fold over the last 21 years77. ----- As regards the relationship between defense and the economy, China positions the build-up of defense capabilities as an important a task as economic development, explaining that it “sticks to the principle of coordinated development of economy and national defense” in China[,]s National Defense 2008. Accordingly, it is believed that China will continue to input resources for the improvement of its defense capabilities within the range of not hampering its economic development. However, attention is to be paid as to whether China will continue increasing its defense budget at the same pace as before, despite the apparent slowdown of the Chinese economy. (See Fig. I-2-3-1) In addition, it must be noted that the amount of the defense budget announced by China is considered to be only part of its actual military expenditures78. For example, it is believed that the announced defense budget does not include all the equipment procurement costs and research and development expenses. **4. Military Posture** China[,]s military forces are composed of the People[,]s Liberation Army (PLA), the People[,]s Armed Police Force79, and the militia80. It is provided that these bodies be instructed and led by the Central Military Commission81. The PLA is defined as a people[,]s army created and led by the Chinese Communist Party, comprising the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and the Second Artillery Force (strategic missile force). (See Fig. I-2-3-2) **(1) Nuclear and Ballistic Missile Forces** China has continued independent efforts to develop nuclear capabilities and ballistic missile forces since the middle of the 1950s, seemingly with a view to ensuring deterrence, supplementing its conventional forces, and maintaining its voice in the international community. China possesses various types and ranges of ballistic missiles: intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM), submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM), intermediate range ballistic missiles/medium range ballistic missiles (IRBM/MRBM), and short range ballistic missiles (SRBM). The survivability and readiness of China[,]s ballistic missile forces are under improvement by updating liquid propellant type to a solid propellant one. Moreover, it is also believed that China is working to increase performance by extending ranges, improving precision, introducing MIRV and other means82. China possesses approximately 30 ICBMs as a strategic nuclear force, the majority of which have been fixed-type missiles with liquid fuel propellant systems. In general, this type of missile requires time to inject liquid fuel immediately before launching, and thus signs of a launch can be detected beforehand and may invite a preemptive attack. For this reason, China has developed the DF-31, which is a new mobile-type ICBM with a solid fuel propellant system mounted onto a transporter erector launcher (TEL), and the DF-31A, an extended model of the DF-31, which appears to have already been deployed. Regarding SLBMs, the country currently appears to be developing the JL-2, a new SLBM with a range of approximately 8,000km, and constructing Jinclass nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBN) to carry the missiles. Now that the DF-31 and the DF-31A have been deployed, once the JL-2 reaches a level of practical use, it is believed that China[,]s strategic nuclear capabilities will improve by a great margin. As for the IBRM/MRBM covering the Asia-Pacific region including Japan, China has deployed liquid fuel-propellant DF-3 and DF-4 missiles. Currently, however, the country also deploys the DF-21, which can be transported and operated on a TEL. These missiles are capable of carrying nuclear warheads. It is believed that China is currently developing conventional-warhead anti-ship ballistic missiles based on the DF-21, which could be used to attack ships at sea including aircraft carriers. China is also believed to be developing the DH-10, a cruise missile with a range of 1,500km or longer. Once available for actual operation, those missiles might complement ballistic missile forces, covering the Asia-Pacific region including Japan. In addition to IBRM/ MRBM, China also possesses a 100 plus dozens of H-6 (Tu-16) medium-range bombers that are capable of ----- carrying nuclear warheads. Concerning short-range ballistic missiles (SRBM), China possesses a large number of DF-15 and DF-11, and they are likely to have been deployed against Taiwan83. (See Fig. I-2-3-3) **(2) Ground Forces** The size of the Chinese ground forces is the largest in the world with approximately 1.6 million personnel. Since 1985, China has continuously sought to modernize its armed forces by curtailing the number of personnel and streamlining organizations and systems in order to improve efficiency. The country aims to develop highly ----- capable military forces, while reducing units inferior in equipment and technologies. Specifically, China is improving mobility by such measures as switching from its past regional defense model to a nationwide mobile model, working to motorize and mechanize its infantry. In addition, China is believed to be strengthening its airborne troops (belonging to the air force) and special operations forces. The country is making its military units smaller, modular and multi-functional84 and also working on reforms to improve its logistical support capabilities. **(3) Naval Forces** The naval forces consist of three fleets−the North Sea, East Sea, and South Sea Fleets. The Chinese Navy has approximately 890 ships (including approximately 60 submarines), with a total displacement of approximately 1.32 million tons. The navy is in charge of the maritime national defense and protecting the sovereignty of territorial waters and maritime rights and interests. The Chinese Navy introduced modern Kilo-class submarines from Russia and is actively constructing new types of domestic submarines to enhance its submarine force. Additionally, the Navy is increasing surface combatant ships with improved air defense and anti-ship missile capabilities, and is increasing and improving landing ships and supply ships. Also, a large hospital ship was commissioned in October 2008. In view of these developments in the modernization of the Chinese Navy, it is believed that China is trying to build capabilities to perform operations in areas more distant from China[,]s shore. Moreover, several high-ranking military officials have expressed positive views on possessing an aircraft carrier85, including Chinese Defense Minster General Liang Guanglie, who remarked at the Japan-China Defense Ministers Meeting in March 2009 that China cannot remain “without an aircraft carrier indefinitely”. China also purchased Varyag, an incomplete Kuznetsov-class aircraft carrier, from Ukraine, and carried out renovations ----- A transporter erector launcher (TEL) equipped with DF-31 ICBMs [U.S. _Varyag, the carrier bought by China from the Ukraine [Courtesy of:_ Missile Defense Agency] Ships of the World] such as repainting86. These facts indicate China[,]s strong interest in possessing an aircraft carrier, and it is believed that China is currently advancing research and development on technology necessary for the possession of aircraft carriers in the future. **(4) Air Forces** The Chinese Air Force and Navy have approximately 1,980 combat aircraft in total. The number of fourthgeneration modern fighters is rising steadily. China is domestically mass producing J-10 fighters and carried out import and licensed production of Su-27 fighters as well as importing Su-30 fighters equipped with anti-surface and anti-ship attack capabilities from Russia. China is importing highly sophisticated long-range surface-toair missiles from Russia in order to improve air defense capabilities. In addition to the introduction of modern fighters, China is making continuous efforts to improve its in-flight refueling capabilities and early warning and control system, which are essential for the operation of modern air forces. Furthermore, it is reported that China has a plan to import a number of large cargo aircraft from Russia. In view of these developments in the modernization of its air force, it is believed that China aims to build capabilities such as air-to-surface and air-toship attack capabilities in further forward areas, and improving long-distance transport capabilities, in addition to improving the air defense of its territory87. China has also begun to enhance the electronic warfare and intelligence gathering capabilities of its aircraft in addition to increased efforts in actual reconnaissance flights against surrounding countries. In recent years in particular, Chinese air activities that appear to be some form of information gathering against Japan have been observed. Also, in September 2007, H-6 medium-range bombers flew into the Japanese air defense identification zone over the East China Sea to advance near to the Japan-China median line. Further attention needs to be paid to these activities conducted by Chinese air forces in the area surrounding Japan. A Chinese Air Force Airborne Early Warning and Control aircraft [Jane’s All the World’s Aircraft 2010@IHS (Global) Limited] **(5) Military Use of Space and Cyber Warfare** **Capabilities** China continues to put forth efforts for space development. The country has launched various satellites into space using indigenously produced rockets, successfully conducted manned space flights, and launched a lunar orbiter. In September 2008, China launched the Shenzhou-7 manned spaceship and its astronaut successfully performed China[,]s first extravehicular activities. As it appears that in China[,]s space development military and non-military ----- sectors are related88, there is the possibility that China utilizes space for such military purposes as information gathering, communications, and navigation. China is developing anti-satellite weapons, and the country tested the destruction of its own satellite in January 2007, applying ballistic missile technology. It is also pointed out that China is developing a system that uses laser beams to hamper satellite functions. China is thought to have interest in cyber warfare and they are believed to have organized and be currently training a cyber warfare-specialized unit89. China[,]s interest in anti-satellite weapons and cyber warfare can be attributed to the increasing reliance of information gathering and command and communication in the military sector, which are vital for swift and efficient exercise of military strength, on satellites and computer networks90. **5. Maritime Activities** **(1) Situation of Maritime Activities** China has been intensifying its maritime activities in recent years. With regard to activity in waters near Japan, a submerged Chinese nuclear-powered submarine navigated in Japanese territorial waters in November 2004, breaching international law. In addition, Chinese naval vessels have been observed conducting what appeared to be exercises or information gathering activities. Other naval vessels as well as Chinese government ships have also been observed engaging in apparent oceanographic research within the exclusive economic zone of Japan. Furthermore, in September 2005, Maritime Self-Defense Force P-3C patrol aircraft observed that a total of five Chinese naval vessels, including one Soveremenny-class destroyer, were sailing near the Kashi gas field (Tianwaitian in Chinese) in the East China Sea and some of them (a total of three vessels including the Soveremenny-class destroyer) circled around the said gas field. In October 2006, a Chinese Song-class submarine surfaced in the vicinity of the U.S. aircraft carrier Kitty Hawk in international waters reportedly near Okinawa. The foreign submarine[,]s approach to a U.S. aircraft carrier is a militarily noteworthy incident 91. In October 2008, four Chinese naval vessels, including a Soveremenny-class destroyer, passed through the Tsugaru Strait to advance to the Pacific Ocean. This was the first identified passage by Chinese surface combatants through the strait. These ships traveled southward in the Pacific and sailed between Okinawa Island and Miyako Island to take a route circling Japan. In November 2008, four naval vessels, including a top-of-theline Luzhou-class destroyer, passed between Okinawa Island and Miyako Island and headed to the Pacific Ocean. In December 2008, two Chinese maritime research ships conducted navigation operations not permitted to foreign ships under international law such as hovering and cruising within the territorial waters of Japan near the Senkaku Islands. Besides activities in waters near Japan, China is enhancing its activities in the Spratly Islands and Paracel Islands, over which it is engaged in territorial disputes with neighbors, including some ASEAN countries. In November 2008, a flotilla of vessels consisting of a Luyang II-class destroyer, a Yuzhao-class amphibious ship and other vessels reportedly exercised in waters near the Spratly Islands. In March 2009, Chinese ships including a naval intelligence collection vessel, a Bureau of Maritime Fisheries patrol ship, and trawlers approached a U.S. Navy acoustic research ship operating in the South China Sea to obstruct its operations. Other incidents also occurred in the same month92. . **(2) Objectives of Maritime Activities** Taking into general consideration relevant factors including China[,]s geographic location and economic globalization as well as the fact that China explicitly states in its laws and other means that its navy assumes the role of safeguarding maritime rights and interests and protecting maritime safety, maritime activities by the Chinese navy and other organizations are considered to have the following objectives. ----- The first objective is to intercept naval operations by enemies in waters as far as possible from the country in order to defend Chinese territory and territorial waters. Behind this is an increase in effectiveness of long-range attacks due to recent progress in science and technology. The second is to develop military capabilities to deter and prevent Taiwan[,]s independence. For example, China maintains that it will not allow any foreign intervention in solving the Taiwan issue and realizing the unification of China. If China aims to hold back by force foreign intervention into Taiwan, which is surrounded by the sea, it needs to enhance its military operational capabilities at sea. The third is to acquire, maintain, and protect maritime rights and interests. China is engaged in exploring and drilling oil and gas fields as well as building facilities and surveying for such facilities in the East China Sea and South China Sea. It is believed that the aims of the naval vessels operating near the drilling facilities of the Kashi oil and gas fields in September 2005 included the demonstration of their naval capabilities of acquiring, maintaining, and protecting maritime rights and interests. The fourth is to defend the sea lanes of communications for China. The background of this is the fact that the sea lanes of communications, including crude oil transportation routes from the Middle East, are extremely important lifelines for the increasingly globalizing Chinese economy. It depends on future international situations at the time as to how far the Chinese Navy should defend the sea lanes of communications by itself, but given recent modernization of the Chinese Navy and Air Force, the scope of their capabilities is believed to be expanding beyond waters near China. For example, as the first ever operation conducted by the Chinese Navy outside China[,]s coastal waters, naval vessels including destroyers were dispatched to escort Chinese ships and others in the Gulf of Aden and off the Somali coast, where a number of acts of piracy have been occurring recently. This shows not only that the Chinese Navy is improving its ----- capabilities to perform operations in distant waters but also the fact that China is increasingly emphasizing the protection of the sea lines of communications93. Attention needs to be paid to Chinese maritime activities with the objectives described above, including the operation of naval vessels and oceanographic research activities near Japan and development of facilities that serve as bases for these activities94. (See Fig. I-2-3-4) (See Fig. I-2-3-5) **6. Education and Training** In recent years, the PLA has been conducting practical exercises and large-scale exercises, including cooperative exercises of the Army, Navy, and Air Force and landing exercises in order to modernize its operational capability. In 2002, as a revision to the previous Military Training Outline, the PLA enforced the Outline of Military Training and Evaluation, which orders the PLA to reform exercises based on science and technology and constantly promote new forms of exercises. Furthermore, the national military training conference held in 2006 emphasized promoting a shift from military training under the conditions of mechanization to military training under the conditions of informatization. The new Outline of Military Training and Evaluation, issued in 2008, highlights training for military operations other than war (MOOTW), education in the knowledge and expertise required for informatization, simulated training of high-tech weapons and equipment, network training and training in complex electromagnetic environments where electronic interference occurs, in addition to joint exercises by different services. In the education spectrum, the PLA aims to develop military personnel versed in science and technology. In 2003, a human resource strategy project was launched to develop human resources capable of directing informatized operations and of building informatized armed forces. The project has a goal of achieving a big ----- leap in the development of military personnel to 2020. In recent years, the PLA appears to be increasing its wage standards, and it is believed that the objective of this is to secure highly-capable human resources. Moreover, in 2000, in order to recruit highly-capable and highly-educated people, the military started a system where civilian college students are provided with scholarships and then allowed to enter the military as commissioned officers after graduation. **7. National Defense Industry Sector** While China imports highly sophisticated equipment and parts that it cannot produce domestically from other countries such as Russia, it is believed to place emphasis on indigenous production of military equipment. The country manufactures much of its equipment domestically and is now actively making research and development efforts on new equipment. China[,]s national defense industry sector appears to be developing due to, an improvement of private industry infrastructure accompanying economic growth, use of dual technologies, and the absorption of foreign technologies, as well as its own efforts. The sector is working as a base for the modernization of China[,]s military. Favorable growth in the Chinese defense industry was once hindered by inefficiency caused by excessive secrecy and other factors; however, in recent years, reform of the defense industry has been progressed. In particular, the emphasis has been placed on two-way technological exchanges where military technologies are utilized for building the national economy, and in turn civilian technologies are absorbed for a build-up of national defense. Specifically, China states that technologies of the defense industry have contributed to the development of civilian space exploration, the aviation industry, and the ship building industry. Furthermore, China maintains that it encourages and supports international cooperation and competition in dual-use industries, thus appearing to have interest in absorbing foreign technologies through dual-use industries. **3. External Relations** **1. Relations with Taiwan** China holds the principle that Taiwan is a part of China, and that the Taiwan issue is therefore a domestic issue. The country maintains that the “one-China” principle is the underlying premise and foundation for discussions between China and Taiwan. China also claims that it would never abandon efforts for peaceful unification, expressing that it will take policy and measures to solve issues of Taiwanese interest and protect their due authority, while it has also repeatedly stated that it has not renounced the use of force from the standpoint of strong opposition to any intervention in the unification of China by foreign powers as well as any move toward independence of Taiwan. The Anti-Secession Law, enacted in March 2005, provides that China will not renounce use of force, stating that China will employ non-peaceful means if a serious situation occurs which would lead to Taiwan[,]s separation from China. Chen Shui-bian (Democratic Progressive Party), who was inaugurated as president of Taiwan in 2000, took actions strongly oriented to Taiwan[,]s independence. This incited sharp reactions by China. In comparison, Ma Ying-jeou, who took office in May 2008, advocates a policy of pursuing Taiwanese Talks between the Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Strait President Chen Yunlin (left) and Straits Exchange Foundation economic development through expanding economic Chairman Chiang Pin-kun held in Taipei in November 2008 [Kyodo exchange with China and the status quo rather than News ] ----- independence. Relations between China and Taiwan are developing. This can be seen in the fact that the leaders of both sides[,] authorized organizations for cross-strait talks95 met for the first time in 10 years in June 2008 and that direct chartered passenger weekday flights, direct maritime links and direct mail services between China and Taiwan began in December 2008. While President Ma Ying-jeou expressed demands including Taiwan[,]s participation in international organizations and the withdrawal of Chinese missiles aimed at Taiwan, President Hu Jintao stated the following96. 1) Regarding the issue of Taiwan[,]s participation in activities of international organizations, fair and reasonable arrangements can be made on the condition that this does not give rise to notions of “two Chinas” or “one China, one Taiwan”. 2) The two sides can at a suitable time engage in contacts and exchanges on military issues and consider setting up a mechanism for mutual trust concerning military security. How China-Taiwan relations will develop is drawing attention. **2. Relations with the United States** There are various outstanding problems between the United States and China, such as human rights in China, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, the Taiwan issue, and trade issues. However, since a stable U.S.China relationship is essential for China in developing its economy, it is believed that China will continue to desire to maintain that stable relationship. The United States believes that international peace and stability and the expansion of free and fair trade are beneficial for China as well as for other countries in the international society, and thus China has a responsibility to support these common interests in cooperation with the United States and other major states in the world. Based on this recognition, the United States makes it an objective of its policy towards China that China will continue to be its economic partner and take responsible actions in the international community. At the same time, the United States recognizes that China has the greatest potential in the long run to compete militarily with the United States and build disruptive military technologies that could offset U.S. military advantages. Accordingly, the United States is engaging with China to make it a constructive partner in the international community, while recognizing it necessary to hedge against the case that such effort would fail97. In response, Chinese President Hu Jintao stated at the U.S.-China Summit meeting in April 2009, that China and the U.S. shared extensive common interests, and that they would work together to build a positive, cooperative and comprehensive relationship in the twenty-first century. China thus shows its emphasis on developing China-U.S. relations. Military exchanges have also developed between China and the United States. The countries have been conducting various policy-related dialogues, and China dispatched an observer to a U.S. military exercise (U.S. Pacific Command exercise “Valiant Shield”) for the first time in June 2006. Moreover, joint exercises have been conducted between the Chinese and United States navies on mutual port visits by naval vessels since September 2006. A military hotline between the defense departments of the two countries was set up in April 2008. However, the military exchanges of the two countries have been sluggish since the U.S. Department of Defense notified Congress of possible arms sales to Taiwan in October 2008. The United States is concerned that the insufficient transparency of the Chinese military may endanger stability by increasing the possibility of misunderstanding and miscalculation98. The U.S. refers to improve mutual understanding with China and to prevent conflict by communicating U.S. resolve to maintain deterrence and stability in the Asia-Pacific region as goals in U.S.-China military exchanges99. **3. Relations with Russia** Since the China-Soviet confrontation ended in 1989, both countries have continuously maintained a stance of ----- placing importance on their bilateral relationship. It has been emphasized that the “strategic partnership” between China and Russia, which was established in the mid-1990s, has deepened. In 2001, the China-Russia Treaty of Good-Neighborliness and Friendly Cooperation100 was concluded. Subsequently in 2004, the long-standing issue of border demarcation between the two countries, which once evolved into a military clash, came to a settlement. The two countries share a common idea that they will promote the multipolarization of the world and building of a new international order. In addition, economic motives have been driving the good relationship between them in recent years. On the military front, since the 1990s, China has purchased modern weapons from Russia, including Su-27 and Su-30 fighter aircraft, Sovremenny-class destroyers, and Kilo-class submarines. Russia is currently the largest supplier of weapons to China; however, some point out that their trade amounts have been on the decline in recent years due to the advancement of indigenous weapon production in China. It is also pointed out that Russia, which shares a land border with China, has a policy of not supplying such sophisticated weapons to China that would cause a threat to Russia itself. China-Russia military exchanges include regular visits by highest-ranking defense officials and joint military exercises. They conducted their first joint exercise in the Shandong Peninsula and other areas in China in August 2005. In August 2007, a joint exercise consisting of anti-terrorism operations was conducted in the Lanzhou Military Region in China and in the Volga-Ural Military District in Russia by the member states of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO)101. It has been reported that Russia and China will hold a joint anti-terrorism exercise in summer 2009. It is believed that through these joint military exercises with Russia, the two countries can deepen mutual understanding and build confidence between their military forces and show the presence of China and Russia as one pole in the multipolarizing world, and China can learn operational methods of Russian weapons and military operational doctrines. **4. Relations with North Korea** North Korea and China have a “traditional friendship,” and North Korea seems to rely heavily on China for a great portion of its food assistance and energy supply. Accordingly, China is believed to have a stronger influence on North Korea than other countries102. China agreed to U.N. Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1695, which condemned the launches of ballistic missiles by North Korea in 2006, UNSCR 1718, which imposed sanctions on North Korea in relation to the nuclear tests, the Security Council presidential statement in April 2009 condemning North Korea[,]s missile launch, and UNSCR 1874, which settled additional measures against North Korea in response to the nuclear test in May 2009. In addition, China has played an active role chairing the Six-Party Talks that have been held in Beijing since 2003, and the international community expects that China will continue its proactive efforts to resolve the nuclear issue. **5. Relations with Other Countries** **(1) Relations with Southeast Asian Countries** As for its relations with countries in Southeast Asia, China has been continuously developing bilateral relations with all the countries in the region through active mutual top-level visits and other means. China is also actively involved in multilateral frameworks such as ASEAN Plus One (China), ASEAN Plus Three, and the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). Through diplomatic forums, the country is deepening economic and cultural cooperation with ASEAN countries, and recently, it has been proactively advancing cooperation in the security sector103. In addition, China is also strengthening these relationships via military aid, for example, through the provision of army engineering equipment for the Philippines and patrol boats for Cambodia. ----- **(2) Relations with Central Asian Countries** The Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, located in the western part of China, is situated next to Central Asia. It directly shares borders with the three countries of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan, and has ethnic minorities settled in the areas straddling borders. Naturally, the region hosts lively exchanges between the people of those countries. Thus China is greatly concerned about the political stability and security situations in Central Asian states, which might be influenced by terrorism caused by Islamic extremists and other factors. Chinese engagement in SCO, which was established in June 2001, is viewed as an indication of China[,]s concerns in such areas. **(3) Relations with South Asian Countries** While China has continued to be at odds with India due to issues such as border conflicts, it has traditionally maintained a favorable relationship with Pakistan, which has been at odds with India as well. Cooperation in the military sector, such as exporting weapons and transferring military technologies has also been reported. On the other hand, in recent years China has been committed to improving its relationship with India while also paying consideration to maintaining balance with Pakistan. Actively conducting mutual visits by top leaders with India, China states that relations with India are strategic and that the issue of border demarcation between the two countries, which once culminated in military clashes, is progressing. It is believed that the development of relations with India can be attributed to the two states[,] placing of importance on economic growth as well as responses to progressing U.S.-India relations. Regarding military exchanges, China has conducted joint naval search and rescue exercises with Pakistan and India since 2003. In December 2007, “Hand-inHand 2007,” the first anti-terrorism joint exercise since the 1962 China-India border conflict, was conducted between both countries[,] armies in Yunnan Province in China, and the anti-terrorism joint exercise “Hand-inHand 2008” was conducted in South India in December China-India anti-terrorism joint exercise ﾒHand-in-Hand 2008ﾓ [Xinhua 2008. News Agency/Kyodo News] **(4) Relations with EU Countries** Trade between China and EU countries has grown remarkably in recent years. For China, the EU is now as important a partner as Japan and the United States, especially in the economic field. China, at diplomatic opportunities, strongly requests EU countries to lift their arms embargoes against China which have been imposed since the Tiananmen Square incident in 1989. Regarding information technology, avionics, and air-independent propulsion systems for submarines and other areas, EU member countries possess more advanced technologies than that of China or Russia, which exports weapons to China. Therefore, if the EU arms embargo on China was lifted, it is possible that the weapons and military technologies of EU countries would transfer to China, and that they would be utilized as a bargaining chip to gain the edge in weapons transactions with Russia. Japan has expressed to the EU its objection to lifting the arms embargo on China, and it is necessary to pay continuous attention to future discussions within the EU. **6. Overseas Activities** China states that it will consistently support and actively participate in U.N. peacekeeping operations, and according to China[,]s National Defense in 2008, the country has sent a total of 11,063 military personnel to U.N. ----- peacekeeping operations. According to the United Nations, as of January 2009, China had deployed a total of 2,146 personnel, police officers, and military observers to 10 U.N. peacekeeping operations, including the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) and the United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS), thus showing a certain presence in peacekeeping operations. China[,]s aim in its proactive attitude to U.N. peacekeeping operations appears to include their intent to strengthen relations with the region where the PKOs are being conducted, particularly with regard to relations with African nations. Since December 2008, China has deployed naval ships including destroyers for escorting missions in the Gulf of Aden and off the Somali coast, where piracy has been rife. (See Fig. I-2-3-6) **7. International Transfer of Weapons** China has provided developing countries in Asia, Africa and other areas with weapons such as small arms, tanks, and aircraft, and it is reported that the main recipients are Iran, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Thailand, and Myanmar while weapons are also being exported to African countries such as the Democratic Republic of Congo, Namibia, and Zimbabwe. With regard to arms exports, China states that it does not interfere in the domestic affairs of importing countries. It has been pointed out that China is supplying weapons to countries that have problems in terms of democracy and human rights, and attention is paid as to whether China will improve the transparency of international weapons transfer in response to the concerns of the international community. **4. Military Capabilities of Taiwan** According to the Taiwan[,]s Quadrennial Defense Review (or the Taiwanese version of QDR) released by the Taiwanese Defense Ministry in March 2009, Taiwan, under the guidance of building the “hard rock” defense advocated by President Ma Jeou Ying, identifies prevention of war, homeland defense, response to contingencies, deterrence of conflict and regional stability as the strategic objectives, and takes the military strategy of “resolute defense and credible deterrence.” Taiwan implemented Jingjing Program (Streamlining Program), in which the total number of military personnel was reduced to 275,000 by the end of 2008, in order to use national defense resources more efficiently, reduce the total number of military personnel, restructure the organizations, and shift to a voluntary service system. Furthermore, Taiwan, for improved expertise of its military personnel and other purposes, aims to transform its armed forces currently consisting of drafted personnel and volunteers into all-volunteer forces, while reducing the total forces to 215,000 personnel by the end of 2014104. At the same time, the Taiwanese armed ----- forces attribute importance to introducing advanced technologies and improving joint operational capabilities. In August 2005, then Taiwanese President Chen Shui-ban announced a policy to increase the ratio of the defense budget to its GDP, which was approximately 2.4% in FY 2005, up to 3% within three years, in order to meet increasing demands for national defense. Taiwan states that it reached a ratio of 3% in 2008105. The Ma administration also sets out the policy that the defense budget will not go below 3% of GDP, in principle. (See Fig. I-2-3-7) With regard to Taiwan[,]s military power at present, ground forces include 41 Army brigades and three Navy Marine Corps brigades with a total of approximately 215,000 personnel. In addition, it is believed that the total of 1.65 million reserve personnel of air, naval, and ground forces would be available in case of war. Regarding naval capabilities, in addition to Kidd-class destroyers imported from the United States, Taiwan possesses relatively modern frigates and other vessels. Regarding air capabilities, Taiwan possesses F-16 A/B fighters, Mirage 2000 fighters, Jing Guo fighters, etc. In view of the fact that China is enhancing its missile, naval, and air forces, the Taiwanese military believes it still needs to modernize the equipment. In October 2008, the U.S. Department of Defense notified Congress of the possible sale of Patriot PAC-3 surface-to-air missiles and 30 AH-64D attack helicopters, and others to Taiwan. Taiwan also wishes to purchase F-16C/D fighter aircraft from the U.S. and the issue is to be observed. Taiwan is also promoting the independent development of equipment. Tien Kung II surface-to-air missiles and Hsiung Feng II anti-ship missiles are deployed and Hsiung Feng IIE cruise missiles are being developed in order to acquire long-range attack capabilities. The military capabilities of China and Taiwan are generally characterized as follows: 1) Regarding ground forces, China possesses an overwhelming number of troops; however, their capability of landing on and invading the island of Taiwan is limited. Nevertheless, China is making efforts to improve its landing and invasion capabilities, by building large landing ships in recent years and other efforts. 2) Regarding naval and air forces, China, as well as overwhelming Taiwan in terms of quantity, has been steadily modernizing its naval and air forces in recent years in the qualitative sphere, where Taiwan has had superiority. 3) Regarding missile attack capabilities, China possesses numerous short-range ballistic missiles with a range that covers Taiwan, and Taiwan seems to have few effective countermeasures. In addition to sizes of forces and performance and quantity of equipment, a comparison of military capabilities should take into account various factors such as objectives and characteristics of envisioned military operations, operational posture, proficiency of military personnel, and logistics. Nevertheless, as China is rapidly ----- modernizing its military power, the overall military balance between China and Taiwan is shifting in favor of China. Attention should be paid to the modernization of both the Chinese and Taiwanese military capabilities and U.S. weapon sales to Taiwan. (See Fig. I-2-3-8) ----- **Section 4 Russia** **1. General Situation** Russia claims that under former President Putin it has overcome the crisis situation of the 1990s and returned to the international community as “a strong state” that others heed and that can stand up for itself, while aiming to further the multipolarization of the international community, and has completely restored the level of social and economic development that was lost in the 1990s. One of the contributing factors to these developments was the economic recovery propelled by price hikes of crude oil, its major export product. Russia takes the stance, in pursuing military modernization, that the country will not be drawn into the arms race and jeopardize economic development106. Dmitry Medvedev was inaugurated as the President of Russia in May 2008, and it appears that the Medvedev administration is essentially carrying on the policy stance of the Putin administration107. However, since it is considered that there are various sorts of factors that might restrain further social and economic development, such as excessive dependence on the energy resource sector, how the recent trend of crude oil price or the impact on economic development caused by global financial crisis will affect Russian policy development President Medvedev of Russia delivering his annual State of the in the future will be a focus of attention108. Nation Address at the Kremlin [EPA/JIJI]) **2. Security and Defense Policies** **1. Basic Posture** President Medvedev approved the National Security Strategy of the Russian Federation through to 2020 in May 2009. The National Security Strategy sets out national and international objectives and strategic priorities for national security and for solid national development to replace the National Security Concept of the Russian Federation109 modified in January 2000. The National Security Strategy views that Russia[,]s influence has been strengthened by a policy of promoting the creation of a multi-polar world and using the potential of Russia. The unilateral approach to the use of force and confrontation of major countries in international relations are listed as having a negative impact on the interests of Russia, and Russia expresses vigilance over the United States[,] plan to deploy a missile defense system in Europe as well as the approach of NATO[,]s military infrastructure to the Russian border. Furthermore, it does not rule out the possibility that the conflicts over resources will be resolved by force. In order to ensure strategic security, Russia claims it will, under the central role of the United Nations in the international security, enhance cooperation with members of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and build an equal and full-fledged strategic partnership with the United States. Russia says it will use political, legal, economic, military and other instruments in order to uphold national sovereignty and interests. As for the field of national defense, viewing as a threat the series of policies of some developed nations that pursue superiority in the military field, particularly in the area of strategy by developing high-tech weapons, non-nuclear strategic weapons, and global missile defense systems, Russia exemplifies, as challenges for strengthening defense capabilities, a shift to a new military structure by increasing the number of permanent readiness units110 and improving organizational and military alignment, while maintaining the capabilities of its ----- strategic nuclear forces. In the meantime, there is the Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation that was made in April 2000, which specifically outlines the principles of the military “Concept”. According to this document, the purpose of defense is to deter aggression or coercion by all means, including nuclear weapons, stating that Russia reserves the right to use nuclear weapons to retaliate against large-scale aggression utilizing conventional weapons. The modification of the Doctrine is currently scheduled, based on the formulation of the National Security Strategy111. **2. Military Reform** Having gone through the chaos after the collapse of the Soviet Union and faced with the difficulty in maintaining its a military posture of the same level as during the Cold War era because of the severe economic situation and the decline in population in the 1990s, Russia began a full-scale process for military reform in 1997 by heeding the three pillars of reform: down-sizing, modernization and professionalization. Currently, Russia is showing progress in the modernization of military forces, including the reduction of the number of soldiers, structural reforms, and the development and introduction of new types of equipment, and in the improvement of combat readiness112. The country[,]s troop reduction goal, set in order to maintain an adequate troop level of one million personnel, is scheduled to be achieved by 2016113. In structural reforms, a shift to three services and three independent corps and the integration of military districts are nearing completion. Regarding the modernization of military forces, in October 2006 the president approved the state policy on military equipment for the period of 2007 to 2015, and accordingly, approximately five trillion rubles (approximately 22.2 trillion yen) will be spent in the development and procurement of military equipment by 2015114. At the same time, in addition to its efforts in the ongoing building of its permanent readiness units by converting all combat troops into permanent readiness units and by establishing an emergency response brigade in each military district by 2012, Russia is also implementing measures toward the introduction of a contractbased service under which soldiers are recruited not by conscription but by contract115. This has been done in order to contribute to the improvement of the Russian military[,]s combat readiness, improve the quality of military personnel, and to maintain highly skilled forces. In so doing, Russia recognizes as a challenge the issues of securing personnel with technical knowledge and abilities through improving the treatment of soldiers116. In addition, Russia has been improving the military unit command system, and it is thought that Russia will continue these measures to improve conventional armed forces along with its efforts to maintain its strategic nuclear deterrent capability against the backdrop of the national defense budget that has been increasing in recent years. (See Fig. I-2-4-1) ----- **3. Military Posture** **1. Nuclear Forces** The Russian military emphasizes nuclear forces in order to supplement its conventional forces. In addition, it allots focus to nuclear forces to secure a global position in the context of an increasingly multipolar world, and as a balance with the nuclear forces of the United States. It is believed that Russia is working to maintain a state of immediate readiness for its nuclear force unit. Russia is gradually reducing the number of its strategic nuclear missiles due to issues such as aging. However, it still possesses intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM) following the United States in scale, submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM) and long range bombers (Tu-95MS Bears and Tu-160 Blackjacks). Regarding the update of nuclear missiles, Russia began to accelerate the development and introduction of new weapons, beginning with the deployment of new Topol-M ICBM (SS-27) units in 2005. In addition, flight trials for the RS-24, which appear to be a multi-headed version of the Topol-M, started in 2007117. In April 2007, Russia launched a Borey-class ballistic missile submarine (nuclear powered) (SSBN); however, it is believed that construction of the new SSBN is delayed in catching up with its initial schedule. Russia also started a flight test in September 2005 for the new-type SLBM Bulava, which appears to mount Borey-class SSBNs. However, it has been pointed out that all flight tests as of 2008 have been unsuccessful, and they have not yet reached the stage of deployment. According to the Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reductions (better known as the Moscow Treaty), the United States and Russia shall reduce the number of their deployable operational nuclear warheads to between 1,700 and 2,200 by December 31, 2012 (not including stored nuclear warheads). Continued attention should be paid to the progress of the disposal program118. In addition, the United States and Russia agreed in April 2009 to begin bilateral intergovernmental negotiations to work out a new, comprehensive and legally binding treaty on reducing and limiting strategic offensive arms to replace the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty I (START I) before it expires on December 5, 2009119. As for non-strategic nuclear forces, Russia had scrapped surface-launched short- and intermediate-range missiles with a range of between 500 and 5,500km by 1991 in accordance with the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, and had removed tactical nuclear weapons deployed aboard naval vessels and stored them in onshore missile silos in the following year. Russia, however, still possesses a broad array of nuclear forces120. **2. Conventional Forces and Other Issues** Conventional forces have concentrated their limited resources on specific units to maintain their combat readiness121. The Russian military is working to recover the skill level of each of its forces and is conducting large-scale exercises using its conventional forces in Europe. Russia[,]s military operations are beginning to be active, as has been seen in its participation in counter-piracy operations off the coast of Somalia and the visits of Tu-160 long range bombers and Navy ships to Central and South American countries for the first time since the end of the Cold War. The development and procurement of equipment for conventional forces are implemented in accordance with the state policy on military equipment for the period of 2007 to 2015. However, as there are issues such as difficulties in securing personnel and lax military discipline due to the decrease in the population of young men as well as poor living conditions for military personnel122, the modernization of conventional forces is not necessarily sufficient. As for the future Russian armed forces, since there are opaque elements which may influence Russia[,]s future economic and social development, it is necessary to continue to observe their future trends. ----- **4. Russian Forces in the Far East Region** **1. General Situation** The current presence of the Russian military forces in the Far East region is comparatively much smaller than it was at its peak. However, a considerable scale of military forces including nuclear forces still remains in the region. The declining trend of exercise activities has ceased, and in recent years activities have revitalized in association with efforts for the recovery of its operational proficiency level. Since 2003, Russia has conducted military exercises in the Far East region, including “Vostok,” which is a biennial large-scale anti-terrorism exercise, and “Mobility 2004,” which was an exercise for the country[,]s permanent combat-ready troops to deploy from the western part of Russia to the Far East region. Furthermore, “Stability 2008”, a major strategic military exercise involving a launch of an intercontinental ballistic missile, was conducted in 2008 throughout Russia and Belarus. As part of this exercise, a large exercise called “Bereg” was carried out in the Far East Given that the overall Russian armed forces set their basis of operation on maintaining the combat readiness of their strategic nuclear unit as well as dealing with conflicts with the inter-theater mobility of its permanent readiness units123, it is necessary to continue monitoring the positioning and trends of future Russian armed forces in the Far East region with the movement of units in other regions also in mind. (See Fig. I-2-4-2) ----- **(1) Nuclear Forces** As for strategic nuclear forces in the Far East region, ICBMs, such as SS-25s, and Tu-95MS Bear strategic bombers are deployed along the Trans-Siberian Railway, and SSBNs, such as the Delta III-class nuclear submarine carrying SLBMs, and others are deployed in and around the Sea of Okhotsk. The readiness of these strategic nuclear forces appears to have been generally maintained. As for non-strategic nuclear capabilities, Russian forces in the Far East region possess a variety of weapons, including medium-range bombers such as Tu-22M Backfires and sea- (undersea) and air-launched cruise missiles. A total of approximately 80 Backfires are deployed in the west of Lake Baikal and coastal areas, including the area across from Sakhalin. **(2) Ground Forces** Ground forces in the Far East region have continuously shrunk in scale since 1990 and currently consist of 15 divisions of approximately 90,000 personnel124. Also, the Pacific Fleet of the Russian Navy has a naval infantry division with an amphibious capability. (See Fig. I-2-4-3) **(3) Naval Forces** The Pacific Fleet is stationed and deployed from its main bases in Vladivostok and Petropavlovsk. The fleet comprises approximately 240 ships with a total displacement in the region of about 550,000 tons, including about 20 major surface ships and about 20 submarines (about 15 of which are nuclear-powered submarines) with a total displacement of approximately 280,000 tons. The forces have been scaled down since 1990. (See Fig. I-2-4-4) **(4) Air Forces** Russia deploys approximately 600 combat aircraft from its Air Force and Navy. This represents a drastic decrease compared with numbers at peak times, but existing models are being modified to improve their capabilities125. (See Fig. I-2-4-5 & 6) ----- **2. Russian Forces in Japan[,]s Northern Territories** Since 1978 under the regime of the former Soviet Union, Russia has been redeploying ground troops on the Kunashiri, Etorofu, and Shikotan Islands of Japan[,]s Northern Territories. These territories are illegally occupied by Russia although they are an integral part of Japanese territory. However, the numbers of military personnel are considered to be far less than at past peak times. Nevertheless, tanks, armored vehicles, various types of artillery, and anti-air missiles are still deployed in the region. The number of Russian military personnel stationed in this region in 1991 was approximately 9,500, and at the Japan-Russia Summit Meeting held in 1997, then Russian Defense Minister Rodionov made it clear that the troops stationed in the Northern Territories had been reduced to 3,500 soldiers by 1995. In July 2005, however, when then Russian Defense Minister Ivanov visited the Northern Territories, he declared that Russia would neither increase nor decrease the troops stationed on the four islands, clearly showing the intention to maintain ----- the status quo. As mentioned above, Russian troops continue to be stationed in the Northern Territories, which are an integral part of Japanese territory, and it is hoped that the issue will be resolved at an early date. **3. Operations in the Vicinity of Japan** Russian military operations seem to be increasingly more active in the vicinity of Japan, including exercises and training, in association with the recovery of troop skill levels. The number of exercises carried out by Russian ground forces in areas adjacent to Japan decreased sharply from peak numbers; however, some activities seem to be on the rise again. With regard to naval vessels, there is a sign of increase in naval training and other activities126. For example, long-term sea training by submarines and surface ships was conducted for the first time in several years, and nuclear submarines resumed their patrols. Regarding aircraft, in an attempt to recover its operational proficiency level, a tendency of revitalization in such activities as flights close to Japan[,]s territorial airspace, exercises and training, can be seen. (See Fig. I-2-4-7) ----- **5. External Relations** **1. Relations with the Commonwealth of Independent States** **(1) General Situation** The Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation approved by President Dmitry Medvedev in July 2008, which sets out the basic foreign policy of Russia, presents the view that Russia[,]s international status has been elevated as one of the influential centers in the trend toward multipolarity and lists the following three basic foreign policies: (a) to preserve and strengthen its sovereignty and territorial integrity, (b) to commit to resolving global issues multilaterally in accordance with the rule of international law, and (c) to form friendly relations with neighboring counties. Russia identifies the development of bilateral/multilateral cooperation with the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) as the first priority of foreign policy127, and it maintains the relationships including multi-lateral frameworks such as Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO)128 and Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO)129. Russia has promoted military integration with CIS member countries, stating that its vital interests are concentrated in the territories of the CIS; Russia has dispatched its federal forces to remain in Ukraine, Georgia (South Ossetia, Abkhazia), Moldova, Armenia, Tajikistan and Kyrgyz; it has also concluded agreements to form a joint air defense system130 and joint border security treaties with CIS member countries131. (See Fig. I-2-4-8) With increasing activities by Islamic armed forces in Central Asia/Caucasia, Russia pursued military cooperation centered on counterterrorism measures in the region, and organized a Collective Rapid Deployment Force in May 2001 within the framework of the CIS Collective Security Treaty Organization132. Since the U.S. and other military forces launched the military campaign in Afghanistan following the 9/11 terrorist attacks against the United States in 2001, Russia has permitted U.S. assistance or U.S. military presence in Uzbekistan, ----- Kyrgyz, Tajikistan and Georgia133. On the other hand, in 2003, Russia established an air force base in Kyrgyz to enhance the CIS Collective Rapid Deployment Force134. Russia also had a division (approximately 8,000 personnel) stationed in Tajikistan, and later made an agreement with Tajikistan in October 2004, securing a Russian military base in the country. **(2) Georgia Conflict** In August 2008, Georgia launched a military attack against South Ossetia and clashed with Russian troops stationed there135, leading to a large-scale armed conflict as Russia reinforced its troops in South Ossetia. With the mediation by France, who was at that time holding the presidency of the European Union, the armed conflict ended after five days. However, the relationship between Russia and Europe-U.S, which was appealing for a peaceful resolution based on the principle of Georgia[,]s territorial integrity, deteriorated as Russia unilaterally recognized the independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. South Ossetia, where the Georgia conflict began, has been seeking secession from Georgia, and in 1989 an armed conflict broke out with Georgia because it would not recognize the independence of South Ossetia. Having envisioned a reintegration of Georgia since his inauguration in 2004, President of Georgia Mikheil Saakashvili has been suppressing the domestic movement for independence and promoting pro-U.S./Europe policy to facilitate Georgia[,]s accession to NATO. This led to tense relations with Russia, which adopts a hardline stance against the U.S. and Europe, recognizing CIS member countries as the priority region in foreign diplomacy. How Russia[,]s recognition of South Ossetia and Abkhazia will influence the movement of secession and independence within CIS, such as the Chechen Republic136 in the Russian territory, Nogorno-Karabakh President Saakashvili of Georgia and leaders from the Ukraine, in Azerbaijan, and Transdniester in Morvdova is worthy President Saakashvili of Georgia and leaders from the Ukraine, Poland and the 3 Baltic states protesting in the Georgian capital of of attention. Tbilisi against Russiaﾕs invasion [EPA/JIJI] **2. Relations with the United States** The relationship between Russia and the United States has improved in various fields through cooperation in the fight against terrorism and other measures137. The United States, however, has expressed concerns about Russian military operations during the Georgia Conflict in August 2008 and domestic affairs in Russia138, while Russia has expressed concerns regarding U.S. foreign policy. Russia states that it must take countermeasures against the U.S. in response to such activities as the large investments by the U.S. into next-generation weapons development and deployment of U.S. military bases in Eastern European countries. The United States, which has been developing its ballistic missile defense program, withdrew from the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty in June 2002. Russia criticized the U.S. decision as a mistake, but did not regard it as a threat to Russia[,]s security. However, President Medvedev of Russia and U.S. President Obama shaking when the United States agreed with the Czech Republic hands at a press conference after the G20 summit [AFP/JIJI] ----- **[COLUMN]** **COMMENTARY** **Security Issues between the United States and Russia** After the Georgian conflict last year, relations between the United States and Russia deteriorated as Russia criticized the U.S. for its support of Georgia while the U.S. condemned Russia for its use of force and recognition of the independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. As a result, the momentum toward a dialogue between the two countries was lost and talks on issues, including that of security, between them stagnated U.S. President Obama, who took office in January this year, stated that he would “reset” the previous relationship with Russia and start a dialogue in a new relationship. He met Russian President Medvedev in April this year. The two leaders: (1) agreed to overcome differences and to cooperate in solving security issues (2) agreed to work toward the conclusion of a treaty to succeed START-I (3) discussed the possibility of mutual cooperation in missile defense (MD), and (4) agreed to cooperate in dealing with the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, terrorism, the stabilization of Afghanistan, etc. Attention will be focused on how the two countries will cooperate to solve security issues. **1. Treaty succeeding START-I** Based on START-I and the Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reductions (the Moscow Treaty), the United States and Russia have reduced their strategic nuclear force, which they built up during the cold war. At the summit meeting in April this year, the heads of the two countries agreed that the new treaty which replaces START-I, which will expire at the end of this year, shall pursue a reduction of the number of operational strategic warheads to below the level stipulated in the Treaty of Moscow−1,700−2,200 by 2012 −and shall include verification/inspection measures based on their experiences with START-I. Attention will be focused on what kind of talks will be conducted on such issues as whether or not to include the reduction of non-operational nuclear warhead stockpiles in addition to the issues above. **2. Deployment of U.S. MD system in Eastern Europe** Assuming that Iran would develop intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) that cover the continental United States by 2015, the United States planned to deploy an MD system in Eastern Europe as a defensive measure. Putin, then President of Russia, strongly criticized this plan in February 2007. Since then Russia has shown strong opposition to the plan, claiming that it could have a negative impact on the country[,]s nuclear deterrence. Last year the United States carried forward the procedure toward deployment, including the signing of the arrangements concerning the deployment of the MD system with Poland and the Czech Republic. The Obama administration clearly indicated that they will not give priority to investment in the system until its technology is established and its cost-effectiveness is proven and that they will continue the deployment of the MD system as long as the Iranian threat continues. President Medvedev, on the other hand, referred to short-range missile deployment in Kaliningrad, Russia, which is adjacent to Poland, in November last year, showing that Russia[,]s stance of opposition to the deployment of the MD system in Eastern Europe basically remains the same. With U.S.-Russia relations improving, how the U.S. and Russia will discuss and handle the MD issue, which touches upon the fundamentals of the security strategies of the two countries, is drawing international attention. ----- and Poland to start full-scale negotiations to deploy part of its missile defense system to these countries, Russia is strongly opposed to this, claiming that the system targets Russia and would negatively impact its nuclear deterrent capabilities139. Furthermore, the United States and Russia agreed in April 2009 to begin bilateral intergovernmental negotiations to work out a new, comprehensive and legally binding treaty on reducing and limiting strategic offensive arms to replace START I before it expires on December 5, 2009. **3. Relations with NATO** Russia, as a rule, has been against the accession to NATO of former Soviet Union countries as well as Central and Eastern European countries. However, Russia took steps to build a new cooperative relationship with NATO following the 9/11 terrorist attacks in the United States, and within the framework of the NATO-Russia Council (NRC), Russia participates in decision making to a certain degree and acts as an equal partner in areas of common interest140. Meanwhile, Russia was dissatisfied that NATO countries would not ratify the Application Treaty of Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE)141 because Russian forces would not withdraw from Georgia and Moldova. Thereafter, discussions were held in such forums as the NRC; however, Russia suspended the CFE Treaty in December 2007, halting inspections based on the treaty. Russia expressed concerns that Ukraine and Georgia reached an agreement with NATO about their future membership at the NATO summit meeting in April 2008142. Such circumstances draw attention to the future developments of NATO-Russia consultations, which have been halted since the Georgia conflict143. **4. Relations with Asian Countries** Russia recognizes the increasing significance of the Asia-Pacific region, which is also important from the viewpoint of economic development in Siberia and the Far East, anti-terrorist measures and security144. The country is currently implementing a pipeline project to transport Siberian oil to the Far East and developing natural gas fields in Sakhalin. In order to develop these underground resources and revitalize its regional economy and social infrastructure, it is important for Russia to enhance economic relations with Asia-Pacific countries including Japan and China. For this reason, Russia emphasizes relations with these countries in its foreign policy and has joined the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC)145, the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO)146 (See Section 3-3). Additionally, Russia signed the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia (TAC) in 2004. Furthermore, President Medvedev has engaged in active summit diplomacy with leaders in Asia; for instance, in May 2008, he visited China immediately after his inauguration and visited Japan to attend the G8 Hokkaido Toyako Summit in July 2008. **5. Exportation of Arms** Russia seems to actively promote the export of arms not only to maintain the infrastructure of its military industry and to make economic profit, but also to help promote better foreign policy. The country[,]s export value has been increasing in recent years. In January 2007, the Russian government granted the exclusive right to export arms to the Rosoboronexport State Corporation147 as part of its lasting efforts to improve its export system. In addition, Russia regards the military industry as an integral part of the nation[,]s military organization and is committed to improving and further developing the military industry by such measures as promoting the integration of aircraft companies such as Sukhoi, MiG and Tupolev. Russia has exported jet fighters and warships to countries including China, India, Algeria, Venezuela and ASEAN member countries148. In addition, Russia signed agreements with North Korea and Iran on military technology cooperation in 2001. ----- **Section 5 Southeast Asia** **1. General Situation** Southeast Asia is encompassed by the Straits of Malacca, the South China Sea, occupying a key position for traffic by linking the Pacific and Indian Oceans, and is an important region for Japan. The countries in this region are making efforts to achieve political stability and steady economic growth, and lately have realized overall economic development to varying degrees. Such economic development has deepened the relationships of interdependense within and outside the region. However, this region still has destabilizing factors, including the territorial dispute over the Spratly Islands, ethnic minority issues, separatist and independence movements, and Islamic extremist groups. Moreover, there are incidents such as piracy by which the safe passage of ships is obstructed. In order to cope with these problems, the countries in the region are working to build sufficient military forces not only for traditional national defense but also to address the new security issues such as antiterrorism and piracy. In recent years, against the backdrop of economic development, they have been modernizing their military forces, particularly that of the Navy and Air Force. In this region, the United States is developing relationships of confidence with Southeast Asian countries and working to strengthen their readiness through numerous joint military exercises, such as the multinational military exercise Cobra Gold, and CARAT149, the provision of military technology and military assistance. (See Fig. I-2-5-1) **2. Defense Policy of Each Country** **1. Singapore** Singapore identifies diplomacy and deterrence as the twin pillars of national defense for maintaining peace and stability, and in particular, it strengthens dialogue, confidence building and cooperation with armed forces in the region and beyond and promotes Total Defense150. Since the country needs to appropriately and flexibly respond to wars, terrorism, peacekeeping activities and humanitarian crises, it is working on the transformation of the Third Generation Singapore Armed Forces151 to implement effective responses with limited resources. Singapore makes efforts for regional cooperation based on friendly cooperative relations with other Southeast Asian countries. Also, aiming to contribute to the stability and development in the region, Singapore supports the United States[,] presence in the Asia-Pacific. The two countries signed a memorandum of understanding in 1990 permitting the United States to use military facilities in Singapore. This allows U.S. forces to promptly respond to an emergency in the Middle East and Africa. The United States ranks Singapore as a Major Security Cooperation Partner. In July 2005, the two countries signed the Strategic Framework Agreement between the United States of America and the Republic of Singapore for a Closer Cooperation Partnership in Defense and Security to further strengthen cooperation in areas such as counterterrorism, prevention of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, joint military exercises and training, and policy dialogues. **2. The Philippines** The Philippines perceives terrorism by domestic anti-government armed groups as the most serious threat to national security. Since 2004, the country has been implementing reform programs in the areas of defense planning, improvement of operational and training capabilities, reform of military structures and modernization of forces in accordance with a defense reform program called the Philippine Defense Reform (PDR). The Philippines and the United States have a history of a close relationship and maintain a long-standing, tight military cooperation relationship152. The two countries still maintain the cooperative relationship, with the ----- continuation of the mutual defense treaty and military assistance agreement, even after the eviction of U.S. forces in 1992. They have been conducting the large-scale annual joint military exercise Balikatan since 2000153 as counter-terrorism measures against terrorist groups including the Abu Sayyaf Group. The Philippines and United States have also conducted other joint exercises, including Balance Piston and Talon Vision. **3. Thailand** Under its flexible omnidirectional diplomatic policy, Thailand pursues association with other Southeast Asian countries and coordination with major countries, including Japan, the United States and China. The national defense strategy of Thailand consists of three concepts: Security Cooperation, United Defense, and Active Defense. Thailand promotes close security cooperation with neighboring countries, the building-up of defense capabilities and reform of the armed forces and the Defense Ministry. ----- Thailand has established a good relationship with the United States and has maintained a cooperative relationship with the United States through continual cooperation since the Cold-War era. Thailand concluded the Military Assistance Agreement with the United States in 1950, and has maintained the relationship. Thailand and the United States launched the joint military exercise Cobra Gold in 1982. Cobra Gold became a multinational exercise in 2000, and includes non-combat missions such as humanitarian assistance and disaster relief154. In 2003, the United States designated the Philippines and Thailand as Major Non-NATO Allies155, since the United States appreciated their proactive participation in the U.S.-led War on Terror. The United States also views them, together with Japan, Korea and Australia, as the cornerstone of peace and security in Asia156. **4. Indonesia** Indonesia emphasizes cooperation with the other ASEAN states and pursues independent and active diplomacy as a principal diplomatic doctrine. Indonesia promotes Total Defense through each effort of Military Defense and Non Military Defense under the doctrine that the whole Indonesian population protect and secure their independence, national sovereignty, territorial integrity and national unity. Furthermore, it is implementing military reform, which includes the prohibition of the involvement of military officers in politics and business and the separation of military and police roles. With respect to the relationship with the United States, military exchanges were temporarily suspended due to disputes over the activities of Indonesian forces in Timor Leste157. However, in November 2005, the United States decided to resume arms sales to Indonesia, and military exchanges between the two countries resumed. In addition, on his February 2008 visit to Indonesia, U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates held dialogue with President Yudhoyono and Minister of Defense Juwono Sudarsono, where they agreed to strengthen military cooperation and counter piracy and terrorism. In January 2009, the Indonesian Navy and the United States Navy conducted a joint exercise of their Special Forces in Java island. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton visited Indonesia as part of her first visit to Asian countries as the top U.S. diplomat and reached an agreement with the Foreign Minister Hassan to build a comprehensive partnership in various areas, including security cooperation, and to further strengthen the bilateral relationship. **5. Vietnam** Vietnam pursues an omnidirectional diplomatic policy and is particularly engaged in the expansion of friendly relations with neighboring countries in the Asia and Pacific region. It intends to carry out a foreign policy of independence, diversification and multilateralization to build relationships of trust with countries striving for peace, independence and development. Vietnam considers the followings as vital national interests; to maintain a peaceful environment and stability for socio-economic development, and to carry out industrialization and modernization in the direction of socialism. It advocates a posture of all-people[,]s national defense, whereby the whole population takes part in building a national defense. Vietnam consistently advocates neither joining any military alliance nor giving any foreign countries permission to have military bases in Vietnam. Regarding relations with the United States, the two countries concluded an agreement on International Military Education and Training (IMET) Program158 in June 2005 and major progress was seen regarding military cooperation. In June 2006, then U.S. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld visited Vietnam, and agreement was reached to expand military exchanges between the two countries. Many U.S. defense-related personnel, including the Defense Secretary and Commander of U.S. Pacific Command, visited Vietnam between 2006 and 2007, and in April 2007, the United States partially lifted its arms embargo on Vietnam159. **3. Military Modernization in the Region** In recent years, Southeast Asian countries are modernizing their militaries against a backdrop of economic ----- development and other factors. In regards to air forces, in 2004, Vietnam imported Russian Su-30 fighters and Indonesia imported Russian Su-27 and Su-30 fighters. In 2005, Singapore concluded a contract with the United States to purchase U.S. F-15 fighters. In 2007, Singapore concluded a contract to purchase additional F-15s, Malaysia imported Su-30 fighters, and Thailand decided to import Swedish JAS-39 fighters. In regards to naval forces, Malaysia, which had not previously possessed submarines, concluded a contract in 2002 to purchase Scorpène-class submarines, which were jointly developed by France and Spain. The first submarine went into commission in January 2009. In 2005, Singapore signed contracts to purchase Swedish Vastergotland-class submarines. In 2007, Singapore commissioned a French Formidable-class frigate, and a total of six of these, including those produced domestically, were commissioned by January 2009. In 2007, Indonesia commissioned two Sigma-class Corvettes, and plans to commission a total of four by the end of 2009. Moreover, in September 2007, Indonesia and Russia agreed to strengthen military technology and defense cooperation. The two nations signed a statement of mutual agreement concerning the procurement of Russian weapons on the scale of $1 billion through government loans, and this agreement is reported to include weapons such as two Kilo-class submarines. Some point out that the military modernization of these countries can be attributed to economic growth following the Asian currency crisis, and continued tensions and rivalries in this region. Although the military modernization does not yet amount to an arms race, in some cases, it can be observed that some Southeast Asian countries watch their neighbors[,] defense programs and react to them160. **4. Relations with China** There are currently territorial disputes between Southeast Asian countries and China over the Spratly Islands and the Paracel Islands161. At the ASEAN-China Summit Meeting held in November 2002, ASEAN member countries and China signed the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea162, which aims for a peaceful settlement of the territorial issue. However, no major development has been seen in the drafting of a Regional Code of Conduct in the South China Sea163, which would provide more concrete behavior and possess legal binding force. Movements observed in recent years with regard to the relationship with the Spratly Islands and Paracel Islands include an increase in activities of neighboring countries claiming their ownership164 and subsequent protests against these claims. In recent years, China has actively pushed the related countries to give priority to the development of resources in the waters surrounding the Spratly Islands, setting aside the territorial issue. For example, in September 2004, China and the Philippines agreed on a joint oil field exploration in the waters of the Spratly Islands, and in March 2005, China, the Philippines, and Vietnam reached an agreement on the launch of a joint exploration of oil and natural gas in the South China Sea. However, the Philippines did not agree to the renewal/ extension of the agreement and withdrew from the agreement in July 2008. In recent years, China has been making efforts to develop cooperative relations with Southeast Asian countries by such means as visits by government officials via bilateral and multilateral frameworks. In the defense sector, senior military officials have made visits between China and Southeast Asian countries, and the first joint search and rescue exercise was conducted with Thailand in 2004, the first of its kind in Southeast Asia. A joint patrol was launched in the Gulf of Tonkin with Vietnamese and Chinese Naval vessels in April 2006. In 2007 and 2008, the special forces of China and Thailand came together to conduct a combined counterterrorism military exercise165. In addition, in November 2007, China donated patrol ships to Cambodia as a means for assistance. At the China-ASEAN Summit Meeting in November 2007, Premier Wen Jiabao expressed China was prepared to strengthen cooperation with ASEAN countries in the sector of unconventional security, and it was ready to provide funds for such uses as marine surveying training on the Straits of Malacca. ----- **5. Regional Cooperation** Southeast Asian nations utilize ASEAN as a multilateral security framework for the region. In addition to the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), a dialogue forum on the political and security sectors in the Asia-Pacific region, the ASEAN Defense Ministers’ Meeting has been held once a year since 2006166. Furthermore, at the 13th ASEAN Summit in November 2007, the ASEAN Charter was adopted that contains the basic principles for establishing ASEAN community by 2015167, and entered into force in December 2008 after completion of the ratification procedures of all member states. The ASEAN Community Blueprints covering the ASEAN Political and Security Community (APSC) were adopted at the 14th ASEAN Summit held in February 2009, marking steady progress in the creation of the ASEAN Community. In the Southeast Asian region, multilateral cooperation, also in frameworks other than ASEAN, is being promoted in order to deal with a wide variety of security issues such as transnational problems including terrorism and piracy. In July 2004, Malaysia, Indonesia, and Singapore started the Trilateral Coordinated Patrols for vigilance against pirates in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore. In this effort, the naval forces of the three countries patrol their own territories in cooperation with each other. Subsequently, in September 2005, the countries launched their joint coastline airborne patrols codenamed Eyes in the Sky. In September 2008, Thailand joined these schemes. As another counter-piracy measure, the Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships and Asia (ReCAAP)168, proposed and led by Japan, entered into effect in September 2006, promoting the sharing of information concerning piracy and establishment of cooperation systems. Since 2004, Malaysia, Singapore, the United Kingdom, Australia, and New Zealand have conducted joint exercises including maritime interdiction training within the framework of the Five Powers Defense The 3rd ASEAN Defense Ministers, Meeting, February 2009 Arrangements (FPDA). [Singaporean Ministry of Defense] **6. Regional Issues** In Southeast Asia, while intra-regional cooperation is in progress, some unstable factors remain. Cambodia registered the Preah Vihear Temple in the World Heritage List in July 2008. The temple is situated in the area where the precise location of the border has yet to be worked out between Cambodia and Thailand. This intensified the tension between the two countries. The opposing forces exchanged gun fire in October 2008, resulting in a number of deaths and injuries. Later, the field commanders of both sides held talks and agreed to conduct joint patrols near the temple, in an effort to alleviate the situation. However, in April 2009, gun fights took place once again between the two sides. In the Philippines, armed conflict between government forces and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) has been intensifying since August 2008, and local residents were forced to flee the affected area. Malaysia, as major member of the International Monitoring Team (IMT)169, acted as a mediator between the Philippine government and MILF but withdrew from the IMT at the end of November 2008, resulting in growing concerns over the deterioration of future security conditions. Australia, New Zealand, Portugal, and Malaysia dispatched their troops to the International Security Forces to Timor Leste in April 2006 in response to a worsening security situation170, and subsequently in August 2006, ----- the United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor Leste (UNMIT) was established. In February 2008, Timor Lesteese President Ramos Horta and Prime Minister Gusmao were attacked by armed groups. After that the political and security situation saw some improvement and is currently generally calm; however, it is still unstable. The mandate of UNMIT was extended to February 26, 2010171. In the meantime, Timor Leste aspires to gain accession to ASEAN by 2012. ----- **Section 6. South Asia** **1. India** **1. General Situation** India is surrounded by many countries and has long coastlines totaling 7,600km. The country has the world[,]s second largest population of more than one billion following China and has great influence in the South Asian region. Also, it has a geographic position that is significant in maritime traffic, connecting the AsiaPacific region with the Middle East and Europe. India is expected to play an important role in maritime security. India has multiple races, religions, languages and cultures within it, but it has an administration elected through free and fair elections under the multi-party system and is the world[,]s largest democratic nations172. Also, India shares a lot with major developed countries including Japan in terms of fundamental values and Indian Navy frigate conducting operations off the coast of Somalia systems, such as liberalism, democracy and a market [Indian Navy] economy. **2. National Defense Policy and Security Situation** India, as its national security policies, lists the possession of military capabilities to protect national interests and the minimum level deterrent against nuclear threats; response to various security challenges ranging from terrorism and low-intensity conflicts to conventional wars and nuclear wars; and enhancement of international cooperation to deal with new threats such as terrorism and weapons of mass destruction. In fact, India actively participates in peacebuilding assistance, including U.N. Peacekeeping Operations. As of February 2009, about 9,000 personnel are involved in 10 peacekeeping operations173. India has been sending naval vessels off the coast of Somalia to conduct coast guard surveillance operations against piracy since October 2008174. In response to the successive terrorist attacks in Mumbai in November 2008, India increased its defense budget by 35% in February 2009 to facilitate the prompt procurement of equipment for the Special Forces175. India intends to maintain minimum credible nuclear deterrence while committing to no first use on nuclear weapons and maintaining the unilateral moratorium (temporary suspension) on nuclear tests that it announced immediately after the nuclear test conducted in 1998. In addition, in its nuclear doctrine released in January 2003, India expressed its commitment to continuing export controls of nuclear weapons and missile-related materials and technologies, and participating in the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty negotiations, as well as to creating a nuclear-free world. However, the doctrine declares that India will retain the option of retaliating with nuclear weapons in the event of a major attack against India by biological or chemical weapons. The Indian Armed Forces include ground forces of 13 corps with approximately 1,100,000 personnel; naval forces of two fleets, totaling approximately 344,000 tons, and air forces of 19 combat air wings and others with roughly 660 combat aircraft. India currently possesses one aircraft carrier, and in addition to promoting a construction plan for one new domestic aircraft carrier, will introduce another aircraft carrier from Russia upon completion of repair work as explained later. In January 2009, Airborne Early Warning and Control Systems (AWACS) of Russian-made IL-76 transport aircraft equipped with Israeli radars were delivered to India. In ----- addition, in conjunction with the retirement of the now-degraded MiG-21 fighter-interceptors, India is planning for procurement of multi-purpose fighter-interceptors, and in February 2007 Indian Defense Minister Antony announced that the country would procure 126 multi-purpose fighter-interceptors through a bidding process176. India is currently building up a ballistic missile that can load a nuclear warhead. In September 2003, India announced that it would operationally deploy the Agni-2 intermediate-range ballistic missile with the army. In September 2008, mid-range ballistic missiles (Agni 3) were deployed at the army and it has been reported that India has begun development of the Agni-4 long-range ballistic missile177. India is working toward the practical realization of ballistic missile defense as a defensive response measure to threats against the homeland. In November 2006, December 2007, and again in March 2009, a missile interceptor test was conducted, and reported as a success178. India has started negotiations with the United States on its ballistic missile defense system179. (See Fig. I-2-6-1) **3. Foreign Policies** **(1) Basic Posture** India has been promoting economic liberalization and reform since the 1990s, and is actively engaging in multilateral diplomacy, thereby steadily increasing its presence in the international community. India[,]s rapid expansion of military cooperation with friendly nations not only strengthens the security environment of the South Asia region, but also is expected to enhance security worldwide. In recent years, India has been Airborne Early Warning and Control aircraft designed for the Indian making efforts to expand military exchanges, such as by Air Force [AFP/JIJI] conducting joint exercises with various other countries180. **(2) Relations with the United States** India is actively striving to strengthen bilateral relations with the United States, while the United States is also promoting the expansion of involvement in India in line with the economic growth of India, thus leading to increasingly stronger mutual relationships in various fields. ----- In July 2005, Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh visited the United States and made a joint statement with then U.S. President George W. Bush that the relationship between the two countries would transform into a global partnership through which they would cooperate in the fields of space exploration, nuclear energy for civilian applications, and military and non-military technologies. Subsequently in March 2006, former President Bush in turn visited India for the first time in his six years as president of the United States181, and agreed with Prime Minister Singh to strategically strengthen bilateral relations. As for cooperation in civilian nuclear activities, in October 2008, then Secretary of State Rice and then Foreign Minister Mukerjee signed the U.S.-India Civil Nuclear Cooperation Agreement, allowing the United States to supply nuclear technology and nuclear fuel to India, a non-signatory to NPT (Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons). In the security field, in June 2005, then Indian Defense Minister Pranab Mukherjee and then U.S. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld signed a 10-year military agreement called the New Framework for the U.S.-India Defense Relationship, based on the recognition that the U.S.-India defense relationship is an important pillar in the mutually beneficial relations between the two countries, which are changing over time. In March 2006, the U.S. Department of Defense announced its intention to enhance cooperation with India on security issues, including maritime security182. Furthermore, in February 2008, U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates paid a visit to India and held discussions with Indian Prime Minister Singh and other leaders. India and the United States have carried out active military exchanges, including joint military exercises. In August 2008, the Indian Air Force participated for the first time in Exercise Red Flag 08-4, which took place at Nellis Air Force Base in Nevada183. In October 2008, U.S. and Indian forces conducted Exercise Malabar in the Arabian Sea. U.S. Navy aircraft carriers participated in the exercise, and anti-air, anti-submarine and anti-surface warfare exercises as well as on-site inspections were carried out. Through these exercises, joint exercises with the United States were enhanced in terms of both quality and quantity. During April and May 2009, Malabar 09 was carried out with the additional participation of Japan184. India takes the stance that it intends to expand its procurement source of weapons to a global scale, and has expressed an interest in U.S. weapons. India has already purchased a used amphibious ship from the United States185, and the United States has approved the sale of a P8 patrol aircraft to India186. **(3) Relations with China** India has been trying to improve relations with China through mutual visits by leaders despite the Tibet issue and unresolved national border issues between the two countries as well as concerns over Chinese nuclear weapons and missiles and the modernization of its military force, including naval forces. When Chinese Minister of National Defense Cao Gangchuan visited India in March 2004, the two countries agreed on the expansion of military exchanges. Subsequently in December 2004, based on this agreement, a visit to China by an Indian Chief of Army Staff was made for the first time by the two countries[,] Vice Foreign Ministers. When Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao visited India in April 2005, the two countries reached an agreement on establishing a strategic and cooperative partnership for peace and prosperity187. In November 2006, Chinese President Hu Jintao visited India for the first time in 10 years as the Chinese president to meet with Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh. Both agreed that the development of a strategic and cooperative partnership between China and India is commonly recognized as an important issue and announced a joint declaration that includes holding regular summit meetings188. In January 2008, Indian Prime Minister Singh visited China and signed a joint statement titled the Shared Vision for 21st Century. Furthermore, in December 2007, the first joint military exercise between the armies of the two countries−an India-China anti-terrorism joint exercise−took place in Yunnan Province in China. In December 2008, the second joint exercise−an India-China anti-terrorism joint exercise−took place in India189. ----- **(4) Relations with Russia** India has traditionally been on friendly terms with Russia and maintains close relations with the country through mutual visits made annually by their leaders. In October 2000, the two countries signed the Declaration of Strategic Partnership to further strengthen their bilateral relations, and have been promoting acquisition of T-90 tanks by India from Russia as well as joint development of a supersonic cruise missile190. In December 2008, Russian President Dmitry Medvedev visited India and both leaders published a joint statement and signed agreements, including an intergovernmental agreement on the construction of nuclear power plants. Russia is a major supplier of weapons to India191. In January 2004, then Russian Defense Minister Ivanov visited India and concluded a contract to sell a retired aircraft carrier, the Admiral Gorshkov, to India. Also in January 2007, then Russian Defense Minister Ivanov visited India and conducted a consultation meeting on military technology cooperation, joint exercises, and other issues192. Furthermore, both countries are reported to have been promoting the joint development of fifth-generation fighter aircraft193. In addition, the two countries have conducted joint military exercises since 2003194. **(5) Relations with Southeast Asian Countries** Since the latter half of the 1990s, India has been emphasizing relations with East Asian countries, including ASEAN members. In October 2003, it signed the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia (TAC)195. **2. Pakistan** **1. General Situation** Pakistan, with approximately 160 million people, borders India, Iran, Afghanistan, and China, and is one of the most geopolitically important countries in Southwestern Asia. Since Pakistan borders Afghanistan and in the past the so-called Khan network was involved in the proliferation of nuclear weapons technology, Pakistan’s attitude towards the international fight against terrorism and non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is attracting increasing international attention. The military government established by General Perves Musharraf (then Chief of Army Staff) who effected a military coup d[,]état in October 1999 came to an end after nine years and Asif Ali Zardari was elected President in September 2008. However, soon after his inauguration, President Zardari was faced with difficulties controlling the government, being stuck between the war on terror led by the U.S. and the acts of retaliatory terrorism stemming from anti-U.S. sentiment being carried out by armed groups in the country196. Thus it is not yet known where the instability of Pakistan will lead. **2. National Defense Policy** Pakistan claims that maintaining nuclear deterrence against the nuclear threat posed by India is essential to ensure national security and self-defense. The Pakistan Armed Forces include ground forces of nine corps with approximately 550,000 personnel; one naval fleet of about 40 warships, totaling approximately 77,000 tons; and air forces including 12 air combat wings with a total of roughly 400 combat aircraft. In recent years, Pakistan has been actively proceeding with development of a ballistic missile capable of mating with a nuclear warhead and cruise missiles. Pakistan first test-launched the Babur (Hatf-VII) cruise missile in November 2005197. From January to February 2008, in exercises of the Army Strategic Force Command (ASFC), the Strategic Missile Group (SMG), following actions in 2006198, it consecutively conducted test launches of various intermediate-range ballistic missiles it owns, including the Ghauri (Hatf-V), and the Shaheen 1 (Hatf-IV). And in April 2008, the first test launch of the intermediate-range ballistic missile Shaheen ----- 2 (Hatf-VI) was conducted. This seems to demonstrate that Pakistan is steadily deploying ballistic missiles to its forces. (See Fig. I-2-6-1) **3. Foreign Policies** **(1) Relations with India** India and Pakistan, which became independent from the former British India after World War II, have had three large armed conflicts over the Kashmir territorial issue199 and others. The territorial dispute over Kashmir has continued, with dialogues repeatedly resumed and suspended, and it constitutes one of the root causes of confrontation between India and Pakistan. However, in February 2004, “multiple dialogues” for the normalization of relations between the two countries, including on the Kashmir issue, were initiated. Although definite progress had been seen in the bilateral relationship before this time200, no fundamental solutions to the issues were in place and relations between the two countries had become tense again after the successive terrorist attacks in Mumbai in November 2008. Now, with the efforts of the international community, led by the United States, a further deterioration of the relations between the two countries has been put on hold201. Nonetheless, the situation is still unpredictable. **(2) Relations with other countries** Pakistan, while attaching importance to friendship and cooperation with Islamic countries, maintains close relations with China as a countermeasure against India. In October 2008, President Zardari visited China and held talks with President Hu Jintao, allowing both leaders to reach a consensus to raise the strategic partnership to a new level. It has been reported that both countries concluded a purchase contract regarding FJ-17 fighter aircraft in March 2009202. Since the 9/11 attacks on the United States, Pakistan has been expressing its intention to join the U.S. led fight against terrorism203. This cooperative attitude was highly appreciated by the international community, and the sanctions that had been imposed on Pakistan by the United States and other countries due to Pakistan[,]s nuclear test in 1998 were lifted204. Pakistan strengthened military cooperation with the United States in the fight against terrorism. In March 2005 the United States decided to sell F-16 fighters to Pakistan, lifting its freeze on the sale that had lasted over 20 years. Furthermore, in March 2007, former U.S. President Bush visited Pakistan, expressing deep appreciation for Pakistan[,]s support in the global fight against terrorism, and the two countries confirmed their policy of promoting terrorism-related information sharing205. Regarding the issue of nuclear proliferation involving Pakistan, then President Musharraf disclosed in February 2004 that some Pakistani scientists, including Dr. Khan, were involved in nuclear proliferation, although the president denied the Pakistani government[,]s involvement in any kind of proliferation activity206. ----- **Section 7. Australia** **1. General Situation** Japan shares basic values such as respect for freedom and human rights, and democracy with Australia. Australia, like Japan and the Republic of Korea, is allied with the United States. Australia has been broadly and actively involved in resolving security issues in the Middle East and Asia-Pacific region in addition to those in neighboring areas such as Timor Leste and Solomon Islands. **2. Security and National Defense Policy** Prime Minister Kevin Rudd made the first National Security Statement to the Parliament in December 2008. In the statement, he stated that the security environment is increasingly fluid and characterized by a complex and dynamic mix of continuing and emerging challenges and opportunities, and identifies self-reliance, the U.S.Australia alliance, regional engagement, commitment to multilateral institutions particularly the United Nations, and creative middle power diplomacy, as some of the principles of Australian national security. In May 2009, Australia released a defense white paper titled “Defending Australia in the Asia Pacific Century: Force 2030” for the first time in the nine years since 2000, which presented national policies for the period through to 2030, based on a strategic outlook for the future. The white paper states that Australia has strategic interests (1) in the defense of Australia against direct armed attack, (2) in the security, stability and cohesion of the immediate neighborhood, which Australia shares with Indonesia and New Zealand, (3) in the stability of the wider Asia-Pacific region, which stretches from North Asia to the Eastern Indian Ocean, and (4) in preserving an international order that restrains aggression by states against each other, and can effectively manage other risks and threats, such as the proliferation of WMD, terrorism, state fragility and failure, intra-state conflict, and the security impacts of climate change and resource scarcity. It is stated that defense policy should be founded on the principle of self-reliance in direct defense and in relation to the country[,]s unique strategic interests, but with a capacity to do more when required, consistent with those strategic interests that Australia might share with others, and within the limits of its resources. This defense policy means that Australia must have the military capacity to (1) act independently where Australia has unique strategic interests at stake, and in relation to which it would not wish to be reliant on the combat forces of any foreign power; (2) lead military coalitions where Australia has shared strategic interests at stake with others, and in relation to which it would be willing to accept a leadership role; and (3) make tailored contributions to military coalitions where Australia shares wider strategic interests with others and is willing to accept a share of the burden in securing those interests. It then gives priorities to the tasks of the Australian Defence Force (ADF) as follows: (1) to deter and defeat attacks on Australia by conducting independent military operations without relying on the combat or combat support forces of other countries; (2) to contribute to stability and security in the South Pacific and Timor Leste; (3) to contribute to military contingencies in the Asia-Pacific region; (4) to contribute to military contingencies in the rest of the world. In order to carry out these tasks, the ADF needs to be more potent in certain areas, particularly undersea warfare and anti-submarine warfare (ASW), surface maritime warfare, air superiority, strategic strike, special forces, Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR), and cyber warfare. Specifically, Australia has decided to acquire 12 new Future Submarines, three new Air Warfare Destroyers (AWD)207, around 100 F-35 Joint Strike Fighters (JSF) and maritime-based land-attack cruise missiles. The Government is committed to 3 percent real growth in the Defense budget for 2017-2018 and 2.2 percent real growth to 2030. ----- **3. Overseas Activities** Australia identifies the security, stability and cohesion of the neighboring region as one of its strategic interests: fragile states in the neighboring region are potential havens for criminals and terrorists, and domestic conflicts would inflict considerable damage on the regional community, including Australia. Thus, Australia is committed to contributing to regional stability by providing active support, including the deployment of military forces208. If the Australian government decided that it is in Australia's wider strategic interests to undertake operations in the Middle East or nearby regions, Australia would do so only after the Government has satisfied itself that the forces have the necessary environment to ensure the success of the operations with the least risk to the deployed forces209. Based on this policy, Australia is deploying about 3,000 personnel abroad out of its 55,000-strong force210 mainly in the following areas. **1. Timor Leste** Australia has actively supported the political and social stability of Timor Leste since 1999, when the independence movement gained momentum in Timor Leste. ADF leads the International Stabilisation Force, and about 650 personnel are working with about 140 New Zealand military personnel211. **2. Solomon Islands** Australia has actively supported the stability and development of Solomon Islands since ethnic disputes intensified there in the late 1990[,]s. The operation has been led by the Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands (RAMSI)212 since July 2003. About 140 ADF personnel comprise the military component of RAMSI together with the forces of New Zealand, Papua New Guinea and Tonga, and engage in providing security for RAMSI[,]s multinational Participation Police Force. ----- **3. Afghanistan** Australia announced its support for the United States immediately after the 9/11 terrorist attacks in 2001 under the U.S.-Australia alliance, and dispatched its troops to Afghanistan in October 2001. Australia has engaged in Afghanistan aiming to prevent the proliferation of terrorism and to prevent Afghanistan again becoming a safe haven for terrorists through assisting the country in ensuring peace and stability. The Rudd Administration has indicated its long term military commitment in Afghanistan213. In April 2009, the government announced a deployment of additional 450 personnel214, whereby about 1,550 soldiers will engage in reconstruction activities or in the training of the Afghan National Army in Oruzgan province. Australia has also participated in Maritime Security Operations (MSO) in the Persian Gulf since March 2004. **4. Iraq** Following the dispatch of about 2,000 ADF troops for the use of force against Iraq in March 2003, Australia has been engaged in reconstruction activities since July 2003. Combat forces withdrew in June 2008215 and there are currently about 150 personnel stationed in Iraq providing security and support for the Australian embassy in Iraq. Prime Minister Rudd said that Australia would shift its emphasis of commitment to economic development, personnel training and humanitarian initiatives216. ADF troops in Afghanistan [Australian Government, Department of Defence] **4. Relationship with Other Countries** Australia attaches importance to its alliance with the United States and intends to strengthen cooperation through security policies with neighboring countries in order to maintain the stability of the region217. **1. The United States** Australia recognizes that the strategic stability of Asia-Pacific region relies significantly on the presence of the United States, and emphasizes the importance of its alliance with the United States based on the ANZUS Treaty (the Security Treaty between Australia, New Zealand and the United States of America)218. In addition to annual Australia-United States Ministerial Consultations (AUSMIN), and joint exercises such as Talisman Saber219, Australia has dispatched warships, combat aircraft and special forces to the military operations in Iraq and the fight against terrorism in Afghanistan, thereby maintaining a close alliance with the United States. Australia announced that it would participate in the U.S.-led F-35 Joint Strike Fighter Program. In preparation for the delay in that program and for the retirement of F-111, in March 2007, Australia decided to purchase F/A-18 Super Hornets. Furthermore, Australia seeks to promote interoperability with the United States through the expansion of U.S.-Australia joint exercise facilities located in Australia220. The government has also suggested cooperation in missile defense221. Joint press conference after AUSMIN in April 2009 [Australian Government, Department of Defence] ----- **2. Southeast Asia** Australia values cooperation with Southeast Asian countries as a way to address terrorism and crime in the region222. As regards its relations with Indonesia, after the Bali terrorist bombings in 2002 and 2005, and the one that occurred in front of the Australian Embassy in Jakarta in September 2004, the two countries developed closer cooperation against terrorism223. Furthermore, in November 2006, they signed an agreement on the framework for security cooperation, which states defense cooperation in a broad area. Australia carries out joint exercises with Malaysia and Singapore, focusing on non-traditional threats, such as terrorism and maritime security, within the framework of the Five Power Defence Agreement (FPDA) (entered into force in 1971). Australia also conducts security cooperation with Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam. **3. New Zealand** Even after the United States suspended its defense obligations toward New Zealand under the ANZUS Treaty in 1986, following the adoption of a non-nuclear policy by New Zealand, Australia has regarded the Treaty as effective between Australia and New Zealand. New Zealand is an important partner for Australia in ensuring stability in the neighboring region. The two countries have been strengthening cooperation in joint military tasks by enhancing interoperability through joint exercises and operations in the region. ----- **Section 8. Europe** **1. General Situation** With the end of the Cold War, many European countries now recognize that the threat of large-scale invasion by other countries has disappeared and regard an outbreak of regional conflict within and around Europe, the rise of terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and other developments as new security challenges. To adapt to new and emerging threats, Europe has sought to stabilize the security environment primarily by strengthening and expanding the frameworks of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO: 28 member states) and the European Union (EU: 27 member states). Moreover, many European countries are proceeding with the development of their own capacity to cope with these new challenges. (See Fig. I-2-8-1) **2. Enhancement and Enlargement of Security Frameworks** **1. Enhancement of Conflict Prevention, Crisis Management and Peacekeeping Functions** **(1) Development of a system necessary for a new role** Founded for the primary purpose of collective defense among member countries, NATO has been shifting the focus of its activities to conflict prevention and crisis management since the end of the Cold War. This shift has also been reflected in the Strategic Concept of the Alliance, reviewed in 1999, in which NATO added conflict prevention, crisis management224 and other missions to its primary mission of collective defense, based on the view that various dangers difficult to forecast, such as ethnic and religious conflicts, territorial disputes, human rights suppression, and the dissolution of a state, still remain in Europe and surrounding regions. In addition to that, taking into account the differences in capabilities between the United States and Europe, which became prominent at the time of NATO[,]s air raid on the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in 1999, NATO is undergoing a reform of its military capabilities, including an organizational reform225, based on the agreement reached at the Prague Summit in November 2002. In the reform process, the development of NATO Response Force (NRF) started in 2002, and the force was declared to be at full operational capability in November 2006. However, with the deployment of the troops to Afghanistan and other areas expanding and becoming prolonged, the future posture of the NRF is currently under discussion in order to reduce the member states[,] burden of providing troops to the NRF226. The EU, enhancing its own commitment to security issues, adopted its first security strategy paper in December 2003, titled “A Secure Europe in a Better World-European Security Strategy.” It sets forth the objectives of addressing major threats including terrorism, the proliferation of WMD, regional conflicts, collapse of states and organized crime through stabilizing surrounding regions and multinational cooperation. In December 2008, the EU released Declaration On strengthening Capabilities. This was released with the Statement on Strengthening International Security as a document related to the Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy - Providing Security in a Changing World, which reviews the implementation of the progress in implementing the security strategy. The declaration calls for the EU to increase personnel, equipment/materials and facilities necessary to respond to threats listed in the European Security Strategy of 2003. Furthermore, the EU, which, unlike NATO, does not assume the mission of defending its member states, has been strengthening cooperation with NATO and working on the development of a system necessary in order to conduct military activities of its own, such as peacekeeping, in cases where NATO does not interfere. Based on the Battlegroup concept set forth in the Headline Goal 2010227 adopted in 2004, the EU has made two ----- Battlegroups constantly on standby to carry out missions since January 2007. Also, the EU established its own operation center in Brussels in January 2007. **(2) Commitment to a New Role** NATO has led the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan since August 2003, which marked its first operation outside Europe, and the NATO-led ISAF mission expanded its presence in October 2006 to cover the whole country. At the NATO summit meeting held in spring 2008, the Bucharest Summit Declaration was adopted, which states that the ISAF mission is NATO[,]s top priority. Since then, some progress has been made, such as the transfer of the security responsibility in Kabul from ISAF forces to Afghan national security forces, but the country is faced with challenges in security and other areas. In the Summit Declaration on Afghanistan adopted at the NATO Summit held in April 2009, member states agreed on issues including to ----- improve support for training for Afghan national forces and police forces, to send troops on a short-term basis to stabilize security in preparation for the Afghanistan presidential elections, and to support the building of a closer relationship between Pakistan and Afghanistan. Based on the agreement made at the NATO Istanbul Summit in June 2004, NATO is training the Iraqi security forces in Iraq, and also continues its missions such as the maintenance of security in Kosovo which declared independence in February 2008. Moreover, European countries play an active role Pakistan-NATO joint naval exercises [NATO picture] in counter-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden off the coast of Somalia. NATO sent the Standing NATO Maritime Group (SNMG) comprising Navy forces of member states to waters off the coast of Somalia in 2008 and 2009228 to conduct counter-piracy operations. The EU has been executing its first-ever naval mission, Operation Atalanta, to combat piracy off the coast of Somalia, and member countries have deployed vessels and aircraft229 in the region. The dispatched vessels and aircraft are engaged in escorting ships employed by the United Nations World Food Programme (WFP) and surveillance activities in the waters230. ----- The EU led peacekeeping operations in Macedonia in 2003 for the first time using NATO[,]s equipment and capabilities231. The EU also conducted its first peacekeeping operations outside Europe without utilizing NATO[,]s equipment and capabilities in the Democratic Republic of Congo in 2003. In December 2004, the EU took over the mission of the NATO-led Stabilization Force (SFOR), which had been operating in Bosnia-Herzegovina232, and sent troops to Chad and Central Africa in January 2008233. These operations represent the EU[,]s proactive involvement in risk management/maintenance of security234. (See Fig. I-2-8-2) **(3) Criteria for Arms Export in Europe** In December 2008, the Council of European Union Foreign Ministers adopted the Council Common Positionsdefining common rules governing control of exports of military technology and equipment (EU Common Position), which sets out a new common ground for approving exports based on arms export control laws of EU member states. Unlike the previous European Union Code of Conduct on Arms Exports (EU Code of Conduct), the EU Common Position has legally binding power and requires member countries to take more stringent measures. **2. Geographical Expansion of Security Frameworks and Partnership** Since the end of the Cold War, efforts have been made to secure the stability of the so-called security vacuum in Central and Eastern Europe by enlarging the NATO framework235. At present, most of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe are NATO member states and have borders with Russia, which has consistently opposed NATO[,]s expansion to the east. At the same time, NATO has pursued a policy of partnership with non-NATO member countries. For example, NATO adopted the Partnership for Peace (PfP)236, which aims to foster confidence and improve interoperability with non-NATO European countries, and the Mediterranean Dialogue (MD)237, which seeks stability in the Mediterranean region. NATO is also strengthening relations with Contact Countries238 such as Australia and Japan with a view to conducting activities outside the region. Since the 9/11 terrorist attacks, NATO and Russia have sought to improve relations, and established the NATO-Russia Council (NRC) in 2002 in light of the need to deal with common issues concerning security. NATO and Russia have continued to pursue dialogue and cooperation in areas such as the fight against terrorism, arms control, and theater missile defense. After the Georgia conflict in August 2008, the NATO-Russia dialogue was temporarily suspended, but NATO member states agreed to resume discussions with Russia at the NATO Foreign Ministers meeting in December 2008. An agreement was reached to resume the official NRC including talks at the ministerial level, at the NATO Summit meeting in 2009. The number of EU member countries in Central and Eastern Europe is also expanding, with the accession of 10 countries in 2004, including Poland and the Czech Republic, and the accession of Bulgaria and Romania in January 2007. (See Fig. I-2-8-3) **3. Efforts by Individual Countries to Maintain the Capability to Respond to Various Situations** Since the end of the Cold War, individual countries−conscious of the new threats of terrorism and the proliferation of WMD−have begun to place emphasis on the allocation of personnel to missions other than homeland defense. As a result, there has been an emphasis on strengthening transport capability for overseas deployment in defense building, giving consideration to the role of NATO and other defense organizations. Moreover, many European countries have been implementing quantitative reductions and restructuring of their military power, while channeling efforts into modernizing their military and increasing national defense expenditures. ----- **1. The United Kingdom** The United Kingdom has maintained the perception that it is not subject to any direct military threats and therefore has pursued military reform focused on enhancing capability in order to cope with new threats since the end of the Cold War. In particular, the U.K. regarded international terrorism and the proliferation of WMD as major threats and improved its overseas deployment capability and readiness 239. The first National Security Strategy of the U.K., announced in March 2008, highlights the broadened view of national security to include threats to individual citizens, and it considers transnational crime, pandemics, flooding and others as threats along with terrorism and the spread of WMD. It also cites factors such as climate change, increasing demand for energy, and poverty as causes of these threats. To cope with these diverse and interrelated threats and risks, the strategy takes a multilateral approach through the U.N., EU and NATO while seeking cooperation not only between the military and the police, but also with the private sector and regional governments, with a view to addressing threats at an early stage. The strategy affirms the existing assessment, concluding that state-led threats will not emerge in the predictable future and that in terms of state-led military threats240. The strategy nevertheless states that the international security environment has grown more complex and less predictable and that while the reemergence of such threats in the long run is unlikely, they cannot be discounted, thus it sets forth a policy for maintaining strong defense capabilities241. To be specific, it gives priority to the procurement of equipment for supporting its ongoing operations, including strategic transportation, support helicopters and armored vehicles. At the same time, it plans to invest for the long term in a broad range of military capabilities for the defense of the U.K. such as aircraft carriers, air defense and anti-submarine warfare, which are difficult to rebuild from zero. Furthermore, in a white paper issued in December 2006, The Future of the U.K.’s Nuclear Deterrence, the U.K. announced it would maintain its own nuclear deterrence based on submarine-launched ballistic missiles in the 2020s and beyond242. These military capabilities will guarantee the U.K.’s future security while enabling it to make contributions to peacekeeping and other international efforts and thus contribute to the international security environment. ----- **2. Germany** In its first national defense white paper in 12 years issued in October 2006, Germany specified that the primary mission of its allied forces remains national defense and collective defense in the traditional sense. However, it declared that in light of the expansion of new threats including terrorism and the spread of WMD, conflict prevention and crisis management, including the fight against international terrorism, are the most likely missions to come. To ensure the necessary military capabilities to meet the above mission, Germany plans to give priority in resource allocation to strengthening strategic transport capacity, global reconnaissance and efficient command with high interoperability. Specifically, Germany plans to introduce the A-400M transport aircraft and completed launches of five satellites fitted with a synthetic aperture radar SAR-LUPE by July 2008. It is also restructuring its military into joint units grouped by function: intervention, stabilization and assistance243 It is also reducing personnel and relocating its domestic camps and facilities. **3. France** France, in its White Paper on Defense and National Security, issued in June 2008, identified risks ranging from cyber attacks to environmental crises, in addition to the direct threats of mass terrorism and ballistic missiles, stating that these threats and risks are interconnected due to globalization and that the continuity between domestic and foreign security has taken on strategic significance. The regions cited as those have influence on the stability of France and Europe included the area extending from the Atlantic to the Indian oceans, subSaharan Africa, and especially the relationship-building with Russia in Europe, as well as Asia, which is growing in its importance. It specifies five statutes of France[,]s national security strategy: prevention, nuclear deterrence244, protection, and overseas intervention, based on accurate perception, knowledge and anticipation of conditions in a world characterized by uncertainty and instability. The report states that France will strengthen these functions and combine them flexibly in order to adapt to changes in the strategic environment over the next 15 years. Regarding France[,]s foreign relations, France calls for strengthening of EU security and renovation of transatlantic relations, and restored its full participation in NATO integrated military structure in April 2009245 in view of the changes in the situation since France[,]s withdrawal from NATO[,]s military structure and, in particular, the complementary relationship between the EU and NATO. With respect to the provision of military power, France intends to meet operational requirements such as enhancing protection capabilities while reducing personnel, consolidating military bases and to proceed with a strengthening of its intelligence functions and a modernization of its military equipment. ----- **Notes:** 1) While the U.S. President is required to submit the National Security Strategy to Congress every year in accordance with Section 404a, title 50 of the United States Code, it was released twice under the former Bush Administration in September 2002 and March 2006. 2) The National Defense Strategy (NDS) is released by the Secretary of Defense as a guide to implementing the National Security Strategy and provides an outline of the strategic documents of the Department of Defense, including the National Military Strategy, which was released in March 2005 and July 2008. In the Forward of the 2008 National Defense Strategy, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates states that the United States will soon have a new President, but the complex issues the United States faces will remain, and this strategy is a blueprint for success in the years to come. 3) For the foreseeable future, winning the long war against violent extremism will be a central objective of the United States, and the United States faces a clash of arms, a war of ideas and the difficulty of providing assistance − an effort that will require patience and innovation. Military efforts against terrorism are likely to be subordinate to measures to promote local participation in government and economic programs to spur development. Victory in this war will entail discrediting extremist ideology, creating fissures between and among extremist groups and reducing them to the level of nuisance groups that can be tracked and handled by law enforcement capabilities. 4) It has been pointed out that deterrence may be impossible in cases where the purpose is not the destruction of a target, but the attack itself, as in terrorism. Thus, it is important to improve post-attack recovery and operational capacity, besides the traditional ability to withstand attack. 5) China and Russia need to be anchored in the international system as responsible stakeholders. India is also expected to assume greater responsibility as a stakeholder, commensurate with its power. 6) Whenever possible, the U.S. prefers non-military options to achieve this purpose. However, the U.S. will, if necessary, act preemptively in exercising its right of self-defense to prevent hostile acts. 7) The QDR is a document that the Secretary of Defense is required to submit to Congress every four years according to Section 118, title 10 of the United States Code. It foresees the security environment in the next 20 years and clarifies issues including the defense strategy, force structure, force modernization plan, defense infrastructure, and budget program. The 2006 QDR was released under the then Bush Administration. 2009 is the year of review as provided in the United States Code. In the background briefing of the QDR in April, 2009, the Department of Defense mentioned that it is already under review and scheduled to be reported to Congress by early 2010. 8) In the current security environment, it is not foreseeable when and where a threat to the United States might emerge. Still, the capability used by adversaries can be anticipated, thus a capability-based strategy focuses on what capabilities are required to deal with the capability of the enemy. 9) The 2001 QDR described that the United States had adopted an approach to structure its forces with the following four objectives: 1) to defend the United States; 2) to maintain forward-deployed forces in four critical regions (Europe, Northeast Asia, the East Asia littoral, and the Middle East/Southwest Asia); 3) to defeat adversaries swiftly in two types of operations in overlapping time frames and to defeat an adversary decisively in one of the two theaters; and 4) to conduct a limited number of small-scale contingencies. 10) The Striker Brigade Combat Team is formed as a light unit so that it can be deployed anywhere in the world promptly by C-130 transport aircraft and other transportation means. Unlike heavily armed conventional mechanized unit, the team is equipped with “Striker,” 8-wheel-drive armored vehicles that are equipped with 105mm guns and other weapons and are characterized by strike assets and mobility. 11) In April 2005, then Commander of U.S. Army Europe Bell announced plans to reduce soldiers spread over 13 main operating locations across Europe to approximately 24,000 soldiers concentrated among four Joint Main Operating Bases (JMOB), which would take place over the next 5 to 10 years. ----- 12) News briefing with then Secretary of the Army Geren and Vice Chief of Staff of the Army Cody (December 19, 2007). 13) In March 2007, the United States announced that one aircraft carrier homeported in the Atlantic ocean would be transferred to a Pacific base in San Diego in 2010. 14) According to the congressional testimony in September 2004 of Admiral Fargo, then Commander of the U.S. Pacific Command, U.S. forces deploy bombers in Guam by rotation. 15) White House Fact Sheet (August 16, 2004). 16) Joint press conference by then U.S. President Bush and then President Kufor of Ghana (February 20, 2008). 17) As for non-strategic nuclear forces, the Nuclear Posture Review announced by the Clinton administration in September 1994 states as follows: (1) Eliminate the option to deploy nuclear weapons on carrier-based, dual-capable (nuclear/conventional) aircraft; (2) Eliminate the option to carry nuclear Tomahawk cruise missiles (TLAM/N) on surface ships: (3) Retain the option to deploy TLAM/N on attack submarines; and (4) Retain the current commitment of dual-capable aircraft based in Europe and Continental United States (CONUS) and the deployment of nuclear weapons in Europe. 18) The Congressional Commission on U.S. Strategic Posture established by the said law submitted a final report to Congress in May 2009, stating that the United States must maintain a viable nuclear deterrent until the conditions that might make possible the global elimination of nuclear weapons happens. 19) President Obama, in his speech to Congress in February 2009, said that he would reform the defense budget so that the U.S. is not paying for Cold-War-era weapons systems no longer in use. Defense Secretary Gates also indicated that re-balance of investment is necessary between current and future capabilities. (Website of the Department of Defense, February 26, 2009). He also points out that the 2008 National Defense Strategy strives for balance in the following three areas: 1) between trying to prevail in current conflicts and preparing for other contingencies, 2) between institutionalizing capabilities such as counter-insurgency and foreign military assistance and maintaining the U.S.[,]s existing conventional and strategic edge against other military forces; and 3) between retaining those cultural traits that have made the U.S. forces successful and shedding those that hamper their ability to do what needs to be done. (Essay in Foreign Affairs, January/ February, 2009) 20) President Obama announced the reform of the system of defense contracting saying that it is time for the waste and inefficiency to end. (March 4, 2009) 21) Equivalent to the budget for the global war on terror (GWOT) under the former Bush Administration, and includes operation expenditures in Iraq and Afghanistan 22) The United States and Russia agreed to begin bilateral intergovernmental negotiations to work out a new comprehensive, legally binding agreement on reducing and limiting strategic offensive arms to replace the START I treaty, which expires on December 5, 2009. (Joint Statement by presidents of the Russian federation and the United States of America regarding negotiations on further reductions in strategic offensive arms, April 1, 2009) 23) Although specific reduction volumes are unclear, it is stated that the U.S. nuclear stockpile would be less than one-quarter of its size at the end of the Cold War. The Defense Secretary Gates also pointed out in his speech in Washington DC in October 2008 that the U.S. would have 75 percent fewer nuclear weapons than those at the end of the Cold War within a few years. In the Department of Energy budget proposal for FY 2010, the Obama Administration announced to cease the development work on the Reliable Replacement Warhead (RRW) and ensure the safety, security and reliability of warheads with more expansive life extension programs. 24) The Secretary of Defense Task Force on Department of Defense Nuclear Weapons Management was set up in June 2008 because of two nuclear management-related incidents. The task force released a report on the Air Force[,]s nuclear mission in September 2008 and the same sort of report on the overall Department of ----- Defense (except for the Air Force) in December 2009. 25) In the organizational reform of the U.S. Army, its conventional pyramid structure (army, corps, divisions, and brigades) will be reorganized into the headquarters with command and control functions and selfsufficient combat units (the size of a brigade) so that it can respond to various situations promptly and flexibly by combining headquarters and working units according to the purpose and scale of the mission. 26) Its headquarters is located at Camp Lejuene in North Carolina. As the Marine Corps Special Operation Command was created, the 4th Marine Expeditionary Brigade was deactivated. 27) The budget proposal for FY 2010 prescribes that the development program for a follow-on bomber not be pursued until the Department of Defense has a better understanding of the needs, the requirements, and the technology, and that personnel reductions be halted in the Air Force and Navy. 28) The budget proposal for FY 2010 states that no additional production of the C-17 airlifter will be requested. The U.S. has sufficient C-17 to meet airlift needs with the 205 that are already in force or in production. 29) The U.S. government has signed the Status of Forces Agreement as well as an agreement on establishing a U.S. BMD radar site with the Czech government, both of which were approved by the Senate of the Czech Parliament on November 27, 2008. The U.S. government has signed an agreement concerning the deployment of ground-based BMD interceptors as well as the adoption of a declaration of strategic cooperation with the Polish government, which contains the deployment of U.S Army Patriot air and missile defense battery in Poland. In addition, Russia is repeatedly opposed to the deployment of the MD system, insisting that it will have a negative impact on the country[,]s nuclear deterrent capability. In response, the United States has explained that the target of the MD system is not Russia: it will be deployed to defend Europe and other allies from missile threats posed by Iran. 30) Remarks by President Obama in Prague (April 5, 2009) 31) The figures of U.S. military mentioned in this paragraph are the numbers of active personnel recorded on the publication source of the U.S. Department of Defense (as of December 31, 2008), and it could change according to unit deployment. 32) Joint editorial of the Korean Workers[,] Party[,]s journals “Rodong Shinmun” and “Workers” (June 16, 1999). 33) In North Korea, it seems that various military decisions are made by the National Defense Commission (Chairman: Kim Jong Il), which has the ultimate military authority, and the Ministry of People[,]s Armed Forces (corresponding to the Ministry of Defense in other countries) is controlled not by the cabinet but by the National Defense Commission. 34) There had been no reports of official activities of Kim Jong Il, chairman of the National Defense Commission, for 50 days since mid-August 2008, which marks the longest absence since he was sworn in as general secretary of the Korean Workers Party in 1997, but since November 2008, he has been rather actively engaged in official activities. 35) The approximate percentage of active service members in total population is 0.2% in Japan, 0.5% in the United States, 0.7% in Russia, and 1.4% in the ROK. 36) White House Press Secretary (then) Dana Perino announced in a statement on April 24, 2008 that North Korea had assisted Syria[,]s covert nuclear activities. In addition, Director of National Intelligence Dennis Blair of the United States testified at the Senate Armed Service Committee in March 2009 that “All the indications led us to believe that North Korea had helped Syria build a nuclear reactor and there is concern that North Korea may export nuclear technology again.” 37) Generally, missiles based on a solid fuel propellant system are considered to be militarily superior to those based on a liquid propellant system because they are capable of immediate launches with their fuel stored in airframes beforehand and they are easy to store and handle. 38) The second and third rounds of the Six-Party Talks were held in February and June 2004 respectively, the fourth round from July to August and in September 2005, and the fifth round in November 2005, December ----- 2006, and February 2007. The sixth round was held in March and September 2007. 39) In June 2008 North Korea submitted a declaration of its nuclear program. However, as of May 2009, no agreement has been made concerning a specific framework for verification. 40) Lieutenant General Maples, Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, testified at the Senate Armed Services Commission in March 2009 that “North Korea could have stockpiled several nuclear weapons from plutonium produced at Yongbyon.” 41) In his statement to the Senate Armed Services Committee in March 2009, Lieutenant General Maples, Director of the DIA, stated that “North Korea may be able to successfully mate a nuclear warhead to a ballistic missile.” 42) In his statement to the Senate Armed Services Committee in March 2009, Lieutenant General Maples, Director of the DIA, stated that “North Korea has had a longstanding chemical warfare program,” and “We believe that Pyongyang possesses a sizeable stockpile of agents.” He also stated that “North Korea is believed to have a long-standing biological warfare program that could support the production of biological warfare agents.” The ROK Defense White Paper 2008 pointed out that “It is believed that approximately 2,500 to 5,000 tons of chemical agents remain stored in a number of facilities scattered around the country and that North Korea is able to produce biological weapons such as the bacteria of anthrax, smallpox and cholera.” 43) The ranges of Scud B and Scud C missiles are estimated to be about 300km and 500km respectively. 44) Among them, the launch of the Scud and the Nodong had more practical characteristics, based on the indication that the missiles were launched before dawn, that a number of different types of ballistic missiles were launched in succession over a short period of time, that the launch was carried out using a transportererector-launcher, and that ballistic missiles with different ranges were landed within a certain area. This leads to the assumption that North Korea has improved the operability of ballistic missiles. 45) For instance, making a three-stage missile by installing a booster at the warhead of a two-stage missile. 46) North Korea admits that it is exporting ballistic missiles to earn foreign currency. (Comment by the Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) on June 16, 1998, and statement made by a North Korean foreign ministry spokesman on December 13, 2002, reported by KCNA on the same day.) 47) In his statement to the House Armed Services Committee in March 2009, General Sharp, Commander, U.S. Forces Korea, stated that preparations are currently underway in North Korea to field a new intermediaterange ballistic missile capable of striking Okinawa, Guam and Alaska. Also, in his statement to the House Armed Services Committee in March 2007, General Bell, then Commander, U.S. Forces Korea, stated that “North Korea is developing a new solid propellant short-range ballistic missile, which it last successfully test-fired in March 2006. Once operational, this missile will be more mobile, more rapidly deployable, and more capable of being launched on shorter notice than current systems.” The ROK Defense White Paper 2008 points out that North Korea has been developing Intermediate-Range Ballistic Missiles (RGM) with a range of over 3000 km since the end of the 1990s and fielded recently. 48) Lieutenant General Maples, Director of the DIA, testified at the Senate Armed Services Commission in March 2009 that, “After the failed July 2006 launch, North Korea has continued development of the Taepodong-2, which could be used for a space launch or as an ICBM.” 49) Director of National Intelligence Dennis Blair stated in his testimony at the Senate Armed Services Committee in March 2009 that “North Korea has already sold ballistic missiles to several Middle Eastern countries and to Iran.” In addition, it has also been pointed out that North Korea has test-launched missiles that it had exported in Iran and Pakistan and subsequently utilized the data. 50) Four Military Guidelines were adopted at the fifth Plenum of the fourth Korean Workers[,] Party[,]s Central Committee in 1962. 51) Covert operations to infiltrate enemy[,]s territories by dispersed small units. ----- 52) Reportedly, North Korea has two types of special operations forces: one under the military forces and the other under the Korean Workers[,] Party. For example, the operation department of the Party is said to be in charge of transporting agents. Moreover, General Burwell B. Bell, Commander of U.S. Forces Korea, stated at the Senate Armed Services Committee in March 2009 that “North Korea still keeps the world[,]s largest Special Forces with more than 80,000 troops.” Also, the ROK Defense White Paper 2008 points out “North Korea[,]s special forces number some 180,000. Considering the operational environment in the Korean Peninsula, North Korea has intensively improved the capabilities of its special operations by strengthening training programs for night, mountain, and street-to-street fighting. 53) Kim Jong Il was re-elected as chairman of the National Defense Commission at the Supreme People’s Assembly in April 2009. In April 2007, a large-scale military parade including the march of missile units was held to celebrate the 75th anniversary of the Korean People[,]s Army with attendance of Kim Jong Il, Chairman of the National Defense Commission. 54) Director of National Intelligence Dennis Blair stated in his testimony at the Senate Armed Services Committee: “Kim probably suffered a stroke in August that incapacitated him for several weeks, hindering his ability to operate as actively as he did before the stroke. However, his recent public activities suggest his health has improved significantly, and we assess he is making key decisions.” 55) In December 2008, the U.N. Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) estimated that North Korea produced approximately 3.34 million tons of crops between November 2008 and October 2009, making required imports approximately 1.79 million tons. 56) It has been pointed out that, as a result of the implementation of these new measures, the following problems have either occurred or signs of such problems have been observed in some areas: acceleration of inflation as a result of a simultaneous raising of wages and commodity prices despite the unresolved shortage of commodities, widening of income gaps, and increasing dissatisfaction with the regime due to information inflow. 57) North Korea insists that it will not denuclearize until “the United States ends its hostile policy and eliminates its nuclear threat.” (Comment of a spokesman for the Foreign Ministry of North Korea, January 13, 2009) 58) The Country Report on Terrorism 2008 published in April 2009 states that “the United States rescinded the designation of the DPRK as a state sponsor of terrorism in accordance with criteria set forth in U.S. law, including a certification that the government of North Korea had not provided any support for international terrorism during the preceding six-month period and the provision by the government of assurances that it will not support acts of international terrorism in the future.” 59) North Korea has intensified its criticism of the ROK. For instance, in January 2009, a spokesman for the General Staff of the Korean Army issued a statement of an “all-out confrontational posture” towards South Korea, and in March 2009, a spokesman for the Committee for the Peaceful Reunification of the Fatherland issued a comment calling for the resignation of President Lee Myung Bak[,]s Administration. 60) The previous treaty contained the provision that if either of the signatories (Russia and North Korea) was attacked, the other would immediately provide military and other assistance by any means. This provision, however, was excluded from the new treaty. 61) After the ARF Ministerial meeting in July 2008, North Korea signed the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia (TAC). 62) The United States and the ROK have been operating the U.S.-ROK Combined Forces Command since 1978 in order to run the U.S.-ROK joint defense system to deter wars on the Korean Peninsula and to perform effective joint operations in case of emergency. Under the U.S.-ROK joint defense system, the operational control authority over ROK forces is to be exercised by the Chairman of the Korea Joint Chiefs of Staff in peacetime and by the Commander of U.S. Forces Korea, who also serves as Commander of the Combined ----- Forces Command, in wartime. 63) The Security Alliance between the U.S. and ROK has been strengthened. Their partnership has been expanded to include political, economic, social and cultural cooperation. They will continue to maintain their strong defense posture in accordance with the changes in the security environment in 21st century. 64) The ROK Defense White Paper 2008 described North Korea as follows: “North Korea[,]s conventional military capabilities, weapons of mass destruction such as nuclear weapons and missiles, and forward military deployment pose direct and serious threats to our national security.” 65) The reform plan has four pillars: (1) expansion of civilian base or national defense; (2) build-up of military structure and system of the forces in conformity with characteristics of modern wars; (3) reorganization of the national defense management system into a low cost and highly efficient system; and (4) improvement of barrack culture in accordance with the trends of the time. 66) It is reported that there are 55 ethnic minorities living in China, besides the Han Chinese ethnic group. 67) “Scientific Development Concept” chiefly consists of “adhering to standardized plans and consideration for all perspectives, maintaining a people-oriented position of establishing comprehensive, balanced and sustainable development concept and the need to promote complete economic, social, and human development.” (As commented by President Hu Jintao at Third Plenary Session of the 16th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China in October 2003) The construction of “Harmonious Society” is defined as a process to continue dissolving social inconsistencies. The “Resolution on Major Issues Regarding the Building of a Harmonious Socialist Society” (adopted at the Sixth Plenary Session of the 16th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China in October 2006) 68) Building a moderately prosperous society in all respects by 2020 is a goal of the Party and the state as outlined in General Secretary Hu Jintao[,]s report to the 17th National Congress of the Communist Party of China in 2007. 69) China traditionally adopted the strategy of a “People[,]s War” based on the recognition that a world-scale war was possible. Under that strategy, the country attributed importance to guerrilla warfare using its vast territory and enormous population. This posture, however, led to harmful effects such as excessively enlarged and inefficient military forces. Under these circumstances, China has come to place importance on local wars such as conflicts that occur over its territorial land and waters since the first half of the 1980s based on a new recognition that a world-scale war will not take place on a long-term basis. After the end of the Gulf War in 1991, the country started to implement measures to improve its military operation abilities in order to win a local war under highly technological conditions. Recently, it has been stated that the core of military modernization is to strengthen capabilities to win a local war under informatized conditions. 70) China amended Regulations on the Political Work of the People[,]s Liberation Army in 2003 to add the practices of Media, Psychological and Legal Warfare to its political work. The Annual Report on Military Power of the People[,]s Republic of China (March 2009) of the U.S. Department of Defense explains the Media, Psychological and Legal Warfare as follows: - Media Warfare is aimed at influencing domestic and international public opinion to build public and international support for China[,]s military actions and to dissuade an adversary from pursuing policies perceived to be adverse to China[,]s interests - Psychological Warfare seeks to undermine an enemy[,]s ability to conduct combat operations through psychological operations aimed at deterring, shocking, and demoralizing enemy military personnel and supporting civilian populations. - Legal Warfare uses international and domestic laws to gain international support and manage possible political repercussions of China[,]s military actions. 71) China[,]s National Defense in 2008. 72) China[,]s National Defense in 2008 stipulates an increase in the country[,]s capabilities to maintain ----- maritime, space and electromagnetic space security and to carry out counter-terrorism measures, stability maintenance, emergency rescue and international peacekeeping operations. 73) China[,]s National Defense in 2008. 74) The Chinese Communist Party[,]s constitution amended in 2002 states, “Upon the 100th anniversary of the party[,]s foundation in (2021), a higher-level, somewhat affluent society shall be created that benefits a population of over a billion, and upon the 100th anniversary of the country[,]s foundation (2049), the nation shall achieve a medium level of development for per-capita gross domestic product, realizing modernization on a basic level.” 75) China[,]s National Defense in 2008 states that “in the past two years, senior PLA delegations have visited more than 40 countries, and defense ministers and chiefs of staff from more than 60 countries have visited China.” 76) For example, China[,]s National Defense in 2008 provides details of personnel expenses, operation maintenance costs, and equipment costs only for the defense budget for FY 2007 each by active force, reserve force and militia. 77) China[,]s announced national defense budget growth rate is a comparative rate figure of the previous year[,]s actual expenditure with this year[,]s initial budget. When comparing last fiscal year[,]s initial budget with this fiscal year[,]s initial budget, the growth rate is approximately 15.4%. Simple conversion of national defense expenditures into foreign currencies based on the market exchange rate does not necessarily reflect the value in light of the country[,]s level of prices accurately. If, however, China[,]s FY 2009 national defense budget is converted into yen at 1 yuan = 15 yen, the amount is equivalent to approximately 7,93trillion yen. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) Yearbook 2009 (June 2009) estimates China[,]s military expenditure for 2008 as approximately 84.9 billion U.S. dollars and ranks China the second largest spender next to the U.S. 78) U.S. Defense Department[,]s Annual Report on Military Power of the People[,]s Republic of China (March 2009) estimates China[,]s actual defense spending as $105 billion to $150 billion, although its official defense budget for 2008 is approximately $60 billion. 79) Missions of the People[,]s Armed Police Force include security of party and government facilities, border maintenance of security, government-citizen joint projects, and firefighting activities. According to China[,]s National Defense in 2002, it is to maintain state security and social stability, and assist the PLA in wartime in defense operations. 80) The militia engages in economic development in peacetime and logistics support for combat operations in wartime. China[,]s National Defense in 2002 explains, “Under the command of military organs, the militia in wartime helps the standing army in its military operations, conducts independent operations and provides combat support and manpower replenishment for the standing army. In peacetime, it undertakes the tasks of performing combat readiness support, taking part in emergency rescue and disaster relief efforts, and maintaining social order.” 81) Formally, there are two Central Military Commissions−one for the CCP and one for the state. However, both commissions basically consist of the same membership, and both are essentially regarded as institutions for the CCP to command the military forces. 82) The Annual Threat Assessment of the Director of National Intelligence of the United States published in February 2009 states that China is developing conventionally armed ballistic missiles with terminally guided maneuverable warheads that could be used to attack U.S. naval forces and airbases. 83) U.S. Defense Department[,]s Annual Report on Military Power of the People[,]s Republic of China (March 2009) states that as of September 2008 China had deployed 1,050 to 1,150 SRBMs on the shore opposing Taiwan, and it is increasing the size of this force at a rate of more than 100 missiles per year, including variants of these missiles with improved ranges, accuracies and payloads. ----- 84) China[,]s National Defense in 2008. 85) Positive remarks by several government or military officers about possessing and constructing an aircraft carrier by several government or military officers have been reported since 2005. Recently, in November 2008, Major General Qian Lihua, director of Defense Ministry's Foreign Affairs Office, reportedly said that the navy of any great power has the dream to have one or more aircraft carriers. In December 2008, the Ministry of Defense spokesman commented on building Chinese aircraft carriers, “The Chinese government will incorporate all aspects of factors, and carefully examine and consider related matters.” In March 2009, a series of positive remarks on the possession or construction of an aircraft carrier were made by senior Navy officers. 86) Since the 1980s, in addition to Varyag, China has purchased Melbourne, a decommissioned Majestic-class aircraft carrier made in the United Kingdom, and Minsk and Kiev, Kiev-class aircraft carriers made in the former Soviet Union, nominally for recycling for scraps of iron or leisure facilities. In 2006, it was reported that China was negotiating the purchase of Russian made Su-33 carrier-based fighter aircraft, which can be operated with a Kuznetsov class carrier. It was also reported in 2007 that China had plans to purchase arresting wires that are used on aircraft carriers from Russia. In September 2008, it was reported that China was planning cooperation with Ukraine, which has a simulation training facility for carrier-based aircraft, with respect to the education and training of navy pilots. China is reported to have imported Su-25UTG, a training airplane for carrier landing, from Ukraine in 2007. 87) The China[,]s National Defense in 2008 explains that China[,]s Air force is “working to accelerate its transition from territorial air defense to both offensive and defensive operations, and increase its capabilities for carrying out reconnaissance and early warning, air strikes, air and missile defense, and strategic projection, in and effort to build itself into a modernized strategic air force.” U.S. Department of Defense[,]s Annual Report on Military Power of the People[,]s Republic of China (May 2006) points out that the goal of the PLA Air Force is “to develop a mobile, all-weather, day-night, low altitude, and over-water force that is capable and flexible enough to quickly perform multiple operational tasks and to project power beyond the “first island chain.” With regard to China[,]s so-called fifth-generation fighter aircraft, U.S. Defense Secretary Gates envisages that they will achieve initial operational capability in 10 to 12 years (Statement at the House Armed Services Committee in May 2009) 88) China[,]s National Defense in 2006 notates that, regarding science, technology and industry for national defense, “Major scientific and technological projects such as manned space flights and the Lunar Probe Project, carried out to spur the leapfrogging development of high-tech enterprises and to bring about overall improvement in defense-related science and technology.” Also, the entire manned space project, including Shenzhou 7, is said to be commanded by Director of the PLA[,]s General Armaments Department. 89) U.S. Department of Defense[,]s Annual Report on Military Power of the People[,]s Republic of China (March 2009) points out that “The PLA has established information warfare units to develop viruses to attack enemy computer systems and networks, and tactics and measures to protect friendly computer systems and networks. In 2005, the PLA began to incorporate offensive Computer Network Operations into its exercises, primarily in first strikes against enemy networks.” 90) The China[,]s National Defense in 2008 refers to an increase in the capabilities to maintain space and electromagnetic space security. 91) A view was presented that China is inclined to adopt a more confident and assertive stance than before, and the anti-satellite weapons test in January 2007 and the Chinese Song-class submarine incident in October 2006, where the submarine surfaced near the USS Kitty Hawk in international waters, can be seen in such a context. (The testimony of then Deputy Undersecretary of Defense Richard Lawless at the U.S. China Economy and Security Review Commission on February 1, 2007) 92) Director of National Intelligence Dennis Blair testified before the U.S. Senate Armed Services Committee ----- on March 10, 2009, that “in the past several years, they [Chinese] have become more aggressive in asserting claims for the EEZ.” 93) China[,]s National Defense in 2008 states that the Chinese Navy is gradually developing its capabilities of conducting cooperation in distant waters and countering non-traditional security threats. 94) It is reported that China is constructing a large-scale naval base that has underground tunnels for nuclear powered submarines in the city of Sanya located in the southern tip of Hainan island. 95) The organizations authorized to deal with cross-strait talks are the Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Straits (ARATS) on the Chinese side and Straits Exchange Foundation (SEF) on the Taiwanese side. 96) Discourse at the discussion on December 31, 2008, commemorating the 30th anniversary of the announcement of Message to Compatriots in Taiwan. 97) National Defense Strategy, U.S. Department of Defense (released in July 2008) 98) Annual Report on Military Power of the People[,]s Republic of China, United States Department of Defense (March 2009) 99) Testimony given by then Deputy Undersecretary Richard Lawless at the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission in February 2007. 100) Regarding the military field, this treaty mentions military confidence building or strengthening of mutual troop reductions in border areas, military cooperation such as military technical cooperation, and holding discussions in the event that there is awareness of any threat to peace. 101) The organization was established in June 2001 and the original members are China, Russia, and four Central Asian countries (Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan). The missions of the organization include to promote cooperation between member countries in a vast range of sectors, including security, politics, culture, and energy. Since the organization[,]s establishment, it has developed organizationally and functionally, such as in holding regular summit-level meetings, and establishing the organizationﾕs head office and the Regional Antiterrorist Structure (RATS). 102) North Korea seems to emphasize negotiations with the United States over the nuclear issue, and it is believed that China, apprehensive that the destabilization of situations in surrounding countries would lead to repercussions within China, hesitates to employ firm measures. In light of this, there is a view that China[,]s wieldable influence on North Korea is limited. 103) Major recent military exchanges between China and Southeast Asian countries include the joint counterterrorism military exercises conducted between the Chinese and Thai armies in July 2007 and September 2008, the first joint patrol conducted by Chinese and Vietnamese naval vessels in the Gulf of Tonkin in April 2006, Chinese naval training vessel[,]s call to Cambodia, Thailand and Vietnam in November 2008, then Chinese Defense Minister Cao Gangchuan[,]s visit to Indonesia in January 2008, and Navy Commander Wu Shengli[,]s visit to Thailand in October 2008. 104) Quadrennial Defense Review, Ministry of National Defense of Taiwan (March 2008) 105) Taiwanese National Defense Report 2008 106) In the speech of then President Putin titled “Russia[,]s Development Strategy through to 2020,” he said that Russia[,]s military spending will be in keeping with the national capability and will not be to the detriment of their social and economic development priorities. 107) President Medvedev in the annual address to the houses of Parliament in November 2008 highlighted the importance of the multipolarization of the international community, opposing any further expansion of NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) and a unipolar world led by the United States, an idea that is the same as that of the Putin administration. 108) With the recent sluggish oil prices and the global financial crisis, the Russian economic growth rate of 2008 was the lowest of the last few years (5.6%, compared with 8.1% in 2007) 109) The National Security Concept of the Russian Federation, formulated in 1997, was revised in January 2000. ----- This revision was made in response to changed circumstances including NATO enlargement, air strikes on the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, NATO[,]s announcement of its so-called “New Strategic Concept,” and the emergence of Islamic extremist groups in Russia and other countries. 110) Troops were reorganized, in the midst of a military forces reduction after the launch of the Russian Federation[,]s armed forces, to strengthen combat readiness through concentrating personnel. It is hoped that this will enable them to promptly respond during the first phase of a large-scale war or in the event of a minor conflict. In the meantime, Defense Minister Serdyukov announced in October 2008 that all the forces would be transformed into combat-readiness troops, after the president approved the document titled “Future of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation” in September 2008. 111) In February 2009, General Nikolai Makarov, the chief of Russia[,]s General Staff of the armed forces, said that a new Doctrine would be approved by the end of 2009. Also, Nikolai Patrushev, the secretary of the Security Council, said that a Doctrine would be submitted during 2009 for approval by the President. 112) After the approval of the “Future of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation” by the president in September 2008, Defense Minister Serdyukov announced in October 2008 a reform of command structure (the four-tier system -- where the line of command is from military district, to army, to division to regiment -- will be replaced with a streamlined three-tier system where the line of command is from military district, to operation command to brigade), the transformation of all combat troops into permanent readiness units and the correction of rank structure of officers. 113) In October 2008, regarding the military reform, Defense Minister Serdyukov said that the armed forces would be reduced to 1 million personnel by 2012. However, the deadline for implementing the cuts was put back from 2012 to 2016 on the President[,]s order. 114) Due to a lack of federal budget resources caused by the financial crisis and last year[,]s decline in crude oil prices, it was necessary to cut the federal budget for FY 2009, including the defense budget. However, President Medvedev announced that this would be covered by the contingency fund accumulated during the economic boom, and the modernization of military forces would continue. Furthermore, giving priority to the procurement of high-tech equipment, the state policy on military equipment for the period of 2011 to 2020 is under preparation and takes into account the lessons learned from the Georgia conflict. 115) In April 2007, then President Putin stated that professional servicemen would account for two-thirds of the armed forces in his annual address. In addition, the period for conscription was reduced to 12 months as of January 2008. 116) Then President Putin[,]s speech “Russia[,]s Development Strategy through to 2020” (February 2008). In order to ensure the necessary number of junior officers, efforts are being made to ensure human resources, by restructuring the military academy, establishing an education center in private higher-education institutions (universities) to train officers on short-term assignment, setting up special education courses in the military academy to train professional non-commissioned officers. 117) In March 2009, the commander of the strategic rocket force said that RS-24 would be deployed after START I expires. 118) At the Kananaskis Summit held in June 2002, the G8 countries including Japan decided, for the purpose of preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, to provide up to $20 billion over the ensuing 10 years to assist Russia in the disposal of chemical weapons, dismantling of decommissioned nuclear submarines, and disposal of fissionable materials. The purpose of this decision was to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. 119) Joint Statement by the leaders of the U.S. and Russia regarding negotiations on further reductions in strategic offensive arms (April 1, 2009) 120) Considering the fact that countries other than the United States and Russia possess IRBMs, Russia had indicated its withdrawal from the INF Treaty that solely regulated the U.S. and Russia. However, in October ----- 2007, Russia and the U.S. stated to the international community that the INF Treaty would be going global. 121) Some divisions and brigades are designated as permanent readiness units. Others appear to face severe personnel shortages despite possessing a sufficient amount of equipment. After the approval of the “Future of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation” by the president in September 2008, Defense Minister Serdyukov announced in October 2008 that all combat troops would be converted to permanent readiness units. 122) In November 2008, 20 people (three military personnel and 17 civilians) died and 21 were injured in the Russian nuclear submarine Nerpa of the Pacific Fleet which was on a test voyage in the Sea of Japan when a false alarm triggered a fire extinguisher. 123) Russia utilized its forces not only of the North Caucasus military district but also those of other districts in the Georgia conflict in August 2008. 124) Estimated number of military personnel within the Siberian and the Far Eastern Military Districts. 125) Russia is developing so-called fifth-generation fighter aircraft with stealth capability and high mobility. 126) The number of cases of the Russian fleet passing through the three international straits (Soya, Tsugaru, Tsushima) of Japan that have been identified and disclosed is as follows: three cases in the Soya Strait in FY 2008 (two in 2006, two in 2007) two cases in the Tsugaru Strait (one in 2006, none in 2007) and one in the Tsushima Strait (none in 2006 and 2007), showing an increase in the last few years. 127) In August 2008, after the Georgia conflict, President Medvedev expressed the view that Russia has regions where it has its privileged interests. 128) At the summit of CSTO heads of states held in February 2009, the members decided to create a permanent, joint rapid reaction force, with the enhanced function of the Collective Rapid Deployment Force. 129) Aiming to maintain regional peace and security and implement a joint response to terrorism, etc., SCO conducts an anti-terrorism drill “Peace Mission” and makes efforts for the stability of Afghanistan. 130) Russia and Belarus signed an arrangement on a united regional air defense system in February 2009. 131) Some CIS countries attempt to maintain a distance from Russia. Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, and Moldova formed a regional alliance named GUAM by combining the initial letters of the member countries, and have been following pro-Western policies to reduce their security and economic dependence on Russia. (Georgia announced its withdrawal from CIS in August 2008.) 132) In August 2001, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz, and Tajikistan provided one troop unit each (battalion or smaller unit) to form the Collective Rapid Deployment Force that consisted of 1,000 to 1,300 personnel. The headquarters is located in Bishkek, the capital of Kyrgyz. In May 2004, Tajikistan provided another two troop units, and Russia and Kazakhstan provided one unit each as well. As a result, the force has expanded to nine battalions with 4,500 personnel. 133) In November 2005, U.S. forces withdrew from Uzbekistan. In February 2009, Kyrgyz notified the United States that it would close down its air base in Manas that the U.S. uses for anti-terrorism operations. 134) The Manas base is located near Kant Air Base. 135) CIS peacekeeping forces led by Russian forces were deployed in Abkhazia and joint peacekeeping forces comprising Russian, Georgian and South Ossetian forces were deployed in South Ossetia. 136) The Chechen Republic was hit by large-scale terrorist attacks in 1999 with the involvement of insurgents. The Russian government conducted sweep operations against pro-independence opposition groups and many prominent terrorists were either killed or captured. The overall number of terrorist attacks has been on the decline since 2007, although attacks on VIPs and police officers have occurred sporadically in Ingushetia and Dagestan. 137) Military cooperation between the two countries, which started with confidence building, is now developing into a state that envisages actual joint efforts. For example, command post exercises code-named “Torgau 2004” started between the U.S. ground forces stationed in Europe and Russian ground forces in 2004, ----- “Torgau 2005” was conducted in 2005, and “Torgau 2007,” which included field training, was also held in 2007. 138) The Annual Report on Human Rights 2008, issued by the U.S. State Department in February 2009, states that Russia launched a military invasion, crossing the internationally recognized border of Georgia and mobilizing an overwhelmingly large-scale force. Military operations by Georgian and Russian forces include the indiscriminate use of force, and a number of civilians, including journalists, have been killed or injured. 139) President Medvedev announced a hard-line stance against the United States[,] deployment of MD systems in his annual address to the Houses of Parliament in November 2008, hinting at the deployment of short-range missiles in the Kaliningrad Region belonging to Russia which borders with Poland. 140) The following nine items have been named as common interests: 1) the fight against terrorism, 2) crisis management, 3) the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery, 4) arms control and confidence measures, 5) theater missile defense, 6) search and rescue at sea, 7) military cooperation and defense reform, 8) responses to civilian emergency situations, and 9) new threats and challenges. 141) At the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) 1999 summit in Istanbul, agreement was met on changing the possession limit by bloc to a possession limit by country and territory, ensuring transparency and predictability, trust building and verification measures, and compliance with the current CFE Treaty until the CFE Application Treaty took effect. As of present, only Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine have ratified the CFE Application treaty, and it has yet to take effect. 142) In a statement released in September 2008, the Russian Foreign Ministry said that Ukraine[,]s aspirations towards NATO membership are in conflict with the security interests of Russia. 143) In April 2009, Russia expressed concerns about the announcement by NATO relating to multinational exercises in Georgia, and a ministerial-level meeting between NATO and Russia has not been held since (as of May 2009). 144) The Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation (released in July 2008) 145) The 2012 APEC Summit Meeting is planned to be held in Vladivostok, based on suggestions by Russia. 146) “Peace Mission 2007,” an SCO joint exercise for anti-terrorism, was held in August 2007. 147) “Rosoboronexport” entered the subsidiary of “Rostechnology” of the governmental corporation that had been founded November 2007. 148) From 2003 to 2004, Russia concluded contracts with Indonesia, Malaysia, and Vietnam to sell its Su-27 and Su-30 jet fighters and some fighters have already been delivered to the contracting countries, and in January 2004, Russia signed a contract to sell an aircraft carrier to India. In 2006, Russia concluded agreements with Algeria and Venezuela to sell Su-30 jet fighters, and a number of them have already been delivered to these countries. 149) CARAT is a collective term for the bilateral exercises held between the United States and six Southeast Asian countries (Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand). 150) Based on the perception that national defense cannot be achieved by conventional military force alone, being faced with limited human resources and changes in the nature of modern warfare, the Total Defense is promoted whereby people are organized in five components: Psychological, Social, Economic, Civil and Military Defense. 151) The Third Generation Singapore Forces place emphasis on three aspects: integration/networking, holistic advancements, and technological advancement. 152) In addition to the mutual defense and military assistance treaties, the United States concluded the U.S. Philippines Visiting Forces Agreement in 1999 and the Mutual Logistics Support Agreement in 2002. 153) Balikatan has been conducted since 1991, but it was suspended during 1995 and 1999 due to the domestic ----- conditions of the Philippines. It was resumed in 2000. 154) Thailand, the United States, Singapore, Indonesia, etc., and about 80 personnel from the Ministry of Defense and the Self-Defense Forces of Japan participated in the exercise held in February 2009. 155) Major Non-NATO Ally (MNNA), which was a status established by the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 and the Nunn Amendment of 1987, allows designated countries to receive benefits in military areas such as eligibility to have military equipment. A status of MNNA also strongly represents said country’s close military cooperation with the United States. 156) Remarks of then Deputy Secretary of State John D. Negroponte at the 5th annual United States Asia Pacific Council conference (April 11, 2008) 157) The United States suspended the IMET program in 1992 to protest against the suppression of the Timor Leste independence movement by Indonesian authorities. The sanctions were removed partially in 1995 but were once again imposed in 1999. 158) IMET provides military personnel from U.S. allies and friends with opportunities to study and receive training at U.S. military education institutions. 159) The United States amended International Traffic in Arms Regulations, allowing Vietnam to export non lethal defense articles on the condition of case-by-case basis licenses or approvals. 160) Military Balance 2008 press release by the International Institute for Strategic Studies in the U.K. (February 5, 2008) and Military Balance 2008. 161) Currently, China, Taiwan, Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, and Brunei all claim territorial rights over the Spratly Islands, while China, Taiwan, and Vietnam claim rights over the Paracel Islands. Chinese and Vietnamese naval forces engaged in an armed conflict in 1988 over the Spratly Islands amongst escalating tensions at the time. However, there have not been any major armed conflicts since. 162) The Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea is a political declaration that clarifies general principles for resolving issues related to the South China Sea. 163) The draft of the Regional Code of Conduct in the South China Sea was proposed by the Philippines at an ASEAN foreign ministers[,] summit in 1999 and discussion has continued at other meetings thereafter. However, the draft has yet to be adopted as there are major differences in countries[,] opinions on the draft[,]s details. 164) China conducted military exercises in the Paracel Islands in November 2007 and it was reported in December 2008 that the Chinese government approved the establishment of “Sansha City” including the Spratly Islands, which provoked anti-Chinese public demonstrations in Vietnam. In 2008, Vietnam and the Philippines condemned and expressed concerns about the visit of then Taiwanese President Chen shui-bian to the Itu Aba Island of the Spratly Islands. In February 2009, China protested against the legislation of the Philippines Archipelagic Baseline Law, and Taiwan and Vietnam both announced that the Splatly Islands and others belonged exclusively to them and that they would not approve of any act of infringement of this. 165) “Strike 2007” was carried out in July 2007 in Guangzhou, China and “Strike 2008” in September 2009 in Chiang Mai, Thailand. 166) The 3rd ASEAN Defense Ministers[,] Meeting discussed a wide range of cross-border security issues, natural disaster, terrorism, maritime security and pandemics, etc., and three concept papers were adopted, some of which are on the principles for membership in the ADMM Plus (expansion of ADMM) and the use of ASEAN military asset capabilities in humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. 167) Based on the principles of the consensus system and of non-interference in internal affairs, ASEAN failed to take effective measures against Myanmar, etc., and thus the direction of organizational reform attracted much attention. The ASEAN Charter has adopted the principle of the consensus system as before, thus where consensus cannot be achieved, the ASEAN Summit may decide how a specific decision can be made. Furthermore, the Charter prescribed that in the case of a serious breach of the Charter or non-compliance, ----- the matter shall be referred to the ASEAN Summit for decision and that ASEAN shall establish an ASEAN human rights body. The ASEAN Charter strives for the enhancement of the organization and institution as mentioned above. 168) The ReCAAP is designed to enhance cooperation among maritime security agencies of the countries involved through the establishment of a piracy-related information sharing system and a cooperation network among the countries. The ASEAN member countries (Indonesia, Malaysia, The Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Brunei, Vietnam, Laos, Myanmar, Cambodia) Japan, Bangladesh, China, India, The Republic of Korea, and Sri Lanka participated in the negotiations on the agreement. However, Indonesia and Malaysia did not sign the agreement. 169) IMT consists of Brunei, Libya and Japan, is chaired by Malaysia and has conducted truce monitoring in Mindanao since October 2004 based on the cease fire agreement reached in July 2003 between the Philippines government and MILF. Since November 2008, the operation of IMT has been suspended due to the pull out of Malaysia from IMT. 170) The current International Security Forces consist of the armed forces from Australia and New Zealand. 171) With the U.N. Security Council resolution 1867 adopted in February 2009, the mandate of UNMIT was extended to February 26, 2010. As of end-February 2009, 1578 civilian police personnel and 33 military observers are serving in Timor Leste. 172) The country has a Muslim population exceeding 100 million. 173) The number of personnel from the Indian forces engaged in U.N. Peacekeeping Operations has been ranked either third or fourth in the world since 2001. 174) In October 2008, the Indian government approved the dispatch of Navy vessels on a patrol mission to the Gulf of Aden, and in November 2008, a frigate of Indian Navy sank a fishing vessel which had been hijacked by pirates. 175) When presenting the 2009-10 budget bill, Finance and Foreign Minister Mukherjee said that the defense budget had increased as a result of the security situation that had deteriorated dramatically. 176) Regarding the procurement of multipurpose fighters, Defense Minister Antony has cited the provision of the contract which calls for introduction of technology created through joint development. 177) In December 2007, Dr. V. K. Saraswat, Chief Controller at the Defense Research & Development Organization (DRDO) of India[,]s Ministry of Defense said that “Agni-4 is still in the design stage and so we cannot give a date for the trials and several tests remain before we operationalize it.” 178) In March 2009, in the Bay of Bengal in eastern Orissa Province, India conducted a test of shooting down a ballistic missile with an interceptor missile, and reported success. It is also said that India successfully conducted a similar test in 2006 and December 2007. 179) U.S. Defense Secretary Gates told reporters at the press conference during his visit to India in February 2008, “Missile defense talks with India are in the very initial stages. We have just started to talk about conducting a joint analysis about what India[,]s needs would be in the realm of missile defense and where cooperation between us might help advance that.” 180) From March to May 2007, the Indian Navy dispatched a fleet and held joint exercises with Singapore, the United States, Japan, China, Russia, and other countries. 181) Former President Bush called India a “natural partner” of the United States. 182) In cooperation with India, the United States intends to provide India with capabilities and technologies required for the country to improve its defense capabilities to an appropriate level, including the sale of F-16 and F-18 fighters. 183) Red Flag is an aerial combat exercise conducted by the U.S. Air force with allied air forces on a regular basis. Su-30MK I fighter aircraft, IL-78 Air Refuler, IL-76 transport aircraft and 247 servicemen of Indian Air Force participated in Red Flag 08-4. ----- 184) Originally, Malabar was a bilateral exercise between the U.S. and India, but five countries took part in Malabar 07-2, including Japan, Australia and Singapore. 185) India purchased an Austin-class Amphibious Transport Dock from the U.S. Navy in 2007, and the vessel was commissioned as INS Jalashwa in June 2007. This vessel is the first former U.S. vessel to be possessed by Indian Navy. 186) P-8 is a new type of U.S. Navy patrol aircraft. The United States had never exported the aircraft before it did to India. 187) In the agreement, China recognized that Sikkim belongs to India. Also, the two countries agreed to continue efforts for the early settlement of the pending border issue. 188) The two countries agreed to hold regular summit meetings and established the target of doubling the bilateral trade amount to $40 billion by 2010. They also signed an agreement on such issues as investment protection and mutual establishment of new Consulates General. 189) The objective of this exercise is reported to be the strengthening of mutual understanding/trust and the promotion of relationships between Chinese and Indian military forces. Hand-in-Hand 2007 in December 2007 and Hand-in-Hand 2008 in December 2008 saw the participation of about 100 personnel from both sides. 190) India test-launched the said missile in January and March 2009. 191) It is estimated that weapons from the former Soviet Union or Russia account for about 70 percent of those possessed by India. 192) The two countries signed a document concerning a joint development project for mid-size, multi-purpose transport aircraft and fifth-generation fighters. In addition, study was made of a proposal to provide India with additional T-90 tanks, Su-30MKI fighters, and Mil-17 helicopters within the framework of the agreement already concluded. It was confirmed to enhance the production capabilities of the Brahmos cruise missiles now under joint nuclear development by the two countries as well as to aim to develop the air launch version of the missile. An intergovernmental agreement was concluded concerning the contract for licensed production of engines for MiG-29 fighters. It was also agreed that the two countries would conduct joint anti-terrorism military exercises in Russian territory in April and September 2007. 193) In October 2007, both countries signed a cooperation agreement for the development/production of fifth generation fighter aircraft. 194) The joint exercise India has been conducting every other year since 2003. 195) At the same time, India signed the Framework Agreement on Comprehensive Economic Cooperation between India and ASEAN and the ASEAN-India Joint Declaration for Cooperation to Combat International Terrorism. 196) President Zardari delivered the first address to the Parliament in September 2008. He said that his administration would continue the three-pronged strategy of the previous administration but that the use of force would only be used as a last resort against terrorism, advocating the necessity of renouncing violence and making peace with those who are willing to make peace as well as of investing in the development and social improvement of the local people. He also stressed the need of FATA (Federally Administered Tribal Areas) reform to root out terrorism. While he asked the government to stay firm in its resolve to not allow its soil to be used for terrorist activities against foreign countries, he also stated that Pakistan would not tolerate the violation of its sovereignty and territorial integrity by any power in the name of combating terrorism. 197) Pakistan conducted a test launch of the Babur (Hatf-VII) cruise missile also in March 2007. 198) From November to December 2006 Pakistan conducted a series of initial test launches of the Ghauri (Hatf-V) and Shaheen (Hatf-IV) mid-range ballistic missiles. 199) The two countries have adopted greatly different positions in relation to solving the Kashmir territorial ----- issue. India[,]s territorial claim over Kashmir is based on the document from the Maharaja of Kashmir to India, while Pakistan claims that the territorial claim over Kashmir should be decided through referendum in accordance with the 1948 U.N. resolution. 200) In August 2005, the two countries agreed on the prior notification of ballistic missile testing and on the establishment of a hotline between their Vice Foreign Ministers. 201) In December 2008, General Kiyani, Chief of Army Staff released a statement after a meeting with Chinese Vice Foreign Minister, He Yafei, who visited Pakistan to ease tensions. He demonstrated Pakistan’s stance of avoiding armed conflict, highlighting the need to de-escalate and avoid conflict in the interests of peace and security. 202) English papers in Pakistan dated March 8, 2009, reported that the Pakistani Air Force and a Chinese company have struck a deal to jointly produce 42 JF-17 fighter jets. 203) Pakistan has supported the fight against terrorism led by the United States and other countries. For example, it provided logistical support for the U.S. operations against Afghanistan, and carried out operations to sweep up terrorists in the border regions of Afghanistan. Also, Pakistan started to dispatch warships to naval operations in the Indian Ocean in April 2004. In appreciation of this support from Pakistan, the United States designated the country as a Major Non-NATO Ally. 204) At the same time, the sanctions that had been imposed also on India by the United States and other countries due to India[,]s nuclear test were lifted. 205) Regarding the possibility of extending nuclear energy cooperation to Pakistan, President Bush only referred to the differences between Pakistan and India in terms of energy needs and history. In response, Pakistan said that it was important for the United States to treat Pakistan and India equally in order to ensure strategic stability in South Asia. 206) In September 2005, (then) President Musharraf reportedly demonstrated his recognition that the Khan network had probably exported a dozen ultracentrifuges to North Korea. In May 2008, BBC News reported that the Pakistani nuclear scientist A. Q. Khan said that allegations he passed on nuclear secrets are false. In the interview, he said that there was pressure put on him to accept the charges “in the national interest.” 207) It has been decided that the destroyer combat system will be a U.S.-made Aegis system equipped with SM-6 long-range anti-aircraft missiles. 208) A Defence Update 2007 and 2009 Defence White Paper 209) 2009 Defence White Paper 210) The breakdown of the military force is as follows: Army: approx. 27,500 personnel, Navy: approx. 13,200 personnel, Air Force: 14,100 personnel. 211) In April 2006 demonstrations by rebellious soldiers in Dili, the capital of Timor Leste, turned into riots, and the Australian Defence Force (ADF) was dispatched in response to a request from the Government of Timor Leste. 212) The activities began with participation of South Pacific nations, led by Australia, in response to a request for assistance from the Government of the Solomon Islands, where a deteriorating security situation triggered by a tribal conflict was out of control. The 15 participating countries include Australia, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, and Tonga. 213) Remarks by Prime Minister Rudd at the U.S.-Australia Summit Meeting on March 25, 2009. 214) Remarks by Prime Minister Rudd at the press conference on April 29, 2009. The new dispatch includes about 330 personnel for the training and support of Afghan National Army in Oruzgan province and about 120 personnel to provide short-term military support to assist with security for the Afghanistan elections in August. 215) The Overwatch Battle Group (approximately 550 personnel) and the Army Training Team (approximately 60 personnel), which had been deployed in southern Iraq, withdrew. It was also announced in May 2009 ----- that the government would conclude its military commitment to the rehabilitation of Iraq on July 31, 2009. 216) National Security Statement, December 2008. 217) National Security Statement, December 2008 and 2009 Defence White Paper 218) A trilateral security treaty between Australia, New Zealand, and the United States, which went into effect in 1952. The United States has suspended its obligation to defend New Zealand since 1986 because of New Zealand[,]s non-nuclear policy. 219) Talisman Saber is a biennial joint exercise between the United States and Australia and was first held in 2005. Tandem Thrust, which had been carried out biennially since 1997, and Crocodile, which was conduced in 2003, were merged into this exercise. In 2007, training for combat task forces was carried out to improve combat readiness and interoperability between the two countries. 20 vessels, 25 aircraft and 7,000 personnel from Australia and 10 vessels, 100 aircraft and 20,000 personnel from the United States participated in the exercise. 220) At the AUSMIN in 2004, a decision was made to further develop training facilities at the Shoalwater Bay Training Area (army, navy and air operation-related) in Queensland, the Delamere Air Weapons Range in the Northern Territory (air operation-related) and the Bradshaw Training Area (ground and amphibious operation-related) in the Northern Territory (all are U.S.-Australia joint exercise facilities in Australia). 221) Australia announced its participation in the U.S. missile defense program in December 2003. At the AUSMIN in 2004, the United States and Australia signed a memorandum of understanding (MOU) that provides a 25-year framework for missile defense system development and testing (details of the MOU have not been disclosed). In August 2004, Australia selected the Aegis air warfare system as the combat system for new air warfare destroyers (AWD). It is suggested that the AWD would support the missile defense system. 222) In July 2004, the ASEAN-Australia Joint Declaration for Cooperation to Combat International Terrorism was signed between Australia and ASEAN. 223) Australia and Indonesia signed a memorandum of understanding on cooperation to combat terrorism in February 2002 (the memorandum had been renewed every year, but it was extended for further three years in February 2008), and jointly hosted a sub-regional ministerial conference on counter-terrorism in March 2007. Australia concluded a memorandum of understanding on counter-terrorism also with Brunei, Cambodia, Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand. 224) In contrast to the mission of collective defense provided in Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, the mission of conflict prevention and crisis management is called a “non-Article 5 mission”. 225) Two strategic commands, Allied Command, Europe and Allied Command, Atlantic, were merged into one Allied Command Operations, and the Supreme Allied Commander Transformation (SACT) was established to supervise the transformation of capabilities and improvement of interoperability of NATO forces. 226) At the NATO Defense Ministers informal meeting in February 2009, British Defense Minister John Hutton proposed the establishment of a 3000-strong rapid deployment force designated to defend the treaty area. 227) The development goal adopted at the 2004 Summit to update the original Helsinki Headline Goal of 1999. 228) Vessels of the U.K., Italy, Turkey and Greece took part in SNMG-2 and were deployed from October to December 2008. Ships of SNMG-1 (United States, Australia, Spain, Portugal, etc.) visiting Southeast Asia and Australia are scheduled to conduct anti-piracy operations for a certain period from end-March and for a certain period from end-June. 229) Vessels of the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Italy, Spain, Greece and others are participating in Operation Atlanta as of March 2009. 230) Besides, Denmark and other countries participate in CTF-151, a multinational task force established in January 2009 under the Combined Maritime Force (CMF) for counter-piracy operations. 231) The NATO Ministerial Meeting in Berlin in June 1996 made a decision enabling access to NATO[,]s assets ----- and capabilities in operations led by the Western European Union (WEU). Most of the roles and missions of the WEU were transferred to the EU. As a result, it was decided, at the NATO Washington Summit Meeting held in April 1999, to once again permit the use of NATO[,]s assets and capacities by the EU. This decision was called the Berlin Plus. In December 2002, NATO and the EU made a permanent arrangement concerning the above decision. 232) At the meeting of EU Foreign and Defense Ministers in November 2008, it was concluded that the current military mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina is at its final stage although it is still necessary to consider the political impact. 233) In March 2009, military missions in Chad and the Central African Republic were transferred from the European Union military operation in Chad and the Central African Republic (EUROR TCHAD RCA) to United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad (MINURCAT). 234) They are called Petersberg Operations. They consist of combat unit missions in crisis management, including 1) humanitarian assistance and rescue operations, 2) peacekeeping and 3) peacebuilding. 235) Four central/eastern European countries and three Baltic States (Romania, Slovenia, Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia, Bulgaria and Slovakia) joined in March 2004 and Albania and Croatia joined in April 2009. The Council of European Union Foreign Ministers meeting in December 2008 called for Georgia and Ukraine to accelerate political, military and other reforms towards accession to the EU. 236) Established in 1994. Separate cooperation agreements have been concluded between NATO and non-NATO countries of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) such as Central and Eastern Europe countries. 237) Established in 1994, MD currently has seven participant countries (Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia). Its objective is to foster stability in the Mediterranean region through political dialogue and engagement in NATO-related activities by Mediterranean countries. 238) The name “Contact Country” has been used since the NATO Istanbul Summit Meeting in 2004. NATO pursues partnerships on a case-by-case basis with countries which share common interests and concerns with NATO. 239) The white paper titled Delivering Security in a Changing World published in December 2003, stating the need for rapid and long-range deployment of military force in order to deal with international terrorism and the proliferation of WMD, set the objective of establishing defense capabilities to support three concurrent operations, including one long-term peacekeeping operation. 240) The Strategic Defence Review (SDR) in 1998 stated that a direct military threat to the U.K. did not exist and that recurrence of such a threat could not be predicted. 241) Delivering Security in a Changing World in December 2003 stated that there was no longer a need for capacity to prepare for recurrence of direct, traditional, strategic threats to the U.K. or its allies. 242) The currently operating Vanguard class nuclear-powered submarines are expected to begin decommissioning in the early 2020s. Therefore, the U.K. government considered whether or not to maintain its nuclear deterrent and consequently announced this white paper. In March 2007, the House of Commons adopted the motion submitted by the government to support the policy set forth in the white paper. 243) The intervention force comprises combat readiness troops equipped with state-of-the-art weapons. It is designed to deal with opponents that have well-organized military formations in intensive multilateral operations, such as those executed by NATO combat readiness troops or EU Battle group units, with the goal of providing the foundation for peace stabilization operations. The stabilization force deals with opponents that have a certain level of military formations and performs peace stabilization operations in low- and medium-intensity operations that last for a relatively long period. The assistance force supports the intervention and stabilization forces in preparing for and performing operations in Germany and in the target areas, through activities including the management of command, educational and training ----- organizations. 244) At the launching ceremony of Ship Submersible Ballistic Nuclear (SSBN), Le Terrible, in March 2008, French president Sarkozy expressed his view of the country[,]s nuclear capability: given the existing risk of nuclear proliferation and other threats, nuclear deterrence is the ultimate guarantee to protect France from any state[,]s aggression against vital national interests and it is essential to maintain its missile capabilities, both submarine-launched and air-launched. He also announced his decision to reduce France[,]s air-launched nuclear missile capability by one-third, which means its arsenal becomes no more than 300 warheads. From February 3 to 4 in 2009, the French SSBN Le Triophant collided with the British SSBN Vanguard at a speed of 5-8 knots. Le Triomphant is believed to have suffered enormous damage to a sonar dome and a diving rudder. It now seems difficult for France to achieve the operational goal of employing one missile-equipped submarine on a patrol mission at all times. 245) On March 17, 2009, the French government won a parliamentary vote on its plan to return to NATO[,]s integrated military command. While the government announced its participation in NATO[,]s integrated military command in April at the NATO Summit, President Sarkozy stated in his speech delivered in March 2009 that France retains an independent nuclear deterrence. ----- ## Part II **The Basics of Japan[,]s Defense Policy and Build-up of Defense Capability** ### Chapter 1 **The Basic Concepts of Japan[,]s Defense Policy and Related Issues** **Section 1. Measures to Ensure Japan[,]s Security** **Section 2. The Constitution and the Right of Self-Defense** **Section 3. The Basis of Defense Policy** **Section 4. New Approaches to Space and Ocean** ----- **Section 1. Measures to Ensure Japan[,]s Security** The peace, security and independence that are indispensable for a country do not happen of their own accord. As countries become increasingly interdependent on one another, attaining peace, security and independence requires a comprehensive approach that includes diplomatic measures, cooperation with allies, as well as the nation[,]s own defense system. As Japan is heavily dependent on other countries for many resources and its development and prosperity depends on free trade, sustained peace and cooperation with the international community is of vital importance. For this reason, Japan is pursuing both regional cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region and cooperation through organizations such as the United Nations, while strengthening bilateral cooperation with other countries through such measures as the Japan-U.S. Alliance1. Japan is thus working to prevent and resolve disputes and hostilities, encourage economic development, promote arms control and disarmament, ensure maritime security, and increase mutual understanding and trust. Japan has also been making the country itself more secure by making society more stable, fostering a willingness to defend the country, and through various economic and educational measures. The objective is to avoid being unguarded, which could lead to foreign aggression. In today[,]s world, however, such measures may not deter real aggression by an outside force, and in the worst case, might not be sufficient to repel an attack on Japan. It is indeed difficult to guarantee national security purely by non-military means. Defense capability is in itself an expression of a nation[,]s will and ability to repel aggression. It provides the ultimate guarantee of a country[,]s security, and cannot be replaced by other means. Therefore, preparation for full-scale aggression is essential, which is the basic role of defense capability. Moreover, the current security environment requires a defense capability that can effectively respond to new threats and various circumstances such as international terrorism and the proliferation and transfer of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles. Therefore, the Government has been strengthening its defense capabilities and upholds the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements, thereby improving the credibility of such arrangements and bolstering its defense measures. In addition, defense capabilities have become increasingly important for international peace cooperation activities and other efforts to improve the international security environment in order to avoid any threat to our country. Recognizing the important role played by its defense capabilities, Japan continues to do its utmost to protect national security, while working to achieve security in the Asia-Pacific region and beyond. Prime Minister Aso making a speech at the 2009 National Defense University graduation ceremony ----- **Section 2. The Constitution and the Right of Self-Defense** **1. The Constitution and the Right of Self-Defense** Since the end of World War II, Japan has worked hard to build a peace-loving nation far from the miseries of war. The Japanese people desire lasting peace, and the principle of pacifism is enshrined in the Constitution, of which Article 9 renounces war, the possession of war potential, and the right of belligerence by the state. Nonetheless, since Japan is an independent nation, these provisions do not deny Japan[,]s inherent right of self-defense as a sovereign state. Since the right of self-defense is not denied, the Government interprets this to mean that the Constitution allows Japan to possess the minimum level of armed force needed to exercise that right. Therefore, the Government, as part of its exclusively national defense-oriented policy under the Constitution, maintains the Self-Defense Forces as an armed organization, and continues to keep it equipped and ready for operations. **2. The Government[,]s View on Article 9 of the Constitution** **1. The Permitted Self-Defense Capability** Under the Constitution, Japan is permitted to possess the minimum necessary level of self-defense capability. The specific limit may vary with the prevailing international situation, the technologies available, and various other factors, and it is discussed and decided according to annual budgets and other factors by the Diet on behalf of the people. Whether such capability constitutes a “war potential” that is prohibited by Article 9, Paragraph 2 of the Constitution must be considered within the context of Japan[,]s overall military strength. Therefore, whether the SDF should be allowed to possess certain armaments depends on whether such possession would cause its total military strength to exceed the constitutional limit. The possession of armaments deemed to be offensive weapons designed to be used only for the mass destruction of another country would, by definition, exceed the minimum necessary level and as such, is not permissible under any circumstances. For example, the SDF is not allowed to possess intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), long-range strategic bombers, or attack aircraft carriers. **2. Requirements for Exercising the Right of Self-Defense** The Government interprets Article 9 of the Constitution to mean that armed force can be used to exercise the right of self-defense only when the following three conditions are met: 1) When there is an imminent and illegitimate act of aggression against Japan; 2) When there is no appropriate means to deal with such aggression other than by resorting to the right; and 3) When the use of armed force is confined to the minimum necessary level. **3. Geographic Boundaries within which the Right of Self-Defense may be Exercised** The use of minimum necessary force to defend Japan under the right of self-defense is not necessarily confined to the geographic boundaries of Japanese territory, territorial waters and airspace. However, it is difficult to give a general definition of the actual extent to which it may be used, as this would vary with the situation. Nevertheless, the Government interprets that the Constitution does not permit armed troops to be dispatched to the land, sea, or airspace of other countries with the aim of using force; such overseas deployment of troops would exceed the definition of the minimum necessary level for self-defense. ----- **4. The Right of Collective Self-Defense** International law permits a state to have the right of collective self-defense, which is the right to use force to stop an armed attack on a foreign country with which the state has close relations, even if the state itself is not under direct attack. Since Japan is a sovereign state, it naturally has the right of collective self-defense under international law. Nevertheless, the Japanese Government believes that the exercise of the right of collective selfdefense exceeds the limit on self-defense authorized under Article 9 of the Constitution and is not permissible. **5. The Right of Belligerence** Article 9, Paragraph 2 of the Constitution prescribes that the “the right of belligerence of the State shall not be recognized.” However, the “right of belligerence” does not mean the right to engage in battle; rather it is a general term for various rights that a belligerent nation has under international law, including the authority to inflict casualties and damage upon the enemy[,]s military force and to occupy enemy territory. On the other hand, Japan may of course use the minimum level of force necessary to defend itself. For example, if Japan inflicts casualties and damage upon the enemy[,]s military force in exercising its right of selfdefense, this is conceptually distinguished from the exercise of the right of belligerence, even though the actual actions appear to be no different. Occupation of enemy territory, however, would exceed the minimum necessary level of self-defense and so is not permissible. **[COLUMN]** **COMMENTARY** **Report of the Council on Reconstruction of the Legal Basis for Security** Against the background of the greatly changing security environment surrounding our country, and with the recognition of the need to reconstruct an effective legal basis for security that fits the situation of the times, the Council on Reconstruction of the Legal Basis for Security (the Council) was set up under the Prime Minister in May 2007 in order to conduct studies on the basis of specific examples. The Council held seven meetings and two opinion exchange sessions. The Council examined the following four issues: 1) Protection of US naval vessels on the high seas; 2) Interception of ballistic missiles that could head for the United States; 3) Use of weapons in international peace operations; and 4) Logistic support for the operations of other countries participating in the same UN PKO activities, etc. presented by then-Prime Minister Abe, and submitted a report to then-Prime Minister Fukuda on June 24 last year. ----- **Section 3. The Basis of Defense Policy** **1. Basic Policy for National Defense** Under the Constitution, Japan has adhered to its Basic Policy for National Defense, which was adopted by the National Defense Council2 and approved by the Cabinet in 1957. (See Reference 6) The Basic Policy for National Defense defines policies to establish the foundation of security through international harmonization and peace activities, as well as ensuring the stability of society, and then to establish efficient defense capabilities and to maintain the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements. **2. Other Basic Policies** Under the Basic Policy for National Defense, Japan has been building a modest defense capability under the Constitution purely for defense purposes without becoming a military power that could threaten other countries, while adhering to the principle of civilian control of the military, observing the Three Non-Nuclear Principles, and firmly maintaining the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements. **1. Exclusively Defense-Oriented Policy** The exclusively defense-oriented policy means that Japan will not employ defensive force unless and until an armed attack is mounted on Japan by another country, and even in such a case, only the minimum force necessary to defend itself may be used. Furthermore, only the minimum defense forces necessary for self-defense should be retained and used. This exclusively defense-oriented policy is a passive defense strategy that is consistent with the spirit of the Constitution. **2. Not Becoming a Military Power** There is no established definition for the term “military power.” For Japan, however, not becoming a military power that could threaten the security of other countries means that Japan will not possess more military force than is necessary for self-defense and that could pose a threat to other countries. **3. The Three Non-Nuclear Principles** The Three Non-Nuclear Principles are that Japan: will not possess nuclear weapons, will not produce nuclear weapons, and will not allow nuclear weapons into Japan. Japan adheres to the Three Non-Nuclear Principles as a fixed national policy. Japan is prohibited from manufacturing or possessing nuclear weapons also under the Atomic Energy Basic Law3. In addition, Japan ratified the NPT (Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons), and as a nonnuclear weapons state, is not permitted to produce or acquire nuclear weapons4. **4. Ensuring Civilian Control** Civilian control of the military means the precedence of political will over the military in a democratic state, and hence democratic political control over the military. Learning lessons from World War II, Japan has adopted the following system of uncompromising civilian control that is entirely different from those under the former Constitution5. Civilian control ensures that the SDF is operated in accordance with the will of the people. The Japanese people are represented in the Diet, which makes legislative and budgetary decisions on matters such as the authorized number of uniformed SDF personnel and principal institutions of the SDF. The Diet also approves defense operations. As part of its general administrative functions, the Cabinet has entire authority ----- related to defense. The Constitution requires the Prime Minister and other Ministers of State in the Cabinet to be civilians. The Prime Minister, acting on behalf of the Cabinet, is the supreme commander of the SDF. The Minister of Defense, who is exclusively in charge of national defense, exercises general control over SDF activities. The Security Council of Japan6 within the Cabinet discusses important defense matters. At the Ministry of Defense, the Minister of Defense is in charge of administrative work related to national defense and controls the SDF. The Minister of Defense is assisted in planning political measures and administration by the Senior Vice-Minister and two Parliamentary Secretaries.7 As mentioned above, the military is under civilian control. The success of the system depends on ongoing political and administrative efforts, as well as a keen interest among Japanese citizens in defense issues. With the emergence of serious issues relating to civilian control in the Ministry of Defense in recent years, fundamental measures are being considered. In the report of the Council for Reforming the Ministry of Defense publicized in July of last year, an enhancement of the Prime Minster[,]s Office as well as the Defense Ministry was demonstrated as part of “the structural improvement for the modern civil control.” Accordingly, the Ministry of Defense has been continuing its efforts to ensure civilian control through the legal establishment of the Defense Council, etc. (See Part IV, Section 2) ----- **Section 4. New Approaches to Space and Ocean** **1. Efforts for Development and Use of Space** The enactment of the Basic Space Law8 passed by the Diet in May 2008, has made it clearer that the development and use of space by Japan shall be carried out under the pacifism enshrined in the Constitution of Japan in compliance with international commitments. The law also stipulates that the Government of Japan shall take necessary measures to promote the development and use of space that contributes to ensuring the peace and security of the international community, as well as to the security of Japan. Furthermore, the Strategic Headquarters for Space Policy was formed within the Cabinet in order to promote measures for the development and utilization of space in a comprehensive and systematic manner. The Basic Plan for Space Policy, which was formulated based on the Basic Space Law by the Strategic Headquarters for Space Policy was released on June 2 2009. The 6 key elements of the plan include the realization of a secure, pleasant and afflnent society utilizing space, as well as the enhancement of national security utilizing space. With the drastic changes in the environment through the enactment of the Basic Space Law, the Ministry of Defense has been deliberating on necessary measures for the potential development and use of space in the new security context, in coordination with discussions on the comprehensive and systematic development and use of space of the entire government. Specifically, the Ministry of Defense established the Committee for Promotion of Outer Space Development and Use, chaired by the Senior Vice-Minister in August 2008 and conducted active discussions. On January 15, 2009, the said Committee decided on the Basic Guidelines for Space Development and Use of Outer Space (the Basic Guidelines)9, and reported them to the Minister of Defense. The Basic Guidelines stipulate that the development and use of space is a particularly effective tool for strengthening functions of C4ISR10 in light of the emphasis of building-up of defense capabilities on realization of sophisticated situational awareness, information sharing and command and control systems by organically linking individual equipment and systems, and thus maximizing the capacity of the equipment as a whole. The second meeting of the Strategic Headquarters for Space Policy Based on the significance of the development and use of space in the defense area, with regard to measures for the promotion of the development and use of space, examinations are to be conducted in view of specific measures, including ones beyond the generalization theory11, while keeping in mind the revision of the National Defense Program Guidelines (NDPG) and the formulation of the next Mid-Term Defense Program expected to take place at the end of this year, with the effective coordination of the whole government. Furthermore, the Basic Guidelines present the direction of future discussions and measures with regard to satellites with various functions such as information collection, warning and surveillance, telecommunications, launching systems, human resources/organizations, and technological foundation. Along with this, it indicates points to be noted in promoting these measures: including promotion of cooperation with the commercial sector and exchange with other organizations. In the future, the Ministry of Defense intends to vigorously conduct examinations on specific measures, in coordination with related ministries, including the Cabinet Secretary, based on the Basic Guidelines and the Basic Plan for Space Policy in order to promote new development and use of space in the security field. ----- **[COLUMN]** **VOICE** **Voice of SDF Personnel Temporarily Assigned to the Secretariat of the** **Strategic Headquarters for Space Policy** ASDF Lieutenant Colonel Yasuo Otani Secretariat of Strategic Headquarters for Space Policy Do you know about the organization called the Secretariat of Strategic Headquarters for Space Policy? The Strategic Headquarters for Space Policy was set up on August 27, 2008, coinciding with the enforcement of the Basic Space Law, which was passed by the Diet in May of the same year, and its Secretariat was set up at the cabinet Secretariat. Related ministries sent 21 staff members to the secretariat, including those on part-time assignment. Two people were sent from the Ministry of Defense. I felt very grateful for this assignment, because I had hoped to engage in space-related Lieutenant Colonel Otani (left) at the Secretariat of Strategic Headquarters for Space Policy work since I majored in space engineering at the National Defense Academy. At the Secretariat, I am responsible for the creation of the Basic Plan for Space Policy (draft) and gathering opinions on it. The Basic Plan for Space Policy presents six basic pillars. (1) Realization of a secure, pleasant and affluent society utilizing space; (2) Enhancement of national security utilizing space; (3) Promotion of space diplomacy; (4) Creatin of vigorous future by promoting R&D of the forefront areas (5) Fostering strategic industries for the 21st Century, (6) Consideration for environment. The plan is scheduled to be developed and completed by the Strategic Headquarters for Space Policy by around May of this year (the plan will have been finalized by the time this white paper is published.) I have gained very valuable experience by working at the Secretariat, which is the “control tower” of our space strategy, and being involved as a member of the SDF in the creation of space strategies in a wide range of fields, including security, diplomacy and industrial development, at this time when the importance of space development/utilization by the country has been increasing. For the development of the Basic plan for Space Policy, we set up the Special Committee on Space Policy, consisting of key figures in a wide range of fields, to obtain their opinions. Receiving opinions from a large number of the members to the effect that space utilization in the defense field should be actively pursued in the future, I felt my heavy responsibility as one of the members of the SDF, who are in charge of national defense. I believe that the Ministry of Defense and the Self Defense Force will work actively for the development/utilization of outer space as the fourth space after land, sea and air. We are in a time when an ASDF member is chosen as an astronaut candidate. As a person involved in the space policy, I will make my contribution to SDF activities, including those related to outer space, while making my utmost efforts for the steady progress of our space development/utilization measures. ----- **[COLUMN]** **VOICE** **Voice of SDF Personnel Chosen as an Astronaut Candidate** Then ASDF Lieutenant Colonel Kimiya Yui (Currently an astronaut candidate of the Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency) I was an F-15 pilot and a test pilot of the Air Self-Defense Force. On February 25 of this year, I was chosen as an astronaut candidate of the Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency (JAXA). I will briefly describe the background of my aspiration to become an astronaut. Born in a village in Nagano Prefecture, where you can see wonderful stars at night, I wanted to become an astronaut from the time I was in an elementary school. However, I went to the National Defense Academy to reduce the financial burden on my parents. After entering the academy, I aspired to become a pilot, shifting my dream from outer space to the sky. After graduating from the academy, I trained to become a pilot in the United States. The basis of my English proficiency was formed by this training in the United States. During the period of training I came across a movie entitled “The Right Stuff.” In the movie an ace fighter pilot of the US Force became a test pilot and then went on to become an astronaut. I knew there is no such career path in Japan but I applied for a test pilot course, thinking that Japan might also select astronauts from among test pilots in the future. Although the duties of test pilots include testing new equipment and were very challenging, they gave me a sense of fulfillment. I heard that JAXA would accept astronaut candidates from the general public, while I was doing desk work at the Ministry of Defense. I was unable to make a quick decision, as I thought my aspiration to become an astronaut could cause trouble at my workplace. But I finally decided to apply for the examination, with the backing of my family, believing this was the last opportunity for me to realize my dream. Studying English, mathematics, physics, liberal arts, etc. for the examination was challenging but it was a really good experience as I could make friends with many other people following their dreams. My life in the ASDF was not easy, both in terms of my duties and training, but I could mature a little more as a person every time I cleared a hurdle. I am really grateful to the ASDF for educating me. At the time you are reading this column I will be working for JAXA and undergoing rigorous training to become an astronaut. I will work hard to live up to public expectations, remembering the rigorous training and duties I experienced in the ASDF. Readers who aspire to become an astronaut! Let[,]s work hard because we can open the way by dedicating all our strength to fulfill our role at every moment with our dreams at the back of our minds. Lieutenant Colonel Yui after his last flight training Lieutenant Colonel Yui being sent off by his colleagues on his retirement ----- **2. Efforts for Ocean Policy** **1. Efforts based on the Basic Act on Ocean Policy** Under various circumstances regarding the ocean, including the sea areas surrounding Japan, the Basic Act on Ocean Policy12 was put into force in July 2007 with the aim of the sound development of the economic society and the stability and improvement of the lives of the people in Japan as well as our contribution to the coexistence of the ocean and human beings, recognizing that it is critical for Japan, as a maritime nation, to establish a new Oceanic State which harmonizes peaceful and proactive development and use of the sea with the preservation of the marine environment. Then, the Headquarters for Ocean Policy was established within the Cabinet as a system to promote ocean policy intensively and comprehensively. Based on this act, a cabinet decision was made in March 2008 to adopt the Basic Plan on Ocean Policy13, which stipulates the basic policy of various measures with regard to the oceans in order to promote such measures comprehensively and systematically. This plan includes extremely important measures in terms of the security of our country: for example, maintaining order at sea carried out from the viewpoint of securing maritime safety, efforts for maritime transport safety, countermeasures against marine-derived natural disasters, and securing maritime transport. The Headquarters for Ocean Policy has been conducting examinations of legal systems with respect to responses to surveys conducted in the Exclusive Economic Zone of our country and countermeasures against piracy including the use of the SDF. The Ministry of Defense participates in the discussions on effective legal systems in coordination with related ministries. The said Headquarters has been discussing coordination between ministries on the integration of marine survey data and the preservation and management of remote islands. The Ministry of Defense participates in these discussions so that works in the related fields can be performed in closer coordination with other ministries. In response to the fact that the Basic Plan on Ocean Policy stipulates: the fostering of human resources who will support a new Ocean State; the systematic development of ships and aircraft for the purpose of ensuring maritime safety; and the conducting of exercises based on the manuals on joint response to suspicious boats, the Ministry of Defense has been making efforts to strengthen cooperation with the Japan Coast Guard. The efforts include (i) to enhance human resources development by increasing the number of professors specializing in the Law of the Sea at the National Defense Academy (ii) to improve equipment for ensuring maritime transport safety, such as escort vessels, special mobile ships14 and rotary-wing patrol A special mobile ship aircraft, and (iii) to strengthen cooperation with the Japan Coast Guard through events such as joint maritime exercises in dealing with suspicious ships. **2. Response to Acts of Piracy** Acts of piracy are a serious threat to public safety and the maintenance of order at sea. In particular, this is an issue that Japan cannot overlook, as a maritime nation that relies on maritime transport for a large amount of resources and food, which is the basis of the existence and prosperity of the nation. The U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea requires all member states to cooperate to the best of their ability in deterring acts of piracy; Japan, too, needs to actively fulfill its international responsibility. ----- **(1) Basic Principle** The Japan Coast Guard (JCG), as a police organization, is given the primary role in responding to acts of piracy. However, in case it is deemed impossible or extremely difficult for the JCG to deal with, the SDF will take on the mission. **(2) Recent Piracy Acts and Efforts by the International Community** While the number of piracy incidents is on the decline worldwide, those caused by pirates armed with machine guns, rocket launchers and others are frequent and the number of such incidents is rapidly increasing off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden. Acts of piracy off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden are a threat to the international community, including Japan, and, as such, represent an issue requiring urgent action. (See Fig. II-1-4-1) Resolution 1816 adopted by the United Nations Security Council in June 2008 and successive resolutions15 ask member states to take action to prevent piracy acts off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden and, particularly, to dispatch naval ships and military aircrafts. The United States, the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Italy, Spain, Greece, Denmark, Russia, India, China, ROK, Malaysia, Singapore, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Iran, Yemen, Kenya, etc., have already dispatched naval ships and others off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden. The EU decided to launch an anti-piracy operation (Operation Atalanta) in December 2008, which includes naval escorts for WFP (World Food Program) ships as well as surveillance in this area. NATO also resumed its counter-piracy operations in March 2009. **(3) Efforts on Japan[,]s Own Initiative** **a. The New Anti-piracy Law** Acts of piracy have been posing a serious threat to public safety and the maintenance of order at sea. UNCLOS requires all states to cooperate to the best of their ability in suppressing acts of piracy, and Japan needs to make its own efforts for public safety and the maintenance of order at sea and actively fulfill its international responsibilities. Under these circumstances, the Bill on the Penalization of Acts of Piracy and Measures against Acts of Piracy was submitted to the Diet and enacted on June 19, 2009. The law aims to appropriately and effectively handle acts of piracy through punishment, suppression and control, irrespective of the nationality of the ship attacked by pirates, in accordance with UNCLOS. The law sets forth provisions so that the SDF can deal with acts of piracy more appropriately and effectively; ----- for example, it enables the SDF to protect foreign-registered ships that are not related to Japan from acts of piracy16 and allows the use of arms to prevent a pirate vessel from approaching a civilian ship. The outline of this law is as shown in Reference 8. (See Fig. II-1-4-2) **b. Anti-piracy Measures through Maritime Security Operations off the Coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden** Approximately 2,000 Japan-related ships travel off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden each year, and this area is extremely important for Japan as it serves as a shipping route that connects Europe/Middle East with East Asia. Thus, protecting the lives and property of Japanese people in this area is an important duty of the Government. In principle, Anti-piracy operations by the SDF should be performed under a new law. However, piracy incidents are rapidly increasing, and since it is necessary to urgently protect the lives and property of Japanese people, an order for maritime security operations was issued on March 13, 2009, upon the Prime Minister[,]s approval based on a cabinet decision, to protect Japanrelated ships from acts of piracy off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden, in accordance with the The Prime Minister, the Minister of Defense and other officials provisions of Article 82 of the Self-Defense Forces Law sending off SDF troops ----- as an emergency measure until a new law is enacted. Following this order, two escort ships (Sazanami and Samidare) left Japan on March 14 and started maritime escort operations on March 3017. In order to perform anti-piracy operations more effectively in such a large sea area, it is also important to carry out surveillance operations in a wide area by fixed-wing patrol aircraft (P-3C). Thus, on May 15, 2009, an order was issued for the dispatch of P-3C aircraft, which was followed by the departure of two P-3C aircraft on May 28. These aircraft have been conducting vigilance, surveillance and other operations in the Gulf of Aden **(i) Activities by Escort Ships** Through maritime security operations, the anti-piracy mission off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden is to protect ships and the basic concept is to deter acts of piracy and drive off pirates. The procedures for the escort are described below. First, the Ministry of Defense (MOD) shall inform shipping companies of the escort plan (navigation schedule, meeting point, etc.) via the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism (MLIT). MLIT shall prepare a list of ships which have expressed the wish to be escorted, and submit it to MOD. Then, MOD shall inform shipping companies of the escort procedures (navigation speed, course, etc.) via MLIT. Based on such coordination, escort ships would meet up with ships to be escorted at a meeting point and sail across the Gulf of Aden while communicating with each other. At the same time, a patrol helicopter mounted on the escort ships would fly over to keep an eye on the area. As of June 11, the two escort ships had carried out 26 escort missions for 83 Japan-related ships. Moreover, as of June 11, in response to a report from a ship other than the escort target, the escort ships took action from a humanitarian viewpoint without enforcing power six times, such as issuing a caution by the LRAD and checking the situation by helicopters. **(ii) Activities with the P-3C aircraft** The P-3C aircraft flying over a wide sea area in the Gulf of Aden in order to protect designated vessels, are ----- basically used for surveillance activities and information collection, based on the navigation information of the vessels concerned and anti-piracy information. Specifically, the P-3C aircraft, which use the Djibouti International Airport as their base, conduct surveillance activities and collect information in the Gulf of Aden, focusing on the sea area where escort ships are conducting an escort mission, and provide antipiracy-related information to the escort ships and the vessels concerned. Since it is effective to utilize the knowledge and _Sazanami escorting a Japanese ship_ experience of the GSDF for the protection of the P-3C aircraft parking apron, the flight squadron deployed to Djibouti is formed as the first joint task force to be dispatched overseas18. In addition, when necessity arises, the ASDF organizes an airlift group consisting of C-130H or U-4 to support these activities by transporting equipment and materials, and the first transport operation was performed on May 21. **(iii) Ships to be Protected** The lives and property at sea to be protected by maritime security operations are, in principle, the lives and property of Japanese people. Specifically, ships falling under the following categories shall be protected: 1) Japanese-registered ships; Parliamentary Secretary for Defense Takeda carrying out an 2) Foreign-registered ships with Japanese crew inspection of MSDF vessels deployed at Djibouti members on board; and 3) Foreign-registered ships operated by Japanese shipping companies or foreign-registered ships with Japanese cargo on board, which are important for the stable economic activities of Japanese people. **(iv) Use of Weapons** In case the use of weapons is deemed necessary in responding to acts of piracy during maritime security operations, weapons shall be used in accordance with Article 7 of the Police Officer Duties Execution Law MSDF P-3C and U.S., German and Spanish patrol aircraft units applied mutatis mutandis to the provisions of Article 93 responsible for counter-piracy operations off the coast of Somalia of the Self-Defense Forces Law. For example, in cases and in the Gulf of Aden (at Djibouti International Airport) where an escorted ship is about to be attacked by a pirate ship, SDF members can fire warning shots on an asneeded basis to suppress the act of piracy. Also, in cases where an escorted ship or the defense force unit is faced with an imminent and illegal act of aggression and if the use of weapons is deemed necessary, the SDF members can fire shots as an act of self-defense. The criteria of judgment for the use of weapons have been formulated in cooperation with related ministries and presented to the units to avoid any confusion, in order to ensure a through response to the piracy. ----- **[COLUMN]** **VOICE** **Voice of SDF Personnel Engaged in Anti-piracy Maritime Patrol Operations off** **the Coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden** Petty Officer Second Class Makoto Hirota The 22nd Flight Squadron, MSDF I am engaged in the maritime security operations to respond to pirates off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden. I am an air navigator of a SH60K patrol helicopter, carried by the destroyer _Sazanami. During the first escort operation on_ March 30 of this year, I participated in a flight to escort commercial vessels. I remember how I was moved when I looked over the five commercial vessels escorted in front and from behind by the destroyers _Samidare and_ _Sazanami in the Gulf of Aden, an important place_ for maritime traffic about 6,500 nautical miles Petty Officer Second Class Hirota in front of an SH-60K patrol (about 12,000km) from Japan. helicopter One of the major roles of patrol helicopters in this operation is to report to the commander the situation around the site swiftly and accurately, making full use of their mobility. My main duty as an air navigator is to search for small targets that could be pirates, and report the information to the commander. I work as much as possible with my hands, eyes and ears, with the help of devices such as binoculars, a radar, an infrared night vision device and a digital camera. We sometimes address small vessels that come close to the fleet by using a Long Range Acoustic Device (LRAD). Thanks to hard training with such equipment, Inside a helicopter I have no fear in executing my duties. Instead, I feel great pride and satisfaction in engaging in this duty to provide direct escort to the vessels important for Japan, which move between Japan and Europe, the Middle East and the African region. During flights I sometimes receive messages such as “small targets that looks like pirates are approaching” on International VHF, so I always engage in my duty with due care and attention so that I can respond to any situation. The temperature here is over 35℃ some days, leaving me drenched with sweat after a flight. Flight operations are always demanding both physically and mentally, but I feel my fatigue vanish when I see an “Arigatou!” message from a commercial vessel sailing away after the escort operation. The long-term operation in this sea area far from Japan and my family naturally makes me feel lonely, but I will complete the assigned task while relieving my loneliness by looking up at the beautiful stars in the sky above the Gulf of Aden. Furthermore, I will use the valuable experience gained in these operations for my future duties as a helicopter navigator. ----- **Notes:** 1) Signifies the relationship between Japan and the United States in which they, as nations that share fundamental values and interests, work together on political, economic, and security issues, based on the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements. 2) The function of this Council was taken over by the Security Council of Japan in 1986. 3) Article 2 of the Atomic Energy Basic Law states that “The research, development and utilization of atomic energy shall be limited to peaceful purposes, aimed at ensuring safety and performed independently under democratic management.” 4) Article 2 of the NPT states that “Each non-nuclear weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes....not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices....” 5) The Cabinet[,]s control over military matters was limited. 6) Members of the Security Council are the Prime Minister (chairman); Minister designated pursuant to Article 9 of the Cabinet Law (Minister of State pre-designated to perform duties of the Prime Minister temporarily when the Prime Minister is absent, involved in an accident, or in a similar situation); Minister of Internal Affairs and Communications; Minister for Foreign Affairs; Minister of Finance; Minister of Economy, Trade and Industry; Minister of Land, Infrastructure and Transport; Minister of Defense; the Chief Cabinet Secretary; and Chairman of the National Public Safety Commission. See Fig. III-1-1-2. 7) In addition, to help the Minister of Defense successfully handle administrative work related to national defense and to reliably manage the SDF, a system to assist the Minister has been established. See Part III, Chapter 4, Section 1 for the organization of the SDF, including assistance to the Minister. 8) See http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/singi/utyuu/about2.html 9) See http://www.mod.go.jp/j/info/uchuukaihatsu/index.html 10) Abbreviation “Command, Control, Communication, Computer, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance” which is the collective term of each function. 11) The notion that allows the SDF to use satellites whose use has been generalized and those with similar functions. 12) See http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/singi/kaiyou/about2.html 13) See http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/singi/kaiyou/kihonkeikaku 14) Refers to Rigid Hull Inflatable Boat (RHIB), which is a duel-system, high-speed vessel that performs higher speed operations and has higher operational capacity and is to be loaded on escort vessels instead of conventional launches. 15) In addition, there are resolutions 1838, 1846 and 1851. 16) The draft Anti-Piracy Measures Law defines the following acts committed for private ends on the high seas (including the exclusive economic zone provided for by the UNCLOS) or territorial sea as well as internal waters of Japan by the crew or the passengers of a ship (except for warships and other government ships) as “acts of piracy”: (1) seizing another ship in navigation or taking control of the operation of another ship by rendering persons incapable of resistance by assault, intimidation or any other means; (2) robbing property on board another ship in navigation or obtaining or causing others to obtain an unlawful profit of property by rendering persons incapable of resistance by assault, intimidation or any other means; (3) kidnapping a person on board another ship in navigation for the purpose of taking the person hostage to demand that a third person deliver any property or take any other unobligated action or to waive the third person[,]s right; (4) demanding that a third person deliver property or take any other unobligated action or waiving that person[,]s right by taking a person on board a robbed ship or a ship whose control is taken or kidnapped on board another ship in navigation hostage; (5) breaking into or damaging another ship in navigation for the purpose of committing acts of piracy as referred to in subparagraphs (1), (2), (3) and (4) above; (6) ----- operating a ship and approaching in close proximity to, beleaguering or obstructing the passage of another ship for the purpose of committing acts of piracy as referred to in subparagraphs (1), (2), (3) and (4) above; (7) preparing weapons and operating a ship for the purpose of committing acts of piracy as referred to in subparagraphs (1), (2), (3) and (4) above. 17) Eight Japan Coast Guard officers are on board the two escort ships to carry out judicial police activities, such as the arrest and interrogation of pirates on an as-needed basis. 18) In addition to MSDF personnel, GSDF personnel are also engaged in managing the forces. ----- ## Part II **The Basics of Japan[,]s Defense Policy and Build-up of Defense Capability** ### Chapter 2 **The National Defense Program Guidelines and Build-up of Defense Capability** **Section 1. Basic Concepts of Formulating the National Defense Program Guidelines** **Section 2. Contents of the National Defense Program Guidelines** **Section 3. Defense Posture Review** **Section 4. Mid-Term Defense Program** **Section 5. Build-up of Defense Capability for FY 2009** **Section 6. Defense-Related Expenditures** |Kyod|o|Ne|ws]| |---|---|---|---| [Kyodo News] ----- **Section 1. Basic Concepts of Formulating the National Defense Program** **Guidelines** The National Defense Program Guidelines set forth the basic principles of Japan[,]s security policy and the basic guidelines for Japan[,]s defense capability in the future, including its significance and role as well as the specific organization of the SDF and the target levels of major defense equipment to be built-up based on these principles and guidelines. The National Defense Program Guidelines have been formulated twice in the past, once in 1976 as “The National Defense Program Guidelines for FY 1977 and Beyond1” (NDPG 1976) and again in 1995 as “The National Defense Program Guidelines for FY 1996 and Beyond2” (NDPG 1995). After deliberation by bodies such as the Defense Posture Review Board and the Security Council of the then Defense Agency3, the current guidelines were formulated in 2004 as “The National Defense Program Guidelines for FY 2005 and Beyond” (NDPG 2004) in order to respond adequately to the international security environment following the 9/11 terrorist attacks on the United States. This section explains the background and basic concepts of the formulation of the National Defense Program Guidelines. (See Reference 9) **1. Background to Formulating the NDPG** **1. Changes in the International Situation and the Diversifying Roles of Military Capability** Since the end of the Cold War, the interdependence of states has deepened and expanded, and with the advancement of international coordination and cooperation, the likelihood of a global armed conflict has become even more distant than it was at the time of the formulation of the NDPG in 1995. On the other hand, complex and diversified regional conflicts stemming from territorial, religious, and ethnic issues have occurred, and responding to new threats and diverse contingencies4 has become an urgent task for various nations and the international community. Against this background, maintaining conventional forms of deterrence remains important in order to prevent inter-state conflicts. However, maintaining conventional forms of deterrence is not always effective against nonstate actors such as international terrorist organizations. In addition, it has become increasingly difficult for a single country to resolve security environment issues, and stabilizing the international security environment has become a common interest of all countries. Therefore, each country has been making a broad range of efforts to resolve such issues through various means including military capabilities, through coordination of various measures, and through international collaboration. In this context, the roles of military capabilities have diversified to include prevention of conflict and reconstruction assistance in addition to the traditional roles of deterrence and response to armed conflict. Under these circumstances, the United States, while giving consideration to international collaboration, has been engaged in a variety of activities, including the war on terror and activities to halt the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Depending on the nature of these activities, there have been instances in which international cooperative frameworks in the form of “coalitions” have been established that differ from traditional alliance relations. In the midst of these global changes, the countries in areas surrounding Japan are characterized by ethnic, religious, political and economic diversity. The area also features several major countries with a complex structure of interrelated interests and disputes over unification, territorial issues, and maritime interests. Many countries are also modernizing and improving their military capabilities. In particular, North Korea is engaged in the development and deployment of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles as well as maintenance and reinforcement of its asymmetric military capabilities (including large-scale special forces). In addition, ----- China continues to grow steadily as a major power in the region both politically and economically. In the military sphere, the country has been modernizing its nuclear/missile forces as well as its naval/air capabilities, and seeking to promote space development and expand the scope of its maritime activities. These trends must continue to be monitored in the future. **2. Remarkable Developments of Scientific Technology** Technological advancement, led by information and communications technology, have not only given rise to significant improvement in combat capabilities, but have also brought about a fundamental transformation of military power, exercising considerable influence on the defense strategies of all countries. **3. Expansion of SDF Activities and the Improvement of Japanﾕs Emergency Response Mechanism** The SDF[,]s activities have been diversifying and expanding to include response to incidents with suspicious vessels, nuclear accidents, various natural disasters, illegal acts, emergency situations, and international activities including both U.N. peacekeeping operations and cooperation in international efforts for preventing and eradicating international terrorism, as well as efforts for the national reconstruction of Iraq. Through the activities being undertaken in response to these situations, coordination with relevant agencies such as police and local communities has been reinforced. **4. Characteristics of Japan** Closely located to major powers of the Eurasian continent, Japan is situated at a strategically important position for the maritime traffic from the northeastern part of the continent to the Pacific Ocean. Japan’s territory consists of a long and thin crescent-shaped archipelago with long coast lines and numerous small islands. The country’s large population is confined within a very narrow territory, with industry and population concentrated mainly in urban areas, while a large number of facilities essential to economic development are located in coastal areas, all of which can be regarded in terms of topology as vulnerabilities. Due to geographic, geologic, and climate conditions, Japan is also prone to natural disasters of various kinds. Furthermore, stability in the international security environment is essential for Japan’s stability and development, which are based on a market-based economic system and free trade. Above all, Japan depends on imports for many resources, relying on the Middle East for approximately 90% of its crude oil consumption. The maintenance of secure and stable sea lanes are therefore of extreme importance to Japan. **2. The Basic Concept of the National Defense Program Guidelines** **1. Two Objectives and Three Approaches** The purpose of Japan[,]s security is to protect the peace, independence, and territory of Japan; to maintain the national system based on freedom and democracy; and to protect the lives and property of the people of the nation. With a steady trend toward attaching importance to collaboration and cooperation in the international community, as well as from the Japanese perspective of playing a role commensurate with the nation[,]s position and gaining the trust of the international community, Japan must independently and proactively make efforts for the peace and stability of the international community, which are prerequisites for Japan[,]s own peace and independence. In doing so, due to the unpredictable, complex, and diverse nature of today[,]s security threats, it is important that the government take swift and appropriate responses through a systematic combination of security-related ----- measures, including those of public security, economy, and intelligence, and promotion of diplomatic efforts in times of peace and effective operation of defense capabilities. Furthermore, it must engage in cooperation with the United States, based on the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements and promote cooperation with relevant countries and organizations such as the United Nations. Based on the abovementioned recognition, the National Defense Program Guidelines define the following two objectives for security: 1) Prevention of threats from reaching Japan and, in the event that they do, repelling them and minimizing any damage, and 2) Improvement of the international security environment to reduce the potential that threats will reach Japan in the first place. In order to achieve the two objectives listed above, three approaches−Japan[,]s own efforts, cooperation with alliance partners, and cooperation with the international community−are to be combined in an integrated manner. (See Fig. II-2-1-1) To combat the threat of nuclear weapons, Japan will rely on the U.S. nuclear deterrent and at the same time will play an active role in efforts for disarmament and non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction such as nuclear weapons and missiles. **2. New Concept for Defense Capability (Shifting emphasis from “deterrent effects” to “response** **capability”)** **(1) Reviewing the Basic Defense Force Concept** With regard to Japan[,]s defense capability, NDPG 1976 set forth the Basic Defense Force Concept. The concept is designed to enable Japan to maintain the minimum necessary basic defense capability as an independent state so as not to turn into a power vacuum and become a destabilizing factor in the region, rather than preparing to directly counter military threats. NDPG 1995 essentially adhered to this concept. The Basic Defense Force Concept was reviewed for the following two reasons in line with changes in the security environment surrounding Japan. These changes to the basic defense force are as shown in Fig. II-2-1-2. **a. Effective Response to Contingencies** Under the Basic Defense Force Concept, focus is placed on defense capabilities of an adequate scale in addition ----- to the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements as preventative measures against potential invasion. Behind this idea is the deterrent effect generated by a country that possesses adequate defense capabilities. However, new threats and diverse contingencies are difficult to predict and can occur unexpectedly, such that conventional deterrent effects that derive from the presence of a defense force do not necessarily work effectively. Therefore, future defense capabilities are strongly required to have the ability to prevent such threats from surfacing, as well as the ability to enable effective response to various contingencies and to minimize damage when such events do occur. **b. Proactive Efforts on Japan[,]s Own Initiative for International Peace Cooperation Activities** The Basic Defense Force Concept is based on the assumption that while it is internationally recognized that efforts for stable international relationships will continue despite the existence of unpredictable and uncertain elements, at the same time, mutually cooperative and interdependent relationships among nations have been advancing, and new threats and diverse contingencies are becoming increasingly difficult for a single nation to resolve. Under these circumstances, Japan, in order to ensure its security, must proactively participate in international collaborative activities for the improvement of the international security environment (international peace cooperation activities) on its own initiative by utilizing its defense capabilities. It has become difficult to build defense capabilities solely on the basis of Japan[,]s Basic Defense Force Concept, which is focused on the defense of Japan. **(2) Multifunctional, Flexible and Effective Defense Capabilities** With regard to future defense capabilities, the National Defense Program Guidelines state that the effective portion of the Basic Defense Force Concept shall be maintained5 under the new security environment, and that in addition to responding to new threats and diverse contingencies effectively, there is also a need to participate proactively in international peace cooperation activities on Japan[,]s own initiative. In addition, while the expected roles of defense capabilities are becoming more diverse, a decline in the youth population due to dwindling birthrates and a dramatic increase in the severity of Japan[,]s fiscal condition should ----- be considered as the country plans the future build-up of defense capabilities. Based on this viewpoint, Japan[,]s future defense capability needs to be equipped with high responsiveness, flexibility, and multi-purpose functionality, and to be supported by advanced technology and intelligence capabilities in line with trends in military technology standards so that it can establish “multi-functional, flexible, and effective defense capabilities” that can respond appropriately to various contingencies through flexible deployment of SDF units and utilization of multifunctional defense equipment. Thus it is necessary for Japan to shift the emphasis of its defense capabilities from pursuit of conventional deterrence effects to acquisition of ability to respond to various contingencies at home and abroad. ----- **Section 2. Contents of the National Defense Program Guidelines** **1. Basic Principles of Japan[,]s Security Policy** As described earlier, there are two objectives for Japan[,]s security: to prevent direct threats from reaching Japan and to repel them, and to improve the international security environment so as to reduce the chances that threats will reach Japan. Japan will achieve these objectives by combining Japan[,]s own efforts, cooperation with alliance partners, and cooperation with the international community in an integrated manner. **1. Japan[,]s Own Efforts** Japan[,]s security depends first and foremost on its own efforts. Based on this recognition, it is stated in the National Defense Program Guidelines that Japan will make its utmost efforts, utilizing all available means, to prevent threats from reaching the country directly. The guidelines state that in the event that these efforts fail to prevent the threat from reaching the country, the Government of Japan will take an integrated response by swiftly making the appropriate decisions and bringing together all relevant organizations, such as the SDF, the police and the Japan Coast Guard, and ensuring adequate cooperation among them. In addition, the Government will establish necessary civil defense systems to respond to various emergency situations, and the central and local governments will work together closely to establish adequate systems. At the same time, Japan will engage in its own diplomatic and other activities to prevent the emergence of threats by improving the international security environment. The guidelines prescribe that Japan[,]s defense capabilities, which are the ultimate guarantee of national security, shall be multi-functional, flexible, and effective, and that the improvement of efficiency and rationalization are necessary in order to realize such capabilities. **2. The Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements (Cooperation with Allies)** The Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements are indispensable to ensuring Japan[,]s security, and the presence of the U.S. military is essential for the maintenance of peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region. Considering the progress made in Japan-U.S. cooperation in dealing with global issues, as exemplified in the fight against terrorism, the close Japan-U.S. cooperative relationship plays a significant role in the effective promotion of international efforts to prevent and respond to new threats and diverse contingencies. The Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements do not function simply because of the existence of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between Japan and the United States. In order to make this agreement effective, it is essential to make continuous efforts in times of peace. From this perspective, the National Defense Program Guidelines clearly specify the following efforts. **(1) Implementation of Strategic Dialogue between Japan and the United States (Strategic** **Objectives, Role-sharing and Military Posture)** Based on the posture of Japan[,]s security and defense capabilities clarified in the National Defense Program Guidelines, Japan will proactively engage in strategic dialogue with the United States on wide-ranging security issues such as role-sharing between the two countries and military posture while working to harmonize perceptions of the new security environment and the appropriate strategic objectives6. In doing so, the Government of Japan will bear in mind the need to reduce the excessive burden on local communities which host U.S. military facilities, while maintaining the deterrent capabilities that the U.S. military presence in Japan provides. ----- **(2) Various Efforts for Strengthening the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements** The Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements shall be enhanced through active promotion of measures including information sharing, various forms of operational cooperation and collaboration on ballistic missile defense (BMD). **3. Cooperation with the International Community** The National Defense Program Guidelines state that in order to improve the international security environment in cooperation with the international community and to help maintain the security and prosperity of Japan, the Government of Japan will actively engage in diplomatic efforts, including the strategic use of Official Development Assistance (ODA). The guidelines also state that based on the recognition that the destabilization of the international community by events such as regional conflicts, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and international terrorist attacks would directly affect its own peace and security, Japan will, on its own initiative, proactively participate in international peace cooperation activities as an integral part of its diplomatic efforts. In particular, stability in the region extending from the Middle East to East Asia is crucial to Japan. Therefore, the Government of Japan will strive to stabilize the region by promoting cooperative efforts in conjunction with other countries concerned in order to deal with common security challenges. Japan will also actively engage in U.N. reforms, as well as promote efforts for multilateral frameworks for security in the Asia-Pacific region such as the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). **2. Vision for Future Defense Capabilities** **1. Role of Defense Capabilities** In recognition of the new security environment, the National Defense Program Guidelines define the role of defense capabilities as: 1) Effective response to new threats and diverse contingencies 2) Preparation for a response to a full-scale invasion 3) Proactive efforts, on Japan[,]s own initiative, to improve the international security environment The guidelines state that Japan will efficiently maintain the SDF posture deemed necessary to carry out missions effectively in each area. NDPG 1995 clearly stated the maintenance of the defense posture of each branch of the SDF. However, the current National Defense Program Guidelines adopt the idea that a new SDF posture should be formed in the process of joint operations being conducted to respond to each contingency. Based on this concept, the guidelines specify in a comprehensive manner, the role and response to be fulfilled in each contingency and the concept of the SDF posture under “The Role of Defense Capabilities.” **(1) Effective Response to New Threats and Diverse Contingencies** The idea behind the response to new threats and diverse contingencies presented in the National Defense Program Guidelines is as follows. As new threats and contingencies are difficult to predict and have the potential to emerge suddenly, Japan will effectively counter such changes by forming and deploying highly ready and mobile defense force units capable of responding appropriately to the characteristics of each situation in accordance with the characteristics of the units and Japan[,]s geographical characteristics. When contingencies do actually occur, the defense force will act quickly and appropriately to seamlessly respond to the situation and in close collaboration with the police, the Japan Coast Guard and other relevant organizations in accordance with the circumstances and the ----- need for division of labor. Major responses to new threats and diverse contingencies are as follows. **a. Response to Ballistic Missile Attacks** Japan will effectively deal with ballistic missile attacks by maintaining a system to counter such attacks, including a BMD system, to be established at an early date. Japan will appropriately deal with nuclear threats through efforts to build the BMD system as well as relying on the U.S. nuclear deterrent. (See Part III, Chapter 1, Section 2-1) **b. Response to Attacks by Guerillas or Special Operations Forces** In response to guerillas and special operations force attacks, Japan will maintain the necessary defense force structure to effectively deal with the situation by enhancing the readiness and mobility of defense force units, as well as by coping with such attacks in a flexible manner, including swift and concentrated unit deployments. (See Part III, Chapter 1, Section 2-2) **c. Response to the Invasion of Japan[,]s Offshore** **Islands** Because of Japan[,]s geographical characteristics, Patriot PAC-3 deployed at Ichigaya under an order for measures to destroy ballistic and other missiles featuring many offshore islands, invasion of such islands can be envisioned as one method of orchestrating an armed attack against Japan. In this regard, Japan must maintain a defense structure which is capable of dealing with precise guidance attacks by transporting SDF units by sea and air in a flexible manner. (See Part III, Chapter 1, Section 2-3) Shooting training from a light-armored vehicle **d. Patrol and Surveillance of Sea and Airspace Surrounding Japan, and Responses to Violations of Japan[,]s** **Airspace and Intrusion of Armed Special Operation Vessels and Other Vessels** In order to effectively respond to new threats and diverse contingencies, early detection is extremely important for the prevention of undesirable events, as well as the prevention of expansion if such an event should it occur. Therefore, around-the-clock patrol and surveillance of the sea and airspace surrounding Japan remains a key role of the SDF. For this reason, Japan will maintain a defense structure that includes warships, aircraft and other equipment necessary to achieve this aim. Japan will also maintain fighter aircraft units to respond swiftly and appropriately to the violation of territorial airspace. Furthermore, in light of issues concerning armed North Korean special operation vessels and submerged navigation within Japanese territory by Chinese nuclear submarines, Japan will take appropriate actions against such spy ships in the waters surrounding Japan and submerged foreign submarines navigating in ----- Japan[,]s territorial waters. (See Part III, Chapter 1, Section 2-4) **e. Response to Large-Scale and Special Disasters** In the event of a large-scale natural disaster or a special disaster such as a nuclear disaster, it is of extreme importance that Japan utilizes the capabilities of the SDF to ensure the security of the people. For situations in which protection of life or property are necessary, Japan will maintain an adequate force structure consisting of defense force units and personnel with specialized abilities and expertise with the ability to undertake disaster relief operations throughout Japan. (See Part III, Chapter 1, Section 2-5) **(2) Preparations for Full-Scale Invasion** While the likelihood of full-scale invasion is declining, new defense capabilities are required for Japan to effectively respond to new threats and diverse contingencies. Proactive engagement is also required of Japan, on its own initiative, aimed at improving the international security environment. In recognition of this security environment, the National Defense Program Guidelines state that Japan will depart from the previous defense build-up concept that emphasizes so-called Cold War-type counter-armor warfare and implement a sweeping review of its defense equipment and personnel earmarked for responding to full-scale invasion with an eye toward reducing numbers. At the same time, in light of the fact that the primary role of defense capability is to respond to fullscale invasion and that the rearrangement of defense build-up will require time, Japan will secure the most fundamental element of its defense capabilities in order to prepare for full-scale invasion. (See Part III, Chapter 1, Section 3) Ceremony marking the launch of submarine Unryu **(3) Proactive Efforts on Japan[,]s own Initiative to** **Improve the International Security Environment** **a. Proactive Engagement on its Own Initiative in International Peace Cooperation Activities** It is stated in the current National Defense Program Guidelines that Japan will proactively participate in international peace cooperation activities on its own initiative with the objective of further ensuring the peace and security of Japan, rather than simply “to make a contribution” as was stated in the previous version of the guidelines. The scope of international peace cooperation activities is extremely broad, and the Government of Japan as a whole needs to be engaged in these activities in an integrated manner with diplomacy as part of the country[,]s unified efforts. Within the framework of the Government[,]s overall policy, the SDF must be appropriately engaged in international peace cooperation activities drawing on its self-sustainability and organizational capabilities. For this reason, the SDF plans to establish the infrastructure necessary to quickly dispatch and maintain defense force units overseas by developing education and training systems, maintaining a highly ready force posture for relevant units, and improving transport and other capabilities. In order for Japan to appropriately participate in international peace cooperation activities, it was determined that necessary arrangements would be made including efforts to prioritize these activities within the SDF[,]s overall missions. (See Part III, Chapter 3, Section 1) ----- **b. Security Dialogues and Promotion of Defense Exchanges** Security dialogues and defense exchanges including bilateral and multilateral training need to be continued in view of the changes in the international security environment and in recognition of the fact that such efforts contribute to the effective implementation of international peace cooperation activities. In addition, activities which contribute to the peace and stability of the international community need to be actively promoted by continuing the implementation of cooperative activities in the area of arms control and disarmament conducted by international organizations such as the United Nations. (See Part III, Chapter 3, Section 2 and 3) **2. Fundamental Elements of Japan[,]s Defense Capabilities** Following are fundamental elements of Japan[,]s defense capabilities that are included in the National Defense Program Guidelines, which are necessary to fulfill the defense missions described earlier. **(1) Enhancement of Joint Operation Capabilities** In order to execute its missions swiftly and effectively and respond to new threats and diverse contingencies without delay in the new security environment, the SDF needs to enhance the joint operational posture so that all SDF services can operate in a unified manner in such situations from the moment they arise. For this reason, the Joint Staff was established and the infrastructure for joint operations was put in place in such areas as education and training, and information and communications, and the SDF reexamined its existing organizations for joint operations capabilities so as to enhance their efficiency. (See Part III, Chapter 1, Section 1-4) **(2) Strengthening Intelligence Capabilities** In order for defense capabilities to function effectively with multi-functionality and flexibility, it is imperative for the Government of Japan to build and fully utilize advanced intelligence capabilities, including the ability to detect contingencies as early as possible and to consolidate and share intelligence accurately and in a timely manner. Therefore, Japan will strengthen its advanced and diversified intelligence-gathering capabilities and enhance its comprehensive analysis and assessment capabilities, considering the security environment and technological trends. Japan will also strengthen its intelligence structure, including the Defense Intelligence Headquarters, which will play a role in supporting these capabilities, and in this regard, Japan will build a sophisticated intelligence capability. **(3) Incorporating the Progress of Science and Technology in Japan[,]s Defense Capabilities** In order to realize multi-functional, flexible and effective defense capabilities, the fruits of various technological innovations resulting from progress in information science and technology should be adequately reflected. In particular, advanced command and communications systems, as well as information communication networks shall be established to develop reliable command and control systems while the rapid intelligence-sharing systems that are indispensable to the SDF[,]s joint operations described above will be enhanced in line with the advanced information and communication technologies available in Japan and abroad. **(4) Effective Utilization of Human Resources** In order to achieve greater outcomes with limited human resources, it is necessary to recruit human resources with high potential and train and educate them to adequately respond to increasingly diverse and international SDF missions and to properly operate rapidly advancing high-tech defense equipment. Research and education on security issues will be promoted together with a reinforcement of the manpower foundation for promoting such research7. ----- **3. Specific Posture for Defense Capability** The attached table of the National Defense Program Guidelines clarifies the specific posture for the defense capabilities needed to fulfill the missions described above. The following provides an overview. **1. Ground Self-Defense Force** **(1) More Effective System for Basic Strategic Units** In peacetime, regionally deployed units (basic strategic units) comprising eight divisions and six brigades, which are responsive and highly mobile, will be formed in preparation for effective and timely response to new threats and diverse contingencies that are often difficult to predict. The units will each be stationed in one of 14 sections demarcated with consideration given to Japan[,]s geography, which is characterized by mountains, rivers and straits. (See Fig. II-2-2-1) **(2)Transition to Personnel-oriented System in Response to the New Security Environment** The transition will be made from the conventional anti-tank warfare-oriented defense build-up concept to a personnel (manpower)-oriented system in order to respond quickly to new threats and diverse contingencies such as attacks by guerillas and special operations forces, large-scale disasters by deploying units across the country and enhance participation in international peace cooperation activities. To ensure effective response capability, the 160,000 reserve personnel set forth in NDPG 1995 will be reduced to 155,000, and the 145,000 regular defense officers set forth in NDPG 1995 will be increased to 148,000. Meanwhile, the amount of primary equipment “tanks and artilleries” will be reduced from approximately 900 vehicles to 600 vehicles for tanks, and from 900 to 600 artillery/vehicles for artillery, respectively. (See Fig. II-2-2-2) **(3) Formation of Central Readiness Force** In order to prevent the expansion of various contingencies should they occur, the Central Readiness Force will be newly organized, for the unified control of Mobile Operation Units (Central Readiness Force Regiment, etc) and various other specialized units (Central NBC Weapon Defense Unit, etc), as a unit which will be provided to each area in the case of contingencies. Within this force, the International Peace Cooperation Activities Training Unit will be newly organized to conduct the necessary education, trainings and research with the aim of swiftly dispatching personnel for international peace cooperation activities. **2. Maritime Self-Defense Force** **(1) Posture of New Destroyer Units for More Effective Response** In order to secure as many well-trained destroyers as possible within the limited number of vessels and to enable prompt response to diverse contingencies, destroyer units will be formed according to the level of readiness rather than the conventional fixed formation. Mobile Operation Units will be integrated into eight divisions (one division consisting of four vessels) to enable swift and continuous response to contingencies. The formation of Regional District Units will be modified so that one unit is deployed in each of five patrol districts in view of the current security environment. ----- ----- **(2) Formation of Submarine Units Focusing on Response to New Threats and Diverse** **Contingencies** Submarine units will continue to retain a total of 16 submarines (units are to be consolidated, from six divisions with two or three vessels per division to four divisions with four vessels each). The new formation of submarines to be deployed in important maritime traffic points in the East China Sea and the Sea of Japan for information gathering purposes is intended to detect signs of new threats and diverse contingencies as early as possible to enable a flexible response. **(3) Streamlining of Combat Aircraft Units** While ensuring the continued surveillance posture of the surrounding waters, as well as its readiness and effectiveness, the number of combat aircraft (including patrol aircraft, and minesweeping and transport helicopters) will be reduced from approximately 170 to 150 as a result of consolidation of units and improvements in efficiency. For the fixed-wing patrol aircraft units, P-3C successor aircraft (P-1) with improved performance will be introduced, and the current eight squadrons will be integrated into four squadrons for increased efficiency. From the viewpoint of increasing operational efficiency, patrol helicopter units will be consolidated from eight squadrons to five, and will be ship-based, in principle. **3. Air Self-Defense Force** **(1) Improving the Efficiency of Fighter Aircraft Units** Although fighter aircraft units will continue to be major units in order to permit appropriate action in a timely manner against the violation of airspace, in light of the decreased probability of a full-scale invasion of Japan, the number of aircraft will be reduced from approximately 300 to 260 by means of improvements in operational efficiency. The number of combat aircraft, including fighters, will be reduced from approximately 400 to 350 in line with such developments as the downsizing of air reconnaissance units. (See Fig. II-2-2-3) ----- **(2) Strengthening Transport and Deployment Capabilities** In order to allow Japan to effectively respond to an invasion of its offshore islands and to properly participate in international peace cooperation activities, Aerial Refueling/Transport Units will be newly established. (See Fig. II-2-2-4) **(3) Division of Airborne Early-Warning Group into Two Groups** The Airborne Early-Warning Group will be reorganized from the single group described in NDPG 1995 into two groups: E-767 early-warning and control aircraft units and E-2C early-warning aircraft units. **4. Major Equipment and Major Units Also Available for Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD)** The National Defense Program Guidelines state that the posture of the SDF must be capable of taking on various roles to deal with diverse tasks. In particular, it has been deemed important for Japan to attempt to obtain understanding for its BMD system both domestically and abroad by explaining the system as specifically as possible and ensuring its transparency. To that end, the guidelines, in the attached table, specify “major equipment and major units also available for ballistic missile defense8.” (See Fig. II-2-2-5) ----- ----- **4. Additional Elements for Consideration** The National Defense Program Guidelines state that the following elements shall be taken into consideration in building up, maintaining and operating defense capabilities. **1. Fiscal Conditions, Procurement of Defense Equipment, and Maintenance and Operation of Defense** **Facilities** In light of severe fiscal conditions, defense expenditures must be curbed by further rationalizing and streamlining of defense forces, and overall defense capability needs to function smoothly and efficiently through harmonization of operations with other measures implemented by the Government. In addition, the Government will make the following efforts: promotion of measures to curb the lifecycle cost9 of procuring defense equipment, implementation of effective and efficient research and development activities, as well as the allocation of limited resources to core technological fields for the establishment of a truly necessary defense production system and technological foundation. In order to efficiently maintain and upgrade Japan[,]s defense-related facilities, the Government will take various measures to promote more harmonious coexistence between these facilities and the local communities. **2. Time frame for Achieving Defense Capability Objectives and Its Review** The National Defense Program Guidelines provide a vision for Japan[,]s defense capabilities for the next decade, based on the idea that it is important to set a concrete timeline for achieving the goals of defense capabilities more clearly. However, necessary revisions will be made either after five years or should there be a significant change in the security environment, taking into consideration such change in the environment, technological progress and other relevant factors at the time. **5. Three Principles on Arms Exports** A statement by the Chief Cabinet Secretary released at the time of the formulation of the National Defense Program Guidelines addressed issues related to arms export control. It stated that given the fact that ballistic missile defense (BMD) would contribute to the effective implementation of the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements and from the viewpoint of contributing to the security of Japan, the Government would exempt items related to BMD systems from the regulations of the Three Principles on Arms Exports and related provisions, on the condition that those items would be subject to strict export control10. (See Reference 11-12) In addition, with regard to cases of joint development and production with the United States as well as cases seen as contributing to counterterrorism and counter-piracy, regarding which questions were raised through the process of developing the National Defense Program Guidelines, it mentioned that the Government would decide whether to take any actions in the future on a case-by-case basis, taking into consideration the basic philosophy as a peace-loving nation of avoiding exacerbation of international conflicts11. The statement by the Chief Cabinet Secretary clarified that Japan would continue to firmly maintain its policy of dealing carefully with arms export control in light of the country[,]s basic philosophy as a peace-loving nation, which is the basis for the Three Principles on Arms Exports and their related policy guidelines. ----- **[COLUMN]** **VOICE** **Voice of SDF Personnel Serving in the Forefront of Defense (in Tsushima)** Staff Sergeant Daisuke Ikeda The 19th Aircraft Control & Warning Squadron, ASDF Many people have been to the Republic of Korea (ROK). But have you visited Tsushima, the Japanese island closest to the ROK? Tsushima, a scenic island, repeatedly experienced invasions in its history, including one by the Mongols. Today, Tsushima Station of the Ground Self-Defense Force, Tsushima Coastal Defense Group of the MSDF, and Unijima Sub Base of the ASDF are here to protect the region. Unijima Sub Base, where I work, is located at the northernmost tip of Tsushima Island. This is a kind of remote island that is truly on the frontline of the Staff Sergeant Ikeda on his warning and surveillance duty border−only about 50 km from the ROK. You can see the city of Busan with the naked eye on a clear day. In addition, since this is a remote island, we commute by ship every day. Currently I belong to the Surveillance Platoon of the 19th Aircraft Control & Warning Squadron. The Surveillance Platoon uses radar to keep an eye on aircraft, etc. approaching Japan and conducts constant surveillance 24 hours a day, every day, as the eyes of air defense of the region. I am engaged in daily warning and surveillance activities in the platoon and providing radio support to pilots of Japanese aircraft. Let me explain why I am working at Unijima Sub Base. I was interested in working in Tsushima, a place with a long history, and also I thought I could gain something positive by working in a severe environment. In addition, senior officers who had instructed me at my previous work location and who I look up to were working there. Those were the main reasons for my coming here. Though this is the duty I wanted to do, honestly speaking, it is sometimes difficult to remain vigilant and keep myself in good shape, because of frequent late night shifts, when ordinary people are in bed. However, I refresh my body and spirit by distinctly switching my life between on- and off-duty modes. One event that occurred during this duty made a big impression on me. An unidentified aircraft appeared near Tsushima. It is unforgettable how all the members who were working in the operation room at that time worked together to respond to the situation in an intense atmosphere, getting information and detecting the location of the aircraft accurately and swiftly, reporting to the Air Defense Direction Center, and so on. I really felt that I was working on the front line of defense. With this experience always in mind, I will work hard as the “eyes of air defense,” disciplining myself to do my task correctly as a member of the Surveillance Platoon while passing on my knowledge and skills to my juniors. Unijima Sub Base, seen from the main island of Tsushima (Korea can be seen on the opposite shore) ----- **Section 3. Defense Posture Review** This section describes the progress of the defense posture review conducted by the Government and Ministry of Defence. **1. Background of the Review of the National Defense Program Guidelines** The security environment surrounding Japan continues to be faced with issues of new threats and diverse contingencies, such as the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and international terrorism, as well as increasing expectations of the active involvement of Japan in international peace cooperation activities. Thus, it is important to more appropriately adapt the defense force to the future security environment. The National Defense Program Guidelines (NDPG) are subject to necessary revisions five years after its formulation, that is, by the end of this year. Accordingly, the Government has decided to hold the Council on Security and Defense Capabilities12 on January 7, 2009 in order to conduct comprehensive deliberations on the visions for Japan[,]s security and defense posture from a wide range of perspectives. The Council comprises members from fields related to security and defense capabilities and expert members with knowledge and experience related to administrative works in these fields. **2. The Council on Security and Defense Capabilities** The first Council was held on January 9, 2009 and Prime Minister Aso requested that the Council carry out active discussions on security strategies and roles of defense capabilities, while foreseeing future international situations and present guidelines for the future defense strategy and of the vision for defense capabilities, based on the following points: 1) International peace operations have been stipulated to a primary mission of the SDF, and the SDF has made considerable achievements in Iraq and in the Indian Ocean. 2) While various issues exist in the situations around Japan, cooperative relations with countries such as ----- China are being strengthened. 3) The reform of the Ministry of Defense calls for the strengthening of functions for planning defense policies and the SDF[,]s joint operations; consolidation of defense capabilities build-up; and review of procurements. The Council has been held ten times as of the end of May, 2009. (See Fig. II-2-3-1) **3. The Defense Posture Review Board** In order to contribute to reviews by the government as a whole on the revision of the NDPG, the Ministry of Defense established the Defense Posture Review Board13 chaired by the then Minister of Defense with the aim of carrying out discussions from various viewpoints on September 17, 2008. At the first meeting of the Board, then Minister of Defense Yoshimasa Hayashi mentioned the following three points to be kept in mind in the process of the discussion: 1) to identify the nature of the Japan[,]s defense capabilities and to make necessary reviews based on it; 2) to make reviews based on the latest domestic and international movements and trends 3) to work with speed while integrating wisdom inside the Ministry in order to achieve results by the summer of 2009. In light of new developments in Japan-U.S. relations and neighboring countries since 2004 as well as the fact that international peace cooperation activities have been stipulated to a primary mission of the SDF, the Ministry of Defense is currently proceeding with reviews on an evaluation of the NDPG, international security environment, the roles of defense capabilities, and a vision for Japan[,]s defense capabilities based on issues. These reviews are carried out in coordination with the Cabinet Office, while maintaining a close linkage with other intra-ministerial reviews including those on the reform of the Ministry of Defense. (See Fig. II-2-3-2) ----- **Section 4. Mid-Term Defense Program** National defense is vital to a country[,]s existence. Therefore, although defense build-up ultimately occurs in accordance with the budget of each fiscal year, defense should be built-up continuously, systematically and steadily based on the security environment surrounding Japan and the role of defense capability in line with a concrete medium-term outlook because research and development of defense equipment, its adoption, improvement of facilities, education of defense personnel, and training of SDF units cannot be realized in the short term. Therefore, since FY 1986 the Government of Japan has formulated mid-term defense programs, each covering five years, and has built-up the nation[,]s defense capabilities each fiscal year based on these programs. The “Mid-Term Defense Program (FY 2005-FY 2009)” is a plan that defines Japan[,]s policy regarding the build-up of its defense capabilities and the main projects for the five-year period to realize new defense capabilities specified in the National Defense Program Guidelines. The program was approved by the Security Council and the Cabinet in December 2004. In December 2008, revisions were made to the sections of the program concerning necessary expenses for and the scale of plans to improve major defense equipment, such as the modernization and upgrading of fighters (F-15). (See 5 of this section, Reference 10 and 13). The government is currently reviewing the Mid-Term Defense Program to formulate a new one by the end of the year, in conjunction with a review of the National Defense Program Guidelines which will be the basis of the formulation.. This section explains the policies envisaged under the Mid-Term Defense Program, organizational reviews of the Defense Ministry and the SDF, main projects related to the SDF[,]s capability and measures intended to reinforce the Japan-U.S. Security Agreements, as well as the revision to the Mid-Term Defense Program in December 2008. **1. Policies for the Program** In line with the National Defense Program Guidelines, the Mid-Term Defense Program has shifted its priority from “deterrence by presence” to “effective response,” and has placed emphasis on the improvement of readiness and mobility, an integrated operation of the GSDF, the MSDF and the ASDF through their joint operations, and the acquisition of new capabilities in line with technological development. Six policies, listed below, form the basis of the program intended to build-up Japan[,]s defense capability in an appropriate manner. 1) Establishment of multi-functional, flexible and effective defense capabilities 2) Organizational reviews of the Defense Ministry and SDF 3) Enhancement of fundamental defense capabilities through joint operations and strengthening of intelligence functions 4) Promotion of various measures that support defense capabilities, such as rational and efficient procurement of defense equipment 5) Further strengthening of the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements 6) Efforts to streamline and increase efficiency of defense capabilities **2. Organizational Review of the Defense Ministry and SDF** The Mid-Term Defense Program calls for an organizational review of the Defense Ministry and the SDF, as shown below, as a means of swiftly and efficiently transforming their structure into one in which new defense capabilities specified under the National Defense Program Guidelines can be acquired. 1) Ideal structure of internal bureaus will be studied in order to improve and strengthen organizations in ----- charge of administrative defense policies, and necessary steps will be taken. 2) The Joint Staff will be established and the Staff Offices of the three SDF services will be reorganized in order to reinforce the joint operations system. Based on the achievement of the joint operations, evaluations of operations will be undertaken and measures necessary to increase effectiveness will be taken. The Defense Intelligence Headquarters will be placed under the direct authority of the Director-General of the Defense Agency at the time. 3) The GSDF, the MSDF, and the ASDF will shift to the structure shown in Chapter 2, Section 2, Fig. II-2-2-5 following the conclusion of the Mid-Term Defense Program. **3. Main Projects Concerning Capabilities of the SDF** Concerning the SDF[,]s defense capabilities, the Mid-Term Defense Program calls for effective response to new threats and diverse contingencies, preparations against full-scale invasion of Japan, proactive efforts on Japan[,]s own initiative to help improve the international security environment, promotion of fundamental defense capabilities, and various measures that support such capabilities. Under the program, the main projects as shown in Fig. II-2-4-1 will be carried out in order to achieve these goals. **4. Measures to Strengthen the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements** Under the new security environment, the following measures will be taken in order to further strengthen the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements and the close relationship with the United States which is backed by the arrangements. 1) Exchange of information and views on the international situation will be enhanced, and strategic dialogue on the general security situation will be continued. 2) Efforts will be made to establish an effective cooperative framework in the field of defense operations. In addition, joint exercises and training will be enhanced. 3) Cooperation in the field of ballistic missile defense (BMD) will be further promoted. 4) Efforts will be made to promote wide-ranging mutual exchanges in the fields of defense equipment and technologies. 5) Measures will be taken to allow smooth and effective stationing of U.S. forces in Japan. 6) Japan will proactively participate in international security efforts and will take measures to enable close collaboration with the United States. ----- ----- **5. Scale of Build-up and Necessary Budget** **1. Scale of Build-up** Fig. II-2-4-2 shows the specific scale of the build-up of main defense equipment needed for the aforementioned main projects being undertaken to improve the SDF[,]s defense capabilities. In accordance with the revised Mid-Term Defense Program (FY 2005-FY 2009) approved by the Security Council and the Cabinet in December of last year, the following changes have been made to the scale of the build-up of major defense equipment as set out in December 2004. **GSDF** (original MTDP) (revised MTDP) - Armored vehicles: 104 vehicles → 96 vehicles - Combat helicopters (AH-64D) : 7 units → 4 units - Transport helicopters (CH-47JA): 11 units → 9 units - Medium-range surface-to-air missiles: 8 companies → 7 companies MSDF (original MTDP) (revised MTDP) - MSDF ship construction (total) : 20 vessels → 17 vessels - Patrol helicopters (SH-60K) : 23 units → 17 units ----- ASDF (original MTDP) (revised MTDP) - Modernization and upgrading of fighter aircraft (F-15) : 26 units → 48 units - Fighter aircraft (F-2) : 22 units → 18 units - New fighter aircraft : 7 units → 0 units - New transport aircraft : 8 units → 0 units - Transport helicopters (CH-47J) : 4 units → 3 units The revised Mid-Term Defense Program stipulates an increase in the scale of plans to modernize and upgrade fighters (F-15). This is aimed to progress the rapid strengthening of Japan`s aerial defense capabilities in response to technological advances achieved by surrounding countries, and to use our main fighter aircraft effectively in the long run by carrying out a short-term and intensive build up of equipment to reduce expenditures. In this project, radar devices and other parts for 38 fighters will be acquired. The specifics of the upgrading of the fighters with these parts will be determined in the Mid-Term Defense Program for FY 2010 onwards. (See Fig. II-2-4-3) ----- **2. Necessary Budget** Although it was envisaged that the total amount of defense-related expenditures required for the implementation of the Mid-Term Defense Program should not exceed about 24.24 trillion yen under FY 2004 prices, this figure was reduced by 600 billion yen in the review of the Mid-Term Defense Program to about 23.64 trillion yen under FY 2004 prices. Expenses to cover the relocation of USFJ to Guam (to reduce the burden on the local community) will amount to around 90 billion yen under FY 2004 prices. This expenditure, which was not anticipated during the formulation of the original Mid-Term Defense Program, has been incorporated into the review. (See Fig. II-2-4-4 and 5) ----- **Section 5. Build-up of Defense Capability for FY 2009** In FY 2009, the quality improvement of Japan[,]s defense capabilities based on the security environment surrounding Japan will be initiated with the modernization and upgrading of fighters (F-15) and other projects. The Ministry of Defense (MOD) will also promote expansion and strengthening of the posture for international peace cooperation activities; responses to new threats and diverse contingencies including attacks by ballistic missiles, terrorists, guerrillas and special operations units; efforts for the development and utilization of space and maritime security; responses to the advancement of military science and technology including research and development of advanced equipment, efforts for the realignment of U.S. forces in Japan, and promotion of measures to reduce the burden of the local communities hosting bases; efforts for human resources enhancement, strengthening of education/research systems and others. Major items planned for the FY 2009 defense build-up program are shown in Fig. II-2-5-1 The MOD has been working on more streamlined and efficient ways for overall equipment procurement, etc, and has set the goal of reducing expenditures14 for research and development, procurement and maintenance of defense equipment by 15% compared with FY 2006 levels by FY 2011. The amount of cost reduction in this Fiscal Year is expected to be approximately 280 billion yen, down by about 13.9%. (See Part III, Chapter 4, Section 1-7, Reference 14-15) CH-47JA with improved engine capacity US-2 search and rescue amphibian E-767 with improved radar function ----- ----- **[COLUMN]** **COMMENTARY** **New Organization of the 15th Brigade** In March next year the 1st combined brigade in Okinawa Prefecture will be abolished and the 15th Brigade will be organized. This is part of the plan to create a posture for effective response to new threats and diverse contingencies, including attack by guerrillas or special operation forces, NBC attack, invasion of remote islands and large-scale/ unconventional disasters, based on the geographic characteristics of the Nansei Islands, which consists of a large number of remote islands spread over a wide area. In organizing the 15th Brigade, an infantry regiment that is expected to play a central role in response to new threats and diverse contingencies will be newly established, while a chemical unit will be newly organized to improve NBC response capabilities. At the same time, necessary functions will be enhanced, such as air fleet posture, and the quality of defense capability will be improved, while enhancing mobility by introducing light armored vehicles and high-mobility multipurpose Emergency airlift of a patient by the GSDF at Miyakojima Island wheeled vehicles. The number of personnel will also increase from about 1,800 to about 2,100. By expanding and strengthening these types of capabilities, the brigade can swiftly deploy its personnel to the disaster area to confirm the situation and conduct rescue operations and providing support to victims. The 15th Brigade will have higher capabilities for responding to new threats and diverse contingencies than the current 1st combined brigade. It will strengthen defense posture in the Nansei Islands. ----- **Section 6. Defense-Related Expenditures** **1. Defense-Related Expenditures and Changes** Defense-related expenditures include spending for maintaining and managing the SDF, improving living conditions in the neighborhoods of defense facilities, and supporting U.S. forces in Japan. The defense-related budget on an expenditure basis for FY 2009 decreased by 39.8 billion yen or 0.8% from the preceding fiscal year for the seventh consecutive year, under the Government[,]s policy to steadily continue to implement the Integrated Reform of Expenditures and Revenues as stipulated in “Basic Policies 200615.” (The budget shown in above excludes costs related to the Special Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO) and costs for reducing the burden on local communities as a part of the U.S. forces realignment). Including 11.2 billion yen in SACO-related expenses and 60.2 billion yen in expenses for reducing the burden on local communities, which is a part of the U.S. forces realignment-related costs, Japan[,]s total defenserelated expenditures for FY 2009 amount to 4,774.1 billion yen, representing a decrease of 0.1% or 5.5 billion yen from the preceding fiscal year. (See Fig. II-2-6-1 and 2) (See Reference 20-21) ----- **2. Breakdown of Defense-Related Expenditures** Defense-related expenditures are broadly classified into “personnel and food provisions expenses,” which cover such items as pay and meals for SDF personnel, and “material expenses,” which finance the repair and maintenance of equipment, purchase of fuel, the education and training of SDF personnel, and the procurement of equipment and others. Material expenses are further classified into “obligatory outlay expenses16,” which are paid under contracts concluded in previous fiscal years, and “general material expenses,” which are paid under current-year contracts. (See Fig. II-2-6-3) The Ministry of Defense terms this classification method as “classification by expenses.” Personnel and food provisions expenses and obligatory outlay expenses, both of which are mandatory expenses, account for 80% or more of the total defense-related budget. A breakdown of general material expenses shows that ongoing or mandatory costs account for a significant portion of the total, including the repair of equipment, education and training of SDF personnel, cost-sharing for the stationing of USFJ, and expenses ----- related to measures to alleviate the burden on local communities hosting U.S. bases in Japan17. Personnel and food provisions expenses decreased by 16.7 billion yen (0.8%) from the previous fiscal year. Obligatory outlay expenses for the year decreased by 31.3 billion yen or 1.8% from the previous year while general material expenses rose by 8.2 billion yen or 0.9% from the previous year18. The breakdown of FY 2009 defense-related expenditures classified by organization, such as the GSDF, MSDF, and ASDF, and also by use, such as maintenance costs and equipment and material purchase expenses is shown in Fig. II-2-6-4. (See Reference 22) **3. Comparison with Other Countries** Understanding the defense expenditures of each country using a single standard is not possible in view of differences in the socioeconomic and budgetary systems. There is not an internationally unified definition of defense expenditures, and breakdowns of defense expenditures are often unclear even in many countries where such data is publicly disclosed. (See Reference 23) Furthermore, though defense expenditures are generally converted into a dollar-termed value for the comparison, defense spending based on this method does not necessarily reflect the precise value resulted from counting each country[,]s price levels. Thus, there are limits to how far a comparison can be significant simply by comparing Japan[,]s defense related expenditures with those of other countries in dollar terms. For reference, Fig. II-2-6-5 displays the defense expenditures of each country shown in dollar terms using the purchasing power parity19 of each country as published by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)20. ----- **[COLUMN]** **The Newly-commissioned Vessels: Hyuuga and Souryuu** **COMMENTARY** **16DDH Hyuuga** _Haruna-class and Shirane-class Helicopter Destroyers (DDH) have aged severely since they have been in_ operation for over a quarter of a century, so they are scheduled for replacement. The successor DDH, Hyuuga, commissioned on March 18 this year, is the first helicopter destroyer with a full-length flush deck from the bow to the stern, which enhances the operational capability of rotary-wing aircraft by, for example, enabling simultaneous operation of three helicopters. Her displacement, 13,950 tons, larger than the incumbent DDH, has enhanced seakeeping ability, which allows an extended operation area and period. Hyuuga is able to serve as headquarters in joint operations, utilizing its sophisticated C4I (Command, Control, Communication, Computer, and Intelligence) function. It is expected, in addition, to serve as a control vessel not only in the defense operations of our country, such as ensuring the safety of marine traffic, but also in operations in response to new threats and diverse contingencies and in international peace cooperation activities by using its functions such as enhanced medical equipment, including an operating theatre. _Hyuuga is the first destroyer which has a_ compartment for women. About twenty MSDF female personnel, including officers, were assigned to a destroyer for the first time, and they are expected to build their careers together with _Hyuuga. Increasing the number of destroyers with_ compartments for women in the future will expand the world in which MSDF female personnel can play an active role. **16SS Souryuu** Ever since the first submarine manufactured in Japan after the war was commissioned in 1960, MSDF has continued to make significant efforts to improve the MSDF silent force. Today 16 submarines built by Japanese shipyards are in service. The ratio of Japanese-made weapons and equipment on submarines is higher than those on other vessels, because the latest foreign technologies are not released due to the strategic nature of submarines and because Japan has world-level technologies to build advanced conventional submarines. _Souryuu was put into service on March 30 this year to take over an aging submarine. She is equipped_ with AIP (Air Independent Propulsion), so she has the capability to remain submerged for a long time. She has an X-shaped rudder, an improved sonar system, a new type of periscope and acoustic tiles. This new equipment makes _Souryuu a remarkably capable_ submarine in all aspects: maneuver, search, attack, stealth features and so on. The “Souryuu” was built by integrating advanced Japanese technologies and she will perform her duty in all situations from surveillance in peace time to operations in times of emergency. ----- **Notes:** 1) See 2) See 3) “On Introduction of Ballistic Missile Defense System and Other Measures” (approved by Cabinet) (See Reference 28), Report by the Council on Security and Defense Capabilities , etc. 4) Defined in the Cabinet decision referenced in Note 3) as “Increased proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles, new threats including activities by international terrorist organizations and others, and diverse situations in which peace and security are affected.” 5) (1) Not designed to directly counter military threats (2) The portion of the concept stating that Japan will maintain defense capabilities based on strategic environments and geographical characteristics in order to prevent invasion is deemed to remain effective and thus will be sustained under the new security environment. 6) Regarding the contents of talks Japan held with the United States based on ideas shown in the National Defense Program Guidelines, see Part III, Chapter 2, Section 2. 7) The Mid-Term Defense Program (FY 2005-FY 2009) stipulates that the Government of Japan will improve the research and education function of the National Institute for Defense, a think tank-like institute of the Japanese Defense Ministry, regarding security policy. 8) Major equipment of the MSDF (Aegis-equipped destroyers: four vessels) and major units of the ASDF (Air-warning control units: seven warning groups and four warning squadrons; surface-to-air guided missile units: three groups). For development of the BMD system, see Part III, Chapter 1, Section 2. 9) Total costs of defense equipment that becomes necessary throughout the full lifecycle of brainstorming sessions, the development process, mass production, operations (including maintenance and repair costs) and equipment scrapping. 10) Based on this statement, it was decided on December 24, 2005 by the Security Council and the Cabinet that the joint Japan-U.S. technical research on a sea-based midcourse system of the BMD would be succeeded by joint Japan-U.S. development in FY 2006. In a statement issued by the Chief Cabinet Secretary on the same day, it was stated that “weapons required by the United States for the purpose of joint Japan-U. S. development shall be provided under strict control and also upon coordination with the United States regarding a framework for provision of weapons.” Following this statement, the Exchange of Notes concerning the Transfer of Arms and Military Technologies was concluded by the Japanese and U.S. Governments in June of 2006. The exchange provides a framework for enabling the transfer of weapons and weapons technologies designed for the joint Japan-U.S. BMD development, as well as weapon technologies that were subject to transfer under the previous Exchange of Notes concerning the Transfer of Military Technologies. (See Part III, Chapter 1, Section 2-1 and Part III, Chapter 2, Section 3-5) 11) In June 2006, Japan decided to provide patrol vessels, which fall under the category of weapons and others under the Three Principles on Arms Export, to Indonesia as grant aid meant to support the country in its efforts to control and prevent terrorism and piracy. A statement issued at that time by the Chief Cabinet Secretary stated that the transfer of the patrol vessels was exempted from the Three Principles on Arms Export on the condition that an international agreement is concluded with the recipient country to ensure that the vessels are not used for purposes other than controlling and preventing terrorism and piracy and that the country does not transfer the vessels to a third party without Japan[,]s prior consent. 12) See 13) See 14) Amount of cost reduction = Initial amount (theoretical figure prior to the introduction of efficiency ----- improvement methods) − Actual expenditure 15) As a part of their efforts to restore sound fiscal standing, the Government and ruling coalition parties conducted discussions and studies on the proposed unified reform of the nation[,]s spending and revenue structures. As a result, specific measures to reform defense-related expenditures were laid out in the Basic Policies 2006 for Economic and Fiscal Management and Structural Reform (Cabinet endorsement on July 7, 2006). 16) Procurement of main front-line defense equipment, such as vessels and aircraft, and the construction of accommodation for SDF personnel, can take several years. In these cases, the fiscal year in which the contract is concluded is different to the fiscal year in which the payment to the contractor is made. Therefore, first of all, the maximum future (basically within five years) payment amount is appropriated in the budget as act of bearing liabilities with national treasury funds (budget authority only to incur obligations is granted, i.e., the MOD is able to conclude a contract but not to make payment). Then, based on such budgeting, in principle, in the fiscal year that construction is completed or that equipment is procured, expenses necessary for payment are allocated as budget expenditure (budget authority to incur obligations and make payment is granted, i.e., the MOD is able to conclude contracts and allocate budget expenditure). Budget expenditure for payments incurred under contracts concluded in previous fiscal years is called “obligatory outlay expenses,” while expenditure for which the payment period has yet to come is termed “future obligation.” 17) A typical cost under this category is expenses for installation of a sound-proof system in residences located near U.S. bases. 18) The comparison with the previous year does not account for SACO-related expenses and the U.S. forces realignment-related expenses (portion meant to reduce the burden on the local community). 19) A gauge that measures each country[,]s ability to purchase assets or services by taking into account their respective price levels. 20) The table excludes Russia and China, for which no OECD data on purchasing power parity exist. For changes in defense expenditures of each country in its local currency, see Part I, Chapter 2 and Reference 23. ----- ## Part III **Measures for Defense of Japan** ### Chapter 1 **Operations of Self-Defense Forces for Defense of Japan and Responses to Diverse Situations** **Section 1. Frameworks for Responses to Armed Attack Situations** **Section 2. Effective Responses to New Threats and Diverse Contingencies** **Section 3. Preparation against Full-Scale Aggression** ----- **Section 1. Frameworks for Responses to Armed Attack Situations** In the administrative policy speech of 2002, then Prime Minister Koizumi clearly stated that the Government would seek the concrete development of legal systems “so as to advance building of a nation that is strong in emergencies.” In light of this, three legislations for responses to situations were enacted in 2003. Furthermore, seven legislations for responses to situations were enacted in 2004 and three related treaties were ratified in 2004. With this, a basis for emergency legislation1 was established. The development of these legal systems reflects many of results of the so-called “Emergency Legislation Study”, which had been conducted by the (then) Defense Agency since 1977. (See Fig. III-1-1-1) It is of utmost importance for the national government to establish a national response framework as a basis for an SDF operational structure, to deal with serious situations which threaten the peace and security of the country and its people, such as armed attacks against Japan. This establishment enables an effective response to armed attack situations and anticipated situations (both to armed attack situations2 and to situations where armed attacks are anticipated3) and contributes to the deterrence of an armed attack, and is also vital from the perspective of achieving civilian control in an armed attack situation. This section outlines the key aspects of Japan[,]s response framework in the event of an armed attack situation, and the SDF operational structure that is based on this framework. ----- **1. The Framework for Responses to Armed Attack Situations** **1. Responses to Armed Attack Situations** The Armed Attack Situation Response Law4 determines the fundamental nature of Japan[,]s response to armed attack situations and defines basic principles, basic policies (the Basic Response Plan) and the responsibilities of national and local governments in the event of an armed attack situation. Based on this legislation and on other emergency legislation, such as the Civil Protection Law, the relevant organizations (designated government institutions, local governments and designated public institutions5) cooperate to implement coordinated response measures. The establishment of this legislative framework enables the country as a whole to implement a thorough response to armed attack situations. (See Fig. III-1-1-2) (See Reference 24-25) **(1) Response Measures** When responding to armed attack situations, the designated government institutions, local governments, and designated public institutions will implement the following countermeasures based on legal provisions between the period of formulation and termination of the Basic Response Plan. **a. Measures to Bring Armed Attack Situations to an End Depending on the Progress of the Situation** 1) The use of military force, unit deployment and other activities conducted by the SDF; 2) Provision of materials, facilities and services and other measures to facilitate the smooth and efficient implementation of the SDF and U.S. forces[,] operations; 3) Diplomatic measures other than those described in paragraphs 1) and 2) above. ----- **b. Measures to Protect Lives, Bodies and Properties of the People, and to Minimize the Effects on People[,]s** **Lives and Economy** 1) Warnings, evacuation instructions, rescue of disaster victims, emergency restoration of facilities and installations, and other measures; and 2) Price stabilization, distribution of necessities of daily life, and other necessary measures. **(2) Responsibilities of the National and Local Governments** The responsibilities of the national and local governments as defined in the Armed Attack Situation Response Law are outlined in Fig. III-1-1-3. **(3) Authority of the Prime Minister for Response Measures** Following the stipulation of the Basic Response Plan, for overall promotion of response measures, the Task Force for Armed Attack Situations etc. (the Task Force) will be established within the Cabinet, with the Prime Minister appointed as leader of the Task Force and appropriate Ministers of State as Deputy Chief and other members of the Task Force. If the Prime Minister recognizes that there are obstacles to protecting the lives, bodies, and properties of the people, and to eliminating an armed attack, when necessary response measures under comprehensive coordination are not implemented, he may instruct the head of the local government concerned and other relevant persons to implement the necessary measures. In circumstances where necessary response measures are not implemented or if there is an obstacle to protecting the lives, bodies, and properties of the people, in emergency response situations, the Prime Minister or the Minister of State responsible for operations relating to the relevant countermeasure may take responsibility for and implement the response measures that the local governments or designated public institutions have failed to implement, after notifying the relevant head of local governments or other relevant individual. ----- **(4) Report to the U.N. Security Council** In accordance with Article 51 of the U.N. Charter, the government will immediately report measures it has implemented to terminate armed attacks on Japan to the U.N. Security Council. **2. Responses to Emergency Situations other than Armed Attack Situations** The Armed Attack Situation Response Law provides for appropriate and rapid response measures to be implemented in emergency situations6 other than armed attacks, in order for the government to ensure the peace and independence of the country, and to maintain the security of the country and its people. In addition, based on changes in various situations surrounding Japan, such as the appearance of unidentified vessels or mass terrorism incidents, measures shall be taken including the following: 1) Development of the systems for assembling information, analysis, and situational evaluations; 2) Preparation for formulating response measures in accordance with various situations; 3) Rapid implementation of measures to strengthen levels of coordination between the SDF, the police, the Japan Coast Guard and other relevant organizations. **(1) Emergency Response Situation Response Plan** In an emergency response situation, the Cabinet must decide the following items for those policies concerning emergency response situations (emergency response situation response plan) and must obtain the approval of the plan by the Diet. Also, on the approval of the emergency response situation response plan, the Headquarters for the Emergency Response Situation will be temporarily established within the Cabinet to deal with the relevant situation. 1) Certification of an emergency response situation and the facts supporting the certification; 2) General plan for responses; and 3) Important matters relating to emergency response measures. **(2) Emergency Response Measures** The designated government institutions, local governments, and designated public institutions will implement the following emergency response measures based on legal provisions, during the period between the formulation and termination of an Emergency Response Situation Response Plan: 1) Measures most appropriate to end the emergency response situation and measures to prevent or suppressattacks during emergency response situations. 2) In order to protect the lives, bodies, and properties of the people from attacks or to minimize the impact on their daily lives and economic conditions in emergency response situations, the following measures will also be implemented according to current developments in the emergency response situation: the issuance of warnings, evacuation instructions, the rescue of disaster victims, the emergency restoration of facilities and equipment, etc. **2. Measures Based on the Armed Attack Situation Response Law** **1. Measures to Protect the Lives etc. of the People and to Minimize the Effects on the Daily Lives of the People** Japan established the Civil Protection Law7, which prescribes measures for necessary items to protect the lives etc. of the people in armed attack situations and emergency response situations. (See 3 of this section) ----- **2. Measures to Terminate Armed Attack Situations** **(1) Facilitation of SDF Operations** Japan enacted the Maritime Transportation Restriction Law8, which enables the implementation of measures to restrict the maritime transportation of foreign military supplies in Japanese territorial waters or in international waters surrounding Japan. Furthermore, Japan revised one part of the SDF Law, and special provisions were newly established for the appropriate application of relevant laws, such as measures for the construction of defense facilities prior to issuance of a defense operations order, provisions related to emergency traffic on issuance of a defense operations order, or relating to the Road Law. **(2) Facilitation of U.S. Forces Operations** **a. Japan established the Law Related to Measures Conducted by the Government in Line with U.S. Military** Actions in Armed Attack Situations9, etc. (U.S. Military Actions Related Measures Law). In accordance with the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty, it prescribes measures to be implemented so that U.S. forces may smoothly and effectively take the necessary actions to terminate armed attacks against Japan. **b.** The Diet approved partial amendment of the Agreement between the Government of Japan and the Government of the United States of America Concerning Reciprocal Provision of Logistic Support, Supplies and Services between the SDF of Japan and the Armed Forces of the United States of America (ACSA - Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement)10. The scope of application for this Agreement has been widened so that it now additionally applies to responses to armed attack situations, the efforts of the international community to contribute to global peace and security, and for disaster response measures. Also, the revision of one part of the SDF Law has enabled the SDF to provide logistic support, supplies, and services to U.S. forces implementing these actions. (See Chapter 2, Section 3) **(3) Other (Coordination of the Use of Facilities of Ports and Airfields, Roads and Others)** Japan established the Law Regarding the Use of Specific Public Facilities11, ensuring that the SDF and U.S. forces[,] actions and measures to protect the people of Japan can be implemented appropriately and promptly. The Law enables the comprehensive coordination of specific public facilities etc. (ports, airfields, roads, territorial waters and airspace, and radio frequencies) that may be required in armed attack situations. **3. Guarantee of Appropriate Implementation of International Humanitarian Laws** **(1) Japan established the Law Concerning the Treatment of Prisoners of War and other Detainees in Armed** Attack Situations (Prisoners of War Law)12. The Law was created to ensure that prisoners are always treated humanely in armed attack situations and to ensure that prisoners[,] lives, bodies, health, and dignity are always respected and protected from any violations or threats. **(2) Japan established the Law Concerning Punishment of Grave Breaches of the International Humanitarian** Law13 prescribing appropriate punishment for “grave breaches” of international humanitarian laws applicable to international armed conflicts. **(3) Along with these individual emergency legislations, the Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions14** of 12 August 1949 and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I15) and the Protocol Additional to the Geneva Convention of 12 August, 1949 and relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II16), which are the main International Humanitarian Laws, were ratified. ----- **(4) Japan has established legislation to protect cultural properties during armed conflict establishing a system to** provide international protection for those cultural properties that can be considered valuable cultural assets for the entire human race, as well as legislation to cooperate with the International Criminal Court which ensures the appropriate implementation of International Criminal Court regulations. **(5) In addition to these laws, three treaties relating to the protection of cultural properties at a time of armed** conflict and the regulations of the International Criminal Court were concluded in 2007. **4. High Readiness for Armed Attack Situations** With the passing of the emergency legislation, Japan has established a legal foundation but still needs to confirm the legislation[,]s effectiveness and also ceaselessly strive to maintain the effectiveness of the required operational infrastructure to ensure an appropriate response in an ever-changing security environment. As part of these efforts, during peacetime, the Special Advisory Committee for Contingency Planning, under the jurisdiction of the Security Council, will study responses to emergency situations, such as armed attacks, terrorist attacks, or the appearance of unidentified vessels. In addition, it will formulate plans for the specific response measures to be implemented by designated government institutions, local governments, and designated public institutions in armed attack situations. The Council will also take steps to formulate role-related plans and ensure that these plans are reflected into policies and operations. The government also works to utilize a range of opportunities to educate the public on all of the important measures that it will implement to protect the lives, bodies, and properties of the people in armed attack situations. Also, it verifies the effectiveness of its operational structure through methods such as training, and maintains high levels of readiness for armed attack situations. **3. Efforts for Civil Protection** **1. Measures for Civil Protection in Armed Attack Situations** All organizations and functions of the government will implement their measures for civil protection in armed attack situations (civil protection measures) based on the Basic Response Plan and the basic guidelines for civil protection in armed attack situations. Also, the country as a whole will give its unfailing support for all civil protection measures implemented by local governments and designated public institutions. Local governments will implement their respective civil protection measures based on the national government policies, and will be responsible for the overall coordination of the civil protection measures to be implemented by relevant authorities in their jurisdiction. **2. The Basic Guidelines for Civil Protection** In 2005, the government established the Basic Guidelines for Civil Protection (hereinafter the “Basic Guidelines”) 17, based on Article 32 of the Civil Protection Law. Designated government institutions and prefectural governments, etc. established the plan concerning civil protection (the Civil Protection Plan) based on the Civil Protection Law and the Basic Guidelines. **3. Roles of the SDF in Civil Protection** In 2005, the then Defense Agency and Defense Facilities Administration Agency, both designated government institutions, established the Civil Protection Plan18, based on the Civil Protection Law and the Basic Guidelines. The Plan included measures to be implemented in full force by the SDF to terminate armed attacks, a primary mission of the SDF. In addition, the Plan described civil protection measures to be implemented within feasible range, relating to evacuation, relief support, and responses to armed attack disasters. (See Reference 26) ----- **[COLUMN]** **COMMENTARY** **Civil Protection Training in Preparation for Biological or Nuclear Terrorist Attacks** In order to strengthen coordination among relevant organizations and to boost collective capability to address emergency response situations, the Ministry of Defense and the SDF have, since 2005, participated in Civil Protection Joint Training programs organized by the central government and local municipalities under the Law Concerning Measures for Protection of the Civilian Population in Armed Attack Situations (Civil Protection Law). In the face of a growing possibility, in recent years, of terrorist acts employing biological agents such as the smallpox virus or radioactive substances such as cesium 137, Japan[,]s response Civil protection training in Ehime Prefecture capability against terrorism employing such weapons must be urgently upgraded and guidelines for joint operation with relevant organizations established. In FY 2008, in order to inspect and verify operational effectiveness, civil protection joint training simulating a terrorist attack with the smallpox virus was carried out in Miyazaki and Ehime Prefectures and similar training simulating a “dirty bomb” (a bomb that scatters radioactive material) incident were held in Kanagawa Prefecture with the participation of Ground, Marine and Air Defense Forces in Regional Defense Bureaus concerned. Through these training operations it has become clear that it is vital that there be comprehensive cooperation and coordination with organizations possessing specialized expertise, such as the Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare, health centers, the National Institute of Infectious Diseases and other medical institutions in the case of a biological terrorist attack, the Nuclear Safety Commission, the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology and the National Institute of Radiological Sciences in the case of a nuclear terrorist attack. In addition, coordination with the police and fire fighting authorities is necessary in the case of a natural disaster. **(1) Civil Protection Dispatch** **a. Dispatch Procedure** For situations where it is recognized that a dispatch is required, the Minister of Defense may issue a civilian protection dispatch order to dispatch relevant units to implement civil protection measures following a request by a prefectural governor or the Task Force Chief19. (See Fig. III-1-1-4) Also, when a defense operations order has been issued in an armed attack situation, or on the issuance of a public security operations order in an emergency response situation, the Minister of Defense may implement civil protection measures or emergency response protection measures if they constitute a part of the consistent defense or public security operations strategy. **b. Authorities** Only in cases when police officers, etc.,20 are not at the scene, the SDF personnel ordered for a civil protection dispatch operation are authorized to execute evacuation and other measures as prescribed by the Law Concerning the Execution of Duties of Police Officials. In addition, only in cases when the municipal mayors, etc. are not at the scene, the SDF personnel ordered for a civil protection dispatch operation are authorized to execute evacuation instructions and other measures. ----- **c. Temporary Organization of Units** During civil protection dispatch operations, the Minister of Defense may temporarily organize special units based on necessity and call SDF ready and reserve personnel to duty. **d. Emergency Response Protection Measures** The same provisions as measures in armed attack situations, based on the Civil Protection Law and the Basic Guidelines etc., shall apply for measures in emergency response situations. **(2) SDF Measures** **a. Evacuation of Residents** The SDF will collect and distribute essential information, coordinate with relevant organizations, and provide guidance and transport services for the evacuation of residents. **b. Relief of Evacuated Residents** Centered on measures for the relief of human life such as search and rescue, and following a request from the Task Force Chief or other authorized persons, the SDF will implement measures to support the lives of the people when necessary such as distributing hot meals and supplying water. **c. Responses to Armed Attack Disasters** The SDF will carry out the following response measures: confirming the extent of damage, providing monitoring support, implementing measures for relief of human lives, preventing damage expansion, and removing dangerous substances as a result of nuclear, biological or chemical (NBC) attacks. Otherwise, the SDF will implement other important measures to ensure the security of facilities such as those related to daily life. ----- **d. Emergency Recovery** While implementing emergency recovery measures for SDF facilities and equipment based on a request from a prefectural governor etc., support operations will be conducted including the removal of dangerous wreckage. **4. Activities by the Ministry of Defense and the SDF to Facilitate the Peacetime Civil Protection Measures** **(1) Participation in Training for Civil Protection** In order to appropriately and promptly implement civil protection measures in armed attack situations, it is essential to coordinate with other ministries and agencies, local governments, and other relevant organizations. The Ministry of Defense and the SDF actively participate and cooperate in civil protection training implemented by government organizations or local governments. The Ministry of Defense and the SDF intend to continue such efforts to strengthen coordination and response capabilities. (See Reference 27) **(2) Coordination with Local Governments in Peacetime** During peacetime, the Ministry of Defense and the SDF closely coordinate with local governments etc. The Provincial Liaison & Coordination Division was established within the GSDF Army Headquarters to achieve effective implementation for civil protection measures through close coordination. To strengthen functions relating to coordination and cooperation with local governments etc., a Civil Protection and Disaster Countermeasures Liaison Coordination Officer post was established in each SDF Provincial Cooperation Office. In addition, GSDF, MSDF, and ASDF members have been appointed as members of the civil protection consultative committees of prefectures and municipalities, which were established to actively solicit opinions from a wide range of citizens and to coordinate the implementation of civil protection measures. Moreover, a staff of each Regional Defense Bureau, which is a designated local administrative organization, SDF personnel participating in civil protection training in Fukui is appointed as a member of the Committee. prefecture **4. The Joint Operational Structure of the Self-Defense Forces** In 2006, the Ministry of Defense and the SDF shifted to a joint operational structure. This has established the basis for unified SDF operations among the GSDF, MSDF, and ASDF in peacetime, and is enabling the SDF to fulfill its expanding range of already diversified duties in an effective and prompt manner. **1. Outline of Joint Operational Structure** **(1) Role of the Chief of Staff, Joint Staff** **a. The Chief of Staff, Joint Staff develops a joint operations concept for the operations, and solely supports the** Minister of Defense on operations from a military expert[,]s perspective. **b. The Minister[,]s commands concerning the operations of SDF shall be delivered through the Chief of Staff, Joint** Staff and orders concerning operations of SDF shall be executed by the Chief of Joint Staff. In doing this, the Minister[,]s commands and orders shall be delivered through the Chief of Joint Staff not only in cases where a joint task force21 is organized, but also in cases where a single SDF unit is employed to take responses. ----- **(2) Relationship between Chief of Staff, Joint Staff and Other Chiefs of Staff** The Joint Staff undertakes the functions relating to those SDF operations that were transferred and consolidated from the GSDF, MSDF and ASDF Staff. The GSDF, MSDF and ASDF Staff Offices continue to undertake functions for unit maintenance, such as personnel, building-up defense capability, and education and training. In addition, from the perspective of facilitating the smooth SDF joint operations, the Chief of Staff, Joint Staff creates medium- to long-term defense concepts and strategies, and annual planning policies to clarify the requirements of the GSDF, MSDF and ASDF functions. Each of the Chiefs of Staff of the GSDF, MSDF and ASDF will implement all measures in accordance with these plans. The information necessary for the SDF to carry out its operations is provided by the Defense Intelligence Headquarters to the Joint Staff and the relevant units. (See Fig. III-1-1-5) **2. Establishment of Infrastructure to Enhance the Joint Operational Structure** Within the joint operational structure it is essential that the Joint Staff and each SDF unit maintain systems to communicate commands accurately and to share information promptly. With this in mind, in March 2008, the SDF Command and Communication Squadron was established to strengthen communication functions. Also, a wide-ranging and mobile information communications structure has been created employing information and ----- communication technologies available at home, overseas. Furthermore, at the unit level, commanders22 of major units who may be required to take command of a joint task force will create plans for such force[,]s operations during peacetime. Also, they need to maintain a posture capable of executing duties through joint training and other methods. For this purpose, staff from other SDF branches is to be stationed at major command headquarters during peacetime, and if necessary, the number of Joint Staff personnel will be increased. Deliberation continues aiming for a more effective joint operational structure and necessary measures to be taken, while bearing in mind past accomplishments. This deliberation includes topics such as the improvement of education and training, the SDF headquarter structure, and the development of human resources and common equipment to fit joint operations. **3. Placing the Defense Intelligence Headquarters under the Direct Command of the Minister of Defense** Following the shift to a joint operations posture, the Defense Intelligence Headquarters, which had been under the control of the Joint Staff Council (at that time), became a special institution under the direct control of the Minister of Defense. Its position and role were identified as the central intelligence organization of the Ministry of Defense. This change has enabled the intelligence organizations of the Ministry of Defense to strengthen the following functions: to collect extensive intelligence and carry out high quality analysis based on the intelligence needs of each government ministry and agency and more prompt, accurate, and direct reporting to the Minister of Defense. ----- **Section 2. Effective Responses to New Threats and Diverse Contingencies** The primary role of the National Defense Program Guidelines is to provide an effective defense response to new threats and diverse contingencies. This section explains the role of the SDF in response to new threats and diverse contingencies under the joint operations posture as well as efforts which the Ministry of Defense and the SDF have made. (See Part II, Chapter 2, Section 2) **1. Response to Ballistic Missile Attacks** While various efforts have been made by the international community for the non-proliferation of ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction, proliferation still continues. Among the countries surrounding Japan, Russia and China have deployed quite a few ballistic missiles. In 2006, North Korea launched seven ballistic missiles, and in April 2009, announced plans for a test launch of a “communications satellite,” which was then launched on April 5, 2009. These events serve to reconfirm that the threat from ballistic missiles is a reality. (See Part I, Combat Information Center (CIC) of the Aegis destroyer Chokai in an Chapter 2, Section 2) (See Reference 1-2) SM-3 flight test Against this background, Japan began developing a ballistic missile defense (BMD) system in FY 2004 in order to improve readiness in response to ballistic missile attacks. Necessary amendments were subsequently made to the SDF Law in 2005. In the same year, the Security Council and Cabinet decided to begin Japan-U.S. joint development of advanced BMD interceptor missiles. Following the Kongo Aegis Destroyer[,]s23 successful flight test of a Standard Missile-3 (SM-3) in 2007, the _Chokai Aegis Destroyer conducted a flight test of a SM-3 in the sea off Hawaii[,]s Kauai Island in November_ 2008. The test proved that the Aegis BMD system on the Chokai functioned properly, although the SM-3 failed to intercept a simulated ballistic missile target due to a malfunctioning of the warhead. In September 2008, the Japanese ASDF successfully shot down a simulated ballistic missile target using Patriot Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3)24 interceptors at White Sands Missile Range New Mexico, U.S. In addition to the assignment of ballistic missile capability to the two Aegis vessels, the success in the flight test of the Patriot PAC-3 shows that Japan is steadily building up its own multi-tier defense system against ballistic missile attacks. (See Fig. III-1-2-1) **1. Japan[,]s Ballistic Missile Defense** **(1) General Situation of BMD System Development** **a. Basic Concept** The BMD system has been developed by Japan and serves to improve the capability of the Aegis destroyers and Patriot systems currently maintained by the SDF. Furthermore, with JADGE (Japan Aerospace Defense Ground Environment), the basic concept is efficient execution of a multi-tier defense system with upper tier interception by Aegis destroyers in coordination with lower-tier interception by Patriot PAC-3. (See Reference 28-29) ----- **b. Configuration of the BMD System** Japan[,]s BMD system consists of Aegis destroyers to intercept ballistic missiles at the mid-course phase, Patriot PAC-3 to intercept ballistic missiles at the terminal phase, the sensor systems to detect and track ballistic missiles, and the command, control, battle management and communications systems to systematically counter ballistic missiles by effectively coordinating the weapons systems and the sensor systems. (See Fig. III-1-2-2) **c. Policy for Introducing the BMD System** In developing the BMD system, existing equipment will be utilized from the perspective of developing an effective and efficient system while reducing costs. Beginning with capability improvements of the Aegis destroyers and Patriot system, an improved model of the current ground radar system will also be employed in the area of sensors. In addition, a newly developed radar (FPS-5)25, which is able to deal with both conventional airborne threats (aircraft and others) and ballistic missiles, has been introduced. The same also applies to JADGE. ----- **d. Development Status of the BMD System** By the end of FY 2008, the MSDF equipped its _Kongo and_ _Chokai Aegis destroyers with SM-3s, and the_ ASDF deployed Patriot PAC-3 to four fire units of the 1st Air Defense Missile Group (Narashino, Takeyama, Kasumigaura and Iruma), one fire unit of the 4th Air Defense Missile Group (Gifu), and Air Defense Missile Training Group and 2nd Technical School (Hamamatsu). By way of continuing the development of the BMD system, the Ministry of Defense and the SDF have the present objective of constructing a system by FY 2011 that links four Aegis destroyers (with added BMD capability), 16 Patriot PAC-3 FUs26 (Air Defense Missile Groups and educational expenses), four FPS-5 radars and seven FPS-3 upgraded radars (improved model) through various types of command, control, battle management and communications systems, such as JADGE. In this fiscal year[,]s budget, a total of approximately 87.3 billion yen (contract basis amount, excluding initial expenses) has been appropriated for development of BMD system outlays for 1) enhancement and strengthening of the operational basis 2) continued development of intercept systems. ----- **[COLUMN]** **VOICE** **Voice of SDF Personnel Engaged in PAC-3 Flight Test** Staff Sergeant Kenichi Sato Fire Platoon, Fourth Air Defense Missile Unit, First Air Defense Missile Group, ASDF I am assigned to the Fourth Air Defense Missile Unit of the First Air Defense Missile Group, whose principal mission is to defend the Tokyo metropolitan area with Patriot PAC-3 against ballistic missile attacks, etc. Patriot PAC-3 is a system that assumes the role of Japan's ballistic missile defense (BMD) at the final stage. In order to confirm that it can put out the maximum capabilities, it is necessary to conduct tests in which missiles are actually launched to intercept targets. However, they cannot be conducted inside Japan due to limitations on maneuver area. We conduct missile launches in the U.S. In September 2008, Japan's first Patriot PAC-3 flight test was held at White Sands Missile Range in the U.S. I felt that this opportunity would allow me to show what I had learnt during my regular training so I was very enthusiastic about participating in the test. As a result I was chosen to participate in the flight test unit. Since it was Japan's first flight test and also because it was held in the U.S., there were many issues that needed to be dealt with. However, our unit was able to launch the PAC-3 missile and successfully intercept the target, thanks to our concerted efforts. I will never forget the sense of accomplishment I felt at that time. In addition, I am confident that our success proved to demonstrate the capabilities of the ASDF not only to people in Japan but also to the world. The difficulty of intercepting a ballistic missile is likened to "shooting down a bullet fired from a gun with another gun." However, I realized that an extremely reliable response with a ballistic missile defense system is possible by means of the precise operation of the Patriot PAC-3, which consists of a radar that detects the missile, a firing control device that accurately computes the missile trajectory and, ultimately, the PAC-3 missile, which independently intercepts a ballistic missile. In the future, I hope to hand down the knowledge and skills acquired through this flight test to our juniors in order to contribute to the further reinforcement of my unit and to the advancement of Japan's BMD capability. Staff Sergeant Sato in front of a PAC-3 PAC-3 missile on impact ----- **(2) Future Capability Improvement** The proliferation of ballistic missile technology continues and the possibility remains that in the future, ballistic missiles will be furnished with countermeasures to avoid interception. Furthermore, expansion of the defense coverage and improvement of interception probability are also required in response to conventional ballistic missiles. Thus, it is essential to improve the kinetic performance of interceptor missiles and undertake initiatives to advance the efficiency and reliability of the BMD system. From this perspective, with regards to the state of capability improvements for Aegis destroyers and the Patriot system, the “Mid-Term Defense Program (FY 2005-FY 2009)” states those necessary measures will be undertaken following consideration on the state of development in the United States. In addition, a Japan-U.S. cooperative development project concerning an advanced interceptor missile commenced from 2006 based on results obtained from Japan-U.S. cooperative BMD research which had started in 1999. Thus, efforts FPS-5 deployed on Shimo-koshiki island to improve future capabilities are being made. (See Fig. III-1-2-3 and 4) **2. Improvement in Legislation and Operations** **(1) Legal Measures regarding Responses to Ballistic Missiles** In response to the event that ballistic missiles or other objects27 are launched toward Japan as armed attacks, defense operation orders for armed attack situations will be ordered and the missiles will be intercepted. On the other hand, in the event ballistic missiles are launched towards Japan and an armed attack situation is not acknowledged, the SDF may take the following measures giving adequate consideration 1) to provide a prompt and appropriate response and 2) to ensure civilian control. **a. When the Minister of Defense determines that there is a possibility that ballistic missiles or other objects** will come flying toward Japan, the Minister of Defense may order SDF units to take measures to destroy the ballistic missiles upon approval of the Prime Minister28. **b. Furthermore, in addition to the above, there may be cases where the situation changes suddenly, such as when** almost no information is available concerning missile launches or when missiles are launched mistakenly or accidentally and there is no time for the Minister of Defense to obtain Prime Ministerial approval. In preparation for such events, the Minister of Defense may prepare emergency response procedures approved by the Prime Minister during peacetime. Then, in accordance with these emergency response procedures, the Minister of Defense may issue an order in advance to SDF units, within a specified period of time, to destroy ballistic missiles when they actually do fly toward Japan. (See Fig. III-1-2-5) (See Reference 30) ----- ----- **(2) Concept of Ensuring Civilian Control of Military** Responses against ballistic missiles require the government to assess the possibility of missiles flying toward Japan by comprehensively analyzing and evaluating the specific situation and international circumstances. In addition to the SDF destroying the missile, it is also necessary to alert and evacuate the people for their protection, undertake diplomatic activities, information gathering by the departments concerned and reinforce readiness for emergencies. In view of the gravity of such incidents and the necessity of action by the Japanese government as a whole, Prime Ministerial approval (Cabinet decision) and orders by the Minister of Defense are required so that the Cabinet and Minister of Defense may sufficiently fulfill their responsibilities. Furthermore, the participation of the Diet is also defined with a provision in the law on reporting to the Diet. (See Reference 32) **(3) Operational Efforts** **a. Responses to Ballistic Missiles through Joint Operations** In cases where a BMD Joint Task Force is formed to deal with incoming ballistic missiles, the Commander of the Air Defense Command is to serve as Commander of the Joint Task Force, and various postures for effective defense are to be put in place under a unified command through JADGE, etc. Furthermore, the GSDF will play a leading role in dealing with damage caused by the impact of ballistic missiles. **b. Japan-U.S. Cooperation in Response to Ballistic Missile Attacks** Further cooperation with U.S. forces in Japan as well as with the U.S. government is required for efficient and effective operation of the BMD system. Thus, related measures were agreed upon at the Japan-U.S. Security Consultative Committee (2+2) meetings in 2005, 2006 and 2007. Also, at the Japan-U.S. defense ministers meeting in November 2007, with progress in development of the BMD system, both Japan and the U.S. agreed to advance cooperation with a focus on operational aspects. (See Chapter 2, Section 3 and Chapter 2, Section 3) ----- **3. Missile Defense of the United States and Japan-U.S. BMD Cooperation** **(1) Missile Defense of the United States** The United States aims to develop a multi-tier missile defense system in which interception systems suited for each of the 1) boost phase, 2) mid-course phase and 3) terminal phase of the ballistic missile flight path are combined for complementary missile defense. These systems are being deployed as they become available29. (See Fig. III-1-2-6) Japan and the U.S. have formed a close coordination concerning ballistic missile defense, and a part of the missile defense system possessed by the U.S. is being deployed in our country step by step. To begin with, in June 2006, the USFJ deployed a transportable radar for BMD at the ASDF Shariki sub base (Aomori Prefecture) 30. Also, BMD capability equipped Aegis destroyers have been forward deployed in Japan and surrounding areas since December 2006. Furthermore, in October 2006, Patriot PAC-3 were deployed at Kadena Air Base in Okinawa Prefecture, and in October 2007, a Joint Tactical Ground Station (JTAGS)31 was deployed at Misawa Air Base in Aomori Prefecture. ----- The development of a part of the U.S. missile defense system in our country will serve to secure the safety of the people of Japan. **(2) Japan-U.S. Joint Development of Improved Missiles** In 1998, the government decided to commence Japan-U.S. joint cooperative research on a sea-based upper-tier system in FY 1999. This cooperative research was not aimed for the BMD system which started to be deployed in FY 2004. Rather, this Japan-U.S. joint technical research has been conducted bearing in mind improving the capabilities of interceptor missiles for the far future, and the design, prototype production and necessary testing of four major components32 of the interceptor missiles were completed. Since Japan-U.S. joint cooperative technical research had acquired prospects for solving initial technical issues, in December 2005, the Security Council and Cabinet decided to shift to a joint development phase of the interceptor missile with improved capabilities using the results of this research as the technological foundation. In June 2006, the Japanese and U.S. governments reached official agreement on this matter. In the budget for this fiscal year, approximately 23.9 billion yen was appropriated for the joint development of the future BMD system. (See Fig. III-1-2-7) (See Reference 31) **(3) Relationship to the Three Principles on Arms Exports** Japan[,]s BMD program consists of capability improvements to the Aegis destroyers and Patriot system possessed by Japan, and does not conflict with the Three Principles on Arms Exports. On the other hand, with regard to the Japan-U.S. joint technical development, which is aimed for improved BMD capability for the future, it will be necessary to export arms concerned with BMD from Japan to the U.S., as part of development. In accordance with the Chief Cabinet Secretary[,]s statement made in December 2004, it was ----- determined, when the transition to joint development was decided in December 2005, that the Three Principles on Arms Exports would not apply under the condition that strict controls are maintained and a framework for the provision that arms required to be exported to the U.S. would be developed through coordination with the U.S. In June 2006, letters concerning the provision of arms and arms-related technology to the U.S. were exchanged which established a framework to provide arms and arms-related technology under tight controls− for example, prohibiting use for other purposes and prohibiting the transfer to third countries without Japan[,]s agreement in advance. (See Part II, Chapter 2, Section 2) **(4) Strengthening Japan-U.S. Cooperation on BMD** Since the decision was made to introduce BMD systems to Japan, efforts have been continuously made to strengthen Japan-U.S. BMD cooperation. As a policy for strengthening the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements, the Mid-Term Defense Program states the Government of Japan will strengthen Japan-U.S. bilateral efforts to enhance ballistic missile defense capabilities and promote cooperation with the U.S. in the areas of defense policy, operations, and equipment and technology. Furthermore, the Cabinet decided to exchange letters concerning BMD cooperation between the Minister for Foreign Affairs and the U.S. Ambassador to Japan. A Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) on BMD cooperation was signed between the (then) Japan Defense Agency and the U.S. Department of Defense in 2004. Furthermore, in June 2006, the Minister for Foreign Affairs and the U.S. Ambassador to Japan exchanged a letter concerning BMD cooperation which included cooperation on Japan-U.S. joint development. **4. Response to North Korean Missile Launch** On March 12, 2009 (Japan time, the same shall apply hereinafter in this section), the International Maritime Organization informed member states, including Japan, that it had received communication from North Korea of an intended test launch of a “communications satellite.” According to the information, Pyongyang had designated a part of the Sea of Japan and of the Pacific Ocean as danger zones from April 4 to 8 between 11:00 and 16:00. The Government of Japan announced that a launch of a rocket, even if it was a satellite, would constitute a clear violation of UNSC resolutions 1695 and 1718, which prohibit North Korea from engaging in any ballistic missile programs. The Government of Japan strongly urged Pyongyang to cancel its plan since the launch would be a blow to ongoing efforts such as 6-party talks toward a détente in the Korean Peninsula, and as such, would be detrimental to the peace and stability of the area. On the other hand, since there was a risk of North Korea launching a rocket in spite of Japan[,]s warnings, it was necessary to take all possible measures to protect the safety and security of our country, although it was unlikely that the rocket would fall within Japanese territory. Thus, on March 27, 2009, the Government developed a response policy to the North Korea missile launch at the Security Council of Japan, and the Minister of Defense issued an order for measures to be implemented to destroy ballistic missiles and other objects pursuant to Article 82-2, Paragraph 3 of the Self-Defense Forces Law. The SDF formed a BMD Joint Task Force and dispatched two Aegis destroyers (Kongo and Chokai) equipped with SM-3 missiles to the central Sea of Japan and deployed Patriot PAC-3 units at SDF bases in the Tohoku region (Iwate and Akita) and the Tokyo metropolitan area (Saitama, Chiba and Tokyo) in order to be prepared for objects falling on Japan[,]s territory. It was presumed that a missile that had been launched from North Korea at 11:30 a.m. on April 5, 2009 flew eastward and at around 11:37 a.m. passed over the Tohoku area and headed toward the Pacific. The Ministry of Defense promptly transmitted the information obtained by Shared Early Warning (SEW) and the various radars of the SDF to the Prime Minister[,]s office, etc.33 ----- Moreover, The SDF collected information by aircraft so as to confirm the safety of the Tohoku region. On April 6, 2009, after considering the subsequent circumstances, the Minister of Defense issued an order for the termination of the measures to destroy ballistic missiles or other objects and withdrew SDF forces. The Ministry of Defense then conducted a comprehensive and expert analysis of the missile launched by North Korea, which was released on May 15, 200934. (See Part I, Chapter 2, Section 2) PAC-3 missiles deployed in the Tohoku region **2. Response to Attacks by Guerillas and Special Operations Forces** Since Japan is highly urbanized, small-scale infiltrations and attacks can pose a serious threat to the peace and security. Such attacks may take various forms including illegal actions by armed agents35, and destructive actions by guerillas and special operations forces which constitute a form of armed attacks on the territory of Japan. **1. Responses to Attacks by Guerillas and Special Operations Forces** **(1) Basic Concept** In the event of an armed attack on Japan by guerillas or special operations forces, Japan will respond by means of defense operations. Forms of armed attacks on Japan include 1) destruction of facilities and attacks on people by irregular forces such as guerillas and 2) subversive activities, assassination of important figures and raids on operation centers by regular forces such as special operations forces. **(2) Operations to Respond to Attacks by Guerillas and Special Operations Forces** In operations to respond to attacks by guerillas or special operations forces, an intelligence gathering posture is established to detect guerillas or special operations forces at the earliest possible time to be captured or destroyed. It is important at this time to quickly gain control of the situation to minimize damage from assault. **a. Search and Detection of Guerillas and Special Operations Forces** Efforts will be made to detect various types of vessels and submarines, which transport guerillas or special operations forces, at an early stage and interdict them at sea through patrols36 in surrounding waters by escort ships or MSDF/ASDF aircraft. When the possibility of infiltration into Japanese territory by guerillas and special operations forces is suspected, GSDF patrol units will engage in warning and surveillance activities in coastal areas. In the event of an infiltration, patrol and air units will search and detect the guerillas or special operations forces. Furthermore, as required, a guarding posture will be established for the prompt deployment of guarding units to secure key facilities. **b. Capture and Defeat of Guerillas and Special Operations Forces** In the event that guerillas or special operations forces are detected, combat forces will be promptly assembled in the area to besiege them, upon which they will be captured or destroyed. (See Fig. III-1-2-8) (See Reference 32-33) ----- GSDF ranger training in a mountain area ----- **2. Response to Armed Agents** **(1) Basic Concept** While the police assume primary responsibility for responding to illegal activities of armed agents, the SDF will respond in principle as shown in Fig. III-1-2-9, in accordance with situational developments. (See Reference 32-33) **(2) Measures for Strengthening Cooperation with the Police** **a. Establishing the Framework for Strengthening Cooperation** For the SDF to deal with armed agents it is important to cooperate with the police agency. Accordingly, in 2000, the Basic Agreement concluded in 1954 between the (then) JDA and National Public Safety Commission, to provide cooperation procedures in case of public security operations to suppress mass violence was revised, enabling its application to illegal activities by armed agents37. In addition, local agreements were concluded in 2002 regarding public security operations between GSDF divisions/brigades and prefectural police forces. Furthermore, guidelines were jointly formulated with the National Police Agency in 2004 for dealing jointly with public security dispatches in the event of armed agent concerns. **b. Joint Exercises with the Police** By July 2005, the GSDF divisions/brigades and each prefectural police force, which are parties to the local agreements, had conducted joint map maneuver exercises to strengthen mutual cooperation at the local level in preparation for dealing with armed agents. Based on the results of these table-top exercises, in October 2005, the Northern Army and Hokkaido prefectural police conducted joint field exercises for the first time. Such joint field exercises were held in FY 2008 between the 12th Brigade and the prefectural police of Niigata and Nagano ----- Prefectures; the 10th Brigade and the prefectural police of Toyama, Ishikawa and Fukui; the 1st Brigade and the prefectural police of Tokyo Metropolitan and Chiba; the 3rd Division and the prefectural police of Hyogo, Shiga and Kyoto; the 6th Brigade and the prefectural police of Miyagi, Fukushima and Yamagata; the 1st Combined Division and the prefectural police of Okinawa; and the 5th Division and the Hokkaido prefectural police, and so on. These exercises served to confirm cooperation guidelines in the event of a public security operation. GSDF inspection training jointly conducted with the police **3. Response to Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Weapons** In recent years, there has been strong recognition of the danger of Nuclear, Biological and Chemical (NBC) weapon proliferation and the means for transporting such weapons, as well as related equipment and materials, to terrorists and rogue states. In the event that such weapons of mass destruction are used, it is likely there will be indiscriminate mass casualties and contamination of an extensive area. The sarin gas attack38 on the Tokyo subway in 1995 and the incidents of mail in the United States containing anthrax39 in 2001 are evidence of the fact that these weapons have already been used. **(1) Basic Concept** In the event of the use of NBC weapons in Japan in a way which corresponds to an armed attack, the SDF will abate the armed attack and rescue victims. Furthermore, in the event of the use of NBC weapons in a way which does not correspond to an armed attack but against which the general police alone cannot maintain public security, the SDF will conduct public security operations to suppress the armed attack and assist victims in cooperation with related agencies. Furthermore, when the incident does not fall under the category of defense operations or public security operations, the SDF will conduct disaster relief dispatches and civilian protection GSDF NBC protection training dispatches to conduct intelligence gathering concerning the extent of the damage; decontamination activities; transport of the sick and injured; and medical activities led by the chemical protection units of the GSDF and medical units of the ASDF, GSDF and MSDF. **(2) Initiatives of the Ministry of Defense and the SDF in Response to NBC Weapons** The Ministry of Defense and the SDF have improved the capability for responding to NBC weapon attacks. Specifically, the Central NBC Weapon Defense Unit with enhanced flexibility of operation was newly formed under the Central Readiness Force. Also, there has been an increase of chemical protection unit personnel, and improvement of all types of protection equipment including chemical protection vehicles, decontamination vehicles, personnel protection equipment and chemical protection clothes. It also conducts research and development on subjects including NBC reconnaissance vehicles, portable automatic sensors for chemical agents as well as decontamination sets. Furthermore, the GSDF has designated personnel to take initial action in the ----- event of special-type disasters in order to allow operations to begin within approximately one hour. The MSDF and ASDF have also acquired protective equipment and materials to be used on vessels and at bases. (See Part II, Chapter 2, Section 4 and Part II, Chapter 2, Section 5) **(3) Response to Substances Related to Nuclear and Radiation Weapons** Substances related to nuclear and radiation weapons have various effects on the health of those exposed to them, even in the event they do not directly damage the body. Thus, appropriate protection and exposure control is required taking into consideration the characteristics of such substances. In the event that a response to such substances is necessary, the SDF will conduct operations using of protective masks and chemical protection vehicles, in cooperation with related organizations including measurement of the contamination situation and transportation of the sick and injured. **(4) Response to Biological Weapons** Biological agents used to make biological weapons have certain incubation periods, and it is difficult to determine whether a disease is caused by biological agents based on the initial symptoms alone. For this reason, in the event that biological agents are dispersed secretly, anthropogenic causes may be suspected only after damage has occurred and spread. Thus, it is anticipated that detection before the damage has spread will be extremely difficult. In the event of an outbreak of such damage, medical institutions will assume primary responsibility for responding to the situation and the SDF will be responsible mainly for decontamination, transportation of patients and medical activities. (See Fig. III-1-2-10) ----- **[COLUMN]** **COMMENTARY** **Opening of the New SDF Central Hospital as the Core SDF Hospital** The new SDF Central Hospital in JGSDF Camp Misyuku (Setagaya-ku, Tokyo) was completed in March 2009 and opened in the following month. The SDF Central Hospital is a medical institution jointly operated by the Ground, Maritime and Air Self-Defense Forces, providing medical service not only to SDF personnel but also to ordinary citizens. The new hospital has decontamination equipment, aseptic rooms and a burns treatment center, which have the capability to deal with nuclear, biological and chemical (NBC) emergencies, as well as new strains of influenza. The hospital, equipped with such facilities, will treat patients infected with life-threatening diseases in the case of armed attacks using biological agents and other situations. It will be also able to cooperate in response to terrorism using chemical agents like the sarin attacks in the Tokyo subway system. Furthermore, it contributes to international peace cooperation activities, with the hospital providing education to SDF medical personnel scheduled to be dispatched overseas. The hospital has an earthquake-proof construction, capable of resisting seismic shocks comparable to the Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake. Its cogeneration system (power generation system in which two types of energy are generated from a single fuel type, also known as combined heat power generation) allows the hospital to supply its own energy needs and is capable of supplying electricity in emergencies, while implementing energy-saving measures. Furthermore, the hospital has water and fuel storage capacity for approximately 5−days[,] demand in order that it may serve as a disaster relief center that can respond to largescale disasters. - Newly installed main facilities include: Rooftop heliport capable of CH-47 (large cargo helicopter) landings and takeoffs → Capable of accepting patients swiftly Decontamination facilities, aseptic rooms, burns treatment center, etc. → Capable of handling a variety of diseases and injuries, including burn injuries from radiation. **(5) Response to Chemical Weapons** Unlike biological agents, the outbreak of injury with chemical agents used to make chemical weapons is generally fast so a rapid initial response at the time of injury is exceedingly important. With respect to chemical agents, the chemical protection units of the GSDF are equipped to respond to chemical agents through the use of their chemical protection clothes and vehicles. The chemical protection units and medical units of the GSDF dispatched for disaster relief dispatches will detect the chemical agents using detective devices, transport and treat victims, Landing Craft Air Cushion transporting a tank up onto a beach and conduct decontamination and medical activities ----- in contaminated areas. Even when the situation does not require SDF dispatch, as required, the SDF will lend chemical protection clothes and dispatch chemical protection unit personnel as liaison officials to the relevant agencies. **3. Response to Aggression on Japan[,]s Offshore Islands** According to the NDPG, the geographical features of Japan are considered vulnerable from a security perspective, due to narrow lands, long coastlines and many islands. In particular, invasion of these islands can be anticipated as one form of armed attack against Japan. In order to respond to aggression on islands, it is important to detect signs at an early stage through activities routinely conducted by the SDF including patrols and military information gathering. Response to this aggression has many points in common with the form of ground defense operations. However, if signs of aggressions are detected in advance, operations will be conducted to prevent invasion of the enemy forces. When no signs of aggression are detected in advance and the islands in question are occupied, operations will be conducted to defeat the enemy. These operations will enable the SDF to swiftly concentrate troops to prevent and destroy enemy forces through the mobile transportation and deployment of forces through joint operations. **4. Warning and Surveillance of the Sea and Airspace Surrounding Japan and Response to** **Violation of Airspace and Armed Special Operations Vessels** In order for the SDF to respond swiftly to not only a full-scale invasion situation but also new threats and diverse contingencies, it is extremely important to routinely conduct warning and surveillance activities in Japan[,]s territorial waters and airspace as well as gather and process information required for defense. For this purpose, the SDF is engaged in various activities directly linked to ensuring the peace and security of Japan. **1. Warning and Surveillance in Sea Areas Surrounding Japan** The MSDF patrols the sea areas surrounding Hokkaido, the Sea of Japan and the East China Sea about once a day, using P-3C patrol aircraft. Furthermore, warning and surveillance activities are conducted with the flexible use of destroyers and aircraft as required, such as for surveillance of a possible missile launch. Thus, a state of readiness is maintained for situations in areas surrounding Japan. As an additional measure, GSDF coastal surveillance units and MSDF security posts conduct 24-hour warning MSDF P-3C patrol aircraft carrying out surveillance operations and surveillance activities in the major sea straits. **2. Warnings and Emergency Takeoffs (Scrambles) in Preparation against Violation of Territorial** **Airspace** The ASDF conducts daily 24-hour surveillance of Japan[,]s territorial and adjacent airspace using nationwide radar, E-2C early warning aircraft and E-767 early warning and control aircraft. Furthermore, some fighters are always kept on standby for immediate takeoff (scramble). When any aircraft suspected of violating Japan[,]s territorial airspace are detected, scrambled fighters will approach them to assess the situation and monitor the aircraft as necessary. In the event that an airspace violation does occur, an evacuation warning will be issued. In FY 2008, there were 237 scrambles by the ASDF40. (See Fig. III-1-2-11) (See Reference 32-33) ----- **3. Response to Submarines Submerged in Japan[,]s Territorial Waters** With respect to foreign national submarines navigating underwater in Japan[,]s territorial waters41, an order for maritime security operations42 will be issued promptly, and the SDF will request the submarine to navigate on the surface of the water and show its flag, in accordance with international law. In the event that a submarine does not comply with the request, it will be requested by the SDF to leave territorial waters. (See Reference 32-33) The MSDF is enhancing and improving capabilities for detecting, identifying and tracking foreign ASDF personnel boarding an F-15 during a scramble ----- submarines navigating underwater in the territorial waters of Japan, as well as making Japanese government intentions clear to these submarines. It is also maintaining and improving capabilities for responding to submarines in shallow water areas. **4. Response to Armed Special Operations Vessels** **(1) Basic Concept** The Japan Coast Guard, as a police organization, is primarily responsible for responding to suspicious armed special operations vessels (unidentified vessels). However, in the event that it is deemed extremely difficult or impossible for the Japan Coast Guard to respond to a situation, an order for maritime security operations will be issued in a timely manner and the SDF will respond in cooperation with the Japan Coast Guard. (See Reference 32-33) Taking into consideration lessons learned and reflecting on the unidentified vessel incident off the Noto Peninsula in 199943 and the unidentified vessel incident in southwest Kyushu in 200144, the government has taken all necessary precautionary measures in order for effective and safe measures to be taken against unidentified vessels, while the Ministry of Defense and the SDF have strengthened cooperation with relevant ministries and agencies. **(2) Ministry of Defense and SDF Efforts to Respond to Unidentified Vessels** **a. Enhancement of Equipment** The MSDF took the following steps: 1) improved the speed of the new-type missile boats45; 2) established the MSDF Special Boarding Unit46; 3) equipped destroyers with machine guns; 4) furnished forcible maritime interdiction equipment (flat-nose shells)47; and 5) improved the sufficiency ratio of essential military vessel personnel. **b. Measures for Strengthening Cooperation with the Japan Coast Guard** **(i) Development of a Framework for Strengthening Cooperation** In 1999, the (then) Defense Agency and the Japan Coast Guard jointly developed the Manual on Joint Strategies concerning Unidentified Vessels which made stipulations concerning information liaison systems, initial response outlines and division of roles (joint response guidelines) before and after the announcement of maritime security operations in the event an unidentified vessel is discovered. **(ii) Joint Exercises with the Japan Coast Guard** The Ministry of Defense and the Japan Coast Guard conduct periodic mutual training, information exchanges and joint exercises. Also, cooperation is strengthened through joint exercises between the MSDF and the Japan Coast Guard, based on the manual, in relation to pursuit and capture guidelines for unidentified vessels and communication between the MSDF and the Japan Coast Guard. MSDF Special Boarding Unit carrying out on-the-spot inspection training **5. Response to Large-Scale and Unconventional Disasters** The SDF conducts a variety of disaster relief activities when such disasters occur including search and rescue for ----- disaster victims and ships or aircraft in distress, flood control, medical treatment, prevention of epidemics, water supply and transportation of personnel and goods. Recently, the SDF has played a major role in responding not only to natural disasters but also to various other disasters. **1. Outline of Disaster Relief Dispatches** **(1) Types and Frameworks of Disaster Relief Dispatches** **a. Dispatches upon Request (General Form of Disaster Relief Dispatch)** In principle, the SDF dispatches units for disaster relief upon the request of prefectural governors and other officials48. This is because prefectural governors and other officials assume primary responsibility for disaster control measures and are in a position to grasp the overall condition of the disaster. Therefore, it is considered most appropriate for dispatches to be made upon their request. Municipal mayors can ask governors to request a disaster relief dispatch by the SDF, but in the event that mayors are unable to make such a request to the prefectural governor, they can inform disaster conditions to the Minister of Defense, or those designated by the Minister. After receiving such requests from governors, the Minister of Defense or other personnel designated by the Minister can immediately dispatch units as necessary according to the disaster situation. In exceptional circumstances when the situation is particularly urgent and a request must be made immediately, the Minister of Defense or those designated by the Minister may authorize a discretionary dispatch (discretionary dispatches). In order to render discretionary dispatches even more effective, the Disaster Prevention Plan49 was amended in 1995 to establish the basis50 for SDF unit commanders and other officials to order discretionary dispatches. Procedures from the request for SDF disaster dispatch up to its withdrawal are shown in Fig. III-1-2-13 ----- **b. Earthquake Disaster Prevention Dispatch** When an alert51 is issued based on the Law Concerning Special Measures for Large-Scale Earthquakes Countermeasures52, the Minister of Defense is authorized to order an earthquake disaster prevention dispatch based on the request of the Director of the Earthquake Disaster Warning Headquarters (the Prime Minister), even prior to the occurrence of an earthquake. **c. Nuclear Disaster Dispatch** When a nuclear emergency alert is issued based on the Special Law on Nuclear Disaster Countermeasures53, the Minister of Defense is authorized to order a nuclear disaster dispatch upon request of the Director of the Nuclear Disaster Countermeasures Headquarters (the Prime Minister). **(2) Authority of SDF Officers in Disaster Relief Dispatches** Under the Self-Defense Forces Law and other legislation, officers of units requested for disaster relief dispatches, earthquake disaster prevention dispatches or nuclear disaster dispatches have the authority to implement evacuation procedures, for example, in order to effectively conduct the activities. (See Reference 32) **2. Initial Operations Posture and Implementation Status of Disaster Relief Dispatches** **(1) Initial Response to the Disaster** Based on lessons learned from the Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake disaster, the SDF has maintained its posture for an initial response to ensure disaster relief operations are conducted promptly. The GSDF has designated approximately 2,700 personnel, 410 vehicles and 30 helicopters nationwide as initial response units to be dispatched for disaster relief operations within about 2 hours. The MSDF has vessels designated for emergency dispatch at each base in addition to aircraft on standby alert, and the ASDF is prepared with its rescue and transportation aircraft on standby alert. Furthermore, in the event that information is received of the occurrence of a strong earthquake greater than level- 5 on the Japanese seismic scale, the SDF will independently dispatch aircraft to gather site information and is in the position to transmit this information to the Prime Minister[,]s Office. Furthermore, depending on the circumstances, liaison officers will be dispatched to the concerned local public authorities for information gathering purposes. The SDF has formulated various contingency plans for responses to large-scale earthquakes, which are under consideration at the Central Disaster Management Council. Since a Tonankai or Nankai Earthquake, for example, is expected to affect a wide area, extending from the Tokai to the Kyushu region, and considerable tsunami damage is also foreseeable, the SDF[,]s Contingency Plan for Tonankai/Nankai Earthquakes stipulates that each SDF shall systematically cooperate to respond to disasters and emergencies. Within 72 hours of such an earthquake, the GSDF shall send units of approximately 70,000 personnel to disaster-stricken areas, the MSDF shall dispatch about 60 ships and about 50 aircraft and the ASDF shall operate about 70 aircraft, including reconnaissance, rescue and transportation planes. **(2) Implementation Status of Disaster Dispatches** **a. Transportation of Emergency Patients** The SDF uses its aircraft to transport emergency patients from isolated islands and remote areas with insufficient medical facilities (transportation of emergency patients). In FY 2008, out of a total of 606 cases of disaster relief operations, 424 cases involved the transportation of emergency patients with as many as 405 cases being dispatches to such isolated islands as the Nansei Islands (Okinawa and Kagoshima Prefectures), the Goto Islands ----- (Nagasaki Prefecture), the Izu Islands and the Ogasawara Islands. Furthermore, in the event that aircraft of other organizations are unable to respond, due to reasons including a short endurance distance, transportation of emergency patients will be provided by vessels navigating areas of ocean far from the mainland. In response to a request by the Governor of the Tokyo Metropolitan Government, on November 24, 2008, the MSDF transported patients requiring urgent treatment from Kozu Island. This brought the total number of transportations from the Izu Islands to 1,500. **b. Firefighting Support** In FY 2008, there were 95 dispatches of firefighting support, the second largest number of dispatches after transportation of emergency patients. Within this category, dispatches for neighborhood firefighting were the highest in number, with 79 cases in FY 2008. Furthermore, upon the request of prefectural governors for disaster relief dispatches, the SDF also conducts aerial firefighting activities in locations where firefighting conditions were difficult, such as mountain and forest areas. (See Fig. III-1-2-14) (See Reference 34) GSDF UH-1 helicopter fighting an Imabari mountain forest fire GSDF personnel searching for missing people after the Iwate-Miyagi Inland Earthquake ----- **[COLUMN]** **VOICE** **Voice of SDF Personnel who was Engaged in Disaster Relief Dispatch (Iwate-** **Miyagi Inland Earthquake)** Master Sergeant Shinji Saito Fourth Company, 20th Infantry Regiment, GSDF Receiving information that a person who went stream fishing alone was missing, a search party was dispatched immediately. However, we were not able to approach the target area on land, due to conditions of the area. Therefore it was decided that a search party of four top rangers, with myself as leader, be organized and a helicopter be dispatched to the area. After locating the car of the missing person from above, we descended with a hoist sling to the spot, with everyone in the party determined to search and find the missing person without fail. Master Sergeant Saito (left) explaining the progress of the search to Because of the threat of secondary disaster from the the family of a missing person aftershocks of the earthquake, combined with the fuel level of the helicopter, our activity was restricted to roughly 2 hours. Searching the route going down the stream, based on information received, we found footprints on an animal path, but we lost the prints along the way. Our search around the area failed to locate the person. Turning back and searching another route, we found footprints again. They were identified as long rubber boots with spikes, used for stream fishing. Since the footprints were still fresh, we were all extremely excited that the person might be nearby. However, there was a crack in the ground with an elevation difference of roughly one meter, and the path ahead was missing. We shouted with all of our might but received no response. We returned again and this time headed upstream, searching for tracks and shouting very loudly to call the person. Hoping that the missing person might be found around the next curve or in the next 10 meters, we went ahead, calculating the time left. Making as much use of the time left as possible -- counting down the minutes and seconds -- we searched but could not find the person. We gathered the belongings found inside the car and returned to the command post where his relatives were waiting. When we handed over the items to the family members, with sadness and pain in our hearts, they wept, saying, "These belong to our father. He left these there..." Trying to control our feelings and hold back tears, we explained to the family members how the search was conducted, showing photos of conditions in the area and of footprints, comparing them with the map of the area. **c. Response to Natural Disasters** On June 14, 2008, an earthquake occurred with the hypo center in the southern inland region of Iwate Prefecture, causing soil avalanche, blocked rivers and roads, and water outage (magnitude of 7.2) (“2008 Iwate-Miyagi Inland Earthquake”). On the same day, the GSDF 9th Artillery Regiment commander received a request from the Iwate prefectural governor, while the GSDF 6th division commander received a request from the Miyagi prefectural governor, and they conducted the following activities: search for missing people, rescue of isolated people by helicopter, water supply, food service, bathing support, and others. The total numbers of personnel, vehicles and aircraft are approximately 26,300, 7,970 and 580, respectively. On July 24, 2008, a 6.8 magnitude earthquake occurred off the northern coast of Iwate Prefecture, causing landslides, the total or partial destruction of buildings, and water outages. On the same day, the JGSDF 9th Artillery Regiment commander received a request from the Iwate prefectural governor and the JGSDF 6th division commander also received a request from the Aomori prefectural governor, and they conducted disaster relief operations. The total numbers of personnel, vehicles and aircraft are approximately 1,800, 270 and 40, respectively. ----- In the 2008 Iwate-Miyagi Inland Earthquake, since a large number of major roads were blocked and mainly mountainous areas were affected, helicopters capable of flexible operation played an important role in rescue activities in isolated villages. Remote controlled bulldozers also played an important role in ensuring the safety of the rescue activities. SDF large helicopters (CH-47) played an indispensable role in transporting such heavy equipment. Furthermore, a number of helicopters, both the SDF and private helicopters, flew over the disasterstricken area in an unorganized manner, highlighting the importance of aircraft control and ensuring safe flights. **3. Efforts for Preparation for Disaster Relief** **(1) Efforts for Preparation for Disaster Relief** In order to respond to natural disasters with speed and accuracy, the SDF carries out various disaster prevention drills, including joint disaster prevention exercises, in addition to formulating disaster relief plans. At the same time, it promotes active participation in local government disaster prevention drills. In FY 2008, as a Comprehensive Drill for Disaster Management, the SDF carried out its joint disaster prevention exercises in cooperation with the Kinki-Region Disaster Prevention Drill of the Government, drills in cooperation with the Comprehensive Disaster Prevention Drill of Shizuoka Prefecture, and the Joint Disaster Prevention Drill by Eight Prefectures and Municipalities, Tsunami Disaster Prevention Drills in cooperation with the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport and Tourism and relevant local governments in the Kyushu region, and a comprehensive drill to respond to nuclear disasters in cooperation with the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry and the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology. Individual units have also conducted disaster prevention drills with relevant local governments. For example, the GSDF North-Eastern Army conducted the largest contingency drill for earthquakes, In which 18,000 people and 24 local governments participated, including Iwate and Miyagi Prefectures. GSDF personnel distributing water after the Iwate-Miyagi Inland Earthquake **(2) Cooperation with Local Governments** It is also important for the SDF to strengthen cooperation with local governments in peacetime in order to conduct disaster relief operations smoothly. In addition to participating in a number of disaster prevention drills, the SDF promotes strengthening of cooperation with local governments, including enhancing information liaison systems and consistency with disaster control plans The post of Liaison and Coordination Officer for Citizen Protection and Disaster Relief Operation Countermeasures was created at the SDF Regional Cooperation Headquarters to work at ensuring cooperation with local governments in peacetime. Human cooperation that utilizes SDF experience and knowledge in disaster prevention operations is extremely effective in strengthening cooperation with local governments. SDF personnel temporarily serve as staff in the Disaster Prevention Bureau of the Tokyo Metropolitan Government, and mutual exchanges of civilian personnel are conducted between the Central GSDF Headquarters and Hyogo Prefecture. Upon the request of local governments, the SDF recommends retired SDF personnel to ----- share their experience and knowledge in this field. As of April, 2009, the number of SDF personnel currently working in sections of local governments related to disaster prevention is 167 people in 43 prefectures and 97 municipalities across the country. (See Reference 35) The following actions to be taken by local governments are important for the Ministry of Defense and the SDF to conduct disaster relief activities more effectively. **a. Securing Staging Areas and Heliports** Disaster relief operations units require a staging area54 at the site as a base for activities to secure a command post, lodging, parking and to accumulate necessary materials. Furthermore, due to the fact that activities using vehicles may be restricted at the time of a disaster, it is necessary to install heliports55 at and nearby the disaster site to enable helicopters to transport emergency patients and materials and to engage in firefighting. At this time, in order to ensure smooth operations at the staging area and the take-off and arrival of helicopters, it is necessary to clearly designate evacuation centers, staging areas and heliports as well as making these locations commonly known to the public in peacetime. **b. Marking Building Numbers** In order for aircraft to efficiently carry out disaster relief operations such as gathering information and transporting people and materials, it is useful to mark numbers on the rooftops of facilities to identify buildings important for disaster prevention, such as prefectural offices and schools. **c. Securing Facilities for Liaison and Coordination** It is also essential for facilities to be established within prefectural government buildings sites for liaison and coordination with the SDF, such as a temporary communication site for liaison and coordination, a designated area for liaison personnel, as well as parking areas. **d. Arrangements for Materials and Equipment** It is important to develop a disaster prevention map for common use by all disaster prevention organizations which indicate the location of evacuation areas, heliports, etc. Furthermore, it is necessary to coordinate on a daily basis to secure water sources such as reservoirs, while maintaining firefighting equipment for aerial firefighting by helicopter. **(3) Development of a Response Manual for Various Disasters** Clarifying basic responses in advance and consolidating the recognition of parties concerned is an effective way of responding more promptly and appropriately to disasters which occur in various forms. For this purpose, in November 2000, the (then) Defense Agency and SDF developed a response manual56 for various types of disasters which compiled issues to be noted for each type of disaster. Copies of this manual were distributed to relevant organizations and local public bodies. **(4) Response to Nuclear Disasters** The Special Measures Law on Nuclear Disaster Countermeasures was enacted based on lessons learned from the critical accident which occurred at the uranium processing plant in Tokaimura, Ibaraki Prefecture in 1999. In accordance with this, the Self-Defense Forces Law was partially revised57. Following the nuclear criticality accident at Tokaimura, the ASDF, GSDF and MSDF have provided transport support, assistance for evacuating residents and monitoring of airborne and seaborne radiation levels in comprehensive nuclear disaster prevention exercises conducted primarily by the Ministry of Economy, Trade and ----- Industry since 2000. This serves to improve effectiveness including a review of cooperation guidelines between government agencies and local bodies at the time of a nuclear disaster. Further, the Mid-Term Defense Program states that in addition to nuclear disasters, capabilities for responding to NBC will be strengthened in order to deal with other special disasters58. **6. Response to Other Events** **1. Improvement in Guard Postures for SDF Facilities** **(1) Operations for Guarding SDF Facilities** When there is a danger of a terrorist attack on facilities and areas of the SDF and USFJ within Japan and in the event it is deemed particularly necessary to prevent damage, the Prime Minister may order SDF units to conduct operations to guard facilities and areas (guarding operations). Part of the authority given to police officials under the Law Concerning the Execution of Duties of Police Officials are applied correspondingly to SDF personnel dispatched for guarding operations59. Further, the amended Self-Defense Forces Law provides that SDF personnel have authority to use weapons beyond the limitations of Article 7 of this law. (See Reference 32-33) The Ministry of Defense and the SDF exchange opinions concerning guarding operations with the police and Japan Coast Guard in order to ensure the effectiveness of such operations. In addition, exercises for guarding operations have been conducted at USFJ facilities and areas throughout Japan since 2003. **(2) Use of Weapons to Guard SDF Facilities in Normal Circumstances** The authority for use of weapons in the course of guarding SDF facilities60 within Japan has been stipulated61. **2. Maintaining Posture to Transport Japanese Nationals Overseas** **(1) Amendment of Self-Defense Forces Law** In addition to the currently utilized government aircraft and ASDF transport aircraft, in 1999, SDF ships and the helicopters onboard were added as a means of transport for transporting Japanese nationals overseas in the event of disasters, riots or other states of emergency in foreign countries. Further, SDF personnel became authorized to use the minimum necessary weapons in order to protect the lives and bodies of themselves and Japanese nationals and thus transportation conditions were reinforced. Furthermore, the transportation of Japanese nationals overseas became a primary SDF mission in January 2007. GSDF personnel carrying out training for guarding SDF facilities **(2) Postures of the ASDF, GSDF and MSDF** In order to transfer Japanese nationals overseas from diplomatic establishments and transport them safely to local airports and harbors, the GSDF designates dispatch personnel for helicopter guidance units62, the MSDF designates transport ships and air units, and the ASDF designates airlift units and personnel for the dispatch, in order to maintain posture for readiness. ----- Furthermore, the mission for the transportation of Japanese nationals overseas needs to be conducted in close cooperation between the ASDF, GSDF and MSDF. To meet this need, joint exercises using transport aircraft and ships are conducted. Also, exercises for transporting Japanese nationals overseas have been conducted as part of the annual Cobra Gold multinational exercise in Thailand since 2008, and some staff members of the Japanese Embassy and Japanese residents in Thailand joined in. Through the exercise, the SDF has strived to improve their capabilities for fulfilling the mission and learned about cooperation measures with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs as well as SDF[,]s activities overseas. GSDF personnel carrying out training for transportation of Japanese nationals overseas **3. Response to Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan** In the event of situations in areas surrounding Japan, the Ministry of Defense and the SDF will provide materials and services as rear area support and conduct rear area search and rescue activities or ship inspection activities as stipulated in the Law to Ensure Security for Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan and the Ship Inspections Operations Law. Furthermore, rear area support was entrenched as a primary mission of the SDF in January 2007. **4. Responses to “New-Type Flu”** Based on the revised action plan for countermeasures against the new-type flu63, in March 2009, the Ministry of Defense and the SDF prepared the MOD Contingency Plan for countermeasures against the new-type flu64. This plan lays out the postures to be improved, details of measures and other necessary matters to enable the Ministry of Defense and the SDF to implement appropriate and swift countermeasures against the new-type flu. The basic policies of this plan stipulate that the Ministry of Defense and the SDF collaborate and cooperate closely with related organizations under normal circumstances. In the case of an outbreak of the new-type flu at home and abroad, the Ministry of Defense and the SDF will ensure that its duties are carried out flawlessly and carry out the new-type flu countermeasures upon requests from relevant organizations, while ensuring the safety of SDF personnel. Specific examples of SDF activities include epidemic control measures for poultry65, transportation of Japanese nationals overseas, quarantine support by medical officers, transportation of relief supplies, diagnosis/treatment at the National Defense Medical College Hospital and SDF hospitals. In order to ensure the effectiveness of this plan, reviews are under way for the development of specific operational procedures. At the request of the Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare, the Ministry of Defense and the SDF dispatched a total of 1,260 SDF doctors and nurses from the National Defense Medical College and SDF medical units to Narita, Osaka and other main airports between April 30- June 1, 2009, to provide quarantine assistance. These activities are based on the following developments: the WHO (World Health Organization) raising its alert level for the new-type flu (A/H1N1), which had broken out in Mexico and other countries, to phase 4 (state in which continued human-to-human transmission of the virus causing community-level outbreaks is observed); the announcement of the Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare of a domestic outbreak of the new-type flu; and the basic policy for countermeasures against the new-type flu stipulating strengthening of quarantine and border control. ----- **5. Military Intelligence Collection** In order for effective operation of defense capabilities to deal with new threats and diverse situations, it is necessary to detect signs of various situations in advance and collect, analyze and share information promptly and appropriately. For Japanese national security, broader and more comprehensive intelligence capabilities are essential. For this reason, the Ministry of Defense and the SDF comprehensively analyze and assess a variety of information and have diversified the means of collecting intelligence. Specific intelligence collection activities include: 1) collecting, processing and analyzing radio waves in relation to military communications and radio waves emitted from electronic weapons bound for Japan from overseas; 2) collecting and analyzing highresolution commercial satellite imagery data66; 3) ISR activities by ships and aircraft and so on; 4) collecting and organizing a variety of open source information; 5) information exchanges with defense authorities of other nations; and 6) intelligence activities such as those conducted by defense attachés and other officials67. Moreover, in order to enhance the capability of collecting a variety of intelligence and comprehensively analyzing and assessing information by responding to the security environment and technical trends, the Ministry of Defense and the SDF develop capable personnel, improve equipment and devices for intelligence collection as well as strengthen the capability of intelligence organizations such as the Defense Intelligence Headquarters, which support the above-mentioned capabilities. Further, the Principles for Strengthening Intelligence Functions (of the Prime Minister[,]s Office) was adopted at an Intelligence Capability Enhancement Review Committee of the Prime Minister[,]s Office in February 2008. In order to strengthen the Prime Minister[,]s Office control tower function in relation to national security, by recognizing the extreme importance of strengthening intelligence functions of the Prime Minister[,]s Office, the Ministry of Defense will cooperate to implement measures such as close cooperation with policy side, intelligence collection, integration and analysis, and information security. Moreover, it will continue to provide necessary security information to the Prime Minister[,]s Office in a timely and appropriate manner. ----- **[COLUMN]** **VOICE** **Voice of SDF Personnel of the Special Airlift Group** Airman First Class Hidetoshi Yoshimi 701st Air Squadron, Special Airlift Group, ASDF The 701st Air Squadron of the Special Airlift Group to which I belong provides transport for international emergency relief and for state guests, etc. I had been taking aircraft-related studies since junior college and, in hope of getting an aircraftrelated job after graduation, joined the ASDF. Learning that there would be an examination for personnel for the Special Airlift Group, I hoped to work in special operations, such as the transporting of the prime minister and other important figures, Airman First Class Yoshimi during passenger service training and took the examination. Fortunately, I was able to pass. After joining the group, I underwent training, starting with training in providing service to important people, readiness training for contingency situations during flight, and training on air cargo loading. I have also received training and education in knowledge and skills related to aircraft and aircraft navigation. On the ground, I mostly make preparations and adjustments for the next airlift assignment. The happiest moment in the course of my duties on various missions is when the passengers say Special Airlift Group after its 200th mission in November 2008 "thank you." Being a novice at the job, however, I still have difficulty making duty adjustments in unfamiliar lands and in overcoming jet lag when missions for transporting important guests are repeated. I am working on physical conditioning and the maintenance of my physical strength in order to successfully fulfill my various duties. I am a member of a soccer team inside the military base. Through training and games during off-work hours and on holidays, I try to refresh myself to maintain both physical and mental health in order to contribute to the achievement of the mission of my group. ----- **Section 3. Preparation against Full-Scale Aggression** The main mission of the SDF is to defend Japan against direct and indirect aggression in order to ensure the peace and independence of Japan as well as to maintain national security. In the region surrounding Japan, even today, unpredictable and uncertain factors remain. Considering the devastating loss of lives and property of the people that full-scale invasions could cause, readiness for such invasions is essential. Japan[,] SDF has consistently been committed to improving and maintaining readiness and defense capabilities, developing necessary equipment as well as continuing its warning and surveillance activities in surrounding sea areas and airspaces; Japan is thus prepared for a full-scale invasion. Demonstrating the readiness of the SDF in this way helps to prevent aggression. In the event of full-scale aggression against Japan, the GSDF, MSDF and ASDF will respond promptly and effectively by means of a joint operational structure to act in a coordinated and integrated manner. Operations to be employed in response to full-scale aggression are classified as follows according to function: 1) operations for air defense, 2) operations for guarding the waters surrounding Japan, 3) operations for land defense, and 4) operations for securing the safety of maritime traffic. In implementing these operations, U.S. forces will support operations employed by the SDF and conduct operations to supplement the capabilities of the SDF, including operations which employ strike capabilities in accordance with the “Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation.” This section explains the outline of typical operations which may be conducted by the SDF to defend the nation in the event that full-scale aggression occurs. (See Chapter 2, Section 3-2) **1. Air Defense Operations** Japan has the geographical characteristics of being surrounded by water and because of modern warfare trends68, in the event of an armed attack on Japan, such attacks are therefore likely to begin with surprise air attacks using aircraft and missiles. Air defense operations are characterized by adequacy of the initial response having a significant effect on the overall operation. Therefore, it is necessary to maintain a prompt response posture in peacetime, continuously collect relevant information, and exhibit combat strength promptly and comprehensively from the initial stage of operations. Operations for air defense can be divided into overall operations led by the ASDF, and local air defense operations conducted by the GSDF, MSDF and ASDF to defend their respective bases and units. In terms of overall air defense, efforts will be made promptly in response to enemy air strikes to intercept enemy aircraft as far from Japanese territory as possible to prevent the enemy from acquiring air superiority69, to prevent damage to the Japanese people and territory, to inflict heavy damage on the enemy and to deter serial air assaults. (See Fig. III-1-3-1) ASDF F-15 fighter aircraft in flight ----- **(1) Detecting Intruding Enemy Aircraft** The entire airspace surrounding Japan is under constant surveillance by means of air warning and control unit radar and early warning and control aircraft so as to detect intruding enemy aircraft as early as possible. **(2) Identifying the Detected Aircraft** Detected aircraft are identified as enemy or friend according to the Japan Aerospace Defense Ground Environment (JADGE)70 system. **(3) Interception and Destruction of the Enemy[,]s** **Aircraft** In the event that an aircraft is identified as an enemy aircraft, the air warning and control unit assigns destruction targets to aircraft standing-by on the ground or in the air, as well as to surface-to-air missile units of the GSDF or ASDF. The enemy aircraft is then destroyed by guided and controlled fighter aircraft or ASDF F-15 fighter launching an air-to-air missile surface-to-air missiles. ----- **2. Operations for the Defense of Surrounding Sea Areas** Armed attacks on Japan can be made by vessels against Japanese ships and land, as well as by aircraft due to the island geography of Japan. Operations of transport vessels are also predicted to enable large-scale ground forces to land on Japanese territory. Operations for defending sea areas surrounding Japan will be led by the MSDF in cooperation with the GSDF and the ASDF to execute various combined strategies including anti-surface ships, anti-submarines and anti-air warfare (local) operations. The cumulative result of these operations provides protection to surrounding sea areas by obstructing enemy advances and exhausting the enemy[,]s military strength. (See Fig. III-1-3-2) **(1) Defense on the Sea** The MSDF patrols vast sea areas using patrol aircraft and patrols navigation sea areas with destroyers. In the event that an enemy surface ship or submarine attempting to attack Japanese ships is detected, it will be destroyed by using MSDF destroyers, submarines and patrol aircraft (anti-surface ship and anti-submarine operations), supported by fighters and others as the situation requires. **(2) Defense in Coastal Areas** The MSDF patrols the vicinity of major ports and harbors using destroyers, patrol aircraft and Firing a 127mm cannon from an MSDF destroyer minesweepers for the early detection of enemy offensives. Depending on the situation, in order to ensure the safety of ships and coastal areas, support will be provided by fighter aircraft and GSDF surface-to-ship guided missile units, and MSDF destroyers, submarines and patrol aircraft (anti-surface ship and anti-submarine operations),will destroy enemy vessels. Further, the MSDF will remove mines laid by the enemy using minesweepers (anti-mine operations). **(3) Defense in Main Straits** MSDF destroyers and patrol aircraft patrol major straits and detect and destroy enemy surface ships or submarines attempting to pass the sea areas (anti-surface ship and anti-submarine operations). As the situation requires, mines will be laid in main sea areas using minesweeping mother ships, submarines, and aircraft of the MSDF and ASDF (mine-laying operations). **(4) Air Defense in Surrounding Waters** Air defense for ships in surrounding waters will be performed by destroyers (anti-air operations) and will receive support from fighters as necessary. MSDF SH-60K patrol helicopter launching an air-to-ship missile ----- **3. Operations for Land Defense** In the event of an attempt to occupy the island nation of Japan, the invading country will acquire air and sea superiority on the invading fronts and then land ground troops, etc., on Japanese territory by ship or aircraft. However, it will be difficult for invading ground troops to demonstrate a systematic fighting force during movements by ship and aircraft, and before and after landing. Land defense operations must take advantage of this weakness to destroy enemy forces as early as possible by countering them between the sea and coastal areas, as well as at landing sites, etc. (See Fig. III-1-3-3) **(1) Defense in the Nearshore Waters** The ASDF, GSDF and MSDF will endeavor, as much as possible, to destroy enemy ships transporting ground troops and such, whilst at sea using destroyers, submarines, patrol aircraft, fighters and surface-to-surface missiles to force the enemy to abandon its intention of landing or to reduce its strength. Further, the ASDF and GSDF will endeavor to destroy enemy aircraft transporting ground troops in the air using fighters and surface-to-air missiles. **(2) Defense in Coastal Areas** The MSDF will use minesweeping mother ships to lay sea mines and the GSDF will use amphibious mine-laying equipment to lay coastal mines to obstruct and counter the mobilization of landing enemy forces. ----- Shooting by GSDF surface-to-ship missile GSDF personnel engaged in airborne operations The GSDF will play the primary role in response to enemy forces planning a landing by concentrating the use of tanks, anti-tanks and special artillery71, etc. deployed close to the coast. In the event that an enemy lands, the enemy invasion will be obstructed and destroyed through mobile striking ability provided predominantly by special artillery of the units, anti-tank missiles and tanks. The ASDF will support the GSDF with fighters during these operations. Enemy airborne assaults72 and helicopter borne assaults73 conducted in coordination with the landing of ground troops will be destroyed in the early stages mainly through special artillery of the units and mobile striking ability. ----- Further, the GSDF will conduct anti-air warfare (local) using anti-aircraft firepower starting with surface-to air missiles. **(3) Inland Defense** In the event that the SDF is not able to destroy enemy ground troops immediately after their landing, an enemy advance will be prevented by pre-deployed units in inland areas with the support of fighters (holding operations). In the meantime, to the utmost extent, units will be assembled from other areas to launch counterattacks to eliminate advancing enemy ground troops. **(4) Countermeasures to be Implemented throughout the Stages of Operations** Throughout each of these stages, efforts will be made by the MSDF using destroyers, submarines, and patrol aircraft, and by the ASDF using fighters to obstruct ocean transport ships providing reinforcements to enemy ground troops and to cut off maritime logistical support lines. Furthermore, throughout land defense operations, the GSDF, MSDF and ASDF will carry out air defense, reconnaissance, and transport of units and supplies, etc., required for the execution of operations. **4. Operations for Ensuring the Safety of Maritime Traffic** The sea lane is the lifeline of Japan, a country that relies on imports for most of its food and resources. Operations to ensure maritime traffic safety are important not only to sustain the country[,]s fighting ability and foundation for survival, but also for enabling the support of U.S. forces to the SDF. The MSDF ensures the safety of maritime traffic by patrolling, escorting ships and making defensive preparations for straits and harbors through a combination of various operations including anti-surface ship and anti-submarine operations, anti-air warfare (local) and minesweeping operations. These operations are conducted in waters several hundred nautical miles around Japan and also generally around 1,000 nautical miles in the event of establishing sea lanes74. Operations conducted in waters surrounding Japan will be almost the same as those for defending the waters surrounding Japan as described previously. In the event of operations following the establishment of sea lanes, the sea lane will be patrolled continuously to quickly detect and respond to disturbances from enemy surface ships or submarines, etc. In addition, Japanese vessels will be escorted as necessary. Air defense of Japanese ships traveling in maritime traffic routes will be conducted by destroyers (anti-air warfare). In this case, depending on the circumstances, support will be provided by fighters. MSDF destroyer _Samidare (rear) and_ _Sazanami during counter-_ piracy operations ----- **Notes:** 1) In Japan, the term “emergency legislation” has no fixed concept; it is rather ambiguous. For example, in the past, a study on legislation concerning operations of SDR, in which defense operation order shall be delivered pursuant to Article 76 of the Self-Defense Forces Act, was conducted as “Emergency Legislation Study.” This White Paper regards emergency legislations as legislations for responses to situations that have been developed since 2003. 2) A situation in which an external armed attack on Japan emerges, or an imminent danger is clearly acknowledged. 3) A situation where an armed attack has yet to emerge, but circumstances are growing increasingly strained and an armed attack is expected. 4) The Law for Ensuring Peace and Independence of Japan and Security of State and the People in Armed Attack Situations etc. See 5) Independent administrative agencies, the Bank of Japan, the Japanese Red Cross Society, the Japan Broadcasting Corporation (NHK), other public institutions, and corporations engaged in public service operations, including the provision of electricity, gas, transportation, communications, and other services. 6) An emergency response situation. (A situation arising due to actions that may kill or injure many people which uses methods equivalent to those used in an armed attack situation, or a situation where it is recognized that the relevant actions represent a clear and present threat that necessitate an emergency response by the state.) Alternatively, a contingency situation other than an armed attack situation that may have a significant impact on the security of the nation and its people. 7) Law concerning Measures for Protection of the Civilian Population in Armed Attack Situations. See 8) The Law concerning the Restriction of Maritime Transportation of Foreign Military Supplies, etc. in Armed Attack Situations. See 9) The Law Related to Measures Conducted by the Government in Line with U.S. Military Actions in Armed Attack Situations, etc. See 10) The Agreement to Amend the Agreement between the Government of Japan and the Government of the United States of America concerning the Reciprocal Provision of Logistics Support, Supplies and Services between the SDF of Japan and the Armed Forces of the United States of America (ACSA). See 11) The Law Related to the Use of Specific Public Facilities, etc. See 12) The Law concerning the Treatment of Prisoners of War and other Detainees in Armed Attack Situations. See 13) The Law concerning Punishment of Grave Breaches of the International Humanitarian Law. See 14) There are four Geneva Conventions: 1) The Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field of August 12, 1949 (Convention I); 2) The Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea of August 12, 1949 (Convention II); 3) The Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War (Convention III); ----- 4) The Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (Convention IV). 15) Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I). See 16) Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II). See 17) See 18) The Civil Protection Plan of the Ministry of Defense. See 19) The Prime Minister will assume the position of the Director of the Countermeasures Headquarters, although these positions will be legally prescribed as separate entities. 20) Police officers, coast guard officers or assistant coast guard officers. 21) Based on Article 22, paragraphs 1 and 2 of the SDF Law, a special unit shall be organized to carry out a specific duty, or the required troops will be placed under the authority of a commander outside of their usual command structure. This unit shall be made up of members of the GSDF, the MSDF and the ASDF, or a combination of two or more of the branches of the SDF. 22) GSDF Commanding General of Army and Central Response Readiness Force Headquarters; MSDF Commander of the Self-Defense Fleet and Commandant Regional District; ASDF Commander of Air Defense Command, Commander of Air Support Command and Commander of Air Defense Force, ASDF and so on. 23) Vessels equipped with Aegis air defense systems which automatically process a series of activities including target search, detection, identification/classification and attack using high performance computers. 24) Patriot PAC-3 system is one of the air defense systems for countering airborne threats. Unlike the conventional type anti-aircraft PAC-2 missiles, which mainly target the interception of aircraft, the PAC-3 missiles are designed primarily to intercept ballistic missiles. 25) Developed since FY 1999, radar which enables the detection and tracking of ballistic missiles (formerly referred to as FPS-XX). 26) Fire Unit (the minimum fire unit of surface-to-air fire units). 27) These refer to objects other than aircraft which are recognized to cause grave damage to human life and property when they fall to earth such as ballistic missiles. 28) A specific example of SDF activity is deployment, upon receipt of the appropriate directive from the Minister of Defense, of Patriot PAC-3 units by the ASDF and Aegis destroyers by the MSDF in order to respond to ballistic missiles and prepare for ballistic missiles launched toward Japan. In the event missiles are launched toward Japan, based on the aforementioned directive, these can be destroyed. 29) The U.S. is steadily enhancing its missile defense systems with research and development while deploying systems as they become technically feasible in what is referred to as the evolutionary spiral development method. 30) The radar was later on moved to the U.S. Forces Shariki Communication Site. 31) A ballistic missile information processing system. 32) The four components are the nose cone, second-stage rocket motor, kinetic warhead, and infrared seeker. 33) On the day before the actual launch, incorrect information pertaining to the launch was released due to inefficient handling of information by the Ministry of Defense/SDF. At the time of the actual launch, information was properly collected and transmitted via a multiple checking system for the Shared Early Warning (SEW), including a check by the Chief of Joint Staff. ----- See 34) For further information about the North Korean missile launch. See 35) Refers to persons engaging in illegal acts such as subversive activities in Japan while possessing weapons with significant killing power, those cooperating with such persons, etc. 36) To systematically patrol a specific area for purposes such as prevention of surprise attack and information collection. 37) The Agreement on the Maintenance of Public Order in the Event of Public Security Operations which was concluded between the former Defense Agency and the National Public Safety Commission. 38) An incident in which members of Aum Shinrikyo spread extremely poisonous sarin gas in subway trains crowded with commuters, claiming the lives of 12 people. The SDF conducted decontamination operations of the trains and stations. 39) Since September 2001, postal mail containing anthrax has been delivered to individuals including members of the U.S. Senate and those related to the mass media. 40) Ratio by country of emergency scramble subject aircraft: Russia, approximately 81%; China, approximately 13%; Taiwan, 3% and others, 3%. 41) Including territorial waters and inland waters. 42) Maritime security operations (Article 82 of the SDF Law) refer to actions taken at sea by the SDF with the particular need to protect lives or property or maintain peace and order. Prime Ministerial approval is required. 43) An SDF patrol aircraft (P-3C) discovered two unidentified vessels in a surveillance operation in Japanese territorial waters east of the Noto Peninsula and west of Sadogashima Island. These were suspected to be North Korean spy ships disguised as Japanese fishing vessels. The two vessels were pursued around the clock by patrol vessels, destroyers and aircraft but fled to outside the air defense identification zones (ADIZ). They are presumed to have reached a port in the northern part of North Korea. 44) An SDF patrol aircraft (P-3C) discovered an unidentified vessel in a surveillance operation and monitored it with patrol vessels and aircraft. The vessel did not stop despite repeated orders by the Japan Coast Guard. As a result, the JCG fired warning shots after alerting the vessel. However, the vessel continued to make its getaway and made an armed attack on the patrol ship which fired shots in self-defense. The vessel subsequently exploded from possible self-destruction and sunk. Based on facts revealed in the investigation process the vessel was identified as a North Korean spy ship. Further, in 2002 a patrol aircraft (P-3C) discovered an unidentified vessel in waters approximately 400km north-northwest off the Noto Peninsula (beyond the exclusive economic zone of Japan) in a surveillance operation. The vessel was tracked and observed by patrol vessels of the Japan Coast Guard, destroyers and aircraft. 45) Six vessels have been commissioned since March 2004 with the following main improvements: 1) Speed improved from 40 knots to 44 knots, 2) fitted with 12.7mm machine guns, 3) bullet-proof measures implemented on the bridge and 4) fitted with night vision devices. 46) A special unit of the MSDF newly established in March 2001 to deter expected resistance, and disarm and immobilize unidentified vessels in the event of on-board inspections under maritime security operations. 47) A non-bursting shell launched from 76mm artillery fitted on destroyers whereby the flat front edge of the shell prevents scattering. 48) The Director General of the Japan Coast Guard, the Director General of the Regional Maritime Safety Headquarters, and the Director of Airport Administrative Office may request disaster dispatch. 49) The Ministry of Defense Disaster Prevention Plan. See 50) Unit commanders may make a dispatch in the event that 1) intelligence gathering is necessary in order to ----- provide information to relevant organizations and bodies, 2) it is deemed impossible for the prefectural governor to make a dispatch request and immediate rescue measures are required, 3) life saving rescue operations occur or a fire or disaster occurs in the vicinity of Ministry of Defense facilities. 51) The Prime Minister issues an earthquake alert with endorsement of the Cabinet in the event that an earthquake has been predicted and when it is deemed necessary to urgently implement emergency earthquake disaster prevention measures. 52) See 53) See 54) Parks and playgrounds close to the disaster site are suitable for assembly areas. For example, for lodging and the activities of forces on the scale of one GSDF regiment, approximately 15,000m2 is required (an area approximately one-third the size of the Tokyo Dome) and a division requires in excess of approximately 140,000m2 (an area approximately three times the size of the Tokyo Dome). 55) While heliport sizes differ according to the type of helicopter and the nature of activities, as a rough estimate, each helicopter requires a circle area with a radius of 50 to 100m. 56) Manual for Responses to Disasters in Urban Areas, Hilly and Mountainous Areas, Islands and Special Disasters. See 57) 1) SDF units can be dispatched to provide assistance upon a request of the Director of the Nuclear Disaster Countermeasures Headquarters, 2) SDF personnel dispatched for nuclear disaster relief may exercise necessary authority, 3) special units may be temporarily formed when necessary for nuclear disaster relief dispatches, and 4) SDF Ready Reserve Personnel may be called up for service in the event of nuclear disaster relief dispatches. 58) Special-type disasters may be caused by terrorist or armed attacks using weapons of mass destruction. 59) Limited to the case where there are no police officials at the scene, SDF personnel on duty are authorized to make enquiries, undertake evacuation measures and enter property in addition to their authorized duties of preventing and controlling crimes and usage of weapons. 60) Facilities and equipment for the storage, accommodation or maintenance of SDF weapons, ammunition, explosives, ships, aircraft, vehicles, wired telecommunications equipment, wireless telecommunications equipment or liquid fuels, barracks, harbors and airports. 61) SDF personnel may use weapons to the extent deemed to be reasonably necessary in situations within applicable facilities in the event it is considered the use of such weapons is required to execute duties or to protect themselves or others. Weapons must not be used to cause harm to other people except in cases of self-defense or acts of emergency evacuation. 62) Units temporarily organized to be dispatched along with transport units (SDF aircraft and ships) to guide and protect Japanese nationals overseas on site. 63) See 64) See 65) Domestic birds such as chickens, ducks and quails. 66) In order to enhance Japan[,]s capability for gathering image data, the third and four intelligence-gathering satellites have now been launched The Ministry of Defense has properly utilized the information provided by the satellites. 67) As of the end of May 2009, 49 defense attachés (SDF personnel temporarily transferred from the Ministry of Defense to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs) were dispatched to diplomatic establishments overseas in 38 locations. Utilizing their experience as SDF personnel, these attachés are engaged in military information gathering through exchange with defense-related personnel of the country to which they have been dispatched, as well as military attachés from other nations. ----- 68) In modern warfare, air operations play a vital role in determining the success or failure of an operation. Therefore, it is essential to secure air superiority ahead of, or concurrently with, land and sea operations. 69) A state in which various strategies can be executed without incurring damage from the enemy due to the security of air superiority. 70) An automated nationwide command and communications system to deliver and process commands, and track information. 71) Long-range and large-caliber howitzers and rockets will be used to destroy or intercept infantry, light armored vehicles and facilities. 72) Assault units which parachute to the ground from transport aircraft in the vicinity of important terrain to conduct offensives. These units are specially formed, equipped and trained to be able to move quickly by air over long distances. 73) Assault units which are delivered to the vicinity of important terrain by transport helicopters to conduct offensives. Compared to airborne offensives, the attack criteria are simply and easily executed. 74) Relatively safe sea areas established to enable maritime traffic. The area and width of sea lanes vary according to the threat aspect. ----- ## Part III **Measures for Defense of Japan** ### Chapter 2 **Strengthening of the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements** **Section 1. The Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements** **Section 2. Japan-U.S. Security Consultation on the Future of the Japan-U.S. Alliance** **and other Matters** **Section 3. Policies and Measures for Enhancing Credibility of the Japan-U.S.** **Security Arrangements** ----- **Section 1. The Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements** Based on the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty1, the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements constitute a central pillar of Japan[,]s national defense. The Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements also serve as the foundation of the Japan-U.S. Alliance, and are indispensable not only to maintaining the peace and security of Japan, but also the entire Asia-Pacific region. In addition, the close cooperative relationship between Japan and the U.S. resulting from their alliance is proving to be extremely significant for effective responses to the diverse security challenges occurring throughout the world. Furthermore, the Japan-U.S. Alliance is playing an increasingly important role by advancing the shared fundamental values in the international community such as respect for human rights, freedom, democracy, and the rule of law. The significance of the Japan-U.S. Alliance continues to grow, and Japan will resolutely strive to maintain and strengthen the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements. (See Fig. III-2-1-1) This section explains the significance of the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements for Japan[,]s security today. ----- **1. The Significance of the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements** **1. Maintenance of Japan[,]s Security** In today[,]s international community, any country seeking to secure its peace and independence must construct a watertight defense system capable of responding to every contingency, ranging from all types of armed attacks − including by nuclear weapons − to military threats or intimidation. In today[,]s globalized international community, it is impossible even for a superpower like the U.S. to guarantee its security by acting alone. Therefore, it would be practically impossible for Japan to ensure its national security by solely independent efforts given its population, land and economy. Moreover, such a strategy would not be politically appropriate and would not necessarily contribute to the regional stability. Consequently, Japan maintains an alliance with the world[,]s dominant military superpower, the U.S., with whom it shares basic values such as respect for freedom, human rights and democracy, and the desire to maintain peace and security. In addition, the U.S. has strong economic ties with Japan and is also widely accepted by countries in the Asia-Pacific region. Further, the overwhelming military strength of the U.S. functions as an effective deterrent against threats to Japan[,]s security. When combined with Japan[,]s own considerable defense capabilities, it creates an absolute defense structure fully capable of maintaining the security of our nation. Article 5 of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty designates that Japan and the U.S. will take bilateral action in the event of an armed attack against Japan. The U.S. obligation to defend Japan in the event of an armed attack means that an attacker must be prepared to confront not only the military power of the SDF, but also the overwhelming military strength of the U.S. This serves as an effective deterrence to potential attacks. **2. Maintenance of Peace and Stability in the Region Surrounding Japan** Article 6 of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty provides for the use of facilities and regions by the U.S. forces within Japan for the purpose of maintaining the security of Japan, and also for the maintenance of international peace and security in the Far East. This provision is based on the recognition that the security of Japan is closely tied to the peace and security of the Far East region to which Japan belongs. Even in the post-Cold War era of today, the region is still facing elements of instability including North Korea[,]s development and deployment of WMD and missiles, the division of the same race in the Korean MSDF vessels conducting a joint exercise with the U.S. nuclearpeninsula, as well as the Taiwan problem. In such a powered aircraft carrier USS George Washington security environment, the close bonds of cooperation based on the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements, as seen in the presence of U.S. forces in Japan, also constitutes the essential foundation for the maintenance of peace and security in the region. These arrangements are complemented by the alliances the U.S. has built with other countries such as South Korea and the Philippines as well as the friendly relations it has developed with other countries in the region, and continue to play an important role in preserving the peace and security of the region in the post-Cold War security environment. **3. Improvement of International Security Environment** The Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements are the foundation for a comprehensive and friendly cooperative relationship between the U.S. and Japan, not only in the defense area but also in a wide range of areas, including ----- political, economic and social aspects. The friendly relationship between Japan and the U.S., founded on their security arrangements, also forms the basis for Japan[,]s foreign policy. It contributes to Japan[,]s ability to implement positive measures to maintain the peace and security of the international community, including promoting dialogue and cooperation on multinational security and cooperating with the United Nations in all areas of its operations. Since the 9/11 terrorist attacks on the United States, the international community has been increasingly concerned about new kinds of threats and diverse contingencies, such as international terrorist attacks and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. In this international environment, the strong bonds forged between Japan and the U.S. are playing an important role in achieving effective cooperative measures that can improve the security of the international community. In particular, under the auspices of the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements, the SDF and U.S. forces are working together in peacetime in a variety of areas to improve the levels of coordination. This kind of close coordination forms the foundation for every kind of international collaboration undertaken by the SDF and U.S. forces, and is resulting in their heightened operational effectiveness. Peace and prosperity of the international community is closely linked to that of Japan. Accordingly, by cooperating with the U.S., which possesses preeminent international operational capabilities, Japan is able to advance its measures to improve the international security environment. This in turn is enhancing the security and prosperity of Japan. **2. Presence of U.S. Forces in Japan** **1. Significance of Presence of U.S. Forces in Japan (USFJ)** Based on the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty, the United States stations its armed forces in Japan. Article 5 of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty obliges the United States to defend Japan, while Article 6 grants the United States the use of facilities and areas in Japan. Taken as a whole, the obligations of both countries form a balance. This differs from the North Atlantic Treaty, which provides only for shared defense by the contracting states. In accordance with Article 5 of the Security Treaty, the U.S. forces in Japan have stable access to facilities and areas in Japan. This access plays a key role in enabling a swift bilateral response by the SDF and U.S. forces in the event of an armed attack against Japan, and constitutes a crucial element of the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements. In addition, as previously stated, an attacking force will confront not only the SDF, but also the USFJ. Therefore, the USFJ functions as an effective deterrent against an armed attack. Moreover, the actions of USFJ in the defense of Japan will be assisted by the timely reinforcement of other U.S. forces. The USFJ also functions as the foundation for the reinforcement actions of U.S. forces. These USFJ functions play a vital role in maintaining the security of Japan. In addition, the U.S. military presence in Japan constitutes the basis for the actions of U.S. forces in the region, and is a vital factor in maintaining peace and security in the region. (See Fig. III-2-1-2) **2. USFJ Facilities and Areas and the Local Japanese Communities** In order for USFJ facilities and areas to fully exert their capabilities, it is vital to gain the cooperation and understanding of the local communities. Meanwhile, the social environment in the surrounding areas has changed a lot through, for example, their urbanization over the past several decades since the conclusion of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty. In light of such changes, it is necessary to reduce the impact of the facilities and areas as much as possible in order to gain the acceptance and support of the public in the true sense as well as to allow them to perform to the best of their capabilities. ----- Our national land is narrow with limited plains and there are many cases where USFJ facilities and areas are located close to urban and business areas. In such areas, factors including the existence of those facilities and areas and the takeoff and landing of U.S. forces[,] aircraft have a considerable impact on the residents’ living environment and local development. It is therefore considered necessary to make efforts to reduce the burden according to the real situation of each local area. (See Chapter 4, Section 2-3) **3. USFJ in Okinawa** In comparison to areas such as the U.S. mainland and Hawaii, Okinawa is located closer to countries in East Asia. Consequently, U.S. forces stationed in Okinawa are able to respond rapidly to needs for urgent deployment within the region. In addition, Okinawa has its geographic advantage that it has a certain distance from countries neighboring Japan. These are considered as the major reasons why U.S. forces are stationed on Okinawa including the U.S. Marine Corps, the first responders to emergencies. The facilities and areas used by U.S. forces in Okinawa were provided to U.S. forces under the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) in May 1972, when the U.S. returned Okinawa to Japan. At present, many USFJ facilities and areas are located within Okinawa Prefecture, including airfields, maneuver areas and logistics support facilities. As of January 2009, about 74 percent in square measure of the USFJ facilities and areas nationwide (for their exclusive use) was concentrated in Okinawa. Special consideration must therefore be paid to easing the burden on Okinawa. ----- **Section 2. Japan-U.S. Security Consultation on the Future of the Japan-U.S. Alliance and** **other Matters** The maintenance of peace and security requires the appropriate development of its means depending on changes in the security environment. To develop an effective cooperative relationship between Japan and the United States as Japan[,]s ally based on the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements, the Governments and people of both countries must make constant efforts in developing the alliance depending on changes in the security environment from time to time. In consideration of the items described in Fig. III-2-2-1, Japan and the United States have been engaged in consultations on the future Japan-U.S. Alliance, including force posture realignment, in recent years. As a result, the two countries have reached various epoch-making agreements for further enhancing the future Japan-U.S. Alliance. Japan and the U.S. are engaged in all types of efforts in close coordination based on the Japan-U.S. Alliance, including the May 2006 agreement on force posture realignment. This section explains details of consultations, including the outline and background of Japan-U.S. consultations on the future Japan-U.S. Alliance and the realignment of USFJ. **1. Outline of Recent Japan-U.S. Consultations** **1. Post-Cold War Developments Concerning the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements** During the Cold War era, the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements contributed to the maintenance of security of Japan as a member of the Free World and the maintenance of peace and security in the region surrounding Japan. ----- Since the end of the Cold War era, Japan and the United States have held various types of dialogues depending on changes in the international security environment. The two countries announced the Japan-U.S. Joint Declaration on Security, which clarifies the direction of bilateral cooperation for the 21st century, at the Japan-U.S. summit meeting held in Tokyo in April 1996. (See Reference 36) The Japan-U.S. Joint Declaration on Security reaffirmed that the bilateral security relationship would remain the cornerstone for maintaining stability and prosperity in the region, and indicated cooperative measures in specific areas that would serve as important pillars to enhance the credibility of the Japan-U.S. Alliance. Based on the Declaration, in September 1997, the two countries established new Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation (hereafter referred to as the “Guidelines”), and implemented various measures. Through these measures, Japan-U.S. defense cooperation has become more effective, and the credibility of the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements has further strengthened. (See Section 3-2, Reference 37) **2. Activities since the 9/11 Terrorist Attacks** **(1) Background of Japan-U.S. Consultations** Since the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, Japan and the U.S. have pursued new postures to deal with the changing security environment including emerging threats such as international terrorist activities and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, as shown in Figure III-2-2-1. Based on the understanding that it is important for Japan and the United States to maintain close exchanges in reviewing respective defense and security policies in the new security environment, the Japan-U.S. Security Consultative Committee2 (hereafter referred to as the “2+2 meeting”) held in December 2002 confirmed that the bilateral security consultations should be intensified. Since then, working-level consultations have been held. Those Japan-U.S. consultations have been conducted as part of bilateral strategic dialogues from a viewpoint of how to make the capabilities of the Japan-U.S. Alliance more effective in meeting changes of the times. Japan has proactively addressed these consultations for the maintenance of its own security, based on the basic policy to maintain deterrence and capabilities and to reduce burdens on local communities. Japan’s basic policy reflects the perception that amid the changing security environment, and in order to maintain a strong Japan-U.S. Alliance it requires both the enhancement of reliability and effectiveness of U.S. commitment to the defense of Japan and the maintenance of peace and security of the Asia-Pacific region and broad and firm support of the people of the two countries. Based on this basic policy, Japan-U.S. consultations have confirmed strategic objectives common to both countries at first, examined Japan-U.S. roles, missions and capabilities in order to achieve common strategic objectives, and then examined force posture realignment (realignment of USFJ) based on those roles, missions and capabilities, and have established the direction of Japan-U.S. Alliance gradually and comprehensively. **a. Confirmation of Common Strategic Objectives (the First Stage)** The two countries identified the strategic objectives concerning defense and security that should be achieved by them in the region and the world, and confirmed them in the Joint Statement3 at the two plus two meeting held in February 2005. At this meeting, the two countries agreed that they should intensify consultations on the sharing of the roles, missions and capabilities as examined at the second stage and on force posture realignment as studied at the third stage. (See 2 of this section) **b. Examination of Roles, Missions and Capabilities of Japan and the United States (the Second Stage)** The two countries examined the roles, missions and capabilities of the SDF and U.S. forces that would be needed for achieving the strategic objectives identified at the first stage, taking into consideration the developments and ----- achievements of security and defense policies of the two countries in recent years. This examination was made to clarify how Japan and the United States should cooperate with each other while the SDF and U.S. forces coordinate adequately before the Unites States would begin force posture realignment. Pursuant to these consultations, the two-plus-two meeting held in October 2005 prepared a joint document titled the U.S.-Japan Alliance: Transformation and Realignment for the Future (hereafter referred to as the “SCC document”) 4. The SCC document indicates the concrete direction of the roles, missions and capabilities shared by Japan and the United States, and other matters. (See 2 of this section) **c. Force Posture Realignment (Realignment of USFJ) (the Third Stage)** The two countries studied the postures of USFJ and the related SDF that would be necessary for performing or demonstrating such roles, missions and capabilities that were examined at the second stage. The study on the realignment of USFJ was conducted based on the basic policy of maintaining deterrence and capabilities and reducing burdens on local communities. The SCC document issued in October 2005 indicated the guiding precepts (see Fig. III-2-2-2) and a specific direction of the realignment of postures of USFJ and related units of the SDF for this study. At the two-plustwo meeting held in May 2006, Japan and the United States finalized the realignment in a document titled the Japan-U.S. Roadmap for Realignment Implementation5 (hereafter referred to as the Roadmap), which indicated the details for implementing concrete initiatives. (See 2 of this section, Reference 38) Following this, at the two-plus-two meeting in May 2007, both sides confirmed the progress made in the previous year on the Roadmap, and reaffirmed the importance of steadily implementing it. (See Reference 40) The overview of Japan-U.S. consultations is shown in Fig. III-2-2-3. A joint document was produced at the two-plus-two meeting held at each stage. Thus, the transparency of Japan-U.S. consultations was ensured and their contents were made known in Japan and abroad. Subsequent consultations, such as the Japan-U.S. Summit Meeting and the Defense Ministers’ Meeting, also reaffirmed that the U.S. Forces realignment shall be steadily carried out in accordance with the Roadmap. ----- **(2) Japan-U.S. Alliance for the World and Asia** At the Japan-U.S. Summit Meeting held in 2003, the two countries agreed to enhance the Japan-U.S. Alliance in the global context, by cooperating and strengthening the relationship with the international community in addressing global problems, as part of efforts to deal with a new security environment. Then, at the Japan-U.S. Summit Meeting held in November 2006, they confirmed that they would work on various challenges of the international community based on the policy of Japan-U.S. Alliance for the World and Asia, while further strengthening the Japan-U.S. relationship. At the Hokkaido Toyako Summit in July 2008 and Japan-U.S. Summit Meeting of November 2008 held on the occasion of the APEC Summit Conference, it was confirmed that the Japan-U.S. Alliance is the cornerstone of the peace and prosperity of the Asia-Pacific region and that both countries will work to further strengthen it. **3. Recent Developments** At the Japan-U.S. Summit Meeting on February 24, 2009, Prime Minister Aso and President Obama agreed to further strengthen the Japan-U.S. Alliance as well as to work hand in hand to address global issues, such as finance and the international economy, the Afghanistan-Pakistan issue and climate change and energy. Both sides also agreed to steadily carry out the realignment of U.S. forces, including the implementation of the Agreement ----- concerning the Relocation of U.S. Marine Corps from Okinawa to Guam, signed on February 17, 2009, in line with the Roadmap. **2. Results Achieved by the Japan-U.S.** **Consultations** **1. Common Strategic Objectives (the First Stage)** The common strategic objectives to be pursued by both Japan and the U.S. were confirmed in the Joint Statement at the two-plus-two meeting held in February 2005 and its overview is described below. - Region: maintenance of security in Japan, strengthening peace and stability in the region, peaceful unification of the Korean Peninsula, peaceful resolution of issues related to North Korea, welcoming China’s responsible and constructive roles and development of a cooperative relationship with China, peaceful resolution of issues concerning the Taiwan Strait, Prime Minister Aso at a summit with President Obama (February improvement of transparency of China’s military 2009) [Cabinet Public Relations Office] affairs, constructive involvement by Russia, assistance to peaceful, stable and vibrant Southeast Asia. - World: promotion of fundamental values such as democracy in the international community, engagement in international peace cooperation activities, reduction and non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and means to transport these weapons, prevention and eradication of terrorism, and improvement in effectiveness of the U.N. Security Council. ----- At the two-plus-two meeting held in May 2007, the two countries reconfirmed their commitments to these common strategic objectives, and highlighted the following strategic objectives (outline) that advance the interests of both countries: - Achieving denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula through the Six-Party Talks; - Further encouraging China to act as a responsible international stakeholder, improve transparency in its military affairs, and maintain consistency between its stated policies and actions; - Increasing cooperation to strengthen the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum as the preeminent regional economic forum; - Supporting efforts made by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) to promote democratic values, good governance, the rule of law, human rights, fundamental freedoms, and a unified market economy in Southeast Asia; - Further strengthening trilateral cooperation among Japan, the United States and Australia in the region and around the world, including in the areas of security and defense; - Continuing to build upon partnerships with India; - Ensuring Afghanistan’s successful economic reconstruction and political stabilization; - Contributing to the reconstruction of a unified and democratic Iraq; - Achieving swift, full implementation of UNSCR 1737 and 1747, aimed at bringing Iran into full compliance with its International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) requirements; and - Achieving broader Japan-North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) cooperation. **2. Roles, Missions and Capabilities of Japan and the United States (the Second Stage)** **(1) Basic Concepts of Roles, Missions and Capabilities** The basic concepts on such primary areas indicated in the SCC document as “defense of Japan and responses to situations in areas surrounding Japan, including responses to new threats and diverse contingencies” and “efforts to improve the international security environment” are shown in Figs. III-2-2-4 and III-2-2-5. In due consideration of the increasing importance of these two areas, Japan and the United States will develop their respective defense capabilities and maximize the benefits of innovations in technology. ----- **(2) Examples of Operations in Bilateral Security and Defense Cooperation to be Improved** The SCC document reconfirmed the necessity to strengthen the entire spectrum of bilateral cooperation. The document pointed out specific examples of key areas for further enhancement in the current security environment, as described in Fig. III-2-2-6. This list of key areas is not intended to be an exhaustive list of possible areas of cooperation, and other areas of operation not explicitly listed above remain important. **(3) Essential Steps to Strengthen Posture for Bilateral Security and Defense Cooperation** It is important for Japan and the United States to intensify their postures of security and defense cooperation so that the two countries may deal with diverse challenges in the new security environment. For this purpose, the two countries identified essential steps that can be taken in peacetime, which are listed in Fig. III-2-2-7. **(4) Enhancement and Expansion of Japan-U.S. Security and Defense Cooperation** Japan and the U.S. agreed to enhance and improve the effectiveness of Japan-U.S. defense cooperation indicated in the Guidelines and cooperation in other fields, if necessary, that are not specified in the Guidelines. (See Section 3-2) ----- Japan and the United States emphasized at the two-plus-two meeting held in May 2006 that the effectiveness of bilateral security and defense cooperation should be strengthened and improved, and the two countries emphasized the importance of examining the scope of security and defense cooperation to ensure a robust alliance relationship and enhance alliance capabilities. Furthermore, in the joint statement made at the two-plus-two meeting held in May 2007, the two countries reviewed progress in updating roles, missions, and capabilities in line with the alliance transformation vision indicated in the October 2005 SCC document, and highlighted as follows: - The redefinition of the SDF’s primary mission to include international peacekeeping operations, international disaster relief operations, and responses to situations in areas surrounding Japan; - Sustained progress in developing more specific planning to reflect the evolving security environment and to better posture the forces of the two countries to operate together in a regional crisis; - Substantive agreement between the two governments concerning security measures for the protection of classified military information, also known as a General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA)6. - Establishment of a bilateral Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) Defense Working Group; - Establishment of a flexible, bilateral interagency coordination mechanism to coordinate positions on policy, operations, intelligence, and public affairs positions before and during crisis situations; and ----- - Execution of joint, bilateral training exercises to strengthen interoperability and advance alliance roles, missions, and capabilities. **3. Force Posture Realignment, Including USFJ (the Third Stage)** **(1) Overview** The force posture realignment of USFJ is necessary to maintain the stable presence of USFJ, which serves as deterrence and capabilities in the Asia-Pacific region, to adapt the Japan-U.S. Alliance based on the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements to a new security environment, and thereby to reinforce the peace of Japan and the peace and security of the Asia-Pacific region. The implementation of these realignment initiatives will lead to a new phase in alliance cooperation and strengthened alliance capabilities in the region. The measures to be implemented demonstrate the resolve of both parties to strengthen their commitments under the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty and, at the same time, to reduce burdens on local communities, including those on Okinawa. The construction and other costs for facility development in the implementation of these initiatives will be borne by the Government of Japan unless otherwise specified in the Roadmap. The U.S. Government will bear the operational costs that arise from the implementation of these initiatives. Since the realignment of USFJ is an important task to reduce burdens on local communities, including Okinawa, while maintaining deterrence and capabilities of USFJ, it is decided that proper budgetary measures will be taken after having examined the particulars of costs to be borne by Japan7. An outline of the realignment is described in Fig. III-2-2-8 and Fig. III-2-2-9, and the current status of specific measures is explained below. **(2) Force Posture Realignment in Okinawa** At present, many of USFJ facilities and areas are located in Okinawa. In particular, U.S. Marine Corps in Okinawa with high mobility and readiness play multiple roles in defending Japan, and in maintaining the peace and security of the region, including responses to the earthquake that took place in Java, Indonesia in May 2006. As part of its global military posture realignment effort, the U.S. is conducting some reviews to strengthen its force structures in the Pacific. Among these reviews are strengthening Marine Corps crisis response capabilities and redistributing those capabilities to provide greater flexibility to respond with appropriate capabilities according to the nature and location of particular situations. These reviews will also enable increased security cooperation with countries in the region, thereby improving the overall security environment. In connection with this realignment, a set of integrated measures that will also substantially reduce burdens on Okinawa are identified as follows. **a. Futenma Replacement Facility and Other Matters** The U.S. Marine Corps Air Station Futenma (MCAS Futenma) fulfills the following functions: 1) To transport ground units of Marine Corps by helicopters and other means; 2) To operate tanker aircraft; 3) To accommodate aircraft in case of emergency. In the meantime, local residents have strongly demanded the early return of MCAS Futenma for their concerns over local safety, noise and traffic of the region as it is located in the middle of the residential area. Therefore, the following initiatives will be implemented on the functions of MCAS Futenma, and then the air station will be returned. ----- ----- ----- **(i) Function to Transport Ground Units of Marine Corps by Helicopters and Other Means** **(a) Status of Basic Plan Based on the SACO Final Report** In the Special Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO) Final Report prepared in December 1996, the two countries agreed to totally return MCAS Futenma after an adequate replacement facility is completed within five to seven years. (See 4 of this section) A sequence of events related to the replacement facility for MCAS Futenma (hereafter referred to as the “Futenma Replacement Facility (FRF)”) after the issuance of the Final Report are shown in Fig. III-2-2-10. In 2002, the Basic Plan of the FRF was finalized. After that, although an environmental impact assessment procedure started in 2004, and the technical site survey, a necessary procedure for commencement of construction begun in 2003, the process did not go smoothly, and as the construction of the FRF was expected to take nine and a half years, it is now expected that it will take another ten years or so to relocate and return MCAS Futenma. In addition, a U.S. military helicopter accident took place in Ginowan City in August 2004. It became evident that the existence of MCAS Futenma in the middle of the residential area has a potential risk, and therefore it was strongly recognized that the early relocation and return of MCAS Futenma is essential. In order to drive away a general feeling of unrest among local residents, the two Governments conducted a study again on how to realize early relocation and return of MCAS Futenma during the course of Japan-U.S. consultations on the realignment of USFJ. **(b) Basic Concept of Review of Futenma Relocation** The U.S. Marine Corps in Okinawa consist of air, ground, logistics and command elements, and the interaction of those elements in actual operations is necessary. Therefore, both sides conducted a study based on the recognition that the FRF needs to be located within Okinawa Prefecture so that rotary wing aircraft currently stationed at MCAS Futenma will be located near the other elements with which they train or operate on a regular basis. ----- In the study, both sides considered several factors, including safety of neighboring communities and military personnel, noise impacts on local communities, impacts on the natural environment including seaweed beds, and operational requirements in peacetime and in contingencies. **(c) Overview of Futenma Relocation** Based on the aforementioned concept, both sides conducted the study intensively. As a result, in the SCC document prepared in October 2005, the initiative to “locate the FRF in an ‘L’-shaped configuration that combines the shoreline areas of Camp Schwab and adjacent water areas of Oura Bay” was approved. Thereafter, as a result of consultation with local municipalities, including Nago City, agreements on the FRF were made with Nago City and Ginoza Village in April 2006 stating that, based on the initiative approved in the SCC document, two runways would be constructed to avoid an air route above the surrounding area pursuant to the request from the local communities, and that the runways should be constructed by paying due attention to the following points: 1) safety of lives of local residents; 2) conservation of the natural environment; and 3) the feasibility of the project. Then, it was decided that the Ministry of Defense, Okinawa Prefecture, Nago City, Ginoza Village and related local municipalities would continue to have consultations on the plan of construction of the FRF in good faith on a continuous basis to reach a conclusion. Based on the above-mentioned agreement, both countries agreed in the Roadmap, to locate the FRF in a configuration that combines the Henoko-saki and adjacent water areas of Oura and Henoko Bays. This facility ----- includes two runways aligned in a “V”-shape, each runway having a length of 1,600meters plus two 100-meter overruns. The length of each runway portion of the facility is 1,800meters, exclusive of seawalls. The facility ensures agreed operational capabilities while addressing issues of safety, noise, and environmental impacts. As indicated in the SACO Final Report, the FRF will have capabilities to support operations of helicopters now stationed in MCAS Futenma and operations of aircraft taking off and landing in a short field. There’s no plan to operate fighter aircraft from this facility. Furthermore, it is indicated that, in order to locate the FRF in the Camp Schwab area, necessary adjustments will be made, such as reconfiguration of Camp Schwab facilities and adjacent water surface areas. In principle, the construction method for the FRF will be landfill. The construction work is targeted for completion by 2014. It is indicated that relocation to the FRF will occur when the facility is fully operationally capable. (See Fig. III-2-2-11) In the case of the newly agreed FRF, construction work will be carried out mainly on land earlier and more steadily than the old plan. Thus, earlier relocation becomes possible. In addition, the portion to be constructed in the offshore area will be made as small as possible. Thus, full consideration is given to environmental impacts. Concerning the construction of the FRF, the Governor of Okinawa Prefecture and the then Minister of State for Defense signed, in May 2006, a Memorandum of Basic Understanding in which both parties agreed to cope with the issue based on the Government plan and paying due attention to: 1) removal of danger of MCAS Futenma; 2) safety of lives of local residents; 3) conservation of the natural environment; and 4) feasibility of the project. ----- **(d) Status of Coordination with Local Communities** The Government made a Cabinet decision on May 30, 2006 to proceed with the construction based on the plan approved at the two-plus-two meeting held on May 1, 2006 and by taking into consideration the positions of the Government, Okinawa Prefecture and the related local municipalities and background of the relocation of MCAS Futenma, aimed to develop a construction plan immediately. It was also decided that the specific construction plan, safety/environmental measures and local development measures should be addressed through consultations made at a consultative organ, which is established jointly with Okinawa Prefecture and related local municipalities8. In response, the Council Meeting on Measures for Relocation of Futenma Air Station9 was set up in August 2006 and has held nine meetings thus far (as of April 2009). At the 8th meeting in July 2008, it was agreed to set up under the Council Meeting the “Working Team for Removing Possible Risks at Futenma Air Station” and the “Working Team for Smooth Implementation of Construction Plan and Environmental Impact Assessment for FRF”, ensuring close consultations between working-level officials of the Government and Okinawa Prefecture. **(e) Status of Implementation of the Environmental Impact Assessment** The Environmental Impact Assessment Scoping Document (hereafter referred to as the “Scoping Document”) was sent to the Governor of Okinawa Prefecture and others on August 7, 2007. Following the public announcement and inspection, additional and revised documents concerning the Scoping Document, which also incorporated the views of the Governor of Okinawa Prefecture, were presented to the Governor of Okinawa Prefecture in March 2008, and a survey in accordance with the Scoping Document began. Upon completion of a year-long assessment covering all four seasons, in March 2009 a Draft Environmental Impact Statement was formulated and, on April 1, sent to the Governor of Okinawa Prefecture. It was made available for general public inspection from April 2 to May 1, and several meetings for explanation were held during the period. Thus the procedure for the environmental impact assessment has proceeded. **(ii) Function to Operate Tanker Aircraft** Air refueling aircraft KC-130 (12 in total) are to be relocated from Futenma Air Station to Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS) Iwakuni (in Yamaguchi Prefecture) under the Roadmap as well as the SACO Final Report. They will be regularly deployed on a rotational basis to Kanoya Base (in Kagoshima Prefecture) and Guam for training and operations. Consultations are being held between Japan and the U.S. pertaining to training and operations at Kanoya Base. **(iii) Base Function to Accommodate Aircraft in Contingencies** Strengthened contingency use of Nyutabaru Air Base (in Miyazaki Prefecture) and Tsuiki Air Base (in Fukuoka Prefecture) will be provided for U.S. forces. When site surveys are completed, facility improvements for the strengthened use will be made as necessary before MCAS Futenma is returned. These improved facilities, when completed, will also support the bilateral training activities, which should be expanded according to the studies on roles, missions and capabilities. Because operations using long runways cannot be replicated at the FRF, improved contingency use of civilian facilities will be examined in the context of bilateral contingency planning, and appropriate arrangements will be made in order to realize the return of MCAS Futenma. **(iv) Efforts to Eliminate Danger at MCAS Futenma** In August 2007 the Ministry of Defense announced various measures as part of efforts to remove possible risks at Futenma Air Station: 1) improving approach and takeoff routes including actively avoiding areas of high ----- residential density, 2) expanding clear zones10 and other measures for safe return from the area around the airfield when there is engine trouble, 3) improving equipment to make the runways more easily visible at night, and 4) developing automatic flight control systems rather than relying on eyesight. The Ministry of Defense is steadily implementing these measures. The Japan-U.S. Joint Committee agreed in February 2008 that of these measures the Government of Japan would improve facilities to make runways more easily visible at night and to expand clear zones. **b. Force Reductions and Relocation to Guam** In conjunction with the realignment of U.S. Marine Corps capabilities in the Asia-Pacific region, the personnel of the III Marine Expeditionary Force (III MEF) will be relocated to Guam11 and the remaining Marine units in Okinawa will be realigned. Due to this realignment in Okinawa, it is planned that approximately 8,000 III MEF personnel and their approximately 9,000 dependents will be relocated from Okinawa to Guam by 2014 in a manner that maintains unit integrity. U.S. Marine Corps forces remaining in Okinawa will consist of Marine Air Ground Task Force elements, such as command, ground, aviation, and combat service support, as well as a base support capability. As for costs of relocating U.S. forces to Guam, the Governments of both Japan and the United States held consultations on how both sides should share such costs. At the Japan-U.S. defense summit meeting held in April 2006, both sides agreed on the sharing of costs for providing facilities and infrastructure involved in the relocation of U.S. forces to Guam, as described in Fig. III-2-2-15. (See 3 of this section) The relocation of the U.S. Marine Corps in Okinawa to Guam is extremely important for advancing the realignment of U. S. Forces and reducing the burden on Okinawa. The Ministry of Defense has held constant consultations on how to implement the Roadmap with the U.S. Government, with the intention of steadily carrying out the realignment of U.S. Forces in accordance with the Roadmap. With respect to projects funded by Japanese direct cash contributions (“Mamizu” projects), Japan and the United States reached a common understanding on specific details and necessary costs for projects to be financed in FY 2009, as well as on the fundamental scheme to implement projects. Therefore, the costs for on-base infrastructure and design projects (approximately 34.6 billion yen) were appropriated in the FY 2009 budget. (See Fig. III-2-2-12) Moreover, in order to further solidify and legally ensure Japan and U.S. bilateral action, such as Japanese cash contributions over the course of several years, the Government of Japan signed an agreement on the relocation of U.S. Marine Corps from Okinawa to Guam (Agreement Between the Government of Japan and the Government of the United States of America Concerning the Implementation of the Relocation of III Marine Expeditionary Force Personnel and Their Dependents from Okinawa to Guam) with the Government of the United States on February 17, 2009. This Agreement entered into force on May 19, 2009. (See Reference 41) Furthermore, the Ministry of Defense has developed the necessary systems, such as the setting up of Guam Relocation Project Office, in preparation for full-fledged Guam Relocation Projects including the projects funded by private finance initiatives in and after FY 2009. **c. Land Returns and Shared Use of Facilities** **(i) Return of Significant Land Areas South of Kadena Air Base** The facilities and areas of USFJ are located in densely populated areas south of Kadena Air Base (approximately 1,500ha in total). Following the relocation and return of MCAS Futenma, and the transfer of III MEF personnel to Guam described above, the remaining facilities and areas in Okinawa will be consolidated, thereby enabling the return of significant land areas south of Kadena Air Base. The Roadmap has stipulated the development of a detailed consolidation plan for the six candidate facilities ----- (Camp Kuwae, Camp Zukeran, MCAS Futenma, Makiminato Service Area, Naha Port, and Army POL Depot Kuwae Tank Farm No.1), and is currently under deliberation between Japan and the United States. (See Fig. III-2-2-8) **(ii) Steady Implementation of the SACO Final Report** The steady implementation of the SACO Final Report prepared in 1996 is important because it aims to properly maintain the capabilities and readiness of USFJ and to reduce impacts of operations of U.S. forces on local residents of Okinawa. In the Roadmap, Japan and the United States agreed to the possibility that the SACO relocation and return initiatives may need to be re-evaluated. **(iii) Shared Use of USFJ Facilities and Areas in Okinawa** The SDF has only a limited number of facilities in Okinawa, including Naha Air Base, and most of them are located in urbanized areas with some operational restriction. Therefore, the shared use of USFJ facilities and areas in Okinawa will greatly improve the training environment for SDF units in Okinawa, and facilitate bilateral training and interoperability between the SDF and U.S. forces. Some of the shared use will enable it to improve readiness and contribute to maintaining the safety of local residents at a time of disaster. Based on such concepts, it was decided that Camp Hansen would be used for GSDF training, and training ----- commenced in March 2008. ASDF will use Kadena Air Base for bilateral training with U.S. forces while taking into account noise impacts on local communities. **d. Relationships among Realignment Initiatives** Within the overall realignment package in the Roadmap, the Okinawa-related realignment initiatives are interconnected. Specifically, consolidation and land returns in the south of Kadena depend on completing the relocation of III MEF personnel and dependents from Okinawa to Guam. The III MEF relocation from Okinawa to Guam is dependent on: 1) tangible progress toward completion of the FRF; and 2) Japan’s financial contribution to fund development of required facilities and infrastructure in Guam. **(3) Improvement of U.S. Army Japan Command and Control Capacity** To have enhanced mobility and readiness as well as to enable joint missions, the headquarters of U.S. Army Japan (USARJ) at Camp Zama (in Kanagawa Prefecture) was activated as the headquarters of the I Corps (Forward)/USARJ in December 2007 and the transformation12 took place at the end of September 2008. This transformation is based on the global realignment of the U.S. Armyas part of the overall transformation of U.S. forces. The transformed USARJ headquarters in Japan will continue to hold the same core mission of defending Japan and maintaining the peace and security of the Far East. To enable rapid responses to various contingencies, the GSDF Central Readiness Force Headquarters that centrally controls mobile operation units and specialized units will be relocated to Camp Zama13 by Japan Fiscal Year 2012 so that it may strengthen coordination with the transformed USARJ headquarters. In accordance with the transformation of USARJ headquarters, a battle command training center and other support facilities will be constructed within U.S. Forces Sagami General Depot (SGD) (in Kanagawa Prefecture) using U.S. funding. In addition, measures will be implemented for more effective and efficient use of Camp Zama and SGD, including partial return of facilities and areas. The partial return of land (approx. 17ha) at SGD facilities and areas was approved by the Japan-U.S. Joint Committee in June 2008. **(4) Yokota Air Base and Airspace** **a. Establishment of the Bilateral Joint Operations Coordination Center (BJOCC)** Enhancement of coordination between headquarters, combined with the transition to a joint operations structure, is quite important from the perspective of ensuring flexible and rapid responses of the SDF and U.S. forces. The headquarters of USFJ located at Yokota Air Base (in Tokyo) plays an important role in the various mechanisms14 under the Guidelines. Therefore, along with the relocation of ASDF Air Defense Command as mentioned below, the Bilateral Joint Operations Coordination Center (BJOCC)15 is to be established and it is planned to complete construction/installation of facilities and infrastructure and to commence operations at the BJOCC by Japanese Fiscal Year 2010. **b. Relocation of ASDF Air Defense Command** ASDF Air Defense Command located in Fuchu City, Tokyo has an air defense mission as well as a function as a headquarters for BMD operations. In the case of air defense and BMD, response time is very short. Therefore, it is quite important for the SDF and U.S. forces to immediately share necessary information. Thus, in Japan Fiscal Year 2010, ASDF Air Defense Command and its relevant units will relocate to Yokota Air Base, where the headquarters of U.S. 5th Air Force is located, and construction/installation work16 is being conducted. This arrangement and the establishment of the above-mentioned BJOCC will make it possible to enhance coordination between headquarters of the SDF and U.S. forces, including the sharing of information concerning air defense and BMD. ----- **c. Yokota Airspace** At Yokota Air Base, U.S. forces conduct radar approach control for the Yokota airspace spreading from the western part of the Tokyo Metropolitan area to Niigata Prefecture. To facilitate the operation of civilian airplanes that enter the airspace, however, the following measures are pursued. (i) Establish a program in Japan Fiscal Year 2006 to inform commercial aviation entities of procedures for transiting Yokota airspace. (ii) Develop procedures in Japan Fiscal Year 2006 for the temporary transfer of responsibility for air traffic control of portions of Yokota airspace to Japanese authorities, when not required by military purposes. (iii) Return air traffic control of portions of Yokota airspace to Japanese authorities by September 2008 after having identified the returned portions by October 2006. (iv) Complete a study17 of the conditions required for the possible return of the entire Yokota airspace by Japan Fiscal Year 2009. In response, the procedure mentioned in (b) as above started in September 2006. The themes of 1) identification of the airspace portions to be returned by September 2008 and 2) collocation of U.S. forces and SDF controllers at the Yokota Radar Approach Control (Yokota RAPCON) facility were mutually agreed by the Governments of Japan and the United States. With regard to the measure 1) above, the area adjacent to the west side of Haneda Airport was reduced by about 40% on September 25, 2008 and the control operation was returned to Japan. With respect to the ASDF controllers together with U.S. force controllers at the Yokokota measure 2) above, the collocation of U.S. forces and RAPCON facility Japanese controllers started in May 2007. The lessons learned here will be incorporated into deliberations on required conditions for the complete return of the Yokota airspace. (See Fig. III-2-2-13) **d. Civilian-Military Dual Use of Yokota Air Base** At the Japan-U.S. Summit Meeting held in May 2003, it was agreed that the feasibility of a civilian-military dual use of Yokota Air Base would be bilaterally studied by both governments. A Liaison Conference was then established as a working panel attended by ministries and agencies (the Cabinet Secretariat, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport, the Defense Agency (now reorganized as the Ministry of Defense)), the Defense Facilities Administration Agency (then)) and the Tokyo Metropolitan Government. Since then, discussions have been made. The Governments of Japan and the United States have conducted a study, starting in October 2006, of the specific conditions and modalities in the study group, with the understanding that the dual use will not compromise military operations and safety of Yokota Air Base18, and based on further coordination and the outcome of the study, both governments will consult and then make appropriate decisions. **(5) Relocation of Carrier Air Wing from Atsugi Air Facility to MCAS Iwakuni** **a. Significance of U.S. Aircraft Carrier Deployment** The presence of the U.S. Pacific Fleet plays an important role in maintaining the regional peace and stability, including the safety of its maritime traffic in the Asia-Pacific region. U.S. aircraft carriers are the core capability in the Fleet. In order to ensure the long-term forward deployment capabilities of aircraft carriers and carrier-based ----- aircraft, it is necessary to secure an operational base in Japan. The conventional aircraft carrier Kitty Hawk had been deployed in this area and anchored in Yokosuka (in Kanagawa Prefecture). After more than 40 years since its commissioning, Kitty Hawk was reaching retirement age. Thus, in September 2008, Kitty Hawk was replaced by the nuclear-powered carrier George Washington, commissioned in 1992. Nuclear-powered aircraft carriers have excellent combatant and operational capabilities. Since they are driven by energy generated in a nuclear reactor, there is no need to replenish fuel, and they are able to maintain the high speeds necessary for the operation of aircraft. Having a strong U.S. Navy presence continuously maintained in areas surrounding Japan by deploying the nuclear carrier George Washington would contribute to the security of Japan and to the maintenance of peace and security in the region. Furthermore, it would The U.S. nuclear-powered aircraft carrier USS George Washington entering the Port of Yokosuka [U.S. Navy] ----- symbolize the deep commitment of the United States to the Japan-U.S. Alliance. The U.S. Navy vows that it will continue to ensure that all of its nuclear-powered warships (including the nuclear carrier George Washington) adhere to the relevant safety policies. For example, the nuclear reactor will normally be shut down while the aircraft carrier is anchored, and repair work and fuel changes will not be carried out in Japan. The Government of Japan intends to continue taking all possible measures to ensure safety. (See Section 3-6-3) **b. Base for Carrier-Based Aircraft** When the U.S. aircraft carrier is deployed in Yokosuka, Atsugi Air Facility (in Kanagawa Prefecture) is currently used as a base for carrier-based aircraft. Since Atsugi Air Facility is located in the center of an urban district, noise of carrier jets taking off and landing particularly had been problems for a long time. These problems should be resolved as soon as possible in order to stably maintain the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements and the operations of carriers under the arrangements from now into the future. After the completion of the runway relocation project at MCAS Iwakuni, the safe operations of aircraft will be possible in a less intrusive manner. In consideration of these matters, Carrier Air Wing Five (CVW-5) squadrons will be relocated from Atsugi Air Facility to MCAS Iwakuni. This relocation, consisting of F/A-18, EA-6B, E-2C and C-2 aircraft (59 aircraft in total), will be completed by 2014, subsequent to the following: (1) completion of necessary facilities, and (2) adjustment of training airspace and the Iwakuni RAPCON airspace. The relocations will be conducted after the runway is moved offshore to mitigate impacts of the increased operations at MCAS Iwakuni due to this relocation. Related measures will also be taken, including the relocation of JMSDF’s EP-3 and other aircraft from MCAS Iwakuni to Atsugi Air Facility, the regular rotational deployment of KC-130 aircraft (which are to be relocated from MCAS Futenma to MCAS Iwakuni) to JMSDF Kanoya Base and Guam, and the relocation of U.S. Marine Corps CH-53D helicopters from MCAS Iwakuni to Guam. It is expected that the area requiring residential noise-abatement work (so-called first category area) will decrease from approximately 1,600ha to 500ha. Thus, the noise around MCAS Iwakuni will be alleviated. Furthermore, safety will be improved as the runway will be relocated offshore and approach and takeoff routes will be established above the water. (See Fig. III-2-2-8) As for field-carrier landing practice (FCLP), a bilateral framework to conduct a study on a permanent FCLP facility is to be established with the goal of selecting a permanent site by July 2009 or the earliest possible date thereafter. In addition, the SCC document confirmed that U.S. forces will continue to conduct FCLPs at Iwo Jima in accordance with existing temporary arrangements until a permanent FCLP training facility is identified. **c. Resumption of Commercial Aviation at MCAS Iwakuni** Considering that the local governments, including Yamaguchi Prefecture and Iwakuni City, have been working together to request the resumption of commercial aviation, the Governments of Japan and the United States have been engaged in discussions to identify such issues as the relations between commercial aviation resumption and the operations of U.S. forces and to study its feasibility. As a result, in October 2005, it was agreed that commercial aviation operations of four round trips per day would be allowed as long as such operations do not compromise U.S. military operational requirements. Since it was then agreed in the Roadmap that portions of the future civilian air facility would be accommodated at MCAS Iwakuni, bilateral coordination has been carried out, and the Ministry of Defense explained the location of commercial aviation facilities to the local governments in May 2007. ----- **(6) Ballistic Missile Defense** As confirmed in the examination on roles, missions and capabilities, Japan and the United States will continue close coordination on Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) as the two countries improve their respective BMD capabilities. In June 2006 the new U.S. Forward Based X-Band Transportable (FBX-T) Radar System (AN/TPY-2; hereafter referred to as the “X-Band Radar System”) with the sophisticated capability to search and track ballistic missiles was deployed to ASDF Shariki Air Station (in Aomori Prefecture) and operations commenced19. The data obtained by the X-Band Radar System will be shared by the two countries. Thereby, the capabilities to intercept missiles directed at Japan and capabilities for protecting the Japanese people and coping with damage will improve. Also in October 2006 U.S. Army Patriot PAC-3 capabilities were deployed to Kadena Air Base and Kadena Ammunition Storage Area, and in addition Aegis-equipped cruisers, which are forward-deployed in the Western Pacific region, have been installed with BMD capabilities over some phases since August 2006. This deployment of U.S. forces’ BMD capabilities to Japan contributes to the improvement of our country’s defense against missile attacks, the maintenance of deterrence of USFJ and the safety of Japanese citizens. **(7) Training Relocation** As for training relocation20, initially, aircraft from three U.S. facilities, Kadena Air Base, Misawa Air Base (in Aomori Prefecture) and MCAS Iwakuni will participate in bilateral training with the SDF conducted at the following SDF facilities: Chitose (in Hokkaido), Misawa, Hyakuri (in Ibaraki Prefecture), Komatsu (in Ishikawa Prefecture), Tsuiki and Nyutabaru. Since March 2007, U.S. forces have conducted training relocation from Misawa Air Base, MCAS Iwakuni and Kadena Air Base to ASDF Chitose, Misawa, Hyakuri, Komatsu, Tsuiki, and Nyutabaru Air Bases. The Government of Japan is improving infrastructure for training relocation at SDF facilities as necessary after conducting site surveys. Furthermore, the Regional Defense Bureaus are working to implement smooth training and have established local headquarters in cooperation with the ASDF and to support the U.S. military in the conduct of training relocation, by communicating with related local government organizations and responding to nearby citizens concerned about their peace and safety during U.S. Air Force F-16 fighter during training relocation to ASDF training. Komatsu Air Base [U..S.A.F.] **3. Initiatives for Smooth Implementation of the Realignment of USFJ** The previously mentioned Roadmap intends to enhance the effectiveness of the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements, maintain deterrence and capabilities, and contribute to the long-awaited reduction of burdens on local communities where USFJ facilities and areas are located. Therefore, it is important to ensure the implementation of the Roadmap, based on the Cabinet decision in May 2006 on the efforts by the Government of Japan regarding the realignment of U.S. forces structure in Japan and others. (See Reference 39) The Law Concerning Special Measures on Smooth Implementation of the Realignment of U.S. Forces in Japan and Related SDF Forces21 (hereafter referred to as the “USFJ Realignment Special Measures Law”) was passed in May 2007 and enacted on August 29, 2007. Following is a general description of that law. ----- **1. Overview of the USFJ Realignment Special Measures Law** **(1) Institutionalization of Provision of Realignment Grant** The realignment grant is a measure the Government takes for those local municipalities that accept increased burdens to implement the realignment of USFJ, in appreciation of their contribution to the maintenance of peace and security of Japan, and is needed for facilitating the smooth implementation of the realignment of USFJ. The grant is awarded for purposes other than for conventional measures around bases22, which have been paid before, and will be used to improve the convenience of lives of residents in the local communities23 where the realignment is implemented and to contribute to the promotion of local industries24, during the period–10 years in principle–including time before and after the realignment. The grant is awarded to related communities depending on the progress of USFJ realignment measures, after the Ministry of Defense has specified defense facilities and nearby communities. **(2) Establishment of Exception to the Grant Rate for Public Works Projects, or Other Treatment** While burdens on local municipalities are increasing due to realignment, some municipalities bear extremely heavy burdens. These municipalities will be required to carry out public works such as roads and ports promptly and special grant-rate measures targeted for such municipalities will contribute to a smooth implementation of the realignment. However, the public works as mentioned above will often be implemented by the national government or prefectures and, in some cases, will be beyond the areas of certain municipalities. In these cases, that the public works may be infeasible with the realignment grant. Therefore, the USFJ Realignment Special Measures Law provides the following measures to promote industrial development of the areas consisting of municipalities with particularly heavy burdens and surrounding municipalities25 (Special Area for Development concerning Realignment). (See Fig. III-2-2-14) - A council chaired by Minister of Defense and consisting of relevant Ministers (Council for Local Development concerning Realignment of U.S. Forces in Japan and Related SDF Forces26) will be established under the Ministry of Defense. - The Governor of a prefecture will apply to Minister of Defense for the designation of Special Area for Development concerning Realignment, and submit a development plan (Development Plan for Special Area for Development concerning Realignment-draft), including public works projects for roads, ports and others. - Upon receipt of an application from the Governor of a prefecture, the Council will deliberate on the designation of Special Area for Development concerning Realignment and on the decision of a development plan for the area27. **(3) Special Financial Operations of the Japan Finance Corporation (JFC) and Other Measures** **a.** **Reasons Why Japan Shares Expenses of Relocating U.S. Forces to Guam** The relocation of U.S. Marine Corps stationed in Okinawa out of the prefecture has been strongly desired by the residents of Okinawa Prefecture. It is important to complete the relocation of U.S. Marine Corps from Okinawa to Guam as soon as possible, which enables the reduction of burdens on Okinawa while maintaining the deterrence and capabilities of the USFJ. Therefore, the Government of Japan has actively approached the United States to negotiate the relocation. As a result, the two countries agreed on the sharing of costs of the relocation. If the United States alone undertakes the development of necessary facilities and infrastructure (electricity, water and waste water, and solid waste disposal) in Guam, the task is expected to take a very long time, despite the need to complete the relocation at an early date. Therefore, the Government of Japan decided to support the United States in its development of ----- ----- necessary facilities, including Marine headquarters buildings, barracks and family housing, and infrastructure. Japan will bear the cost for the relocation on the basis of actual requirement of facilities and infrastructure. In other words, Japan will not bear the cost based on a certain percentage of the total costs necessary for the relocation, which the United States requested in the negotiation. Also, the development of family housing and infrastructure for Marine personnel will be funded by private finance initiatives by means of equity investment and loans so that the Government of Japan’s financial burden may be reduced as much as possible. The funds for projects will be recovered by rents and service charges paid by the U.S. side in the future. The agreed amounts of the costs of relocation to Guam to be shared by Japan and the United States are based on the estimation prepared by the U.S. side at the stage of study, and therefore such amounts are only approximate. To reduce and rationalize the amount of cost to be borne by Japan, it will be important for the Government of Japan to carefully examine concrete project schemes and the detailed estimate for spending. Therefore, GOJ will take budgetary measures after thorough examinations have been made in cooperation with the Japan Finance Corporation28 (JFC) and efforts have been made to reduce the amount of costs required. (See Fig. III-2-2-15) **b. Outline of Special Financial Operations of JFC** To properly and stably implement overseas projects for which private finance initiative is utilized for a long period, it will be necessary to employ the capability of JFC which has expertise and experience in this field. Therefore, it was decided to authorize JFC to conduct financial services for facilitating the USFJ realignment as exceptional measures under the USFJ Realignment Special Measures Law, so that JFC can make equity investments, loans and other operations that will be needed for projects to facilitate the relocation of U.S. Marine Corps in Okinawa to Guam, and to authorize the Government of Japan to take special financial measures for such operations. (See Fig. III-2-2-16) ----- **(4) Measures for USFJ Local Employees** The employment of USFJ local employees may be adversely affected by the USFJ realignment, because defense facilities will be returned, U.S. Marine Corps in Okinawa will relocate to Guam, and other measures will be taken as a result of the realignment of USFJ. Therefore, the Government of Japan decided to take measures to maintain their employment, including education and skill training. (See Section 3-6) **(5) Validity of the Law** - The law shall be valid for 10 years. - Despite the validity of the law, measures including special operations of JFC shall remain effective for a considerable length of time. **2. Measures based on the USFJ Realignment Special Measures Law** Based on the USFJ Realignment Special Measures Law, 14 defense facilities and 33 municipalities were identified as realignment defense facilities and realignment municipalities qualified for realignment grants in October 2007. During 2008 Iwakuni City, Nago City, Ginoza Village, Zama City, and three municipalities related to Camp Hansen, were additionally identified, and 14 defense facilities and 39 municipalities received realignment grants. In the budget for FY 2009 approximately 9.1 billion yen has been earmarked for realignment grants. **4. Various Measures Concerning USFJ Facilities and Areas** Ensuring the stable use of the USFJ facilities and areas is essential for the achievement of the objectives of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty. The Government of Japan has long been implementing measures to harmonize the stable use of these facilities and areas with requests of the surrounding local communities. **1. USFJ Facilities and Areas Located in Japan, Excluding Okinawa** **(1) Iwakuni Runway Relocation Project** In response to requests of Iwakuni City and other local governments, the Government of Japan has decided to proceed with the project to relocate the runway approximately 1,000 meters to the east (offshore) in order to solve the problems related to operations, safety and noise and to ensure the stable use of MCAS Iwakuni. (See 2 of this section) **(2) Realignment of USFJ Facilities and Areas in Kanagawa Prefecture** Considering that local governments concerned and other organizations have strongly requested the return of USFJ facilities and areas in Kanagawa Prefecture, the Governments of Japan and the United States held consultations on the ideal state of these facilities and areas. As a result of consultations, the two countries reached a common understanding regarding a basic stance on the return of the six facilities and areas in Yokohama City, including KamiSeya Communication Station, and the construction of approximately 700 units of U.S. family housing in the Yokohama City portion of Ikego Housing Area and Navy Annex. The Japan-U.S. Joint Committee agreed upon the result of the consultation in October 2004. The construction of U.S. family housing will: 1) pave the way for the extensive return of six USFJ facilities and areas (approximately 419ha in total) in Kanagawa Prefecture; and 2) solve the current housing shortage problem of U.S. Navy in Japan. In addition, it is essential to achieve the objectives of the Japan- U.S. Security Treaty. Therefore, the Ministry of Defense is making utmost efforts to realize the abovementioned housing ----- construction through coordination with the United States and local governments concerned through such procedures as design and environmental impact assessment. (See Fig. III-2-2-17) Of these six facilities and areas, in 2005, the whole land area of Koshiba POL Depot, and, in May 2009, Tomioka Storage Area, were returned to Japan. As for the remaining four facilities and areas, the Ministry of Defense will be attentive to the requests of related local governments concerning the use of land, and will ask the United States to return them as soon as possible. **2. USFJ Facilities and Areas in Okinawa** As of January 2008, approximately 74% of the area of USFJ facilities and area (for exclusive use) are concentrated in Okinawa Prefecture, and they take up approximately 10% of the area of the prefecture, and approximately 18% of the area of the main island of Okinawa. Therefore, the Cabinet and the Government as a whole are addressing the issues related to Okinawa as one of the most important tasks. The Ministry of Defense, for its own part, has so far been strongly committed to implementing a number of measures to resolve these issues, while at the same time, harmonizing the achievement of objectives of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty with the requests of local communities. ----- ----- ----- Of these measures, the Ministry of Defense believes that the steady implementation of the proposals set out in the Final Report of the Special Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO), which was completed by the Governments of Japan and the United States, would be the most reliable way to reduce the burden on the people of Okinawa. Therefore, the Ministry of Defense is making efforts to realize the proper and rapid implementation of such proposals. (See 2 of this section) **(1) Efforts for Realignment, Consolidation and Reduction before the Establishment of SACO** When Okinawa was returned to Japan in 1972, the Government of Japan provided 83 facilities and areas covering approximately 278km2 for exclusive use by USFJ under the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty. However, their concentration in Okinawa has led to strong calls for their realignment and reduction on the grounds that regional promotion and development projects are restricted and the lives of residents are seriously affected. In view of these circumstances, both countries have continued their efforts to realign, consolidate and reduce USFJ facilities and areas, focusing on issues that are strongly voiced by local communities. In light of the items identified by the joint statement issued by then Prime Minister Eisaku Sato of Japan and then President Richard Nixon of the United States in 1972, a plan for the realignment and consolidation of USFJ facilities and areas in Okinawa was endorsed by the Security Consultative Committee (SCC) held in 1973, 1974 and 1976. It was agreed at the meeting of the Japan-U.S. Joint Committee of 1990 that both sides would proceed with the necessary adjustments and procedures for the return of land, known as the 23 Issues. Meanwhile, under the agreement reached at the Japan-U.S. Summit of 1995 regarding the so-called Three Okinawa Issues (the return of Naha Port, the return of Yomitan Auxiliary Airfield, and the relocation of artillery live-fire training over Highway 104) strongly demanded by the residents of the prefecture, it was agreed that efforts would be made to resolve the issues. (See Reference 42) **(2) Backgrounds of the Establishment of SACO and Other Matters** Public interest in Okinawa-related issues heightened across the country in response to an unfortunate incident that occurred in 1995 as well as the refusal of the then Governor of Okinawa to sign land lease renewal documents under the Special Measures Law for USFJ Land. Considering that the burden on the people of Okinawa should be reduced as much as possible and shared by the whole nation, the Government has, for the sake of future development of Okinawa, decided to put even greater efforts into bringing about steady progress in the realignment, consolidation and relocation of USFJ facilities and areas, and to do its utmost to take measures for industrial development in Okinawa. In order to hold consultations on issues related to USFJ facilities and areas in Okinawa, the Government established the Okinawa Action Council between the central government and Okinawa Prefecture, and SACO between Japan and the United States in 1995. Since then, the issues on Okinawa were intensely discussed for about one year, and the so-called SACO Final Report was compiled in 1996. (See Reference 43) **(3) Overview of the SACO Final Report and Progress** The SACO Final Report stipulates the return of land (the total return of six facilities, including MCAS Futenma, and the partial return of five others, such as the Northern Training Area), the adjustment of training and operational procedures (the termination of artillery live-fire training over Highway 104 and the dispersion of similar live-fire training into maneuver areas on mainland Japan), the implementation of noise-reduction initiatives, and the improvement of operational procedures under the Status of Forces Agreement. The land to be returned based on the SACO Final Report represents approximately 21% (about 50km2) of USFJ facilities and areas in Okinawa, exceeding the roughly 43km2 of land returned during the period between the reversion of ----- Okinawa and the implementation of the SACO Final Report. The facilities and areas relating to the SACO Final Report, as well as major progress, are described in Fig. III-2-2-18 and Fig. III-2-2-19. The changes in the numbers and area of USFJ facilities and areas (for exclusive use) as a result of the efforts described above are described in Fig. III-2-2-20. The Ministry of Defense will continue to make its maximum efforts aiming at realizing the SACO Final Report with the understanding and support of local communities. **(4) Efforts for the Use of Returned Land Used for USFJ Facilities and Areas** Regarding the return of the land used for USFJ facilities and areas, the Ministry of Defense has taken measures to restore vacated land to its original state by removing buildings and structures, and to provide benefits for the owner of the land in accordance with the Special Measures Law for USFJ Land Release. Under the Special Measures Law for Okinawa Development (enforced in 2002), benefits are provided for the owner of large-scale vacated land or designated vacated land. Pursuant to the Policy toward Tasks in Each Field Related to Promotion and Facilitation of Utilizing Returned Land Used for MCAS Futenma, formulated in December 2001, related municipalities have been making efforts to establish returned land use plans. In February 2006, Okinawa Prefecture and Ginowan City established a basic policy for the use of returned land used for MCAS Futenma. The Ministry of Defense will continue efforts to promote and facilitate the utilization of vacated land in coordination and cooperation with related ministries and prefectural and municipal governments. ----- ----- **Section 3. Policies and Measures for Enhancing Credibility of the Japan-U.S.** **Security Arrangements** It is necessary to make incessant efforts to ensure the continued effectiveness and enhance the credibility of the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements. The following section explains the relevant measures other than those mentioned in the preceding section. **1. Japan-U.S. Policy Consultations** **1. Major Forums for Japan-U.S. Consultations on Security** Close policy consultations on security are conducted through diplomatic channels as well as between officials in charge of defense and foreign affairs at multiple levels of the Governments of Japan and the United States through the Security Consultative Committee (SCC) (so-called two-plus-two meeting), the Security Subcommittee (SSC) and the Subcommittee for Defense Cooperation (SDC). The framework of these consultations is shown in Fig. III-2-3-1. In addition, the Ministry of Defense organizes Japan-U.S. defense ministerial meetings between the Minister of Defense of Japan and the U.S. Secretary of Defense as necessary where discussions are made with a focus ----- on defense policies of the respective governments and defense cooperation. Furthermore, the Ministry of Defense has held working-level meetings when necessary and exchanged information with the U.S. Department of Defense and others under the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements. The importance of these opportunities has further increased as Japan-U.S. defense cooperation has been enhanced in recent years. The sharing of information and views at every opportunity and level between Japan and the United Meeting between Vice-Minister of Defense Masuda, and Admiral States is undoubtedly conducive to increased credibility Keating, Commander, U.S. Pacific Command of the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements, through further enhancement of close collaboration between the two countries. Therefore, the Ministry of Defense is proactively involved in these activities. **2. The Defense Ministers’ Meeting between Japan and the United States** The Japan-U.S. policy consultations (ministerial level) conducted since 2006 are shown in Fig. III-2-3-2. On May 1, 2009, the Defense Ministerial Meeting was held in Washington D.C. between Defense Minister Yasukazu Hamada and United States Secretary of Defense Robert Gates. An outline of the meeting is provided below. **(1) North Korea** The U.S. side stated that Japan and the United States were able to cooperate in response to North Korea’s missile launch in April through coordination prior to the launch and discussions at the U.N. Security Council, and that military cooperation is more important than ever. The Japanese side stated that in order to smoothly deal with the many issues Japan and the U.S. are currently facing, including responding to North Korea, it is necessary to maintain a unified position through high Meeting between Wiercinski, Commander, U.S. Army in Japan, and level consultations. Hibako, Chief of Staff, GSDF **(2) General Remarks on the Japan-U.S. Alliance** The Japanese side stated that ministerial talks such as these contribute to the strengthening of the Japan-U. S. Alliance, which has also been instructed by Prime Minister Aso. The U.S. side stated that the arrival of the nuclear-aircraft carrier George Washington at Yokosuka last year symbolized the soundness of the Japan-U.S defense relationship, and reconfirmed its commitment to extended deterrence29 in accordance with the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty. Meeting between General Schwartz, Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Forces, and Hokazono, Chief of Staff, ASDF ----- **(3) Realignment of USFJ** The U.S. side stated that it welcomed the fact that the agreement on the relocation of U.S. forces from Okinawa to Guam had been approved by the House of Representatives. The Japanese side stated that Okinawa issues remained sensitive requiring continued efforts and that it would endeavor to secure the relevant budget to proceed ----- with the relocation as smoothly as possible. **(4) QDR and the National Defense Program Guidelines** The U.S. side mentioned its hopes for continuing Japan-U.S. bilateral talks in the process of formulating the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR). The Japanese side stated that a vision of the Japan-U.S. Alliance should be discussed at the ministerial-level to ensure the smooth progress of discussions in various fields. After the meeting, briefings on the QDR and the National Defense Program Guidelines were given by each side, followed by exchange of views. **(5) Support for Afghanistan-Pakistan and Anti-piracy Countermeasures** The U.S. side stated that it welcomed the leadership demonstrated by Japan, making reference to 1) Japan’s offer to pay the salaries of Afghanistan police officers for 6 months as well as its assistance in the improvement of the Ring Road; 2) Japan’s holding of the Ministerial Meeting of the Friends of Democratic Pakistan in April 2009 and pledging its support with 1 billion dollars financial assistance and 3) the two destroyers dispatched to the Gulf of Aden. The Japanese side stated that it will continue to provide assistance to the best of its abilities to Afghanistan and Pakistan, and appreciated the U.S. for its understanding of the constraints surrounding the dispatch of SDF forces to Afghanistan as well as for recognizing the efforts by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Defense in contributing to Afghanistan as “two wheels of one cart.” The Japanese side stated that it is making efforts to dispatch P-3C aircraft to the sea areas off the coast of Somalia by the end of May 2009; this was welcomed by the U.S. **(6) New Fighter Aircraft (F-X)** The U.S. gave a briefing on the current situation in the U.S. Congress. The Japanese side stated that it needs Meeting between Minister of Defense Hamada and Secretary of to introduce fighter planes with high-level air defense Defense Gates (May 2009) capabilities for the defense of Japan. **2. Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation and Policies to Ensure their Effectiveness** **1. The Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation** In 1996, the reexamination of the Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation30 was mentioned in the Japan U.S. Joint Declaration on Security. Based on this, Japan and the U.S. both reviewed the previous guidelines in order to enhance credibility towards Japan-U.S. security, and a new version of the Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation (hereafter referred to as “the Guidelines”) was acknowledged at the Security Consultative Committee (SCC) (so-called two-plus-two meeting) in September 1997. The outline is as follows. (See Reference 37) **(1) Objectives of the Guidelines** The Guidelines aim to create a solid basis for more effective and more credible Japan-U.S. cooperation under normal circumstances, in case of an armed attack against Japan and in situations in areas surrounding Japan. ----- **(2) Matters for Cooperation Prescribed in the Guidelines** **a. Cooperation under Normal Circumstances** Both governments will maintain close cooperation for the defense of Japan and for the creation of a more stable international security environment, and will promote cooperation in various fields under normal circumstances. Such cooperation includes information sharing and policy consultations; security dialogues and defense exchanges; U.N. Peacekeeping Operations (PKOs) and international humanitarian operations; bilateral defense planning, and mutual cooperation planning; enhancing bilateral exercises and training; and establishing a bilateral coordination mechanism. **b. Actions in Response to Armed Attack against Japan** Bilateral actions in response to an armed attack against Japan remain a core aspect of Japan-U.S. defense cooperation. The SDF will primarily conduct defensive operations31 while U.S. forces conduct operations to supplement and support the SDF’s operations based on respective concepts of operations in a coordinated manner. (See Reference 44) ----- **c. Cooperation in Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan** The Governments of both Japan and the United States will make every effort, including diplomatic efforts, to prevent situations in areas surrounding Japan32 from occurring. (See Reference 45) **(3) Bilateral Programs under the Guidelines** In order to promote Japan-U.S. cooperation under the Guidelines in an effective manner and to ensure successful bilateral defense cooperation, the two countries need to conduct consultative dialogues throughout the spectrum of security conditions mentioned above. In addition, both sides must be well informed and coordinate at multiple levels to accomplish such objectives. To that end, the two governments will strengthen their information and intelligence-sharing and policy consultations by taking advantage of all available opportunities, and will establish the following two mechanisms to facilitate consultations, coordinate policies, and coordinate operational functions. ----- **a. Comprehensive Mechanism** The Comprehensive Mechanism has been created so that not only the SDF and U.S. forces but also the relevant agencies of the respective governments conduct bilateral works based on the Guidelines under normal circumstances. In the comprehensive mechanism, bilateral work such as bilateral defense planning and mutual cooperation planning will be conducted so as to be able to respond smoothly and effectively to armed attacks against Japan and to situations in areas surrounding Japan. (See Fig. III-2-3-3) **b. Coordination Mechanism** The coordination mechanism, established in 2000, is being set up in normal circumstances so that the two countries may coordinate their respective activities in the event of an armed attack against Japan and in situations in areas surrounding Japan. (See Fig. III-2-3-4) **2. Various Policies for Ensuring the Effectiveness of the Guidelines** **(1) Measures for Ensuring the Effectiveness of the Guidelines** In order to ensure the effectiveness of the Guidelines, it is important to properly take necessary measures, including legal ones, regarding Japan-U.S. cooperation in case of armed attack situations and situations in areas surrounding Japan. From this perspective, it is necessary for the Government of Japan as a whole to collaborate in advancing bilateral work between Japan and the United States, including examination of bilateral defense planning and mutual cooperation planning of the Guidelines in peacetime. Laws such as the Law concerning Measures to Ensure the Peace and Security of Japan in Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan and the Ship Inspection Operations Law are being established in light of Japan-U.S. cooperation in areas surrounding Japan. Also, measures are being taken to facilitate U.S. force operations as a part of strengthening of security cooperation legislation for situations such as armed attacks. **(2) Outline of the Law concerning Measures to Ensure the Peace and Security of Japan in** **Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan and the Ship Inspection Operations Law** The Law concerning Measures to Ensure the Peace and Security of Japan in Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan establishes the measures that Japan will implement in response to situations in areas surrounding Japan and the actual implementation procedures. The Ship Inspection Operations Law provides for the types, measures and other matters of ship inspection operations implemented by Japan in response to situations in areas surrounding Japan. Its outline is as follows. The Prime Minister, facing a situation in areas surrounding Japan and when found necessary to adopt measures including such SDF activities as rear area support33, rear area search and rescue operations, and ship inspection operations, must request a Cabinet decision on such measures and on a draft basic plan of response measures. The Prime Minister must obtain prior approval, or ex post facto approval in case of emergency, from the Diet in order for the SDF to conduct response measures. In accordance with the basic plan, the Minister of Defense will draw up an implementation guideline (including designation of implementation areas), obtain approval for the guideline from the Prime Minister, and give the SDF orders to conduct rear area support, rear area search and rescue activities, and ship inspection operations. Heads of relevant administrative organizations will implement response measures and may request the heads of local governments to provide the necessary cooperation for the organizations to exercise their authorities in accordance with relevant laws and regulations and the basic plan. In addition, the heads of relevant administrative organizations may ask persons other than those from the national government to cooperate as necessary in ----- accordance with relevant laws and regulations and the basic plan34. The Prime Minister reports to the Diet without delay when the Cabinet has made a decision or approved its revision, or when the response measures have been completed. **(3) Rear Area Support** Rear area support means support measures, including the provision of goods, services and conveniences, given by Japan in rear areas to U.S. Forces conducting activities that contribute to the achievement of the objectives of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty in situations in areas surrounding Japan. (Article 3, Paragraph 1, Item 1 of the Law concerning Measures to Ensure the Peace and Security of Japan in Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan) As rear area support, the SDF provides goods and services, including supplies, transportation, repair, maintenance, medical services, communications, airport and seaport activities and base activities. **(4) Rear Area Search and Rescue Operations** Rear area search and rescue operations mean operations conducted by Japan in situations in areas surrounding Japan to search and rescue those who engage in combat and are shot down in rear areas (including transporting those rescued). (Article 3, Paragraph 1, Item 2 of the Law concerning the Measures to Ensure the Peace and Security of Japan in Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan). If one does not engage but still faces a mishap he/she will be also rescued. In addition, if there is anyone in the territorial waters of a foreign country adjacent to the implementation area in which the SDF is conducting activities, the SDF will also rescue that person, after having obtained approval from that foreign country. However, this is limited to cases in which no combat operations are conducted at that time and are expected to be conducted in the waters throughout the period during which the SDF conducts rescue activities. **(5) Ship Inspection Operations** Ship inspection operations mean operations conducted by Japan in situations in areas surrounding Japan to inspect and confirm the cargo and destination of ships (excluding warships and others35) and to request, if necessary a change of sea route, or destination port or place, for the purpose of strictly enforcing the regulatory measures concerning trade or other economic activities to which Japan is a party. These activities are conducted based on the U.N. Security Council Resolution or the consent of the flag state36 in the territorial waters of Japan or in the surrounding high seas (including the EEZ37) (Article 2 of the Ship Inspection Operations Law). **3. Japan-U.S. Bilateral Training and Exercises** Bilateral training and exercises conducted by the SDF and U.S. Forces are useful for enhancing their respective tactical skills38. Bilateral training and exercises are also indispensable as a means of facilitating mutual understanding and close communication under normal circumstances, thereby improving interoperability and ensuring the smooth conduct of Japan-U.S. bilateral actions. In addition, it is important for the SDF to conduct necessary trainings for collaboration and coordination between the SDF and U.S. Forces in normal circumstances so that the SDF may carry out the missions conferred by the Law concerning the Measures to Ensure the Peace and Security of Japan in Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan, and other laws. Such efforts serve to maintain and enhance the credibility and deterrent effect of the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements. Therefore, the SDF has conducted a variety of bilateral training and exercises with U.S. Forces, and maintains a policy to enhance these training and exercises in the future. For example, Joint Staff Office and units from the GSDF, MSDF, ASDF and U.S. Forces participated in the Japan-U.S. Bilateral Joint Training Exercise (a command post exercise) in January 2009. With the cooperation of relevant ministries, SDF’s responses and Japan-U.S. cooperation were examined and training and exercises were carried out assuming various situations ----- such as a Japan-U.S. bilateral response for the defense of Japan and situations in areas surrounding Japan. The purpose of this was to maintain and enhance integrated joint operation capabilities. In the exercises, SDF and U.S.Forces trained and examined the Japan-U.S. bilateral response for the defense of Japan as well as the SDF response. (See Reference 46) GSDF and U.S. Marine Corps conducting field training exercises A U.S. F-22 fighter stationed in Kadena (front) flying in formation with an ASDF F-15 fighter **[COLUMN]** **VOICE** **Voice of SDF Personnel who Participated in US-Japan Joint Training** Colonel Satoru Nomura Training Group Leader, Operations Department, Joint Staff U.S.-Japan joint training is conducted primarily for (1) the United States and Japan to confirm that the various mechanisms and plans mutually or individually decided by the United States and Japan, as well as equipment and weapons each country possesses, work well; and (2) the maintenance and improvement of capabilities in joint response to various situations, in order to respond to various situations including Japan's defense and situations in areas surrounding our country. Joint training between the two countries is typically associated with “assault by U.S. and Japanese troops, supporting armed tanks, Colonel Nomura with the U.S. forces in Japan sea vessels and fighters.” However, in training that involves decision-making at a high level by high command and other top-level headquarters to ensure solid execution of essential components of military operation, the “command post training” scheme, which does not involve actual operation of troops, is adopted. In this way the various limitations involved in large-scale troop deployment can be averted. As the Training Section Chief of the SDF Joint Staff, I am responsible for planning and other duties for U.S.-Japan joint exercises. In the “US-Japan Joint Exercise” (Command Post Training) held in January 2009, I worked with U.S. military personnel as representative of the SDF for roughly one week at the post for joint exercise control at the U.S. Yokota Air Base. Although I regularly work to deepen mutual understanding through conferences and joint missions, I ----- discovered in the process of the exercise that there are differences between the United States and Japan in perception and interpretation of the same event and that there are issues that require renewed study. In order to resolve such problems with speed, a joint study meeting was held immediately after the exercise to make improvements. With the conditions surrounding the two countries changing from day to day, it is important to conduct these exercises regularly to maintain readiness for situations in which the United States and Japan must act jointly. I am convinced that effective training in action, in which should be actually taken by the troops of both countries in response to contingencies, will lead to an improvement both in function and capability and will lead to the strengthening of the US-Japan security alliance and ultimately to meeting the expectations of the people of Japan. I intend to continue working diligently to fulfill my duties in the future. **4. The Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement between Japan and the United States** The basic principle of the Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA)39 between Japan and the United States is that if either side requests the provision of goods or services, the other side should provide these goods or services40. The Agreement is designed to positively contribute to the smooth and effective operation of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty and to efforts for international peace made under the leadership of the United Nations. Its scope of application includes various occasions such as bilateral training and exercises in peacetime, U.N. PKOs, situations in areas surrounding Japan, and armed attack situations. (See Fig. III-2-3-5) **5. Mutual Exchanges of Equipment and Technology** There is need for both Japan and the U.S. to aggressively promote cooperation in areas of equipment and technology while bearing in mind the maintenance of Japan’s technology and production base and the mutual cooperation principle based on the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty and the Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement between Japan and the United States of America. In view of the progress in technological cooperation between Japan and the United States, the improvement of technological level, and other factors, Japan decided to transfer its military technology to the United States despite the provisions of the Three Principles on Armed Exports and related regulations. And, in 1983, Japan concluded the Exchange of Notes concerning the Transfer of Military Technologies to the United States of America41. In June 2006, the Governments of Japan and the United States concluded the Exchange of Notes concerning the Transfer of Arms and Military Technologies to the United States of America42 to replace the foregoing Exchange of Notes. (See Part II, Chapter 2, Section 2) ----- Under these frameworks, the Government of Japan has decided to provide the United States with 18 items of arms and military technology, including portable surface-to-air missile (PSAM) technology and weapon technologies related to joint technological research on BMD. Japan and the United States consult with each other at forums such as the Systems and Technology Forum (S&TF), which provides opportunities for exchanging opinions about military equipment and technology, and conduct cooperative research and development regarding the specific projects agreed upon at the forums. Since 1992, the two countries have concluded the joint project agreement, and conducted 17 joint projects, 11 of which have been completed. Japan-U.S. cooperation in military equipment and technology is significant for improving interoperability and reducing R&D costs and risks, and the two countries have been examining the possibility of expanding joint research projects in the future. (See Reference 47) **6. Measures to Ensure the Smooth Stationing of USFJ** The stationing of USFJ forms the core of the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements and also demonstrates the U.S.’s deep commitment to Japan and the Asia-Pacific region. USFJ greatly contributes to the peace and stability of Japan and the region in various ways. In particular, their presence itself is considered to function as a visible deterrent. Thus, the Government of Japan tries to enhance the credibility of the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements by actively taking various measures to ensure the smooth stationing of USFJ. **1. Japan’s Support for the Stationing of USFJ** **(1) Cost Sharing for the Stationing of USFJ** The cost sharing for the stationing of USFJ is important to ensure the smooth and effective implementation of the ----- Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements. From this point of view, the Government of Japan has made efforts as much as possible within the scope of the Status of Forces Agreement or based on the Special Measures Agreement43, with due consideration for its financial situation and other factors. At present, the Ministry of Defense bears cost for the stationing of USFJ as mentioned in Fig. III-2-3-6. Under the new SMA put into effect in May 2008, the sharing of labor costs and training relocation costs will be maintained within the framework of the previous SMA; while costs such as those for utilities will be reduced at a fixed rate. The new agreement also states that the U.S. Government will make further efforts to economize its expenditures. Furthermore, an agreement was made between the U.S. and Japanese Governments for a comprehensive review of cost sharing for the stationing of USFJ in order to enhance its efficiency and effectiveness. **(2) Measures taken in Addition to Cost Sharing for the Stationing of USFJ** In addition to the cost sharing for the stationing of USFJ, the Government of Japan bears the necessary costs for USFJ facilities and areas (such as rental fees for facilities), and takes measures to improve the living environment in the surrounding areas of these facilities and areas. The Japanese Government also provides the municipalities with a base subsidy44, for example, as a substitute for property tax. (See Fig. III-2-3-7) **(3) USFJ Local Employees** 25,499 employees (as of end of FY 2008) are working at USFJ facilities as clerical workers at headquarters, engineers at maintenance/supply facilities, security guards and firefighters, workers at welfare/recreational facilities, etc. They provide indispensable support for the smooth operation of USFJ. The government of Japan hires these employees in accordance with the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA). The Ministry of Defense supports the stationing of USFJ by conducting administrative work such as personnel management, payment of wages, healthcare and welfare. **2. Ensuring the Stable Use of USFJ Facilities and Areas** The Government has concluded lease contracts with owners of private and public land on which these facilities and areas exist in order to ensure the stable use of necessary USFJ facilities and areas. However, should the ----- Government be unable to obtain the approval of land owners, it will acquire a title to use45 under the Special Measures Law for USFJ Land46. In addition, the Government has promoted measures related to USFJ facilities and areas in order to strike a balance between the accomplishment of the objectives of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty and the requests of the surrounding communities. (See Section 2-4) Moreover, in the vicinities of USFJ facilities and areas, incidents and accidents caused by U.S. military personnel, etc., have affected local residents. The Government of Japan has requested USFJ to take effective measures for the prevention of recurrence, such as educating personnel and enforcing strict discipline among them, and is cooperating in preventive measures. The Government of Japan has also taken measures for prompt and appropriate compensation for the damage caused by such incidents and accidents. **3. Efforts to Preserve the Environment Surrounding USFJ Facilities and Areas** Concerning environmental issues surrounding USFJ facilities and areas, at the two-plus-two meeting held in September 2000, the Governments of Japan and the United States, in recognition of the importance of environmental protection associated with USFJ facilities and areas, agreed to make it a common purpose to ensure the health and safety of neighboring residents of USFJ facilities and areas, U.S. Forces personnel and their dependents, and announced the Joint Statement of Environmental Principles47. In order to follow up on this statement, Japan-U.S. consultations have been more frequently held. Specifically, related ministries and agencies have been engaged in discussions regarding strengthened cooperation at the time of periodic reviews of the Japan Environmental Governing Standards (JEGS) 48, exchange of environmental information, and response to environmental contamination in collaboration with each other. In addition, at the two-plus-two meeting held in May 2006, the two countries confirmed the importance of improved implementation of the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA), including proper attention to the environment. With regard to the nuclear-powered aircraft carrier USS George Washington, since September 2006, Japanese and U.S. officials have held working-level meetings on disaster prevention and safety measures for nuclearpowered aircraft carriers. Japan-U.S. joint exercises with the participation of governmental organizations, Yokosuka City, and the U.S. Navy have also been held since 2007. The nuclear-powered aircraft carrier USS George Washington took part in the exercises for the first time in December 2008. ----- **[COLUMN]** **COMMENTARY** **Cooperation and Exchanges between the USFJ and Local Communities** The presence of the United States Forces in Japan requires understanding and cooperation from the residents surrounding U.S. military bases. Exchange events between USFJ personnel (military and civilian personnel and their dependents) and local residents contribute to deepening mutual understanding. The Ministry of Defense hosted a snowball fight tournament between American and Japanese elementary school children in the Misawa Air Base area (Misawa City), and a friendship concert featuring a local brass band and the USAF band in the Yokota Air Base area (Fussa City) in Marathon race at Yokota Air Base Japan FY 2008. Both gained a positive reputation among local residents. In addition, the USFJ, as a “good neighbor,” has actively worked on exchange events with local residents for many years. For instance, Yokota Air Base is opened to local residents for an annual marathon event. Some 8,600 people participated in the marathon held in January this year. In other areas where USFJ bases are located, the U.S. forces have made efforts to carry out exchange events with local residents, holding various band concerts and English conversation classes. Snowball fight between American and Japanese elementary school children USFJ band concert ----- **[COLUMN]** **VOICE** **Voice of Recruit (MSDF Fixed-term Enlistee)** Seaman Masashi Karasuyama Operation Section of the “Shimakaze” I enlisted as a trainee in the 348th term of the Sasebo Training Center in March 2008. At present, I am assigned to the destroyer Shimakaze, which belongs to the 1st Escort Flotilla, as a signal operator. My motives for enlisting in the MSDF were that I learned about SDF personnel dispatched for disaster relief and engaged in international peace cooperation activities, through reports on TV, newspapers, and other sources, and I felt admiration for them. Since then I wished to dedicate myself to work for my country and society. When I first joined the MSDF, I had a lot of apprehensions, the biggest of which was that I could not swim very well. MSDF personnel, whose workplace is the high seas, must be able to swim fairly well. As I had feared, I did not come up to the mark in the initial measurement of swimming ability, and improving my ability to swim was a major objective of mine in the training center. Subsequently, I did my best to train not only during class but also on my own after the end of training sessions and on weekends, with coaching from my instructor and the group leader as well as support from my fellow trainees. Through this effort, I managed to bring my swimming ability up to the standard by the end of the training course. This achievement was an object lesson in the value of support from my training mates, and also gave me the confidence that there was nothing I could definitely not do and that my accomplishments depended on my own effort. On the first voyage after I boarded the Shimakaze as a member of the crew, I felt as if the big destroyer, which has a displacement of over 4,000 tons, was bobbing like a leaf, and I became violently seasick, as many had warned I would. For several days, I kept running to the rest room, and became worried about whether I could go on as a member of the destroyer crew in such condition. As I experienced a number of voyages, however, I became surprisingly at home on board, and eventually overcame my seasickness. I had also been apprehensive about service on board, but participated on a long exercise cruise for the first time in February this year, and got precious experience of sailing in the seas of Southeast Asia. This gave me a vivid sense of my own growth. I am still “green” as both a destroyer crew member and a signal operator, but I will take pride in performing my duties and make efforts to do work that contributes to my country and society as a fullfledged regular MSDF personnel, as soon as possible. Seaman Karasuyama carrying out adjustments to the communications equipment on the bridge ----- **Notes:** 1) The Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between Japan and the United States of America: 2) One of the occasions for policy talks between Japan and the United States of America which is attended by the Minister for Foreign Affairs and Minister of State for Defense from Japan, and the Secretary of State and Secretary of Defense from the United States. (See Section 3-1, Fig. III-2-3-1) 3) See 4) See 5) See 6) Signed and concluded on August 10, 2007. 7) The Cabinet decision on May 30, 2006, regarding the Government’s efforts for USFJ force structure realignment stipulated that the government take the necessary measures, including from legal and budgetary viewpoints, for the smooth and appropriate implementation of the realignment. Meanwhile, in this severe financial situation where the government as a whole is continuing to implement cost reduction measures, the government endeavors to further rationalize and make efficient use of defense-related expenditures and build up efficient defense capabilities. 8) Accordingly, the previous Cabinet decision designating the “coastal area of Henoko in Nago City in the Camp Schwab Water Area” as the construction site was abolished. (See Reference 39) 9) The members of this Council Meeting are the Chief Cabinet Secretary; the Minister of State in Charge of Okinawa and Affairs Related to the Northern Territories; the Minister of Defense; the Minister of Internal Affairs and Communications; the Minister for Foreign Affairs; the Minister of Finance; the Minister of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology; the Minister of Health, Labor and Welfare; the Minister of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries; the Minister of Economy, Trade and Industry; the Minister of Land, Infrastructure and Transport; the Minister of the Environment; the Governor of Okinawa Prefecture; the Mayor of Nago City; the Mayor of Ginoza Village; the Mayor of Kin Town; and the Mayor of Higashi Village. 10) Area to ensure safety of takeoff and landing by removing all obstacles. 11) Units to relocate include: III MEF Command Element, 3rd Marine Division Headquarters, 3rd Marine Logistics Group (formerly known as Force Service Support Group) Headquarters, 1st Marine Air Wing Headquarters, and 12th Marine Regiment Headquarters. The affected units will relocate from such facilities as Camp Courtney, Camp Hansen, Futenma Air Station, Camp Zukeran, and Makiminato Service Area. 12) According to the U.S. there will be 70 personnel there by the end of September 2008, and they are examining personnel plans and other matters beyond that time. 13) An agreement was reached at the Japan-U.S. Joint Committee on March 5, 2009 about the joint use of land, such as the GSDF Central Readiness Force Headquarters building. 14) See Section 3-2. 15) Concerning air defense and BMD, the BJOCC will fulfill functions to facilitate bilateral actions for the defense of Japan by making close coordination between headquarters and share information of SDF and U.S. Forces thereby improving interoperability. 16) An agreement was reached at the Japan-U.S. Joint Committee in July 2007 about the joint use of land, such as the Air Force Command building of the ASDF and another agreement reached in December 2008 about the joint use of land, such as the Air Defense Operations Group building and communications building. 17) This study will be conducted as part of a comprehensive study of options for related airspace reconfigurations and changes in air traffic control procedures that would satisfy future patterns of civilian ----- and military demand for use of Japanese airspace. 18) According to the Roadmap, the study will be completed by the Study Group within 12 months of commencement. 19) The radar was thereafter transferred to the neighboring U.S. Shariki Communication Site. 20) USFJ aircraft conduct bilateral exercises at SDF facilities in order to improve interoperability and reduce the impact of training activities on the areas surrounding USFJ air bases. 21) See 22) Measures have been implemented to prevent and reduce burdens under the Law on Improvement of Residential Environments Around Defense Facilities. 23) Under the USFJ Realignment Special Measures Law, the changes of composition of units of those naval vessels that conduct operations in synchronization with USFJ air wings subject to realignment (replacement of the aircraft carrier at Yokosuka Naval Base with a nuclear aircraft carrier) will be treated in the same way as the realignment of USFJ. 24) The scope of specific projects includes 14 projects identified by Article 2 of the enforcement ordinance of the USFJ Realignment Special Measures Law, including educational, sports and cultural projects. 25) Surrounding municipalities are limited to those for which development measures are considered necessary in conjunction with municipalities with heavy burdens in consideration of natural, economic and social conditions. 26) Chairman: Minister of Defense. Relevant Ministers: Chief Cabinet Secretary; Minister of Internal Affairs and Communications; Minister for Foreign Affairs; Minister of Finance; Minister of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology; Minister of Health, Labor and Welfare; Minister of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries; Minister of Economy, Trade and Industry; Minister of Land, Infrastructure and Transport; Minister of the Environment; and Ministers of State specifically designated by the Prime Minister. 27) As for public works projects under the Development Plan for Special Area for Development concerning Realignment that have been deliberated and approved at the Council, the percentage of costs borne by the Government, or grant rate, will apply to the seven projects concerning road, ports, fishing ports, water supply, sewage system, land reform, and facilities for compulsory education that should be immediately implemented in consideration of the content and degree of adverse influences caused by the realignment of USFJ on local communities will be higher than those for ordinary cases. 28) The Japan Bank for International Cooperation merged with finance corporations including National Life Finance Corporation on October 1, 2008, to become the Japan Finance Corporation. The name The Japan Bank for International Cooperation has been retained with a view to its international credibility and so on. 29) Extended deterrence refers to a nation’s deterrence, which is the capacity to make a potential aggressor refrain from aggression by making it clearly aware that its aggression may result in unacceptable damage, being extended to enhance the defense capacity and security of a third nation. 30) The Former Guidelines were created in 1978. These guidelines stipulate the cooperation between Japan and the United States to effectively achieve the goals stated in the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty. 31) Operations conducted to interdict an enemy’s offensive and to prevent their purpose from being achieved. Offensive operations mean aggressive forms of operations to search and defeat enemies. 32) Situations that will have an important influence on Japan’s peace and security, including situations that could develop into a direct armed attack against Japan if left unaddressed. (Article 1 of the Law concerning the Measures for Peace and Security of Japan in Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan) 33) The term “Rear Area” refers to Japan’s territorial waters and international waters surrounding Japan (including the exclusive economic zone up to 200 nautical miles (or approximately 370km) from the baseline of the territorial waters) in which no combat operations are conducted at that time and no combat operations are expected to be conducted throughout the period when the rear activities are carried out, and ----- the space over these international waters. 34) If any person other than the central government who had been requested to cooperate has suffered a loss as a result of such cooperation, the Government shall take necessary fiscal measures for the loss. 35) Warships and such vessels that are possessed or operated by foreign governments that are exclusively used for non-commercial purposes. 36) The state that has the right to fly its flag as prescribed in Article 91 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. 37) Article 1 of the Law on the Exclusive Economic Zone and the Continental Shelf. See 38) The capabilities required to operate a unit of a certain size in addition to the use of individual items of equipment. 39) The official title is the Agreement between the Government of Japan and the United States of America Concerning Reciprocal Provision of Logistic Support, Supplies and Services between the SDF of Japan and the Armed Forces of the United States of America. 40) The categories of supplies and services as provided under the Agreement include: food; water; billeting; transportation (including airlift); petroleum, oil and lubricant; clothing; communications; medical services; base support; storage; use of facilities; training services; spare parts and components; repair and maintenance; airport and seaport services; and ammunition (only in armed attack situations and anticipated situations) (provision of weapons is not included). 41) The Exchange of Notes concerning the Transfer of Military Technologies to the United States of America under the Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement between Japan and the United States of America. 42) The Exchange of Notes concerning the Transfer of Arms and Military Technologies to the United States of America under the Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement between Japan and the United States of America. 43) The Agreement between Japan and the United States of America concerning New Special Measures relating to Article XXIV of the Agreement under Article VI of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between Japan and the United States of America, Regarding Facilities and Areas and the Status of United States Armed Forces in Japan. 44) Provided by the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications. 45) The term “title” means a legal cause that justifies a certain act. 46) The official title is the Law for Special Measures Regarding the Use and Expropriation of Land, etc., Incidental to the Agreement Under Article VI of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security Between Japan and the United States of America, Regarding Facilities and Areas and the Status of United States Armed Forces in Japan. 47) Consists of 1) environmental governing standards; 2) information exchange and access; 3) responses to environmental pollution; and 4) consultation on the environment. 48) The Japan Environmental Governing Standards (JEGS) is an environmental governing standard prepared by USFJ to guarantee that USFJ activities and facilities can protect the health of the people and the natural environment. The JEGS provides the methods to handle and store environmental pollutants. ----- ## Part III **Measures for Defense of Japan** ### Chapter 3 **Improvement of the International Security Environment** **Section 1. Efforts to Support International Peace Cooperation Activities** **Section 2. Promotion of Security Dialogue and Defense Exchanges** **Section 3. Efforts for Arms Control, Disarmament and Non-Proliferation** ----- **Section 1. Efforts to Support International Peace Cooperation Activities** At present, the international community faces a range of global-scale problems, such as international terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, complex and various conflicts and international crimes. With deepening mutual dependency among states and regions caused by the advancement of telecommunications and the globalization of the economy, there is a concern that even events that occur far from Japan may pose a threat or impact on Japan. In light of the difficulty for a single country to respond to and solve these global threats and the need to take an approach to addressing these threats not only on the military front but also on various other fronts, it is widely recognized that the international community should join hands in coping with these threats. On the basis of these circumstances, Japan’s defense and security goals set forth in the National Defense Program Guidelines (NDPG) are to improve the international security environment and to reduce the potential threats to Japan. As a result, the NDPG also states that Japan will promote diplomatic efforts including the use of Official Development Assistance (ODA), and, proactively and on its own initiative, Japan will work on activities that nations of the world cooperatively undertake to enhance the international security environment (international peace cooperation activities). This chapter will explain the Ministry of Defense and the SDF’s efforts for international peace cooperation activities. (See Fig. III-3-1-1) (See Reference 48) ----- **1. Proactive Efforts to Support International Peace Cooperation Activities on Japan’s Own** **Initiative** **1. Significance of Stipulating International Peace Cooperation Activities as a Primary Mission of the** **SDF** Amid the current security environment, the peace and security of the international community is considered to be closely linked to the peace and security of Japan. Based on this notion, if the SDF aspires to take part in international peace cooperation activities, proactively and on its own initiative, improvements need to be made to education and training, stand-by postures of necessary units and transportation capabilities. It was considered that these improvements should be carried out after stipulating international peace cooperation activities, which used to be regarded as supplementary activities1, as a primary mission2 In 2007, international peace cooperation activities and activities responding to situations in areas surrounding Japan were stipulated as a primary mission of the SDF, alongside the defense of Japan and the maintenance of public order. **2. History of Japan’s Efforts to Support International Peace Cooperation Activities** The Persian Gulf War became a major turning point for prompting Japan to recognize the need to provide personnel for international cooperation on the military front. The SDF dispatched a minesweeping unit of the MSDF to the Persian Gulf in 1991 to ensure the safe passage of Japanese vessels. For Japan, this dispatch meant an international contribution on the human front with the purpose of peaceful and humanitarian support for the reconstruction of devastated, and war-affected countries. In 1992, the International Peace Cooperation Law3 was enacted and Japan subsequently dispatched GSDF personnel to Cambodia in September of the same year as the country’s first participation by the SDF in U.N. peacekeeping operations. Since then, the Ministry of Defense and the SDF have participated in various international peace cooperation activities. The 9/11 attacks on the United States in 2001 led to the enactment of the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law4. The law became ineffective in November 2007, and the replenishment activities in the Indian Ocean were halted. However, the succeeding law, the Replenishment Support Special Measures Law5, was enacted in January 2008, and the MSDF recommenced replenishment activities in February 2008. In 2003, Japan enacted the Iraq Special Measures Law6. As a result, the GSDF provided medical care, water supply and assistance for the recovery and improvement of public infrastructure such as schools and roads in Samawah, Iraq, and the ASDF transported supplies for humanitarian and reconstruction assistance from its base in Kuwait. The participation of the SDF in these international peace cooperation activities contributes to the maintenance of the peace and security of the international community including Japan. It also contributes to enhancing Japan’s credibility as it provides an opportunity to demonstrate the capabilities of the SDF through activities together with international organizations such as the U.N. and forces of other countries. (See Fig. III-3-1-2) **3. Non-Operational Efforts to Carry out Prompt and Accurate International Peace Cooperation Activities** In order to undertake international peace cooperation activities proactively and on its own initiative, the SDF must continue peacetime efforts to establish various systems. In March 2008, the GSDF established the Central Readiness Force Regiment under the Central Readiness Force, so that Japan can quickly and appropriately dispatch the Central Readiness Regiment for international peace cooperation activities as an advance unit to carry out operations smoothly on the ground. In August and September 2008, in an effort to improve readiness, the Central Readiness Force, together with the Air Support Command of the ASDF, carried out a series of exercises for training for international peace cooperation activities. The SDF also promotes the improvement and enhancement of equipment for international peace cooperation ----- activities. The GSDF has improved a range of vehicles fitted with bullet-proof glass and run-flat tires7 as well as high capacity generators to enable troops to carry out operations in areas with underdeveloped infrastructure. At the same time, in order to ensure that activities can be carried out in a variety of conditions, the engine capabilities of transport helicopters (CH-47) are being enhanced. The MSDF has improved transport ships and destroyers equipped with helicopters for helicopter operations overseas. At the same time, the MSDF conducts operational studies concerning portability and mobile operations of the Marine Air Command and Control System (MACCS) to promote the effective operation of fixed-wing patrol aircrafts overseas. In order to maintain the command communication function between aircraft and the ground, the ASDF promotes the development of aviation satellite phones. This equipment is also very useful for responding to domestic incidents. Furthermore, as a foundation for education, research and publicity relating to international peace cooperation activities, the Ministry of Defense will establish the International Peace Cooperation Center (provisional name) under the Joint Staff College to educate SDF personnel, officials of the related ministries and other relevant persons, as well as to conduct PR activities on the SDF’s international peace cooperation activities. **4. Welfare and Mental Health Care of Dispatched SDF Personnel** It is extremely important to make preparations so that the dispatched SDF personnel, who are expected to fulfill their assigned duty under severe working conditions while being far away from their home country and their families, can effectively fulfill such duty while maintaining both their physical and mental health. The Ministry of Defense and the SDF have taken various measures to ease away deep anxiety of SDF members being dispatched overseas for participation in international peace cooperation activities and of their ----- **[COLUMN]** **COMMENTARY** **Exercises for Dispatch and Deployment for International Peace Cooperation** **Activities** With the Central Readiness Force Regiment newly formed under the Central Readiness Force in March 2008, the SDF has improved its system for the swift dispatch of the GSDF to locations of international peace cooperation activities. However, the overseas deployment of troops requires a broad range of preparations, such as packaging, storage and loading of an enormous quantity of equipment and supplies for sea and air transport, modification of equipment to adapt to the mission and distinctive characteristics of the destination, coordination with transport groups of the Maritime and Air Self-Defense Forces and coordination with private airlines and shipping companies. Therefore it is necessary to make detailed plans in advance and conduct practical training based on the plan in order to verify the effectiveness of the plan and to ensure the familiarization of the plan for personnel scheduled to be dispatched. For this purpose, the Central Readiness Force conducted, in autumn of 2008, in Japan's first exercise for dispatch and deployment for international peace cooperation activities involving some 500 personnel, including those scheduled for dispatch from the headquarters of the Central Readiness Force and the Central Readiness Force Regiment, as well as some 150 vehicles and 5 aircraft. This was conducted with the assistance of support groups from the ASDF and relevant units from the GSDF. Aimed at training troops at maneuver areas in Japan for dispatch for international cooperation activities, the exercise started with dispatch preparations in the Kanto area where the Central Readiness Force Regiment and the Kanto Logistics Depot were located. ASDF aircraft and commercial vessels were then transported to the Aibano Training Area (Shiga Prefecture), which was selected as a simulated base in the target country and transition activities--from advance troops to full-scale troops−were conducted over a span of roughly one month. Through the exercise, capabilities of swift overseas deployment of the GSDF were confirmed. The participants were also able to obtain firsthand understanding of their respective roles in the dispatch, and the SDF’s capabilities of responding to international peace cooperation activities were enhanced. Similar exercises are scheduled to be held regularly in the future for maintenance and enhancement of the SDF posture for swift dispatch for international peace cooperation activities. SDF personnel preparing their personal equipment SDF personnel boarding a C-130 ----- families in Japan so that the members can devote themselves to undertaking assigned duties without having to worry about their physical and mental health. Welfare services are provided for the dispatched SDF members to help them maintain close bonds with their families in Japan. Specifically, direct communication between the dispatched SDF members and their families in Japan is ensured via TV telephones, enabling SDF members and their families to exchange video correspondence. Moreover, briefing sessions for families of the dispatched members have been held to provide them with necessary information, and family support centers and family counseling rooms have been established to respond to various questions raised by the families. The SDF also offers mental healthcare services such as a course on stress reduction methods for SDF members scheduled to be dispatched overseas. Moreover, engaging in overseas missions, dispatched SDF members can consult other SDF members who have been designated as counselors after undergoing specialized training. Such counselors provide the dispatched members with sufficient mental care. In addition, medical officers accompany the SDF units engaged in overseas missions. The Ministry of Defense is prepared to send qualified psychiatrists from Japan or return sickened personnel for full treatment if necessary. **5. Debates on a So-called General Law** Recently, the establishment of a so-called general law for international peace cooperation has been vigorously discussed in various venues. For example, in August 2006, at the LDP Policy Research Council Subcommittee of Defense Studies, the draft of the international peace cooperation bill was approved for the subsequent intra-party discussions. Further, in June 2008, the ruling parties’ project team dealing with a general law for international peace cooperation compiled an interim report8. Frequent discussions have also been conducted at Diet sessions on the significance and details of a general law concerning international peace cooperation activities. Japan has so far engaged in various types of international peace cooperation activities based on the International Peace Cooperation Law and other relevant laws. Meanwhile, since cooperation activities by the international community to maintain world peace and security have become quite diverse, special measures laws have been developed to respond to individual cases as the need arises. However, it would be desirable to establish a general law that provides in advance for the details of measures to be conducted by Japan to enable international peace cooperation activities to be carried out promptly and effectively. Such a law would also be significant for showing Japan’s fundamental policy concerning such activities to people in Japan and other countries. The Ministry of Defense believes that this issue needs to be reviewed, while giving due consideration to the depth of the national debate. **2. Cooperation in Global Efforts to Reconstruct Iraq** **1. Details and Significance of Japan’s Efforts to Support Iraqi Reconstruction** Since May 2003, the international community has been proactively engaged in activities to help rebuild Iraq, following the adoption of U.N. Security Council Resolution 14839 and subsequent resolutions. Japan began dispatching SDF units to the Middle East in December 2003 based on the Law Concerning Special Measures on Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance in Iraq, or the Iraq Special Measures Law, approved in the Diet in July of the same year. The dispatched SDF units conducted humanitarian and reconstruction assistance activities in cooperation with support provided by Official Development Assistance until December 2008. The SDF units also assisted troops of foreign countries in their efforts to restore security and stability in Iraq as support activities for ensuring security with a scope which would not affect the units’ ----- humanitarian and reconstruction assistance activities. Japan’s cooperation activities play a vital role in helping the country to rebuild itself so that it can become a peaceful, democratic and responsible country, paving the foundation for Japan and Iraq to establish favorable relations in the future. They are not only instrumental in stabilizing the overall Middle East but also are extremely important for Japan because the situation in the Middle East region directly affects the prosperity and stability of Japan, which relies on the region for nearly 90% of its petroleum. Japan’s humanitarian contribution to the activities along with the United States for the reconstruction of Iraq has further cemented the relationship of mutual confidence between Japan and the United States, helping to strengthen their bilateral security alliance. Japan’s support to help rebuild Iraq has garnered acclaim both from the international community and the Iraqi people. It played a significant role not only in enhancing trust in Japan by the international community A C-130 setting off for home having completed its Iraq reconstruction but also in achieving closer and more effective security assistance mission cooperation between Japan and the United States. **2.** **Achievements of SDF Operations based on the Iraq Special Measures Law** Since December 2003, based on the Iraq Special Measures Law, the SDF had provided humanitarian and reconstruction support, such as medical care, water supply, restoration and improvement of public infrastructure such as schools and roads, and transportation of personnel and aid materials for the local people facing hardship. These activities helped Iraq rebuild proactively. In June 2006, the government of Japan determined that activities of the GSDF in Al-Muthanna province should be concluded, considering that the reconstruction in Al-Muthanna province had shifted to the stage of being conducted on Iraqi people’s own initiative. In September of the same year, the GSDF concluded its operations which had lasted up to approximately two and a half years. (See Reference 49) Moreover, in order to cooperate for the stability and reconstruction of Iraq, the ASDF units provided air transport support for the GSDF units dispatched to Al Muthanna Province as well as for the U.N. and other multinational forces. Following the Government’s November 2008 decision to terminate air transport support within the year considering the objects of Japanese activities were accomplished, the air transport mission that had lasted for about five years ended in December 2008. The transportation achievements until the completion of the mission resulted in 821 operations with the transportation of 46,500 personnel and 673 tons of goods and materials. Personnel contributions by the SDF and assistance through ODA are together promoted as “two wheels of a cart.” SDF contributions have obtained visible outcomes, such as the establishment of a democratic government in Iraq, improvements in security conditions and progress in reconstruction by the Iraqi people themselves; these achievements have been highly appreciated by the international community, including Iraq itself. The SDF’s concrete practices of international cooperation activities which are based on daily training, succeeded in contributing to the reconstruction of Iraq, and played a steady role in international efforts in Iraq with the reliance of foreign nations. Through the period of SDF’s activities which lasted almost 5 years since its beginning in December 2003, the SDF accomplished its operations without even one casualty under severe conditions such as high temperatures and sandstorms, as well as obtained international appraisal, including from Iraq. These accomplishments were ----- brought by the concrete efforts of individual SDF personnel to complete their given missions. SDF personnel, who currently conduct international cooperation activities as a primary mission, gained valuable experience by concluding activities while witnessing that Iraqi people promoted the reconstruction of Iraq on their own initiative. Based on this experience, the Ministry of Defense and the SDF recognize the necessity to keep promoting its involvement in international cooperation activities for the future. **[COLUMN]** **VOICE** **Voice of SDF Personnel who Worked in the Iraq Reconstruction Support Airlift** **Squadron** Major Osamu Kato 401 Flight Squadron, First Tactical Airlift Group, ASDF (Then Captain of Iraq Reconstruction Support Airlift Squadron) I served as Captain of the 16th Iraq Reconstruction Support Airlift Squadron. The mission of the Airlift Squadron stationed at Ali Al Salem Air Base in Kuwait was to airlift materials and personnel of the multinational forces and the U.N. for Iraq reconstruction support to Ali Air Base, Baghdad Airport and Arbil Airport in Iraq using C-130 aircraft. Since I had already been dispatched there three times, I was not worried about the mission and the local life. Mission flights were hard: with the temperatures climbing up to nearly 50℃ and humidity levels of only a few percent, which my body had difficulty getting used to, it was physically very severe. However, I felt an immense sense of relief and achievement likened to nothing C-130 transport aircraft and Major Kato (center) else at the end of each mission flight when I was released from the mission with the tension of being constantly forced to be on full alert against possible anti-air missile attacks. It was a great pleasure for me to have been able to contribute to the reconstruction of Iraq and to enhance the relationship of trust with the other countries concerned. I also feel proud of my contribution to the national interests of Japan. I boarded the last mission flight as a captain. When I shook hands with the Commander and the Vice Commander of the squadron, who came to greet me after the mission was completed, I remembered the sincere advice they had given me, as well as all of the competent pilots who had actively carried out the missions, the headquarters personnel, the chiefs of all units as well as the other personnel who had provided strong support for the mission flights, and I felt a surge of pleasure that I had been able to work with such excellent bosses, colleagues and subordinates. The Commander said nothing; all he could do was clasp my hand tightly and look at me with his red eyes. During my four dispatches, I was able to directly witness other countries’ international efforts, and I learnt a lot. I want to tell of my experiences as well as lessons learned by the many other officials involved in this mission to my juniors who might work in the field of international cooperation in the future. I also hope to be able to develop a more powerful team that will contribute to the stability of Japan and eventually of the world. ----- **3. Evaluation of Japan’s Efforts by the International Community** **(1) Evaluation in Iraq** At the meeting with Senior Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs Hashimoto on her visit to Iraq on December 21, 2008, Iraq’s Prime Minister, Nuri al-Maliki, expressed his gratitude for the role and contribution of Japan’s SDF during its mission in Iraq as well as economic assistance through yen loans. On January 28, 2009, when former Prime Minister Abe visited Baghdad as a Prime Minister’s special envoy and had talks with President Talabani, Vice-President al-Hashimi and Vice-Prime Minister Saleh, he was told that the Iraqi people would never forget Japan’s contribution to the reconstruction and stability of Iraq, including the dispatch of the SDF, during this time of difficulties which Iraq has faced. **(2) Evaluation by the United Nations** The U.N. Secretary General, Ban Ki-moon, sent a letter to Prime Minister Aso in December 2008 expressing his appreciation for the Japanese Government’s important contribution through the transport support provided by the SDF to the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI). He also expressed the significance of the ASDF operations, stating that the air transport support provided by Japan in such severe operational circumstances was an important and reliable means for moving deployed personnel and transporting cargo from Kuwait to United Nations offices in Baghdad and Erbil, and that, consequently, UNAMI and United Nations agencies could expand their activities in Iraq.” **(3) Evaluation by Other Countries** (Then) U.S. President Bush expressed his appreciation for Japan’s activities in Iraq in a letter addressed to Prime Minister Aso in January 2009 by saying that the United States was grateful to the Government and people of Japan for their involvement in the efforts to reconstruct and restore stability to Iraq. The president also noted that Japan’s SDF had contributed to the successes that were now being enjoyed by the Iraqi people. **3. Activities Responding to International Terrorism** **1. Efforts of International Community** Since the 9/11 attacks on the United States in 2001, international community has continued its fight against terrorism not only on the military front but also on diplomatic, police, judicial, intelligence and financial fronts. However, the threat of terrorist attacks prevails in international society; terror acts10 in which international terrorist organizations including Al Qaeda were suspected to be involved have occurred throughout the world. In order to fully eradicate such terrorism, it is imperative that international society be united for long-term involvement. Strongholds of terrorist groups like Al Qaeda are believed to exist along the national border between Afghanistan and Pakistan. As Afghanistan continues to serve as a production center for narcotics, a source of major funding for terrorist activities, international forces including the U.S. military have conducted the Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) to wipe out Al Qaeda and Taliban in the region. A number of countries have dispatched troops to Afghanistan to take part in the U.S.-led operation in an attempt to eradicate terrorists in the region. However, some groups with suspected links to terrorist organizations who are believed to be involved in narcotics and weapons trafficking may escape to the sea passing through the mountainous regions. These groups are believed to utilize the sea to widen their activities to the Middle East, Africa, Europe or Southeast Asia and may be engaging in terrorist activities in those regions. (See Fig. III-3-1-3) The international community has been engaged in counter-terrorism maritime interdiction operations11 in ----- the Indian Ocean in order to block and deter the movement of terrorists, weapons, ammunition and narcotics − a major funding source for terrorism. At present, U.S., European, Pakistani, and other countries’ warships are operating in this area. These activities such as making radio inquiries and conducting on-the-spot inspections of suspicious boats have already achieved accomplishments such as detecting and confiscating a large amount of narcotics, firearms, and portable anti-tank rockets. In addition, the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) has been trying to maintain security in Afghanistan and rebuild the country, reflecting the determination by the international community to prevent it from reverting to a hotbed of terrorism12. **2. Japan’s Efforts in the Fight Against Terrorism** At a time when the international community stands united in its counter-terrorism efforts, it is necessary for Japan to reinforce its efforts to combat terrorism in collaboration with other countries as well. Based on this recognition, Japan is promoting counter-terrorism efforts13 in myriad fields. Since December 2001, the SDF has been conducting maritime replenishment activities in the Indian Ocean to support the counter-terrorism maritime interdiction operations by vessels of foreign nations such as the United States, the United Kingdom, France and Germany, as well as the Islamic Republic of Pakistan. These replenishment activities enable foreign ships to continue their activities in a wide sea area without returning port for refueling. Therefore, these activities have become an important base for the efficient and effective implementation of maritime interdiction operations against terrorism. These efforts have been highly appreciated by the international community. The U.N. Security Council resolution 1776 adopted in September 200714 expresses appreciation for the contribution of many countries to the Operation Enduring Freedom, including the ----- Maritime Interdiction Operations. This appreciation was reiterated in the U.N. Security Council resolution 1833 adopted in September 2008. Replenishment activities at sea require the refueling vessel to position itself parallel to the vessel being refueled for a long period of time, which requires a high level of skill and capability. Only few other countries besides Japan can stably conduct such replenishment activities at sea for a long period. Thus, such activities by the MSDF can be regarded as a highly appropriate contribution by Japan. At the same time, these MSDF activities have contributed to promoting peace and stability in the region, and fostering the national interests of Japan, whose energy resources are dependent mostly on the Middle East. The replenishment activities that have been conducted for six years by the MSDF based on the former Anti Terrorism Special Measures Law, have earned high appraisals from various countries. Although the continuation of these replenishment activities had been desired, it was suspended due to the expiration of the Law mentioned above in November 2007. However, from the aforementioned perspective, after the establishment of the Replenishment Support Special Measures Law by the Diet in January 2008, the SDF has promptly dispatched the MSDF vessels to the Indian Ocean, and resumed replenishment activities from February 2008. **3. Outline of the Replenishment Support Special Measures Law and Implementation Plan** **(1) Outline of the Replenishment Support Special Measures Law** The Replenishment Support Special Measures Law aims that, for replenishment support activities15 for the multinational forces participating in counter-terrorism maritime interdiction activities, Japan continues its proactive and responsible contribution to international efforts to prevent and eradicate international terrorism, which consequently contributes to securing peace and security in international society including Japan. The Replenishment Support Special Measures Law limits the type and manner of activities to replenishment only, and stipulates the implementation area including the range of foreign nations of dispatch. Consequently, the law does not establish the provisions concerning Diet approval, which is based on the idea that if the bill passes through Diet deliberations, repeated requests for the Diet approval for the implementation of the activities can be regarded as unnecessary. The Japanese government determined that, in order to play a responsible role in international society, it needed to continue replenishment support activities which had become an important basis for counterterrorism maritime interdiction operations, while nations of the whole world have worked hard for the reconstruction and development of Afghanistan. Subsequently, on December 12, 2008, the duration of the law, whose original expiration date was January 15, 2009–because it should expire one year from the date of enforcement–was extended for another one year 16 Defense issues seminar on replenishment support activities until January 15, 2010 . (See Reference 32-33) (Hokkaido Defense Bureau) **(2) Outline of the Implementation Plan** Based on the Replenishment Support Special Measures Law, the Implementation Plan stipulates the basic policies for replenishment support activities, the scope of areas where such activities are undertaken, and the size, composition, equipment and the period of dispatch of SDF units conducting activities in foreign territories. The Government approved the Implementation Plan at the January 16, 2008 Cabinet meeting. The Japanese Government twice extended the term of deployment of the SDF troops in the Implementation ----- Plan, which was originally until June 30, 2008, considering the situation of the fight against terrorism in Afghanistan. (See Fig. III-3-1-4) (See Reference 50) **4. Replenishment Support Activities by the Maritime Self-Defense Force** In accordance with the Replenishment Support Special Measures Law, the MSDF resumed replenishment activities in the Indian Ocean in February 2008. The MSDF supplied fuel for vessels and helicopters on board vessels and water, to naval vessels of countries participating in anti-terrorism maritime interdiction operations, and as of the end of May 2009, Japan has supplied vessels with fuel 105 times, fuel for helicopters on board vessels 14 times, and water 47 times. (See Fig. III-3-1-5) It is not only the United States that is involved in counter-terrorism maritime interdiction operations. Various nations from all around the world also participate, and, in fact, the fuel supplied to countries except the United States, such as European countries and the Islamic Republic of Pakistan constitutes about 80 % of the total fuel supplied through MSDF replenishment support activities17. In this way, the MSDF is supporting international counter-terrorism efforts. ----- On April 27, 2009, the 100th replenishment operation since the resumption of the activities in February 2008 was conducted for a French vessel. The enclosed bridge of the French frigate displayed a banner with a thank-you message during the 100th replenishment operation. Regarding replenishment activities, the following measures are taken to ensure that the fuel supplied by Japan is appropriately used in line with the purport of the Replenishment Support Special Measures Law. **(1) Conclusion of Exchange of Notes** Japan concluded a new exchange of notes under the Replenishment Support Special Measures Law18 with countries subject to replenishment following the practice under the former Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law. By clearly rewriting the purpose of the Replenishment Support Special Measures Law on the exchange of notes, it further clarifies that the replenishment such as refueling by the MSDF shall be properly conducted under the purpose of the law. Moreover, it stipulates consultations between the Japanese government and the governments involved for the effective implementation of the Law. In addition, the conditions for replenishment were repeatedly explained to each country before signing the exchange of notes, and were concluded with all countries accepting these conditions. The MSDF vessel Tokiwa (right) conducting the 100th replenishment support with the French frigate Aconit (left) involved in a counterterrorism maritime interdiction operation The enclosed bridge of the French frigate displaying a banner with a thank-you message during the 100th replenishment operation **(2) Confirmation work by Liaison Officers in Bahrain** MSDF liaison officers dispatched to the Bahraini Coalition Headquarters confirm each time of supply, whether the aforementioned vessels are following operations based on the Counterterrorism Maritime Interdiction Operation written on the Replenishment Support Special Measures Law, while comprehending the plans of vessels to be supplied. Additionally, in such events, the officers make an entry of the following check points in a stylized format: the date and time of replenishment, name and attached unit of vessels subject to supply, replenishment amount, and future plans (documentation of follow-up procedures that have been conducted). Also regarding the adequacy of replenishment implementation, the Minister of Defense will make the final decision when it is difficult for the local unit to make a decision. **5. International Evaluation of Japan’s Efforts** The Japanese government received continuous appraisals from international society when the extension of its replenishment support activities was decided following the enactment of the amendment to the Replenishment Support Special Measures Law on December 12, 2008. On the same day, the President of Afghanistan, Karzai, issued a statement expressing his gratitude to the ----- Japanese people for their decision to continue its support for the international forces engaged in the fight against terrorism. A statement by the U.N. Secretary General, Ban Ki-moon, welcomed the enactment of the Replenishment Support Special Measures Law, as this will allow Japan to continue its support for international activities in Afghanistan for another year. Furthermore, on January 12, 2009, the Foreign Ministry of Pakistan also issued a statement welcoming the decision of the Japanese Diet to continue its replenishment support to vessels engaged in Operation Enduring Freedom in the Indian Ocean. The Ministry stated that this continuous Senior Vice Minister of Defense Kitamura giving a speech on the support shows Japan’s trust in Pakistan’s resolution to occasion of the homecoming ceremony of the destroyer Ariake continue the fight against terrorism. Furthermore, the U.S. Secretary of State, Clinton, at a joint press conference with Japan’s foreign minister on February 17, 2009, expressed her gratitude for Japan’s support for Operation Enduring Freedom. She also stated that Japan’s replenishment support activities were extremely important for the success of operations by multinational forces in Afghanistan. It was not only North American and EU countries, such as France, Germany and Canada, but countries such as India, Singapore and Saudi Arabia which delivered their praise. This all shows that Japan’s replenishment activities are highly evaluated and appreciated by international society. Under such circumstances, where the threat of international terrorism has yet to be eradicated and the significance of counter-terrorism maritime interdiction operations conducted by various foreign countries has not diminished, international society has continuously shown high expectations for the SDF’s replenishment support activities. **4. Efforts to Support U.N. Peacekeeping Operations, etc.** As a way to prevent recurrence of regional conflicts following a cease-fire agreement, the U.N. sponsors peacekeeping operations and political and peace building missions such as ceasefire monitoring, election monitoring, and reconstruction assistance. As of the end of May 2009, peacekeeping operations are underway in 16 locations around the world, and political and peace building missions are underway in 12. (See Fig. I-1-4-2) In addition, international organizations such as the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the governments and NGOs of individual countries engage in relief and reconstruction activities for the victims of conflicts and large-scale disasters from a humanitarian perspective or from the viewpoint of stabilizing the domestic situations of affected countries. Japan, in a bid to fulfill a role commensurate to its international status, has been cooperating both in terms of funding and personnel, with global efforts being led by the U.N. to build a peaceful and stable international community. In order to help improve the international security environment, based on International Peace Cooperation Law, the Ministry of Defense and the SDF have actively engaged in international peace cooperation activities by dispatching troops and through other efforts. **1. Outline of International Peace Cooperation Law, etc.** The International Peace Cooperation Law, enacted in 1992, is designed to contribute further to global efforts ----- being led by the U.N. to achieve peace in the international community by upgrading Japan’s framework for cooperating appropriately and quickly in 1) U.N. peacekeeping operations19, 2) humanitarian support for international relief and rescue opeations20 and 3) international election monitoring activities. The law stipulates a set of basic guidelines (the so-called five principles for participation) for Japan’s participation in a U.N. peacekeeping force (PKF). (See Fig. III-3-1-6, 7) ----- **2. The United Nations Mission in Sudan** **(1) Background to Japan’s Decision to Send Troops to UNMIS** In Sudan, the Sudanese Government and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement signed the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in January 2005. Based upon this agreement, the United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) was formed to support the execution of the CPA and to perform ceasefire surveillance etc. In addition to the military section that performs ceasefire surveillance etc., the UNMIS has the civilian section in charge of election support and humanitarian assistance coordination. UNMIS is a multi-functional, large-scale U.N. peacekeeping operation that involves approximately 10,000 people. During the joint press conference after the meeting with U.N. Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon in June 2008, (then) Prime Minister Fukuda announced the dispatch of SDF personnel to UNMIS headquarters. This was followed by a Cabinet decision on October 3, 2008, to dispatch SDF personnel to UNMIS Headquarters. On October 24, 2008, two SDF officers left for Sudan. One SDF officer was then dispatched to the Embassy of Japan in Sudan as a Defense Attache in order to provide personnel support for the operations at the UNMIS Headquarters. In April 2009, they were replaced by two SDF officers as the second headquarters personnel, who are currently engaged in the assignment. Since Sudan is the largest country in Africa, bordering nine countries, its stability is crucial to the improvement of the security environment of Africa as a whole. Furthermore, in light of the fact that terrorist organizations such as Al Qaeda had located its base in Sudan, Japan’s proactive involvement on its own initiative in international efforts for the stability of Sudan by dispatching SDF officers to UNMIS is of great significance from the viewpoint of the fight against terrorism and the security of Japan. Moreover, not only G8 countries but also Asia-Pacific countries have been deeply involved in various issues facing Africa; thus, participating in UNMIS will help to strengthen cooperation between Japan and these countries. It will also expand the SDF’s approach to international peace cooperation and is useful from the perspective of human resources development and improving practical capabilities of the SDF. (See Fig. III-3-1-8) ----- **(2) Activities of Dispatched Personnel** The SDF officers dispatched to UNMIS do not carry weapons, in line with the policy of the U.N. that personnel at headquarters work without arms, and, as mentioned below, are dispatched on an individual basis. One SDF personnel in Sudan is undertaking coordination duties within UNMIS relating to the general logistical demands of the military sectors in the Logistics Office of the Military Component Headquarters located in the capital, Khartoum. The other officer is managing the database at the Joint Information Analysis Center in the Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General of the U.N. GSDF officers have earned high acclaim from UNMIS personnel for their discipline, professionalism, and sincere approach to their work. **[COLUMN]** **VOICE** **Voice of SDF Personnel who Worked for UNMIS** Major Hironobu Tanaka Education and Training Division, Ground Staff Office (Then Leader of First Sudan International Peace Cooperation Team) I was sent to the United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) in October last year and worked for about six months at UNMIS headquarters in Khartoum, the capital of Sudan. My mission at UNMIS headquarters was to undertake, as a logistics officer, coordination duties related to supply and transportation for dispatched units and military observers assigned to UNMIS. The logistics office (J4) was a multinational organization, with the other officers coming from Australia and Egypt. We were working together beyond differences in nationality and culture, with the common goal of improving the basis of UNMIS activities. At first I had difficulties understanding the English of various countries spoken with a strong accent and making myself understood in English. But I gradually became able to make myself understood and to work smoothly overcoming the language barrier. This was probably possible because the other officers had gradually understood the work attitude peculiar to Japanese, who tend to Major Tanaka (center) during a briefing at UNMIS regional accomplish tasks with sincerity and care. headquarters During my mission, I had an opportunity to go on a trip to the southern region, where military observers were in operation. This gave me an understanding of the current situation in rural areas of Sudan and the real state of military observers serving on the front line, which I could not see in Khartoum. This trip was a valuable experience, which made me keenly aware of how important it is to work from the viewpoint of people in the field. On the official trip and at the headquarters, I was often spoken to by officers from different countries who had worked with the SDF for UNMIN in Nepal or UNDOF on the Golan Heights, and they told me that they were glad to have another opportunity to work with Japanese personnel. The other day, a Cambodian officer said to me “Thank you, SDF.” I am delighted to see that the international peace cooperation activities the SDF has conducted are supported by local people and that their effects are gradually spreading. I believe that I was able to carry on the tradition my predecessors had established and leave my mark on UNMIS as a Japanese officer. I hope to pass on my experiences to my juniors and to expand this great tradition. ----- **3. United Nations Mission in Nepal (UNMIN)** **(1) Background of Japan’s Decision to Send** **Personnel to UNMIN** Despite the ongoing civil war between the Nepalese Government and the Maoists (Communist Party of Nepal) in a bid to capture power, an accord aimed at achieving permanent peace was signed in November 2006 thanks to repeated peace negotiations under the new government established in May 2006. Subsequently, a comprehensive peace agreement was reached, marking the end of conflict. In response to a request from the Nepalese GSDF personnel addressing the UNMIS Force Commander upon Government and a recommendation by the Secretary- reporting for duty General of United Nations, United Nations Mission in Nepal (UNMIN) was established in January 2007 through U.N. Security Council Resolution 1740. Nepal’s Constituent Assembly election was held in April 2008 and marked the transition from a monarchy to a federal democratic republic, representing a certain degree of progress in Nepal’s peace process. Nevertheless, some issues remain unsolved, such as the integration of the national army and Maoists militia groups. In January 2009, the U.N. extended UNMIN’s tenure until July 23, 2009, at the request of the Nepalese government. Situated between China and India, Nepal occupies an important strategic position, and its stability is crucial to the security of the Asian region as a whole. Japan’s Cabinet, in response to a request by the U.N. for the dispatch of arms monitors to UNMIN operations, decided to dispatch personnel to the mission, and in March 2007, six GSDF officers were dispatched to UNMIN. In March 2008, the second team of six arms monitors replaced the first team, and in March 2009, the third team consisting of six members replaced the second team to continue arms-monitoring duties. In addition, the Ministry of Defense and the International Peace Cooperation Headquarters of the Cabinet Office respectively dispatched two liaison personnel for coordination with relevant local agencies and information collection. (See Fig. III-3-1-9) **(2) Activities of GSDF Officers at UNMIN** The GSDF officers dispatched to UNMIN do not carry weapons, in line with the provisions of the U.N. The officers, dispatched on an individual basis, have been working as arms monitors and arms monitors’ headquarters personnel, which is different from the past personnel dispatch by Japan for the support of U.N. peacekeeping operations where SDF officers were dispatched as arms-monitoring personnel and headquarters personnel along with military units. SDF officers are being dispatched to seven Maoist camps and barracks of the Nepalese military for monitoring of the management of arms and armies. SDF officers have earned high acclaim from U.N. staff in Nepal and UNMIN arms monitors of participating nations for their discipline, professionalism, GSDF personnel checking the management situation of weapons at UNMIN leadership and sincere approach to their work. ----- **4. The U.N. Disengagement Observer Force** **(1) Background to Japan’s Decision to Send Troops to UNDOF** The U.N. Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) has been undertaking peacekeeping operations in a zone called the Area of Separation (AOS), set up in the Golan Heights between the opposing troops of Syria and Israel based on a ceasefire agreement. UNDOF’s mission is to monitor the ceasefire between the two countries and the implementation of measures stipulated under an agreement between the countries over the separation of their opposing troops. The SDF has been providing logistical support for UNDOF operations. (See Fig. III-3-1-10, 11) For Japan, as a country that relies on the Middle East for the majority of its oil imports, stability in this region is crucial. Japan’s participation in the UNDOF operations GSDF personnel engaged in an UNDOF night towing operation is significant because it marks Japan’s personnel contribution to the international efforts for peace in the Middle East. The participation is also significant for Japan to develop human resources for international peace cooperation activities. The Government of Japan decided in December 1995 to dispatch SDF units and other personnel to the UNDOF. In February 1996, the first transport unit of 43 personnel was sent to the Golan Heights and replaced a Canadian transport unit. Since then, an SDF unit has been dispatched approximately every six months on a rotating basis. However, the rotation system has changed so that only the rotation of personnel is conducted with the unit maintained, and the Golan Heights Transport Unit was newly organized in February 2008. **(2) SDF Operations** The dispatched SDF transport unit is in charge of transporting daily goods and materials needed for UNDOF operations from the harbors, airports and commodities markets of Israel, Syria and Lebanon to the UNDOF ----- camps. The unit also provides logistical support, including repairs of roads and removal of snow from streets in plateau areas with an altitude of more than 2,800 meters. The transport unit stayed at the same camp as Indian forces, which replaced Canadian forces in March 2006. Members of the SDF and Indian forces jointly provide meals and other services to troops. The ASDF flies a C-130H transport plane and a U-4 multipurpose assistance plane to the Golan Heights every six months to transport goods and materials for the transport unit. Three SDF personnel being sent to the UNDOF headquarters are in charge of planning and coordination of ----- transport and other UNDOF logistic support operations, and are also responsible for publicity and budget-related works. The SDF officers are assigned to the UNDOF headquarters for about one year, and are replaced by other SDF personnel after completing their assignment. The SDF personnel as of the end of May 2009 are in the 14th dispatch. Japan had initially intended to complete its participation in UNDOF operations within two years. However, participation has continued until now after taking into consideration various factors, such as strong requests from the U.N., high evaluation of past Japanese operations by the U.N. and relevant countries, and the importance of Japan’s personnel contribution to peace in the Middle East, an issue that greatly affects Japan’s national prosperity. Japan’s contribution to UNDOF has been deepened with the SDF dispatch of the Golan Heights Transport Unit totaling up to 27 times, with approximately 1,200 personnel. **5. Dispatch of Instructors to the PKO Center in Egypt** At the joint press conference with the U.N. General Secretary, Ban Ki-moon, (then) Prime Minister Fukuda announced that Japan would make efforts to strengthen the capacity of PKO centers in Africa including sending military officers as instructors. Following this, two GSDF officers were dispatched to the PKO center in Egypt (CCCPA: Cairo Regional Center for Training on Conflict Resolution and Peacekeeping in Africa) during November 21-30, 2008. The aim of this dispatch was to support the self help peacekeeping efforts of African nations. It was the first time that SDF instructors had been dispatched to a foreign educational and training institution for PKO officers. The dispatched SDF personnel gave lectures on the importance of building relationships with local residents in international peace cooperation activities. They incorporated specific case studies into their talks based on the experience in humanitarian GSDF personnel receiving a gift from the CCCPA Director and reconstruction assistance in Iraq as well as lessons learned from domestic and international disaster relief operations. They made efforts to make the lectures simple enough to be understood even without specialist knowledge of military-civilian cooperation, which was highly commended by CCCPA staff as well as the audience. This success was followed by another request for instructors in May 2009; a GSFD officer was dispatched to CCCPA accordingly between May 22 and June 6, 2009. The officer participated as an instructor in desktop exercises on peacekeeping activities, advising and conducting training for the African military and civilian GSDF personnel advising South African army brigadier-general personnel. ----- **[COLUMN]** **VOICE** **Voice of SDF Instructor Dispatched to PKO Center in Egypt** Lieutenant Colonel Yoji Takahashi 7th Artillery Regiment, First Battalion Commander, GSDF (Then International Cooperation Office of Joint Staff Office) As part of Japan’s proactive efforts on its own initiative to contribute to the peacebuilding activities of the international community, I was dispatched last November along with Lieutenant Colonel Sakaemura to participate in Integrated Training Programs for Integrated Peacekeeping Missions at the Cairo Regional Center for Training on Conflict Resolution and Peacekeeping in Africa. I, who had led the 22nd Golan Heights transport unit, was dispatched from the Operations Department of the Joint Staff Office and Lieutenant Colonel Sakaemura, who had taken part in the humanitarian and reconstruction assistance in Iraq, Lieutenant Colonel Takahashi answering questions from participants in the training program was dispatched from the Central Readiness Force. As part of the training program, we gave lectures on the SDF’s international peace cooperation. The lectures centered on the basic elements to be taken into consideration when conducting military-civilian cooperation and we gave examples of operations in Iraq as well as international disaster relief in Sumatra and other areas. The International Peace Cooperation Activities Training Unit of the Central Readiness Force was also mentioned as an example of SDF education and training for international peace cooperation activities. Before giving the lectures, I was anxious about playing a role as one of the first SDF instructors sent to a PKO center abroad. The lectures, however, were well received by the local instructors and participants. They commended us saying that our lectures based on the experiences and lessons of the SDF’s international peace cooperation activities were informative and had offered a different approach to that of Europe and the United States. I felt proud that I was able to contribute to peacebuilding in Africa and was reminded that Japan’s efforts relating to international peace cooperation activities are evaluated highly. It was very significant being able to contribute to local education and training for PKOs and I believe that PKO-related capacity building in Africa through the dispatch of lecturers is a new approach and a great possibility for Japan to contribute to international peace cooperation activities. I hope that similar opportunities for SDF personnel to demonstrate the international contributions of Japan will increase in the future, and I hope I will have the opportunity to participate again. **5. International Disaster Relief Operations** The Ministry of Defense and the SDF are determined to step up international disaster relief operations from the viewpoint of humanitarian contributions and improvement of the international security environment. In addition, the GSDF, the MSDF and the ASDF maintain their readiness to take any necessary action based on prepared disaster relief operation plans, whenever a situation in which their operations are deemed necessary arises. The SDF has dispatched its units overseas for international disaster relief operations while closely examining specific relief requests filed by governments of affected countries and disaster situations in these ----- countries. The Ministry of Defense and the SDF have been proactively conducting international disaster relief operations fully utilizing the capabilities of the GSDF, the MSDF and the ASDF. (See Fig. III-3-1-12) **1. Outline of the Law Concerning the Dispatch of International Disaster Relief Teams** Since the enactment of the International Disaster Relief Law21 in 1987, Japan has engaged in international disaster relief activities in response to requests from the governments of affected countries and international organizations. In 1992, the International Disaster Relief Law was amended to enable the SDF to participate in international disaster relief operations and to transport its personnel and equipment. Since then, the SDF has maintained its readiness for international disaster relief operations with self-sufficient capabilities, including relief operations and medical treatment, and with the use of its own equipment, organizations and the benefits of regular training. **2. International Disaster Relief Operations by the SDF and the SDF’s Posture** International disaster relief operations conducted by the SDF may take different forms according to factors such as the scale of the disaster, the degree of damage, and the requests of the governments of affected countries or international organizations. In the major earthquake that struck the central region of Java, Indonesia in 2006, the SDF, acting on a request from the Indonesian Government, provided medical assistance, examining a total of about 3,800 persons while vaccinating about 1,700 persons and controlling infections diseases over an area of about 4,300m2. Judging from the past experience of SDF dispatched to various disaster sites in Japan, the SDF’s capabilities in international disaster relief operations encompass 1) medical services, such as first-aid medical treatment and epidemic prevention, 2) transport of goods, patients, and disaster relief personnel by helicopter, and 3) ensuring water supplies using water-purifying devices. Also, the SDF uses transport planes and transport ships to carry disaster relief personnel and equipment to the affected area. ----- Central Readiness Force and regional units of the GSDF maintain their readiness to ensure that they can carry out international disaster relief operations in an independent manner anytime the need arises. The MSDF and the ASDF maintain their readiness to dispatch fleet and air-support units, respectively, to transport supplies to units participating in international disaster relief operations, including their own, as the need for disaster relief arises. ----- **Section 2. Promotion of Security Dialogue and Defense Exchanges** In the new National Defense Program Guidelines (NDPG), making proactive efforts on its own initiative to help improve the international security environment is stated as a major role of defense. Therefore, the Ministry of Defense and the SDF proactively promote security dialogue and defense exchanges, including bilateral and multilateral training, while also taking part in international peace cooperation activities. This section will describe the security dialogue and defense exchanges in which the Ministry of Defense and the SDF have currently been engaging. **1. Significance of Security Dialogue and Defense Exchanges** Since the end of the Cold War, awareness has grown regarding the importance of preventing meaningless arms races, and contingencies and the escalation of such events through means such as increasing the transparency of military capabilities and defense policies, and enhancing mutual trust through dialogue and exchanges between defense officials and through various joint exercises between military units. Today, in an age when mutual cooperation and dependence between nations continues to grow in the international community, it is widely recognized that the international community must work together in responding to new threats and diverse contingencies. In recent years in particular, defense exchanges have deepened in terms of quality and have expanded in terms of quantity with the aim of the proactive promotion of exchanges to improve the security environment. Specifically, this includes: 1) the increasing significance of establishing and strengthening cooperative relations with the international community as well as confidence-building; 2) a global expansion of exchanges that extends over Japan’s neighboring countries; and 3) the increasing importance of promoting not only goodwill exchanges but also practical exchanges, and action-oriented exchanges in addition to dialogue. For this reason, the Ministry of Defense formulated the “Basic Policy for Defense Exchanges22” in April 2007 in order for the ministry to implement defense exchanges in a harmonized and strategic manner. The “Basic Policy” emphasizes defense exchanges23 aimed at contributing directly to the enhancement of international cooperation in addition to the promotion of traditional defense exchanges. The “Basic Policy” also aims to build relations of trust and cooperation with other countries by utilizing various of defense exchange measures24 that are effectively not limited to bilateral dialogue and consultation. (See Fig. III-3-2-1) The Ministry of Defense and the SDF actively conduct bilateral exchanges with related countries, host various international conferences, and participate in multilateral security dialogues, such as the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and multilateral joint exercises. (See Fig. III-3-2-1) **2. Bilateral Defense Exchanges** Bilateral defense exchanges are those between defense officials from various countries and with the objective of promoting relations of trust and cooperation. Characteristically, these exchanges allow a tailor made response in light of particular relations with an individual nation, and it is possible that the bilateral relationships of trust and cooperation constructed via these exchanges can lay the foundation for effectively promoting other initiatives such as multilateral security dialogue. (See Reference 51) **1. Japan-Republic of Korea Defense Exchanges** The Republic of Korea (ROK) is an important country for Japan’s security from a geopolitical perspective. It is also a friend of Japan as both countries share the fundamental values of freedom and democracy. The ROK has formed an alliance with the United States and, just as Japan does, allow the United States to station its ----- forces in the country from a security perspective. Therefore, it is extremely important for Japan and the ROK to proactively utilize defense exchanges to promote mutual understanding and relations of trust, establish a basis for cooperation, and to effectively coordinate and cooperate in policy-making for the peace and stability of the entire East Asia region. **(1) High Level Exchanges Including Ministerial Meetings** Almost every year since 1994, the defense ministers of Japan and the ROK have made reciprocal visits and held discussions. In April 2009, ROK Defense Minister Lee Sang Hee visited Japan and exchanged opinions with Japanese Defense Minister Yasukazu Hamada about North Korean issues and Japan-ROK exchanges. After the meeting, both ministers signed the first Memorandum of Intent regarding defense exchanges between the Ministry of Defense, Japan and the Ministry of National Defense, the Republic of Korea. Furthermore, views were openly exchanged on various occasions including in January 2008 when (then) ROK Chief of Army Staff Park Honyoru visited Japan ROK Minister of National Defense Lee and Minister of Defense Hamada ----- to meet with (then) Japanese GSDF Chief of Staff Ryoichi Oriki, in April 2008 when (then) ROK Chief of Air Force Staff Kim Ung-Ki visited Japan to meet with (then) Japanese ASDF Chief of Staff Toshio Tamogami, and in April 2008 when ROK Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Kim Tae-Young visited Japan to meet with (then) Japanese Chief of Staff, Joint Staff Saito. In October 2008, Japanese MSDF Chief of Staff Keiji Akahoshi visited Korea to take part in the International Fleet Review and the Western Pacific Naval Symposium (WPNS). **(2) Regular Consultations between Defense Officials** In addition to holding military-to-military consultations (bilateral consultations at the Director-General/ Councilor-level) every year since 1994, Japan and the ROK have held security dialogue since 1998 that has included diplomatic authorities from both countries. In July 2008, Japan and the ROK held the 16th military-to-military consultation whereupon views were exchanged on Japan and the ROK’s defense policies and Japan-ROK defense exchanges. In addition, in December 2008, the second Japan-ROK military-to-military working group was held between Director-level officials. Furthermore, in October 2008, Japan and the ROK held the eighth bilateral security dialogue where views were exchanged on matters including the security environment surrounding the two countries and their respective security policies. Active dialogue has also been held between Japan’s Joint Staff and the ROK Joint Chiefs of Staff as well as between Japan’s GSDF, MSDF and the ASDF, and the ROK’s Army, Navy and Air Force respectively. In addition, Japan and the ROK have been promoting mutual exchange of students and research exchanges. **(3) Exchanges between Units** Japan GSDF and the ROK Army have held defense exchanges, including mutual visits by unit commanders of the GSDF’s Western Army and the ROK’s Second Army25 since 2001. In June 2007, the Commander of the ROK Second Army visited Japan, and in October 2007, the Commanding General of the Japanese GSDF Western Army visited the ROK. Exchanges between Japan’s MSDF and the ROK Navy, including mutual visits by naval vessels since 1994, have been carried out. In September 2008, ROK Navy vessels visited Japan, and in October 2008, MSDF vessels participated in the International Fleet Review held in the ROK. In December 2008, ROK’s commander of the First Fleet visited Japan and the Commandant of the Maizuru District visited ROK in May 2009. Japan ASDF and the ROK Air Force have continued exchanges through mutual visits by aircraft since 2000. Mutual visits by unit commanders have also taken place, with the ROK Southern Air Force Combat Commander visiting Japan in May 2008, and the commander of the Japanese ASDF Western Air Defense Force visiting the ROK in May2009. **(4) Trilateral (Japan, U.S., and ROK) Cooperation** On the occasion of the 8th Asian Security Summit26 hosted by the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) of the United Kingdom in May 2009, Defense Minister Hamada held the first trilateral defense ministers’ meeting with U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates and ROK Minister of National Defense Lee Sang Hee, in which views were exchanged on the response to the North Korea’s nuclear test and the significance of close trilateral cooperation. In November 2008, defense officials of Japan-U.S.-ROK held Defense Trilateral Talks to exchange views on security-related issues. ----- **2. Japan-Russia Defense Exchanges** Russia has great influence on the security of Europe, Central Asia, and the Asia-Pacific region and is a neighboring country of Japan. It is therefore very important for Japan to deepen defense exchanges with Russia and promote relations of trust and cooperation. As Japan-Russia relations has continuously been developing in wider areas following the 1997 summit in Krasnoyarsk, the Ministry of Defense has been steadily promoting defense exchanges with Russia at various levels in accordance with the memorandum on JapanRussia defense exchanges signed in 1999. Minister of Defense Hamada, U.S. Secretary of Defense Gates and ROK Minister of National Defense Lee **(1) High Level Exchanges Including Ministerial Meetings** High-level exchanges have advanced between Japan and Russia since 1996, when the then Minister of State for Defense, Hideo Usui, visited Russia, becoming the first Japanese defense minister to visit Russia since the Soviet era. When the then Minister of State for Defense, Fukushiro Nukaga, visited Russia in January 2006, Japan and Russia revised the 1999 memorandum on defense exchanges. The then Russian Defense Minister, Sergey Ivanov, told that the Japan-Russia Action Plan was a strong foundation for deepening cooperation between their respective defense officials. Minister Ivanov also said that defense exchanges had significantly deepened between the MSDF and Russia’s Navy. He added that he also wished to promote exchanges between the GSDF and Russia’s Ground Force and between the ASDF and Russia’s Air Force. Minister Nukaga and Minister Ivanov shared the view that observers would be mutually dispatched to exercises conducted by the GSDF and Russia’s Ground Force. They also shared the view that representatives and aircraft of the ASDF and Russia’s Air Force would make mutual visits. Furthermore, the then Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Ground Force, Aleksei Maslov, visited Japan in March 2008 and exchanged views with the then Japanese GSDF Chief of Staff, Ryoichi Oriki. In April 2008, the then Chief of Joint Staff, Saito, visited Russia to exchange views with the then Chief of General Staff,Yuri Baluyevsky. **(2) Regular Consultations between Defense Officials** The Ministry of Defense has continued to hold discussion with Russia, such as Japan-Russia Bilateral Working Group meetings and annual meetings based on the Japan-Russia Agreement on the Prevention of Incidents on and over the High Seas, to discuss how to promote overall defense exchanges as well as holding regular discussion between Director-General-level and Councilor-level defense officials. Japan’s Joint Staff and the General Staff Office of the Russian Armed Forces actively held dialogues as well as the GSDF, ASDF and their respective counterparts. In addition, Japan-Russia defense research and instructor exchanges are continually held between the National Institute for Defense Studies and a research institute affiliated with the Russian Defense Ministry. **(3) Exchanges between Units** The GSDF and the Russian Ground Force have promoted mutual exchanges since 2003, including a mutual visit between the Russian Commander of Far Eastern Military District and the Commanding General of the GSDF’s Northern Army. In November 2008, the Commanding General of the Far Eastern Military District visited Japan, ----- and in March 2009, the Commanding General of the GSDF’s Northern Army visited Russia. In September 2008, three observer s were sent from GSDF for the first time to the exercises of the Russian Ground Forces. The MSDF and the Russian Navy have conducted mutual visits by vessels every year since the MSDF’s first port visit to Vladivostok in 1996. Both have also conducted bilateral joint search and rescue exercises since 1998. The 10th SAREX was held during September and October 2008, taking as an opportunity the visit of two Russian Navy vessels to the Maizuru port. The ASDF and the Russian Air Forces have conducted Defense Force and the 11th Air Force and Air Defense Army of the Russian Air Force since 2007, including a mutual visit of unit commanders. In November 2008, the _Shimakaze (right) alongside a Russian vessel during the 10th SAREX_ commander of the ASDF’s Northern Air Defense Force visited Russia for the first time. As has been shown, previously infrequent exchanges of the Ground and Air Forces are now making steady progress. **3. Japan-China Defense Exchanges** China’s outstanding economic development and the modernization of its military capabilities in recent years have drawn much attention from other countries around the world. Deepening mutual understanding on the defense front and promoting relations of trust with China is beneficial not only for the security of the two countries, but also for ensuring peace and stability in the Asia- Pacific region. In December 2007, the then Prime Minister, Yasuo Fukuda, officially visited China. Both sides shared the view on the status of the “promotion of exchanges and mutual trust” as one of the three pillars of a materialization of the “Mutually Beneficial Relationship Based on Common Strategic Interests27” The two sides also shared the view on enhancing exchanges in the security sector, including dispatching an MSDF vessel and reciprocal visits by company-officer-level officers of the SDF and People’s Liberation Army. In addition, upon the May 2008 visit of Chinese President Hu Jintao, agreement was concluded on such matters as enhancing high-level exchanges between officials including defense ministers, implementing visit by an MSDF vessel to China, and promptly establishing a communication mechanism between defense authorities. In the Joint Statement between the Government of Japan and the Government of the People’s Republic of China on Comprehensive Promotion of a “Mutually Beneficial Relationship Based on Common Strategic Interests,” it was also noted that reciprocal visits by high-level officials in the security sector would be enhanced and that various dialogues and exchanges would be promoted, thereby further strengthening mutual understanding and trust. Minister-level exchanges play an important role in the promotion of defense exchanges, which are an important element of a “Mutually Beneficial Relationship Based on Common Strategic Interests.” **(1) High Level Exchanges Including Ministerial Meetings** In August 2007, the then Chinese Minister of National Defense, Cao Gangchuan, visited Japan and held a discussion with the then Minister of Defense, Masahiko Koumura, regarding international and regional situations, defense policy of Japan and China, and Japan-China defense exchanges. During the meeting, both sides shared the view on the importance of the further development of Japan-China defense exchanges, including the ----- promotion of high-level exchanges between officials such as defense ministers and chiefs of staff, reciprocal port calls by naval vessels, and expanding exchanges in various military branches and sectors. Both sides released the Japan-China Defense Authorities Joint Press Release between Japan-China Defense Authorities the first joint document released between Japanese and Chinese defense authorities. In March 2009, Defense Minister Hamada visited China and held a discussion with Minister of National Defense Liang Guanglie on the defense policies of Japan and China, Japan-China defense exchanges and the regional situations. Both ministers concurred that Japan and China should promote exchange at every level and in every field as well as dialogue and cooperation with regard to PKO, disaster relief and anti-piracy measures. They also issued a joint press release28 which included ten concurred points concerning major future defense exchanges. In addition, the then Chief of Staff, Joint Staff, Saito, visited China in February 2008 and held dialogue with Chief of General Staff of the People’s Liberation Army Chen Bingde. Vice-Defense Minister Kohei Masuda visited China in March 2008 and held a discussion with Deputy Chief of General Staff Ma Xiaotian and made proposals regarding the intention of the increase of China’s military spending. He also paid a courtesy call to Minister of National Defense Liang Guanglie. They shared the view that visits by high-level officials should also be continued in the future. In September 2008, Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Air Force Commander General Xu Qiliang visited Japan and exchanged frank views with the then ASDF Chief of Staff, Toshio Tamogami. They agreed to endeavor to further strengthen defense exchanges. In October 2008, Chinese PLA Navy Commander Admiral Wu Shengli visited Japan and held talks with MSDF Chief of Staff Keiji Akahoshi and concurred on the importance of defense exchanges between Japan MSDF and the Chinese Navy. In February 2009, Deputy Chief of General Staff of the PLA General Ge Zhengfeng visited Japan and exchanged frank views with the then GSDF Chief of Staff, Ryoichi Oriki, and agreed to actively promote defense exchanges. Minister of Defense Hamada and Wu, Chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress **(2) Regular Consultations between Defense** **Officials** In March 2009, Japan and China held bilateral security dialogue between diplomats and defense officials. The two countries have also promoted research and educational exchanges, mainly by accepting Chinese defense officials in regular courses at the National Institute for Defense Studies in Tokyo, and by sending Japanese students to the PLA National Defense University, in addition to continued mutual visits by defense officials from the National Institute for Defense Studies, the JSDF Joint Staff College, and China’s PLA National Defense University. **(3) Exchanges between Units** In a meeting held in August 2007 between the then Minister of Defense, Masahiko Koumura, and the then Minister of National Defense, Cao Gangchuan, the two ministers shared the view on conducting reciprocal port calls by naval vessels in commemoration of the 35th anniversary of the normalization of Japan-China diplomatic relations. Thus, the Chinese destroyer Shenzhen of South China Sea Fleet ported in Tokyo for the first time from November to December 2007. Following this visit, and based on an agreement between Japanese and Chinese leaders, the MSDF destroyer Sazanami visited Zhanjiang in China’s Guandong Province as an MSDF vessel for the first time in June 2008. Japan sent blankets and emergency food and sanitary supplies as a token of sympathy ----- for those affected by the Great Sichuan Earthquake. Furthermore, exchanges are also being promoted, including GSDF personnel being dispatched for the first time as observers in September 2007 to Chinese military exercise “Warrior 2007” upon invitation from China and visit to Japan by the delegation of leaders of the Chinese PLA Air Force. Pursuant to the agreement between Japanese and Chinese leaders, a group of young company-grade PLA officers made their first visit to Japan in September 2008. In March 2009, a group of junior company-grade SDF officers visited China. On both occasions, the officers paid courtesy calls and participated in unit and cultural training. **4. Japan-Australia Defense Exchanges** Australia is an important partner for Japan in the Asia-Pacific region: Japan and Australia are allies of the United States and have many interests in common in the area of defense. From this perspective, it is important for peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region to promote defense exchanges with Australia to establish a foundation for a cooperative relationship, and to promote collaboration and cooperation more effectively. Moreover, cooperation between Japan and Australia in the trilateral framework with the United States and in the multilateral frameworks is important. In recent years, in particular, defense exchanges between Japan and Australia have deepened and expanded and bilateral cooperation29 in the field of security has been advancing steadily, including cooperation in Iraq and humanitarian support in case of disaster. Based on these circumstances, the then Japanese Prime Minister, Shinzo Abe, and the then Australian Prime Minister, John Howard, released the Japan-Australia Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation30 in March 2007 in Japan in order for the two countries to further strengthen bilateral security cooperation under a comprehensive framework. Based on this joint declaration, the then Japanese Minister of Defense, Fumio Kyuma, and the then Australian Minister for Defence, Brendan Nelson, held a meeting in June 2007. Following the meeting, Japan and Australia held Joint Defence and Foreign Ministerial Consultations (“two-plus-two”) for the first time. In September 2007, at the Japan-Australia Summit meeting, which took place between the then Prime Minister, Abe, and the then Prime Minister, Howard, in Australia, an action plan to implement the Australia-Japan Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation was drawn up that, with regard to the areas of security and defense, included such matters as a direction for updating the Memorandum on Japan-Australia Defence Exchange. Minister of Defense Yasukazu Hamada held a defense ministerial meeting with the then Australian Minister for Defence, Joel Fitzgibbon, in Japan in December 2008. The ministers signed the updated Memorandum on Japan-Australia Defence Exchange, (Memorandum on Defence Cooperation)31. The three pillars of the updated Memorandum are: (1) promoting cooperation in international peace cooperation activities, (2) strengthening usual cooperation and coordination, such as through strategic policy discussions and expanded and enhanced exercises, (3) strengthening Japan-U.S.-Australia trilateral and multilateral cooperation. At the subsequent 2nd Japan-Australia two-plus-two meeting, the ministers agreed to further promote bilateral security cooperation. The joint statement32 issued after the meeting noted that it welcomed the updating of the Memorandum on Japan Australia Defence Exchange. It was also confirmed that Australia would host the next Japan-Australia two-plustwo meeting in 2009. In light of these developments, Japan and Australia are currently holding discussion in order to promote security cooperation. **(1) High Level Exchanges Including Ministerial Meetings** In June 2008, the then Minister of Defense, Shigeru Ishiba, exchanged views on future Japan-Australia ----- cooperation with Prime Minister Kevin Rudd in Japan. In December 2008, Minister Hamada held a meeting with the then Australian Minister for Defence, Joel Fitzgibbon, and both signed the Memorandum on JapanAustralia Defence Cooperation. Furthermore, in May 2009, at the 8th IISS Asia Security Summit, Minister Hamada had a meeting with Minister Fitzgibbon. Both ministers agreed to deal with the issue of the nuclear test conducted by North Korea together to accelerate studies on logistics cooperation, to expand and enhance joint exercises and to strengthen Japan-U.S.-Australia MSDF Chief of Staff Akahoshi and Shalders, then Chief of the Royal trilateral cooperation, and exchanged views on the Australian Navy Defence White Paper of Australia. In April 2008, the then Chief of the Royal Australian Navy, Russ Shalders, visited Japan and exchanged views with MSDF Chief of Staff Akahoshi, and the then ASDF Chief of Staff, Toshio Tamogami, exchanged views with the then Chief of the Royal Australian Air Force, Geoff Shepherd, on his visit to Australia in May 2008. **(2) Regular Consultations between Defense Officials** Japan and Australia have held military-to-military consultations at the Director-General or Councilor level as well as security dialogue including diplomatic officials almost every year since 1996. The Joint Staff, the GSDF, the MSDF, and the ASDF have also held consultations with their respective counterparts in the Australian Defense Force on a regular basis. Both countries also exchange students of their defense-related educational institutions and hold research exchanges. In recent years, in response to developments in bilateral cooperation, each consultation has been held on a more frequent basis. The last military-to-military consultation was held in September 2008. **(3) Exchanges between Units** GSDF units dispatched to international peace cooperation activities in areas such as Timor Leste and Iraq conducted exchanges with units of the Australian Army there. Also, the MSDF and the Royal Australian Navy and Air Force conduct mutual goodwill visits by ships and aircraft. In July and August 2008, MSDF units participated for the first time in a Multilateral Joint Naval Exercise (KAKADU 08) in Australia and sent one escort ship. The MSDF also sent a patrol aircraft (P-3C) in September 2008. In October 2007, the ASDF dispatched a multi-purpose assistance aircraft (U-4) to Australia for the first time. ----- **[COLUMN]** **VOICE** **Voice of SDF Personnel Serving as Defense Attaché** Captain Kazushige Nagai 11th Defense Attaché to Australia This year, the movie titled “Australia” was released and−just like a scene from the movie−the country is rich in nature with oceans and mountains. On the other hand, people have to be constantly conscious of mountain bush fires in the dry season. This is a reality in Australia. I work at the Japanese Embassy in Canberra, the capital city. It is also surrounded with desert and one can see wild kangaroos up close. As Japan and Australia were enemies during the Second World War, it was necessary for us to start rebuilding our relationship after the end of the war. Today, as well as being allies of the United States, we have become important “mutually-friendly countries” in the Asia-Pacific region that share democratic values. Apart from the United States, Australia is now the only country with which we regularly hold Joint Defence and Foreign Ministerial Consultations, known as “2+2.” Captain Nagai (right) and his wife with Italian My work as the Defense Attaché to Australia, representing Defense Attaché and his wife at an SDF the Ministry of Defense and the SDF includes a wide variety anniversary reception of responsibilities. Recognizing that defense exchange is of great importance in further fostering a friendly relationship between two countries, I work proactively for coordination on mutual visits by Ministers of Defense, Chiefs of Staff and units, bilateral exercises, and training for the SDF personnel. I also exchange views on the security environment of both countries with a large number of Australian counterparts. In addition, I also take part in activities such as ceremonies of independence days and military memorial days of those countries with the approximately 45 military attachés in Australia Captain Nagai (right) and his wife with Italian Defense Attaché and who represent the military forces of approximately his wife at an SDF anniversary reception 25 different countries. Through such events and regular meetings to exchange views and opinions, I am making efforts to deepen mutual understanding with them. Due to differences, such as culture and background, there are large differences in opinions and knowledge among us, but we all share a common recognition of the importance of establishing a more stable international security environment, and we have built relationships that overcome language barriers. As the relationship between Japan and Australia deepens, I believe that it will lead to more defense exchanges. I also believe that it will become a foundation for peace and security in the Asia-Pacific region. Through my own efforts, with the support of my family, I hope that I will be able to do something to make the foundation a little more solid. ----- **(4) Cooperation among Japan, the United States and Australia** In June 2007, upon attending the 6th IISS Asia Security Summit, the then Minister of Defense, Fumio Kyuma, held the first Japan-U.S.-Australia Defense Ministerial Meeting with U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates and the then Australian Minister for Defence, Brendan Nelson. In April 2008, following the meeting held in April 2007, a Director-General-level meeting was held between Japan, the United States and Australia, discussing matters including trilateral defense cooperation. Furthermore, in May 2007 and February 2008, defense officials from Japan, the United States and Australia held the Pacific Global Air Mobility Seminar. At the seminar, views were exchanged on future trilateral air lift cooperation. At the seminar in February 2008, the loading exercise of a GSDF CH-47J onto a U.S. Air Force’s C-17 was conducted. Moreover, in October 2007, trilateral exercise using patrol aircraft (P-3C) was conducted for the first time among the MSDF, U.S. Navy, and Royal Australian Air Force. **5. Japan-India Defense Exchanges** India has traditionally maintained friendly relations with Japan, and share the same recognition on democracy, and free-market-oriented economy. Moreover, India has a vast territory with a population of more than one billion, and possesses great influence on the security in the South Asian region. This region is important for the safety of sea lanes that connect Japan to the Middle East as well as for activities that Japan conducts in the Indian Ocean and in other areas. Against this background, it is very meaningful both for Japan and India to hold consultations to exchange views over matters including defense policy and regional situations, to deepen mutual understanding, and to promote relations of mutual trust and cooperation. In December 2006, the Indian Prime Minister, Manmohan Singh, visited Japan and signed a joint statement between Japan and India, after meeting with the then Japanese Prime Minister, Shinzo Abe. In the joint statement, the two countries shared the view on upgrading Japan-India relations to “Strategic and Global Partnership”33 and specified measures to be taken in political and security sectors toward building such a partnership. In addition, in August 2007, the then Prime Minister, Abe, visited India where he and the Indian Prime Minister, Manmohan Singh, signed the Joint Statement on the Roadmap for New Dimensions to the Strategic and Global Partnership between Japan and India. They agreed to study the future course of cooperation in the security field between the two countries and also enhance defense exchanges. In October 2008, the Indian Prime Minister, Singh, visited Japan and talked with Prime Minister Aso. They signed the Joint Statement Towards Japan-India Strategic and Global Partnership34, which includes the creation of a comprehensive framework for the enhancement of security cooperation between the two countries, the development of an action plan with specific measures, and the Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation between Japan and India (Joint Declaration)35. The Joint Declaration specifies that cooperation will be conducted between the two Defense Authorities by way of, for example, meetings between the Defense Ministers, meetings between the Vice-Minister of Defense of Japan and the Defense Secretary of India including Defense Policy Dialogue, Military-to-Military Talks at Director General/ Joint Secretary Level, and Service-to-Service exchanges including bilateral and multilateral exercises. **(1) High Level Exchanges Including Ministerial Meetings** In August 2007, the then Minister of Defense, Yuriko Koike, and the then Senior Vice-Minister of Defense, Takahide Kimura, visited India and held dialogue with Indian Minister of Defense A.K. Antony and Minister of State for Defense Pallam Raju. During the defense ministerial meeting, views were exchanged on such matters as countering terrorism, regional situations, and Japan-India relations. Views were shared to develop defense exchanges further. In April 2007, the then Indian Defense Secretary, Shekhar Dutt, visited Japan and held Japan-India Defense Policy Dialogue with the then Japanese Vice-Minister of Defense, Takemasa Moriya, which was expanded from ----- the Vice Defense Minister-level meeting. They exchanged views on how to deepen defense exchanges between the two countries and the regional situations in the future. Moreover, in January 2007, the then Indian Air Force Chief of Staff, S. P. Tyagi, visited Japan and exchanged views with the then ASDF Chief of Staff, Yoshida. In April 2007, the then Indian Army Chief of Staff, J. J. Singh, visited Japan and exchanged views with the GSDF Chief of Staff, Ryoichi Oriki. In August 2008, the Indian Naval Chief of Staff, A. S. Mehta, visited Japan and exchanged views with MSDF Chief of Staff Akahoshi. **(2) Regular Consultations between Defense Officials** The 5th session of talks between defense officials was held in February 2009 to exchange views on defense policies of Japan and India and on Japan-India defense exchanges. In November 2008, the first staff talks were conducted between the SDF and the Indian Navy to exchange views on mutual cooperation. Furthermore, Japan and India actively promote research exchanges, including sending and accepting students such as through a program launched in FY 2008, which involves sending students to the Indian National Defense University, as well as mutually dispatching defense researchers. **(3) Exchanges between Units** The MSDF and the Indian Navy have frequently made reciprocal visits in the past. Unit exchanges are active as, during these reciprocal visits, MSDF Training Squadron and Indian Navy units conduct activities such as goodwill exercises. In April 2007, three Indian Naval vessels paid a port call in Japan, marking the 15th visit to Japan by Indian Navy vessels. During the Indian vessels’ visit, Japan, the United States, and India conducted their first trilateral joint maritime exercise. Furthermore, in September 2007, the MSDF participated in a multilateral joint marine exercise (“Malabar 07-2”)36 in the waters near the Bay of Bengal for the first time, and in April 2009 participated in a multilateral joint marine exercise (“Malabar 09”)37 in the waters near _Suzunami goodwill exercises(right) alongside an Indian vessel during Japan-India_ Okinawa. **6. Japan-U.K. Defense Exchanges** Being a major power that influences the European region as well as the rest of the world, the United Kingdom has maintained close relations with Japan. On the security front, Japan has shared the same strategic interests with the United Kingdom, as both countries are important allies of the United States. Given this relationship, it is important for both Japan and the United Kingdom to promote defense exchanges, build a basis of cooperation, and promote more effective cooperation and coordination by exchanging information relating to the regional situation as well as to global issues such as countermeasures against terrorism and piracy. In January 2004, the former Japanese Minister of Defense, Shigeru Ishiba, and the then U.K. Secretary of State for Defence, Geoffrey Hoon, signed a memorandum on bilateral defense cooperation in order to develop bilateral defense exchanges in various sectors, thereby confirming the two countries’ resolve to promote defense exchanges at all levels and in various fields. **(1) High Level Exchanges Including Ministerial Meetings** In January 2006, the then Japanese Minister of State for Defense, Fukushiro Nukaga, visited the United Kingdom ----- **[COLUMN]** **VOICE** **Voice of SDF Student Overseas** Captain Tateki Tawara Student at the Indian National Defence College Exchange Following the December 2007 “Joint Statement on the Advancement of the Strategic and Global Partnership”, recently, events such as the signing of the “Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation” in October of last year have been actively carried out for Japan-India defense exchanges. In this context, I have been dispatched to the NDC as a foreign student. The NDC is located in the capital city of India, New Delhi, and provides education, over a 47 week period from January to early December, on a wide range of subjects including Security, National Strategy, Military Affairs, Science and Technology, Captain Tawara (3rd from right) inside an Indian Air Force airplane during practical training in India Economics, International Relations and Domestic Matters. The students at the NDC consist of highranking officers from the army, navy and air forces, as well as individuals in equivalent roles. For this year, the college accepted 100 foreign students, consisting of 40 army, 6 navy, 12 air force officers and 19 from high-ranking government officials, as well as 23 foreign students from 22 different countries including England, America and Australia. Studying with students from around the world is a great chance for me to gain deeper understanding of not only India but also many other countries. In addition to the lectures by experts Captain Tawara (far right) with exchange students from the Egyptian in each field and group studies, the curriculum Air Force and the Qatar Navy offers study tours to various locations around the country in order to deepen our understanding on India’s domestic situation. Such tours have allowed me to experience things one would not be able to see by studying at a desk or on a private tour: a natural environment that differs completely from my country, the huge magnitude of the land, and a wide variety of ethnic groups and religions. At present there are approximately 3,000 Japanese residents in India. In comparison with the approximately 130,000 Japanese residents in China, 40,000 in Thailand and 30,000 in Singapore, the number is very limited. I believe that this means that there is still a lot of room for developing cooperative relationships between Japan and India in various fields. In the field of Security, India is very important for our country in consideration of present SDF activities including replenishment support activities in the Indian Ocean and anti-piracy measures, as well as in ensuring the safety of the sea lanes. Through utilizing the experience and relationships I have gained, I hope that I will be able to continue to contribute to defense cooperation between Japan and India. ----- and met with the then U.K. Secretary of State for Defence, John Reid. During their meeting, Minister Nukaga and Secretary Reid confirmed that high-level and working-level defense exchanges advanced between Japan and the United Kingdom. They also exchanged views on the progress on development of Iraqi Security Forces and the process of transferring security authorities to Iraq. At the 45th Munich Security Conference, Minister of Defense Hamada met with U.K. Secretary of State for Defence John Hutton and agreed to cooperate in anti-piracy measures. At the 8th IISS Security Dialogue Stirrup, Chief of the Defense Staff of the U.K. and Oriki, Chief of held in May 2009, Minister for International Defence Staff, Joint Staff and Security Baroness Ann Taylor met with Minister Hamada and they confirmed shared views on piracy issues and responses to North Korea. In March 2008, the year marking the 150th anniversary of the Anglo-Japanese Friendship and Trade Treaty, U.K. Chief of Air Staff Torpy visited Japan and exchanged views with the then ASDF Chief of Staff, Tamogami. In May 2009, MSDF Chief of Staff Akahoshi visited the United Kingdom and exchanged views on security matters including antipiracy measures with First Sea Lord Sir Jonathon Band. **(2) Regular Consultations between Defense Officials** Japan and the United Kingdom frequently hold dialogue between Director-General-level and Councilor-level officials. In June 2007, Japan and the United Kingdom held DG-level meetings of Foreign Affairs and Defense authorities as well as between defense authorities, and exchanged views on matters such as defense policy and Iraqi issues. Moreover, from June 2007 to January 2008, the chiefs of Japan’s Joint Staff, the GSDF, the MSDF, and the ASDF have also held consultations with their respective U.K. Ministry of Defense counterparts. Also, the 5th session of talks between defense officials and 10th Staff Talks (conference between the Joint Staff and the British Defence Ministry) were held in October 2008 to conduct a frank exchange of views on defense policies of the two countries, the regional situation and defense exchanges. In March 2009, the Ground Staff Office held Staff Talks and exchanged frank view about international peace cooperation activities and defense exchanges. Peace Support Operation (PSO) Seminars have been conducted since 2005 to provide a forum for exchanging and sharing knowledge based on each country’s experiences with regard to international peace cooperation activities. **(3) Exchanges between Units** After the deployment of U.K. Forces in Muthanna Province in Iraq, the GSDF 30 troops which had been deployed since January 2004 in the same area38, held active exchanges with the U.K. forces in Samawah, Iraq. **7. Defense Exchanges with Southeast Asian Countries** Southeast Asian countries are situated in areas deemed strategically important for maritime traffic that connects Japan with the Middle East and Europe, and they also have close economic relations with Japan. Therefore, promoting dialogue between Japan and these countries on various security issues and deepening relations of mutual trust and cooperation are of great importance for both sides. Following the 45th Munich Security Council in February 2009, Minister of Defense Yasukazu Hamada held a meeting with Singapore’s Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Defence Teo Chee Hean in May 2009 on the ----- occasion of the 8th IISS Asia Security Summit. Both sides agreed to start to draft a memorandum on defense exchanges and cooperation on maritime security. Minister Hamada also held a meeting with General Phung Quang Thanh, Minister of National Defense of Vietnam, and agreed to start drafting a memorandum on defense exchanges and to strengthen exchanges, such as mutual visits and education. In February 2009, Timor Leste’s Secretary of State for Defense, Julion Tomas Pinto, who was visiting Japan at the invitation of the Ministry of Defense, paid a courtesy call to Minister Hamada. In March 2009, Minister Hamada Parliamentary Secretary for Defense Kishi and Vietnamese Minister held a meeting with Prime Minister and Minister for of Defense Gen. Phung Quang Thanh Defense and Security Kay Rala Xanana Gusmão of Timor Leste in Japan. They exchanged views on receiving students from Timor Leste to study at the National Defense Academy of Japan from JFY 2010 and on the promotion of bilateral defense exchange through multilateral meetings, such as the Tokyo Defense Forum. In May 2009, Parliamentary Secretary for Defense Kishi visited the Philippines and Vietnam. He visited ARF Voluntary Demonstration of Response and exchanged views on the importance of developing defense exchanges ----- with Undersecretary for Defense Affairs Antonio Santos. He also exchanged opinions on the direction of JapanVietnam defense exchanges and other defense matters with General Phung Quang Thanh, Minister of National Defense, and Vice-Minister of National Defense of Vietnam Vinh. The recent major high-level exchanges between Japan and Southeast Asian countries are shown in Fig. III-3-2-2, indicating how defense relations between Japan and these countries have steadily progressed. In addition to exchanges between high-level officials, Japanese defense officials have held consultations at the working-level on a regular basis to promote mutual understanding and relationships of confidence through exchange of views in the security and defense field. Japan and Southeast Asian countries have also steadily conducted staff talks of each service, exchanges of researchers and students as well as unit-to-unit exchanges including port calls. Through these defense relations, Japan and Southeast Asian countries lay the foundation for building a multilateral defense network, which could play an important role for establishing peace and stability in the region. **8. Defense Exchanges with Other Countries** In addition to neighboring countries previously described, Japan has promoted defense exchanges with many other countries. The Ministry of Defense has held high-level exchanges, working-level consultations and student exchanges with many other countries around the world. Among them are Pakistan, which has played an important role in the global fight against terrorism; Canada, with which Japan had undertaken the U.N. peacekeeping operations in the Golan Heights; Mongolia, an Asia-Pacific country; countries related to the SDF’s mission in Iraq such as Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates (UAE); European countries such as Germany and France, and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). ----- Regarding unit-to-unit exchanges, mutual visits by vessels have been frequent along with mutual exchanges with countries where international peace cooperation activities are underway. The recent high-level exchanges are as shown in Fig. III-3-2-3. In August 2007, the then Minister of Defense, Koike, visited Pakistan for the first time as Defense Minister, and exchanged views on the fight against terrorism with the then President, Musharraf, and the then Defense Minister, Iqbal, and officials during their Saito, then Chief of Staff, Joint Staff, and Chief of General Staff of the meetings. Defense Minister of Luxembourg Schiltz Polish Armed Forces General Gagor visited Japan for the first time and met with former Minister of Defense Ishiba in October 2007. Like this, the Ministry of Defense intends to establish a close and cooperative relationship with many countries. Also, in March 2009, then Minister of Defense Ishiba met with New Zealand Defense Minister Goff during his visit to Japan and exchanged opinions on cooperation with regard to PSI. Minister of Defense Hamada visited Germany on the occasion of the 45th Munich Security Conference in February 2009, and exchanged opinions with Defense Minister Jung about anti-piracy measures and defense exchanges. In March 2009, German Chief of Staff Army General Budde visited Japan and exchanged opinions with General Oriki, then Ground SDF Chief of Staff. In July 2008, French Secretary General for National Defense Delon visited Japan to give a briefing on France’s White Paper on Defense and exchanged views with Vice Minister Masuda and others. In June 2008, Chief of Staff French Air Force General Abrial came to Japan. In May 2009, Chief of MSDF Admiral Akahoshi visited France and exchanged views with Chief of French Navy Admiral Forissier. Defense authority meetings for the two countries were held in April 2008 and mutual visits of navy vessels have also been conducted. In relation to NATO, policy dialogues and cooperation have progressed as Japan and NATO are partners in endeavors for the stability and prosperity of the international community. In January 2007, the then Prime Minister, Shinzo Abe, participated in the North Atlantic Council for the first time as the Japanese Prime Minister and delivered a speech. Mutual visits between the Minister of Defense and the Secretary General of NATO have been carried out in recent years to exchange opinions on the fight against terrorism and the regional situation. The two sides have agreed to deepen their cooperation as partners sharing common values and to enhance Japan-NATO relations in terms of both political and practical cooperation. At the working level, the Japan NATO High Level Consultations have been regularly held. Defense Minister Hamada met with Mongolian Defense Minister Bold in May 2009 on the occasion of the 8th IISS Asian Security Summit and exchanged views on the North Korean situation and defense exchanges between the two countries. Furthermore, in May 2008, the then Senior Vice-Minister of Defense, Eto, visited Poland for the first time as a high-level official of the Ministry of Defense and exchanged opinions with senior officials from the Polish Defense Ministry. In September 2008, the Norwegian Vice Minister of Defense visited Japan and exchanged views on defense policies, international peace cooperation activities and the regional situation. In this way, through defense exchanges, Japan is playing an important role for the peace and stability of Asia and the world. (See Fig. III-3-2-4) ----- ----- **3. Multilateral Security Dialogue** **1. Significance of Multilateral Security Dialogue** Multilateral security dialogue is extremely significant because participating countries can increase their mutual understanding and relations of mutual trust by exchanging views on security issues of mutual concern. Such security dialogue can also effectively contribute to bringing about regional peace and stability through cooperation and coordination among countries concerned on regional issues affecting several countries. (See Reference 52) **2. ASEAN Regional Forum** At the ASEAN foreign ministers’ meeting and ASEAN Post-Ministerial Conference in 1993, the foreign ministers from 17 countries and from the European Community (EC), now the European Union (EU), agreed to create the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) as a political and security forum in the Asia-Pacific region. Since its first ministerial meeting in 1994, the ARF has held its regular ministerial meeting annually. The number of ARF members has gradually increased annually to currently 26 countries and one organization39. At present, the ARF is not a security organization typically seen in Europe, such as NATO and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), but the ARF is of significance because it provides opportunities for both foreign and defense officials to attend various inter-governmental meetings. The Ministry of Defense believes that it is necessary for defense officials among ARF member countries to enhance mutual confidence along with the evolution of the ARF process so that the ARF can become a forum to generate a sense of community among Asia-Pacific countries, and thereby stabilize the region’s security environment. To this end, the Ministry has been continuing its efforts to deepen mutual understanding within the ARF through continuous participation in the ARF, by encouraging ARF members to increase the transparency of their defense policies while explaining Japan’s policies and efforts, and by promoting frank discussion among defense officials. In recent years, ARF member countries have been actively exchanging their views on common regional security issues including international disaster relief activities, maritime security, peacekeeping activities, counter-terrorism, and climate change. The Ministry of Defense has been actively participating in such discussions at the ARF. Furthermore, in the aforementioned fields, the ARF has begun to look for more practical cooperation. For example, in the area of international disaster relief, following the drafting of a “general guideline” that should be considered for international cooperation, the drafting of the document which describes more concrete cooperation procedures is underway. Furthermore, in May 2008, a desktop exercise took place in Indonesia. In May 2009, the ARF Voluntary Demonstration of Response, the first field exercises on disaster relief, was conducted in the Philippines, in which the GSDF, MSDF and ASDF conducted training in medical care, epidemic control, water supply and evacuation assistance for disaster affected people. Every year, ARF holds such meetings as the Senior Officials Meeting (SOM), the Inter-Sessional Support Group (ISG) on Confidence-Building Measures and Preventive Diplomacy (CBM/PD) and the ARF Security Policy Conference in addition to the Foreign Ministerial Meeting. Apart from the so-called plenary meeting, which is composed of foreign and defense ministry officials, defense officials have convened their own Defense Officials Dialogue prior to the plenary meeting since the 2002 Ministerial Meeting. The Ministry of Defense has steadily increased its involvement in the ARF, by actively participating in these meetings, and frankly exchanging views with defense officials from other ARF member countries. Moreover, Japan co-hosted the 1st Inter-Sessional Meeting on Maritime Security (ISMMS) with Indonesia and New Zealand. ----- **3. Multilateral Security Dialogue Sponsored or Participated in by the Japan Defense Ministry and the SDF** The Ministry of Defense believes that it is important for Japan to take the initiative in multilateral security dialogue in order to promote relations of mutual confidence and cooperation among defense officials of Japan and other countries through exchanges of information and opinions. The Ministry of Defense also believes that by doing so, Japan can contribute to the stability of the Asia-Pacific region. Based on this recognition, the Ministry of Defense and the SDF have taken the initiative for multilateral security dialogue by sponsoring various international seminars while it has also actively participated in such forums sponsored by other countries and other organizations. (See Reference 53-54) The first meeting of senior defense officials on common security challenges in the Asia- Pacific Region was held in Tokyo in March 2009, hosted by the Ministry of Defense. The purpose of this meeting was to build close personal relationships between defense officials from Japan and ASEAN member countries through frank discussions on regional security challenges. Other than Japan, participating countries comprised Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam. The meeting was chaired by Vice-Minister of Defense Masuda and participants frankly and constructively discussed common regional security challenges such as humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, maritime security, peace keeping and peace building. After the meeting, Vice-Minister of Defense Masuda had individual meetings with the Secretary of State for National Defense of Cambodia, the Secretary General of Defense of Indonesia and the Permanent Secretary for National Defense of Laos. Furthermore, the first Tokyo Seminar on Common Security Challenges was held on the following day with the participation of experts and defense officials from Japan and Southeast Asian countries to discuss (1) shared regional security concerns, (2) measures to explore regional cooperation for common challenges, and (3) roles and responses of defense official in regional cooperation. The Forum for Defense Authorities in the Asia-Pacific Region (Tokyo Defense Forum) has been sponsored by the Ministry of Defense every year since 1996. The Forum is designed to contribute to the stability of the Asia-Pacific region by deepening mutual understanding among participating countries on each other’s defense policy and increasing the transparency of their defense policies. In the forum, defense officials of participating countries have exchanged views on defense policies of each country, and confidence-building measures in the field of defense. At the 13th forum in October 2008, opinions were exchanged on “Efforts for International Cooperation in Disaster Relief” and “National Defense Policies” with the participation of 25 countries, the EU, OCHA, ASEAN Secretariat, and the ICRC. In February 2008, the 7th Sub-committee meeting was held with the participation of 25 countries, the EU, OCHA, ASEAN Secretariat, and the ICRC which debated “Regional Cooperation and its Impact on Surrounding States,” while deliberating on the content of the “Best Practice Reference Paper for Peace-Building”40 including Senior Vice-Minister of Defense Kitamura making a speech at the capacity building and elements to be noted for promoting 13th Tokyo Defense Forum international cooperation with respect to peacebuilding. The IISS Asia Security Conference, an international conference held annually in Singapore under the sponsorship of a private institute, is the only conference where a large number of defense ministers in the AsiaPacific region participate. Minister of Defense Hamada participated at the 8th conference in May 2009, and delivered a speech on important security issues of the same region, under the theme, “The Major Powers and ----- Asian Security: Cooperation or Conflict?” During the conference, Minister of Defense Hamada met individually with the Defense Ministers of Vietnam, Australia, U.S., Mongolia and Singapore, while holding the first Japan-U.S.ROK Defense Ministerial Meeting paid a courtesy call on Singaporean Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong and Singapore’s Minister Mentor Lee Kuan Yew. The Munich Security Conference (founded in 1962) is one of the most prestigious international conferences on security in the western world. Defense Minister Hamada attended the 45th Conference in February 2009, becoming the first Japanese defense minister to do so. The minister made remarks and participated in panel discussion on “Managing Instability: Global Challenges and the Crisis of Global Governance.” Taking this Conference as an opportunity, Minister Hamada had talks with his counterpart ministers from Singapore, the United Kingdom and Germany. He also met with Professor Joseph Nye, a scholar in international politics. In addition, the Pacific Area Senior Officer Logistics Seminar (PASOLS) was organized for the first time in Japan in September 2007 and co-hosted with the U.S. Army Pacific Headquarters, with 91 participants from 28 countries and 2 organizations. In August 2009, the Pacific Armies Chiefs Conference (PACC) and Pacific Armies Management Seminar (PAMS) are scheduled to be held in Japan jointly with the U.S. Army and the U.S. Pacific Army. **4. Multilateral Exercises** **1. Significance of Multilateral Exercises in the Asia-Pacific Region** The Defense Ministry and the SDF consider participating in and hosting multilateral exercises will contribute not only to improving their maneuvering skills but also to helping establish the foundation for building cooperative relationship among participating countries through the coordination process and exchange of views. Since 2000, multilateral exercises involving various elements such as humanitarian assistance, disaster relief and non-combatant evacuation operations, have been conducted in the Asia-Pacific region, in addition to conventional combat exercises. Specific exercises thus far conducted on a multilateral basis include refugee rescue training held as part of the Rim of the Pacific Exercise ; the Cobra Gold Exercise conducted by the United States, Thailand and other countries focusing on U.N. PKO activities and disaster relief operations; the exercise for submarine rescue drills in the West Pacific, which was hosted by Singapore in 2000, Japan in 2002, the Republic of Korea (ROK) in 2004 and Australia in 2007; and the Maritime Multilateral Exercise Malabar 07-2 hosted by the United States and India. The Ministry of Defense and the SDF will continue to participate in these multilateral exercises proactively and on their own initiative. **2. Efforts on Multilateral Exercises in the Asia-Pacific Region** **(1) Hosting Multilateral Exercises** The MSDF hosted “Pacific Reach 2002” in April 2002, a multilateral exercise for submarine rescue drills in the West Pacific41. This was the first time Japan hosted a multilateral exercise. In October 2002, the MSDF hosted the Multilateral Search and Rescue Exercise42. The SDF has sent its officers to the annual Cobra Gold exercise since 2005. In February 2009 at Cobra Gold 2009, they participated for the first time in a PKO field training exercise, in addition to U.N. PKO MSDF US-2 landing on the water in Manila harbor during an ARF field disaster rescue exercise ----- command post exercise and training for medical divisions of humanitarian and civic assistance activities noncombatant evacuation operations and transportation of Japanese nationals overseas. Furthermore, in March 2009, the SDF participated in Exercise AMAN 2009, a multilateral naval exercise hosted by Pakistan for the first time, and in May 2009, took part in the first field exercise on disaster relief held in the Philippines for the first time under the AFR framework43. Multilateral exercises in which the SDF has recently participated are as shown in Fig. III-3-2-5. **(2) Inviting Observers to Multilateral Exercises** The SDF invited observers from eight countries in the Asia-Pacific region to Japan in September 2001 to the 4th Japan-Russia Search and Rescue Exercise. Since then, the SDF has been making efforts to invite observers from foreign countries to multilateral exercises being sponsored by the SDF. The GSDF has invited working-level officers from countries mainly in the Asia-Pacific region to Japan to participate in the Multinational Cooperation Program in the Asia-Pacific (MCAP), which it has hosted annually since 2002 as part of its multilateral cooperation. (See Fig. III-3-2-6) ----- ----- **Section 3. Efforts for Arms Control, Disarmament and Non-Proliferation** In recent years, the international community has firmly recognized the new threat of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), the missiles which serve as their means of delivery, and related equipment and materials in the hands of terrorists and countries of concern. For this reason, efforts toward non-proliferation, which regulate and strictly control their export, have become pressing tasks for the peace and stability of today’s international community. From a humanitarian point of view, international public opinion demanding regulation of certain conventional weapons has also been rising. Responding to the issue of regulating certain conventional weapons, while continuing to consider the balance between such humanitarian demands and defense necessity, has become an important challenge for all countries. As an effort to address these challenges, a regime dealing with arms control, disarmament and nonproliferation is being developed with the cooperation of all nations worldwide. (See Fig. III-3-3-1) Based on the above, Japan plays an active role in efforts to create a world free of nuclear weapons by taking realistic and step-by-step measures for disarmament and non-proliferation, as well as in international efforts related to the disarmament and non-proliferation of other weapons of mass destruction and the missiles which serve as their means of delivery, and furthermore in those related to the issue of regulating certain conventional weapons. This section will explain the measures of the Ministry of Defense and the SDF toward efforts concerning arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation carried out by international organizations including the United Nations. ----- **1. Efforts on Treaties related to Arms Control, Disarmament and Non-Proliferation of** **Weapons of Mass Destruction** **1. Nuclear Weapons** **(1) Related Treaties** Treaties and export control regimes for the purpose of arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, are shown in Reference 55. **(2) Japan’s Efforts** From the perspective of reinforcing the disarmament and non-proliferation regime, Japan has been proactively participating in discussions for better implementation of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) as well as discussions in the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), in addition to continuing its work aimed at the early enforcement of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), and efforts for the strengthening of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards. **2. Chemical Weapons/Biological Weapons** **(1) Relevant Treaties** Treaties and export control regimes for the purpose of arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation of chemical and biological weapons, are shown in Reference 56. **(2) Japan’s Efforts** **a. Since 1980, the Ministry of Defense and the SDF have dispatched chemical protection specialists from the** GSDF to the negotiations of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) when required. As members of the Japanese delegation they assisted to draft the convention. Since 1997, when the convention came into effect, GSDF experts on protection from chemical weapons have been dispatched to The Hague, the Netherlands, to implement verification measures stipulated in the convention. There is currently one GSDF officer and one retired GSDF officer serving in this capacity. (See Reference 57) At the GSDF Chemical School (Saitama City), small quantities of chemical substances, which are the target of regulation in the convention, are synthesized for the purpose of protection research. Therefore, in accordance with the stipulations of the convention, inspections have been implemented a total of six times since the initial establishment of the organization. In addition, the government as a whole is working on projects to dispose of abandoned chemical weapons in China, according to the CWC. Based on results of investigations so far, it is estimated that even now up to approximately 300,000 to 400,000 chemical weapons of the former (Imperial) Japanese Army remain buried in Haerbaling District, Dunhua City, Jilin Province, China. The Ministry of Defense and the SDF have sent five personnel including GSDF officers on loan to the Cabinet Office, which is responsible for the disposal of abandoned chemical weapons in accordance with the CWC. Since 2000, GSDF chemical and ammunition specialists have been dispatched to the location for excavation and recovery projects a total of eight times. From August through September last year, seven SDF personnel participated in excavation and recovery projects in Lianhuapao, Dunhua City, Jilin Province, China, conducted by the Cabinet Office, and carried out the identification of shells and emergency disarmament. **b. With regard to the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), cooperation is being given to efforts to strengthen** ----- it by sending SDF officers who are pharmaceutical and medical specialists, to relevant meetings. **c. Personnel have been dispatched to the Australia Group (AG) Meeting every year since 1994, and they are** collaborating to help make the group’s regulations and agreements effective. **3. Delivery Means (Missiles)** **(1) Relevant Agreements** International political agreements and export control regimes for the purpose of arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation of means of delivery (missiles) are shown in Reference 58. **(2) Japan’s Efforts** The Ministry of Defense has been dispatching personnel to the assembly of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) every year since 1992, and they are collaborating to help make the MTCR’s regulations and agreements effective. **2. Efforts on Arms Control-Related Treaties on Certain Conventional Weapons** **1. Related Treaties** Treaties and export control regimes for the purpose of arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation of certain conventional weapons recognized as being inhumane, are shown in Reference 59. **2. Japan’s Efforts** **(1) The Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons** **Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects** In recent years, negotiations and reviews have been conducted to reduce the humanitarian risks that may be brought about by Explosive Remnants of War (ERW) such as unexploded ordnance. In the 2003 Conference of the State Parties to the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects (CCW), the protocol related to ERW (called Protocol V) was adopted and came into effect in November 2006. However, discussion regarding ERW continued, due to the necessity of responding to the problems brought about in particular by unexploded cluster munitions (munitions that have multiple sub-munitions in themselves). At the Conference of the State Parties in November 2007, it was decided to carry out negotiations at meetings of the group of governmental experts of the following year, for the purpose of responding promptly to the humanitarian concern of cluster munitions. Following this decision, several meetings were held. Since a final consensus was not able to be reached, it was decided that negotiations would be continued in 2009 at the Conference of the State Parties in November 2008. From the perspective of gaining the participation of major producers and possessors, as well as enhancing practicality by contributing to the convention on cluster munitions, Japan engages in active discussions with relevant countries by dispatching a delegation, including personnel from the Ministry of Defense, to the conferences of the State Parties and group of governmental experts, where discussion and negotiations are taking place for the purpose of the addition of protocol. ----- **(2) Convention on Cluster Munitions** Regarding the cluster munitions issue, momentum was gained for the prohibition of cluster munitions outside the CCW framework, and the international conference was held in Oslo in February 2007 where the Oslo Declaration was adopted, claiming to conclude an international agreement by the end of 2008 to ban cluster munitions which cause unacceptable harm to civilians. As a result of negotiations (Oslo Process)44 in the series of international conferences that followed, the Convention on Cluster Munitions was adopted by 107 countries, including Japan, at the Dublin Conference in May 2008. The Convention was signed by 94 states (including Japan) in Oslo in December 2008; however, major producers and holders of cluster munitions (U.S., China, Russia, etc.) did not take part in the process. The use of all cluster munitions possessed by the SDF will immediately be banned once the Convention enters into force in Japan. Thus, from the viewpoint of fulfilling the mission of defending Japan, the Ministry of Defense and the SDF are promoting the introduction of precision-guided equipment that immediately supplements part of the functions of cluster munitions. **(3) The Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-** **Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction** The Ministry of Defense and the SDF began disposing of anti-personnel mines in January 2000. In February 2003, the destruction of all anti-personnel mines was completed excluding the minimum necessary amount retained as an exception, recognized in the convention for the purpose of developing technology and training in landmine detection and clearance. Meanwhile, in order to maintain the security of Japan, as an alternative that poses no danger of causing harm to civilians and does not correspond to the anti-personnel mines banned in the convention, the acquisition of an anti-personnel obstacle system, which includes directional fragmentation charges45, is proceeding. As of the end of March 2009, 156 nations have concluded this convention, but only 13 out of 26 ARF participating nations did so. For this reason, until now the Ministry of Defense has encouraged ARF participating nations who have not yet concluded this convention to do so. What is more, the Ministry of Defense has been submitting annual reports to the United Nations on data such as exceptional possession, while also actively cooperating in the international efforts on the issue of anti-personnel mines, by dispatching its staff from time to time to relevant international conferences46 where necessary. **(4) U.N. Register of Conventional Arms** Every year, the Ministry of Defense registers data on the amount of imported defense equipment with the United Nations, while also voluntarily providing information related to its holdings, domestic procurement of such equipment and its domestic procurement of small arms and light weapons. It also dispatches its staff to expert meetings and so on where necessary, which are carried out to improve and strengthen this system. **3. International Efforts for Non-Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and Others** **1. Proliferation Security Initiative** **(1) Background Behind Adoption of the PSI** The United States was deeply concerned that countries of proliferation concern such as North Korea and Iran are engaged in the development of weapons of mass destruction and missiles. In December 2002 it announced the National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction, and advocated the comprehensive three-pillared ----- approach of “non-proliferation,” “counter-proliferation,” and “responding to the effects of WMD use.” As a part of this, (then) President Bush announced the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI)47 in May 2003, and as a result of his request for the participation of nations in the effort, as of May this year, it has developed into an international approach with the support of over 90 countries, including Japan. **(2) Past Achievements of PSI and Japan’s Efforts** In order to increase WMD proliferation interdiction capabilities, as of May of this year, a total of 33 PSI interdiction training exercises have been carried out by nations supporting the Statement of Interdiction Principles48, which declared the objectives of PSI up until now and principles for the purpose of interdiction. In addition to this training, meetings have been held by the PSI participating nations, and discussions are being held to tackle the policy and legislative challenges faced. As a result of such activities, there have been some success stories in actual operations, such as the BBC China Incident49 which validated the effectiveness of PSI. The objective of PSI is to contribute to the improvement of the national security environment, and, as such, Japan has been making a range of efforts in support of the Statement of Interdiction Principles since PSI was first advocated in May 2003. **(3) Efforts by the Defense Ministry and SDF** It has been thought necessary for the Ministry of Defense and the SDF to continue to make use of the SDF’s capabilities in Japanese efforts, to cooperate with relevant organizations and countries and to contribute to PSI. After the third Paris Plenary Meeting, in addition to dispatching Ministry of Defense personnel including SDF personnel to a variety of meetings, Japan dispatched observers to PSI interdiction exercises conducted overseas, and gathered related information. In October 2007, along with relevant organizations such as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the National Police Agency, the Ministry of Finance and the Japan Coast Guard, Japan hosted the second PSI Maritime Interdiction Exercise (Pacific Shield 07)50, following the previous exercise in 2004. In September 2008, MSDF P-3C aircraft took part in a PSI Maritime Interdiction Exercise in New Zealand. Through these efforts, for example in the case of PSI maritime interdiction activities, the relevant information obtained through information gathering activities (such as surveillance by ships of the MSDF and by aircraft of the MSDF and ASDF) is provided to relevant organizations and countries. Furthermore, it is thought that the MSDF will be able to carry out effective boarding and on-the-spot inspections of suspicious ships, with the cooperation of the Japan Coast Guard in the event that maritime security operations are ordered. When cargo inspection is carried out in harbors and so on, it is believed that the decontamination capabilities of the GSDF will be able to effectively assist in PSI activities, if by some chance harmful substances such as chemical agents are spilt. ----- For the purpose of strengthening comprehensive non-proliferation systems including PSI, Japan has been approaching national defense authorities of other Asian countries (outreach activities), and has been taking advantage of opportunities such as defense exchanges to work on promoting understanding toward PSI. (See Fig. III-3-3-2) **(4) Future Efforts** In light of cases, including the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction in areas surrounding Japan, Japan A JMSDF P-3C (left) and a New Zealand Air Force P-3K in flight should tackle the issue to prevent the proliferation of during a PSI Maritime Interdiction Exercise in New Zealand such weapons even during peace time by regarding PSI as a broadly defined security issue including defense, diplomacy, law execution and export control. Also, from the perspective of improving the SDF’s response capability, Japan will consider participating in, and hosting, exercises. **2. Security Council Resolution 1540 Concerning the Non-Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction** In April 2004, the United Nations Security Council unanimously voted for the adoption of Security Council Resolution 1540 on the Non-Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, which aims to take appropriate and effective action because the proliferation of NBC weapons and their means of delivery pose a threat to the peace and security of the international community. Under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, its details include: 1) to refrain from providing support of any kind to non-state actors attempting to develop weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery, 2) to adopt and execute appropriate and effective legislation to prohibit the manufacture etc., of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery by terrorists in particular, and 3) to establish border controls and export control measures for the purpose of preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery. Based on the danger imposed by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction on the peace and stability of the international community, which includes Japan, the prevention of proliferation of these weapons of mass destruction to non-state actors such as terrorists, is an urgent task for the international community. Based on the recognition of this fact, Japan supports the adoption of this resolution, and hopes that all United Nations members will observe the resolution. ----- **[COLUMN]** **VOICE** **Voice of Recruit (General Officer Candidate, ASDF)** 2nd Lieutenant Shiho Sugimoto 1st Air Wing Maintenance, Supply Group Before joining the ASDF I was just a University student who spent most of my time with the school’s dance group and working part-time jobs. In my fourth year of university, when I was job seeking, I had interviews with a range of companies including travel agents and manufacturers and I was even promised employment, but I couldn’t picture myself working at that the company. I learnt of the recruitment system of SDF general candidates when my friend told me I should take the exam for it. I had always enjoyed physical activity and I had an interest in the SDF disaster relief operations, so I also took the exam for enrollment in the SDF. I was 2nd Lieutenant Sugimoto as commander for marching practice at the Ground Officer Candidate School (pictured left) overjoyed when I passed and had hopes of working on the frontlines of defense, but at the same time I was anxious about whether I could really do it. I wanted to see what it was really like, so I visited the ASDF Officer Candidate School in Nara. The teaching staff there looked really cool and had a lot of pride in their work. Though I felt nervous, they answered all of my questions and I felt that I wanted to become just like them. So, I decided to join the SDF. The first ten months after entering the school, I received training at the Officer Candidate School in Nara. The three-hour swimming training in the sea and the 60 km marching training with heavy 2nd Lieutenant Sugimoto carrying out supplies duties at the Dispatch Control Unit facility packs and rifles were so hard that several times I almost gave up. But, going through these hard training sessions with my colleagues supporting each other I felt I became mentally strong, and I learnt that if you have a strong will there are no limitations you cannot overcome. During that ten-month period I gained experiences that I never could have had anywhere else. These days, I’m working at the Hamamatsu Base as a supply officer. The Supply Unit is responsible for a series of logistics duties, such as acquiring and distributing to the various units and disposing materials. Because we handle everything from clothing to airplane fuel, if the Supply Unit is delayed in its work, it has an impact on the operation of every unit - meaning that we have a huge amount of responsibility. I felt that this kind of work, conducted by unsung hero supporting the SDF’s activities, suited me, and that is why I applied for the job. I am still inexperienced in leading my subordinates and in regards to the knowledge necessary in the field of supplies, but just like those instructors at the Officer Candidate School that helped me decide to enlist, I would love to become an SDF officer that others would aspire to be. ----- **Notes:** 1) Activities prescribed in the Article 8 of the Self-Defense Forces Law (a miscellaneous provision) or a supplementary provision. 2) Missions defined in Article 3 of the Self-Defense Forces Law. The primary mission is to defend Japan. The secondary missions are the preservation of public order, activities in response to situations in areas surrounding Japan and international peace cooperation activities. 3) The Law concerning Cooperation for United Nations Peacekeeping Operations and Other Operations. See 4) The Special Measures Law concerning Measures Being Implemented by Japan in Response to Activities by Foreign Countries to Achieve Goals Envisaged under the U.N. Charter Following Terrorist Attacks in the United States on September 11, 2001, and concerning Humanitarian Measures Being Implemented on the Basis of Relevant United Nations Resolutions. See 5) The Law concerning the Special Measures on the Implementation of Replenishment Support Activities for Counter-Terrorism Maritime Interdiction Activities. See < http://www.cas.go.jp/jp/hourei/houritu/kyuuyu_sinpou.pdf> 6) The Law concerning the Special Measures on the Implementation of Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance Activities and Support Activities for Ensuring Security in Iraq. See 7) Tires that allow vehicles to maintain mobility, even when punctured and deflated 8) In the first meeting of the project team, it was agreed that future discussion should be adherent to the basic principles such as an adherence to the Constitution and securing civilian control such as the Diet’s approval procedure. On that basis, it is said in the interim report that the project team discusses such issues as whether security missions should be added to existing missions like ceasefire monitoring and humanitarian and reconstruction assistance, and how to deal with international peace cooperation activities without U.N. resolutions. 9) The resolution recognizes the specific authorities, responsibilities, and obligations under applicable international law of the United States and Britain as powers under unified command (the Authority). The Authority is requested to promote the welfare of the Iraqi people through effective administration of Iraqi territory until an internationally recognized representative government is established by the people of Iraq. The resolution also calls upon U.N. member states to provide humanitarian relief to the Iraqi people, help reconstruct Iraq, and contribute to the stability and security of Iraq. 10) Bali (October 2005); Jordan, Amman (November 2005); Algiers (December 2007). 11) Counter-terrorism maritime interdiction operations are to conduct inspections, verification, and other necessary measures to ships navigating the Indian Ocean in order to interdict and deter transportation of terrorist, weapons, through international cooperation, which is one of the activities contributing to the achievement of U.N. Charter objectives, by making effort in the elimination of threat by terrorist attacks by foreign militaries. 12) As of June 8, 2009, 42 countries are participating in the ISAF, which is designed to support the Afghanistan Government by maintaining its public security, so as to prevent Afghanistan from reverting into a hotbed of terrorism. 13) Japan is pursuing various anti-terrorism measures with a central focus on such fields as immigration controls, collection and analysis of counterintelligence, countermeasures to prevent hijackings and similar acts, measures for NBC, security of important domestic facilities, and countermeasures against terrorist funding. Furthermore, the Government of Japan formulated an “Action Plan for Preventing Terrorist ----- Attacks” containing 16 items of specific measures in December 2004, and has been addressing such issues as an international exchange of the information concerning lost or stolen passports, strengthening of immigration controls, introduction of the sky marshal program, strengthening of identity verification of foreign hotel guests, strengthening of controls of materials feared to be used for terrorism, and enhancement of information gathering capabilities. 14) The Security Council reached a resolution focusing mainly on the extension of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), adopted on September 19, 2007, to October 13, 2008. In this resolution, evaluation of each country’s contribution to the Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) was expressed. With the resolution 1833 adopted in September 2008 it was decided to extend the authorization of the ISAF, as defined in resolution 1776, for a period of twelve months beyond October 13, 2008. 15) Activities related to the supply of goods and services of the SDF to foreign marine vessels that are engaged in SDF counter-terrorism maritime interdiction activities (Limited to water supply and fuel for marine vessels or rotary wing aircraft mounted on marine vessels), in order to contribute to the smooth and effective operation of counter-terrorism maritime interdiction activities. 16) In order to increase public awareness regarding the fight against terrorism and to broaden public understanding of the necessity of continuing the Replenishment Support Special Measures Law, the Ministry of Defense conducted a series of PR activities: the delivery of an official speech by the Minister of Defense on September 11, 2008 (broadcasted to SDF units nationwide), television conference between the Minister of Defense and the commander of the MSDF Mission in the Indian Ocean, and concerts by the SDF band, etc. The Ministry of Defense also held a total of 30 defense issues seminars on replenishment support activities throughout the country hosted by each Regional Defense Bureau during September and December 2008. 17) See 18) E/N was signed with five countries (U.S., U.K., Pakistan, France and Germany) in February 2008. Others were signed with Canada in March 2008, with New Zealand in April 2008, and with Denmark in September 2008. 19) Activities conducted in line with a U.N. resolution and under the jurisdiction of the U.N. for the maintenance of peace and security in the international community to deal with the outbreak of conflicts, including ensuring the observance of an agreement concerning prevention of renewed military conflicts between the warring parties. 20) Activities being conducted by the U.N., other international organizations or countries based on a humanitarian spirit for the relief of victims of military conflicts, and reconstruction activities in connection with war-related damage. Such activities are initiated in accordance with a U.N. Security Council Resolution or requests from international organizations such as the UNHCR. 21) The Law concerning the Dispatch of International Disaster Relief Teams. See 22) See 23) Including dialogue directly tied to sharing awareness on issues and policy coordination, joint exercises that are directly linked to facilitating the SDF’s international peace cooperation activities, etc. 24) Including reciprocal unit inspections and dispatch of observers to exercises, various types of forums, symposiums, and seminars, information sharing, equipment and technology exchanges, providing SDF expertise in the disaster sector, etc. 25) The Second Army was reorganized into the Second Operations Command on November 1, 2007. 26) This is a multilateral meeting that gathers defense-minister-level officials from the Asia-Pacific region and it is held with the objective of discussing defense issues and regional defense cooperation. It began under the sponsorship of the International Institute for Strategic Studies, a private research facility in the United ----- Kingdom. Since the first meeting in 2002 it has been referred to as the Shangri-La Dialogue, after the name of the hotel where it is held. See 27) See 28) See 29) Specific examples following PKOs in Cambodia include cooperation in Samawah, Iraq and humanitarian assistance in response to disasters caused by the Indian Ocean tsunami. 30) See < http://www.mod.go.jp/j/news/youjin/2007/03/13.pdf > 31) See 32) See 33) See 34) See 35) See 36) In addition to Japan, the United States, India, Australia, and Singapore also participated. 37) In addition to Japan, the United States and India also participated. 38) The GSDF concluded its withdrawal from Iraq in September 2006. 39) 26 countries including 10 member countries of ASEAN (Brunei, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam, Cambodia (from 1995), Myanmar (from 1996), Japan, Australia, Canada, China, India, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, ROK, Russia, the United States (from 1996), Mongolia (since 1998), DPRK (from 2000), Pakistan (from 2004), Timor Leste (from 2005), Bangladesh (from 2006), Sri Lanka (from 2007) and the EU. 40) A document enabling countries involved to share information on training as well as their experiences of participating in international peace cooperation activities. 41) The MSDF dispatched two vessels to the first western Pacific submarine rescue training hosted by the Republic of Singapore Navy in 2000. Also, at the second training in 2002, 10 vessels from 5 countries including three MSDF vessels conducted an exhibition of submarine rescue technology in the Western Kyushu waters. 42) Nine countries of Japan, India, Australia, ROK, Singapore, Thailand, New Zealand, France, and Russia, in the Southern Kanto Waters, practiced the common process and steps in search and rescue with participant countries’ vessels while simulating MSDF vessels as distressed merchant ships. 43) 21ARF and other countries participated, and training was conducted in areas such as medical care, water purification, epidemic control, construction and marine rescue operations. 44) Participating countries include Norway and other sponsors (Peru, Austria, New Zealand, Ireland, etc.) and many developing countries such as Latin America and Africa which were included in the NGO-centered process. 45) Explosives for use in anti-infantry combat, which obstruct the approach of enemy soldiers. In order that civilians do not get indiscriminately hurt, personnel will operate them with their objective in sight. Detonation in the presence, approach or contact of civilians is not planned. 46) The Ministry of Defense recommended retired SDF members to the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) between 1999 and December 2006, to provide support anti-personnel mine removal activities in Cambodia. These retired SDF members were dispatched as maintenance and transport advisors for the Cambodian Mine Action Centre (CMAC) under the JICA framework of long-term dispatched specialists. 47) PSI is an initiative which continues to work in accordance with existing international and domestic laws to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their related materials, and consider steps which participating nations are able to take together. At the same time, it attempts to work toward the ----- strengthening of related domestic laws within the range possible for each country. 48) The Statement of Interdiction Principles refers to the fact that the PSI participating countries will share the effort aimed at halting the flow of weapons of mass destruction to countries of proliferation concern or non-state actors, and from countries of proliferation concern or non-state actors. At the same time, it refers to all interested countries which are concerned about proliferation, supporting PSI and working together with current PSI participant countries to take steps that are possible and intended to be implemented. With the statement, each country is taking concrete action for the purpose of preventing the proliferation of the freight of weapons of mass destruction, within the allowable range of international and domestic law. 49) In September 2003, the German Foreign Office obtained information that the Antigua and Barbuda (an island nation in the Caribbean Sea) ship BBC China was transporting nuclear-related items and materials to Libya. The German government dispatched intelligence experts to Italy, and carried out inspections with the cooperation of Italy and the U.S. Navy. They discovered counterfeiting of container numbers, brought the ship to Taranto, Italy and seized the nuclear-related items and materials (aluminum tubes which could be used in a centrifuge). As a result of this incident, the nuclear development of Libya was tied to the exposure of the Khan Network, and the effectiveness of PSI was demonstrated. 50) Under the sponsorship of Japan, the PSI Maritime Interdiction Training was held in Izu-Oshima Eastern Sea, Yokosuka New Port and Yokohama Port, with the main objectives of showing the strong intention of the international community aimed at strengthening non-proliferation systems, increasing the skill of participating nations and relevant organizations, strengthening mutual cooperation, and promoting PSI understanding among non-PSI participating countries. Ships, aircraft, units and so on from the SDF took part. Ships, aircraft, customs officials etc., from Australia, France, New Zealand, Singapore, the United States, and the United Kingdom participated in the training, and observers from 40 nations including these countries were dispatched to the exercise ----- ## Part III **Measures for Defense of Japan** ### Chapter 4 **Citizens of Japan, the Ministry of Defense and the SDF** **Section 1. Sustaining Defense Capabilities** **Section 2. Interaction between the Ministry of Defense & the SDF, and the Local** **Community & Japanese Citizens** First Lieutenant Sakamoto, representing the SDF Physical Training School, has won the world wrestling championships four years in a row ----- **Section 1. Sustaining Defense Capabilities** Defense capabilities are the ultimate guarantee of a country’s security and no other means can replace this function. It is not enough for the SDF, as the core of the defense capabilities, to simply create the necessary organization, but it is also indispensable to earn the understanding and support of the Japanese citizens in order to execute its missions. Defense capabilities depend on organization and human resources. Under the security environment of recent years, missions have become more diverse and international in character, and equipment within the Ministry of Defense and the SDF1 has been improved. Human resources must therefore be improved too, which means securing and training high-quality personnel. It is essential that information and communications capabilities and related equipment keep up with this changing environment. Thus, various approaches are taken, from the viewpoint of strengthening information and communications capabilities and acquiring related equipment more promptly and appropriately. This section explains the development of the organization and of human resources in the Ministry of Defense and the SDF, measures for the enhancement of information and communications capabilities, the effective and efficient procurement of equipment and the enhancement of technical research and development. **1. Organization of the Ministry of Defense and the SDF** The SDF, the core of Japan’s defense capability, is a specialist organization that plays the most essential role in the continued existence of the country, that is, national defense. The SDF consists of a full range of units and services that provide the functions required to fulfill that responsibility. **1. Organization of the Ministry of Defense and the SDF** The Ministry of Defense and the SDF consist of a number of organs that center on the GSDF, MSDF, and ASDF, to fulfill their mission of defending Japan as armed organizations, and a number of other organs including the National Defense Academy, National Defense Medical College, National Institute for Defense Studies, Defense Intelligence Headquarters (DIH), Technical Research and Development Institute (TRDI), Equipment Procurement and Construction Office, and the Inspector General’s Office of Legal Compliance. In January 2007, the Japan Defense Agency was upgraded to the Ministry of Defense. With this transition, a ministerial post responsible for the defense of Japan was created, which has empowered the Minister of Defense to present various policy options commensurate with the policy planning administrative body. This has reinforced the function of policy planning and capabilities for accurately and promptly responding to a number of emergency situations. (See Figs. III-4-1-1,2) **2. System to Support the Minister of Defense** The Minister of Defense, in accordance with the provisions of the SDF Law, is in charge of the SDF, and is supported by the Senior Vice-Minister of Defense and two Parliamentary Secretaries for Defense. The Minister of Defense is supported by the Administrative Vice-Minister of Defense in supervising administrative work. Defense Counselors have provided support to the Minister of Defense in setting up basic policies. However, in FY 2009, the Defense Counselor system, which has lost its effective function, will be abolished, and the Defense Council and post of Special Advisor to the Minister of Defense will be established by law in order to strength the support system to the Minister of Defense and ensure civilian control. Moreover, the Internal Bureau, Joint Staff and Ground Staff Office, Maritime Staff Office, and Air Staff Office support the Minister of Defense. The Internal Bureau is responsible for basic policies relating to the ----- work of the SDF. The Deputy Vice Minister of Defense and Directors-General of the Bureaus, as part of their own responsibilities, support the Minister of Defense when the Minister of Defense gives instructions and authorization to the Chief of Joint Staff (Chief of Staff, Joint Staff), and Chief of Ground Staff (GSDF Chief of Staff), Chief of Maritime Staff (MSDF Chief of Staff), and Chief of Air Staff (ASDF Chief of Staff). The Joint Staff is a staff organization for the Minister of Defense concerning SDF operations. The Chief of Joint Staff supports the Minister of Defense by providing unified military expert advice on SDF operations. The Ground Staff, Maritime Staff, and Air Staff are the staff organizations for the Minister of Defense concerning their respective services (excluding operations, with the Chiefs of Staff for the GSDF, MSDF, and ASDF acting as the top-ranking expert advisors to the Minister of Defense. ----- ----- **3. Restructuring of the Ministry of Defense** In July 2008, a report was compiled by the Council for Reforming the Ministry of Defense, established at the Prime Minister’s Office, and in August 2008, the Ministry of Defense released the Basic Policies for Organizational Reform in the Ministry of Defense and the Implementation Plan for Realizing Reform of the Ministry of Defense. The Ministry will conduct organizational reform in FY 2009, including the establishment of the Defense Council by law. The Basic Concept for 2010 Organizational Reforms was formulated in December 2008, and drastic organizational reform is now under consideration. (See Part IV, Section2) **4. Base of Defense Administration in Regional Areas** The relationship between the Ministry of Defense and local communities is increasing its importance. Consequently, in September 2007, the Ministry of Defense unified the local branch offices of the Defense Facilities Administration Agency (the Defense Facilities Administration Bureaus) and the regional organizations of the Equipment Procurement Office at the time of the disbandment and integration of the Defense Facilities Administration Agency, and established the Regional Defense Bureaus as the local branch offices to create a base for comprehensive defense administration in regional areas, including coordination and consultation with local governments and municipalities related to defense policies. The Regional Defense Bureaus are making explanations to the local communities of the policies of the Ministry of Defense and the reorganization of the U.S. Forces (as work to ensure local cooperation to obtain the understanding and cooperation of local governments and residents), and implementing various policies such as local coordination in line with the improvement of defense facilities in order to smoothly and effectively implement the overall administrative works of the Ministry of Defense. **2. Recruitment and Employment of Personnel in the Ministry of Defense and the SDF** The Ministry of Defense and the SDF need highly qualified personnel in order to fulfill their missions. Uniformed SDF personnel and other personnel of the Ministry of Defense and the SDF are recruited and employed under various systems2. (See Reference 60) **1. Recruitment** At SDF Provincial Cooperation Offices, which are located in 50 locations throughout the nation (four in Hokkaido, and one in each prefecture), the Ministry of Defense and the SDF conduct recruitment with the Recruitment at local cooperation headquarters help of prefectural and municipal governments, schools, private recruitment counselors and others. Local public organizations are also required to carry out administrative recruitment activities3, and the Ministry of Defense defrays the costs incurred by local public organizations. Since recruitment of the SDF personnel is likely to become increasingly difficult with the declining birth rate in Japan, it is necessary to seek the assistance of local public organizations, related organizations and other community organizations. (See Fig. III-4-1-3) (See Reference 61) ----- **[COLUMN]** **VOICE** **Voice of SDF Personnel Engaged in Recruitment** Master Sergeant Katsuhide Tsugihara Muroran District Branch, SDF Sapporo Local Cooperation Office, GSDF My duties as public information personnel started with the recruitment of Mr. F, who was then enrolled in a professional school. Mr. F had sufficient academic ability but was a reticient and mild-mannered man who worried about his weight. I coached him for the interview and told him to lose weight. Upon repeated practice, he gradually became capable of communicating his thoughts and opinions in interviews, but the day of the admission exam in autumn arrived without a significant reduction in his weight. Mr. F passed the exam, but was told his figures for weight and body fat were high, as we expected. Master Sergeant Tsugihara recruiting personnel for the SDF They passed him, but on the condition that he would improve these items by the time he actually joined the SDF. In response, we made concrete plans for reducing his weight, and I called him once every two weeks to hear how things were progressing. By these conversations, it seemed to me that he was making smooth progress in reducing his weight. But when I met him three months later, I saw that, far from getting thinner, he had gained more weight. I had been feeling reassured by checking with him on the phone, and realized I had been too optimistic. I figured that, in his current state, he would not pass the physical examination on the day of his entry in the SDF unit, and decided to do some running with him in the evening once every three days. Nevertheless, his weight was slow to come down, and he began to get nervous. One day, when I paid a visit to his house after he did not show up for our run, he told me that he "had had enough" and had obviously given up the idea of enlisting. I spoke with his parents and asked them to persuade him to try again, promising to work together with him. With the encouragement of his parents, he again promised to make the effort with me, and we continued to run together for the next month and a half. He never said much to begin with, and did not express words of confidence, but I diligently worked with him nonetheless, always recalling how his mother had bowed to me and asked me to please help her son out. At long last, the big day arrived. I was completely confident that he would pass, but still felt apprehensive until I knew that he had actually done so. Toward evening, I was finally informed that he had passed. I went to see him in the unit for educating new recruits. "Congratulations Mr. F, I mean, Private F," I said, and he gave me the biggest smile I had ever seen on his face. That night, I received a phone call from his delighted parents, who exclaimed that they had never seen their son look so happy. I couldn't describe the sense of satisfaction I felt. The examinees have their own particular circumstances that vary with differences in aspects such as living environment. We public information personnel are not mere recruiters; I believe we must take it to heart that we are involved with the future of individuals who want to be SDF personnel as we help them enlist. As the father of a child about the same age as recruits, I am going to continue my efforts to be a reliable person and recruiter. ----- **2. Employment** **(1) Uniformed SDF personnel** Uniformed SDF personnel enlist of their own free will on a volunteer basis and are employed as General Officer Candidates; General Candidates for Enlisted (Upper)4, Privates (GSDF), Seaman Apprentices (MSDF), Airmen Third Class (ASDF), and others5. Because of the special nature of the work they do, personnel management performed for uniformed SDF personnel is distinct from that of general civilian government employees6. Personnel management of the uniformed SDF personnel differs significantly from that of general civilian government employees because the former adopts an early retirement system and a short-term New recruits trying on their uniforms for the first time service system to keep the forces strong. Under the early retirement system, the uniformed SDF personnel retire at a younger age than general civilian government employees. Meanwhile, under the short-term service system, employment may be completed in two or three years. Upon employment, the uniformed SDF personnel who enlist in each SDF service complete the basic education and training in a training unit or at a school of each SDF service, and are then assigned to units and positions nationwide. The preferences and aptitude of each personnel are taken into consideration when assigning them to occupational areas and positions, which are determined before they complete their basic education. (See Reference 62-63) ----- **(2) SDF Ready Reserve Personnel, SDF Reserve Personnel, and Candidates for SDF Reserve** **Personnel** **a. Purpose of Maintaining the Reserve Personnel System** Normally, the number of uniformed SDF personnel is kept to the minimum needed to respond to situations: Uniformed SDF personnel need to be available immediately in an emergency as the need arises. To meet such needs promptly and systematically, there are three systems7: the SDF Ready Reserve Personnel System, the SDF Reserve Personnel System, and the System for Candidates for SDF Reserve Personnel8. In particular, the System for Candidates for SDF Reserve Personnel, which is mainly for personnel without experience, was established to develop and expand the defense basis, secure the stability of SDF Reserve Personnel, and effectively use civilian expertise in fields such as medical practice and language skills. There are two employment categories in the SDF Reserve Personnel system: general and technical. Personnel hired in the technical category are healthcare professionals and qualified technical personnel in such fields as languages and information processing. Candidates for SDF Reserve Personnel are appointed as SDF Reserve Personnel following completion of the education and training necessary to work as SDF personnel. In recent years, SDF Reserve Personnel employed with qualifications as healthcare professionals have participated in general disaster prevention drills as medical officers once being appointed as SDF Reserve Personnel, and those employed through their language qualifications have been active as interpreters, participating in Japan-U.S. joint armies of the GSDF post exercises and activities in other fields, following their appointment as SDF Reserve Personnel. (See Reference 64) **b. Cooperation from Corporations Employing Personnel** In addition to carrying out their normal duties, SDF Reserve Personnel and other personnel are also expected to undergo training to maintain the required skills. To attend such training, they take leave or vacation, or adjust their work schedules accordingly. To function smoothly, such systems require the understanding and cooperation of the employers of the personnel. SDF Ready Reserve Personnel, in particular, attend training for 30 days a year, so employers need to allow Ready Reserve Personnel to take this leave and prepare for their absence. To assist, the Ministry of Defense provides a special subsidy to companies and other organizations to cover for their Ready Reserve Personnel when attending training sessions and the like. This reduces the burden on such employers. **(3) Administrative Officials, Technical and Engineering Officials, Instructors, and Other Civilian** **Personnel** There are approximately 22,000 civilian personnel − administrative officials, technical and engineering officials, or instructors, and others − in addition to uniformed SDF personnel at the Ministry of Defense and the SDF. These civilians are mainly employed through the Recruit Examination for National Public Employee Level 19, or the Class I, II, or III Examination for Ministry of Defense Civilian Personnel. After participating in the same training course, civilian personnel who passed Level 1 and Class 1 or 2 undertake a wide range of work. Administrative officials are engaged in the planning of defense policy in the Internal Bureau, analysis/ research at the Defense Intelligence Headquarters as well as a variety of administrative work (budget, public relations, operations associated with military bases, etc.) at the SDF bases and the Regional Defense Bureaus throughout the country. Technical and Engineering officials play a key role in constructing various defense facilities (command headquarters, runways, facilities for ammunition storage, etc.), carrying out R&D, and pursuing the effective procurement of equipment such as fighter aircrafts and vessels. Instructors conduct advanced research relating to defense and provide high-quality education to SDF ----- personnel at the National Institute for Defense Studies, the National Defense Academy, and the National Defense Medical College. As of the end of March 2009, there were 632 Technical and Engineering Officials and Instructors with doctoral degrees. In addition, in various organizations where these civilian personnel are the main work force, uniformed SDF personnel of the GSDF, MSDF and ASDF work together with these civilian personnel, mainly in fields where the special knowledge of uniformed SDF personnel is required. **3. Daily Education and Training** In order to accomplish its missions such as the defense of the country, the SDF needs its commanding officers and other members to maintain high capacity, knowledge and skills, and it also needs each unit to maintain a high level of proficiency. SDF personnel are always required to be prepared to fully exert their capabilities in any situation, so that the SDF can immediately and appropriately deal with various situations and deter any country threatening to invade Japan. GSDF personnel conducting shooting training from a helicopter MSDF personnel during a fire prevention exercise MSDF personnel during a fire prevention exercise Education10 and training are crucial for the SDF to strengthen its capabilities to accomplish its missions by developing its human resources. For this purpose the SDF is making efforts to educate and train its personnel and its units under various constraints to make them strong, and to maintain and improve its readiness to respond to any situation, paying careful attention to safety including preventing accidents. **1. Education of Uniformed SDF personnel** **(1) Present Status of Education** Enhancing the ability of each uniformed SDF personnel is essential for the SDF units to perform their duties at units. At its schools and training units, therefore, the SDF provides life-long opportunities for systematic phased education according to position and duties to nurture the necessary qualities in order to cultivate quality, knowledge and skills of personnel. When personnel need to improve their professional knowledge and skills, or if it is difficult for them to acquire such knowledge and skills within the SDF, they may study abroad or at external educational institutions11 ASDF personnel taking part in flight training ----- such as domestic companies, research institutes, and similar organizations. The SDF will continue to entrust this kind of education to a wide range of external educational organizations to help personnel further improve their qualifications, knowledge and skills. **(2) Joint Educational Programs** The joint operations posture was started in March 2006. Knowledge and skills regarding joint operations are essential in order to make it work, and education concerning joint operations provides an important basis for that. Therefore, the three services of the SDF have enhanced education on joint operations at their Takakuwa, Sergeant first class, GSDF, from the SDF Physical Training respective Staff Colleges12, and at other educational School taking 5th place in the 200m individual medley at the Beijing Olympics facilities. Additionally, a joint educational program system has been set up, mainly at the Joint Staff College13, where SDF officers who will become Senior Unit Commanders and Senior Staff receive joint education. **(3) Educational Programs Meeting the Needs of the Times** The SDF has increasing opportunities to take part in international activities, and is developing more active relationships with other countries, and so has provided tuition in English, Russian, Chinese, Korean, Arabic, and other languages in addition to the programs mentioned above. The SDF has also been accepting students from abroad to increase understanding of other countries. Furthermore, in order to conduct international peace cooperation activities in an expeditious and continuous manner, the GSDF International Peace Cooperation Activities Training Unit carries out professional performance education and training for GSDF personnel throughout the country (mainly key personnel at the time of dispatch). The International Peace Cooperation Center (provisional name) will be established to implement education, research, PR activities related to international peace cooperation activities. (See Chapter 3, Section 1) (See Reference 65-66) **2. SDF Training** **(1) Training by Each Self-Defense Force** There are two main types of training within units in the GSDF, MSDF, and ASDF: training for individual SDF personnel to improve their proficiency in respective fields, and training for units to conduct systematic operations. Training for individuals is conducted one-on one in stages based on occupational classification and individual ability. Training for units is conducted by size of unit, from small to large, and large-scale comprehensive training is also carried out to ensure that overall abilities can be exercised. (See Reference 67) In addition to such training for national defense, training is given on the diverse roles required for the An ASDF CH47J that has landed on the MSDF transport vessel SDF in recent years. (See Chapter 1 Section 2, Chapter _Shimokita during a joint exercise; and GSDF personnel boarding on_ 3 Section 1) reconnaissance motorcycles and on foot ----- **(2) Joint Exercises** In order to exert defense capabilities most effectively in case of an armed attack on Japan, the GSDF, MSDF, and ASDF must conduct joint exercises during peacetime. Therefore, the SDF has been conducting joint exercises involving two or more forces. Such joint exercises have been strengthened with the transition to a joint operations posture in March 200614. (See Reference 67) **(3) Restrictions on Education and Training, and Responses** Various facilities and equipment15 are available for SDF training under the nearest possible environment to that of real fighting, yet many restrictions are imposed on their usage. Particularly, restrictions16 in maneuver areas, waters and airspace, and firing ranges where training is carried out are becoming tighter along with the modernization of equipment and other changes. Such areas are not sufficient in size, are unevenly dispersed across the nation, and have time limitations. Furthermore, training under an electronic warfare17 environment – conducted as practical training – is limited by the need to avoid radio wave interference. To deal with these restrictions, each SDF makes maximum use of its limited domestic maneuvering areas. They also strive to carry out more practical training by conducing live-firing training and Japan-U.S. joint exercises in the United States and waters off the United States where there are training conditions not available in Japan. (See Reference 68) **(4) Safety Management** Because the primary mission of the SDF is to defend Japan, SDF training and activities are inevitably accompanied by risk. However, accidents that cause injury or loss of property to the public or the loss of life of SDF personnel must be avoided at all costs. Continuous safety reviews and improvements are vital, and must be jointly handled by the Ministry of Defense and the SDF. The Ministry of Defense and the SDF take great care to ensure the safety of military vessel and aircraft traffic, and firing training at ordinary times, and prepare aeronautical safety radio facilities and equipment for prevention and rescue in the event of marine accidents. **(5) The Collision between the Destroyer Atago and the Fishing Boat Seitoku Maru** On February 19, 2008, the destroyer Atago collided with the Seitoku Maru fishing boat resulting in the deaths of its crew of two. It is extremely regrettable that the SDF, which is responsible for defending the lives and property of the Japanese people, caused such an accident. On May 22, 2009, the Ministry of Defense released the results of an investigation carried out by the MSDF accident investigation committee headed by the MSDF Vice-Chief of Staff18. The report attributed the main cause of the accident to a failure to conform to fundamental procedures for safe navigation, such as: a continuous watch with the naked eye and radars on the bridge and at the Combat Information Center19; close coordination between duty officers, including proper communication and reporting; and the appropriate collision avoidance measures taken by duty officers. In order to prevent recurrence of a similar accident, the SDF must go back to basics and ensure that all assigned duties are carried out steadily. The Ministry of Defense is resolved to thoroughly implement the preventive measures recommended by the committee20. **(6) Death of a Student in a Training Course related to MSDF Special Boarding Unit** A MSDF Petty Officer 3rd Class enrolled in the Special Boarding Unit Applied Training Course fell unconscious during a hand-to-hand combat training with two instructors and 15 other students on September 9, 2008 and died on September 25, 2008. ----- The Ministry of Defense compiled and released an interim report on October 22, 2008, detailing the investigation process by the MSDF Accident Investigation Committee established on September 10, 2008, headed by the Chief of Staff of the MSDF’s Kure District Headquarters. The following problems are considered to be associated with this incident. First, the training program was not appropriately planned and managed. Specifically, it does not seem that this hand-to-hand combat training with 15 students without a break was carried out carefully taking into account their skill levels or the number of people involved in the training. Second, it was not reasonable to conduct this kind of hand-to-hand combat training for a student whose enrollment had been decided to be cancelled. This incident is still under investigation by the Accident Investigation Committee, as well as by the MSDF Criminal Investigation Unit. The Ministry of Defense will continue a detailed investigation of the facts in addition to taking necessary measures to prevent a recurrence of a similar incident. **4. Working Conditions of Personnel, Measures on Personnel Matters, and Other Related** **Issues** The duties of the SDF make no distinction between night and day. The work assigned to uniformed SDF personnel can be extremely demanding, involving various operations onboard aircraft, long-term service on ships or submarines, or parachuting. To instill SDF personnel with pride and allow them to concentrate on their duties without anxiety, the Ministry of Defense and the SDF strive to provide salaries and allowances, medical care, health and welfare, and benefits that reflect the special nature of their duties. (See Fig. III-4-1-4) **1. The Panel to Examine Comprehensive Reform in the Personnel Field of the Defense Force** The Ministry of Defense has acknowledged the significance of maintaining high-quality human resources, and has implemented various measures for the new era21. Given the rapidly declining birth rate in recent years and changes in lifecycles of SDF personnel, a wide range of reforms, which focus on the personnel field of the Defense Force, has become a pressing issue, in order to secure sufficient human resources and create a comfortable working environment where personnel can concentrate on their duties without anxiety. In September 2006, the Panel to Examine Comprehensive Reforms in the Personnel Field of the Defense Force was established. The panel is headed by the Minister of State for Defense (at the time), and includes top officials of the Defense Agency (at the time) and outside experts. Under their authority the panel has implemented various types of research projects and studies. In June 2007, the panel produced a report22 of its findings compiled in the following categories: “Recruitment Items,” “Service Period Items,” “Items on Measures for Aid and Post-Retirement,” and “Other Items.” Furthermore, in August 2007, the “Panel to Implement Measures for the Comprehensive Reform in the Personnel Field of the Defense Force23,” headed by the Senior Vice-Minister of Defense was established This panel gives consideration to the creation of new positions within the SDF and, as such, is working for the steady implementation of these reforms. **2. Efforts for Further Utilization of Female SDF Personnel** The Ministry of Defense is making efforts to employ and promote more women (as SDF personnel, administrative officials, etc.) while giving due consideration to maintaining the strength of the SDF as well as to the capability, aptitude and motivation of each individual. At the same time, the Ministry is improving the working environment for a healthy work-life balance as well as eliminating the idea of fixed distribution of roles for work based on gender. Efforts are also being made to dispatch female SDF personnel to disaster relief and international peace cooperation activities. To provide childcare assistance to SDF personnel, who work under special working conditions (irregular work patterns, etc.), childcare centers were established at the GSDF Camp Mishuku in FY 2007, at the GSDF ----- Camp Kumamoto in FY 2009, and will also be established in Yokosuka District in FY 2010. In order to carry on the duties of personnel who take childcare leave, a system was introduced in FY 2007 to recruit fixed-term substitute personnel. As of end-March 2009, nine personnel had been recruited through this system. Continued reviews are being carried out regarding the revision of restrictions on the assignment of female personnel to certain posts. In September 2008, restrictions with regard to assignments to destroyers, minesweeper tenders, and patrol helicopters24 were lifted. ----- **[COLUMN]** **VOICE** **Voice of Female SDF Personnel Working on a Destroyer** Lieutenant Junior Grade Kaori Sei Engineer on the Hyuga, MSDF When I graduated from the faculty of literature of a regular university in March 2004, I wanted to experience a world that an ordinary corporate female employee would not be able to experience. For this reason, I decided to enter the Maritime Officer Candidate School in Etajima, Hiroshima Prefecture as a general officer candidate in the MSDF Officer Candidate School’s 55th term. After completing the first year of study, I went on an ocean training cruise. Upon returning to Japan, I worked as an Assistant ASW officer Lieutenant Junior Grade Sei on duty in the cockpit on the training ship Yamagiri, a Communications Officer on the supply ship Oumi, and an Assistant Engineer Officer on the training ship Kashima. During this period, I had the opportunity to participate in three long-distance training voyages. On these voyages, I received practical officer training and strove to improve my own skills while sailing the oceans of the world. I was assigned to the destroyer Hyuga as a Prospective Officer last November and engaged in work such as final adjustments for the ship’s engine. When the Hyuga was commissioned on March 18 this year, I was appointed Assistant Engineer Officer. At present, I am busy every day with tasks aimed at making the Hyuga combat-ready as early as possible. My work includes the formulation of operating procedures for the Hyuga’s new type of engine with fewer operators than ever before and the preparation of guidelines for damage control through proper response to fires and flooding. These are experiences an ordinary office employee would never have known, and perfectly in line with my motives for enlisting. The Hyuga is the first destroyer to which SDF female personnel have been assigned. Its crew contains about 20 SDF female personnel, including myself. SDF female personnel have been assigned to training ships, supply ships, and other such vessels even in the past, and both male and female personnel have been given the same duties in the same work environment. The duties on a destroyer are sometimes physically hard for women to perform, but there is otherwise no difference from the vessels to which women have been assigned so far. All crew members–both female and male SDF personnel–are making efforts to execute their duties. I am convinced that the placement of SDF female personnel on the Hyuga will lead to an increase in the number of women desiring duty on ships, and that their activities will also contribute to recruitment of manpower for the MSDF. As one of the first SDF female personnel to be part of a destroyer crew, I am determined to continue improving my capabilities, doing my utmost to improve the working environment for the smooth execution of duties by both men and women, and making a contribution so that women who follow me as SDF personnel will be able to exercise their abilities to the fullest in various assignments. ----- **3. Efforts to Prevent Suicide among SDF Personnel** In 1998, the annual number of suicides in Japan exceeded 30,000 and has since maintained a high level. This is a serious social problem in Japan. The same is true for the SDF, with a record-setting 94 SDF personnel suicides in FY 2004, 93 suicides in FY 2006, 83 suicides in FY 2007, and 76 suicides in FY 2008. The suicide of any SDF personnel is truly a great tragedy for both the suicides themselves and their bereaved families, and it is also a great loss for the SDF to lose capable personnel. The Ministry of Defense established, in July 2003, the Defense Agency Headquarters for the Prevention of Suicides (at the time), headed by the Parliamentary Secretary for Defense (at the time), and took the following measures to prevent suicide. Much effort will be continued to be made for the prevention of suicide. 1) Expanding the counseling system (inside counselors, outside counselors, mental health care officers, and a 24-hour telephone hotline for counseling). 2) Promoting education, to ensure that commanders feel signs of mental problems among subordinates, and that enlisted personnel are aware of their own mental health. 3) Setting a campaign period for the measures regarding mental health in spring and summer, which is when personnel are transferred, to enhance the measures for example: having commanders closely monitor the mental condition of subordinates whose environment has been changed due to personnel transfer, providing various reference materials and providing lectures. **4. Commemorating Personnel Killed in the Line of Duty** Since the establishment of the National Police Reserve in 1950, which has evolved through the National Safety Force and the Coastal Safety Force into the SDF today, SDF personnel have been striving to accomplish the noble mission of protecting the peace and independence of Japan. They have accomplished this by devoting themselves unstintingly to training, day and night, to live up to the expectations and trust of the Japanese citizens, regardless of danger, and with a strong sense of responsibility. During this time, however, more than 1,700 personnel have lost their lives in the line of duty. Prime Minister Aso giving a memorial address at a memorial In the Ministry of Defense and the SDF, funeral ceremony for SDF personnel killed in the line of duty ceremonies are carried out by each SDF unit, to which the personnel killed in the line of duty belonged, in order to express condolences to them. Moreover, in order to eternally recognize the achievements of the SDF personnel killed in the line of duty, and to express deep honor and condolences, memorial ceremonies are carried out in various forms, and support is provided to the families of the deceased25. **5. Retirement and Outplacement of Personnel, and Related Issues** **1. Retirement and Outplacement of Personnel** There is an early retirement system and a short-term service system for uniformed SDF personnel, to keep the forces strong. Unlike civilian personnel of the central government, many uniformed SDF personnel retire by their mid- 50s (personnel serving under the early retirement system) and their 20s (most uniformed personnel serving under the short-term service system). To resolve concerns that uniformed SDF personnel may have about their future, it is essential to ensure that they can lead stable lives after retirement, and thus can work diligently without any worries while in service. ----- Such treatment also boosts morale and makes it easier to attract high-quality human resources. For these reasons, the Ministry of Defense places great importance on outplacement measures for retiring uniformed SDF personnel in personnel matters, and assists outplacement, such as by providing occupational training to teach useful skills, and by effectively using employment information26. Various local organizations help retiring SDF personnel find new jobs. On the other hand, since the Ministry of Defense is not authorized to conduct employment placement services itself, the SDF Assistance Foundation – with the permission of the Minister of Health, Labour and Welfare, and the Minister of Land, Infrastructure and Transport – offers free employment placement services. As the job market is expected to remain tight, assistance from local governments and other organizations is also becoming increasingly necessary. Retired Regular Personnel of the SDF work in various sectors, including the manufacturing and service industries, and are now increasingly being employed as risk management staff, including disaster prevention, by local public organizations. Retired SDF personnel are highly evaluated by their employers because they generally have an excellent sense of responsibility, diligence, physical strength, spirit, discipline and other qualities. In particular, those retired or reaching mandatory retirement age have great leadership skills cultivated through many years of service. (See Fig. III-4-1-5) **2. Regulations on Outplacement of Personnel after Retirement** There are restrictions on the outplacement of uniformed SDF personnel to ensure impartiality in public duties. For example, within the first two years after a person leaves the SDF, if the prospective employer is a private company that had a contract with the Ministry of Defense within five years before said person leaves the SDF, then the approval27 of the Minister of Defense or other regulated personnel is required. In 2008, the Minister of Defense approved 93 individual cases (93 persons) of reemployment of uniformed SDF personnel at private companies. ----- **3. Reappointment System** The reappointment system allows the reemployment of personnel who have the desire and capabilities to continue working as SDF personnel after they reach the retirement age. The system makes the best possible use of experienced and valuable human resources, and secures the linkage between employment and pension. Under this system, the Ministry of Defense and the SDF have reappointed 367 personnel as of the end of March 2009. Furthermore, from the standpoint of building an environment for uniformed SDF personnel, who reach retirement earlier than general civilian government employees to focus on their duties with a sense of security, there are plans to revise the Reappoint System from the existing appointment within one year to make appointments possible within three years when under 60 years of age. (See Fig. III-4-1-6) **6. Enhancing Information and Communications Capabilities** Information and communications are the basis for command and control, from the central commands to respective headquarters of each SDF, and to the lower units. It is what is called the “central nervous system” of the Ministry of Defense and the SDF. Thus, to enhance information and communications capabilities, which are directly linked to the ability to complete missions, the Ministry of Defense is making efforts to develop more extensive and flexible information and communications systems to meet the demands for joint operations and international peace cooperation activities. **1. Response to the Information Technology (IT) Revolution** In response to the IT revolution of recent years, the Ministry of Defense and the SDF are pursuing information superiority28, and are developing the infrastructure to integrate their defense capabilities to ensure efficient operations. The following three core measures have been taken: 1) Developing sophisticated networks and frameworks, including the Defense Information Infrastructure (DII) and Common Operating Environment (COE); ----- 2) Enhancing information and communications capabilities29, such as the Central Command System (CCS) and the C2 (command and control) systems of the GSDF, MSDF, and ASDF; and 3) Assuring information security, such as responding to cyber attacks against the Ministry of Defense and the SDF. **2. Future Policy for Information and Communications (Action Plan)** In order to meet the new operational requirements, it is necessary to develop more varied and flexible information and communications systems. The MOD has set policies and objectives to strengthen command and communications capabilities and developed advanced information and communications systems 30. Now, DII is a MOD-wide network infrastructure, to which almost all systems are connected, and COE is incorporated into various kinds of C2 systems, and is being applied to logistics and accounting systems. With respect to responses to cyber attacks, the SDF C4 Systems Command (C4SC) was newly established in March 2008 and response procedures were developed and implemented to deal with cyber attacks. Several efforts are also under way to strengthen cyber-attack response capabilities, for example, equipping with state-of-the-art protective systems and carrying out research and development of technologies to respond to cyber attacks. (See Fig. III-4-1-7) (See Part II, Chapter 2, Section 5) **7. Efforts for Effective and Efficient Acquisition of Defense Equipment** Appropriate and efficient acquisition of defense equipment is one of the most important elements for Japan’s defense. It is also imperative to always maintain an indispensable production and technological base for defense equipment in Japan. The MOD has therefore implemented a range of measures relating to the acquisition of defense equipment. ----- **1. Comprehensive Acquisition Reform** The Ministry of Defense has been promoting comprehensive acquisition reform. The major goals are: more efficient and streamlined procurement, supply and Life Cycle Cost (LCC)31 of defense equipment and materials; enhancement of open and transparent procurement processes; as well as preservation and upgrading of the necessary defense production and technological infrastructure. Once procured, major defense equipment is used over a long period of time, ranging from 10 to 20 years or more. Therefore, acquisition reform towards more efficient and streamlined management of equipment–from concept-refining, development, production, operation (including maintenance, repairs and modernization) to disposal–is of increasing importance. In light of this fact, the Ministry of Defense established the Equipment Procurement Office (then) in July 2006 with the aim of achieving more efficient equipment acquisition32. The MOD is pursuing a variety of efforts for efficient procurement of equipment and materials. These include the package purchase of equipment in a single fiscal year rather than over multiple fiscal years; lump-sum purchase of equipment and materials instead of respective purchase by the three SDF services; commoditization of certain specifications at the development stage; introduction of commercial off-the-shelf products; private consignment; and review of equipment maintenance costs. While the Japanese government is making efforts to assure appropriate public purchasing in all fields, the MOD has also been reviewing limited tendering contract procedures to enhance the transparency and fairness of the procurement process. Limited tendering contract procedures are being reformed by expanding the scope of the comprehensive evaluation bidding system33, increasing the number of contracts for package purchase of equipment over multiple fiscal years, and introducing efficient bidding procedures. A Deputy Director-General in charge of audit was appointed at the Equipment Procurement Office in July 2006, while a councilor in charge of auditing and an audit division were set up in the Internal Bureau in the MOD in August 2006. **2. Efforts for Comprehensive Acquisition Reform** In October 2007, a Project Team for the Promotion of the Comprehensive Acquisition Reform was organized, with the Parliamentary Secretary for Defense at the helm, in response to a Ministerial Directive for the Acceleration of the Comprehensive Acquisition Reform. The Report of the Acquisition Project Team (the Report)34 comprised measures to deal with commercial import issues in response to, for example, the padded-billing case by Yamada Corporation, as well as measures to strengthen LCC management and set cost reduction goals. The Report has prescribed a detailed schedule for the implementation of individual measures to clarify the steady progress of the Reform. Each responsible department has been conducting work in accordance with the schedule. On July 30 and December 25, 2008, the Project Team met and confirmed the steady progress of individual projects. The progress thus far is outlined below. **(1) Actions for Commercial Import Issues** (i) In order to prevent a recurrence of padded billing, such as the case of Yamada Corporation, the Ministry has established special provisions for commercial import procurement (direct inquiry of estimates, doubling of the penalty for breach of promise regarding padded-billing) (since April 2008), held information sessions to foster direct contracting (in July 2008), and introduced commercial import investigations to check records of the trading company’s accounting system. (December 2008). (ii) Price survey procedures have been prepared (September 2008) and the number of import liaisons has been increased from 3 to 10 people to enhance the price survey function in the United States. (Since October 2008) (iii) Establish a Commercial Import Procurement Division in the Equipment Procurement and Construction Office. (FY 2009) ----- **(2) Strengthening of Management of Life Cycle Costs** (i) Establish a Life Cycle Cost Management Office in the Equipment Procurement and Construction Office (EPCO) (ii) Pilot operations (LCC Annual Report on Selected Equipment, Report to the Minister) in preparation for full-scale operations from FY 2009 (since March 2008) (iii) Promotion of LCC research/education (a joint seminar with U.S. DoD and Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency (JAXA) in June 2008) **(3) Establishment of Performance Targets for Cost Control** (i) A comprehensive cost reduction goal of a 15% reduction in costs by FY 2011 in comparison with costs in FY 2006 with regard to R&D, procurement and maintenance of defense equipment. (ii) Rate of cost reduction: Average of around 8.8% (reduction of approx.170 billion yen) in FY 2007, average of around 8.6% (reduction of approx.170 billion yen) in FY 2006 (provisional value), average of around 13.9% (reduction of approx. 280 billion yen) in FY 2009 (provisional value). (See Part II, Chapter 2, Section 5) **(4) Expansion of Incentive Contracts System** The Ministry has introduced a new and more effective incentive contract35 system that improves the evaluation procedure for contractor’s proposals which promotes corporate cost reduction activities by reviewing the overall system to enhance the effect of incentive contracts. One case has been taken on (October 2008). **(5) Review of Central and Local Procurement** (i) In order to further improve transparency, the approval of Minister of Defense is now required for high value limited tendering contracts for local procurement (same level as central procurement: over 150 million yen) (Since July 2008). (ii) In order to manage central and local procurement in a unified manner, appropriate systems are going to be established (FY 2009-FY 2010). **(6) Other** (i) In order to incorporate the streamlining of supply, maintenance, procurement and education, in addition to joint operations, into the development of defense capabilities, the Joint Coordination Committee on Equipment was set up in the Joint Staff (July 2008). (ii) The Technology Evaluation Committee was set up as a new evaluation framework to promote comprehensive acquisition reform, including the reduction of development costs. (May 2008) **3. Enhancement and Expansion of the Defense Production & Technological Base** Regarding defense equipment, it is necessary to pursue effective and efficient acquisition of defense equipment that adequately responds to the development of joint operations and meets the needs of troops, taking into account the latest trends in military science and technology. Therefore, for the acquisition of equipment the SDF selects the most appropriate method of procurement–domestic production, import, or domestic production under license agreement–on the basis of reviews that take into consideration not only performance and price, but also maintenance, supply, ease of education and training, and the necessity of Japan’s own improvements. At the same time, securing a domestic production and technology base that possesses the production capacity and technological capability to supply outstanding domestically produced equipment plays an important role. This is because regarding major defense equipment such as aircraft, ships, tanks and guided missiles, production ----- volumes are low as a whole, initial investment required is high and a high level of technological capability is required. The number of companies able to develop and produce these types of equipment is therefore limited to one or a handful of companies. For this reason, there is a possibility that withdrawal from the market of a single firm involved in the manufacture of equipment could immediately interfere with the stable acquisition and maintenance of equipment. When procuring equipment from outside of Japan, maintaining this domestic production and technology base makes it possible to secure negotiating power with partner countries and acquire equipment under conditions as favorable as possible to Japan. For this reason, the Ministry of Defense, taking severe financial circumstances and the importance of life cycle cost management into account, believes that priority should be given to establishing, maintaining and fostering a defense production and technological base, taking the approach of selection and focus. (See Reference 69) **8. Enhancement of Technical Research & Development** In the Ministry of Defense, strict financial circumstances make it necessary to select and concentrate research programs (e.g. by sharing works with the private sector, focusing on fields of our country’s superiority). **1. Research & Development of the Technical Research & Development Institute (TRDI)** It has become necessary to introduce emerging technologies into R&D, and to conduct deeper analysis on operational needs. For these purposes, a number of new R&D methods are being adopted36. A pilot research project will be launched in FY 2009 allowing individual SDF personnel to communicate with each other and share information. In order to reflect the opinions of users concerning operational performance improvements and weight reduction in the research of this system technology, research activities shall be carried out using a wide range of evaluation data based on practical operations and the results of experiments37 on C4I2 (Command, Control, Communication, Computer, Intelligence and Interoperability) and cooperation between defense force units. In view of joint operations to realize organizational combat through networking of forces, high-performance digital data link systems shall be developed for loading fighter aircrafts. In order to optimize the performance, schedule and cost throughout the lifecycle of equipment, it is effective to thoroughly conduct trade-off analyses on a number of proposals regarding performance and cost at the point of concept creation or R&D. Additionally, it is effective to continuously follow-up for improvements and other necessary measures, after deployment of equipment. Continuous study is underway as part of efforts to enhance the R&D system. **2. Strengthening Relations with the Commercial-off-the-Shelf (COTS) Technology Field** In regard to R&D at the Ministry of Defense, the National Defense Program Guidelines and the MidTerm Defense Program state that efforts should be made “by proactively introducing advanced technology of industrial, governmental, and academic sectors.” TRDI aims to investigate and introduce superior technologies in the private sector. As part of this effort, basic technology research themes have been selected, and investigation and research projects that invite public participation by not only private corporations, but also various research organizations, were introduced. Advanced Information Combat Equipment System (AICES) prototype ----- Furthermore, technological information is exchanged with organizations such as the Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency (JAXA), Information Technology Promotion Agency (IPA), National Institute of Health Sciences and National Maritime Research Institute. Utilization of such projects is intended to push forward introduction of a wide range of superior technology from research organizations and corporations. It is also important to spread the outcome of R&D at the Ministry of Defense into the private sectors. The Ministry of Defense is cooperating to promote the conversion of aircraft that have been developed as SDF aircraft for civil use, since this may lead to a reduction in the procurement costs of such aircraft. The Ministry of Defense is cooperating with other related ministries and agencies through the Council of Ministries and Agencies Related to Promotion of Development of Civil Aircrafts38. **[COLUMN]** **COMMENTARY** **Fighter Aircraft Stealth Technology (Electro-Magnetic Waves)** Ever since their appearance, fighter aircraft have always Figure 1 been developed by mobilizing the most advanced technology of the times. The so-called fifth generation of fighters represented by the U.S. F-22 feature a stealth capability, high maneuverability, and sophisticated electronic equipment, and boast an overwhelmingly superior fighting power. As a result, various other countries are pursuing programs of research and development (R&D) related to items such as the stealth capability, which is one of the key technologies of the fifth- generation fighters. This trend will presumably gather even more momentum over the coming years. Japan, too, has thus far carried out ground testing of the stealth capabilities of fighter aircraft. These capabilities are realized mainly through reduction of radar echo (i.e., reducing the radar cross section (RCS)). The ways of curtailing radar echo include having the waves reflected in a particular direction using a shape that prevents them from being reflected back in the direction of the point of origin, and application of an absorbent to absorb the electro-magnetic energy (see Figure 1). The main sources of echo on a fighter are the leading edges of the main wings and tails, air intakes, and the surface disparity of panels on the fuselage shell. Curtailment of radar echo from these parts is linked to RCS reduction (see Figure 2). The major specific type of RCS- reducing technology consists of altering the fuselage, panels, and air intake ducts into special shapes (see Figure 3). ----- The Technical Research & Development Institute of the Ministry of Defense has been promoting various research programs aimed at acquiring such technology. In a project for “Research on Flight Control System for Enhanced Maneuverability” to test the RCS-reducing technology on the level of an entire aircraft as the culmination of its ground testing research to date, it produced a full-aircraft, actual-sized RCS model and obtained all sorts of data with it in France. As for future activities, besides researching technical practicality, we are going to acquire various data through application to real aircraft under actual environments in the context of “Research on Advanced Technology Demonstrator Aircraft”, and also intend to compile all types of documentation conceivably required for studies of air defense in Japan. **[COLUMN]** **VOICE** **Voice of Female Technical Officials Working in R&D** Technical Official Risa Kimoto Surface Ship Systems Section, Systems Division, Naval Systems Research Center Technical Research & Development Institute I joined the Technical Research & Development Institute as an electronic engineer in 2005. Currently, I am engaged in hydrodynamic and hydro acoustic evaluation testing for naval ships in the Flow Noise Simulator (FNS). The FNS is a large, low- turbulence, re-circulating water tunnel with a very low background noise level. The FNS is one of the most technically advanced cavitation tunnels in the world, and it is capable of conducting a wide variety of naval hydrodynamic / hydro acoustics tests with large scale models. Most of the tests in the FNS require hard Inside the measurement tunnel of the flow noise simulator work, but that increases the pride I have for my job. ----- Technical Official Eri Kawashima NBC Detection Technology Section Human Oriented Systems Division, Advanced Defense Technology Center Technical Research & Development Institute I joined the Technical Research & Development Institute as a chemical engineer in 2005. Since being assigned to the NBC Detection Technology Section, I have been constantly engaged in the research and development (R&D) of a palm-sized automated chemical agent detector (PACAD). Initially, I carried out basic research, such as the verification of detection mechanisms and the examination of detection algorithms. The R&D of PACAD is currently in the prototyping stage, and I get busier and busier every year because of the increase in workload that involves In the chemical laboratory coordinating meetings and performing tests in addition to the routine research work. Though very busy, I am learning more and more by experiencing various tasks, and I get a sense of satisfaction out of my job. Technical Official Takako Yasunaga Guidance and Control Research Section, Missile Research Division Air Systems Research Center Technical Research & Development Institute I joined the Technical Research & Development Institute as an electronic engineer in 2005. Presently, I am working at the Guidance and Control Research Section, which has been conducting physical simulations of guided weapons. The Missile Research Division conducts research, test and evaluation on the guidance and control of missiles to confirm performance. As missiles apply a wide range of technologies depending on their missions and operation, I conduct physical simulation tests for various prototypes. We must have a deep Inside the missile system simulator Inside the missile system simulator understanding of the characteristics of the guided weapon, as well as their target, for each test in preparation. I feel a sense of responsibility for my mission as these missiles are produced domestically and deployed on each corps after these tests. Besides, I am encouraged by the satisfaction I get from conducting research on the state-of-the-art technologies for future guided weapon systems. ----- **Section 2. Interaction between the Ministry of Defense & the SDF, and the Local** **Community & Japanese Citizens** As stated at the beginning of this chapter, the various activities of the Ministry of Defense and the SDF cannot be carried out by the Ministry of Defense and the SDF alone. They are only possible with the understanding and cooperation of each and every citizen, local governments and other organizations. In addition to the details explained in Section 1 of this chapter, the SDF is executing its duties with support and cooperation from the local communities and the Japanese people in a variety of forms. Likewise, the SDF has been making various cooperation activities to support the people’s lives. Such activities are further deepening the mutual trust between the local community and the people, and the SDF, not only contributing to the enhancement and strengthening of the foundation of defense bases, but also instilling a sense of pride and self-confidence in SDF personnel. To ensure full function of defense facilities39, it is necessary to maintain a state of stable use by securing harmony with the local communities, and gaining the understanding and cooperation of local residents surrounding defense facilities. For this reason, the Ministry of Defense and the SDF strive to minimize the impact of the presence and operation of defense facilities on the daily lives of local residents through various measures. This section explains the daily interaction between the Defense Ministry and the SDF and the local communities, and activities undertaken to gain public understanding and cooperation. **1. Cooperation from Local Public Organizations and Other Related Organizations for the SDF** **1. Cooperation in Recruitment of Uniformed SDF personnel and Support for Outplacement** As stated in the previous section, under the severe recruitment environment and employment situation, the cooperation of local public organizations and relevant organizations is vital to secure highly qualified personnel and to assist the outplacement of uniformed SDF personnel who retire at a relatively young age. (See Section 1-2) **2. Support for SDF Activities** SDF camps and bases are located in all prefectures, and maintain close relations with the local communities. Various forms of cooperation and support from the local communities are indispensable for the SDF to conduct diverse activities. The SDF has also received words of encouragement from the people including local residents and relevant organizations. In addition to this kind of support and cooperation from the local communities, many letters of encouragement are sent by the people to personnel engaging in international peace cooperation activities which raise the morale of personnel and reinforce their awareness of serving the people of Japan. **2. Activities in Civic Life and Contributions to Society** The SDF is carrying out support activities for residents in a number of fields linked with the people, based on requests from local governments and relevant organizations, in addition to its role set forth in the National Defense Program Guidelines. For example, the SDF worked with relevant organizations to carry out preparations for command post training and preliminary drills, as well as to provide transport support for VIPs, surveillance and enhance readiness for contingencies at the G8 Hokkaido Toyako Summit in July 2008. The GSDF is responsible for the disposal of unexploded ordnance (UXO). In May 2008, a large unexploded ----- bomb was found in Chofu-city and promptly disposed by disposal experts after evacuating approximately 16,000 local residents from about 8,000 households These activities have deepened the mutual trust between the SDF and the people and contributed to expanding and strengthening the foundation of national defense. They also give SDF personnel a sense of pride and confidence in their constant contribution to the lives of the people. (See Reference 70-71) GSDF personnel disposing of unexploded ordnance (Chofu-city) **[COLUMN]** **VOICE** **Voice of SDF Personnel Engaged in Disposal of Unexploded Ordnances** **(Okinawa)** Master Sergeant Michio Ogata 101st Unexploded Ordnance Disposal Unit, 1st Combined Brigade, GSDF I am assigned to the 101st Unexploded Ordnance Disposal Unit (stationed at Naha) of the 1st Combined Brigade. When I joined the Unit about four and a half years ago, I imagined Okinawa to be lovely resort islands featuring beautiful seas and a lot of sun. But the cries of “kinkyu” (“emergency”) shouted three times in succession to dispatch us for disposal of unexploded ordnance (UXO) make me realize it is also a place where many such munitions are found. In December of last year, the number of UXO disposals by the Unit was over 30,000. As technical information personnel as well as disposal personnel, I dispose UXO found on Master Sergeant Ogata disposing of unexploded ordnance land in Okinawa Prefecture. Besides directing the disposal of ordnance on the site, I also make advance preparations, coordinate procedures for operation, and conduct guidance for safety during the disposal. Upon completion of the disposal, we perform maintenance work to keep our equipment and materials in good condition. In addition, I collect and compile information on UXO disposal and expand our data in order to improve the disposal capabilities of the Unit personnel. The most rewarding job is rendering UXO safe. UXO is possibly in a dangerous condition so that we cannot release them from the place where they were found. To render it safe means to destroy or remove their fuses with special instruments, and thereby to put them in a condition which allows it to be transported. I could not easily express in words the feeling of fulfillment I get when successfully defusing UXO. When the residents who had been evacuated from the surrounding area give us words of appreciation, I feel really rewarded and glad that I am engaged in such work, in spite of the danger. We always bear in mind the danger posed by UXO and improve our disposal skills on a daily basis so that we can contribute to the safety and security of the people of Okinawa. I am committed to continued work for swift and safe disposal of UXO. ----- **3. Harmony between Defense Facilities and the Local Community, and Environmental** **Conservation** **1. Scale and Features of Defense Facilities** The uses of defense facilities can be extended in various ways such as maneuver areas, airfields, ports and barracks40. Many defense facilities require large areas of land. Due to Japan’s geographical characteristics, there are some cities and industrial facilities that must compete with defense facilities on narrow plains. In particular, problems related to restricted presence and operations of defense facilities have emerged due to the urbanization of areas around many defense facilities as a result of economic development. Also, noise related to frequent takeoffs and landings by aircraft, firing, bombing, gunshots from artillery, tank operations and so on, raise concern in the affected residential communities. (See Figs. III-4-2-1, 2) ----- **2. Defense Facility Issues and Various Measures** Defense facilities, as bases which support the defense capabilities of Japan and the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements, are indispensable to the country’s security, and maintaining continuous and stable use of them is necessary. For that reason, the Ministry of Defense has been securing harmony between the defense facilities and surrounding areas, and working to obtain the understanding and cooperation of the local residents by taking the measures shown in Fig. III-4-2-3. (See Reference 72) Based on the proposals incorporated into the report41 compiled by the Council for the Improvement of the Living Environment around Airfields comprised of external experts, and with regard to measures for improving the living environment such as subsidies for residential sound insulation, the Ministry of Defense is making efforts to grasp the status of the noise in areas surrounding defense facilities, appropriately review target areas for sound insulation in consideration of the actual status and expand new measures. (See Figs. III-4-2- 3, 4, 5) (See Reference 73) ----- **3. Environmental Conservation** As a part of the government, the Ministry of Defense has been developing implementation plans based on a variety of government plans to proactively promote various efforts for environmental conservation42. In 2001 the Ministry of Defense Environment Month and Week were established, during which camps throughout the country carried out events for the purpose of environmental conservation, such as prevention of global warming, and enhancing a sense of environmental awareness by SDF personnel. In maintaining its facilities and equipment, the SDF is promoting diverse efforts43 to ensure environmental conservation and decrease the environmental burden. A new facility of the GSDF camp in Kanan-city, Kochi Prefecture, which is scheduled to be completed in 2010, has adopted an “all electricity” system, under which kitchen facilities, ventilation and hot-water systems are run by gas or boilers. In addition to excellent economic performance, it is expected that this system will have a positive environmental effect by reducing CO2 emissions. **4. Public Relations Activities, Information Disclosure, and Related Activities** The activities of the Ministry of Defense and the SDF to protect the peace and security of Japan can not be carried out without the understanding and support of the people of Japan toward the Ministry of Defense and the SDF. For this reason, the Ministry of Defense and the SDF, have been making efforts to provide them with information44 through active public relations activities, etc. from the perspective of responding to increased public attention to national defense and accountability to the public45. ----- **1. Various Public Relations Activities** As the scope of SDF activities has expanded both domestically and internationally, including international peace cooperation activities such as the replenishment support activities in the Indian Ocean and disaster relief dispatches, the public attention to the SDF and defense issues has been increasing. With the recognition that it is necessary to proactively promote publicity on defense policies and SDF activities on a regular basis, the Ministry of Defense and the SDF employ a variety of PR activities to ensure better understanding about the current status of the SDF in consideration of the changing public awareness and needs as well as increasing overseas attention to the Ministry of Defense and the SDF. (See Reference 74) **(1) Website, Pamphlets and Others** The Ministry of Defense and the SDF conduct PR activities using a wide variety of media, including providing information and gathering public opinions and supplying PR videos via the internet, and displaying commercial films for each SDF service. The Ministry of Defense has been making efforts to provide accurate information on the SDF and the national defense more extensively to the public, in the form of creation and distribution of various pamphlets which explain the policies of the Ministry of Defense and the activities of the SDF, cooperation for media coverage, and assistance in editing the PR magazine “MAMOR.” Furthermore, as the SDF activities overseas have increased, oversea attention to the Ministry of Defense and the SDF has been enhanced. In order to address such situation, the Ministry of Defense is making efforts including publishing the English language quarterly newsletter “Japan Defense Focus”, promoting participation of foreign media in regular press conferences, expanding the English section of the Ministry of Defense website, creation of defense white papers, various policy pamphlets and PR videos in English. The Ministry of Defense has been making efforts to use PR-related expenses actively, efficiently and effectively. In addition to these efforts, regarding measures such as the replenishment support activities and so on of the MSDF in the Indian Ocean, etc., which has particularly attracted public attention, intensive publicity has been carried out through channels such as the Ministry of Defense website, special features in the PR magazine, a video distribution channel established on a commercial video website, videos, pamphlets, and the seminars on defense issues organized by Regional Defense Bureaus. Furthermore, the Ministry of Defense has been making efforts to provide the public with information on the anti-piracy activities being carried out by the MSDF off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden through a special section on the website of the Ministry of Defense, etc. **(2) Events, PR Facilities, etc** The Ministry of Defense and the SDF conduct activities to extensively inform the people of the current status of the SDF46. These activities include the annual GSDF Comprehensive Fire Power Exercise conducted at the base of Mt. Fuji; cruises for experience by vessels of the MSDF in each region; and demonstration flights and boarding experience on aircraft at open base festivals held at ASDF bases. In addition, at camps and bases throughout the country, events including equipment exhibitions, unit tours and SDF band concerts are held on the anniversary of a unit’s foundation. They also parade through the city both in vehicles and on foot with cooperation from the local community concerned. Furthermore, in commemoration of the anniversary of the foundation of the SDF, events such as a SDF Marching Festival, a troop review, a fleet review, and an air review are held. Last year’s SDF Marching Festival was held at the Nippon Budokan attracting a total audience of approximately 37,000. Concerning annual reviews by the SDF, the troop review, fleet review and air review are hosted in rotation by the GSDF, MSDF and ASDF at which the SDF equipment and exercises are exhibited to the public. In 2008, due to the soaring fuel prices, the ASDF held an air review with a smaller number of ----- **[COLUMN]** **COMMENTRAY** **SDF’s Movie Collaboration “Sora e – Sukui no Tsubasa RESCUE WINGS”** The Ministry of Defense and the SDF fully cooperated in the filming of the movie “Sora e – Sukui no Tsubasa RESCUE WINGS”, which was released throughout the country in December of last year. The film depicts the growth of one woman as a pilot of a rescue helicopter. Twenty-three year old Second Lieutenant Kawashima pilots a UH-60J Rescue helicopter of the ASDF Komatsu Rescue Squadron. She put all her heart into training to be a rescue helicopter pilot after joining the Komatsu Rescue Squadron because of her admiration for the ASDF Rescue Wing, which had Ms. Yuko Takayama, who played new pilot Second Lieutenant saved her mother’s life. Her character develops in a Kawashima group of professionals that are thrown into the harshest situations as the last stronghold to protect people’ s lives, going through troubles and difficulties. One day, an F-15J fighter crashes into the sea and Second Lieutenant Kawashima is dispatched to rescue the pilot. She goes into the operation and risks her life while struggling against dwindling reserve fuel. As a matter of fact, the father of the actress that plays Second Lieutenant Kawashima, Ms. Yuko Takayama, was a medic in the Niigata Rescue Squadron and rescued many isolated residents in the 2004 Niigata Chuetsu Earthquake and died in a plane crash while on duty in the following year. The accident occurred while he was conducting a training exercise simulating a rescue of a distressed pilot from a snowy mountain. In 2005, while Ms. Takayama was in Tokyo with her family to attend a memorial service for the SDF personnel who died on duty, she was picked up by a talent scout in Harajuku and got the chance to act in this movie. The rescue squadron that Ms. Yuko Takayama’s father belonged to conducts disaster relief operations in addition to air rescue missions to search for and rescue distressed pilots. In recent years, they rescued many people in the Great Hanshin Awaji Earthquake (January, 1995), the Niigata Chuetsu Earthquake (October, 2004), and the Iwate-Miyagi Inland Earthquake (June, 2008), which is still so fresh in our memories. In reality, there are no female rescue helicopter pilots yet, but the relevant regulations do allow female members to become such pilots, so perhaps in the near future we will see the first female pilot. SDF equipment appears in many scenes of the movie. In addition to the UH-60J and the F-15J, the U-125 Search and Rescue Aircraft and the MSDF destroyer “Harusame” play active roles by showing their magnificent figures on the big screen. The DVD was also released in April of this year. This movie is worth seeing for anyone who is interested in the SDF or in becoming a pilot or medic, and, of course, it is still worth seeing even if you are not interested in the SDF. Ms. Yuko Takayama (3rd from left) with co-actors ----- participating aircraft and simplified implementation procedures. Approximately 14,300 people attended the air review, including its preliminary performance. A fleet review by the MSDF is planned in 2009. In addition to such events, the Ministry of Defense and the SDF actively promote tours at PR facilities. For example, some facilities in the Defense Ministry at Ichigaya are open to visitors on two guided tours each weekday; one each in the morning and afternoon. Since the tours were launched in June 2000, more than 230,000 people have visited the facilities so far. Each SDF service also has established PR facilities which people can visit free of charge, and camps and bases across Japan have PR stations and history museums open to the public. (See Reference at the end of the book) **(3) Enlistment Experience Programs** The Ministry of Defense and the SDF offer SDF Life Experience Tours47 and Enlistment Experience Programs 48 at the request of private companies, etc. These programs are intended to deepen public understanding of the SDF by giving them the opportunity to experience first hand the daily life and training of the SDF as well as to have direct contact with SDF members, while staying at an SDF camp or base for two to three days. In FY 2008, the SDF conducted four SDF Life Experience Tours, in which about 130 college students and women participated, and about Enlistment Experience Program 1,300 Enlistment Experience Programs, in which about 14,200 people participated. **2. Appropriate Operation of the Information Disclosure System and Personal Data Protection System** An information disclosure system49 was established in the Ministry of Defense, in line with the enactment of the Act on Access to Information Held by Administrative Organs in 2001. The Ministry of Defense discloses administrative documents, and a personal information protection system50 (in MOD) was also established in line with the Law for the Protection of Personal Information Held by Administrative Organs of 2005. Along with measures to ensure the security of the personal information under its jurisdiction, the Defense Ministry also discloses such information in response to requests for disclosure, revision and termination of use. For this reason, the receipt and implementation of disclosure applications are instigated at the Ministry of Defense offices and each Regional Defense Bureau and branch51. (See Reference 75, Reference at the end of the book) **3. Appropriate Operation of the Whistle-Blower Protection System** In recent years, workers within corporations have contributed to revealing various corporate scandals, which have threatened the peace of mind and security of the peoples’ daily life. In order to develop a safeguard system to protect workers who disclose information, the Whistle-Blower Protection Act entered into effect in April 2006. In accordance with this act, the Defense Ministry set up a system to handle public interest-related information disclosures by MOD employees and outside workers on issues where the Defense Ministry has the legal authority to punish or issue recommendations. Moreover, the Ministry of Defense and the SDF have established an internal contact desk for information disclosure in the public interest by MOD employees, and an external contact desk for related disclosure by outside workers. Through the contact desks, the Defense Ministry deals with information disclosure that is in the public interest and whistle-blower protection52. ----- **4. Engagement in Policy Evaluation** In 2001, a system to evaluate government policies was introduced with the aim of improving the efficiency and quality of administration in the public’s best interest, while the Government Policy Evaluations Act (GPEA) entered into effect in 2002. Based on these plans, the Ministry of Defense is evaluating various policies designated to achieve the objectives of the Defense Ministry and the SDF: to ensure the peace and independence of Japan and the security of the state. In addition to project evaluations, policy evaluations are primarily carried out using a comprehensive evaluation system53 since Ministry of Defense policy implementation involves analysis from diverse perspectives, such as domestic and overseas circumstances and technological innovation trends. In FY 2008, 54 policy evaluations were performed, including an evaluation of the grant for development of the environs of specific defense facilities. **5. Other Efforts** In October 2008, it was found that then ASDF Chief of Staff had expressed inappropriate views in an essay he had submitted to an essay contest sponsored by a private company. The Ministry of Defense removed him from his post, and afterwards let him retire. The Ministry of Defense has taken disciplinary action against the senior personnel concerned and implemented the following measures to prevent recurrence of such incidents. **(1) Thorough Awareness of High Rank Officers** The Ministry of Defense believes that it is important for anyone assigned to an important position, such as Chief of Staff, to be aware of his or her responsibility accompanying the position and behave in a way that is commensurate with the thus acquired social status. They are also required to study diligently so as to broaden their views. The Ministry is therefore making an effort to enhance such awareness through training opportunities and other measures. **(2) Education and Self-discipline of SDF Personnel** Taking the view that it is necessary to offer opportunities for appropriate education and self-discipline from the stage of junior officers, the Ministry of Defense examines the SDF education system and makes efforts to improve it. **(3) Clarification of Procedures for Expressing One’s Views Outside** Considering the fact that the former ASDF Chief of Staff failed to follow the notification procedures before making his views public, the Ministry of Defense enforced in April 2009 the “Thorough Observation of Procedures for Expressing One’s Views Outside the Ministry and the SDF (Instruction)” and the “Implementation of Procedures for Expressing One’s Views Outside the Ministry and the SDF (Notice)” to clarify the scope of application, details and destination of the notification. ----- **[COLUMN]** **VOICE** **Voice of Recruit (General Candidate for Enlistment, GSDF)** Leading Private Naoya Sakurai 1st Engineer Battalion 3rd Company At present I am assigned to the 3rd Company of the 1st Engineer Battalion in Camp Asaka (Tokyo, Nerima ward) of the GSDF, where I am putting my utmost into my training and work. Ever since my childhood I have loved sports and was always a member of sports clubs during my school days. When I was vaguely thinking of doing a job that would enable me to contribute to society while strengthening myself physically, my father suggested that I join the SDF. I felt that my wishes would be fulfilled if I became an SDF member and the job would be worthwhile in respect to protecting the peace of Japan. I was especially attracted to becoming a key member of the SDF – a sergeant – and I decided on enlisting as a general candidate for enlistment. Just before joining the SDF, I only had a vague image of what the SDF was about, and I sometimes felt anxious. But, as I went on to go through the hard but fulfilling training for new recruits, my anxiety gradually faded away. Also, for some time after joining the SDF, I was not used to group activities and found it quite hard, but I was able to overcome all difficulties with the kind instructions from my superiors and the help of other colleagues. As a result, I was able to reach the qualification I had been aiming at, Level 1 of the physical test. After three months of training for new recruits, in order to obtain the knowledge and skills I needed for my own specialty, I underwent a further three months of training. Fighting against the heat of summer and sweating, I learnt all of the necessary basic things in order to work as a civil engineer. There were a lot of things to learn and it was hard work, but, in spite of all that, I really got to see myself grow and develop. After the training, in the company I was assigned to, I was kept busy with training, including building up my physical strength, and came up against difficulties even greater than those in the training for new recruits, but I always thought that it was worthwhile. In the beginning, there were many things to learn and I was frequently at a loss, but my superiors were always there to help out and they gave a lot of valuable advice. Currently all I can do is follow the advice I received, but I’m planning to participate in many training programs and gain great new experiences in order to become a GSDF sergeant who is able to lead juniors. In the future I will do my best in taking up the challenge of participating in ranger training, which is said to be the hardest of all. Leading Private Sakurai during a training exercise ----- **Notes:** 1) The Ministry of Defense and the SDF are the same governmental organization for defense. The “Ministry of Defense” is used to refer to the governmental organization responsible for the administration and operations of the GSDF, MSDF and ASDF, whereas the “SDF” is used to refer to the armed organization operating in units that is responsible for the defense of Japan. 2) See for details on the recruitment of uniformed SDF personnel. For details on employment information, see 3) Notification of the recruitment period, checking of qualifications for application, processing of application forms, issuance of examination admission tickets, notification of examination dates and locations, provision of locations and facilities necessary for examinations, public relations and related works. 4) Until FY 2006, the SDF had two “enlisted (upper)” recruitment systems for candidates between the ages of 18 and 27: the “Student Candidate for Enlisted (Upper) System” and the “Candidate for Enlisted (Upper) System.” In FY 2007, the two recruitment systems were reorganized and unified into a new appointment system: “General Candidate for Enlisted (Upper) System”. It adopts some elements of the “Student Candidate for Enlisted (Upper) System,” which aims to raise awareness of candidates for the Enlisted (Upper), and of the “Candidates for the Enlisted (Upper) System,” which emphasizes individual capabilities in personnel management. 5) For SDF Youth Cadets employed as Recruits in the GSDF, MSDF and ASDF, FY 2007 was the final year for employment of MSDF and ASDF Youth Cadets and no further recruitment and employment will be performed. Nevertheless, from FY 2009 GSDF Youth Cadets is scheduled to be revised so that their status is not uniformed SDF personnel but the new, non-combatant students of GSDF. Fixed-term SDF personnel are, prior to their formal employment as Privates (GSDF)/ Seaman Apprentice(MSDF)/ Airman Third Class(ASDF), recruited as candidates for uniformed SDF personnel and receive education and training to foster their sense of mission, responsibility, unity, discipline, and compliance. This system will be adopted from July 2010. 6) SDF personnel must perform duties such as defense operations as specified in the Self-Defense Forces Law. They are, therefore, designated as special national government employees under Article 2 of the National Civil Service Law, and personnel management of SDF personnel is conducted independently of that of general civilian government employees. 7) See 8) Many countries other than Japan also have reserve personnel systems. 9) Traditionally, only administrative officials were employed through the Class 1 Examination for National Public Workers It has been decided that some technical and engineering offices whose main duties are administrative work will be recruited through the Class 1 Examination for National Public Workers from as of FY 2010. As a result, the Class I Examination for Ministry of Defense Civilian Officials will be used to employ officers engaged mainly in research. 10) Details on education and training can be found on the website of each SDF group: GSDF at ; MSDF at ; and ASDF at 11) Such external educational institutions in FY 2009 include the Tokyo Institute of Technology and Waseda University in Japan, and the National Defense University (U.S.) and California University (U.S.) overseas. 12) Institutes of each SDF where SDF officers of each service and others receive training on security, defense strategy and other subjects. 13) The Joint Staff College is part of the Joint Staff Office and educates SDF officers on joint operations. 14) Training includes SDF Joint Exercises, Japan-U.S. Combined Joint Exercises, and Ballistic Missile Response Exercises to prevent and remove direct threats to Japan, training such as International Peace ----- Cooperation Exercises and Joint International Humanitarian Operation Training in preparation for international peace cooperation, and related activities. 15) For example, the GSDF has a Command Post Exercise Center for carrying out command and staff activities at the division/regiment level, and the Fuji Training Center and urban warfare training facilities for company-level training. 16) For example, some firing and launch training involving tanks, anti-tank helicopters, missiles, long-range artillery, surface-to-air guided missiles (improved Hawk and Patriot System), surface-to-surface missiles, torpedoes, and other weapons cannot be carried out at some firing ranges in Japan, or are prohibited in Japan as ranges exceed domestic limits. There are also various restrictions on exercises by large-scale units that require larger areas, minesweeping training, and submarine rescue drills that are carried out in relatively shallow sea areas, and early-morning and night-time flight training. 17) Activities to detect, exploit, and reduce or annul the effects of enemies’ electromagnetic waves, while securing the use of electromagnetic waves by friendly forces. 18) See 19) Combat Information Center 20) (i) Strengthen watch and reporting/communication systems. (ii) Strenghten teamwork for safety operations. (iii) Strengthen the operational system by improving personnel capabilities. (iv) Thorough instructions by the duty officer. Furthermore, the Ministry of Defense has already taken measures to try to prevent a recurrence, such as the formulation of basic guidelines for the use of autopilot equipment, the enhancement of simplified sound recording equipment for the bridge of the vessel, and the development of appropriate warning and communication systems. 21) See for details on gender equality; and for details on the Laws for Measures to Support the Development of the Next Generation. 22) See the following for the Report on Measures for the Comprehensive Reform in Personnel Field of the Defense Force: 23) In the panel, in addition to an Executive Secretary Committee headed by the Vice-Minister of Defense, the following five panel groups were created: 1) Panel Administration; 2) Personnel Planning Related Policy, etc.; 3) Appointment System and Rank-based-pay, etc.; 4) Recruitment and Aid, etc.; 5) Post-Retirement Policy, etc. 24) No restrictions have been imposed on assignments to patrol helicopters for the purpose of education or research and development. 25) The Memorial Stone of SDF Members who Died on Duty was established in 1962, and reinforced in 1980, due to aging through weathering. Afterwards, when the headquarters of the then Defense Agency was moved to Ichigaya in 1998, the Memorial Zone in its current form was located on the east side of the memorial area with the Memorial Stone of SDF Members who Died on Duty and Other Monuments. A Memorial Ceremony for SDF Members who Died on Duty is held annually at the Memorial Zone. This ceremony is attended by surviving family members of the honored dead, and also attended by highranking staff of the Ministry of Defense and SDF under the Prime Minister and Minister of Defense, ----- former Directors-General of the Defense Agency, and others. At the Memorial Stone of SDF Members who Died on Duty in the Memorial Zone there is an iron plate containing the names and other information of personnel killed in the line of duty. When foreign dignitaries such as Defense Ministers visit the Ministry of Defense, they make offerings of flowers, expressing their respect and condolences to personnel killed in the line of duty. Memorial ceremonies are also held at individual SDF posts and bases. 26) Specific measures include: provision of education and training to acquire useful knowledge and skills for outplacement; promotion of employment of retiring uniformed SDF personnel in the public sector; networking of employment information at each SDF; and improvement of job-seekers’ skills by enhancing the job training curricula. For further information on outplacement assistance, see (GSDF), (MSDF), (ASDF) 27) “Seclusion from private companies” is stipulated in Article 62 of the Self-Defense Forces Law. 28) Superiority in prompt and accurate recognition, gathering, processing and dissemination of information. 29) For details on the Defense Information Infrastructure (DII: Standardized network for the MOD/SDF), the Common Operating Environment (COE: Basic group of software commonly used by computer systems maintained by each service of the SDF), and the Central Command System (CCS: central command system that conducts data aggregation processing and other data processing by online-connecting the command system of each SDF service), see: 30) The five policy targets are “Enhancement in Gathering/Communicating Information in the Chain of Command (Vertical Direction)”; “Promotion of Intelligence Sharing Among Units (Horizontal Direction)”; “Establishment of System to Cope with Cyber Attacks”; “Promotion of Intelligence Sharing with External Organizations”; and “Enhancement of Various Telecommunication Infrastructures.” 31) Costs incurred during the entire life cycle of equipment or materials, from the planning, development, mass production and operation (including maintenance, repair and improvement work) through the disposal 32) In September 2007, the Equipment Procurement Office was reorganized as the Equipment procurement and construction office. 33) Regarding the extremely important matter of evaluation of technical factors, this differs from an automatic bidding procedure which determines the vendor solely on the basis of price, instead of on a comprehensive evaluation of additional factors as well as price. 34) See 35) A system which seeks to reduce procurement costs by incentivizing private companies to reduce costs. When a cost reduction on a project is achieved due to the efforts of the private company that has been commissioned for the work, a portion of the cost savings is awarded to the company. 36) 1) “Operational Demonstration Research” is introduced. In this type of research, the SDF service (the future operator) will evaluate the prototypes of the equipment. The evaluation will be reflected onto the later R&D, procurement, and related operations. 2) “Evolutionary Development” is introduced. At the start of the development phase, the performance requirements to be achieved are left undecided. Even after the start of the development phase, the precision of required performance can be upgraded, and up-to-date military science technology can be newly introduced. 37) Experiments conducted by the GSDF using specific units, for the purpose of specifying the New Way of Fighting based on Information Supremacy and the effective development of command and communications equipment. 38) This council was established in September 2003 by the former Defense Agency; the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology; the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry; and the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport. It was established to promote development of civil aircraft and engines ----- based on initiative taken by our nation as a whole. This is important in the sophistication of our country’s industrial infrastructure, as well as the development and dissemination of industrial technology. 39) The generic term for the facilities used by the Self-Defense Force and the U.S. forces in Japan based on the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty. It refers to maneuver areas, airfields, ports, communication stations, barracks, warehouses, ammunition depots, oil bunkers and so on. 40) The land area of defense facilities, as of 1 January this year is approximately 1,397km2 (the sum of the land area of SDF facilities (approximately 1,085km2), the land area of the facilities and areas (for exclusive use) of the U.S. forces in Japan (approximately 309km2) and the land area of facilities other than SDF facilities which the U.S. forces in Japan are jointly using under the Status of Forces Agreement (approximately 4km2)), which accounts for approximately 0.37% of the country’s land. Of this, approximately 42% of the land area of SDF facilities is situated in Hokkaido. Divided by use, approximately 75% of this is maneuver areas. Meanwhile, 74km2 of the land area of the facilities and areas of the U.S. forces in Japan (for exclusive use) is jointly used by the SDF under the Status of Forces Agreement. 41) See 42) The Ministry of Defense’s implementation plan established in October 2007 after receipt of the “Plan for the government to establish measures that should be enacted for the purpose of suppression of greenhouse gases etc., related to their business and projects” (approved by the Cabinet in the same year), the “Defense Agency environmental consideration policy” established in 2003 based on the government’s “Basic Environment Plan” and a review of the corresponding plans carried out in January 2005. See for the environmental consideration plans of the Ministry of Defense. 43) Specifically, improvement of policies for air and water quality conservation, recycling and waste disposal, improvement to environmental protection facilities, and environmental assessments, etc. 44) See < http://www.mod.go.jp/menu/kohokatsudo.html > 45) From the viewpoint of security, etc., there is some information which is not suitable for release to the public (such as 1) information that may hinder the operation of units, 2) information that may impair the relationship of mutual trust with the nation concerned and 3) information related to individuals). However, the Ministry of Defense will continue to retain its policy to make efforts to release information as much as possible in order to enhance the public’s understanding. 46) For details on events, etc., see the Ministry of Defense website 47) Further information on the Summer Tour/Spring Tour for College Students, etc. Ms. Parsley Tour (experiential tour for women in their 20s) and One-Day Visit to SDF for Women is available on the MOD website. 48) Tours to experience the daily life of the Ground, Maritime or Air Self-Defense Force (For tour information, refer to the abovementioned website). 49) See 50) See 51) See < http://www.mod.go.jp/j/info/joho/johokokai06.pdf > 52) See 53) See ----- ## Part IV **Reform of the Ministry of Defense** **Section 1. Council for Reforming the Ministry of Defense** **Section 2. Efforts for Realizing Reform of the Ministry of Defense** **Section 3. Other Efforts** ----- Defense capabilities are the last resort to ensure the nation’s security and cannot be substituted by other means. Nevertheless, a defense force that lacks the public support cannot function effectively. Thus, Self-Defense Forces personnel strive on a daily basis to live up to the public trust and expectations. However, a number of incidents of misconduct have occurred recently that could shatter public trust in the Ministry of Defense and the SDF. The Ministry of Defense and the SDF are advancing fundamental reforms, by thoroughly reviewing conventional work patterns and practices so as to revitalize the organizations that are responsible for ensuring the peace and independence of our country. Part IV explains various efforts for the reform of the Ministry of Defense. Section 1 covers the Council for Reforming the Ministry of Defense, including the background/progress of the reform, Section 2 covers efforts for realizing the reform, and Section 3 covers other efforts. **Section 1. Council for Reforming the Ministry of Defense** **1. Background/Process of the Ministry of Defense Reform** In response to frequent occurrences of misconduct and accidents involving the Ministry of Defense and the SDF, such as mistakes in reporting the amount of refueling in the Indian Ocean, information leakage via the Internet, leakage of special defense secrets related to the Aegis system, and the misconduct by the former Vice-Minister of Defense, the Council for Reforming the Ministry of Defense (the Reform Council) was established at the Prime Minister’s Office to engage in a fundamental review of the issues related to the Ministry from the viewpoint of the public, with the participation of various experts. The first meeting of the Council was held in December 20071. **2. Report of the Reform Council** The Reform Council held 11 meetings, and a report was formulated in July 20082. In December 2008, the 12th meeting was held to discuss the progress of the reforms. This section describes the recommendations for reform as well as the major incidents of misconduct contained in the report. (See Reference 76) **1. Incidents of Misconduct - Identifying the Issues** The Reform Council points out that it is essential that continuous organization-wide efforts be made to identify goals and nurture a sense of duty, while making every effort to minimize mistakes in order to prevent a recurrence of the incidents of misconduct that have repeatedly occurred in the Ministry of Defense and the SDF in recent years, which have had a considerable impact on the society. (See Fig. IV-1-1) Report by the Council for Reforming the Ministry of Defense ----- **2. Reform Proposal (1) – Reform of the Awareness of Personnel and Organizational Culture** The Reform Council proposed the following three principles for reform: (1) Thorough adherence to rules and regulations (2) Establishment of professionalism (professional awareness) (3) Establishment of a management of work that prioritizes execution of duties, with the aim of total optimization The specific measures are shown in Figure IV-1-2. ----- **3. Reform Proposal (2) – Organizational Reforms for Modern Civilian Control** The Reform Council proposed an organizational reform of the Prime Minister’s Office and the Ministry of Defense so that the Ministry of Defense and the SDF can implement the above-mentioned three principles for reform steadily and effectively. **(1) Strategic level – Strengthening Command Functions of the Prime Minister’s Office** The Reform Council proposed that the Prime Minister’s Office should utilize the Security Council and other ministerial councils to strengthen the command functions by actively and comprehensively discussing the critical items for security. The specific measures are shown in Figure IV-1-3. **(2) Organizational Reforms to Strengthen Command Functions at the Ministry of Defense** The Reform Council proposed that while basically maintaining the current organization of the Ministry of Defense, a structure should be created through drastic reforms and restructuring of the various functions and responsibilities, so as to prevent a recurrence of incidents of misconduct, enable civilian control to function and enable the Ministry of Defense to implement more effective defense policies. The specific measures are shown in Figure IV-1-4 ----- ----- **Section 2. Efforts for Realizing Reform of the Ministry of Defense** In order to follow the basic direction laid out in the report by the Council for Reforming the Ministry of Defense (the Report) and to realize the reform of the Ministry, the Ministry of Defense Reform Head Office headed by the Minister of Defense was established in July 2008. This was followed by the development of the Basic Policy for Organizational Reform of the Ministry of Defense3 and the Implementation Plan for Realizing Reform of the Ministry of Defense (Implementation Plan)4 in August 2008, and the Organizational Reforms Measures to be Implemented in FY 20095 and Basic Concept for FY 2010 Organizational Reforms6 in December 2008. In May 2009, the bill for the partial amendment of the Ministry of Defense Establishment Law and related laws was passed. This bill included the establishment of the Defense Council to realize the FY 2009 organizational reforms, as well as the establishment of the position of Special Advisor to the Minister of Defense. In carrying out the recommendations prescribed by the Report, it is necessary to systematically assess and analyze the current situation, design and plan improvements and new measures, and coordinate to put them into practice, as well as to regularly release the progress and future plans to gain the understanding and support of the public. Thus, the Ministry of Defense will periodically revise and release the Implementation Plan, which contains specific details of the implementation process of the individual recommendations and as well as the progress made to date. This section describes the efforts of the Ministry of Defense for realizing the reform of the Ministry of Defense in accordance with the Implementation Plan. **1. Efforts for Thorough Conformity to Principles of Reform** **1 Thorough Adherence to Rules and Regulations** **(1) Thorough Adherence to Rules and Regulations by Senior SDF Personnel** In order to promote thorough adherence to rules and regulations among senior SDF personnel, the rules and regulations pertaining to SDF personnel were compiled and a Handbook of Service Regulations, which provides explanations and details of specific cases, was developed and distributed. A Service Code Checklist was formulated and disseminated to be used for compliance guidance and assessment of personnel understanding. **(2) Workplace Education on Adherence to Rules and Regulations** In order to ensure thorough adherence to rules and regulations, opinions will be exchanged with the education departments of each organization and an analysis of the current state of workplace education will be carried out to pave the way for necessary improvements, reflecting these opinions. At the same time, a checklist of matters to be considered will be developed, along with improvements in workplace education. **(3) Thorough Observance of Rules and Regulations Related to Classified Information** Along with a thorough dissemination of rules and regulations related to information security, the Self-Defense Force Intelligence Security Command will be established by integrating the individual intelligence security units of each SDF. Furthermore, when possible, the functions of the criminal investigation units established in each SDF will be unified in order to enhance unit-based criminal investigations and the preventive mechanism against violation of regulations. ----- **(4) Clarification of Responsibilities for Securing Transparency/ Competitiveness in Defense** **Procurement** In April 2009, the Import Procurement Division that uniformly controls general import procurements was set up in the Equipment Procurement and Construction Office and direct contracting with overseas manufacturers is being promoted. In March 2009, a notification was issued, stipulating the basic concepts relevant to the preparation and release of the minutes of major meetings of the Ministry of Defense as a measure to improve the transparency of the decision – making process. Strict observation of the re-employment of senior personnel will be carried out. At the same time, the SDF law will be revised with due consideration to the specific nature of SDF personnel to introduce regulation on reemployment in accordance with regulations for central government personnel and to strengthen the monitoring system for re-employment. **(5) Strengthening Inspection** Inspection of procurement organizations, which had previously been conducted by the Internal Bureau of the Defense Ministry, was conducted jointly by relevant organizations, including the Internal Bureau. The Inspector General’s Office of Legal Compliance formulates an annual defense inspection plan by selecting mid-term inspection matters and considering priorities. Moreover, stringency and effectiveness of inspections will be ensured by conducting inspections without notice. **(6) Review/Improvement of Rules and Regulations** Ministerial ordinances and lower regulations are being reviewed from the viewpoint of necessity and rationality (some have practically lost effect) and are being abolished or revised if necessary. Also, with respect to confidential administrative documents, a review board comprising internal experts was established in March 2009 to carefully examine the validity of the reasons for designation of confidentiality. **2. Establishment of Professionalism (Professional Awareness)** **(1) Improving Education for Senior Uniformed SDF Personnel** In order to give senior SDF officers a thorough awareness, training has been provided when they are promoted to the rank of general since March 2009. Education at each level of low, middle and high ranks will be improved in order to raise awareness of professionalism and occupational responsibility as well as to enhance the professional capacity of senior SDF personnel. Consistent basic policy for education will be formulated and the list of books and materials which would contribute to self-discipline will be formulated and distributed. In order to expand integrated education and to ensure cooperation in educational programs among GSDF, MSDF and ASDF Staff Colleges, the Ministry of Defense specified more clearly the contents of integrated education provided by the Joint Staff College and the three Staff Colleges in the regulations regarding integrated education in March 2009. In order to broaden the views of senior uniformed SDF personnel, inter-ministerial personnel exchanges will be steadily promoted and study programs at domestic and overseas graduate schools will be further enhanced. **(2) Improving Basic Personnel Education** In order to improve basic personnel education, workload and staff allocation will be reviewed at the level of Staff ----- Offices, Headquarters and Units. Priorities for educational policies at each level, including those for enlisted personnel, will be clearly defined. Furthermore, the basic education required for fulfilling missions will be steadily provided and cooperation between units and schools as well as integrated education suitable for each level will be expanded and strengthened. **(3) Fostering Professionalism in Information Communication and Security** In order to develop a sense of professionalism in personnel working in the field of information communication, the Preliminary Report for Contingency Situations (notification) and detailed implementation procedures were disseminated to all staff. Furthermore, in order to develop a sense of professionalism in personnel working in the field of information security, security education, which is currently strictly conducted in line with the Guidelines for Information Security Education, will be examined in a timely manner to verify whether it is tailored to the characteristics of individual organizations and, if necessary, revised. In order to enhance counter-intelligence measures7, the SDF Intelligence Security Command will be set up, and the Minister of Defense Counter-Intelligence Committee was established in March 2009 to effectively collect and share information pertaining to counter-intelligence. In order to strengthen information security measures, the Ministry will continue measures such as strengthening the readiness and training of specialists to confirm conformity with rules and regulations based on the Directive concerning Information Assurance of the Ministry of Defense, which has been revised in accordance with the unified government standards. **3. Establishment of a Management of Works that Prioritizes Execution of Duties, with the Aim of Total** **Optimization** **(1) Establishment of PDCA Cycle** The current situation concerning the work improvement system of each organization and good practices of business improvement methods of private sectors were examined. Based on this, the PDCA (Plan-Do-Check-Act) cycle will be established in SDF units by developing and disseminating the Guidelines for Improving Works. **(2) Concerted Response to Issues by Integrated Project Teams** In order to address certain policy issues facing the Ministry of Defense, when it is appropriate to use an Integrated Project Team (IPT), which transcends the borders of bureaus, an IPT has been addressing these issues. Newly arising critical policy issues that transcend borders of bureaus will in principle be dealt with by the IPT. **(3) Promotion of the Integrated Project Team Method in Defense Procurement** In order to further enhance the Life-Cycle Cost Management of equipment, the Minister of Defense has decided to develop a system to ensure a decision-making based on judgments regarding defense requirements and cost performance, while at the same time increasing accountability relating to cost. In April 2009, a Life-Cycle Cost Management Office was set up in the Equipment Procurement Construction Office and cross-organizational liaison and coordination meetings are held actively by utilizing the IPT method. **(4) Integrated Public Relations Activities of the Whole Organization** In order to ensure consistency in public relations activities of the whole organization, the Minister’s Secretariat Press Secretary will grasp in an integrated manner details of all press conferences by senior personnel of the ----- ministry and information released by the Ministry of Defense and each SDF. At the same time, rules will be developed regarding responses to the media by central and local offices, and direct dialogue with the public will be promoted. In March 2009, some improvements were made in the procedures to be taken when SDF personnel publicly express their personal views, including clarification of matters subject to notification and the details of notification, which were then issued as the Notice of the Minister of Defense and disseminated to all SDF personnel. **4. Other** In order to develop a system which enables the Ministry of Defense to gather information and ensure prompt responses in an integrated manner in the event of emergency, the Ministry of Defense gradually installs necessary equipment within the official building. A notice was issued to set up a task force based on the decision made by the Minister of Defense in the event of an SDF incident. In addition, the Ministry of Defense will conduct reviews on a wide range of issues, including the establishment of procedures for response to various situations, a review of the intermediate headquarters in the SDF, a full-scale revision of local procurement, the development of a highly independent third-party inspection system for equipment procurement, the utilization/treatment of retired uniformed SDF personnel and the further strengthening of cooperation with other ministries, particularly the National Police Agency and the Japan Coast Guard. **2. Fundamental Organizational Reform** **1. Organizational Reform in FY 2009** In FY 2009, the Ministry of Defense will abolish the advisory structure by Defense Counselors, which has lost its effective function, and take the following measures in order to strengthen its system to support the Minister of Defense and ensure civilian control. The bill for the partial amendment of the Ministry of Defense Establishment Law, which is necessary for the reform, was passed at the Diet in May 2009. **(1) Establishment of the Defense Council by Law** The Defense Council will be established by law as an organization where the Minister of Defense and other political appointees, civilian and uniformed SDF personnel deliberate on basic policies related to matters under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Defense. The Council comprises the Minister of Defense, the Senior ViceMinisters of Defense, Parliamentary Secretaries for Defense, Special Advisors to the Minister of Defense, ViceMinister of Defense, Deputy Vice-Minister/Directors-General, all Chiefs of Staff and the Director of the Defense Intelligence Headquarters. **(2) Establishment of Special Advisors to the Minister of Defense** A maximum of three Special Advisors will be politically appointed by the Minister of Defense (on a part-time basis until FY 2009) to advise the minister with regard to important matters relating to the Ministry of Defense based on their own knowledge and experience. (See Fig. IV-2-1) ----- **(3) Other** The position of Deputy Director-General for Reform of the Ministry of Defense (Chief of the Ministry of Defense Reform) and the Ministry of Defense Reform Promotion Office will be established. **2. Basic Concept for FY 2010 Organizational Reform** In December 2008, the Ministry of Defense formulated and released the Basic Concept for FY 2010 Organizational Reform of the Ministry of Defense, as described below, which has just been reported to the Council for Reforming the Ministry of Defense. Intra-ministerial examinations are currently under way based on this concept, and the FY 2010 budget request will be made for drastic organizational reforms, which will then be realized following coordination with related ministries and deliberations at the Diet. **(1) Objectives of Organizational Reform** Fundamental organizational reform through the steady and effective implementation of the three principles of reform proposed in the report will be carried out to prevent a recurrence of incidents of misconduct, and at the same time to enable the SDF to function actively and efficiently by utilizing human resources while ensuring civilian control in light of recent changes in the security environment surrounding the SDF and in the importance of the roles expected of the SDF. Under these objectives, the Ministry of Defense will enhance the functions of the Bureau of Defense Policy and of the Joint Staff, unify defense capabilities build-up sections (build-up sections), and take measures within the management sections as well as personnel, education - training sections, while fostering a sense of unity and establishing a cooperative system between civilian and uniformed SDF personnel. **(2) Establishing a Cooperative System between Civilian Personnel and Uniformed SDF Personnel** Civilian personnel and uniformed SDF personnel possess different kinds of professional knowledge and experience, and therefore, it is necessary for them to work together and cooperate in every situation in the Internal Bureau, Joint Staff and other staff offices, etc, for the total optimization of the Ministry of Defense and the SDF. ----- For this purpose, a quota system for uniformed SDF personnel in the Internal Bureau, which is difficult under the current system, will be introduced. Civilian personnel and uniformed SDF personnel are to be appropriately allocated based on their areas of expertise, with the aim of creating a system where the two groups can truly cooperate with each other. **(3) Functional Reinforcement of the Bureau of Defense Policy** **a. Basic Direction of Creating a New Bureau of Defense Policy** **(i) Functional reinforcement of the Core of Defense Policy** The role the Ministry of Defense and SDF play in ensuring the security of Japan is expanding. In order to appropriately support the Prime Minister and the Minister of Defense, to further ensure civilian control and to carry out more effective policies in the field of security, it is necessary to reinforce the function of the Bureau of Defense Policy, which is the core of Japan’s defense policy, in addition to strengthening the command functions of the Prime Minister’s Office. **(ii) Establishment of a Consistent System to Implement Defense Policies** In the FY 2010 organizational reform, the organization of the Ministry of Defense will be fundamentally reformed, with the establishment of a new department in charge of defense capability build-up, along with the abolition of the Bureau of Operational Policy and the functional reinforcement of the Joint Staff. The Bureau of Defense Policy will reinforce its functions with the aim of closely cooperating with each staff office and the newly established defense capability build-up department and create a system to consistently implement defense policies. **b. Specific Direction of Organizational Reform** **(i) Strengthening of the Function of Planning and Communicating of Defense Policies from** **Medium and Long-term Viewpoints** The Report proposes that the Prime Minister’s Office formulate a national security strategy in order to strengthen its command functions. In response, the Ministry of Defense will strengthen its planning and communication functions by, for example, formulating the National Defense Strategy (provisional name), thus actively contributing to the development of the strategy by the Prime Minister’s Office. **(ii) Strengthening of the Function of International and Regional Policy Planning, including** **International Activities** In order to ensure the security of Japan, international activities by the Ministry of Defense and the SDF are increasingly being expected to expand, and the Ministry of Defense needs to appropriately address various security issues in different regions outside our country. In order to contribute to the function of comprehensive planning, devising and communication of defense policies from medium- to long-term viewpoints, as well as to the above-mentioned roles, it is necessary to strengthen the capacity to collect and analyze various information and improve international and regional policy planning, including international peace cooperation activities, in cooperation with intelligence and operational divisions. It is also necessary to reinforce systems so that defense exchanges, multilateral security dialogues, and arms control and disarmament can be conducted in a strategic manner. **(iii) Posting of Uniformed SDF Personnel in the Defense Policy Bureau** In order to reinforce the above-mentioned functions of the Defense Policy Bureau, uniformed SDF personnel will ----- be placed in positions at the rank of the Deputy Director General or lower in the Bureau of Defense Policy, to create a system that directly reflects the knowledge and experience of uniformed SDF personnel in the planning of defense policies. **(4) Functional Reinforcement the Joint Staff** **a. Basic Direction of Creating a New Joint Staff** After the times of restrained management of the SDF and prioritizing defense capability build-up, we have now entered the times in which the SDF must be operated more properly to play a range of roles to respond various situations, such as large-scale disasters and unidentified vessels, as well as to implement international peace cooperation activities. Also, the security environment surrounding Japan has changed and we are seeing a heightened awareness of risk management in today’s world. In order to respond to various situations under such circumstances, the Ministry of Defense will abolish the Bureau of Operational Policy and create a new Joint Staff that assumes the operations of the SDF in a unified manner. At the same time, reviews will be conducted on the relationship between the Chief of Joint Staff and Chiefs of Staff of GSDF, MSDF and ASDF to take appropriate measures. **b. Specific Direction of Organizational Reform** **(i) Abolition of the Bureau of Operational Policy** The Bureau of Operational Policy will be abolished and its functions will be transferred to the Joint Staff, in principle, in order to resolve unclear parts of its responsibilities caused by the overlapping duties between the Bureau of Operational Policy and the Joint Staff and to carry out the operations of the SDF in a rational and unified manner. As a result, matters concerning the basics of the operations of the SDF, which is now under the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Operational Policy, will not be maintained under the jurisdiction of the Internal Bureau. A new Joint Staff will perform functions such as planning operations of the SDF and coordinating with other ministries. The scope of its specific duties will be determined while giving consideration to the roles of the new Joint Staff and to the relationship between the Joint Staff and the Bureau of Defense Policy, which has jurisdiction over the matters concerning the basics of defense and security. The way of dealing with the Diet related to the new Joint Staff’s duties – will be reviewed to reach a conclusion. **(ii) Posting of Civilian SDF Personnel in the Joint Staff** Since the operations of the SDF need to be conducted in consideration of domestic and international political situations and the above-mentioned functions of planning and coordination with other ministers will be added as the new roles of the Joint Staff, a system will be created incorporating civilian personnel into the new Joint Staff at the rank of Deputy Chief of Staff or lower. **(iii) Other** Among the matters concerning the basics of unit exercises, which are currently under the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Operational Policy, certain matters which shall be carried out by the Internal Bureau will come under the jurisdiction of the Internal Bureau. The jurisdiction of the Internal Bureau and the Joint Staff will be clarified at a future time, together with the jurisdiction for improvement and management of the information system of the Ministry of Defense, the basics of command and communication and the basics of radio waves management. ----- **(5) Unification of Defense Capability Build-up Sections** **a. Basic Direction of the Creation of a New Build-up Department** In order to ensure total optimization of defense capability build-up, it is necessary to formulate a comprehensive concept/plan for the organization/the authorized number of personnel/formation/equipment/deployment of the entire SDF. It is also necessary for the Ministry of Defense to carry out defense capability build-up projects in an integrated, effective and efficient manner, through the compilation of the annual budget under the concept of total optimization. In this way, individual measures can always be planned and implemented in accordance with the objectives of the entire organization and efficiency can be pursued through intensive budget management in accordance with priorities as well as integration and consolidation of individual projects. For this purpose, the build-up sections of the Internal Bureau and the Staff Offices will be integrated and a new build-up department will be established that engages in build-up projects in a unified manner. **b. Specific Direction of Organizational Reform** **(i) Operations of the New Build-up Department** The new build-up department will carry out defense capability build-up projects in a unified manner. The department will be in charge of matters such as the formulation of a consolidated build-up concept of the Ministry of Defense and build-up plans, administration of the compilation/implementation of the annual budget and coordination with the Cabinet Office. The department is in charge of formulating a build-up concept/plan and budgeting works, including a fiscal budget request with respect to the major units, major equipment, common equipment, system-related equipment, R&D, authorized number of uniformed SDF personnel and the authorized number of Administrative Officials of each SDF as a key component of our country’s defense capability. **(ii) Exception of Unification** As an exception to the unification concept, matters closely linked with the administrative work of each SDF will be handled by the relevant Staff Office to enable each SDF to perform their own administrative work smoothly. However, in the final phase, the new build-up department will consolidate this work to optimize defense capabilities build-up. **(iii) A Vision for the New Build-up Department** The new build-up department will basically be a bureau of the Internal Bureau, and review and examinations will be conducted on its specific work procedures and specific organizational structure. **(6) Measures for Management Sections, and Personnel, Education, and Training Sections** **a. Management Sections** Since the management sections of the Ministry of Defense need to conduct work in a unified manner without overlapping of work between the Internal Bureau and other organizations, the sections will be unified as much as possible for the streamlining of work and the effective utilization of human resources. In specific reviews, work will be organized and integrated focusing on similar and shared work from the viewpoint of overlapping. The organization will then be reviewed and procedures will be improved and streamlined, paying due attention so as not to undermine the operation of the administrative work of each Ground/Maritime/Air Staff Office. ----- **b. Personnel, Education and Training Sections** From the perspective that each Ground/Maritime/Air Staff Office should assume the main responsibility for personnel, education and training of uniformed SDF personnel, the specific work conducted by each Ground/ Maritime/Air Staff Office will be clarified. Also, from the perspective of assisting the Minister of Defense in an integrated manner with regard to system and policy, the specific work conducted by the Internal Bureau will be clarified, in order to further optimize work conducted by the Internal Bureau and the Staff Offices. As for specific reviews, procedures for work between the Internal Bureau and the Staff Offices will be carefully examined and regulations will be revised on an as-needed basis, while giving due consideration to avoiding any overlap of work between the Internal Bureau and the Staff Offices. **(7) Other** **a. Establishment of Special Panels** The Ministry of Defense Reform Head Office is resolved to make strenuous efforts for the FY 2010 budget request by setting up special panels under the Ministry of Defense Reform Head Office to review specific matters for the fundamental organizational reform in FY 2010 as mentioned above and by conducting reviews on specific organizational plans and new work procedures. **b. Verifications Concerning Work** It is necessary to make a smooth transfer to the new organization so as to avoid unnecessary confusion in order to ensure that the fundamental organizational reform will function properly. Therefore, the Ministry of Defense will conduct verifications concerning work, aiming to realize organizational reform in FY 2010. ----- **Section 3. Other Efforts** **1 Fundamental Reform of the Maritime Self-Defense Force** In response to a number of cases of misconduct, including a leak of confidential information regarding the Aegis system and a mistake in reporting the amount of refueling during international peace cooperation missions, and in order to prevent a recurrence of such incidents and to improve organizational integrity in the medium and long term, in March 2008, the Ministry of Defense set up the Committee for the Fundamental Reform of the Maritime Self-Defense Force (Fundamental Reform Committee), chaired by the Chief of Staff, MSDF and composed of major commanders. The Fundamental Reform Committee has convened four times to exchange a wide range of views about the mission, education and organization of the MSDF, while taking account of the opinions of those on duty. In order to present the reform policies based on the discussions at the Fundamental Reform Committee to the whole organization, the MSDF released the Operational Guidelines for the Fundamental Reform of the Maritime Self-Defense Force (Notification of the Chief of Staff, MSDF) on December 24, 2008. (See Fig. IV-3-1) In order to increase the effectiveness of the MSDF reform and steadily promote various measures, the MSDF created the Committee to Promote Measures for Fundamental Reform of the Maritime Self-Defense Force, chaired by the Vice Chief of Staff, MSDF, on December 24, 2008 to carry out further deliberations on the reform, promotion of implementation and supervision of measures. ----- **2 Efforts for Adherence to SDF Code of Ethics** In August 1999, the Self-Defense Forces Personnel Ethics Act was established along with the National Public Service Ethics Act, and came into effect the following April. On the basis of this Act, the establishment of the Self-Defense Forces Personnel Ethics Code was decreed by Cabinet Order. In order to further improve legal compliance and ethics of personnel, the Ministry of Defense has implemented education on ethics, duties and compliance8 for SDF Personnel by, for example, establishing supervisor training and conducted defense inspections. In the future, more efforts will be made to improve education and training as well as to make full use of the defense inspection system. A National Defense Medical College professor was arrested on suspicion of accepting bribes relating to the procurement of medical equipment in October 2008. The Ministry of Defense, in response, dismissed the professor on March 13, 2009. The professor was found guilty at the Tokyo District Court on March 19, 2009. Taking seriously the former professor’s conviction regarding an action carried out while in service, the Ministry of Defense has been making efforts to implement compliance training for all personnel to ensure that such an incident does not recur. ----- **Notes:** 1) See for the meetings of the Council for Reforming the Ministry of Defense 2) 3) 4) 5) 6) 7) To restrain information leaks and other related damage caused by espionage activities by foreign intelligence organizations against the Ministry of Defense/the SDF 8) To adhere to laws and regulations ----- ### Reference ----- Table of Contents Part I Security Environment Surrounding Japan Reference 1. Number of deployed nuclear warheads by country and their major means of delivery...... 397 Reference 2. Performance of Major Ballistic and Cruise Missiles........................................................... 397 Reference 3. Outline of Major Countries and Regional Military Power (Approximate Numbers).......... 398 Reference 4. Outline of Regular and Reserve Forces of Major Countries and Regions (Approximate Numbers).............................................................................................................................. 399 Reference 5. Outline of Changes in Military Power in Countries and Regions Surrounding Japan........ 399 Part II The Basics of Japan’s Defense Policy and Build-up of Defense Capability Chapter 1 The Basic Concepts of Japan’s Defense Policy and Related Issues Reference 6. Basic Policy for National Defense....................................................................................... 400 Reference 7. Report of the Council on Reconstruction of a Legal Basis for Security (excerpt).............. 400 Reference 8. Outline of a Bill Concerning Punishment of and Response to Acts of Sea Piracy.............. 401 Chapter 2 The National Defense Program Guidelines and Build-up of Defense Capability Reference 9. National Defense Program Guidelines, FY 2005-............................................................... 402 Reference 10. Mid-Term Defense Program (FY 2005-2009)..................................................................... 409 Reference 11. Statement by the Chief Cabinet Secretary........................................................................... 415 Reference 12. The Three Principles on Arms Export, etc........................................................................... 417 Reference 13. About the Review of the Mid-Term Defense Program (FY 2005–FY 2009)...................... 418 Reference 14. Cost of Major Programs in FY 2009.................................................................................... 419 Reference 15. Major Equipment to be Procured in FY 2009...................................................................... 421 Reference 16. Number of Tanks and Major Artillery Owned, Performance Specifications....................... 422 Reference 17. Number of Major Aircraft and Performance Specifications................................................ 422 Reference 18. Number of Major Ships Commissioned into Service, with Performance Specifications and Data........................................................................................................ 423 Reference 19. Guided Missile Specifications.............................................................................................. 424 Reference 20. Pattern of Defense-Related Expenditures (Original Budget Basis)..................................... 425 Reference 21. Changes in Major Areas of Expenditures on General Account Budget (Original Budget Basis)...................................................................................................... 425 Reference 22. Changes in Composition of Defense-Related Expenditures (Original Budget Basis)......... 426 Reference 23. Trend of Defense Expenditures of Major Countries............................................................ 427 Part III Measures for Defense of Japan Chapter 1 Operations of Self-Defense Forces for Defense of Japan and Responses to Diverse Situations Reference 24. Basic Principles for Responding to Armed Attack Situations............................................. 427 Reference 25. Examples of Items Provided by Basic Response Plan......................................................... 428 Reference 26. Highlights of the Civil Protection Plan of the Ministry of Defense.................................... 428 Reference 27. Participation in Civil Protection-Related Joint Exercises by the National Government and the Local Public Entity (FY 2007)................................................................................ 430 Reference 28. Preparation of Ballistic Missile Defense System, etc.......................................................... 431 Reference 29. Statement of the Chief Cabinet Secretary of Japan on the Cabinet Decision, “On Introduction of Ballistic Missile Defense System and Other Measures”..................... 433 ----- Reference 30. Emergency-Response Procedures Concerning Measures to Destroy Ballistic Missiles or Other Objects as Stipulated under Article 82-2, Paragraph 3 of SDF Law..................... 434 Reference 31. Statement by the Chief Cabinet Secretary “Japan-U.S. Cooperative Development of Advanced SM-3 Missile for Ballistic Missile Defense”...................................................... 436 Reference 32. Main Operations of the Self-Defense Forces....................................................................... 438 Reference 33. Statutory Provisions about the Use of Armed Force and Weapons by SDF Personnel....... 440 Reference 34. Record of Disaster Relief Dispatches (Past Five Years)...................................................... 441 Reference 35. Retired SDF Personnel Working at Disaster Prevention-Related Departments of Local Governments.............................................................................................................. 442 Chapter 2 Strengthening of the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements Reference 36. Japan-U.S. Joint Declaration on Security: Alliance for the 21st Century (tentative translation)........................................................................................................... 443 Reference 37. Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation................................................................. 446 Reference 38. United States-Japan Roadmap for Realignment Implementation (tentative translation)..... 453 Reference 39. Efforts by the Government of Japan regarding Realignment of U.S. Force Structure in Japan and Others.................................................................................................................. 458 Reference 40. Joint Statement of the U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee U.S. Department of State (tentative translation).............................................................................................. 459 Reference 41. Agreement between the Government of Japan and the Government of the United States of America Concerning the Implementation of the Relocation of III Marine Expeditionary Force Personnel and Their Dependents from Okinawa to Guam................. 464 Reference 42. Outline of 23 Issues............................................................................................................. 468 Reference 43. The SACO Final Report (tentative translation)................................................................... 469 Reference 44. Concept of Operations When an Armed Attack against Japan Takes Place........................ 475 Reference 45. Function and Fields and Examples of Items for Cooperation in Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan............................................................................................................... 476 Reference 46. Record of Japan-U.S. Bilateral Exercises in FY 2007......................................................... 477 Reference 47. Japan-U.S. Joint Research and Development Projects........................................................ 479 Chapter 3 Improvement of the International Security Environment Reference 48. The SDF Record in International Peace Cooperation Activities......................................... 480 Reference 49. GSDF Activities Based on Special Measures Law for Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance in Iraq, and Their Results................................................................................... 482 Reference 50. Basic Plan Concerning the Replenishment Support Activities based on the Special Measures Law on Implementation of Replenishment Support Activities towards the Anti-Terrorism Maritime Interdiction Operation........................................................... 483 Reference 51. Record of Main Bilateral Defense Exchanges (Last Five Years)......................................... 485 Reference 52. Record of Major Multinational Security Dialogues (Asia-Pacific Region, Last Five Years)................................................................................ 486 Reference 53. Multilateral Security Dialogues Hosted by the Ministry of Defense................................... 487 Reference 54. Other Multilateral Security Dialogue................................................................................... 489 Reference 55. Treaties Related to Arms Control, Disarmament and Non-Proliferation, Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction and Other Weapons (nuclear weapons)............................... 490 Reference 56. Treaties Related to Arms Control, Disarmament and Non-Proliferation, Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction and Other Weapons (biological and chemical weapons).... 490 ----- Reference 57. Dispatch of Ministry of Defense Personnel to International Organizations (Last Five Years).................................................................................................................. 491 Reference 58. Treaties Related to Arms Control, Disarmament and Non-Proliferation, Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction and Other Weapons (delivery means including missiles)................... 491 Reference 59. Treaties Related to Arms Control for Certain Conventional Weapons................................ 492 Chapter 4 Citizens of Japan, the Ministry of Defense and the SDF Reference 60. Personnel of the Ministry of Defense (Breakdown)............................................................ 493 Reference 61. Authorized and Actual Strength of Self-Defense Personnel................................................ 493 Reference 62. Overview of Appointment System for SDF Regular Personnel.......................................... 494 Reference 63. Rank and Retirement Age of SDF Regular Personnel......................................................... 495 Reference 64. Overview of Systems Related to SDF Reserve Personnel................................................... 496 Reference 65. Outline of the SDF Educational System.............................................................................. 497 Reference 66. Exchange Student Acceptance Record (FY 2008)............................................................... 498 Reference 67. Record of the Main Exercises of Each of the Self-Defense Forces (FY 2008)................... 499 Reference 68. Results of Fire Training and Related Training by Dispatch of Each of the Self-Defense Forces to the United States (FY 2008)................................................................................. 500 Reference 69. Change in Equipment Volumes Procured, by Procurement Method.................................... 501 Reference 70. Activities in Civic Life......................................................................................................... 501 Reference 71. Activities Contributing to Society....................................................................................... 502 Reference 72. Outline of Measures to Improve the Living Environment in the Areas Surrounding Defense Facilities................................................................................................................. 503 Reference 73. New Measures to Promote Harmony between Defense Facilities and Surrounding Communities........................................................................................................................ 503 Reference 74. "Public Opinion Survey on the Self Defense Forces and Defense Issues” (excerpt) (Public Relations Office of Cabinet Office: as of January 2009)......................................... 504 Reference 75. Record of Information Disclosure by the Ministry of Defense (FY 2008).......................... 505 Part IV Reform of the Ministry of Defense Reference 76. Outline of the Report by the Council for Reforming the Ministry of Defense.................... 506 Defense Chronology[....................................................................................................................................... 510] Organizational Diagram of the Self-Defense Forces (As of March 31, 2009) Location of Principal SDF Units (As of March 31, 2009) ----- Organizational Diagram of the Self-Defense Forces ----- Defense Chronology ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- Location of Principal SDF Units (As of March 31, 2009) ----- Reference 1. Number of deployed nuclear warheads by country and their major means Reference 2. Performance of Major Ballistic and Cruise Missiles ----- Reference 3. Outline of Major Countries and Regional Military Power (Approximate Numbers) ----- Reference 4. Outline of Regular and Reserve Forces of Major Countries and Regions (Approximate Numbers) Reference 5. Outline of Changes in Military Power in Countries and Regions Surrounding Japan ----- Reference 6. Basic Policy for National Defense (Adopted by the National Defense Council and approved by the Cabinet on May 20, 1957) The aim of national defense is to prevent direct and indirect aggression and to repel any such aggression with the aim of protecting Japan’s independence and peace, which are founded on democracy. In order to achieve this, the Basic Policy states as follows: (1) To support the U.N. activities and promote international cooperation to achieve world peace. (2) To stabilize the livelihood of the people, promote their patriotism, and establish the foundations required for national security. (3) Within the limits required for self-defense, to progressively establish efficient defense capabilities in accordance with the nation’s strength and situation. (4) To deal with external act of aggression based on the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements, until the United Nations can provide sufficient functions to effectively prevent such acts in the future. Reference 7. Report of the Council on Reconstruction of a Legal Basis for Security (excerpt) Council’s recommendation concerning the four issues 1) Protection of U.S. vessels on the high seas: in order to protect the lives and property of the people of Japan in the increasingly severe security environment of today, the effective functioning of the Japan-U.S. Alliance is more important than ever. To maintain and strengthen the relationship of trust between the allied countries, it is essential to allow U.S. vessels to be protected when they are in danger when Japan and the United States are engaged in a joint activity. According to the existing constitutional interpretation and the provisions of the current laws, the protection of U.S. vessels is possible as a reflex effect of the right to individual selfdefense, own protection and protection of weapons, etc. based on Article 95 of the SDF Law. However this allows the SDF to protect U.S. vessels only in extremely exceptional cases and does not allow response to the reality of attacks by anti-ship missiles. In such a case of attacks by anti-ship missiles, exercise of the right of collective self-defense must be allowed. Such exercise of the right of collective self-defense shall be limited to the cases that are closely related to Japan’s security. 2) Interception of ballistic missiles that could head for the United States: a sufficiently effective response would not be possible if we assume the existing concept of self defense and domestic procedures. A missile defense system has been built assuming an even closer cooperation between Japan and the U.S. It is virtually impossible to separate Japan’s defense from the cooperation. If Japan does not shoot down ballistic missiles heading for the United States despite being able to do so, it would rock the foundation of the Japan-U.S. Alliance, which forms the basis of Japan’s security. Such a situation should never happen. We cannot solve this problem based on the traditional approach of response based on the right to individual self-defense or police authority. Consequently we need to exercise the right of collective self-defense in such a case of missile attack, too. Because ballistic missile defense using the right to collective self-defense in this case would occur basically on the high seas or an area closer to Japan, it differs in nature from the proactive use of weapons in a foreign territory. 3) Use of weapons in international peace operations: it is deemed that the Self-Defense Forces dispatched for U.N. PKO activities, etc. is only allowed to use weapons for self protection and the protection of weapons, etc. The traditional constitutional interpretation and the provisions of the current law have not allowed the ----- Self-Defense Forces to use weapons during U.N. PKO activities etc. when the adverse party is a nation or a nationlike organization, because it might fall under the use of force prohibited under Article 9 of the Constitution. Consequently the Self-Defense Forces have participated in such activities based on a standard different from the international one that allows the use of weapons for “rushing to and guarding” troops and military personnel of other countries participating in the same U.N. PKO activity and/or eliminating obstacles to the execution of U.N. PKO duties. This situation runs counter to common sense and could be criticized by the world community. Our interpretation of Article 9 of the Constitution should be that participation in U.N. PKO activities is not forbidden. In addition to the purpose of self defense, the use of weapons should be allowed when rushing to and guarding troops and military personnel of other countries participating in the same activity and executing duties. However, this does not mean that units of the SelfDefense Forces may participate in such activities with combat as their main duty. 4) Logistic support of the activities of other countries participating in the same U.N. PKO activities, etc: it has been considered that such support, if “integrated with the exercise of force by another country,” might fall under the exercise of force prohibited under Article 9 of the Constitution. However, the concept of “integration” is extremely difficult to apply to actual activities, where situations change every second. In which cases shall logistic support be deemed to be integrated with the exercise of force by other country? Where shall the line be drawn between “combat area” and “non-combat area,” for example? This issue will be solved fundamentally if we take the view that engagement in collective security efforts is not prohibited under the Constitution. Before reaching this stage, however, when discussing the relationship between logistics support, such as supply, transportation and medical care, that will never involve the use of weapons on the one hand and the use of weapons by other countries that are to be supported on the other, we should abandon the “integration” theory that concerns constitutional evaluation. Instead, we should decide on a policy of whether or not we should provide logistics support to other countries and to what degree, as an issue of policy appropriateness, considering whether or not the activities of the country to be supported are acceptable to the people of Japan and are based on a comprehensive assessment of the advantages and disadvantages. Reference 8 Outline of a Bill Concerning Punishment of and Response to Acts of Sea Piracy 1. Purpose of the legislation To establish matters necessary for the punishment of and proper and effective response to acts of sea piracy in order to maintain public safety and order at sea, in light of the importance of ensuring the safety of marine navigation for the economy of Japan and the people’s lives. 2. Definition of acts of piracy Acts of Piracy: the following acts conducted by those who are crew members of or are aboard a vessel (excluding a war vessel, etc.) for private purposes on high seas (including exclusive economic zones) or Japan's territorial waters, etc: (1)robbery of vessel/operation control, (2) robbery of the property, etc. on a vessel, (3) kidnapping of a person(s) on board, (4) taking of a hostage (s) (5) for the purpose of (1) to (4); (i) invasion/destruction of a vessel (ii) excessive access, etc. to another vessel, (iii) unlawful navigation with dangerous weapons ----- 3. Punishment concerning acts of piracy A person who has conducted an act of piracy shall be punished as follows: (1) 2(1) – (4) : imprisonment, with work, for life or for a definite term of not less than 5 years; imprisonment, with work, for a definite term of not less than 6 years when the person concerned causes injury; death penalty or life imprisonment, with work, when the person concerned causes death. (2) 2(5)(i) and (ii) : imprisonment, with work, for a definite term of not less than 5 years (3) 2(5)(iii) : imprisonment, with work, for a definite term of not less than 3 years 4. Response by the Japan Coast Guard to acts of piracy (1) Japan Coast Guard carries out necessary measures to respond to acts of piracy. (2) Maritime safety officials may use weapons in accordance with the provisions of Article 7 of the Act concerning Execution of Official Police Duties. In addition, while they are in action to prevent 2(5) (ii), as is currently conducted, if the pirates do not obey the preventive action and continue to attempt the act of 2(5) (ii), and there is probable cause to believe there are no other means, the maritime safety officials may use weapons not exceeding the limit that is found reasonably necessary in accordance with the situation. 5. Response by the Self-Defense Forces to acts of piracy (1) When there is a special need to respond to acts of piracy, the Minister of Defense may order action against such acts upon approval by the Prime Minister. In order to obtain approval, the Minister of Defense shall create a response guideline and submit it to the Prime Minister (just notifying the outline of the action suffices when the situation demands expediency). (2) The response guideline shall include the need and area of the action against pirates, size of the unit, period and other important matters. (3) The Prime Minister shall report to the Diet when he/she gave approval and when the action against pirates was concluded. (4) Necessary provisions of the Japan Coast Guard Law, those of Article 7 of the Act concerning Execution of Official Police Duties and 4(2) shall apply mutatis mutandis to SDF regular personnel. Reference 9. National Defense Program Guidelines, FY 2005 (Approved by the Security Council and the Cabinet on December 10, 2004) I. Purpose II. Security Environment Surrounding Japan III. Basic Principles of Japan’s Security Policy IV. Future Defense Forces V. Additional Elements for Consideration I. Purpose In order to ensure the peace and safety of Japan and peace and stability of the international community, given the current security environment surrounding our country, the Security Council and Cabinet of the Government of Japan approved the “National Defense Program Guidelines, FY 2005-.” The Guidelines build on the December 19, 2003 Security Council and Cabinet decision, “On Introduction of Ballistic Missile Defense System and Other Measures.” ----- II. Security Environment Surrounding Japan 1. The 9/11 terrorist attacks on the United States demonstrated that, in addition to such traditional problems as inter-state military confrontations, non-state actors such as international terrorist organizations have emerged as a dire threat in today’s security environment. Against a backdrop of increased interdependence and growing globalization, the international community is facing urgent new threats and diverse situations to peace and security, including the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles, as well as international terrorist activities (hereinafter “new threats and diverse situations”). We need to bear in mind that conventional forms of deterrence may no longer work effectively against international terrorist organizations, which have neither states nor citizens to protect. Ten years have passed since the end of the Cold War. Mutual cooperation and interdependence among major countries have deepened, as exemplified by the growing trust between the United States and the Russian Federation. Since a stable international environment serves the interests of all nations, greater efforts at international coordination and cooperation on security issues have taken root in the international community, including those within the framework of international organizations such as the United Nations. In this context, the United States, as the sole superpower, continues to contribute significantly to international peace and stability by taking active measures to combat terrorism and to prevent proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. In the meantime, the use of military force now plays a broader role in the international community than simply deterring or responding to armed conflict: Military force is also used for a variety of purposes, including the prevention of conflict and the reconstruction assistance. 2. As a result of the further expansion and deepening of interdependence among the nations in recent years, greater efforts are also being made to promote and strengthen bilateral and multilateral coordination and cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region. However, although Russia has drastically reduced its armed forces in the Far East since the end of the Cold War, massive military might, including nuclear arsenals, continue to exist in the region, and a number of countries are pouring in efforts to modernize their military forces. The situation on the Korean Peninsula is unpredictable and cross-Taiwan Strait relations remain uncertain. North Korea is engaged in the development, deployment and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles, and it maintains a large number of special operations forces. Such military activities by North Korea constitute a major destabilizing factor to regional and international security, and are a serious challenge to international non-proliferation efforts. China, which has a major impact on regional security, continues to modernize its nuclear forces and missile capabilities as well as its naval and air forces. China is also expanding its area of operation at sea. We will have to remain attentive to its future actions. The close and cooperative relationship between Japan and the United States, based on the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements, continues to play an important role for the security of Japan as well as for peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region. 3. In light of the security environment surrounding our country, as outlined above, even though a full-scale invasion against Japan is increasingly unlikely, Japan must now deal with new threats and diverse situations in addition to regional security issues. 4. In considering Japan’s security, we have to take into account vulnerabilities resulting from: limited strategic depth; long coast lines and numerous small islands; a high population density; the concentration of population and industry in urban areas; and a large number of important facilities in coastal areas, in addition to frequent natural disasters due to Japan’s geological and climatic conditions, and the security of sea lines of communication which are indispensable to the country’s prosperity and growth. ----- III. Basic Principles of Japan’s Security Policy 1. Basic Principles The first objective of Japan’s security policy is to prevent any threat from reaching Japan and, in the event that it does, repel it and minimize any damage. The second objective is to improve the international security environment so as to reduce the chances that any threat will reach Japan in the first place. Japan will achieve these objectives by both its own efforts as well as cooperative efforts with the United States, Japan’s alliance partner, and with the international community. To this end, Japan will: support United Nations activities for international peace and security; make diplomatic efforts to promote cooperative relationships with other countries; further develop its close cooperative relationship with the United States, based on the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements; establish a basis for national security by preserving domestic political stability; and, develop efficient defense forces. Based on the Constitution of Japan, and the ideas of maintaining the exclusively defense-oriented policy by not becoming a military power that might pose a threat to other countries, Japan will continue to uphold the fundamental principles of developing modest defense forces of its own under civilian control and will continue to adhere to the three non-nuclear principles. To protect its territory and people against the threat of nuclear weapons, Japan will continue to rely on the U.S. nuclear deterrent. At the same time, Japan will play an active role in creating a world free of nuclear weapons by taking realistic step-by-step measures for nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. Japan also will play an active role in international disarmament and non-proliferation efforts regarding other types of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery means, such as missiles. 2. Japan’s Own Efforts (1) Basic Ideas Based on the premise that any country’s security depends first and foremost on its own efforts, Japan will utilize all appropriate means to prevent any threat from reaching the country. In addition, based on the principle of acting closely with the international community and its alliance partner—the United States— Japan will engage in diplomatic and other activities to improve the international security environment so as to prevent the emergence of any new threats. (2) Japan’s Integrated Response In the event that these efforts fail to prevent a threat from reaching Japan, the Government of Japan will take an integrated response by swiftly making appropriate decisions through mechanisms such as the Security Council, and bringing together all relevant organizations. To this end, the Government will improve its ability to collect and analyze information which serves as the basis of the Government’s decision-making. The Self-Defense Forces, police, Japan Coast Guard and other relevant organizations will improve their close cooperation through increased intelligence sharing, joint exercises, and other activities, while appropriately sharing their roles, and improve their overall performances. In addition, the Government will establish national protection systems including those for responding to different types of disasters, by quickly issuing warning signals and promoting mutual cooperation between the central and local governments. (3) Japan’s Defense Forces Japan’s defense forces are the ultimate guarantee of its national security, representing Japan’s will and ability to repel any threat that might reach its shores. Japan has developed its defense forces in accordance with the “National Defense Program Guidelines, FY 2005-” (Security Council and Cabinet decision on November 28, 1995) which incorporated the key elements of the Basic Defense Force Concept. The Basic Defense Force Concept espouses the idea that, rather than preparing to directly counter a military threat, Japan, as an independent state, should ----- maintain the minimum necessary basic defense forces lest it becomes a destabilizing factor in the region by creating a power vacuum. Combined with the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements, this concept has been successful in preventing an armed invasion from occurring. Given the new security environment, however, future defense forces should be capable of effectively responding to new threats and diverse situations while maintaining those elements of the Basic Defense Force Concept that remain valid. Because the peace and stability of Japan is inextricably linked to that of the international community, Japan should voluntarily and actively participate in activities that nations of the world cooperatively undertake to enhance the international security environment (hereinafter “international peace cooperation activities”). In developing Japan’s defense forces, we have to take into account the fact that while the roles that our defense forces have to play are multiplying, the number of young people in Japan is declining as a result of the low birth rate, and fiscal conditions continue to deteriorate. From this standpoint, Japan will develop multi-functional, flexible, and effective defense forces that are highly ready, mobile, adaptable and multi-purpose, and are equipped with state-of-the-art technologies and intelligence capabilities measuring up to the military-technological level of other major countries. In building such a defense force, without expanding its size, the Government of Japan will rationalize and streamline personnel, equipment, and operations so as to attain greater results with the limited resources that are available. 3. Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements The Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements are indispensable in ensuring Japan’s security. In addition, the U.S. military presence is critically important to peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region, where unpredictability and uncertainty continue to persist. Close cooperative relations between Japan and the United States, based on the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements, play an important role in facilitating international efforts to prevent or to respond to new threats and diverse situations, such as terrorism and ballistic missiles attacks. Japan will proactively engage in strategic dialogue with the United States on wide-ranging security issues such as role-sharing between the two countries and U.S. military posture, including the structure of U.S. forces in Japan, while working to harmonize our perceptions of the new security environment and appropriate strategic objectives. In doing so, the Government of Japan will bear in mind the need to reduce the excessive burden that the existence of U.S. military bases and facilities places on local communities, while maintaining the deterrent that the U.S. military presence in Japan provides. In addition, Japan will continue to strengthen the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements by actively promoting such measures as: intelligence exchange; operational cooperation, including in “situations in areas surrounding Japan”; cooperation on ballistic missile defense; equipment and technology exchange; and, efforts to make the stationing of U.S. forces in Japan smoother and more efficient. 4. Cooperation with the International Community In order to improve the international security environment and help maintain security and prosperity of Japan, the Government of Japan will actively engage in diplomatic efforts, including the strategic use of Official Development Assistance (ODA). Based on the recognition that the destabilization of the international community by events such as regional conflicts, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and international terrorist attacks would directly affect its own peace and security, Japan will, on its own initiative, actively participate in international peace cooperation activities as an integral part of its diplomatic efforts. In particular, stability in the region spreading from the Middle East to East Asia is critical to Japan. ----- Japan traditionally has close economic ties with this region, its sea lines of communication run through the region, and Japan depends almost entirely on energy and natural resources from overseas. In this context, Japan will strive to stabilize the region by promoting various cooperative efforts in conjunction with other countries sharing common security challenges. In order to enable the international community to effectively address the range of new issues in the twenty-first century, measures must be taken to reform the world’s only global and comprehensive international organization—the United Nations—to make it more effective and reliable. Japan will actively pursue this goal. In the Asia-Pacific region, multilateral frameworks for regional security, such as the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), as well as multilateral efforts to deal with common agendas such as counter-terrorism and counter-piracy are taking root. By continuing to support these positive developments, Japan will continue to play an appropriate role, together with the cooperation with the United States, to promote a stable security environment in the region. IV. Future Defense Forces 1. Role of the Defense Forces Based on the recognition described above, Japan will develop and maintain, in an efficient manner, the necessary Self-Defense Forces posture to effectively carry out missions in the following areas: (1) Effective Response to the New Threats and Diverse Situations Japan will deal effectively with the new threats and diverse situations by developing highly responsive and mobile defense force units capable of responding properly to various different situations and by deploying them appropriately in accordance with Japan’s geographical characteristics. Should such a situation emerge, the defense forces will respond quickly and appropriately in smooth and close collaboration with the police and other relevant organizations, thereby providing a seamless response to the situation in accordance with circumstances and designated roles. Japan’s Self-Defense Forces posture to address the key elements of the new threats and diverse situations will be as follows: a. Response to Ballistic Missile Attacks We will respond to ballistic missile attacks by establishing necessary defense force structure, including the introduction of ballistic missile defense systems, to deal effectively with ballistic missile attacks. We will adequately respond to the threat of nuclear weapons by doing so, in addition to relying on U.S. nuclear deterrence. b. Response to Guerrillas and Special Operations Forces Attacks We will maintain necessary defense force structure to respond effectively to attacks carried out by guerrillas and special operations forces. We will also enhance readiness and mobility of the defense force units, and deal with such attacks in a flexible manner. c. Response to the Invasion of Japan’s Offshore Islands We will maintain necessary defense force structure to respond effectively to the invasion of Japan’s offshore islands, improve and strengthen capabilities to transport and deploy forces, and deal with the invasion in a flexible manner. d. Patrol and Surveillance in the Sea and Airspace Surrounding Japan, and Response to the Violation of Japan’s Airspace and the Intrusion of Armed Special-Purpose Ships and Other Similar Vessels We will maintain necessary defense force structure, including ships, aircraft and other assets, to carry out around-the-clock patrol and surveillance in the sea and airspace surrounding Japan. We will also maintain fighter aircraft units to respond instantly to the violation of our territorial airspace, as well as combatant ships and other assets in order to respond to armed special-purpose ships operating in ----- waters surrounding Japan, submerged foreign submarines operating in Japan’s territorial waters, and other similar vessels. e. Response to Large-Scale and/or Special-Type (Nuclear, Biological, Chemical, and Radiological) Disasters To deal effectively with large-scale and/or special-type (nuclear, biological, chemical, and radiological) disasters, where protection of life and property is desperately needed, we will maintain an adequate force structure with defense force units, as well as specialized capabilities and expertise to conduct disaster relief operations in any part of Japan. (2) Preparations to Deal with Full-Scale Invasion Since in our judgment, the likelihood of full-scale invasion of Japan has declined and is expected to remain modest in the foreseeable future, we will modify our current defense force building concept that emphasized Cold War-type anti-tank warfare, anti-submarine warfare and anti-air warfare, and will significantly reduce the personnel and equipment earmarked for a full-scale invasion. However, because the original role of our defense forces is to cope with full-scale invasion and reconstructing these forces cannot be accomplished in a short period of time, Japan will continue to maintain the most basic capabilities of its defense forces, while also taking into account developments in neighboring countries and making use of technological progress. (3) Proactive Efforts to Improve the International Security Environment In order to engage actively in international peace cooperation activities, we will take the following measures: develop education and training systems, highly responsive force posture for relevant units, and transport and other required capabilities; establish necessary infrastructure to quickly dispatch defense force units overseas and to carry out missions continuously; and, make necessary arrangements to include the promotion of international peace cooperation activities in the Self-Defense Forces mission priorities. We will strongly promote activities for international peace and stability, including security dialogue and defense exchanges, bilateral and multilateral training and exercises, and arms control and disarmament efforts carried out by international organizations such as the United Nations. 2. Critical Elements of Our Defense Capabilities Following are the critical elements for developing defense forces capable of carrying out the missions described above. (1) Enhancing Joint Operation Capabilities In order to have the three services of the Self-Defense Forces work integrally and to enable them to execute their missions swiftly and effectively, we will employ them jointly whenever possible. We will create a central organization to facilitate joint operations, and establish infrastructure for training and education as well as intelligence and communications. In doing so, we will reexamine existing organizations so as to enhance their efficiency. (2) Strengthening Intelligence Capabilities In order to employ our defense forces successfully to respond effectively to the new threats and diverse situations, it is imperative for the Government to be able to identify events at the earliest possible time and to collect, analyze, and share intelligence promptly and accurately. For this purpose, we will strengthen our diversified intelligence collection capability and enhance our comprehensive analysis and assessment capability, keeping in mind the changes in the security environment and technological trends. We will also strengthen the Self-Defense Forces’ intelligence structure, including the Defense Intelligence Headquarters that supports our capabilities. In this way, we will build a sophisticated intelligence capability. ----- (3) Incorporating the Progress in Science and Technology into Our Defense Forces We will incorporate the outcome of science and technological progress, in such areas as information and communications technologies, into our defense forces. In particular, we will develop the command and control systems and agile intelligence sharing systems that are indispensable for joint operations, in tune with information and communication technologies available at home and overseas. In addition, we will create advanced systems for command and communications and a network for information and communications, with sufficient protection against possible cyber attacks, to enhance operational and organizational efficiency. (4) Utilizing Human Resources More Efficiently We will take various measures to maintain high morale and firm discipline within the Self-Defense Forces. We will recruit, cultivate, train and educate high-quality personnel to meet the challenge of the diversification and internationalization of Self-Defense Forces missions, and the need to properly operate rapidly advancing high-tech equipment. In addition, we will promote activities related to research and education on security issues, and develop human resources. The defense force level required to fulfill missions described above is indicated in the attached table. V. Additional Elements for Consideration 1. In developing, maintaining, and operating the defense forces as described in section IV, the following elements will be taken into consideration. (1) Mindful of increasingly severe fiscal conditions, we will restrict defense expenditures by further rationalizing and streamlining defense forces. We will also work to make our defense forces successful in carrying out their missions by harmonizing their operations with other measures taken by the Government. (2) We will make procurement and research and development (R&D) more effective and efficient by taking the following measures: curbing lifecycle costs, including purchase price of defense equipment; actively using cutting-edge technologies developed by private enterprises, universities, and governmental organizations in carrying out R&D as well as by allocating R&D resources in a more focused manner; and, appropriately and timely reviewing various R&D projects. At the same time, we will work to establish defense production and technological bases, especially in core technological areas indispensable for our national security. (3) In order to efficiently develop and maintain defense-related facilities, the Government of Japan will, in close cooperation with relevant local authorities, take various measures to make those facilities coexist more harmoniously with local communities. 2. The National Defense Program Guidelines provide the vision for our defense forces for the next decade. However, five years from now or in case there is a significant change in the international situation, we will review and, if necessary, revise the Guidelines in light of the security environment, technological progress, and other relevant factors at the time. ----- Reference 10. Mid-Term Defense Program (FY 2005-2009) (Approved by the Security Council and the Cabinet on December 10, 2004) I. Policies for the Program From FY 2005 to FY 2009, the Government of Japan (GOJ) will build-up Japan’s defense forces based on the following plan, in accordance with the “National Defense Program Guidelines, FY 2005-” (adopted by the Security Council and the Cabinet on December 10, 2004. Hereinafter the new NDPG). 1. In order to effectively respond to new threats and diverse situations as well as to voluntarily and proactively participate in activities that nations of the world cooperatively undertake to enhance the international security environment (hereinafter “international peace cooperation activities”), the GOJ will efficiently establish multi-functional, flexible and effective defense forces that are highly ready, mobile, adaptable and multipurpose, and are equipped with state-of-the-art technologies and intelligence capabilities, while maintaining the most basic capabilities to cope with large-scale invasion. 2. Under the new security environment, the GOJ will review current organs of defense administration, and transfer the major units and main equipment of the Self-Defense Forces (SDF) to the new defense forces prescribed in the new NDPG while reducing equipment and personnel earmarked for large-scale invasion. 3. In order to realize defense forces that are multi-functional, flexible and effective, the GOJ will advance the critical elements of defense capabilities; strengthening joint operation capabilities and intelligence capabilities while incorporating the progress in science and technology, and making effective use of human ----- resources as well. 4. In building, maintaining and operating defense forces, the GOJ will promote measures that support the defense forces such as: procuring defense equipment more effectively and efficiently; and improving cooperative ties with related administrative institutions and local communities. 5. The Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements are indispensable in ensuring Japan’s security. In addition, the U.S. military presence is critically important to peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region. Moreover, the close cooperative relationship between Japan and the U.S. based on the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements plays an important role in facilitating international efforts in security fields. The GOJ will promote measures to further strengthen the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements and the close relations with the U.S. based on the Arrangements. 6. Mindful of seriously deteriorating fiscal conditions, and with due consideration paid to other national measures, the GOJ will restrict defense expenditures by further rationalizing and streamlining defense forces. II. Review of the Organizations of Defense Agency and SDF 1. The GOJ will review organization of defense administration including the Internal Bureau of Defense Agency, and take necessary measures. 2. The GOJ will establish a new joint staff organization and transform each service Staff Office in order to strengthen the joint operations. The GOJ will continue to study on whether or not further organizational change is necessary for effective joint operations, and take necessary measures. The GOJ will place the Defense Intelligence Headquarters under direct control of the Minister of State for Defense. 3. Concerning the Ground Self-Defense Force (GSDF), the GOJ will: transform five Divisions, one Brigade and two combined Brigades, among which a Division and two Combined Brigades are converted into three Brigades, in order to improve readiness and mobility, while reducing number of tanks and artillery; and establish the Central Readiness Force that administrates and operates units for nation-wide mobile operations and special tasks. The authorized number of GSDF personnel will be around 161,000 persons (152,000 persons for regular personnel and 8,000 persons for reservists) at the end of FY 2009. The actual number of GSDF regular personnel will be approximately 146,000 at the end of FY 2009. 4. Concerning the Maritime Self-Defense Force, the GOJ will consolidate the number of the Escort divisions of the Destroyer unit for mobile operations into eight, each of which is deployed four destroyers; and abolish one of the Escort divisions for regional deployment. The GOJ also consolidate the number of divisions of the Submarine unit into five, Flight Squadrons of Fixed-wings Patrol Aircraft unit into four and Patrol Helicopter unit into five. 5. Concerning the Air Self-Defense Force, the GOJ will transform the Early Warning Group into that composed with two squadrons. The GOJ will establish the first Aerial Refueling Transport Unit. III. Major Plans Related to SDF Capabilities 1. Effective Response to the New Threats and Diverse Situations (1) Response to Ballistic Missile Attacks The GOJ will improve the capabilities of the Aegis destroyers and Patriot surface-to-air missiles to enable them to respond to ballistic missile attacks. The GOJ will study the course of capability improvement for FY 2008 and after, taking into consideration the status of BMD technology development in the U.S., and take necessary measures. The GOJ will also improve the Base Air Defense Ground Environment (BADGE), and start to buildup a new warning and control radar which can detect and track ballistic missiles. ----- The GOJ will promote the joint Japan-U.S. technical research targeting the sea-based upper-tier system, consider the possibility of transition to the development stage, and take necessary measures. (2) Response to Attacks by Guerillas or Special Operations Units In order to effectively respond to attacks by guerillas or special operations units, the GOJ will improve the readiness and mobility of ground units, and strengthen the capability of infantries, and procure: light armored vehicles; multi-purpose helicopters (UH-60JA, UH-1J); and combat helicopters (AH-64D). The GOJ will also improve the capability to deal with nuclear, biological and/or chemical attacks. (3) Response to Invasions of Japan’s Offshore Islands In order to effectively respond to invasion of Japan’s offshore islands by improving transportation, deployment and other capabilities, the GOJ will procure transport helicopters (CH-47JA/J), tanker transport aircraft (KC-767), fighters (F-2) and new transport aircraft that will replace C-1s. The GOJ will, based on actual operations and other matters, reconsider the total number of tanker-transport aircraft, and will take necessary measures. The GOJ will also improve rescuing capability by attaching transport aircraft (C-130H) the in-flight refueling function for rescue helicopters (UH-60J). (4) Patrol and Surveillance in the Sea and Airspace Surrounding Japan, and Response to Violation of Japan’s Airspace or the Intrusion of Armed Special-Purpose Vessels In order to patrol and survey in the sea and airspace surrounding Japan constantly and continuously, and to deal properly with armed special-purpose ships or submerged foreign submarines navigating under Japanese territorial sea, the GOJ will: procure destroyers (DDH and DD), patrol helicopters (SH60K) and minesweeper-transport helicopters (MCH-101); modernize early warning aircraft (E-2C) and the air control and warning systems of the BADGE; procure new patrol aircraft that will replace P-3Cs: and initiate the project to modernize early warning and control aircraft (E-767). The GOJ will also promote the modernization of fighters (F-15), and procure new fighters that will replace F-4s while restricting the total number of the procurement under the new NDPG. (5) Response to Large-Scale and/or Special-Type Disasters In order to effectively respond to large-scale and/or special-type disasters and other situations that demand protection of human lives and properties in cooperation with related institutions, the GOJ will take measures to help the SDF units improve necessary capabilities. 2. Preparations to Deal with Large-Scale Invasion of Japan Since the likelihood of large-scale invasion of Japan is expected to remain modest in the foreseeable future, the GOJ will modify the current defense force building concept that emphasized anti-tank warfare, antisubmarine warfare, and anti-air warfare, and will downsize equipment and personnel earmarked for a largescale invasion. At the same time, because reconstructing defense forces cannot be accomplished in a short period of time, while taking into accounts developments in neighboring countries and making use of technological progress, the GOJ will continue to procure tanks, artillery, mid-range surface-to-air missiles, destroyers, submarines, minesweepers, patrol aircraft, fighters, and so on. 3. Voluntary and Proactive Efforts to Improve the International Security Environment (1) Appropriate Effort for International Peace Cooperation Activities In order to send units quickly to international peace cooperation activities and sustain the operation, the GOJ will: establish a unit for education and research for international peace cooperation activities; expand and improve the current rotating standby posture; and procure equipment for international peace cooperation activities. (2) Enhancement of Security Dialogue, Defense Exchanges and Co-Training/Exercises with Other Countries The GOJ will promote measures for bilateral or multilateral security dialogue and defense exchanges ----- by positively promoting defense exchanges of each level and participating in international peace cooperation activities such as Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) and joint exercises for rescue and other objectives. The GOJ will also take part in efforts in the areas of arms control and disarmament led by international organizations including the United Nations (U.N.). 4. Critical Elements of Defense Capabilities (1) Strengthening Joint Operation Capabilities In addition to creating a new joint staff organization and reorganizing service Staff Office as mentioned in section II above, the GOJ will reorganize the Joint Staff College, conduct joint exercises, establish common information and communication infrastructure, and take other measures to build foundations for the joint operations. (2) Strengthening Intelligence Capabilities The GOJ will strengthen the capability of intelligence sections such as the Defense Intelligence Headquarters by securing and training able personnel and enhancing measures for gathering and analyzing various intelligence including signal and geospatial intelligence. The GOJ will modernize Electronic Intelligence Aircraft (EP-3), and start tentative modification for converting some of the F-15 fighters to reconnaissance aircraft. In addition, the GOJ will take necessary measures, upon consideration, with regard to unmanned aerial vehicles of high altitude and endurance. (3) Incorporation of the Progress in Science and Technology into Defense Forces a. Strengthening Command and Control Capability, etc. In order to have credible command and control and swift information sharing that are indispensable for joint operations and smooth implementation of international peace cooperation activities with enhanced operational and organizational efficiency, the GOJ will establish advanced command and communication systems and information and communication network in tune with information and communication technologies available at home and overseas, thereby concentrating and circulating information through chains of command, sharing intelligence at the unit level, strengthening capability to respond cyber attacks and enhancing information sharing with relevant organizations and other entities. b. Promoting Research and Development The GOJ will promote development of next generation aircraft that will replace P-3Cs and C-1s, and next generation tank. The GOJ will promote, taking into account trends of science and technology, research and development (R&D) of various command and control systems, unmanned aerial vehicles, and other equipments, with focused distribution of resources. In the meantime, the GOJ will make efforts for effective and efficient implementation of R&D by proactively introducing advanced technology of industrial, governmental and academic sectors, using modeling and simulation methods, using the same parts or components for different equipment, and promoting cooperation with the U.S. and other nations. Furthermore, the GOJ will review methods for focused investment in R&D, and the organization of the Technical Research and Development Institute, and take necessary measures. (4) Effective Utilization of Human Resources a. Enhancement of Measures for Personnel, Education and Training The GOJ will take various measures for maintaining high morale and strict discipline of personnel. The GOJ will secure and raise SDF personnel of high quality through increasing young officers endowed with flexible judgment and other means, and also enhancing education and training so that the SDF can better respond to diversified and internationalized missions, advanced defense ----- equipment and joint operations. The GOJ will also consider effective way of utilization of retired personnel in the society, and take necessary measures. b. Promotion of Research and Education Regarding Security Issues The GOJ will improve the research and education function of the National Institute for Defense Studies regarding security policy. The GOJ will enhance human basis by personnel exchanges in security area. 5. Measures to Support Defense Capability (1) Streamlined and Efficient Acquisition of Equipment The GOJ will strengthen efforts to curb lifecycle cost of equipments including cost of procurement, with a concrete target to achieve. The GOJ will promote general procurement reform and take necessary measures, such as establishing an efficient procurement and replenishment posture which can cope with diverse situations and establishing the truly necessary defense industrial and technological basis, the center of which constitutes core technological areas indispensable for national security. (2) Promotion of Cooperation with Relevant Administrative Organizations and Local Communities The GOJ will improve coordination with the relevant organizations such as police, fire department, and the Coast Guard, and promote cooperation with local governments and local communities with the Civil Protection Law as its basis. In addition, the GOJ will efficiently maintain and develop defense-related facilities. In order to make those facilities coexist more harmoniously with local communities, the GOJ will continue to promote measures for local communities surrounding those facilities under close cooperation with local governments. IV. Measures to Strengthen the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements 1. Exchanges of Intelligence and Policy Consultations The GOJ will promote exchanges of intelligence and views regarding international situations, and maintain strategic dialogue with the U.S. on wide-ranging security issues such as role-sharing between the two countries and the military posture that includes force structure of the U.S. Forces in Japan (USFJ), bearing in mind the need to reduce the excessive burden that U.S. military bases and facilities place on local communities, while maintaining the deterrent that the U.S. military presence in Japan provides. 2. Operational Cooperation and Bilateral Exercise/Training Based on the outcome of the strategic dialogue, the GOJ will make efforts to build an effective posture for operational cooperation, and expand bilateral exercise/training. 3. Promotion of Cooperation based on Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) The GOJ will strengthen Japan-U.S. bilateral efforts to enhance ballistic missile defense (BMD) capabilities, and promote cooperation with the U.S. in the fields of defense policy, operations, and equipment and technology. 4. Equipment and Technology Exchanges The GOJ will make efforts to enhance broad mutual exchanges including joint R&D projects with the U.S. in the area of equipment and technology. 5. Promotion of Efforts to Make the Stationing of the USFJ Smooth and Effective The GOJ will take measures to make the stationing of the USFJ smooth and efficient, such as support to the stationing of the USFJ and realignment, consolidation, and reduction of USFJ facilities and areas in Okinawa, while engaging in strategic dialogue with the U.S. regarding force structure of the USFJ on its own initiative and continuously maintaining the deterrent that the U.S. military presence in Japan provides. ----- 6. Enhancement of Japan-U.S. Cooperation concerning International Measures for Regional or Global Security The GOJ will take measures to closely cooperate with the U.S. and proactively participate in international activities to prevent or to tackle new threats and diverse situations such as the fight against terrorism and the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI). V. Size of Procurement Regarding the size of equipment procurement as described in the preceding section III (Major Plans related to SDF Capabilities), specific numbers of main equipment procurement are shown in the attached table. VI. Expenses Required 1. The limit of the total amount of defense-related expenditures needed for this program is approximately 24.24 trillion yen at the prices of FY 2005. 2. In the annual budget formulation process, the GOJ will decide it within the framework of the expenditures required by this Program, while achieving harmony with other Government measures by seeking further efficiency and rationalization. In case of needs to respond to an unforeseeable situation in the future, extra budget, besides the defense-related expenditures shown in I, might be provided within the limit of 100 billion yen on the condition that the Security Council of Japan would approve. The GOJ will continue to respect the spirit of seeking a moderate defense build-up as stated in the “Program for the Future Build-up of Defense Capability” (adopted by the Security Council and the Cabinet on January 24, 1987). 3. Within the limit of the total amount of expenditures to this program, the program will be reviewed if necessary in three years from now, considering various factors in and outside Japan including international situations prevailing at that time, global trends in technology such as information and communication technology and Japan’s fiscal condition. (Attached Table) ----- VII. Others 1. The GOJ will review the modality of defense forces stated in the new NDPG to make necessary changes, in five years or when serious situational changes emerge, taking into account the security environment and technological trends at the time. 2. The GOJ will steadily implement projects related to the Special Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO). The costs required for their implementation will be separately identified. Reference 11. Statement by the Chief Cabinet Secretary (December 10, 2004) 1. The Government of Japan approved the “National Defense Program Guidelines, FY 2005-” (the new NDPG) and the “Mid-Term Defense Program, FY 2005-FY 2009” at the Security Council and the Cabinet Meeting today. 2. In light of the new threats and diverse situations presented by today’s security environment, including the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles, international terrorism, and other various situations that affect peace and security, the Government has developed the new NDPG in recognition of the need to set new guidelines for shaping Japan’s future security and defense. 3. The new NDPG spell out both Japan’s vision for future defense forces as well as the basic principles of its security policy which underlie that vision. Japan has two basic security policy objectives: (a) to prevent any threat from reaching Japan and, in the event that it does, to repel it; and (b) to improve the international security environment in order to prevent any threat from reaching Japan in the first place. The new NDPG make it clear that, in particular, improving the international security environment is one of the major pillars of the security policy of Japan, whose prosperity and growth depend heavily on the security of sea lines of communication. The new NDPG point out that it is necessary to achieve these goals by both its own efforts as well as cooperative efforts with the United States, Japan’s alliance partner, as well as with the international community. At the same time, we will continue to firmly uphold the basic principles of our defense policy that we have ascribed to in accordance with the Constitution of Japan. 4. In implementing this policy, the Government of Japan will employ all available means to prevent any threat from reaching the country. Should a threat reach Japan, the Government will take an integrated response, swiftly making appropriate decisions, bringing together all relevant organizations, and having them cooperate fully. The new NDPG have clearly stated that relevant organizations such as the Self-Defense Forces, the police, and the Japan Coast Guard will utilize all available means and work closely together to protect Japan and its people. In addition, as a part of its own effort, Japan will engage in diplomatic and other activities to improve the international security environment so as to prevent the emergence of any threats. Japan’s defense forces—the ultimate guarantee of its national security—should be capable of effectively responding to any new threats and diverse situations, while inheriting the elements of the Basic Defense Force Concept that still remain valid. Japan’s defense forces should also be capable of actively participating in international peace cooperation activities in order to improve the international security environment. While roles that the defense forces have to play are multiplying and fiscal conditions continue to deteriorate, Japan’s future defense forces should be multi-functional, flexible, and effective while, at the same time, more rationalized and streamlined. The Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements are indispensable to the security of Japan as well as the peace ----- and stability in the Asia-Pacific region. Based on the Arrangements, close cooperative relations between Japan and its alliance partner, the United States, play an important role in facilitating international efforts to effectively address new threats and diverse situations. Japan will proactively engage in strategic dialogue with the United States on wide-ranging security issues such as role-sharing between the two countries and U.S. military posture, including the U.S. force structure in Japan, while working to harmonize our perceptions of the new security environment and appropriate strategic objectives in it. Regarding its cooperation with the international community, Japan will utilize its Official Development Assistance (ODA) strategically and actively participate in international peace cooperation activities. The new NDPG have clearly defined these activities as part of our effort to improve the international security environment. 5. Regarding the future defense force, Japan will develop highly responsive and mobile defense forces capable of dealing effectively with new threats and diverse situations, and deploy them appropriately in accordance with Japan’s geographical characteristics. Japan’s future defense forces should be capable of coping with ballistic missile attacks, attacks carried out by guerrillas and special operations forces, and invasion of offshore islands. They should also be able to execute patrol and surveillance in the sea and airspace surrounding Japan, and respond to the violation of airspace, the intrusion of armed special purpose ships and other similar vessels, and large-scale and/or special-type (nuclear, biological, chemical, and radiological) disasters. Should such a situation emerge, the defense forces will respond in smooth and close collaboration with the police and other relevant organizations, thereby providing a seamless response to the situation in accordance with circumstances and designated roles. In our judgment, the likelihood of a fullscale invasion of Japan has declined and will remain modest for the foreseeable future. Thus, based on a fundamental review, we have decided to reduce the personnel and equipment earmarked for coping with such a contingency. However, because the original role of our defense forces is to cope with fullscale invasion and reconstructing these forces cannot be accomplished in a short period of time, Japan will continue to maintain the most basic capabilities of its defense forces, while also taking into account developments in neighboring countries and making use of technological progress. In our effort to improve the international security environment, we will establish infrastructure and make necessary arrangements to engage in international peace cooperation activities. Japan will continue to strongly promote activities conducive to international peace and stability, such as security dialogue and defense exchanges. 6. We will continue to firmly maintain our policy of dealing with arms exports control carefully, in light of Japan’s basic philosophy as a peace-loving nation on which the Three Principles on Arms Exports and their related policy guidelines are based. If Japan decides that it will engage in joint development and production of ballistic missile defense systems with the United States, however, the Three Principles will not be applied, under the condition that strict control is maintained, because such systems and related activities will contribute to the effective operation of the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements and are conducive to the security of Japan. In addition, through the process by which the NDPG were developed, questions were raised regarding how to handle cases of joint development and production with the United States (other than those related to the ballistic missile defense system) as well as those related to support of counter-terrorism and counterpiracy. Decisions will be made on the basis of individual examination of each case, in light of Japan’s basic philosophy as a peace-loving nation that aims at avoiding the escalation of international conflicts. 7. Based on the new NDPG, the Government will devise Japan’s vision for international peace cooperation activities, and take legal and other necessary measures concerning Japan’s security and defense policy, including placement of international peace cooperation activities in Self-Defense Forces’ mission priorities, ----- and operational issues pertaining to the ballistic missile defense systems. 8. To clearly indicate the target period in which the planned defense force level will be achieved, the new NDPG provide the vision for our defense forces for the next decade. In addition, in order to better adjust our defense policy to the changing security environment, we will review and, if necessary, revise the NDPG in five years. 9. The “Mid-Term Defense Program, FY 2005-FY 2009” was formulated to achieve the defense forces level that Japan should possess as provided for in the new NDPG. We expect the total defense-related budget for the new Mid-Term Defense Program to be approximately 24,240 billion yen under FY 2004 prices. 10. The Government of Japan will report today’s decision to the Diet. I would sincerely hope that the people of Japan will understand and give their support to the decision. Reference 12. The Three Principles on Arms Export, etc. The export of “arms” needs a license from the Minster of Economy, Trade and Industry pursuant to the Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Control Law (Law 228, 1949) (Note) and the Export Trade Control Order (Ordinance No. 378, 1949). Note: Now known as the Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Law. 1. The Three Principles on Arms Export On April 21, 1967, then Prime Minister Eisaku Sato declared the Three Principles at the House of Representatives’ Audit Committee meeting. (Summary) The Principles provide that arms export to the following countries shall not be permitted: (1) Communist Bloc countries; (2) Countries to which arms export is prohibited under the U.N. resolutions; or (3) Countries which are actually involved or likely to become involved in international conflicts. 2. The Government’s Unified View on Arms Export On February 27, 1976, then Prime Minister Takeo Miki announced the Government’s view at the House of Representatives’ Budget Committee meeting. (Full text) (1) The Government’s Policy With regard to the export of “arms,” the Government, from the standpoint of Japan as a pacifist country, has always been dealing with the problems of arms export in a cautious manner to avoid the escalation of international conflict. The Government will continue to deal with such matters pursuant to the following policy and will not promote arms export. (i) The export of “arms” to the areas subject to the Three Principles shall not be permitted. (ii) The export of “arms” to areas other than the areas subject to the Three Principles shall be restrained in line with the spirit of the Constitution and the Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Control Law. (iii) Equipment related to arms production (Export Trade Control Order, Separate Table 1, Section No. 109, etc.) shall be treated in the same category as “arms.” (2) Definition of Arms The term “arms” is used in different laws and regulations or in terms of application, and its definition should be interpreted in accordance with the purpose of that law or regulation. ----- (i) Arms referred to in the Three Principles on Arms Export are “those that are used by the military forces and directly employed in combat.” Specifically “arms” are those that are listed in Items from No. 197 to No. 205 in the Annexed List 1 of the Export Trade Control Order and are consistent with the above definition. (ii) “Arms” under the Self-Defense Forces Law are interpreted as “firearms, explosives, swords and other machines, equipment and devices aimed at killing and injuring people or destroying things as means of armed struggle.” Such equipment as destroyers, fighters and tanks that move, intrinsically carrying firearms, etc. for purposes of directly killing and injuring people or destroying things as a means of armed struggle, are considered “arms.” Note: Due to partial revision of the Export Trade Control Order in November 1991, “the item No. 109” in (3) of 1) and “the items from No. 197 to No. 205” in (1) of 2) have been changed to “the Item No. 1.” Reference 13 About the Review of the Mid-Term Defense Program (FY 2005–FY 2009) (Approved by the Security Council and the Cabinet on December 20, 2008) Content of the review In order to improve equipment more efficiently while adequately responding to the development, etc. of the technology level of foreign countries, the scale of modernization/upgrading of fighters (F-15) and improvement of other equipment/material indicated in the appendix of the Mid-Term Defense Program (FY 2005–FY 2009) shall be as shown in this appendix. Expense account With the review of the improvement scale of the major equipments and other measures, the limit of the total defense-related cost of the plan shall be about 28,640 billion yen, which is the price calculated in 2004. Other In addition to the above, the expense for measures to reduce the local burden concerning the realignment of US forces during the period of the plan is about 90 billion yen, which is the price calculated in 2004. We shall continue to implement the measures adequately and swiftly in accordance with the “government efforts concerning the realignment of U.S. force structure in Japan, etc.” (Approved by the Cabinet on June 30, 2006) ----- (Attached Table) Reference 14. Cost of Major Programs in FY 2009 1. Contents of Major Programs (Unit: million yen) (Unit: million yen) ----- 2. Enhancement of Equipment (Unit: million yen) ----- Reference 15. Major Equipment to be Procured in FY 2009 ----- Reference 16. Number of Tanks and Major Artillery Owned, Performance Specifications Number Owned (As of March 31, 2009) |Col1|Col2|Col3| |---|---|---| |||| |Performance Specifications and Data||| |||| |||| |||| |||| |||| |||| |||| |||| (As of March 31, 2009) ----- Reference 18. Number of Major Ships Commissioned into Service, with Performance Specifications and Data |(As of March 31, 2009|Col2|Col3|Col4|Col5| |---|---|---|---|---| |||||| |||||| |||||| |||||| |||||| |||||| |||||| |||||| |Performance Specifications and Data||||| |||||| |||||| |||||| |||||| |||||| |||||| |||||| |||||| |||||| |||||| |||||| |||||| |||||| ----- Reference 19. Guided Missile Specifications (As of March 31, 2009) |Col1|Col2|Col3|Col4|Col5|Col6|Col7|Col8|Col9| |---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---| |||||||||| |||||||||| |||||||||| |||||||||| |||||||||| |||||||||| |||||||||| |||||||||| |||||||||| |||||||||| |||||||||| |||||||||| |||||||||| |||||||||| |||||||||| |||||||||| |||||||||| |||||||||| |||||||||| |||||||||| |||||||||| |||||||||| |||||||||| |||||||||| |||||||||| |||||||||| |||||||||| |||||||||| |||||||||| |||||||||| |||||||||| |||||||||| |||||||||| |||||||||| ----- Reference 20. Pattern of Defense-Related Expenditures (Original Budget Basis) (Unit: 100 million yen, %) Reference 21. Changes in Major Areas of Expenditures on General Account Budget (Original Budget Basis) (Unit: 100 million yen, %) ----- Reference 22. Changes in Composition of Defense-Related Expenditures (Unit: 100 million yen, %) |Col1|Col2| |---|---| ||| ||| ||| ||| ||| ||| ||| ||| ||| (Original Budget Basis) ----- Reference 23. Trend of Defense Expenditures of Major Countries Reference 24. Basic Principles for Responding to Armed Attack Situations ----- Reference 25. Examples of Items Provided by Basic Response Plan Reference 26. Highlights of the Civil Protection Plan of the Ministry of Defense Civil Protection Plans are prepared by all designated administrative agencies based on provisions including Article 33, Paragraph 1 of the Civil Protection Law. 1. Basic Concept The SDF shall take measures to protect civilians such as evacuation, relief of residents, and responses to armed attack situations, to the extent possible without affecting its main duty to repel an armed attack with full force in an armed attack situation. 2. Implementation Framework a. An intra-ministry coordination system and emergency call posture of personnel shall be developed in peacetime. b. In armed attack situations and anticipated situations, the Defense Minister shall instruct necessary responses with the advice of the Defense Council, to be held as necessary. To that end, the system assisting the Defense Minister shall be established through augmentation of personnel and others. In addition, units shall be put on readiness in anticipation of implementing civil protection measures (enhanced service capabilities of personnel, inspection and maintenance of equipment and supplies, etc.). 3. Implementation Procedures for Civil Protection Measures a. If the Defense Minster is requested by a prefectural governor and recognizes it is unavoidable, or is requested by the Task Force Chief, the Minister of State for Defense, with the approval of the Prime Minister, orders a civilian protection dispatch to implement civil protection measures. b. If the Minster of State for Defense is requested for support by a prefectural governor and recognizes it is required, the Defense Minister orders defense operations/public security operations to all or part of the forces to implement civil protection measures. ----- 4. Contents of Civil Protection Measures Executed by the SDF a. Evacuation of residents The SDF, in coordination with related organizations, implements guidance and transportation of evacuated residents, as well as collection and provision of necessary information. In addition, it coordinates and manages procedures associated with traffic inside the SDF’s posts and bases or on the premises of U.S. military installations in Japan, for the purpose of evacuation. b. Relief of evacuated residents The SDF implements lifesaving measures (such as search and rescue, and provision of first aid), and as appropriate, measures for livelihood support (such as preparation of hot meals, water supply, and transportation of aid supplies). In addition, it gives permission to use facilities of the Ministry of Defense for the purpose of relief. c. Responses to armed attack situations The SDF checks on the damage situation (including monitoring support), saves lives (including search and rescue, and provision of first aid), prevents the spread of damage (including evacuation support of surrounding residents, and firefighting), and removes hazardous substances caused by attacks using NBC weapons, etc. In addition, it implements support for securing safety of life-related facilities (including instruction/advice, and personnel dispatch). 5. Responses to Emergency Response Situations The SDF implements protection measures for emergency responses pursuant to the measures for civil protection in implementation procedures and content. ----- Reference 27. Participation in Civil Protection-Related Joint Exercises by the National Government and the Local Public Entity (FY 2007) ----- Reference 28. Preparation of Ballistic Missile Defense System, etc. (Adopted by the Security Council of Japan and approved by the Cabinet on December 19, 2003) (Preparation of Ballistic Missile Defense System) 1. On the issue of the ballistic missile defense (BMD), under the recognition that Japan should take active measures on the issue given the advancement of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles, the Mid-Term Defense Program (FY 2001 to FY 2005) (hereinafter “MTDP”), which was adopted by the Security Council of Japan and approved by the Cabinet on December 15, 2003, stipulates that “necessary measures will be taken upon the review of its technical feasibility.” As recent tests of various kinds have confirmed the high technical feasibility of the BMD, development of the BMD system has become feasible upon the improvement of capacities and joint operation of the existing Aegis systemequipped destroyers and the surface-to-air Patriot guided missile system. Thus, considering that the BMD system is inherently defensive as well as unsubstitutable and is the only measure to protect the lives and properties of the people of Japan against ballistic missile attacks, the system agrees with Japan’s exclusively defenseoriented policy. Consequently, the Government of Japan is determined to equip the nation with the same system. (Review of Japan’s Defense Capabilities) 2. Regarding the security environment surrounding Japan, while large-scale invasion by a third country into Japan has become less likely, measures against the increasing proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles, activities of international terrorist groups and other types of new forms of threats as well as diverse contingencies that are likely to have a negative impact on the peace and security of the nation (hereinafter “the new threats, etc.”) has been urgently needed for the international community. For the peace and stability of the nation and the international community, Japan also needs to take all possible measures against such new threats, etc. through comprehensive and prompt responses under the organic coordination of diplomatic effort promotion, effective operation of defense forces and other measures, while firmly maintaining the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements. When such new security environment and the introduction of the BMD system are considered, we come to a conclusion that the whole defense capacities of Japan need to be reviewed. To this end, we will make effectual measures against the new threats, etc. according to the specific features of each of them while maintaining close cooperation with concerned agencies and local communities, further developing cooperative relationship with the United States based on the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements, and promoting cooperation with neighboring nations and other nations and international organizations concerned. At the same time, the Government of Japan will review the whole defensive capacities of Japan in order to prepare for proactive and affirmative actions that are to be taken to protect the peace and stability of the international community to which Japan belongs. In so doing, preparation of necessary schemes that can effectually deal with the new threats, etc., including terrorist attacks and ballistic missile attacks, will be prepared, and at the same time the current defense build-up concept and equipment system will be fundamentally reviewed and appropriate down-sizing will be made, while taking events of largescale invasion into consideration. These actions are to build defense forces that are capable of effectively responding to the new security environment. Based on the views described above, when renewing the current system of the Self-Defense Forces into a new system, we will pursue the improvement of readiness, mobility, flexibility and multipurpose functions of the system as well as highly advanced technical capabilities and intelligence capabilities, and at the ----- same time we will carry out a fundamental review of the existing organizations, equipment and other items concerned in order to improve their efficiencies. In so doing, the following items will be focused in order to establish an effectual system. (1) The current organizations and alike will be reviewed, and new organizations, including an advisory organization to the Defense Minister, necessary for the operation of the Self-Defense Forces that centers on joint operation, will be formed. (2) As for the major units of the Ground, Maritime and Air Self-Defense Forces, new schemes, including a new organization, will be constructed in order that effectual measures may be taken in the event of new threats, etc. (3) Necessary functions, organizations and equipments will be prepared in order to readily take actions that effectively contribute to the peace and security of the international community. (4) In order to prepare for the unexpected change of the security situations in the future, while securely retaining the fundamental components to respond to events of large-scale invasion and concerning the security situations of the surrounding area of Japan, the following measures will be taken. a. Regarding the Ground Self-Defense Force, a defense build-up concept focused on anti-tank warfare will be developed, and a system that can promptly respond to the new threats, etc. will be prepared through improvement of mobility and other capabilities, while the current situation of tanks, artilleries and other weapons will be reviewed and appropriate downsizing will be made. b. Regarding the Maritime Self-Defense Force, the defense build-up concept will be altered to one that is focused on anti-submarine warfare, and preparation of a responding system to ballistic missiles and other new threats, etc. will be attempted, while the current situation of destroyers, fixed-wing patrol aircraft and other equipment will be reviewed and appropriate downsizing will be made. c. Regarding the Air Self-Defense Force, the current defense force build-up concept focused on the anticombat aircraft warfare will be modified to better prepare for ballistic missile and other new threats, etc. At the same time, the current situation of combat aircraft and other equipment will be reviewed and appropriate downsizing and other measures will be taken. (Defense-related Expenditures) 3. When carrying out such a large-scale program as the BMD system preparation, the Government of Japan will carry out a fundamental review of the existing organizations and equipment of the Self-Defense Forces based on the items described above (see 2) in order to improve the efficiency, and, at the same time, make efforts to reduce defense-related expenditures to take the harsh economic and fiscal conditions of Japan into consideration. Based on such views, the government will lay down a new Mid-Term Defense Program that will replace the current program by the end of 2004 and determine the limit of the total amount needed for the same program. (Formulation of New Defense Program Guidelines) 4. As a precursor to the formulation of a new Mid-Term Defense Program, the Government of Japan will formulate new National Defense Program Guidelines that will replace the National Defense Program Guidelines from FY 1996 (adopted by the Security Council of Japan and the Cabinet on November 28, 1995). The new Guidelines will be formulated to adopt the system to the new security environment and follow the concepts described above (see 1 and 2). We also aim to stipulate our visions for Japan’s defense forces, including the position of Japan’s Self-Defense Forces in activities to maintain the peace and stability of the international community. ----- Reference 29. Statement of the Chief Cabinet Secretary of Japan on the Cabinet Decision, “On Introduction of Ballistic Missile Defense System and Other Measures” (December 19, 2003) 1. The Government of Japan decided “On Introduction of Ballistic Missile Defense System and Other Measures” at the Security Council of Japan and the Cabinet today. This decision shows the thinking behind the introduction of BMD system, and at the same time, indicates the direction of Japan’s defense force review taking into account the introduction of BMD system and the new security environment. Based on this decision, the Government of Japan will formulate a new National Defense Program Outline and a new MidTerm Defense Program by the end of the year 2004. 2. The Government of Japan, recognizing that rapid progress on the relevant technologies of BMD has recently been made and that technological feasibility of BMD system is high, and noting that BMD system is suitable for our exclusively defense-oriented policy, decided to introduce the multi-tier defense system based on the Aegis BMD system and Patriot PAC-3 (Patriot Advanced Capability-3). 3. The technical feasibility of the BMD system has been confirmed with the results from interception tests and other capability tests carried out by the United States as well as with the Japan’s original simulation experiments. Therefore, we concluded that technical reliability of these systems is considerably high and the technology has reached a sufficiently high level for practical use as we can see from the decision by the United States on the primary deployment. 4. BMD system is the only purely defensive measure, without alternatives, to protect life and property of the citizens of Japan against ballistic missile attacks, and meets the principle of exclusively defense-oriented policy. Therefore, it is considered that this presents no threat to neighboring countries, and does not affect the regional stability. 5. As for the issue of the right of collective self-defense, the BMD system that the Government of Japan is introducing aims at the defense of Japan. It will be operated based on Japan’s independent judgment, and will not be used for the purpose of defending third countries. Therefore, it does not raise any problems with regard to the issue of the right of collective self-defense. The BMD system requires interception of missiles by Japan’s own independent judgment based on the information on the target acquired by Japan’s own sensors. 6. In legal terms on the operation of the BMD system, interception of ballistic missile attack is basically conducted as a defense operation that is undertaken in situations regarded as an armed attack against Japan. In addition, due to the nature of ballistic missiles and the characteristics of BMD, the Government will conduct specific studies on necessary measures including legal ones, which enable appropriate responses to each situation. 7. The joint Japan-U.S. technical research currently underway is not for the system being introduced this time, but it aims to improve the capability of future interceptor. It remains important to carry on the research in order to take all possible measures to ensure national defense. The future transition to the development and deployment stage will be decided separately, taking international situations of the time and other factors into consideration. 8. Japan will take all possible measures to ensure national defense and prevention of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, by ensuring transparency and encouraging international understanding on BMD, and by promoting further cooperation with the United States on technology and operation. ----- Reference 30. Emergency-Response Procedures Concerning Measures to Destroy Ballistic Missiles or Other Objects as Stipulated under Article 82-2, Paragraph 3 of SDF Law (Cabinet Decision on March 23, 2007) In line with Paragraph 3 of Article 82-2 of the SDF Law (No. 165 of 1954 law and hereinafter called the Law) and Article 104-2 of the Ordinance to Execute the SDF Law (No. 179 of 1954 ordinance and hereinafter called the Ordinance), emergency-response procedures concerning measures to destroy ballistic missiles and others (as stipulated under Paragraph 1 of Article 82-2 of the Law) are stipulated as follows. These procedures are stipulated based on the current defense capability Japan has against ballistic missiles, arising from the deployment of a PAC-3 Patriot missile at the 1st Air Defense Missile Group of the Central Air Defense Force of the Air Defense Command of the ASDF (hereinafter called the 1st Air Defense Missile Group). The procedures will be revised in the future if a revision is deemed necessary due to reasons including the enhancement of Japan’s ballistic missile defense capability. 1. Conditions for the Defense Minister to issue an order based on provisions stipulated under Paragraph 3 of Article 82-2 of the Law and conditions which are required in order to certify the situation as a state of “emergency” as stipulated under Paragraph 3 of Article 82-2 of the Law (related to Article 104-2-1 of the Ordinance) (1) Conditions for the Defense Minister to issue an order based on provisions stipulated under Paragraph 3 of Article 82-2 If either of conditions shown below is met, the Defense Minister will issue an order based on provisions stipulated under Paragraph 3 of Article 82-2. a. When a ballistic missile is suspected of having been launched in a foreign country or is feared to be launched in a foreign country but it cannot be recognized at that time that the missile is feared to fly toward Japan due to an uncertainty over the purpose of a possible launch of the missile and its capability and other factors b. When a satellite launch rocket launched in a foreign country or other objects except aircraft whose possible fall may result in causing serious damage to human life and property are feared to fall due to an accident and other reasons but it cannot be recognized at that time that the rocket or other objects are feared to fly toward Japan due to an uncertainty over the location of the accident and the situation of the accident and other factors (2) Conditions which are required in order to certify the situation as a state of “emergency” It can be certified that the situation is a state of “emergency” if Japan’s Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) system recognizes that a ballistic missile or other objects are flying toward Japan. 2. Scope of ballistic missiles and other objects which become subject to measures stipulated under Paragraph 3 of Article 82-2 of the Law and means to destroy the missiles or others (related to Article 104-2-2 of the Ordinance) (1) Scope of ballistic missiles and other objects Either of objects listed below that is recognized to be flying toward Japan using its BMD system a. Ballistic missile b. Satellite launch rocket ----- c. Artificial satellite d. Other objects except aircraft whose possible fall may result in causing serious damage to human life and property (2) Means to destroy ballistic missiles or other objects Based on provisions stipulated under Article 93-2 of the Law, a PAC-3 Patriot missile deployed at the 1st Air Defense Missile Group will be launched with the aim of destroying an incoming ballistic missile or other objects over Japanese territory or over international waters in the vicinity of Japan (including an exclusive economic zone stipulated under the United Nations Convention on Law of the Sea). 3. Areas where SDF units undertake activities to implement measures based on provisions stipulated under Paragraph 3 of Article 82-2 of the Law (related to Article 104-2-3 of the Ordinance) Areas where SDF units undertake activities following the issuance of an order by the Defense Ministry to implement measures based on provisions stipulated under Paragraph 3 of Article 82-2 of the Law are in Japanese territory, international waters in the vicinity of Japan and over such waters. Areas where SDF personnel belonging to the 1st Air Defense Missile Group undertake activities are limited to places where their activities are deemed necessary to prevent a possible fall of a ballistic missile or other objects from causing damage in the Tokyo metropolitan area. Such areas will be designated under an order to be issued by the Defense Minister based on provisions stipulated under Paragraph 3 of Article 82-2 of the Law. 4. Matters concerning command of SDF units which implement measures based on provisions stipulated under Paragraph 3 of Article 82-2 of the Law (related to Article 104-2-4 of the Ordinance) SDF units which implement these measures are the 1st Air Defense Missile Group, the Aircraft Control and Warning Wing and other units whose activities are judged by the Defense Minister to be necessary under certain situations. SDF units in charge of implementing the measures will be placed under the Commander of the Air Defense Command. The command of the Defense Minister with regard to operations of SDF units in charge of implementing the measures will be conducted via the Chief of Staff at the Joint Staff Office. A Defense Minister’s order regarding this matter will be executed by the Chief of Staff at the Joint Staff Office. 5. Matters concerning cooperation with relevant government organizations (related to Article 104-2-5 of the Ordinance) When the Defense Ministry recognizes the light of a ballistic missile or other objects toward Japan using its BMD system, it will immediately inform relevant government organizations (the Cabinet Secretariat, the National Police Agency, the Fire and Disaster Management Agency, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Fisheries Agency, the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport, the Japan Coast Guard and other administrative organizations whose activities are judged by the Defense Minister to be necessary under certain situations) of the detection of the missile or the objects, areas where they are forecast to fall and an estimated arrival time. When SDF units in charge of implementing measures to destroy the missile or other objects have taken such measures, the Defense Ministry will immediately inform the relevant government organizations of the situation regarding the destruction. ----- In addition, the Defense Ministry will conduct necessary cooperation with the relevant government organizations in response to their requests. 6. Matters concerning measures to be taken when it is recognized that a ballistic missile or other objects stipulated under Paragraph 1 of Article 82-2 of the Law are feared to ly toward Japan while an order issued based on provisions stipulated under Paragraph 3 of Article 82-2 of the Law is in place (related to Article 104-2-6) When it is recognized that a ballistic missile or other objects stipulated under Paragraph 1 of Article 82-2 of the Law are feared to fly toward Japan while an order based on provisions stipulated under Paragraph 3 of Article 82-2 of the Law is in place, the Defense Minister, based on Paragraph 1 of Article 82-2 of the Law, will order SDF units to take the measures to destroy the missile or the objects after receiving an approval from the Prime Minister. The Defense Minister will then withdraw the order which has been in place based on provisions stipulated under Paragraph 3 of Article 82-2 of the Law. Reference 31. Statement by the Chief Cabinet Secretary “Japan-U.S. Cooperative Development of Advanced SM-3 Missile for Ballistic Missile Defense” (December 24, 2005) 1. The Government of Japan, through today’s meetings of the Security Council of Japan and the Cabinet, decided to initiate Japan-U.S. joint development of advanced SM-3 missile for Ballistic Missile Defense. 2. The Government of Japan has started and promoted Japan-U.S. joint technical research on a sea-based upper tier system since 1999 with the understanding that BMD system is the only and purely defensive measure, without alternatives, to protect the lives and properties of Japanese citizens against ballistic missile attacks and meets the principles of exclusively defense-oriented policy, in an environment marked by proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles. This research does not aim at the BMD system which Japan started to introduce since FY 2004, but aims to improve the future capabilities of interceptors in order to expand all possible means to ensure Japan’s national defense. 3. The “Mid-Term Defense Program (FY 2005-2009)” states “the Government of Japan will consider the possibility of transition to the development stage, and take necessary measures.” Based on the results of Japan-U.S. joint technical research to date, the Government of Japan has sufficient prospect for solving the initial technical challenges. In the current international situation, taking into consideration the continuing fiscal constraint, we consider it appropriate to promote Japan-U.S. joint development of advanced SM-3 missiles efficiently in order to acquire the capability against future ballistic missile threats. Future transition to the deployment stage of the advanced missile will be decided based on the results of the joint development. 4. Regarding the relation with the Three Principles on Arms Export, “Statement by the Chief Cabinet Secretary” for National Defense Program Guidelines, FY 2005- (approved by the Security Council of Japan and the Cabinet on December 10, 2004), states “if Japan decides that it will engage in joint development and production of ballistic missile defense systems with the United States, however, the Three Principles on Arms Exports will not be applied, under the condition that strict control is maintained, because such systems and related activities will contribute to the effective operation of the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements and are conductive to the security of Japan.” We will continue to firmly maintain our policy of dealing with arms ----- exports control carefully, in light of Japan’s basic philosophy as a peace-loving nation on which the Three Principles on Arms Exports and their related policy guidelines are based. Based on these, arms that need to be provided to the United States for the Japan-U.S. joint development will be provided under strict control after coordinating with the United States in the future on the framework for arms transfer. 5. Japan will continue to ensure the transparency and increase international understanding of its BMD system while further promoting cooperation in the areas of policy, operation and equipment/technology with the United States. Through these efforts, Japan will strive to take all possible measures in ensuring its national defense and preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles. ----- Reference 32. Main Operations of the Self-Defense Forces ----- ----- Reference 33. Statutory Provisions about the Use of Armed Force and Weapons by SDF Personnel ----- Reference 34. Record of Disaster Relief Dispatches (Past Five Years) ----- Reference 35. Retired SDF Personnel Working at Disaster Prevention-Related Departments of Local Governments (As of April 30, 2009) ----- Reference 36. Japan-U.S. Joint Declaration on Security: Alliance for the 21st Century (tentative translation) (Tokyo, April 17, 1996) 1. Today, the Prime Minister and the President celebrated one of the most successful bilateral relationships in history. The leaders took pride in the profound and positive contribution this relationship has made to world peace and regional stability and prosperity. The strong Alliance between Japan and the U.S. helped ensure peace and security in the Asia-Pacific region during the Cold War. Our Alliance continues to underlie the dynamic economic growth in this region. The two leaders agreed that the future security and prosperity of both Japan and the U.S. are tied inextricably to the future of the Asia-Pacific region. The benefits of peace and prosperity that spring from the Alliance are due not only to the commitments of the two Governments, but also to the contributions of the Japanese and American people who have shared the burden of securing freedom and democracy. The Prime Minister and the President expressed their profound gratitude to those who sustain the Alliance, especially those Japanese communities that host U.S. forces, and those Americans who, far from home, devote themselves to the defense of peace and freedom. 2. For more than a year, the two Governments conducted an intensive review of the evolving political and security environment of the Asia-Pacific region and of various aspects of the Japan-U.S. security relationship. On the basis of this review, the Prime Minister and the President reaffirmed their commitment to the profound common values that guide our national policies: the maintenance of freedom, the pursuit of democracy and respect for human rights. They agreed that the foundations for our cooperation remain firm, and that this partnership will remain vital in the twenty-first century. The Regional Outlook 3. Since the end of the Cold War, the possibility of global armed conflict has receded. The last few years have seen expanded political and security dialogue among countries of the region. Respect for democratic principles is growing. Prosperity is more widespread than at any other time in history, and we are witnessing the emergence of an Asia-Pacific community. The Asia-Pacific region has become the most dynamic area of the globe. At the same time, instability and uncertainty persist in the region. Tensions continue on the Korean Peninsula. There are still heavy concentrations of military force, including nuclear arsenals. Unresolved territorial disputes, potential regional conflicts, and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery all constitute sources of instability. The Japan-U.S. Alliance and the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security 4. The Prime Minister and the President underscored the importance of promoting stability in this region and dealing with the security challenges facing both countries. In this regard, the Prime Minister and the President reiterated the significant value of the Alliance between Japan and the U.S. They reaffirmed that the Japan-U.S. security relationship, based on the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between Japan and the United States of America, remains the cornerstone for achieving common security objectives, and for maintaining a stable and prosperous environment for the Asia- Pacific region as we enter the twenty-first century. (a) The Prime Minister confirmed Japan’s fundamental defense policy as articulated in its new National Defense Program Outline adopted in November 1995, which underscored that the Japanese defense capabilities should play appropriate roles in the security environment after the Cold War. The Prime ----- Minister and the President agreed that the most effective framework for the defense of Japan is close defense cooperation between the two countries. This cooperation is based on a combination of appropriate defense capabilities for the Self-Defense Forces (SDF) of Japan and the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements. The leaders again confirmed that U.S. deterrence under the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security remains the guarantee for Japan’s security. (b) The Prime Minister and the President agreed that continued U.S. military presence is also essential for preserving peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region. The leaders shared the common recognition that the Japan-U.S. security relationship forms an essential pillar which supports the positive regional engagement of the U.S. The President emphasized the U.S. commitment to the defense of Japan as well as to peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region. He noted that there has been some adjustment of U.S. forces in the Asia-Pacific region since the end of the Cold War. On the basis of a thorough assessment, the U.S. reaffirmed that meeting its commitments in the prevailing security environment requires the maintenance of its current force structure of about 100,000 forward deployed military personnel in the region, including about the current level in Japan. (c) The Prime Minister welcomed the U.S. determination to remain a stable and steadfast presence in the region. He reconfirmed that Japan would continue appropriate contributions for the maintenance of U.S. Forces Japan, such as through the provision of facilities and areas in accordance with the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security and Host Nation Support. The President expressed U.S. appreciation for Japan’s contributions, and welcomed the conclusion of the new Special Measures Agreement which provides financial support for U.S. forces stationed in Japan. Bilateral Cooperation under the Japan-U.S. Security Relationship 5. The Prime Minister and the President, with the objective of enhancing the credibility of this vital security relationship, agreed to undertake efforts to advance cooperation in the following areas. (a) Recognizing that close bilateral defense cooperation is a central element of the Japan-U.S. Alliance, both Governments agreed that continued close consultation is essential. Both Governments will further enhance the exchange of information and views on the international situation, in particular the AsiaPacific region. At the same time, in response to the changes which may arise in the international security environment, both Governments will continue to consult closely on defense policies and military postures, including the U.S. force structure in Japan, which will best meet their requirements. (b) The Prime Minister and the President agreed to initiate a review of the 1978 Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation to build upon the close working relationship already established between Japan and the U.S. The two leaders agreed on the necessity to promote bilateral policy coordination, including studies on bilateral cooperation in dealing with situations that may emerge in the areas surrounding Japan and which will have an important influence on the peace and security of Japan. (c) The Prime Minister and the President welcomed the April 15, 1996 signature of the Agreement Between the Government of Japan and the Government of the United States of America Concerning Reciprocal Provision of Logistic Support, Supplies and Services Between the SDF of Japan and the Armed Forces of the United States of America, and expressed their hope that this Agreement will further promote the bilateral cooperative relationship. (d) Noting the importance of interoperability in all facets of cooperation between the SDF of Japan and the U.S. forces, the two Governments will enhance mutual exchange in the areas of technology and equipment, including bilateral cooperative research and development of equipment such as the fighter ----- support (F-2). (e) The two Governments recognized that the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery has important implications for their common security. They will work together to prevent proliferation and will continue to cooperate in the ongoing study on ballistic missile defense. 6. The Prime Minister and the President recognized that the broad support and understanding of the Japanese people are indispensable for the smooth stationing of U.S. Forces Japan, which is the core element of the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements. The two leaders agreed that both governments will make every effort to deal with various issues related to the presence and status of U.S. forces. They also agreed to make further efforts to enhance mutual understanding between U.S. forces and local Japanese communities. In particular, with respect to Okinawa, where U.S. facilities and areas are highly concentrated, the Prime Minister and the President reconfirmed their determination to carry out steps to consolidate, realign, and reduce U.S. facilities and areas consistent with the objectives of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security. In this respect, the two leaders took satisfaction in the significant progress which has been made so far through the Special Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO), and welcomed the far-reaching measures outlined in the SACO Interim Report of April 15, 1996. They expressed their firm commitment to achieve a successful conclusion of the SACO process by November 1996. Regional Cooperation 7. The Prime Minister and the President agreed that the two Governments will jointly and individually strive to achieve a more peaceful and stable security environment in the Asia-Pacific region. In this regard, the two leaders recognized that the engagement of the U.S. in the region, supported by the Japan-U.S. security relationship, constitutes the foundation for such efforts. The two leaders stressed the importance of peaceful resolution of problems in the region. They emphasized that it is extremely important for the stability and prosperity of the region that China play a positive and constructive role, and, in this context, stressed the interest of both countries in furthering cooperation with China. Russia’s ongoing process of reform contributes to regional and global stability, and merits continued encouragement and cooperation. The leaders also stated that full normalization of JapanRussia relations based on the Tokyo Declaration is important to peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region. They noted also that stability on the Korean Peninsula is vitally important to Japan and the U.S. and reaffirmed that both countries will continue to make every effort in this regard, in close cooperation with the Republic of Korea. The Prime Minister and the President reaffirmed that the two Governments will continue working jointly and with other countries in the region to further develop multilateral regional security dialogues and cooperation mechanisms such as the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), and eventually, security dialogues regarding Northeast Asia. Global Cooperation 8. The Prime Minister and the President recognized that the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security is the core of the Japan-U.S. Alliance, and underlies the mutual confidence that constitutes the foundation for bilateral cooperation on global issues. The Prime Minister and the President agreed that the two governments will strengthen their cooperation in support of the U.N. and other international organizations through activities such as peacekeeping and humanitarian relief operations. Both Governments will coordinate their policies and cooperate on issues such as arms control and disarmament, including acceleration of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) negotiations and the ----- prevention of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery. The two leaders agreed that cooperation in the U.N. and APEC, and on issues such as the North Korean nuclear problem, the Middle East peace process, and the peace implementation process in the former Yugoslavia, helps to build the kind of world that promotes our shared interests and values. Conclusion 9. In concluding, the Prime Minister and the President agreed that the three pillars of the Japan-U.S. relationship—security, political, and economic—are based on shared values and interests and rest on the mutual confidence embodied in the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security. The Prime Minister and the President reaffirmed their strong determination, on the eve of the twenty-first century, to build on the successful history of security cooperation and to work hand-in-hand to secure peace and prosperity for future generations. Reference 37. Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation (New York, September 23, 1997) I. The Aim of the Guidelines The aim of these Guidelines is to create a solid basis for more effective and credible Japan-U.S. cooperation under normal circumstances, in case of an armed attack against Japan, and in situations in areas surrounding Japan. The Guidelines also provide a general framework and policy direction for the roles and missions of the two countries and ways of cooperation and coordination, both under normal circumstances and during contingencies. II. Basic Premises and Principles The Guidelines and programs under the Guidelines are consistent with the following basic premises and principles. 1. The rights and obligations under the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between the United States of America and Japan (the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty) and its related arrangements, as well as the fundamental framework of the Japan-U.S. alliance, will remain unchanged. 2. Japan will conduct all its actions within the limitations of its Constitution and in accordance with such basic positions as the maintenance of its exclusively defense-oriented policy and its three non-nuclear principles. 3. All actions taken by Japan and the U.S. will be consistent with basic principles of international law, including the peaceful settlement of disputes and sovereign equality, and relevant international agreements such as the U.N. Charter. 4. The Guidelines and programs under the Guidelines will not obligate either Government to take legislative, budgetary or administrative measures. However, since the objective of the Guidelines and programs under the Guidelines is to establish an effective framework for bilateral cooperation, the two Governments are expected to reflect in an appropriate way the results of these efforts, based on their own judgments, in their specific policies and measures. All actions taken by Japan will be consistent with its laws and regulations then in effect. III. Cooperation under Normal Circumstances Both Governments will firmly maintain existing Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements. Each Government will make ----- efforts to maintain required defense postures. Japan will possess defense capability within the scope necessary for self-defense on the basis of the “National Defense Program Outline.” In order to meet its commitments, the United States will maintain its nuclear deterrent capability, its forward-deployed forces in the Asia-Pacific region, and other forces capable of reinforcing those forward-deployed forces. Both Governments, based on their respective policies, under normal circumstances will maintain close cooperation for the defense of Japan as well as for the creation of a more stable international security environment. Both Governments will under normal circumstances enhance cooperation in a variety of areas. Examples include mutual support activities under the Agreement Between the Government of Japan and the Government of the United States of America concerning Reciprocal Provision of Logistic Support, Supplies and Services between the Self-Defense Forces of Japan and the Armed Forces of the United States of America; the Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement between the United States of America and Japan; and their related arrangements. 1. Information Sharing and Policy Consultations Recognizing that accurate information and sound analysis are at the foundation of security, the two Governments will increase information and intelligence sharing, and the exchange of views on international situations of mutual interest, especially in the Asia-Pacific region. They will also continue close consultations on defense policies and military postures. Such information sharing and policy consultations will be conducted at as many levels as possible and on the broadest range of subjects. This will be accomplished by taking advantage of all available opportunities, such as the Security Consultative Committee (SCC) and Security Sub-Committee (SSC) meetings. 2. Various Types of Security Cooperation Bilateral cooperation to promote regional and global activities in the field of security contributes to the creation of a more stable international security environment. Recognizing the importance and significance of security dialogues and defense exchange in the region, as well as international arms control and disarmament, the two Governments will promote such activities and cooperate as necessary. When either or both Governments participate in U.N. PKOs or international humanitarian relief operations, the two sides will cooperate closely for mutual support as necessary. They will prepare procedures for cooperation in such areas as transportation, medical services, information sharing, and education and training. When either or both Governments conduct emergency relief operations in response to requests from governments concerned or international organizations in the wake of large-scale disasters, they will cooperate closely with each other as necessary. 3. Bilateral Programs Both Governments will conduct bilateral work, including bilateral defense planning in case of an armed attack against Japan, and mutual cooperation planning in situations in areas surrounding Japan. Such efforts will be made in a comprehensive mechanism involving relevant agencies of the respective Governments, and establish the foundation for bilateral cooperation. Bilateral exercises and training will be enhanced in order not only to validate such bilateral work but also to enable smooth and effective responses by public and private entities of both countries, starting with the SDF and U.S. forces. The two Governments will under normal circumstances establish a bilateral coordination mechanism involving relevant agencies to be operated during contingencies. IV. Actions in Response to an Armed Attack against Japan Bilateral actions in response to an armed attack against Japan remain a core aspect of Japan-U.S. defense ----- cooperation. When an armed attack against Japan is imminent, the two Governments will take steps to prevent further deterioration of the situation and make preparations necessary for the defense of Japan. When an armed attack against Japan takes place, the two Governments will conduct appropriate bilateral actions to repel it at the earliest possible stage. 1. When an Armed Attack against Japan is Imminent The two Governments will intensify information and intelligence sharing and policy consultations, and initiate at an early stage the operation of a bilateral coordination mechanism. Cooperating as appropriate, they will make preparations necessary for ensuring coordinated responses according to the readiness stage selected by mutual agreement. Japan will establish and maintain the basis for U.S. reinforcements. As circumstances change, the two Governments will also increase intelligence gathering and surveillance, and will prepare to respond to activities, which could develop into an armed attack against Japan. The two Governments will make every effort, including diplomatic efforts, to prevent further deterioration of the situation. Recognizing that a situation in areas surrounding Japan may develop into an armed attack against Japan, the two Governments will be mindful of the close interrelationship of the two requirements: preparations for the defense of Japan and responses to or preparations for situations in areas surrounding Japan. 2. When an Armed Attack against Japan Takes Place (1) Principles for Coordinated Bilateral Actions (a) Japan will have primary responsibility immediately to take action and to repel an armed attack against Japan as soon as possible. The U.S. will provide appropriate support to Japan. Such bilateral cooperation may vary according to the scale, type, phase, and other factors of the armed attack. This cooperation may include preparations for and execution of coordinated bilateral operations, steps to prevent further deterioration of the situation, surveillance, and intelligence sharing. (b) In conducting bilateral operations, the SDF and U.S. forces will employ their respective defense capabilities in a coordinated, timely, and effective manner. In doing this, they will conduct effective joint operations of their respective forces’ ground, maritime and air services. The SDF will primarily conduct defensive operations in Japanese territory and its surrounding waters and airspace, while U.S. forces support SDF operations. U.S. forces will also conduct operations to supplement the capabilities of the SDF. (c) The U.S. will introduce reinforcements in a timely manner, and Japan will establish and maintain the basis to facilitate these deployments. (2) Concept of Operations (a) Operations to Counter Air Attack against Japan The SDF and U.S. forces will bilaterally conduct operations to counter air attacks against Japan. The SDF will have primary responsibility for conducting operations for air defense. U.S. forces will support SDF operations and conduct operations, including those, which may involve the use of strike power, to supplement the capabilities of the SDF. (b) Operations to Defend Surrounding Waters and to Protect Sea Lines of Communication The SDF and U.S. forces will bilaterally conduct operations for the defense of surrounding waters and for the protection of sea lines of communication. The SDF will have primary responsibility for the protection of major ports and straits in Japan, for the protection of ships in surrounding waters, and for other operations. U.S. forces will support SDF operations and conduct operations, including those, which may provide additional mobility and strike power, to supplement the capabilities of the SDF. ----- (c) Operations to Counter Airborne and Seaborne Invasions of Japan The SDF and U.S. forces will bilaterally conduct operations to counter airborne and seaborne invasions of Japan. The SDF will have primary responsibility for conducting operations to check and repel such invasions. U.S. forces will primarily conduct operations to supplement the capabilities of the SDF. The U.S. will introduce reinforcements at the earliest possible stage, according to the scale, type, and other factors of the invasion, and will support SDF operations. (d) Responses to Other Threats (i) The SDF will have primary responsibility to check and repel guerrilla-commando type attacks or any other unconventional attacks involving military infiltration in Japanese territory at the earliest possible stage. They will cooperate and coordinate closely with relevant agencies, and will be supported in appropriate ways by U.S. forces depending on the situation. (ii) The SDF and U.S. forces will cooperate and coordinate closely to respond to a ballistic missile attack. U.S. forces will provide Japan with necessary intelligence, and consider, as necessary, the use of forces providing additional strike power. (3) Activities and Requirements for Operations (a) Command and Coordination The SDF and U.S. forces, in close cooperation, will take action through their respective command andcontrol channels. To conduct effective bilateral operations, the two Forces will establish, in advance, procedures which include those to determine the division of roles and missions and to synchronize their operations. (b) Bilateral Coordination Mechanism Necessary coordination among the relevant agencies of the two countries will be conducted through a bilateral coordination mechanism. In order to conduct effective bilateral operations, the SDF and U.S. forces will closely coordinate operations, intelligence activities, and logistics support through this coordination mechanism including use of a bilateral coordination center. (c) Communication and Electronics The two Governments will provide mutual support to ensure effective use of communications and electronics capabilities. (d) Intelligence Activities The two Governments will cooperate in intelligence activities in order to ensure effective bilateral operations. This will include coordination of requirements, collection, production, and dissemination of intelligence products. Each Government will be responsible for the security of shared intelligence. (e) Logistics Support Activities The SDF and U.S. forces will conduct logistics support activities efficiently and properly in accordance with appropriate bilateral arrangements. To improve the effectiveness of logistics and to alleviate functional shortfalls, the two Governments will undertake mutual support activities, making appropriate use of authorities and assets of the central Government and local governments, as well as private sector assets. Particular attention will be paid to the following points in conducting such activities: (i) Supply The U.S. will support the acquisition of supplies for systems of U.S. origin while Japan will support the acquisition of supplies in Japan. ----- (ii) Transportation The two Governments will closely cooperate in transportation operations, including airlift and sealift of supplies from the U.S. to Japan. (iii) Maintenance Japan will support the maintenance of U.S. forces’ equipment in Japan. The U.S. will support the maintenance of items of U.S. origin which are beyond Japanese maintenance capabilities. Maintenance support will include the technical training of maintenance personnel as required. Japan will also support U.S. forces’ requirement for salvage and recovery. (iv) Facilities Japan will, in case of need, provide additional facilities and areas in accordance with the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty and its related arrangements. If necessary for effective and efficient operations, the SDF and U.S. forces will make joint use of SDF facilities and U.S. facilities and areas in accordance with the Treaty and its related arrangements. (v) Medical Services The two Governments will support each other in the area of medical services such as medical treatment and transportation of casualties. V. Cooperation in Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan that will Have Important Influence on Japan’s Peace and Security (Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan) Situations in areas surrounding Japan will have an important influence on Japan’s peace and security. The concept, situations in area surrounding Japan, is not geographic but situational. The two Governments will make every effort, including diplomatic efforts, to prevent such situations from occurring. When the two Governments reach a common assessment of the state of each situation, they will effectively coordinate their activities. In responding to such situations, measures taken may differ depending on circumstances. 1. When a Situation in Areas Surrounding Japan is Anticipated When a situation in areas surrounding Japan is anticipated, the two Governments will intensify information and intelligence sharing and policy consultations, including efforts to reach a common assessment of the situation. At the same time, they will make every effort, including diplomatic efforts, to prevent further deterioration of the situation, while initiating at an early stage the operation of a bilateral coordination mechanism, including use of a bilateral coordination center. Cooperating as appropriate, they will make preparations necessary for ensuring coordinated responses according to the readiness stage selected by mutual agreement. As circumstances change, they will also increase intelligence gathering and surveillance, and enhance their readiness to respond to the circumstances. 2. Responses to Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan The two Governments will take appropriate measures, to include preventing further deterioration of situations, in response to situations in areas surrounding Japan. This will be done in accordance with the basic premises and principles listed in Section II above and based on their respective decisions. They will support each other as necessary in accordance with appropriate arrangements. Functions and fields of cooperation and examples of items of cooperation are outlined below, and listed in the Annex. (1) Cooperation in Activities Initiated by Either Government Although either Government may conduct the following activities at its own discretion, bilateral cooperation will enhance their effectiveness. (a) Relief Activities and Measures to Deal with Refugees ----- Each Government will conduct relief activities with the consent and cooperation of the authorities in the affected area. The two Governments will cooperate as necessary, taking into account their respective capabilities. The two Governments will cooperate in dealing with refugees as necessary. When there is a low of refugees into Japanese territory, Japan will decide how to respond and will have primary responsibility for dealing with the low; the U.S. will provide appropriate support. (b) Search and Rescue The two Governments will cooperate in search and rescue operations. Japan will conduct search and rescue operations in Japanese territory; and at sea around Japan, as distinguished from areas where combat operations are being conducted. When U.S. forces are conducting operations, the United States will conduct search and rescue operations in and near the operational areas. (c) Noncombatant Evacuation Operations When the need arises for Japanese and U.S. noncombatants to be evacuated from a third country to a safe haven, each Government is responsible for evacuating its own nationals as well as for dealing with the authorities of the affected area. When both Governments deem it appropriate, they will coordinate in planning and cooperate in carrying out such evacuations, including matters that affect the securing of means of transportation and the use of transportation and facilities, using their respective capabilities in a mutually supplementary manner. Should a similar need arise with regard to noncombatants other than of Japanese or U.S. nationality, the respective countries may consider extending, on their respective terms, evacuation assistance to third country nationals. (d) Activities for Ensuring the Effectiveness of Economic Sanctions for the Maintenance of International Peace and Stability Each Government will contribute to activities for ensuring the effectiveness of economic sanctions for the maintenance of international peace and stability. Such contributions will be made in accordance with each Government’s own criteria. Additionally, the two Governments will cooperate with each other as appropriate, taking into account their respective capabilities. Such cooperation includes information sharing, and cooperation in inspection of ships based on U.N. Security Council resolutions. (2) Japan’s Support for U.S. Forces Activities (a) Use of Facilities Based on the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty and its related arrangements, Japan will, in case of need, provide additional facilities and areas in a timely and appropriate manner, and ensure the temporary use by U.S. forces of SDF facilities and civilian airports and ports. (b) Rear Area Support Japan will provide rear area support to those U.S. forces that are conducting operations for the purpose of achieving the objectives of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty. The primary aim of this rear area support is to enable U.S. forces to use facilities and conduct operations in an effective manner. By its very nature, Japan’s rear area support will be provided primarily in Japanese territory. It may also be provided on the high seas and international airspace around Japan which are distinguished from areas where combat operations are being conducted. In providing rear area support, Japan will make appropriate use of the authority and capacity of the central Government and local governments, as well as private sector capacity. The SDF, as appropriate, will provide such support consistent with their mission for the defense of Japan and the maintenance of public order. ----- (3) Japan-U.S. Operational Cooperation As situations in areas surrounding Japan have an important influence on Japan’s peace and security, the SDF will conduct such activities as intelligence gathering, surveillance and minesweeping, to protect lives and property and to ensure navigational safety. U.S. forces will conduct operations to restore the peace and security affected by situations in areas surrounding Japan. With the involvement of relevant agencies, cooperation and coordination will significantly enhance the effectiveness of both Forces’ activities. VI. Bilateral Programs for Effective Defense Cooperation under the Guidelines Effective bilateral cooperation under the Guidelines will require Japan and the U.S. to conduct consultative dialogue throughout the spectrum of security conditions: normal circumstances, an armed attack against Japan, and situations in areas surrounding Japan. Both sides must be well informed and coordinate at multiple levels to ensure successful bilateral defense cooperation. To accomplish this, the two Governments will strengthen their information and intelligence sharing and policy consultations by taking advantage of all available opportunities, including, SCC and SSC meetings, and they will establish the following two mechanisms to facilitate consultations, coordinate policies, and coordinate operational functions. First, the two Governments will develop a comprehensive mechanism for bilateral planning and the establishment of common standards and procedures, involving not only the SDF and U.S. forces but also other relevant agencies of their respective Governments. The two Governments will, as necessary, improve this comprehensive mechanism. The SCC will continue to play an important role in presenting policy direction for the work to be conducted by this mechanism. The SCC will be responsible for presenting policy, validating the progress of work, and issuing directives as necessary. The SDC will assist the SCC in bilateral work. Second, the two Governments will also establish, under normal circumstances, a bilateral coordination mechanism that will include relevant agencies of the two countries for coordinating respective activities during contingencies. 1. Bilateral Work for Planning and the Establishment of Common Standards and Procedures Bilateral work listed below will be conducted under a comprehensive mechanism, involving relevant agencies of the respective Governments in a deliberate and efficient manner. Progress and results of such work will be reported at significant intervals to the SCC and the SDC. (1) Bilateral Defense Planning and Mutual Cooperation Planning The SDF and U.S. forces will conduct bilateral defense planning under normal circumstances to take coordinated actions smoothly and effectively in case of an armed attack against Japan. The two Governments will conduct mutual cooperation planning under normal circumstances to be able to respond smoothly and effectively to situations in areas surrounding Japan. Bilateral defense planning and mutual cooperation planning will assume various possible situations, with the expectation that the results of this planning work will be appropriately reflected in the plans of the two Governments. The two Governments will coordinate and adjust their plans in light of actual circumstances. The two Governments will be mindful that bilateral defense planning and mutual cooperation planning must be consistent so that appropriate responses will be ensured when a situation in areas surrounding Japan threatens to develop into an armed attack against Japan or when such a situation and an armed attack against Japan occur simultaneously. (2) Establishment of Common Standards for Preparations The two Governments will establish under normal circumstances common standards for preparations for the defense of Japan. These standards will address such matters as intelligence activities, unit activities, ----- movements and logistics support in each readiness stage. When an armed attack against Japan is imminent, both Governments will agree to select a common readiness stage that will be reflected in the level of preparations for the defense of Japan by U.S. forces, the SDF and other relevant agencies. The two Governments will similarly establish common standards for preparations of cooperative measures in situations in areas surrounding Japan so that they may select a common readiness stage by mutual agreement. (3) Establishment of Common Procedures The two Governments will prepare in advance common procedures to ensure smooth and effective execution of coordinated U.S. forces and SDF operations for the defense of Japan. These will include procedures for communications, transmission of target information, intelligence activities and logistics support, and prevention of fratricide. Common procedures will also include criteria for properly controlling respective unit operations. The two Forces will take into account the importance of communications and electronics interoperability, and will determine in advance their mutual requirements. 2. Bilateral Coordination Mechanism The two Governments will establish under normal circumstances a bilateral coordination mechanism involving relevant agencies of the two countries to coordinate respective activities in case of an armed attack against Japan and in situations in areas surrounding Japan. Procedures for coordination will vary depending upon items to be coordinated and agencies to be involved. They may include coordination committee meetings, mutual dispatch of liaison officers, and designation of points of contact. As part of such a bilateral coordination mechanism, the SDF and U.S. forces will prepare under normal circumstances a bilateral coordination center with the necessary hardware and software in order to coordinate their respective activities. VII. Timely and Appropriate Review of the Guidelines The two Governments will review the Guidelines in a timely and appropriate manner when changes in situations relevant to the Japan-U.S. security relationship occur and if deemed necessary in view of the circumstances at that time. (The schedule omitted: See Reference 45) Reference 38. United States-Japan Roadmap for Realignment Implementation (tentative translation) (Washington, DC, May 1, 2006) Overview On October 29, 2005, the U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee (SCC) members approved recommendations for realignment of U.S. forces in Japan and related Japan Self-Defense Forces (SDF) in their document, “U.S.Japan Alliance: Transformation and Realignment for the Future.” In that document, the SCC members directed their respective staffs “to finalize these specific and interrelated initiatives and develop plans, including concrete implementation schedules no later than March 2006.” This work has been completed and is reflected in this document. ----- Finalization of Realignment Initiatives The individual realignment initiatives form a coherent package. When implemented, these realignments will ensure a life-of-the-alliance presence for U.S. forces in Japan. The construction and other costs for facility development in the implementation of these initiatives will be borne by the Government of Japan (GOJ) unless otherwise specified. The U.S. Government (USG) will bear the operational costs that arise from implementation of these initiatives. The two Governments will finance their realignment-associated costs consistent with their commitments in the October 29, 2005 SCC document to maintain deterrence and capabilities while reducing burdens on local communities. Key Implementation Details 1. Realignment on Okinawa (a) Futenma Replacement Facility (FRF) The United States and Japan will locate the FRF in a configuration that combines the Henoko-saki and adjacent water areas of Oura and Henoko Bays, including two runways aligned in a “V”-shape, each runway having a length of 1,600 meters plus two 100-meter overruns. The length of each runway portion of the facility is 1,800 meters, exclusive of seawalls (see attached concept plan dated April 28, 2006). This facility ensures agreed operational capabilities while addressing issues of safety, noise, and environmental impacts. In order to locate the FRF, inclusive of agreed support facilities, in the Camp Schwab area, necessary adjustments will be made, such as reconfiguration of Camp Schwab facilities and adjacent water surface areas. Construction of the FRF is targeted for completion by 2014. Relocation to the FRF will occur when the facility is fully operationally capable. Facility improvements for contingency use at ASDF bases at Nyutabaru and Tsuiki related to replacement of Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS) Futenma capabilities will be made, as necessary, after conducting site surveys and before MCAS Futenma is returned. Requirements for improved contingency use of civilian facilities will be examined in the context of bilateral contingency planning, and appropriate arrangements will be made in order to realize the return of MCAS Futenma. In principle, the construction method for the FRF will be landfill. The USG does not intend to operate fighter aircraft from this facility. (b) Force Reductions and Relocation to Guam Approximately 8,000 III Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) personnel and their approximately 9,000 dependents will relocate from Okinawa to Guam by 2014, in a manner that maintains unit integrity. Units to relocate will include: III MEF Command Element, 3rd Marine Division Headquarters, 3rd Marine Logistics Group (formerly known as Force Service Support Group) Headquarters, 1st Marine Air Wing Headquarters, and 12th Marine Regiment Headquarters. The affected units will relocate from such facilities as Camp Courtney, Camp Hansen, MCAS Futenma, Camp Zukeran, and Makiminato Service Area. The U.S. Marine Corps (USMC) forces remaining on Okinawa will consist of Marine Air-Ground Task Force elements, such as command, ground, aviation, and combat service support, as well as a base support capability. Of the estimated $10.27 billion cost of the facilities and infrastructure development costs for the III MEF relocation to Guam, Japan will provide $6.09 billion (in U.S. FY 2008 dollars), including $2.8 billion in direct cash contributions, to develop facilities and infrastructure on Guam to enable the III MEF ----- relocation, recognizing the strong desire of Okinawa residents that such force relocation be realized rapidly. The United States will fund the remainder of the facilities and infrastructure development costs for the relocation to Guam estimated in U.S. FY 2008 dollars at $3.18 billion in fiscal spending plus approximately $1 billion for a road. (c) Land Returns and Shared Use of Facilities Following the relocation to the FRF, the return of MCAS Futenma, and the transfer of III MEF personnel to Guam, the remaining facilities and areas on Okinawa will be consolidated, thereby enabling the return of significant land areas south of Kadena Air Base. Both sides will develop a detailed consolidation plan by March 2007. In this plan, total or partial return of the following six candidate facilities will be examined: Camp Kuwae: Total return. Camp Zukeran: Partial return and consolidation of remaining facilities and infrastructure to the extent possible. MCAS Futenma: Total return (see FRF section above). Makiminato Service Area: Total return. Naha Port: Total return (relocated to the new facilities, including additional staging constructed at Urasoe). Army POL Depot Kuwae Tank Farm No. 1: Total return. All functions and capabilities that are resident in facilities designated for return, and that are required by forces remaining in Okinawa, will be relocated within Okinawa. These relocations will occur before the return of designated facilities. While emphasizing the importance of steady implementation of the recommendations of the Special Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO) Final Report, the SACO relocation and return initiatives may need to be reevaluated. Camp Hansen will be used for GSDF training. Shared use that requires no facility improvements will be possible from 2006. ASDF will use Kadena Air Base for bilateral training with U.S. forces, taking into account noise impacts on local communities. (d) Relationships among Initiatives Within the overall package, the Okinawa-related realignment initiatives are interconnected. Specifically, consolidation and land returns south of Kadena depend on completing the relocation of III MEF personnel and dependents from Okinawa to Guam. The III MEF relocation from Okinawa to Guam is dependent on: (1) tangible progress toward completion of the FRF, and (2) Japan’s financial contributions to fund development of required facilities and infrastructure on Guam. 2. Improvement of U.S. Army Command and Control Capability U.S. Army command and control structure at Camp Zama will be transformed by U.S. FY 2008. The headquarters of the GSDF Central Readiness Force subsequently will arrive at Camp Zama by Japan FY 2012; SDF helicopters will have access to Kastner Heliport on Camp Zama. Along with the transformation of Army headquarters in Japan, a battle command training center and other support facilities will be constructed within Sagami General Depot (SGD) using U.S. funding. In relation to this transformation, the following measures for efficient and effective use of Camp Zama and SGD will be implemented. Some portions of land at SGD will be returned for local redevelopment (approximately 15 hectares (ha)) and for road and underground rail (approximately 2ha). Affected housing units will be relocated to ----- Sagamihara Housing Area. A specified area of open space in the northwest section of SGD (approximately 35ha) will be provided for local use when not required for contingency or training purposes. Portions of the Chapel Hill housing area of Camp Zama (1.1ha) will be returned to the GOJ following relocation of affected housing units within Camp Zama. Further discussions on possible additional land returns at Chapel Hill will occur as appropriate. 3. Yokota Air Base and Airspace ASDF Air Defense Command (ADC) and relevant units will relocate to Yokota Air Base in Japan FY 2010. A bilateral master plan for base use will be developed to accommodate facility and infrastructure requirements. A bilateral, joint operations coordination center (BJOCC), established at Yokota Air Base, will include a collocated air and missile defense coordination function. The USG and GOJ will fund their own required equipment and systems, respectively, while both sides will coordinate appropriate funding of shared-use equipment and systems. The following measures will be pursued to facilitate movement of civilian aircraft through Yokota airspace while satisfying military operational requirements. Establish a program in Japan FY 2006 to inform commercial aviation entities of existing procedures to transit Yokota airspace. Return portions of Yokota airspace to Japanese control by September 2008; specific portions will be identified by October 2006. Develop procedures in Japan FY 2006 for temporary transfers of air traffic control responsibility to Japanese authorities for portions of Yokota airspace, when not required for military purposes. Study the conditions required for the possible return of the entire Yokota airspace as part of a comprehensive study of options for related airspace reconfigurations and changes in air traffic control procedures that would satisfy future patterns of civilian and military (U.S. and Japanese) demand for use of Japanese airspace. The study will take into account both the lessons learned from the Kadena radar approach control (RAPCON) transfer experience and the lessons learned from experiences with collocation of U.S. forces and Japanese controllers in Japan. This study will be completed in Japan FY 2009. The USG and GOJ will conduct a study of the specific conditions and modalities for possible civilianmilitary dual-use of Yokota Air Base, to be completed within 12 months from commencement. The study will be conducted on the shared understanding that dual-use must not compromise military operations and safety or the military operational capabilities of Yokota Air Base. Based upon the outcome of this study, the two governments will consult and then make appropriate decisions on civilian-military dual-use. 4. Relocation of Carrier Air Wing from Atsugi Air Facility to Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS) Iwakuni The relocation of Carrier Air Wing Five (CVW-5) squadrons from Atsugi Air Facility to MCAS Iwakuni, consisting of F/A-18, EA-6B, E-2C, and C-2 aircraft, will be completed by 2014, subsequent to the following: (1) completion of necessary facilities, and (2) adjustment of training airspace and the Iwakuni RAPCON airspace. Necessary facilities will be developed at Atsugi Air Facility to accommodate MSDF E/O/UP-3 squadrons and other aircraft from Iwakuni, taking into account the continued requirement for U.S. operations from Atsugi. The KC-130 squadron will be based at MCAS Iwakuni with its headquarters, maintenance support ----- facilities, and family support facilities. The aircraft will regularly deploy on a rotational basis for training and operations to MSDF Kanoya Base and Guam. To support the deployment of KC-l30 aircraft, necessary facilities will be developed at Kanoya. U.S. Marine Corps CH-53D helicopters will be relocated from MCAS Iwakuni to Guam when the III MEF personnel relocate from Okinawa to Guam. Training airspace and Iwakuni RAPCON airspace will be adjusted to fulfill safely the training and operational requirements of U.S. forces, Japan SDF, and commercial aircraft (including those in neighboring airspace) through coordination by the Joint Committee. A bilateral framework to conduct a study on a permanent field-carrier landing practice facility will be established, with the goal of selecting a permanent site by July 2009 or the earliest possible date thereafter. Portions of the future civilian air facility will be accommodated at MCAS Iwakuni. 5. Missile Defense As both sides deploy additional capabilities and improve their respective ballistic missile defense capabilities, close coordination will continue. The optimum site for deployment of a new U.S. X-Band radar system has been designated as ASDF Shariki Base. Necessary arrangements and facility modifications, funded by the USG, will be made before the radar becomes operational in summer 2006. The USG will share X-Band radar data with the GOJ. U.S. Patriot PAC-3 capabilities will be deployed to Japan within existing U.S. facilities and areas, becoming operational at the earliest possible time. 6. Training Relocation Both sides will develop annual bilateral training plans beginning in Japan FY 2007. As necessary, a supplemental plan for Japan FY 2006 can be developed. Initially, aircraft from three U.S. facilities—Kadena, Misawa, and Iwakuni—will participate in relocated training conducted from the following SDF facilities: Chitose, Misawa, Hyakuri, Komatsu, Tsuiki, and Nyutabaru. Both sides will work toward expanding use of SDF facilities for bilateral training and exercises in the future. The GOJ will improve infrastructure for training relocation at SDF facilities as necessary after conducting site surveys. Relocated training will not diminish the quality of training that is currently available to U.S. forces in Japan, taking into account facilities and training requirements. In general, bilateral training will commence with participation of 1-5 aircraft for the duration of 1-7 days, and develop over time to participation of 6-12 aircraft for 8-14 days at a time. At those SDF facilities at which terms of joint use are stipulated by Joint Committee agreements, limitations on the number of joint training events will be removed. Limitations on the total days and period per training event for joint use of each SDF facility will be maintained. The USG and GOJ will share costs for bilateral training as appropriate, bearing in mind the priority of maintaining readiness. ----- Reference 39. Efforts by the Government of Japan regarding Realignment of U.S. Force Structure in Japan and Others (May 30, 2006 Cabinet Decision) 1. The Governments of Japan and the U.S. had a series of consultations regarding examinations of the roles, missions and capabilities of Japan’s Self-Defense Forces (SDF) and the U.S. Armed Forces, and of realignment of U.S. force structure in Japan. And at the Security Consultative Committee (SCC) Meeting of October 29, 2005, recommendations on those issues were approved. The governments of the two countries continued consultations and at the SCC Meeting of May 1, 2006 the final report including specific initiatives for realignment of U.S. force structure in Japan and other issues (hereinafter “realignment related measures”) was approved. 2. In the new security environment, it is important to maintain and develop the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements to ensure the security of Japan and maintain the peace and stability of the Asia-Pacific region in a continuous manner. Stationing of the U.S. forces in Japan is at the core of the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements, and stable use of facilities and areas of the U.S. forces needs to be secured. Facilities and areas used by the U.S. forces concentrate on Okinawa, and areas around facilities and areas on the mainland are increasingly urbanized, hence these facilities and areas have great impact on the living environment of residents and regional development. In light of such conditions, it is important to maintain deterrence and capabilities while reducing burdens on local communities, in order to secure stable use of facilities and areas by gaining broader public understanding and cooperation as well as to maintain and develop the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements. 3. The final report includes the following specific initiatives: relocation of approximately 8,000 Marine Corps personnel from Okinawa where facilities and areas used by the U.S. forces concentrate; relocation of Futenma Air Station to Camp Schwab; return of significant land areas south of Kadena Air Base which are densely populated (including total returns of Futenma Air Station, Makiminato Service Area, Naha port facilities and other facilities); collocation of ASDF Air Defense Command and relevant units at Yokota Air Base to enhance coordination between the headquarters; transformation of the U.S. Army command and control structure at Camp Zama; deployment of a new U.S. X-Band radar system for BMD at ASDF Shariki Base; relocation of Carrier Air Wing from Atsugi Air Facility to Iwakuni Air Station; return of some portions of Camp Zama and Sagami General Depot; and relocation of trainings. These realignment related measures shall be steadily implemented based on the timeframe for implementation presented in the final report. 4. Ensuring security arrangements for maintenance of the peace and security of Japan is one of the most significant policies of the Japanese government, therefore, it is necessary for the government to address the issue with responsibility. Based on such recognition, in implementing realignment related measures that entail new burdens on the part of local authorities, the government will take requests from the local authorities that shoulder such burdens into consideration, and take measures for regional development and other in return for their contributions to the peace and security of Japan. In addition, the Government of Japan will continue to be totally committed to taking measures in promotion of the use of returned land and securing employment stability of workers at USFJ facilities and areas. 5. Relocation of Marine units in Okinawa to Guam is critical in reducing burdens on Okinawa where U.S. facilities and areas concentrate, thus it shall be rapidly implemented with required costs shared by Japan. 6. Based on such recognition, the Government of Japan shall properly and promptly implement realignment ----- related measures including legal and budgetary aspects. Meanwhile, under the strained state of public finance, the Government of Japan shall make efforts in more drastic rationalization and streamlining of defenserelated expenses to implement an efficient defense program, in line with the efforts of the government as a whole in cost-cutting and rationalization. The “Mid-Term Defense Program (for FY 2005 to FY 2009)” (approved by the Cabinet on December 10, 2004) shall be reviewed once estimates for the entire costs of realignment related measures become clear based on concrete contents of realignment of U.S. force structure in Japan and others. 7. As to relocation of Futenma Air Station, it shall be implemented based on the plan approved at the SCC Meeting on May 1, 2006, with due consideration on the positions of the national government, the local government of Okinawa and relevant local authorities, as well as the course of discussions so far regarding the issues such as facilities related with relocation of Futenma Air Station, the basing agreement and regional development and others, through paying enough attention to removal of danger of Futenma Air Station, safety of lives of residents in the vicinity, preservation of natural environment and feasibility of the program. Also a construction plan for the Futenma Replacement Facility (FRF) shall be formulated in a prompt manner. The government shall establish a consultative body together with the Government of Okinawa and relevant local governments to have consultations about and address the issues of a concrete construction plan of the FRF, safety and environmental measures and regional development. In accordance with this, the Government Policy Concerning Relocation of Futenma Air Station (approved by the Cabinet on December 28, 1999) shall be abolished. However, in FY 2006, the projects based on the “II Regional Development” stipulated in the abovementioned government policy shall be implemented. Reference 40. Joint Statement of the U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee U.S. Department of State (tentative translation) (Washington, DC, May 1, 2007) Alliance Transformation: Advancing United States-Japan Security and Defense Cooperation I. Overview The U.S.-Japan security relationship is the bedrock of Japan’s defense and the keystone of peace and security in the Asia-Pacific region. The members of the Security Consultative Committee (SCC) welcomed recent advances in bilateral security and defense cooperation, consistent with the vision laid out in SCC meetings and statements over the past two years. The North Korean provocations, including missile launches in July and a nuclear test in October 2006, serve as stark reminders of the importance of transforming the U.S.-Japan Alliance to ensure its continued effectiveness in an ever-changing security environment. The SCC members recognized that, just as today’s expanding U.S.-Japan cooperation was enabled by previous efforts to update and consolidate the alliance that began years ago, so too will investments that the two countries make in the alliance today enable and ensure effective alliance responses to future challenges to peace and security. Additionally, the SCC members stressed the importance of the traditional role of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security, which has enabled a life-of-the-alliance presence for U.S. forces in Japan while ----- providing U.S. security assurances to the Government of Japan. U.S. extended deterrence underpins the defense of Japan and regional security. The U.S. reaffirmed that the full range of U.S. military capabilities— both nuclear and non-nuclear strike forces and defensive capabilities—form the core of extended deterrence and support U.S. commitments to the defense of Japan. In this context, the SCC members emphasized the need to expand and deepen bilateral intelligence cooperation and information sharing in order to respond more effectively to emerging security challenges. They also decided to strengthen mechanisms to protect classified materials. President George W. Bush and Prime Minister Shinzo Abe met on November 18, 2006 and called for a review of U.S.-Japan bilateral security cooperation, especially in the area of ballistic missile defense (BMD), reiterating its importance during their April 27, 2007 summit meeting. The SCC members focused on this agenda today in the context of common strategic objectives and alliance transformation. The SCC members also welcomed the elevation of Japan’s defense organization from agency to ministry status and the redefinition of the Self-Defense Forces’ (SDF) international peace cooperation activities as part of their primary missions. II. Common Strategic Objectives The U.S. and Japan are committed to promoting fundamental values such as basic human rights, democracy, and the rule of law in the international community. On February 19, 2005, the SCC members identified common strategic objectives that provide a broad basis for advancing bilateral cooperation. At today’s meeting, the SCC members reconfirmed their commitment to these common strategic objectives, taking the current international security environment into account. In this context, they welcomed the “Initial Actions for the Implementation of the Joint Statement” adopted at the fifth round of the Six-Party Talks on February 13, 2007, and urged North Korea to expeditiously meet its commitments described in the statement. During their discussions, the SCC members highlighted the following strategic objectives that advance the interests of both countries: - Achieving denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula through the Six-Party Talks and fully implementing the Joint Statement of September 19, 2005, which envisions progress in other areas, including: the normalization of relations between North Korea and the United States and Japan, respectively; resolution of humanitarian issues, such as the matter of abductions; and commitment by all Six Parties to join efforts for lasting peace and stability in Northeast Asia. - Achieving swift and full implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1718, noting that all United Nations Member States remain obligated to comply with the provisions of that Chapter VII resolution. - Recognizing the importance of China’s contributions to regional and global security, further encouraging China to conduct itself as a responsible international stakeholder, improve transparency in its military affairs, and maintain consistency between its stated policies and actions. - Increasing cooperation to strengthen the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum as the preeminent regional economic forum, recognizing its crucial role in promoting stability, security, and prosperity in the region. - Supporting efforts made by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) to promote democratic values, good governance, the rule of law, human rights, fundamental freedoms, and a unified market economy in Southeast Asia, and building regional capacity and cooperation on critical non-traditional and transnational security issues bilaterally and through the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). - Further strengthening trilateral cooperation among the United States, Japan, and Australia in the region and around the world, including in the areas of security and defense, based on shared democratic values and ----- interests. - Continuing to build upon partnerships with India to advance areas of common interests and increase cooperation, recognizing that India’s continued growth is inextricably tied to the prosperity, freedom, and security of the region. - Ensuring Afghanistan’s successful economic reconstruction and political stabilization, which is essential to securing broader regional security and to defeating terrorism. To that end, the United States and Japan are both committed to supporting Afghanistan’s transition, which requires reconstruction, development, and security. - Contributing to building a united, democratic Iraq capable of governing, defending, and sustaining itself, while remaining an ally in the War on Terror. - Achieving swift, full implementation of UNSCR 1737 and 1747, aimed at bringing Iran into full compliance with its International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) requirements. Noting the international community’s continuing concerns regarding Iran’s activities in the Middle East, both countries share the view that Iran must play a more positive role in the international community by demonstrating responsible behavior on the issue of terrorism. - Achieving broader Japan-North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) cooperation, recognizing that NATO’s global contributions to peace and security and the common strategic objectives of the U.S.-Japan Alliance are consistent and complementary. III. Roles, Missions, and Capabilities On October 29, 2005, the SCC approved the document, “U.S.-Japan Alliance: Transformation and Realignment for the Future,” which outlined initiatives on roles, missions, and capabilities of U.S. and Japanese forces. Following through on the security agenda laid out in that SCC document is imperative to the alliance’s ability to respond to diverse challenges in the contemporary security environment. The SCC members reviewed progress in updating roles, missions, and capabilities in line with this alliance transformation vision and highlighted: - The redefinition of the SDF’s primary mission to include international peacekeeping operations, international disaster relief operations, and responses to situations in areas surrounding Japan, which reflects growing attention to the importance of Japan’s contributions to improving the international security environment. In this context, the SCC members discussed the SDF’s assistance for Iraq’s reconstruction efforts as well as its support to coalition forces operating in the Indian Ocean. - Sustained progress in developing more specific planning to reflect the evolving security environment and to better posture our two forces to operate together in a regional crisis. Because such planning requires further coordination in a wide range of functions and ields, active participation of relevant ministries and agencies in the bilateral planning process will remain vital. - Substantive agreement between the two governments concerning security measures for the protection of classified military information, also known as a General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA). The GSOMIA will facilitate information exchange and establish a common basis of information security contributing to sharing of intelligence and defense program and operational information. - Establishment of a bilateral Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) Defense Working Group to make steady progress in improving readiness and interoperability of U.S. and Japanese forces against CBRN weapons, ensuring sustained operational capability in the event of an attack by weapons of mass destruction. - Establishment of a flexible, bilateral interagency coordination mechanism to coordinate policy, operational, intelligence, and public affairs positions before and during crisis situations. ----- - Execution of joint, bilateral training exercises to strengthen interoperability and advance alliance roles, missions, and capabilities. The SCC members, recognizing the growing importance of the U.S. force presence to Japanese and regional security, stressed the requirement for appropriate resources to ensure the success of the alliance transformation agenda. Both allies will also make best efforts to secure resources to improve alliance capabilities and to sustain the presence of U.S. forces in Japan. IV. Implementation of the Realignment Roadmap The SCC members reaffirmed their resolve to steadily implement the realignment initiatives described in the May 2006 SCC document, “United States-Japan Roadmap for Realignment Implementation.” These initiatives, when implemented, will enhance U.S. and Japanese public support for the security alliance. The SCC members reviewed and appreciated the progress made thus far with the initiatives described in the “Roadmap” including: - The creation of a bilateral coordination mechanism in June 2006 providing implementation oversight for the realignment initiatives; - Japanese Diet action on legislation and funding required to facilitate early implementation of realignment initiatives; - Elaboration of the engineering and technical design for the Futenma Replacement Facility and the initiation of surveys in the water areas offshore of Camp Schwab; - Significant cooperation toward relocation of the III Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) personnel and their dependents from Okinawa to Guam by 2014, including: The U.S. creation and funding of a Joint Guam Program Office to oversee planning and development of the facilities in Guam; The launch of the U.S. environmental impact assessment process, including Notice of Intent to prepare an Environmental Impact Statement, for the relocation of U.S. Marine Corps forces from Okinawa to Guam; and Submission of the above-mentioned legislation to the Japanese Diet authorizing the Japan Bank for International Cooperation (JBIC) to take appropriate measures under the direction of the Japanese government to fulfill a portion of Japan’s financial commitments related to the relocation of III MEF personnel and their dependents from Okinawa to Guam. - Commencement of the aircraft training relocation program in March 2007; - Implementation of flexible-use of Yokota airspace measures in September 2006, and agreement in October 2006 for return of portions of Yokota airspace to Japanese control by September 2008, and for collocation of SDF controllers at the Yokota Radar Approach Control (RAPCON). These measures will help facilitate the movement of civilian aircraft through Yokota airspace while satisfying military operational requirements; and - October 2006 launching of the Study Group on the specific conditions and modalities for possible civilmilitary dual-use of Yokota Air Base, as specified in the “Roadmap.” The SCC members reaffirmed that completion of the Futenma Replacement Facility, in accordance with the “Roadmap” by the target date of 2014, is the key to successful and timely implementation of the overall realignment plan for Okinawa, including the III MEF relocation to Guam and subsequent consolidation of remaining facilities and areas on Okinawa. The SCC members acknowledged the significant progress on a detailed consolidation plan and directed their staffs to continue close consultations toward its completion. The SCC members also appreciated continued progress in implementation of commitments under the 1996 Special Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO) final report, including return of the Senaha Communications ----- Facility in September 2006, and the Sobe Communications Facility and the Yomitan Auxiliary Airfield in December 2006, totaling more than 300 hectares/750 acres. V. Strengthening BMD and Operational Cooperation Alliance BMD capabilities, which contribute to the alliance’s overall deterrence posture, are strengthened to the extent that U.S. and Japanese systems can operate together effectively. The SCC members confirmed that, as both countries develop and deploy capabilities, every effort must be made to ensure tactical, operational, and strategic coordination. In that light, the United States and Japan will take appropriate measures, in close coordination, in response to ballistic missile threats against alliance interests. In this context, the SCC members highlighted the following areas of operational cooperation: - To strengthen operational cooperation, bilateral planning efforts must take into account missile defense capabilities, today and in the foreseeable future. To that end, the two sides’ forces will clarify concepts, roles, and missions for each side in the conduct of missile defense and related operations in response to ballistic missile threats. At the same time, a policy-level forum will ensure that policy guidance for BMD operations is unambiguous and current. - On October 29, 2005, the SCC directed the creation of a bilateral joint operations coordination center (BJOCC). During the North Korean missile provocations of June-July 2006, the United States and Japan exchanged information in a timely manner, including through an interim coordination facility at Yokota Air Base with SDF liaisons. The success of this facility in ensuring that both sides had a common awareness of the evolving situation validated the importance of continuous enhancement of bilateral policy/operational coordination including through establishment of the BJOCC at Yokota Air Base. - Recognizing the importance of improving the situational awareness of U.S. forces and the SDF, the two sides are committed to the routine sharing of BMD and related operational information directly with each other on a real-time, continuous basis. The two sides will also develop a bilateral common operational picture (COP). - The two sides will establish a comprehensive information-sharing roadmap to identify broader operational information and data to be shared in support of alliance roles, missions, and capabilities. VI. Enhancing BMD System Capabilities The SCC members noted with satisfaction that past alliance decisions about missile defense, coupled with recent accelerated cooperation, have strengthened BMD capabilities in the region. They highlighted key advances, including: - The operational deployment of a U.S. X-Band radar system to ASDF Shariki Base, Japan, with associated U.S. delivery of radar data to Japanese forces. - The operational deployment of a U.S. PAC-3 battalion to Kadena Air Base, Japan. - The recent and continuing addition of Standard Missile (SM-3) defense capabilities to the forward-deployed naval forces of the U.S. Pacific Fleet. - Japan’s decision to accelerate modification of its Aegis ships with SM-3 capabilities. Japan will complete modification of DDG Kongo by the end of 2007, and will expedite modification of DDGs Chokai, Myoko, and Kirishima. - Japan’s decision to expedite the deployment of PAC-3, which resulted in deployment of the first PAC-3 fire unit in March 2007 and its goal to deploy 16 PAC-3 capable fire units by early 2010. - Priority focus on U.S.-Japan cooperative development of the next generation SM-3 interceptor. The basic agreement on a framework for technology transfer reached by the two sides will facilitate progress on this project as well as in future U.S.-Japan technology cooperation projects. The SCC members confirmed that advancing the alliance transformation agenda for security and defense ----- cooperation will contribute to regional and global peace and security. Reference 41. Agreement between the Government of Japan and the Government of the United States of America Concerning the Implementation of the Relocation of III Marine Expeditionary Force Personnel and Their Dependents from Okinawa to Guam (Signed on February 17, 2009) The Government of Japan and the Government of the United States of America, Affirming that Japan-United States security arrangements, based on the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between Japan and the United States of America signed at Washington on January 19, 1960, are the cornerstone for achieving common security objectives, Recalling that, at the meeting of Japan-United States Security Consultative Committee on May 1, 2006, the Ministers recognized that the implementation of the realignment initiatives described in the Security Consultative Committee Document, “United States-Japan Roadmap for Realignment Implementation” (hereinafter referred to as “the Roadmap”) will lead to a new phase in alliance cooperation, and reduce the burden on local communities, including those on Okinawa, thereby providing the basis for enhanced public support for the security alliance, Emphasizing their recognition of the importance of Guam for forward presence of United States Marine Corps forces, which provides assurance of the United States’ commitment to security and strengthens deterrent capabilities in the Asia-Pacific region, Reaffirming that the Roadmap emphasizes the importance of force reductions and relocation to Guam in relation to the realignment on Okinawa and stipulates that approximately 8,000 III Marine Expeditionary Force (hereinafter referred to as “III MEF”) personnel and their approximately 9,000 dependents will relocate from Okinawa to Guam by 2014, in a manner that maintains unit integrity, and recognizing that such relocation will realize consolidation and land returns south of Kadena, Recalling that the Roadmap stipulates that United States Marine Corps CH-53D helicopters will be relocated from Marine Corps Air Station Iwakuni to Guam when the III MEF personnel relocate from Okinawa to Guam, the KC-130 squadron will be based at Marine Corps Air Station Iwakuni with its headquarters, maintenance support facilities, and family support facilities, and the aircraft will regularly deploy on a rotational basis for training and operations to Maritime Self-Defense Forces Kanoya Base and Guam, Reaffirming that the Roadmap stipulates that, of the estimated ten billion, two hundred seventy million United States dollar ($10,270,000,000) cost of the facilities and infrastructure development costs for the III MEF relocation to Guam, Japan will provide six billion, ninety million United States dollars ($6,090,000,000) (in U.S. FY 2008 dollars), including two billion, eight hundred million United States dollars ($2,800,000,000) in direct cash contributions, to develop facilities and infrastructure on Guam to enable the III MEF relocation, recognizing the strong desire of Okinawa residents that such force relocation be realized rapidly, Reaffirming further that the Roadmap stipulates that the United States will fund the remainder of the facilities and infrastructure development costs for the relocation to Guam-estimated in U.S. FY 2008 dollars at three billion, one hundred eighty million United States dollars ($3,180,000,000) in fiscal spending plus approximately one billion United States dollars ($1,000,000,000) for a road, Recalling that the Roadmap stipulates that, within the overall package, the Okinawa-related realignment initiatives are interconnected, specifically, consolidation and land returns south of Kadena depend on completing the relocation of III MEF personnel and dependents from Okinawa to Guam, and the III MEF relocation from ----- Okinawa to Guam is dependent on: (1) tangible progress toward completion of the Futenma Replacement Facility, and (2) Japan’s financial contributions to fund development of required facilities and infrastructure on Guam, Have agreed as follows: Article 1 1. The Government of Japan shall make cash contributions up to the amount of two billion, eight hundred million United States dollars ($2,800,000,000)(in U.S. FY 2008 dollars) to the Government of the United States of America as a part of expenditures for the relocation of approximately 8,000 III MEF personnel and their approximately 9,000 dependents from Okinawa to Guam (hereinafter referred to as “the Relocation”) subject to paragraph 1. of Article 9 of this Agreement. 2. The amount of Japanese cash contributions to be budgeted in each Japanese fiscal year shall be determined by the Government of Japan through consultation between the two Governments and reflected in further arrangements that the two Governments shall conclude in each Japanese fiscal year (hereinafter referred to as “the further arrangements”). Article 2 The Government of the United States of America shall take necessary measures for the Relocation, including funding for projects of the Government of the United States of America to develop facilities and infrastructure on Guam subject to paragraph 2. of Article 9 of this Agreement. Article 3 The Relocation shall be dependent on tangible progress made by the Government of Japan toward the completion of the Futenma Replacement Facility as stipulated in the Roadmap. The Government of Japan intends to complete the Futenma Replacement Facility as stipulated in the Roadmap in close cooperation with the Government of the United States of America. Article 4 The Government of the United States of America shall use Japanese cash contributions and their accrued interest only for projects to develop facilities and infrastructure on Guam for the Relocation. Article 5 The Government of the United States of America shall ensure that all participants in the process of acquisition for projects to be funded by Japanese cash contributions for the Relocation shall be treated fairly, impartially and equitably. Article 6 The Government of Japan shall designate the Ministry of Defense of Japan as its implementing authority, and the Government of the United States of America shall designate the Department of Defense of the United States of America as its implementing authority. The two Governments shall hold consultations at the technical level on implementation guidance to be followed by the implementing authorities, and on the specific projects referred to in paragraph 1.(a) of Article 7 of this Agreement. Through such consultations, the Government of the United States of America shall ensure that the Government of Japan shall be involved, in an appropriate manner, in the implementation of the said specific projects. Article 7 ----- 1. (a) Specific projects to be funded in each Japanese fiscal year shall be agreed upon between the two Governments and reflected in the further arrangements. (b) The Government of the United States of America shall maintain a United States Treasury account to which the Government of Japan shall provide cash contributions. The Government of the United States of America shall open and maintain, under the said account, a sub-account for Japanese cash contributions in each Japanese fiscal year. 2. Japanese cash contributions and their accrued interest that is contractually committed to pay for specific projects shall be credited, based on the method of calculation using an index to be agreed upon between the implementing authorities referred to in Article 6 of this Agreement, to the total amount of Japanese cash contributions, which is up to the amount of two billion, eight hundred million United States dollars ($2,800,000,000) (in U.S. FY 2008 dollars). 3. (a) In case there remains an unused balance of Japanese cash contributions after the completion of all contracts, as evidenced by receipt of documents releasing the Government of the United States of America from any further financial and contractual liability, for all specific projects funded in the same Japanese fiscal year, the Government of the United States of America shall return the said unused balance to the Government of Japan, except as provided in paragraph 3.(b) of this Article. (b) The Government of the United States of America may use, with the consent of the implementing authority of the Government of Japan, the unused balance for other specific projects funded in the same Japanese fiscal year. 4. (a) The Government of the United States of America shall return interest accrued from Japanese cash contributions to the Government of Japan, except as provided in paragraph 4.(b) of this Article, after the completion of all contracts, as evidenced by receipt of documents releasing the Government of the United States of America from any further financial and contractual liability, for the last specific projects funded by Japanese cash contributions. (b) The Government of the United States of America may use, with the consent of the implementing authority of the Government of Japan, interest accrued from Japanese cash contributions for projects funded by Japanese cash contributions. 5. The Government of the United States of America shall provide the Government of Japan with a report, every month, on transactions in the United States Treasury account, including all the sub-accounts related to Japanese cash contributions. Article 8 The Government of the United States of America shall consult with the Government of Japan in the event that the Government of the United States of America considers changes that may significantly affect facilities and infrastructure funded by Japanese cash contributions, and shall take appropriate actions, taking Japanese concerns into full consideration. Article 9 1. Japanese cash contributions referred to in paragraph 1. of Article 1 of this Agreement shall be subject to funding by the Government of the United States of America of measures referred to in Article 2 of this Agreement. 2. United States’ measures referred to in Article 2 of this Agreement shall be subject to: (1) the availability of funds for the Relocation, (2) tangible progress made by the Government of Japan toward the completion of the Futenma Replacement Facility as stipulated in the Roadmap, and (3) Japan’s financial contributions as stipulated in the Roadmap. ----- Article 10 The two Governments shall consult with each other regarding the implementation of this Agreement. Article 11 This Agreement shall be approved by Japan and the United States of America in accordance with their respective internal legal procedures. This Agreement shall enter into force on the date when diplomatic notes indicating such approval are exchanged. ----- Reference 42. Outline of 23 Issues (As of March 31, 2009) |(As of March 31, 2009|Col2| |---|---| ||| ||| ||| ||| ||| ||| ||| ||| ||| ||| ||| ||| ||| ||| ||| ||| ||| ||| ||| ||| ||| ||| ||| ----- Reference 43. The SACO Final Report (tentative translation) (December 2, 1996) The Special Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO) was established in November 1995 by the Governments of Japan and the United States. The two Governments launched the SACO process to reduce the burden on the people of Okinawa and thereby strengthen the Japan-U.S. alliance. The mandate and guidelines for the SACO process were set forth by the Governments of Japan and the United States at the outset of the joint endeavor. Both sides decided that the SACO would develop recommendations for the Security Consultative Committee (SCC) on ways to realign, consolidate and reduce U.S. facilities and areas, and adjust operational procedures of U.S. forces in Okinawa consistent with their respective obligations under the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security and other related agreements. The work of the SACO was scheduled to conclude after one year. The SCC which was held on April 15, 1996, approved the SACO Interim Report which included several significant initiatives, and instructed the SACO to complete and recommend plans with concrete implementation schedules by November 1996. The SACO, together with the Joint Committee, has conducted a series of intensive and detailed discussions and developed concrete plans and measures to implement the recommendations set forth in the Interim Report. Today, at the SCC, Minister Ikeda, Minister Kyuma, Secretary Perry and Ambassador Mondale approved this SACO Final Report. The plans and measures included in this Final Report, when implemented, will reduce the impact of the activities of U.S. forces on communities in Okinawa. At the same time, these measures will fully maintain the capabilities and readiness of U.S. forces in Japan while addressing security and force protection requirements. Approximately 21 percent of the total acreage of the U.S. facilities and areas in Okinawa excluding joint use facilities and areas (approx. 5,002ha/12,361 acres) will be returned. Upon approving the Final Report, the members of the SCC welcomed the successful conclusion of the yearlong SACO process and underscored their strong resolve to continue joint efforts to ensure steady and prompt implementation of the plans and measures of the SACO Final Report. With this understanding, the SCC designated the Joint Committee as the primary forum for bilateral coordination in the implementation phase, where specific conditions for the completion of each item will be addressed. Coordination with local communities will take place as necessary. The SCC also reaffirmed the commitment of the two governments to make every endeavor to deal with various issues related to the presence and status of U.S. forces, and to enhance mutual understanding between U.S. forces and local Japanese communities. In this respect, the SCC agreed that efforts to these ends should continue, primarily through coordination at the Joint Committee. The members of the SCC agreed that the SCC itself and the Security Sub-Committee (SSC) would monitor such coordination at the Joint Committee described above and provide guidance as appropriate. The SCC also instructed the SSC to seriously address the Okinawa-related issues as one of the most important subjects and regularly report back to the SCC on this subject. In accordance with the April 1996 Japan-U.S. Joint Declaration on Security, the SCC emphasized the importance of close consultation on the international situation, defense policies and military postures, bilateral policy coordination and efforts towards a more peaceful and stable security environment in the Asia-Pacific region. The SCC instructed the SSC to pursue these goals and to address the Okinawa-related issues at the same time. ----- Return Land: — Futenma Air Station—See attached. — Northern Training Area Return major portion of the Northern Training Area (approx. 3,987ha/9,852 acres) and release U.S. joint use of certain reservoirs (approx. 159ha/393 acres) with the intention to finish the process by the end of March 2003 under the following conditions: - Provide land area (approx. 38ha/93 acres) and water area (approx. 121ha/298 acres) with the intention to finish the process by the end of March 1998 in order to ensure access from the remaining Northern Training Area to the ocean. - Relocate helicopter landing zones from the areas to be returned to the remaining Northern Training Area. — Aha Training Area Release U.S. joint use of Aha Training Area (approx. 480ha/1,185 acres) and release U.S. joint use of the water area (approx. 7,895ha/19,509 acres) with the intention to finish the process by the end of March 1998 after land and water access areas from the Northern Training Area to the ocean are provided. — Gimbaru Training Area Return Gimbaru Training Area (approx. 60ha/149 acres) with the intention to finish the process by the end of March 1998 after the helicopter landing zone is relocated to Kin Blue Beach Training Area, and the other facilities are relocated to Camp Hansen. — Sobe Communication Site Return Sobe Communication Site (approx. 53ha/132 acres) with the intention to finish the process by the end of March 2001 after the antenna facilities and associated support facilities are relocated to Camp Hansen. — Yomitan Auxiliary Airfield Return Yomitan Auxiliary Airfield (approx. 191ha/471 acres) with the intention to finish the process by the end of March 2001 after the parachute drop training is relocated to Ie Jima Auxiliary Airfield and Sobe Communication Site is relocated. — Camp Kuwae Return most of Camp Kuwae (approx. 99ha/245 acres) with the intention to finish the process by the end of March 2008 after the Naval Hospital is relocated to Camp Zukeran and remaining facilities there are relocated to Camp Zukeran or other U.S. facilities and areas in Okinawa. — Senaha Communication Station Return Senaha Communication Station (approx. 61ha/151 acres) with the intention to finish the process by the end of March 2001 after the antenna facilities and associated support facilities are relocated to Torii Communication Station. However, the microwave tower portion (approx. 0.1ha/0.3 acres) will be retained. — Makiminato Service Area Return land adjacent to Route 58 (approx. 3ha/8 acres) in order to widen the Route, after the facilities which will be affected by the return are relocated within the remaining Makiminato Service Area. — Naha Port Jointly continue best efforts to accelerate the return of Naha Port (approx. 57ha/140 acres) in connection to its relocation to the Urasoe Pier area (approx. 35ha/87 acres). — Housing consolidation (Camp Kuwae and Camp Zukeran) Consolidate U.S. housing areas in Camp Kuwae and Camp Zukeran and return portions of land in housing areas there with the intention to finish the process by the end of March 2008 (approx. 83ha/206 acres at Camp Zukeran; in addition, approx. 35ha/85 acres at Camp Kuwae will be returned through housing consolidation. That land amount is included in the above entry on Camp Kuwae.). ----- Adjust Training and Operational Procedures: — Artillery live-fire training over Highway 104 Terminate artillery live-fire training over Highway 104, with the exception of artillery firing required in the event of a crisis, after the training is relocated to maneuver areas on the mainland of Japan within Japanese FY 1997. — Parachute drop training Relocate parachute drop training to Ie Jima Auxiliary Airfield. — Conditioning hikes on public roads Conditioning hikes on public roads have been terminated. Implement Noise Reduction Initiatives: — Aircraft noise abatement countermeasures at Kadena Air Base and Futenma Air Station Agreements on aircraft noise abatement countermeasures at Kadena Air Base and Futenma Air Station announced by the Joint Committee in March 1996 have been implemented. — Transfer of KC-130 Hercules aircraft and AV-8 Harrier aircraft Transfer 12 KC-130 aircraft currently based at Futenma Air Station to Iwakuni Air Base after adequate facilities are provided. Transfer of 14 AV-8 aircraft from Iwakuni Air Base to the United States has been completed. — Relocation of Navy aircraft and MC-130 operations at Kadena Air Base Relocate Navy aircraft operations and supporting facilities at Kadena Air Base from the Navy ramp to the other side of the major runways. The implementation schedules for these measures will be decided along with the implementation schedules for the development of additional facilities at Kadena Air Base necessary for the return of Futenma Air Station. Move the MC-130s at Kadena Air Base from the Navy ramp to the northwest corner of the major runways by the end of December 1996. — Noise reduction baffles at Kadena Air Base Build new noise reduction baffles at the north side of Kadena Air Base with the intention to finish the process by the end of March 1998. — Limitation of night flight training operations at Futenma Air Station Limit night flight training operations at Futenma Air Station to the maximum extent possible, consistent with the operational readiness of U.S. forces. Improve Status of Forces Agreement Procedures: — Accident reports Implement new Joint Committee agreement on procedures to provide investigation reports on U.S. military aircraft accidents announced on December 2, 1996. In addition, as part of the U.S. forces’ good neighbor policy, every effort will be made to insure timely notification of appropriate local officials, as well as the Government of Japan, of all major accidents involving U.S. forces’ assets or facilities. — Public exposure of Joint Committee agreements Seek greater public exposure of Joint Committee agreements. — Visits to U.S. facilities and areas Implement the new procedures for authorizing visits to U.S. facilities and areas announced by the Joint Committee on December 2, 1996. — Markings on U.S. forces official vehicles Implement the agreement on measures concerning markings on U.S. forces official vehicles. Numbered ----- plates will be attached to all non-tactical U.S. forces vehicles by January 1997, and to all other U.S. forces vehicles by October 1997. — Supplemental automobile insurance Education programs for automobile insurance have been expanded. Additionally, on its own initiative, the U.S. has further elected to have all personnel under the SOFA obtain supplemental auto insurance beginning in January 1997. — Payment for claims Make joint efforts to improve payment procedures concerning claims under paragraph 6, Article XVIII of the SOFA in the following manner: Requests for advance payments will be expeditiously processed and evaluated by both Governments utilizing their respective procedures. Whenever warranted under U.S. laws and regulatory guidance, advance payment will be accomplished as rapidly as possible. A new system will be introduced by the end of March 1998, by which Japanese authorities will make available to claimants no-interest loans, as appropriate, in advance of the final adjudication of claims by U.S. authorities. In the past there have been only a very few cases where payment by the U.S. Government did not satisfy the full amount awarded by a final court judgment. Should such a case occur in the future, the Government of Japan will endeavor to make payment to the claimant, as appropriate, in order to address the difference in amount. — Quarantine procedures Implement the updated agreement on quarantine procedures announced by the Joint Committee on December 2, 1996. — Removal of unexploded ordnance in Camp Hansen Continue to use USMC procedures for removing unexploded ordnance in Camp Hansen, which are equivalent to those applied to ranges of the U.S. forces in the United States. — Continue efforts to improve the SOFA procedures in the Joint Committee The SACO Final Report on Futenma Air Station (an integral part of the SACO Final Report) (Tokyo, Japan, December 2, 1996) 1. Introduction a. At the Security Consultative Committee (SCC) held on December 2, 1996, Minister Ikeda, Minister Kyuma, Secretary Perry, and Ambassador Mondale reaffirmed their commitment to the Special Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO) Interim Report of April 15, 1996 and the Status Report of September 19, 1996. Based on the SACO Interim Report, both Governments have been working to determine a suitable option for the return of Futenma Air Station and the relocation of its assets to other facilities and areas in Okinawa, while maintaining the airfield’s critical military functions and capabilities. The Status Report called for the Special Working Group on Futenma to examine three specific alternatives: 1) incorporate the heliport into Kadena Air Base; 2) construct a heliport at Camp Schwab; and 3) develop and construct a sea-based facility (SBF). b. On December 2, 1996, the SCC approved the SACO recommendation to pursue the SBF option. Compared to the other two options, the SBF is judged to be the best option in terms of enhanced safety and quality of life for the Okinawan people while maintaining operational capabilities of U.S. forces. In addition, the SBF can function as a fixed facility during its use as a military base and can also be removed when no longer necessary. ----- c. The SCC will establish a bilateral U.S.-Japan working group under the supervision of the Security SubCommittee (SSC) entitled the Futenma Implementation Group (FIG), to be supported by a team of technical experts. The FIG, working with the Joint Committee, will develop a plan for implementation no later than December 1997. Upon SCC approval of this plan, the FIG, working with the Joint Committee, will oversee design, construction, testing, and transfer of assets. Throughout this process, the FIG will periodically report to the SSC on the status of its work. 2. Decisions of the SCC a. Pursue construction of an SBF to absorb most of the helicopter operational functions of Futenma Air Station. This facility will be approximately 1,500 meters long, and will support the majority of Futenma Air Station’s flying operations, including an Instrument Flight Rules (IFR)—capable runway (approximately 1,300 meters long), direct air operations support, and indirect support infrastructure such as headquarters, maintenance, logistics, quality-of-life functions, and base operating support. The SBF will be designed to support basing of helicopter assets, and will also be able to support short-field aircraft operations. b. Transfer 12 KC-130 aircraft to Iwakuni Air Base. Construct facilities at this base to ensure that associated infrastructure is available to support these aircraft and their missions. c. Develop additional facilities at Kadena Air Base to support aircraft, maintenance, and logistics operations which are currently available at Futenma Air Station but are not relocated to the SBF or Iwakuni Air Base. d. Study the emergency and contingency use of alternate facilities which may be needed in the event of a crisis. This is necessary because the transfer of functions from Futenma Air Station to the SBF will reduce operational flexibility currently available. e. Return Futenma Air Station within the next five to seven years, after adequate replacement facilities are completed and operational. 3. Guiding Principles a. Futenma Air Station’s critical military functions and capabilities will be maintained and will continue to operate at current readiness levels throughout the transfer of personnel and equipment and the relocation of facilities. b. To the greatest extent possible, Futenma Air Station’s operations and activities will be transferred to the SBF. Operational capabilities and contingency planning flexibility which cannot be supported by the shorter runway of the SBF (such as strategic airlift, logistics, emergency alternate divert, and contingency throughput) must be fully supported elsewhere. Those facilities unable to be located on the SBF, due to operational cost, or quality-of-life considerations, will be located on existing U.S. facilities and areas. c. The SBF will be located off the east coast of the main island of Okinawa, and is expected to be connected to land by a pier or causeway. Selection of the location will take into account operational requirements, airspace and sea-lane deconfliction, fishing access, environmental compatibility, economic effects, noise abatement, survivability, security, and convenient, acceptable personnel access to other U.S. military facilities and housing. d. The design of the SBF will incorporate adequate measures to ensure platform, aircraft, equipment, and personnel survivability against severe weather and ocean conditions; corrosion control treatment and prevention for the SBF and all equipment located on the SBF; safety; and platform security. Support will include reliable and secure fuel supply, electrical power, fresh water, and other utilities and consumables. Additionally, the facility will be fully self-supporting for short-period contingency/emergency operations. ----- e. The Government of Japan will provide the SBF and other relocation facilities for the use of U.S. forces, in accordance with the U.S.-Japan Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security and the Status of Forces Agreement. The two Governments will further consider all aspects of life-cycle costs as part of the design/acquisition decision. f. The Government of Japan will continue to keep the people of Okinawa informed of the progress of this plan, including concept, location, and schedules of implementation. 4. Possible Sea-Based Facility Construction Methods Studies have been conducted by a “Technical Support Group” comprised of Government engineers under the guidance of a “Technical Advisory Group” comprised of university professors and other experts outside the Government. These studies suggested that all three construction methods mentioned below are technically feasible. a. Pile Supported Pier Type (using floating modules)—supported by a number of steel columns fixed to the sea bed. b. Pontoon Type—platform consisting of steel pontoon type units, installed in a calm sea protected by a breakwater. c. Semi-Submersible Type—platform at a wave free height, supported by buoyancy of the lower structure submerged under the sea. 5. The Next Steps a. The FIG will recommend a candidate SBF area to the SCC as soon as possible and formulate a detailed implementation plan no later than December 1997. This plan will include completion of the following items: concept development and definitions of operational requirements, technology performance specifications and construction method, site survey, environmental analysis, and final concept and site selection. b. The FIG will establish phases and schedules to achieve operational capabilities at each location, including facility design, construction, installation of required components, validation tests and suitability demonstrations, and transfer of operations to the new facility. c. The FIG will conduct periodic reviews and make decisions at significant milestones concerning SBF program feasibility. ----- Reference 44. Concept of Operations When an Armed Attack against Japan Takes Place ----- Reference 45. Function and Fields and Examples of Items for Cooperation in Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan ----- Reference 46. Record of Japan-U.S. Bilateral Exercises in FY 2007 ----- ----- ----- Reference 48. The SDF Record in International Peace Cooperation Activities ----- ----- Reference 49. GSDF Activities Based on Special Measures Law for Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance in Iraq, and Their Results ----- Reference 50. Basic Plan Concerning the Replenishment Support Activities based on the Special Measures Law on Implementation of Replenishment Support Activities towards the Anti-Terrorism Maritime Interdiction Operation (January 16, 2008) (Final amendment: December 24, 2008) 1. Basic Policy The terrorist attacks that took place in the United States on September 11, 2001 were despicable and unforgivable acts that were committed not only against the United States but also against humankind as a whole. The threat of terrorist attacks has not been eliminated and the war on terror still continues to exist in the international community. The Fight Against Terrorism is one of the most important issues that the whole world including Japan should tackle. For six years up to November 1, 2007, Japan had undertaken response measures in line with the Special Measures Law Concerning Measures Being Implemented by Japan in Response to Activities by Foreign Countries to Achieve Goals Envisaged under the U.N. Charter Following Terrorist Attacks in the United States on September 11, 2001, and Concerning Humanitarian Measures Being Implemented on the Basis of Relevant United Nations Resolutions (Law No. 113 of 2001). The Fight Against Terrorism requires continuous international efforts. With the recognition that it is Japan’s own problem, it is important that Japan will continuously make an active contribution on its own initiative for the prevention and eradication of international terrorism. Given such a recognition, Japan will undertake replenishment support activities for foreign military forces conducting counter-terrorist maritime interdiction activities in line with the Law Concerning the Special Measures on the Implementation of Replenishment Support Activities for Counter-Terrorism Maritime Interdiction Activities (Law of 1 of 2008) as follows. 2. Matters concerning Designation of Area Where Replenishment Support Activities are to be Implemented When designating the area where replenishment support activities are to be implemented as high seas (including the exclusive economic zone stipulated in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, limited to the Indian Ocean (including the Persian Gulf, same as below) and waters they pass in operating between the Indian Ocean and Japan’s territorial waters) and in the air above the high seas, and territory of foreign countries (countries located in the Indian Ocean or on its seashores, or Japan’s territory, and countries where seaports are located for calling in among those countries), the Defense Minister shall fully consider the overall situation of the activities conducted by other countries as well as the security situation on the ground to ensure that the activities are to be conducted in areas where no combat operations are conducted and no combat operations are expected to be conducted throughout the period during which the activities are to be conducted there and safety is to be ensured while activities are underway. 3. Size and Composition of SDF Units Engaging in Replenishment Support Activities in Overseas Territories, Their Equipment and Dispatch Period A. (A) Size and Composition MSDF units implementing replenishment support activities by supply vessels and escort vessels (up to 500 personnel. If unit replacement is involved, the number will be up to 1,000 personnel) B. (B) Equipment ----- a. (a) Vessels 1 supply vessel and 1 escort vessel (up to 2 supply vessels and up to 2 escort vessels if unit replacement is involved) b. (b) Others Equipment necessary for ensuring health and safety of SDF personnel and for replenishment support activities (except those listed in (a)) C. (C) Dispatch Period The period between January 16, 2008 and July 15, 2009. 4. Important Matters Concerning Procurement and Transfer to Foreign Militaries of Goods Other Than Those Being Used or Having Been Used by SDF in Clerical Work and Business Projects In order to replenish fuel and water to vessels and rotary wing aircraft carried on vessels as replenishment support activities, the Government of Japan procures the relevant fuel, and transfers it to other foreign military forces on the basis of the purport of the Law. 5. Matters Concerning Coordination and Liaison between Relevant Government Organizations for Implementation of Replenishment Support Activities The Cabinet Secretariat takes the initiative in promoting coordination and liaison between relevant government organizations. 6. Other Important Matters Concerning Replenishment Support Activities A. (A) Relevant government organizations closely communicate with each other to share information obtained through execution of administrative duty which is deemed necessary for implementation of replenishment support activities by the SDF, including overall situations of activities by foreign military forces in areas where SDF units are to engage in such activities and their vicinity, and local security conditions. B. (B) Heads of relevant government organizations cooperate with the SDF when the Defense Minister files a request with such organizations for dispatching to SDF units which are to engage in replenishment support activities their employees with technological expertise and ability, etc. which are deemed necessary for implementation of the activities and for providing goods and equipment belonging to the government organizations, as long as such cooperation does not hamper execution of their administrative duty. C. (C) Heads of Japan’s foreign establishments designated by the Foreign Minister provide necessary cooperation for the implementation of replenishment support activities acting on an order by the Foreign Minister. ----- Reference 51. Record of Main Bilateral Defense Exchanges (Last Five Years) |(Apr. 1, 2004 Jun.5, 2009)|Col2|Col3|Col4| |---|---|---|---| |(Apr. 1, 2004 Jun.5, 2009)|||| ||||| ||||| ||||| ||||| ||||| ||||| ||||| ||||| ||||| ||||| ||||| ||||| ||||| ----- Reference 52. Record of Major Multinational Security Dialogues (Asia-Pacific Region, Last Five Years) (Apr. 1, 2004 Jun.5, 2009) ----- Reference 53. Multilateral Security Dialogues Hosted by the Ministry of Defense ----- ----- ----- Reference 55. Treaties Related to Arms Control, Disarmament and Non-Proliferation, Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction and Other Weapons (nuclear weapons) Reference 56. Treaties Related to Arms Control, Disarmament and Non-Proliferation, Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction and Other Weapons (biological |and chemical weapons)|Col2|(As of June 5, 2009)| |---|---|---| |||| |||| |||| |||| ----- Reference 57. Dispatch of Ministry of Defense Personnel to International Organizations (Last Five Years) Reference 58. Treaties Related to Arms Control, Disarmament and Non-Proliferation, Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction and Other Weapons (delivery means including missiles) ----- ----- Reference 60. Personnel of the Ministry of Defense (Breakdown) (As of March 31, 2009) Reference 61. Authorized and Actual Strength of Self-Defense Personnel |(As of March 31, 2009|Col2|Col3|Col4|Col5| |---|---|---|---|---| |||||| |||||| |||||| |||||| |||||| |||||| |||||| ----- Reference 62. Overview of Appointment System for SDF Regular Personnel ----- Reference 63. Rank and Retirement Age of SDF Regular Personnel ----- Reference 64. Overview of Systems Related to SDF Reserve Personnel ----- Reference 65. Outline of the SDF Educational System ----- Reference 66. Exchange Student Acceptance Record (FY 2008) (Unit: persons) |Col1|Col2|Col3|Col4|Col5|Col6|Col7|Col8|Col9|Col10|Col11|Col12|Col13|Col14|Col15| |---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---| |||||||||||||||| |||||||||||||||| |||||||||||||||| |||||||||||||||| |||||||||||||||| |||||||||||||||| |||||||||||||||| ----- Reference 67. Record of the Main Exercises of Each of the Self-Defense Forces (FY 2008) ----- |Reference 68. Results of Fire Training and Related Training by Dispatch of Ea Self-Defense Forces to the United States (FY 2008)|Col2|Col3|Col4|Col5| |---|---|---|---|---| |||||| |||||| |||||| |||||| |||||| |||||| |||||| |||||| |||||| |||||| ----- Reference 69. Change in Equipment Volumes Procured, by Procurement Method (Unit: 100 million yen) Reference 70. Activities in Civic Life ----- Reference 71. Activities Contributing to Society ----- Reference 72. Outline of Measures to Improve the Living Environment in the Areas Surrounding Defense Facilities Reference 73. New Measures to Promote Harmony between Defense Facilities and Surrounding Communities ----- Reference 74. "Public Opinion Survey on the Self Defense Forces and Defense Issues” (excerpt)(Public Relations Office of Cabinet Office: as of January 2009) ----- “Special Public Opinion Survey on the Replenishment Activities by the Self Defense Forces” (excerpt) (Public Relations Office of Cabinet Office: as of January 2009) Reference 75. Record of Information Disclosure by the Ministry of Defense (FY 2008) ----- Reference 76. Outline of the Report by the Council for Reforming the Ministry of Defense I Introduction 1. The Council for Reforming the Ministry of Defense was set up at the Prime Minister's Office in December 2007 in response to the frequent occurrence of scandals in the Ministry of Defense and the Self-Defense Forces. 2. The Council will conduct continued examination to throw light on individual cases and the organizational problems that allowed them occur and indicate measures for recurrence prevention and the direction for reform. Functioning of the principles of the reform and effective action in line with the duties of the organization requires reconstruction of the organization and decision-making system of the Ministry of Defense and the Self-Defense Forces. 3. The Self-Defense Forces now face an era when multi-functional, flexible and effective action is required. In addition to further enhancement of “safety from armed organizations” emphasized after the war, we need the perspective of “safety provided by an armed organization” in the future. 4. The council proposes a reform of the system so that it can effectively fulfill the security function while securing civilian control. II Cases of misconduct—Defining the problem 1. Confusion of the amount of fuel provided (breach of reporting duty): Press conferences by the Chairperson of the Joint Staff Council and the statement of the Defense Agency Director and the Chief Cabinet Secretary concerning the amount of fuel provided to the U.S. Navy vessels were held based on the erroneous figure reported by the MSO Operations and Plans Department Director. Not correcting the error after the recognition thereof is a breach of reporting duty and indicates the lack of professionalism and is counter to civilian control. The organizational problem of ill-definition of the responsibility to correct errors shall be corrected. 2. Information Leakage case (communication information revolution and information security): Cases of leaking to the outside business data that included confidential information through file-sharing software installed in private PCs occurred one after another up until 2006. The cause was: (1) recognition by the Self Defense Forces failed to keep pace with the rapid evolution of communication information and; (2) their awareness of security concerning confidential information was not at a sufficient level. 3. Aegis information leakage case (learning of advanced technologies and information security): Case where Aegis information, which falls under the category of Special Defense Secrets, was used as a teaching material, without the regular procedure being followed, and it spread throughout the MSDF. This occurred as a result of the combination of the willingness to learn about advanced technologies and the lack of awareness of information security. 4. Atago Collision case (Slackening of basic action discipline): MSDF destroyer “Atago” collided with a fishing ship. The case provided a lesson on what terrible consequences can follow the slackening of basic discipline, an epidemic disregard for rules across the organization and a lack of navigation skills. In addition, it revealed the problem in communications between the staff and the Internal Bureau in an emergency after the occurrence of the accident. 5. Betrayal by the former Vice-Minister of Defense, Moriya: The case where the former Vice-Minister of Defense is accused of receiving entertainment, money and presents and of using his influence over the procurement of defense equipment and materials. The pursuit of private profit in procurement is a hideous betrayal that is farthest from the professionalism expected from an official of the Internal Bureau. There is a problem also in the organizational environment that allowed such a grave transgression by the top-ranking ----- officer to continue unchecked. 6. Comprehensive examination of the cases In order to control misconduct it is essential to make continual efforts to minimize errors while clarifying goals and mission awareness across the organization. III Reform recommendation (1)—Reform of the thinking of the SDF personnel and organizational culture 1. Principle of reform Based on the examination/analysis of the misconduct cases, we propose the reform principles of: (1) complete compliance with rules, (2) Establishment of professionalism, (3) establishment of operation that gives the execution of duties top priority, aiming at total optimization. 2. Complete compliance with rules It is necessary to establish unprompted compliance awareness as an organizational climate. It is also necessary to organize rules to clearly define items to be conformed with. (1) Staff personnel themselves should understand the need for rules and show example by leadership. (2) Workplace education on compliance with rules, focused on necessity rather than formality (3) Rigid adherence to the rules concerning confidentiality and strict punishment for violation (4) Clarification of where the responsibility lies and creation/disclosure of proceedings records to ensure transparency in defense procurement (5) Strengthening of audit/inspection functions, including short-notice inspections (6) Examination and review of the need for rules 3. Establishment of professionalism Leadership of superior officers who have a strong commitment to professionalism shall nurture high ethical standards and a sense of mission. (1) Review education programs and how to build administrative experience in order to develop staff personnel with a wider vision. (2) Review the balance between the work load and personnel positioning at individual SDF departments and enhance basic workplace education, while reducing undue burden on the workplace. (3) Fostering professionalism in communication/information security that is essential for modern security guarantee 4. Establishment of operation that gives the execution of duties top priority, aiming at total optimization In addition to raising the awareness of individual personnel, units, etc., it is necessary to create an organizational culture that pursues total optimization focused on execution of duties. (1) Establishment of a cooperation system by nurturing a sense of unity of civilian and SDF personnel and that of the Ground, Maritime and Air SDF (2) Establishment of an autonomous PDCA (Plan Do Check Act) cycle (3) Improvement efforts shared by subordinates and their commanders, who lead basic units of the SDF, while taking reference to best practices in the private sector (4) Expeditious response to policy issues through policy planning based on the IPT (Integrated Project Team) system (5) Fully-fledged introduction of the IPT method to defense procurement (6) Further promotion of the joint operations system led by Joint Staff (7) Implementation of public relations keeping consistency among various interviews as well as between headquarters and individual units in order to prevent public distrust ----- IV Reform recommendation (2)—Organizational reform for modern civilian control 1. Need for organizational reform Organizational reform is necessary for the Ministry of Defense and the Self-Defense Forces to implement the three reform principles described above more reliably and effectively. 2. Strategy level—Enhancement of the command tower function of the Prime Minister’s Office The command tower function of the Prime Minister’s Office as well as that of the Ministry of Defense needs to be enhanced. (1) Expressly provide a security strategy for the entire country on which defense policies should be based. (2) Enhance meetings where cabinet members, including the Chief Cabinet Secretary, the Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Defense Minister discuss major issues concerning security routinely and expeditiously. (3) Set up a meeting of related ministers for discussion of the government policies etc. concerning improvement of defense capabilities. Set up a permanent organ to support the meeting. (4) Reinforce the staff of the Cabinet Secretariat to enhance the system to assist the Prime Minister with regard to security. 3. Organizational reform to enhance the command tower function at the Self-Defense Forces (1) Enhancement of the policy decision mechanism that is led by the Minister of Defense (i) Abolish the Defense Counselor System and set up the position of Advisor to the Minister of Defense. (ii) Clearly position the Defense Council by law to assist policy decision and emergency response by the Defense Minster through deliberation of three parties: 1. statespersons, including the Senior Vice-Minister, the Vice-Minister and the Chief of Staff, Joint Staff, 2. civilian personnel, and 3. SDF personnel. (iii) Set up a center for consolidation of information and crisis management of the Ministry. (2) Enhancement of the function of the Bureau of Defense Policy Enhance the functions of planning, drawing up and publicizing defense policies. Enhance the functions based on the actual condition of operations by employing SDF personnel. (3) Enhancement of the function of the Joint Staff Abolish the Bureau of Operational Policy and implement operations under the Chief of Staff, Joint Staff, on orders from the Minister. Important matters, such as operations by units and defense planning, shall be submitted for the approval of the Minister of Defense after deliberation at the Defense Council. Enhance the functions by employing civilian personnel. (4) Unification of the defense capability improvement divisions (i) For total optimization of defense capability improvement, an improvement division shall be established that handles improvement projects, etc. in an integrated fashion by sorting out and restructuring defense capability improvement divisions of the Internal Bureau, GSDF, MSDF and ASDF Staff Offices. Its specific role shall be discussed further. The new system shall allow fullfledged implementation of IPT-based procurement. (ii) Conduct a review to change local procurement to central procurement as far as possible. Strengthen a highly independent third-party check system. (5) Measures in other priority areas (i) For administration staff, actively use uniformed SDF personnel who are familiar with the unit concerned while advancing integration as much as possible. (ii) Personnel affairs and education/training of uniformed SDF personnel shall be the responsibility of the GSDF, MSDF and ASDF Staff Offices, but the Internal Bureau shall also assist the Minister of ----- Defense in these matters in system and policy aspects. V Closing Remarks Execution plan of the reform recommended here should be promptly put together and implemented. In addition, multidimensional simulations should be conducted before the organizational reform. The Council raised various issues, such as how to facilitate a closer relationship between the Ministry of Defense and the Self-Defense Forces on one hand and the Police and Japan Coast Guard on the other while ensuring the function of the entire country. The Council expects the Ministry of Defense and the Self-Defense Forces to recreate themselves as proud professionals. -----