# DEFENSE OF JAPAN 2005 ## (Summary／Tentative Translation) Japan Defense Agency Note: 1.This translation is intended to highlight quick points of “Defense of Japan 2005.” 2.This paper is not an excerpt of “Defense of Japan 2005” and includes remarks to provide a reader with background information that is not in the original paper. 3. Please refer to the original Japanese version for accuracy. 4. We welcome your comments on the wording or translation of this paper. ----- ### Contents **Chapter I** **Security Environment Surrounding Japan** Overview .............................................................................................................................................1 Section 1 Issues in the International Community................................................................................2 Section 2 National Defense Policies of Major Countries and Their Approaches to Creating Stability in the International Community ............................................................................5 Section 3 Security Environment in the Asia-Pacific Region...............................................................8 **Chapter II** **The Basics of Japan’s Defense Policy, the National Defense** **Program Guidelines, and the New Mid-Term Defense Program** Section 1 The Basic Concept of Japan’s Defense Policy ..................................................................18 Section 2 The New National Defense Program Guidelines (2004 NDPG) .......................................19 Section 3 Toward Achieving New Defense Capability .....................................................................26 Section 4 Shift to Permanent Joint Operations Structure ..................................................................29 Section 5 Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements and Various Related Policies .....................................31 **Chapter III** **Effective Responses to New Threats and Diverse Contingencies** **and National Defense against Full-Scale Aggresion** Section 1 Effective Responses to New Threats and Diverse Contingencies .....................................37 Section 2 National Defense against Full-scale Aggression ...............................................................46 Section 3 Measures Related to Responses to an Armed Attack Situation, etc...................................47 **Chapter IV** **Efforts to Improve International Security Environment Proactively** **and on Its Own Initiative** Section 1 Efforts to Support International Peace Cooperation Activities..........................................54 Section 2 Establishing the Basis for Cooperative Relations in the International Community ........................................................................................66 **Chapter V** **People and the Defense Agency/SDF** Section 1 Basis of Defense Capability ..............................................................................................72 Section 2 SDF Activities that Benefit the People..............................................................................80 Section 3 The Defense Agency, SDF, and Local Communities.........................................................81 Section 4 USFJ Facilities and Areas in Okinawa ..............................................................................83 ----- ### Chapter I Security Environment Surrounding Japan Overview Non-state actors such as terrorist organizations have drawn much attention as dire threats in today’s international security. There is also greater risk of transfer or proliferation of weapons of mass destruction or WMDs, such as nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons, and ballistic missiles. In particular, international concern is mounting over the acquisition of WMDs by certain states and international terrorists seeking them. In addition, illegal activities, such as piracy and drug smuggling, have impacted on the international security. As evident in the activities of international terrorists, it is difficult to forecast when and where new threats will emerge. Questions have arisen as to what measures are effective against entities like terrorist organizations which do not necessarily act on rational judgment. In order to properly address such threats, not only military capabilities but also comprehensive approaches including diplomatic, law enforcement, judicial, intelligence, and economic measures are needed. On the other hand, the very nature of new threats makes it difficult for a country to deal with them by itself. International cooperation, therefore, has been promoted to nip threats in the bud, establishing international frameworks and conducting measures based on such initiatives. In such cases as authoritarian regimes threatening regional order or states eroded away by terrorism collapsed, international efforts have been made so as to restore them to responsible nation to prevent them from becoming hotbeds for terrorism. Under the circumstances, the reform of the United Nations (U.N.) has been brought up for agenda so that the U.N. can strengthen its function and more effectively address new threats. Meanwhile, the role of military force has expanded beyond “national defense” into such fields as “maintenance of regional order” and “global cooperation.” The values to be protected by military force are also extending from “national interests” to “the common values of the region or the international community.” To illustrate this point, many countries have dispatched troops and actively cooperated in reconstruction and stabilization efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan. On the occasion of last December’s earthquake off the Sumatra Island and Tsunami in the Indian Ocean, which brought about unprecedented disasters to the littoral, many countries including neighbors were quick to send military units for disaster relief operations. Efforts to stabilize the security environment will take on even greater importance in future. The United States and other major countries have undertaken reforms of their military capabilities with an emphasis on responsiveness, mobility, and flexibility to address various contingencies. ----- ### Section 1. Issues in the International Community **1. The Fight against Terrorism** Since the 9-11 terrorist attacks, the U.S. and other countries have formed an international coalition, committing not only military but also diplomatic, law enforcement, judicial, intelligence and economic resources to the ongoing fight against terrorism. Nonetheless, international terrorist organizations remain active, and dispersed terrorist cells, no longer under centralized control, are in fact engaged in activities that transcend traditional organizational frameworks; and these cells also appear to be making use of the Internet and incorporating other information and communications tools into their operations. Given the need for the international community to join together in combating terrorism, countries are making endeavors prevent the spread of terror by developing cooperative structures for counterterrorism in multilateral frameworks including the U.N., the G8 and regional cooperation organizations. The U.S. and other countries have continued military operations against Taliban and Al Qaeda in and around Afghanistan since October 2001. Pakistani forces are putting more emphasis on their sweeping operations against terrorists in the border area with Afghanistan. In the Arabian Sea, military vessels from various countries including Japan have endeavored to prevent the spread of terrorism from Afghanistan. In October 2004, Afghanistan held a presidential election in accordance with the December 2001 agreement on Afghanistan’s political process; Hamid Karzai was elected president and a new administration was inaugurated in December 2004. Despite twists and turns, the political process is thus moving into its final stages towards peace in Afghanistan. Since the fall of Saddam Hussein’s regime following the U.S. and U.K. military operations in 2003, it seems that terrorists are flowing into Iraq due to deteriorated security situation and insufficient border controls, and numerous terrorist attacks have taken place targeting not only soldiers but also general Iraqi citizens and foreign civilians. It has become clear since April 2004 that terrorists have intended to make Iraq a hotbed for terrorists; numerous kidnappings targeting foreigners have occurred to display terrorist threats through TV and the Internet. Thus, Iraq continues to be the front line in the war on terror. Terrorist attacks against diverse targets using various means are taking place around the globe: Southeast Asia, Russia, Europe and other parts of the world. **2. Transfer and Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction** The transfer or proliferation of WMDs and ballistic missiles has been regarded as a significant threat since the end of the Cold War. In general, some states that seek WMDs tend to be rather less hesitant to put their land and people at risk. Terrorist organizations might be active in such countries because of their poor governance. Consequently, the chance of actual use of WMDs may be high in these states. In addition, there is a high possibility of chemical or nuclear materials being transferred or spilled out from these states to other countries since it is unlikely that these states can effectively manage the related technology and materials. There have been growing concerns, in the international community, about the acquisition and use of WMDs by terrorists and other non-state actors. Based on these concerns, the international community has taken uncompromising and decisive stance against WMDs. This has put enormous pressure on countries seeking such weapons, leading some of them ----- to accept inspections by international institutions or to abandon further programs to develop WMDs. There still remain, however, concerns on nuclear activities by Iran and North Korea. Iran has suspended its uranium enrichment activities in keeping with an accord signed in November 2004 by Iran, the UK, France, and Germany. Iran’s high ranking officials, however, announced the resumption of uranium reprocessing activity in May, casting uncertainty over a future course of this issue. North Korea is now suspected of pursuing not only a plutonium-based but also a uranium-based nuclear weapons development program. (See also Section 3.2 of Chapter 1 on North Korea’s nuclear weapons activities.) **3. Situations of Iraq** The security situation in Iraq remains unpredictable in general although the level of danger differs by region. Multinational forces and Iraqi Security Forces continue to be subjected to attacks primarily in the Sunni Triangle in central Iraq and in some parts of northern Iraq even after governing authority was transferred from the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) to the Iraq Interim Government on June 28, 2004. This is because former regime elements and Islamic extremists, purportedly flowing into Iraq from abroad, have tried to throw Iraq into disorder and to disrupt the political process including the National Assembly elections by giving the impression at home and abroad that the Iraqi Government is unable to govern the country and the multinational forces are failing in providing security. The Iraqi Interim Government, since the transfer of governing authority, has taken such a variety of measures as bolstering Iraqi Security Forces, promulgating the Order of Safeguarding National Security, and offering amnesty. The Iraqi Interim Government conducted offensive operations in Fallujah with the U.S. forces in November 2004, inflicting serious damages to insurgents. However, some of the insurgents, fleeing from Fallujah to other areas, continue to attack multinational forces and Iraqi Security Forces. The multinational forces and Iraqi Security Forces therefore have continued offensive operations in the Sunni Triangle and parts of northern Iraq. Formation of Iraqi Transitional Government through the democratic process have made it more difficult for insurgents to gain support of the Iraqi people, but the security situation in Iraq remains in flux. The Province of Al Muthanna, Southeastern Part of Iraq, where Japanese Ground Self Defense Force (GSDF) is engaged in humanitarian and reconstruction activities, has been relatively calm and stable compared to other regions of Iraq. However, there have been a total of ten indirect fire attacks against the GSDF camp in As Samawah as of July 2005. Judging from the modus operandi, scale and circumstances of these attacks, there seems to be a rather small possibility that they were organized attacks by such substantial forces as insurgent groups presently seen in other regions of Iraq. Although there have been few attacks on multinational forces in Al Muthanna for months, the explosion of improvised explosive devices took place in the vicinity of the GSDF convoy in July 2005. Thus, there is no denying the possibility that attacks could occur hereafter in Al Muthanna. Dutch units together with Iraqi police had been in charge of maintaining security in Al Muthanna but, with the withdrawal of the Dutch units from the area, British units have been responsible for security in the province since March 2005. As the British units are as capable as the Dutch units of providing security and as the Iraqi Security Forces become more competent with training by the Dutch units, there have been no ----- particular changes in the security situation in this province. In February 2005 the Australian government decided to dispatch military units to the Governorate of Al Muthanna. Australian units were deployed in May 2005 and, together with British units, they provide a secure environment and assist in the training of Iraqi Security Forces. The political process set out in the Transitional Administrative Law (TAL) has moved ahead steadily, including the National Assembly elections held on January 30, 2005. Although terrorist attacks were conducted in some regions on the election day, it is a major step to secure and stable democracy of Iraq that a large number of Iraqi nationals went to the polls without yielding to intimidations of terrorists and insurgents. The Iraqi Transitional Government endeavors to draft a permanent constitution by August 15 of this year. The TAL requests a draft constitution to be presented to the Iraqi people for approval in a general referendum to be held by no later than October 15, and then the National Assembly elections to be held by mid-December under a new permanent constitution, leading to a new constitutionally elected government by the end of 2005. Although reconstruction efforts of Iraq have been made mainly by the Iraqi Interim Government and the Iraqi Transitional Government, many countries are contributing to the Iraqi reconstruction through bilateral assistance programs, dispatch of troops, etc. At the end of May 2005, approximately 138,000 U.S. military personnel and more than 20,000 troops from 26 countries were deployed to Iraq to maintain security and assist reconstruction. Since the National Assembly elections in January 2005, the focus of multinational forces has shifted from missions of directly combating insurgents to ones of enhancing the capabilities of Iraqi Security Forces. Iraqi Security Forces played such a key role in providing security during the National Assembly elections that their ability to maintain security won the praise of many other countries. Still, it is some time before Iraqi Security Forces are able to maintain security and stability in Iraq on their own. Multinational forces are therefore expected to continue providing training to these security forces. Individual countries have assisted in the reconstruction of Iraq according to their own particular circumstances, and the scale and tasks vary from county to country. Some countries have withdrawn their units due to expiration of their dispatch term or financial constraints, and other countries have decided on withdrawal of troops due to changes in their policy. Many other countries, however, have expressed their intentions to continue their efforts. **4. Complex and Diverse Regional Conflicts** The characteristics of regional conflicts differ from one conflict to another. They may result from racial, religious, territorial, or resource related problems, and may come in the form of armed conflict, sustained armed antagonism and others. Since Cold War era, armed antagonism in the Middle East, between India and Pakistan, and on the Korean Peninsula, has continued to the present day. Civil wars in many parts of the world including Sri Lanka, Haiti and Sudan still persist. Diverse and complex situations such as large-scale violations of human rights violations, mass refugees, or terrorism resulting from regional conflicts can easily escalate into serious international problems. Therefore, the international community takes military action from early ----- stages in some cases, while emphasizing and pursuing political and diplomatic solution in other cases. ### Section 2 National Defense Policies of Major Countries and Their Approaches to Creating Stability in the International Community **1. U.S. Defense Policy** The U.S. recognized from the 9.11 terrorist attacks that its geographical condition could not make its territory free from a direct attack, and has decided to give top priority to homeland defense. At the same time, it has announced a realistic attitude toward securing safety and freedom of action, and pursuing national interests outside the country as well. This posture is reflected in the “National Defense Strategy” and “National Military Strategy” released in March 2005, and the Bush administration in its second term is expected to essentially maintain such a stance. Under the 2002 “National Security Strategy,” the U.S. regards terrorist attacks and the proliferation of WMDs as the largest threats. The strategy also points out the risk of rogue states and terrorists gaining access to WMDs since concepts of traditional deterrence function poorly or not at all against them. In response to such threats the U.S. has striven to establish a practical and effective framework to prevent the proliferation of WMDs, their delivery means, and related materials. In May 2003, President Bush announced the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) as a measure to prevent the proliferation of WMDs in coordination with other countries. The National Security Strategy sets forth the following: ―The greater the threat, the greater is the risk of inaction and the more compelling the case for taking anticipatory action to defend the U.S., even if uncertainty remains as to the time and place of the enemy’s attack; ―The U.S. will, if necessary, act preemptively to forestall or prevent hostile acts by adversaries such as terrorist organizations or states sponsoring terrorism that pursue WMDs and deterrence will not work against; and ―The U.S. will not use force in all cases to preempt emerging threats nor should the nation use preemption as a pretext for aggression. The Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) released in 2001 describes the objectives of U.S. defense policies as being: 1) to assure allies and friends of the U.S. of its commitments on security; 2) to dissuade adversaries from becoming military competitors in the future; 3) to deter threats or coercion from adversaries using forward-deployed forces; and 4) to decisively defeat any adversary if deterrence fails. In addition, the U.S. shifted the basis of defense planning from a “threat based” model adopted by former administrations to a “capabilities based” model. It also shapes its forces for the following four objectives: 1) to defend the U.S.; 2) to maintain forward-deployed forces in four important regions (Europe, Northeast Asia, the East Asian ----- littoral, and the Middle East/Southwest Asia) to deter aggression; 3) to swiftly defeat adversaries in two theaters of operation in overlapping timeframes and to decisively defeat an adversary in one of the two theaters; and 4) to maintain and prepare forces for smaller-scale contingency operations. At present, the U.S. is reviewing the global deployment posture of its forces. Some factors driving this review are as fololows; 1) U.S. forces has acquired new capabilities for long-range, high-precision targeting; 2) joint operations capabilities have been enhanced through improvements in systems for collecting and managing intelligence; and 3) U.S. forces must be mobile enough to rapidly move over long distances and must be prepared to use temporary basing solutions to adapt to a world in which potential threats have become more unpredictable. The U.S. is reviewing its global posture and announced in November 2003 that consultations with Congress, allies and friends would be intensified. The U.S. Department of Defense affirms that U.S. forces should be transformed so that they can provide national defense in the security environment of the 21[st] century, and it focuses on the followings: C[4]ISR, joint operations, rapid deployment capabilities, the ability to project forces into distant environments, stealth technology, precision-guided weapons, bunker busters, unmanned aerial vehicle, missile defense, and responses to NBC weapons and counterterrorism in the process. The relationship between the U.S. and Russia has improved through cooperation in the fight against terrorism. The Joint Statement on the New Relationship between the U.S. and Russia, which was issued at the U.S.-Russia Summit Meeting held in November 2001, stated that both countries “have overcome the legacy of the Cold War” and “neither country regards the other as an enemy or threat,” and made it clear that the U.S. and Russia have entered a new stage of cooperation and mutual trust. Currently, the momentum toward the new strategic relationship between the two countries remains unchanged. Although the U.S. has emphasized cooperative U.S.-Russia relations in a variety of fields, it has also expressed concerns about recent political developments in Russia. **2. Defense Policies of Other Major Countries** **Russia** President Putin, who began his second term in May 2004, has set liberty, prosperity, affluence, strength, and civilization as national objectives, and has been conducting active summit diplomacy with other countries through which he pursues Russian national interests. The president also made clear his emphasis on domestic policy for his second term, and he has pressed ahead with social reforms. In seeking to strengthen the state structure, he has at the same time moved to rebuild a centralized structure by abolishing a direct electoral system of regional governors and seeking to make authorities delegated to regions uniform by reducing/abolishing special authority granted to particular regions. Russia has identified international terrorism, movements to decrease the role of the U.N. and, the eastward expansion of NATO as threats against its national interests. It also perceived that an increase of ----- weapons with high technology in the Western countries, together with the critical state of the Russian military, have resulted in weakened Russian national security. Finally, it claims that potential threats remain or are growing both at home and abroad although the possibility of large-scale wars has decreased. Based on these perceptions, Russia states that the objectives of national defense should be to deter aggression, prevent a war and an armed conflict and secure international security and world peace, and that it takes measures to achieve deterrence and continue to maintain nuclear forces to prevent invasions of any scale. In addition, it points out the possibility of using armed forces for purposes other than national defense, including various peacetime operations while denying plans to proactively use forces in counter-terrorism measures. In addition, the importance of inter-theater mobility of permanent combat-ready troops is pointed out given the vastness of the Russian territory. It seems that Russia has put an increased emphasis on nuclear capability to make up for deficiencies in its conventional forces, and is making efforts to maintain the readiness of nuclear forces. As for its conventional forces, Russia seems to be concentrating its limited resources on certain units to maintain their combat readiness while executing military reforms. The future of Russian forces is unclear due to the opacity of both the political and economic conditions in the country, and it is necessary to keep monitoring the progress of military reforms of Russian forces. However, it is unlikely that the size and posture of Russian forces would return to their status during the Cold War era. **Europe** Many European countries recognize that the threat of a large-scale invasion by other nations has disappeared. At the same time, new security issues have surfaced, including regional conflicts, the rise of international terrorism and the proliferation of WMDs, and many European countries are making efforts to ensure capabilities to respond to these new challenges. Against this backdrop, NATO has shifted the focus of its activities to conflict prevention and crisis management. As NATO takes on new roles, there have been calls for more drastic reforms of NATO to counter the emergence of threats from non-state actors. At the heart of NATO’s improved capabilities is the NATO Response Force (NRF), which can swiftly deploy worldwide in various crisis scenarios. The NRF is expected to acquire full operational capabilities by October 2006. The EU has been enhancing its own commitment to security issues in recent years, having engaged in activities in the areas of crisis management and security maintenance. The EU in 2004 adopted “Headline Goal 2010” that focused on the concept of creating a number of 1500-man units that could be put on standby in rotation. The EU is hoping to have the first battle group ready for deployment in 2005, and is planning from 2007 to maintain two battle groups on standby through rotation at any given time. **3. Efforts to Create Stability in the International Community by the U.N. and Other** **Frameworks** Recently, discussions are underway on organizational and other reforms of the U.N. that in order to deal effectively with diversifying threats. Reforms of U.N. organs in ways that increase their effectiveness and credibility are necessary for the international community to adequately address new issues of the ----- twenty-first century, and Japan is actively involved in these reform efforts. U.N. Peace keeping Operations (PKOs) grew in scale as the scope of U.N. missions expanded to include such activities as monitoring decommissioning of arms, holding elections and monitoring governments, repatriating refugees and engaging in other humanitarian support efforts. On the other hand, PKOs face a number of problems including securing personnel/equipment and ensuring the safety of personnel. The U.N. and concerned countries have discussed measures to resolve these problems, and some of the proposals have born fruits such as the enhancement of the U.N. standby arrangements system, which enables the rapid implementation of PKOs. **4. Trends in the Military Science and Technologies** In recent years, developed countries continue conducting various studies on the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) because they understand that reforms backed by the Information Technology revolution will drastically improve combat strength. Consequently, these countries will continue upgrading their advanced military science and technology. On the other hand, countries as well as terrorist organizations and other non-state actors that find it technically and economically difficult to maintain high-tech forces are expected to prefer an asymmetrical means of attack. These asymmetrical means of attack include WMDs, terrorist attacks, and cyber attacks. Developed countries are increasingly aware of the significance of research and development for technologies to counter asymmetrical threats. ### Section 3. Security Environment in the Asia-Pacific Region **1. General** The expansion and deepening of interdependence among the nations have promoted and strengthened bilateral and multilateral coordination and cooperation mainly in the economic areas in the Asia-Pacific region. On the other hand, there are still unsolved issues such as territorial disputes or unification problems in the region. Under these circumstances, North Korea’s nuclear issue has stirred up international concern. This issue not only has serious effects on security in East Asia, but also has become a matter of grave concern for the international community in terms of non-proliferation. Many Asia-Pacific countries have increased their national defense expenditures and introduced new equipment to enhance and modernize their military capabilities. In particular, China, which is steadily growing as a political and economic power in the region, continues to strengthen its military capabilities. Such trend draws attention from other countries in the region. In addition to traditional security issues, such issues as terrorism and acts of piracy have been exerting serious influence over regional security in Southeast Asia in recent years. Given the above, bilateral alliances and friendship with the U.S. at their center and the presence of the US forces based on these relations continue to play important roles in maintaining peace and stability of the region. In addition, bilateral military exchanges as well as multilateral dialogues on regional security, such as the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), have taken root in the region. ----- **2. The Korean Peninsula** **North Korea** North Korea has been advocating the construction of a “strong and rising great power” as its basic national policy, aiming at creating a strong socialist state, and adopted a “military first policy” to realize this goal. It appears that General Secretary Kim Jong Il intends to continue running the country by attaching importance to and relying on them. Although North Korea is faced with serious economic difficulties to this day, the country seems to be maintaining and enhancing its military capabilities and combat readiness by preferentially allocating resources to its military forces. **(1) WMDs and Ballistic Missiles** Concerning the nuclear issue of North Korea, three* rounds of Six-Party Talks were held so far to pursue a peaceful solution to this problem and to achieve denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. Subsequently, diplomatic efforts continue to hold the next Six-Party Talk. North Korea, however, released a statement under the name of its Ministry of Foreign Affairs that it would suspend its participation in the talks for an indefinite period until the conditions were improved and atmosphere was warmed up. The country also claimed in the statement that it had already “manufactured nukes.” In May 2005, North Korea announced that it had completed the removal of 8,000 spent fuel rods from its graphite-moderated nuclear reactor in Yongbyon, to the north of Pyongyang. _Note: Based on an understanding on July 9th between the U.S. and North Korean sides, the fourth Six-Party_ _Talk started on July 26th._ There are views that North Korea is resorting to brinkmanship by intentionally heightening tension through continuously taking such actions as mentioned above, whilst not fully rejecting to participate in the talks, in order to get compensation. However, the alternative view suggests that North Korea’s ultimate objective is to acquire nuclear weapons. Because the ultimate goal of North Korea is believed to be to maintain existing regime, it seems that the two foregoing views are not incompatible. The North Korean nuclear issue is important not only for the security of Japan but also for the international community from the viewpoint of the nonproliferation. Taking into account a series of North Korea’s latest words and actions and the fact that the country’s once-suspected nuclear weapons development is not yet resolved, the possibility of North Korea having considerably advanced its nuclear weapons program cannot be excluded. For the solution of North Korea’s nuclear issue, it is important that Japan, the U.S., and the Republic of Korea (ROK) keep working closely together. At the same time, other states and international organizations such as China and Russia, which are other participants in the Six-Party Talks, as well as the European Union, the United Nations, and the IAEA may play an important role. Details of North Korean ballistic missiles are still unclear partly because of the extremely closed nature of the country. However, it appears that North Korea gives high priority to ballistic missiles in order to boost its military capabilities, to obtain foreign currency, as well as to pursue its political and diplomatic purposes. In addition to Nodong, which is considered to be in the process of being deployed, and Taepo Dong-1, ----- which is being developed, North Korea is thought to be developing Taepo Dong-2, with a range of 3,500-6,000 km, a two-stage missile with a new booster as its first stage and a Nodong as the second. Thus, the range of North Korean ballistic missiles is expected to be extended further, and there is also a possibility that their derivative missiles could be developed. As the background of North Korea’s rapid strides in the development of its ballistic missiles with only a few test launches, it is assumed it imported various materials and technologies from outside. It has been pointed out that North Korea transfers and proliferates ballistic missiles or related technologies to Iran and Pakistan, and North Korea promotes the development of missiles using funds gained by these transactions. North Korea needs to be watched carefully because of the problems it poses with its development, deployment, and proliferation of ballistic missiles as well as the nuclear problem in general. These issues bring uncertainty not only to the Asia-Pacific region but also to the international community. **(2) Military Posture** While North Korea has been making efforts to maintain and strengthen its military capabilities and readiness, most of its equipment is outdated. On the other hand, North Korea has special operations forces that can conduct various operations ranging from intelligence-gathering and sabotage to guerilla warfare. These forces are approximately 100,000 strong. Moreover, it seems that there are many underground military installations across the country. Thus, it would appear that North Korea develops, deploys, and proliferates weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles and also maintains large-scale special operational forces, thus maintaining and enhancing its so-called asymmetrical military capabilities. Through maintaining such military posture, North Korea has increased military tension over the Korea Peninsula, and its behavior constitutes a serious destabilizing factor in East Asia as a whole, including Japan. **(3) Domestic Affairs** Some people point out that the North Korean regime is not as stable as it was due to increasing disparity between the rich and the poor, loosening social control characterized by worship of money, and falling morale. However, in light of the fact that national events have been held and diplomatic negotiations have been conducted in an orderly manner, the regime in North Korea based around Kim Jong Il, chairman of the National Defense Commission, is considered to be on the right track. **The ROK** The Roh Moo-hyun administration, inaugurated in February 2003, upholds “Policy of Peace and Prosperity,” which succeeds to the thinking of “Engagement Policy” promoted by the administration of former President Kim Dae-jung. The ROK aims “to defend the nation from external military threats and invasion, uphold peaceful unification and contribute to regional stability and world peace as its national defense objectives”. As one of “external military threats,” the ROK had regarded North Korea as its “main enemy.” In its Ministry of National Defense’s White Paper 2004, however, North Korea is no longer described as such. Instead, the White Paper refers to “direct military threats from North Korea including its conventional military 10 ----- capabilities, weapons of mass destruction and forward military deployment”. **3. China** **General** In recent years, China has been continuously achieving dramatic economic growth. The country has also improved its diplomatic image and achieved many results. On the military front, China has been making efforts to modernize its military power supported by the continuing expansion of its military expenditure. China has thus been steadily growing as a political and economic power in the Asia-Pacific region and the trend of its military development draws attention from countries in the region. **(1)Domestic Affairs** The State President Hu Jintao, who completed the transfer of the party, state, and military authorities, has followed the policy of the previous administration while taking an initiative to strengthen administrative abilities of the Communist Party and focused on sectors of the Chinese population that have been left behind by the economic reform. While achieving successful economic growth, China has several domestic problems such as corruption of Communist Party cadres, separatist and independent movements, widening urban-rural or coastal-inland gaps owing to the rapid economic growth, and unemployment due to the reform of state-owned enterprises. Attention should be paid to how China deals with these issues. **(2) Relations with Taiwan** In recent years, China and Taiwan have strengthened their economic relations and human interactions through trade, investment, and cultural and academic exchanges. Accordingly, economic interdependence between China and Taiwan is expected to deepen further. In March 2005, China enacted “The Anti-Secession Law.” The law has stipulated that China would make its best efforts to solve the China-Taiwan issue in a peaceful manner but at the same time might take non-peaceful measures if Taiwan showed some movement toward independence. Japan, the U.S., and EU showed concerns over the law, in view of its negative effects to the peace and stability of the Taiwan Strait and to the relationship between China and Taiwan, which had been improving. There is a gap between the fundamental stances of China and Taiwan and attention should be paid to future trends toward a peaceful resolution of the Taiwan issue. The point is whether they will find any meeting ground to reopen an official dialogue. **(3) Relations with the U.S. and others** It seems that China is wary of increase in U.S.’s influence in the international community through the fight against terrorism, its increased presence in Central Asia, and inclination toward “U.S. unipolarity.” On the other hand, China wishes to maintain close relationship with the U.S. since economic development in China requires it. As for China-Russia relationship, both countries share a desire to promote multipolarization in the 11 ----- world and the construction of a new world order based on multipolarity, and have maintained positive relationship with each other. Amid the general advancement in mutual relationship, military exchanges have also been promoted, and the two countries are reportedly planning to conduct a large-scale joint military exercise this year. As North Korea seems to rely heavily on China for food assistance and energy supply, China is believed to have a strong influence on North Korea. With respect to the nuclear issue, China has consistently pressed for denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and its peaceful settlement. China has played a significant role in the Six-Party Talks and the international community expects further contributions by China toward a resolution of the nuclear issue. China has attached much importance to the establishment of stable security environments in the neighboring areas including Southeast Asia, South Asia and Central Asia. China aims to establish practical and cooperative relations with foreign countries, mainly through security talks and cooperation in areas of non-traditional security. **Military Affairs** **(1) National Defense Policy** As the world moves towards multi-polarization and economic globalization, China recognizes that countries are becoming more interdependent with each other, sharing mutual interests over wider areas. On the other hand, China believes that tendencies of hegemonism and unilateralism have gained new ground, as struggles for strategic points, strategic resources and strategic dominance crop up from time to time. The country claims that there is unbalanced economic development observed in the world. China also expresses concern on non-traditional security issues such as terrorism. With these perceptions of the current situations, China, as its basic objectives and obligations for national security, declares to protect its national sovereignty, territories, and maritime interests; to further develop its economy and society; and to continuously strengthen its comprehensive national power. It has also expressed its intention to strengthen its defense capabilities to safeguard China’s security, unification, and its modernization drive, and adheres to military strategy of active defense. This is a strategic thinking that calls for active response in the event of an attack, though precluding preemption. China has deepened its understanding that worldwide Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) is gaining momentum and informationalization has become a key factor in enhancing war-fighting capabilities of armed forces. For modernizing the Chinese military based on this understanding, the country is aggressively promoting “RMA with Chinese characteristics” with the concept of informationalization at its core. **(2) National Defense Budget** At the National People’s Congress in 2005, the Chinese government announced that its national defense budget for FY 2005 would be 244.7 billion yuan, an approximate 12.6% increase over that of the previous year. For the announced budget, China has recorded a growth rate over 10% consecutively for 17 years in terms of initial defense budget. With respect to the relationship between national defense and economy, China states that it will firmly maintain the principle of coordinated development of national 12 ----- defense and economy in its defense white paper. There seems therefore to be little possibility for a rapid change of resource allotment in favor of the national defense. However, it seems that China will continue to modernize its military considering the fact that the total amount of its national defense budget has been significantly increasing. It must be noted that the amount of defense expenses announced by China is considered to be only a part of its actual military expenditures. For instance, expenses on equipment procurement and research and development are not necessarily included in the official figures for defense expenditures. China’s defense white paper and other documents have failed to provide, for example, plans for major equipment procurement or number of current equipment. It is more than desirable that China will make an additional effort to improve transparency of its defense policy and military capabilities. **(3) Military Strength** China has been modernizing its military capabilities focusing on nuclear and missile forces as well as its naval and air forces in recent years. It is necessary to keep paying attention to these modernization trends and to carefully evaluate whether the modernization of China’s military forces exceeds the level necessary for its national defense. Concerning Chinese nuclear forces and ballistic missiles, China has worked on developing an independent nuclear capability with a view to guaranteeing deterrence, supplementing its conventional forces, and ensuring its influence in the international community. China is currently developing new-type DF-31 inter-continental ballistic missiles and submarine-launched ballistic missiles. With regard to intermediate-/medium- range ballistic missiles with ranges covering the Asian region including Japan, China has been replacing old DF-3 missiles with DF-21 missiles, new type of missile with improved accuracy and other performances. In addition, China is enhancing the deployment of short-range ballistic missiles along the shore facing the Taiwan Strait. Finally, China has been conducting research and development on countermeasures against missile defense. China has been continuously seeking to modernize its ground armed forces by curtailing personnel and streamlining organizations and systems in order to improve efficiency. It also plans to implement a reform to improve its logistical support capability. The Chinese navy is aiming to extend the space for offshore defensive operations while integrated combat capabilities are enhanced in conducting offshore campaigns. Accordingly, naval modernization is underway with the continuous introduction of quiet Kilo-class submarines and Sovremenny-class destroyers with supersonic anti-ship missiles from Russia. In addition, China has been domestically constructing several new-type ships in recent years. The number of new fourth-generation aircraft operated by the Chinese Air Force and Navy is rising sharply. China is currently developing J-10 (F-10) fighters domestically, and has promoted import of Su-30 fighters with anti-surface and anti-submarine attack capability from Russia. The Chinese Air Force is reportedly aiming to gradually shift from one of territorial air defense to one of both offensive and defensive operations. China is also seeking to modernize its air force by acquiring in-flight refueling capability and early warning and control systems that are essential in conducting modern air campaign while developing cruise missiles. 13 ----- **(4) Military Posture** In recent years, China have been conducting large-scale exercises including joint exercises of the Army, Navy, and Air Force and landing exercises, with the aim of advancing modernization in its operation. In addition, China is making efforts to train military personnel well acquainted with science and technology. **(5)Maritime Activities** In recent years, we have witnessed vigorous maritime activities by Chinese naval vessels and oceanographic research ships navigating in waters near Japan. One of the most notable cases has been the incident caused by a submerged Chinese nuclear powered submarine that intruded into Japan’s territorial waters last November. The Chinese Navy aims to extend the space for offshore defensive operations while integrated combat capabilities are enhanced in conducting offshore campaigns, as mentioned above. In addition, it is pointed out that the country aims to build a so-called blue-water navy in the future. Therefore, it is important to monitor Chinese movements and identify Chinese strategies underlying them. **Military Capability of Taiwan** Since January 2004, Taiwan has been implementing a new downsizing program, “Jingjin Program (The ROC Armed Forces Streamlining Program)” to manage national defense resources more efficiently, to reduce the total number of military personnel, and to promote a restructuring of armed forces. At the same time, the Taiwanese armed forces attach importance to the introduction of advanced technologies and improvement of comprehensive operational capabilities. Taiwan recognizes that unless the Taiwanese forces effectively improve their strength, the military superiority would be gradually shifting to the Chinese side in and after 2006. Based on this recognition, Taiwan is currently focusing on modernizing its equipment. In June 2004, the Executive Yuan of Taiwan formulated a special budget plan for purchasing arms, specifically to purchase eight diesel submarines, 12 P-3C patrol aircraft, and the latest Patriot missile system PAC-3. The budget bill is now under deliberation for approval by the Legislative Yuan. **4. Russia in the Asia-Pacific Region** **(1)General** For Russia to facilitate the development of underground resources and to bolster economy and social infrastructure in the far east region, it is important to build closer economic relations with Asia-Pacific countries. Recognizing the increasing importance of the Asia-Pacific region in its foreign policy, Russia is actively engaged in diplomatic activities with countries in the region. At the same time, it is actively committing itself to resolving regional problems, such as the issue of the Korean Peninsula, to secure its influence, because the peace and stability of the Asia-Pacific region is important for Russia. **(2)Military Posture** The force levels of the Russian military in the Russian far east region have declined and their current 14 ----- force level remains far smaller than its peak. Training and other operations, after reaching bottom, have been gradually showing an upward trend in recent years. In 2004, the permanent combat readiness troops conducted “Mobility 2004” as exercise for rapid deployment from the western part of Russia to the far east region. For the future of the Russian forces in this region, it is necessary to continue to monitor the future developments as the Russian forces are attributing more importance to the inter-theater mobility of permanent combat readiness troops for dealing with conflicts, and political and economic conditions in the country still remain largely uncertain. However, it is unlikely that the force level and posture of the Russian forces in this region would return to that of the Soviet forces during the Cold War era within the foreseeable future. **5. Southeast Asia** **(1) General** The countries in Southeast Asia have until now worked to achieve political stability and sound economic progress while striving to deepen relations of mutual reliance with other countries both inside and outside the region. On the other hand, such destabilizing factors as the territorial dispute over the Spratly Islands, minority ethnic issues, separatist and independent movements, and Islamic extremist organizations persist in the region, while there have been incidents in which the safe passage of ships have been obstructed by pirates. **(2) Developments in ASEAN** The turning point for ASEAN was the realization of ASEAN 10 with the formal admission of Cambodia to ASEAN in 1999, more than 30 years after its establishment. In 2001, the ASEAN-member countries made a statement for reducing economic disparity among them and confirmed the importance of cooperation towards economic integration. The countries have thus promoted cooperation in the economic and trade areas. These countries are expected to cooperate with each other in various areas, including peace and stabilization of the region. In recent years, active movements centering on ASEAN have been observed. On the other hand, while the economic gap among ASEAN member countries has widened due to the expansion of ASEAN membership, there also exist political differences among countries of the region. Additionally, a change of generation in leadership has been taking place, and ASEAN is facing various challenges including discussions about effective measures against cross-border crimes such as terrorism and review of traditional principles such as non-intervention in domestic affairs and consensus methods. Attention should be given to how ASEAN, groping for solutions of these issues, takes steps to realize a “community” in the future. **(3) Maritime Safety in the Malacca and Singapore Straits** The Straits of Malacca, lying between Sumatra and Malay Peninsula is an important sea passage in the Asia-Pacific region, together with the Singapore Straits located to its south east. The Southeast Asian waters have been the scene of half as many attacks of piracy and armed robbery as those in the entire globe. 15 ----- It has been pointed out that the acts of piracy are becoming more heinous and aggravated in recent years. As for security of the Straits of Malacca, the coastal countries shall bear its primary responsibility but its security exerts influence over the interests of other countries using the straits. For cross-border issues like terrorism and piracy, it is necessary to take multilateral cooperative measures. Accordingly, various talks and cooperation have been promoted towards establishment of specific arrangements for cooperation among the coastal countries of the Straits of Malacca, other interested countries including Japan, and relevant international organizations. **6. Other Regions** **Australia** As seen in its engagement in the East Timor issue and Solomon Islands issue in July 2003, Australia intends to engage actively in efforts to resolve regional security issues. Having reviewed its national defense strategy in terms of security environment influenced by the 9-11 terrorist attacks, and by the bombing in Bali, Indonesia, in October 2002, Australia released a report entitled “Australia’s National Security: A Defense Update 2003” in February 2003. The report stresses that the twin threats of terrorism and the proliferation of WMDs represent significant changes in the global strategic environment in the past two years, and that they are real and immediate threats to Australia. **India** With a total population of more than one billion, vast land, and a geographical position that is important in maritime traffic, India has great influence in South Asia. India states following points on its national security policies; ―the possession of military capabilities to protect the national interest and the minimum level deterrent against nuclear threats; ―response to various security challenges ranging from terrorism, low-intensity conflicts, to conventional wars and nuclear wars; ―enhancement of international cooperation to deal with new threats such as terrorism and WMDs. In addition to its friendly relationship with Russia, India has made progress in improving relations with the U.S. and China. With regard to its relation with Pakistan, with which India has a pending issue over Kashmir, both countries have made some progress in mutual confidence building through the continued “Composite Dialogue” which began in February 2004. **Pakistan** Pakistan’s fight against terrorism and approach to nonproliferation of WMDs is drawing international attention. President Musharraf has been improving relations with India, and also expressed his support for the U.S.-led war on terrorism and prevention of the proliferation of WMDs. In the meantime, Islamic extremist groups at home and abroad criticized President Musharraf’s policy. Achieving stability in Pakistan is crucial from the viewpoint of securing stability in South Asia. 16 ----- **Central Asia** Countries in Central Asia are making efforts to establish security frameworks that are independent from that of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) has been an example, established as a multilateral security scheme. The U.S. military presence in this region has continued to date as the region is surrounded geographically by two superpowers, Russia and China, and was strongly influenced by Russia in the past. **7. U.S. Forces in the Asia-Pacific Region** The U.S., which is also a nation in the Pacific, continues to play an important role in ensuring peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region by deploying forces under the Pacific Command, a joint command of the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps. The U.S. has repeatedly referred to its significant role in the Asia-Pacific region. The U.S. Pacific Command has its headquarters in Hawaii and forward-deployed forces, mainly drawn from the Navy and Air Force, in the Pacific Ocean and Indian Ocean with the objective of providing quick, flexible responses to any contingency and guaranteeing the security of the region. 17 ----- ### Chapter II The Basics of Japan’s Defense Policy, the National Defense Program Guidelines, and the New Mid-Term Defense Program Section 1 The Basic Concept of Japan’s Defense Policy **1. Measures to Ensure National Security** For a nation to achieve its peace and security, mere desire to do so does not suffice. As the world becomes increasingly interdependent, only through a comprehensive approach involving, among other things, diplomatic efforts, defense efforts and cooperation with alliance partners, can a nation ensure its peace and security. In the international arena, Japan has endeavored to enhance bilateral relations including the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements. Japan has also been active in international cooperative efforts both at the regional and global level, contributing to conflict prevention and resolution, economic development, arms control and disarmament, and improved international trust and mutual understanding. Meanwhile, such non-military means alone cannot ensure nation’s peace and security: they are not always capable of deterring aggression and can never repel aggression should it occur. On the other hand, defense capability is in itself an expression of a nation’s will and ability to repel aggression, and provides the ultimate guarantee of a country’s security, and its function cannot be substituted by any other means. It has indeed been the policy of the Government to ensure a defense posture that has no capability gap. To this end, the Government has built, maintained, and operated appropriate level of defense capability, and has worked to improve the credibility of the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements through, among other things, the building of an effective mechanism for bilateral cooperation. In addition to these defense efforts, the new security environment that has emerged in recent years increasingly calls for an endeavor involving defense capability toward improving international security environment in order to forestall security threats that may affect Japan. **2. The Constitution and the Right of Self-Defense** It is recognized beyond doubt that, as long as Japan remains an independent nation, the Constitution does not deny the inherent right of self-defense that Japan as a sovereign state is entitled to maintain. It is the established interpretation of the Constitution that it allows Japan to possess a force that is minimum necessary for national self-defense. The right of self-defense under Article 9 of the Constitution may be exercised only when the following three conditions are met: ―there is an imminent and illegitimate act of aggression against Japan; ―there is no appropriate means to deal with such an act of aggression other than by resorting to the right of self-defense; and ―the use of armed strength is confined to the minimum necessary level. It is recognized under international law that a state has the right of collective self-defense, which is the right to use armed force to stop an armed attack on a foreign country with which it has close relations, even when the state itself is not under direct attack. Since Japan is a sovereign state, it naturally is entitled 18 ----- to the right of collective self-defense. It has been the position of the Government, however, that the exercise of the right of collective self-defense exceeds the limit of self-defense authorized under Article 9 of the Constitution and is not therefore permissible under the Constitution. **3. The Basics of Defense Policy** The “1957 Policy for National Defense” provides some fundamental policies regarding Japan’s national defense, which include: promotion of cordial international relations; building of the foundation of national security through improving people’s livelihood; building of efficient defense capabilities; and centrality of Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements in countering aggression. Other policies that are not included in the 1957 document include: adherence to exclusively defense-oriented policy; a resolve not to become a military power that poses threat to other countries; adherence to the Three Non-Nuclear Principles; and civilian control of the military. ### Section 2 The New National Defense Program Guidelines (2004 NDPG) **1. The Evolution of the National Defense Program Outlines** **_The National Defense Program Outlines (1976NDPO and 1995NDPO)_** Japan’s defense capability has been built in ways that are best respond to various conditions of given time: overall framework of international relations, the state of the SDF, regional situations surrounding Japan, and the nation’s economic and financial situations. The National Defense Program Outlines (NDPOs)* have served to provide basic guidelines for how Japan’s defense should be tailored to achieve its end. More specifically, NDPOs have covered such themes as overarching principles of national security and the roles of defense force, and, based on the foregoing, organization and force structure of the SDF as well as target force level for major equipment. _Note: The English Title for the Boueikeikaku-no Taikou was changed in 2004 from the “National Defense_ _Program Outlines” to the “National Defense Program Guidelines” to better reflect the nature of the_ _document. The Japanese title did not change._ The first NDPO was formulated and approved by the National Defense Council and the Cabinet in October 1976, based on the recognition that Japan’s defense capability had achieved the target force level through the implementation of the previous four defense build-up programs (covering three to five years), which warranted a policy guideline for the future. In 1995, the NDPO was revised in view of dramatic changes in the international environment signified by the end of the Cold War as well as the public increasing expectations for the SDF to play broader roles in such fields as overseas activities. **_Features of 1976 NDPO_** The 1976 NDPO was formulated against the backdrop of the détente in the 1970s, and adopted the ‘Basic Defense Force Concept’ based on the assumption that the underlying trends of international relations would not change significantly for some years to come. Rather than aiming at countering security threats 19 ----- head-on, this concept called upon to possess the minimum necessary defense capability as an independent country so that Japan would not become a power vacuum that would be destabilizing for regional security. This concept can be characterized as having heavier emphasis on **_deterrent effect for_** **_preventing_** **_aggression against Japan_** rather than actual response in the event of aggression. **_Features of 1995 NDPO_** While the Basic Defense Force Concept remained mostly unchanged, the 1995 NDPO paid attention to such factors as significant changes in international situations and increasing expectation to SDF roles, and made a review on the size and the functions of defense capabilities. It calls for defense forces that are capable of **_effectively dealing with diverse contingencies_** and that can have **_appropriate flexibility to be_** able to make a smooth response to an unexpected development of the situation by enhancing necessary functions and seeking for qualitative improvement while making efforts to pursue rationalization, efficiency and streamlining. The 1995 NDPO can be summarized as a concept with greater emphasis on effective operations of **_defense forces Japan possesses and looking for_** **_more proactive use_** **_of SDF capabilities in various_** **_missions not limited to (narrowly defined) national defense._** **2. Background of Formulating the 2004 National Defense Program Guidelines** **(1) Changes in International Circumstances** **_Overall International Circumstances (Changes in Threat and Destabilizing Factors)_** While the likelihood of a global conflict has become more remote even in comparison with the time of formulating the 1995 NDPO, attention is focused today not only on military conflicts between states, but also on major security threats such as **_activities of non-state actors including international terrorist_** organizations that are not easily identifiable. Response to these new threats and diverse contingencies has been an urgent issue for individual nations and the international community as well. While traditional deterrent capability continues to play an important role in preventing state-to-state conflicts, the concept of traditional deterrence may not necessarily prove to be effective with respect to non-state actors like terrorists. It is necessary to pay a closer attention to the fact that it has become **_increasingly difficult for any country to deal with on its own with such new threats_** that have the potential to spread beyond national borders. **_Increasing International Cooperation Efforts & the Changes in the Roles of Military Force_** Ensuring stable international security environment has become the common interest of all countries, and each country is making **_a broad range of efforts to resolve security issues by utilizing defense_** capabilities as well as other measures and coordinating such measures under international collaboration. Military forces have come to **_assume a variety of roles_** in the push towards greater stability in the security environment. In addition to their traditional roles of deterring and responding to armed conflicts, military forces **_have been actively called upon for stabilization of security environment, ranging from_** 20 ----- conflict prevention to reconstruction assistance. **_Security Environment Surrounding Japan_** In the areas surrounding Japan, efforts are underway to **_strengthen bilateral and multilateral_** **_partnership and cooperation. While, the likelihood of a full-scale invasion of Japan has declined._** On the other hand, the countries in the areas surrounding Japan are characterized by diversity in ethnic **_groups, religions, political systems, and economic strength; the area also features several major countries_** and having a complex structure of interwoven interests as well as disputes over unification, territory and maritime interests. Many countries are also modernizing and improving their military capabilities. In particular, North Korea is engaged in the development and deployment of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles and maintaining and reinforcing its asymmetric military capabilities (e.g. large-scale special forces), giving rise to circumstances that profoundly affect the regional and Japan’s peace and stability. China with a key influence on the security of this region continues to grow steadily as a major power in the region both politically and economically, while in the military sphere the country has been modernizing its nuclear/missile forces as well as its naval/air military capabilities and seeking to expand the scope of its activities at sea. Attention must also be paid to these trends in future. **_(2)Remarkable Technological Developments_** Technological advancements led by the information and communications technologies have been remarkable, **_considerably impacting on the defense strategies_** of all nations, and compelling them to review their own equipment and systems as well as their strategic concepts. **_(3)Expanding SDF’s Activities and Japan’s Strengthened Emergency Response Mechanism_** The SDF’s activities have been diversifying and expanding. Through various activities in response to contingencies, coordination with relevant functions such as police agencies and local communities has been reinforced. **_(4)Geographical Characteristics of Japan_** Japan is located at a key strategic point. Its territory consists of a long, thin crescent-shaped archipelago with long coastline and many small islands distant from the main islands, which could present vulnerabilities that require special attention from security viewpoint. Japan is also prone to natural disasters such as earthquakes, typhoons, and volcanic eruptions among other countries because of its geographical conditions: terrain, geology, climate and others. In addition, it is essential to ensure safety of maritime traffic and stable utilization of the oceans for sustained socioeconomic stability/development and the livelihood of the Japanese people. **3. A Series of Studies and Decisions that led to the Formulation of the 2004 NDPG** Prior to the formulation of the National Defense Program Guidelines in December 2004, various studies were conducted on different occasions. 21 ----- In December 2003, based on the studies and reviews conducted within the Defense Agency (“Defense Posture Review Board”) (established in September 2001), _‘The Direction for Reviewing Defense_ _Capabilities’_ was stipulated in the Cabinet Decision titled “On Introduction of Ballistic Missile Defense System and Other Measures”. This Cabinet Decision called for an inter-ministry review of defense capabilities to formulate a National Defense Program Guidelines that replaces the 1995 NDPO by the end of 2004 in accordance with the ‘Direction’ In April 2004, the Council on Security and Defense Capabilities (Chairperson: Hiroshi Araki, Advisor of TEPCO) was established under the supervision of Prime Minister Koizumi, to gather opinions from experts in security and business communities, as a part of government’s initiative to make a comprehensive review on future security and defense postures with broad perspectives. This council had 13 meetings and [submitted the final report “Japan’s Visions for Future Security and Defense Capabilities” (Araki Report) to](http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/singi/ampobouei/dai13/13siryou.pdf) Prime Minister Koizumi in October 2004. The report depicts the new security environment and the need to respond to threats that are complex and diverse both in terms of actor and nature, as characterized by the emergence of non-state actors like terrorist organizations. It also lays out the “Concept of Integrated Security Strategies.” This calls for **_integrated execution of appropriately combined three approaches,_** namely i) Japan’s own efforts, ii) collaboration with allies, and iii) collaboration with the international community, to **_achieve (Japan’s )_** **_two (security) objectives: i) defending Japan, and ii) preventing threats by improving the international_** security environment In October 2004, the Security Council of Japan began deliberations on future defense policy and force structure based on ‘The Direction for Reviewing Defense Capabilities’ included in the 2003 Cabinet Decision and the Report. In December 2004, the Government made a Cabinet Decision on the 2004 NDPG after making broad and comprehensive reviews in the Security Council. **4. The Basic Concept of the 2004 NDPG** **(1)Articulation of Two Objectives and Three Approaches as the Basic Concept on Japan’s Security** In order to ensure peace and security of Japan, the new 2004 NDPG clearly defines Japan’s Basic Policy for Security and identifies the following two objectives; ―to **_prevent direct threats to Japan, and to eliminate the threats that reach Japan as well as to minimize_** the damage, and ―to **_improve the international security environment_** and to prevent any threats from reaching Japan. To achieve these objectives, **_appropriate combination of the three approaches should be exerted in an_** integrated manner; namely i) Japan’s own efforts, ii) cooperation with the allies and iii) cooperation with the international community. **(2)Clarifying the Concept of New Defense Capabilities: Shifting Focus from “Deterrent** **effect-oriented” to “Response capability-oriented” Defense Capabilities)** The Basic Defense Force Concept, which the 1995 NDPO basically succeeded from the 1976 NDPO, was reviewed for the following two reasons in recognition of changes in security environment surrounding 22 ----- Japan. **_Further Effective Response to the Situations_** The Basic Defense Force Concept, in short, focused on the deterrent effect of defense force’s presence, deterring aggression by adequate defense capabilities. However, since the new threats and diverse contingencies are difficult to predict and can occur unexpectedly, conventional deterrent power by the presence of defense forces will not necessarily work effectively. Therefore, defense capabilities of the future require improved readiness and mobility to enable effective responses to diverse contingencies and to minimize damages. **_Proactive Efforts for the International Peace and Cooperation Activities_** There is wide recognition that today’s security issues such as the new threats and diverse contingencies are difficult for one nation to resolve, and that peace and security of Japan is directly and closely linked to peace and security of the international community. In order to ensure Japan’s security, Japan must proactively participate in international collaborative activities (International Peace Cooperation Activities) by utilizing its defense capabilities for the improvement of international security environment. Under this circumstance, it has become more difficult to build defense capabilities based solely on Japan’s Basic Defense Force Concept, that focuses on the defense of Japan (and emphasizing the passive **_aspect (of not turning into a power vacuum and becoming a destabilizing factor for surrounding regions.))_** **_New Concept on Defense Capabilities: “Multi-Functional, Flexible and Effective Defense Forces”_** In recognition of these points, future defense force shall be characterized by high response capability, mobility, flexibility and multi-purpose functionality. It shall also be supported by advanced technology and information/intelligence capabilities reflecting the trends in military technology. All of these will contribute to making future defense force “multi-functional, flexible, and effective”, and capable of responding to various contingencies in a flexible manner. Thus, the focus should be shifted from “deterrent-effect-oriented’ to “response-capability-oriented” defense force, with stronger emphasis on the ability to respond to various situations both at home and abroad.. **5. Quick Points about 2004 NDPG** **(1)Basic Principles of Japan’s Security Policy** **_Basic Principles_** See the section 4. “The Basic Concept of the 2004 NDPG” **_Japan’s Own Efforts_** Based on the recognition that Japan’s security depends first and foremost on its own efforts, the 2004 NDPG states that Japan will utilize all appropriate means to prevent any threat from directly reaching the 23 ----- country. In the event that these efforts fail to prevent a threat from reaching Japan, the Government of Japan will take an integrated response by swiftly making appropriate decisions through bringing together all relevant organizations. **_Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements_** The 2004 NDPG says that the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements are indispensable for Japan to ensure its security, and the presence of the U.S. military is essential for the maintenance of peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region. The progress made with Japan-U.S. cooperation for global issues such as the fight against terrorism, close Japan-U.S. cooperative relationships are playing a significant role in the international efforts for preventing and responding to the new threats and diverse contingencies. **_Cooperation with the International Community_** In order to improve the international security environment and help maintain security and prosperity of Japan, the Government of Japan will actively engage in diplomatic efforts, including the strategic use of Official Development Assistance (ODA). Based on the recognition that the destabilization of the international community by events such as regional conflicts, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and international terrorist attacks would directly affect its own peace and security, Japan will, on its own initiative, actively participate in international peace cooperation activities as an integral part of its diplomatic efforts. In addition, stability in the regions spreading from the Middle-East to East Asia is particularly critical to Japan, and thus the Government of Japan will promote the cooperative efforts on security issues common to other nations as well, make efforts to maintain the stability of these regions, and actively engage in the U.N. reform. Japan will also promote the efforts for multilateral frameworks for regional security such as the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) in the Asia-Pacific region. **(2)Future Defense forces** **_Role of the Defense Forces_** In recognition of new security environment, the 2004 NDPG defines the role of the defense forces as “effective response to the new threats and diverse contingencies,” “proactive efforts to improve the international security environment,” and “preparation to deal with full-scale invasion,” which is the primary role of defense forces, and Japan will develop and maintain, in an efficient manner, the necessary Self-Defense Forces posture to effectively carry out missions in each of the areas. **_Measures to be Taken for the Development of Defense Capabilities_** In order for defense forces to play these roles under new security environment, the 2004 NDPG particularly emphasize the following measures to be promoted as basic items of defense forces, in the recognition without which their realization is impossible: “To enhance joint operation capabilities”; “To strengthen intelligence capabilities”; “To incorporate the progress in science and technology into our defense forces”; and 24 ----- “To utilize human resources more efficiently” **(3)Specific Defense Posture** **_Ground Self Defense Force_** In the new force posture, the infantry units will be reinforced to enable them to effectively respond to the new threats and diverse contingencies including guerrillas’ attacks and special operations forces attacks, invasion of offshore islands, and large-scale and special type disasters. **_Maritime Self Defense Force_** The new force structure will be designed based on the needs of ensuring timely and effective response to the new threats and diverse contingencies as well as international peace cooperation activities. To meet these needs, effective tasking and formation of units as well as accelerated command flow through reducing the layers of commands for operations (i.e. simplifying the command structure) will be required. In accordance with this new concept, missions will be divided between commanders, those mainly in charge of commanding highly trained units to respond to various situations and those mainly in charge of training up of units to qualified level. **_Air Self Defense Force_** In the new force structure, traditional defense build-up concept, succeeding from Cold War era and focusing on anti-aircraft combat warfare, will be changed and the number of combat aircraft in possession will be streamlined. At the same time, the posture to enable ASDF’s proactive participation in international peace cooperation activities will be enhanced and necessary force structure and posture will be maintained to take appropriate action/measures to the violation of the Japanese airspace without delay. **_Key Equipment and Major Units Available for Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD)_** The attached table for the NPDG shows the “Key Equipment and Major Units Available for Ballistic Missile Defense” as breakdown figures of key equipment for the MSDF and major units of the ASDF. The system consists of 4 Aegis-equipped destroyers as major equipment, and air warning and control units formed with 7 warning groups and 4 warning squadrons and 3 groups of surface-to-air guided missile units as major force. **_Additional Elements for Consideration_** The 2004 NDPG calls for taking and implementing the following elements into consideration in developing, maintaining, and operating defense forces. ―Consideration for increasingly severe fiscal conditions ―Seeking to curb life-cycle cost of defense equipment including purchase price ―More effective and efficient procurement and research and development ―Establishing defense production and technological bases (core technological areas indispensable for national security) by allocating the limited resources through selection and concentration 25 ----- ―Promotion of measures to make defense-related facilities coexist more harmoniously with local communities **_Level and Timing of Defense Forces to be Achieved and the review of the NDPG_** The 2004 NDPG provide the vision for our defense forces for the next decade, setting out the expected timetable for achieving defense force level as well as the timing and conditions for reviews, unlike 1976 and 1995 NDPOs which do not clarify the timing for achieving the target force level in the attached table approved by the Cabinet. This is based on the idea that facts on Japan’s defense capabilities need to be shown to the people as specific as possible. The NPDG is scheduled for reviews in 5 years or when significant changes are observed, and necessary review and revision will be made in consideration of the security environment and technological trend at that time. **6. Three Principles on Arms Exports** The statement by the Chief Cabinet Secretary released along with 2004 NDPG refers to issues on arms export control. In consideration of the progress of Japan-U.S. joint technology studies, it states, if Japan decides that it will engage in joint development and production of ballistic missile defense system with the United States, the Three Principles will not be applied, under the condition that strict control is maintained, because, with the ballistic missiles proliferating internationally, such systems and related activities will contribute to the effective operation of the Japan-U.S. security arrangements and are conducive to the security of Japan. In addition, it states that how to handle cases of joint development and production with the United States (other than those related to the ballistic missile defense system) as well as those related to support of counter-terrorism and counter-piracy, regarding which questions that were raised through the process by which the NDPG was developed will be decided on the basis of individual examination of each case. ### Section 3 Toward Achieving New Defense Capability To realize a phased transition to a new structure stipulated by the new NDPG, the Government of Japan approved in December 2004 the “Mid-Term Defense Program (FY 2005-FY 2009) (new MTDP) at its Security Council and the Cabinet Meeting. The new MTDP is the first MTDP under the new NDPG, and enables the realization of new defense capability based on a **_concept of establishing multi-functional,_** **_flexible and effective defense forces by focusing on effective response to new threats and diverse_** contingencies. **1．The New Mid-Term Defense Program (MTDP)** **(1)Guiding Principles** **_―Establishment of “Multi-Functional, Flexible and Effective Defense Forces”_** 26 ----- ―Review of organizations of the Defense Agency and the SDF ―Enhancement of Basic Defense Forces through improvement of joint operations and intelligence functions ―Promotion of measures to strengthen infrastructure for defense forces ―Further enhancement of Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements ―Efforts to rationalize, and improve efficiency of, defense forces **_(2)Review of Organizations of Defense Agency and the SDF_** **_Review of Organizations in Charge of Defense Administration_** Defense Agency shall study the modality of structures and formation of its internal bureaus and take necessary measures, including reorganization, in order for the SDF to perform its duties more effectively. **_Enhancement of Joint Operations Systems (Structure)_** To enhance the joint operations system/postures (structure), Defense Agency will review existing organizations to improve their efficiency, establish new Joint Staff Office and reorganize existing Staff Offices. **_Ground Self Defense Force_** Five divisions, one brigade and two combined brigades will be reorganized to curtail battles tanks and main artillery equipment and further improve readiness, mobility, etc., of which one division and two combined brigades will be reorganized into brigades. The Central Readiness Group will be newly formed to control and operate both mobile operation units, such as airborne brigades and helicopter brigades, and specialized units, such as special operation groups and chemical protection units. **_Maritime Self Defense Force_** As for escort vessel units to be used for mobile operation, the number of escort vessels of 1 escort vessel unit will be increased from current level of 2–3 to 4, while 12 escort vessel units will be streamlined to 8 units. The number of the escort vessel units for regional deployment will be reduced by one. Reorganizations will be made with regard to submarine units (from 6 to 5), fixed-wing patrol aircraft units (from 8 to 4) and patrol helicopter units (from 9 to 5) respectively. **_Air Self Defense Force_** The aircraft control and warning unit will be reorganized, and the aircraft control and warning squadron will consist of 2 flying corps (one flying corps operating E-767 early warning and control aircraft and another flying corps operating E-2C early warning aircraft). The in-flight refueling and transport unit will be newly established when KC-767 in-flight refueling and transport aircraft are deployed. **(3) Expenses Required for 2004 MTDP** 27 ----- The total amount of defense-related expenditures required for the implementation of the new MTDP shall not exceed about ¥24.24 trillion in Fiscal 2004 price. It is required that the annual budget be decided within the framework of the above-mentioned defense-related expenditures. In addition, an additional budget not exceeding ¥100 billion may be used for implementing projects subject to the approval of the Security Council of Japan in cases where extra spending is required to respond to unforeseen future events. **(4)Review of the Program** In three years, the new MTDP will be reviewed within the total amount of the defense-related expenditures as the case may be in consideration of domestic and overseas circumstances. In five years, or if circumstances change significantly, the visions of the Japanese defense forces defined in the new NDPG will be examined and amended accordingly in consideration of then prevailing security environment and technological standards. **2. Defense Build-up Program for Fiscal 2005** For FY 2005 defense program/budget, an emphasis will be made on the following points. **_Effective Response to New Threats and Diverse Contingencies_** ―Promotion of Measures for the Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) System ―Defense against Guerilla or Special Operations Forces Attacks ―Defense against Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Attacks ―Defense against Invasion upon Japan’s Offshore Islands ―Reactions to Armed Infiltration Boat and Other Vessels ―Response to Large-Scale or Extraordinary Disasters, etc. **_Matters Related to New Joint Operations Structure_** **_Establishment of More Advanced Information/Communications and Intelligence Infrastructure_** **_Enhancement of Intelligence Functions_** **_Activities to Maintain Peace and Stability in the International Community, Including Japan_** **_Enhancement of Personnel Measures, and Education and Training of SDF Units_** **_Response to Progress in Military Science &Technology (promotion of advanced technology R&D)_** **_Promotion of Base Countermeasures etc._** **_Promotion of Comprehensive Acquisition Reforms_** **_Enhancement of environmental measures to reduce environmental impact from SDF’s activities_** **3. Defense-Related Expenditures** Total defense-related expenditures for FY 2005 amount to ¥4,830.1 billion excluding ¥26.3 billion for SACO-related expenses, down ¥46.3 billion (1.0%) from the previous fiscal year level. 28 ----- ### Section 4 Shift to Permanent Joint Operations Structure **1.** **Background of the Reorganization** In July 1954, the Joint Staff Council (JSC) comprising a Chairman and the Chiefs of Staff of the GSDF, MSDF, and ASDF, was established aimed at comprehensive and effective management of the SDF. The role of this Council has been gradually expanded to meet the demands of the times. In actual operations, however, each service has acted separately in accordance with its own operational concept; when necessary, the JSC is authorized to provide coordination and/or control among the services, but its basic position has been to allow each service to operate on its own. In April 2002, the Minister of State for Defense issued instructions to the JSC and the Chiefs of Staff to carry out studies on joint operations. In December, a report (Report on the Study of Joint Operations) was submitted that outlined the need to switch from a structure in which each service of the SDF basically operates independently to one in which joint operations are the norm. The newly formulated 2004 NDPG requires that “We will create a central organization to facilitate joint operations, and establish infrastructure for training and education as well as intelligence and communications.” The new MTDP formulated simultaneously with the 2004 NDPG states that “The GOJ will establish a new Joint Staff Office and transform each service Staff Office in order to strengthen the joint operations. The GOJ will continue to study on whether or not further organizational change is necessary for effective joint operations, and take necessary measures.” By the end of Fiscal 2005, the Defense Agency is scheduled to establish a new joint operations structure for the SDF. **2. The Needs for Enhancing SDF’s Joint Operations Structure** **(1)Ensuring Swift and Effective Responses through Integrated GSDF/MSDF/ASDF Operations** **_Strengthening Integration among the SDF Services_** The SDF is to establish a joint operational posture, in normal circumstances, linking SDF units so that they can carry out their mission swiftly and effectively on the basis of a jointly designed/planned operational concept. **_Utilization of Advanced Military Technology_** The success or failure of missions in new operational environment often hinges on the degree of utilization of information and communications technology. Joint operational posture must be established that allows maximum utilization of the latest military technology in SDF operations. **(2)Consolidating Military Expert Advice Provided to the Minister of State for Defense** Under the present operational posture in which the Chiefs of Staff and the JSC all provide their own military expert advice to the Minister of State for Defense, the accounts may be based on differing assessments of the situation and differing operational concept, which this could hinder swift and effective 29 ----- responses in an emergency. To resolve this problem and to maintain close cooperation with policy advisors in the Agency’s internal bureaus, military expert advice should be consolidated in any situations. **(3)Improving the Effectiveness of the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements** When engaging in joint operations with U.S. joint force, the GSDF, MSDF and ASDF under the present operational posture operate independently at times and coordinate joint operations when necessary; this stands in contrast to the United States, in which forces from all four services operate under a single commander and in line with an unified joint operational concept. The SDF should therefore adopt a joint operations posture to facilitate joint operations with U.S. Forces in accordance with operational concept designed and proposed by both sides from their respective stances on integration. **3. Establishment of New Joint Operations Structure/Organization** **(1)Concept of New Joint Operations Structure** Under the new joint operations system, new Joint Chief of Staff, as chief of the newly created Joint Staff Office will prepare a unified operations concept for GSDF, MSDF and ASDF, and solely assist the Minister of State for Defense on SDF operations from the standpoint of military expert. In other words, under the new joint operations system, Joint Chief of Staff will solely assist the Minister of State for Defense from the standpoint of military expert on all operations of GSDF, MSDF and ASDF, such as defense operations, public security operations and international disaster relief activities. Should a serious situation take place, the Minister of State for Defense will exercise command through Joint Chief of Staff on operations even when units of a single SDF service (for example, GSDF) are mobilized to respond to the situation. **(2)Creation of Joint Staff Office and other measures** The new Joint Staff Office* will perform those functions concerning operations of the SDF that are transferred from Staff Offices of GSDF, MSDF and ASDF. On the other hand, each Staff Office of GSDF, MSDF and ASDF will continue to perform the functions concerning training/education, personnel management, defense build-up etc. In other words, Joint Staff Office will perform a function to operate troops (Force user), while each Service Staff Office will perform a function to build troops (Force provider). _Note: Current Office to be reorganized into New Joint Staff Office has the same English translation but the_ _Japanese word for it (Toubaku-Jimukyoku) literally means “Secretariat of Joint Staff Council” and has_ _limited functions compared with those of the New Staff Office._ **4. Other Measures Taken in Line with the Shift to Joint Operations Structure** 30 ----- **(1) Placing the Defense Intelligence Headquarters (DIH) under the Direct Command of Minister** **of State for Defense** The Defense Intelligence Headquarters (DIH), currently under the Joint Staff Council, will be placed under the direct command of Minister of State for Defense in order to clarify its missions and responsibilities as “the central intelligence organization of the Defense Agency.” Thus DIH will be well capable of responding to various needs of internal organs and the Government. At the same time, Directorate for Joint Intelligence (tentative name) with an intelligence assistance function to consolidate intelligence needed for operations of the SDF will be newly created for efficiency within DIH to replace Directorate for Crisis and Current Intelligence (currently performing similar but limited function). **(2)Enhancement of Command and Communications Capabilities** To conduct joint operations or perform in international peace cooperation activities properly, it is essential for the SDF to establish a reliable command and control and timely intelligence sharing scheme instantly. To respond to the extended scope of activities or swift operations, it is required that comprehensive and mobile intelligent and communications infrastructure should be established based on domestic and foreign cutting edge information technology. **(3)Other Measures** In addition to above-mentioned programs, there is a need for strengthened training framework, including joint exercises. It is also necessary to conduct studies on (the most effective structure of) future SDF command head-quarters, and the need for revising equipment utilization in light of joint operation. These issues should be addressed after having studied the actual effect of joint operations following the establishment of joint operations structure. ### Section 5 Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements and Various Related Policies **1. The Significance of the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements** **_Maintenance of Japan’s Security_** In combination with the maintenance of its own appropriate level of defense, Japan will and should maintain its bilateral alliance with the U.S, and ensure its own security through making the deterrent power provided by the alliance work effectively. **_Maintenance of Peace and Stability in the Region Surrounding Japan_** The close relationship between Japan and the United States, founded on the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements, forms the basis for securing the engagement of the United States and the deployment of U.S. forces necessary for the peace and stability of the region surrounding Japan. Together with alliances and 31 ----- friendly relations between the United States and other countries of this region, the Japan-U.S. security relations continue to play a key role in securing the peace and stability of the region. **_Improvement of International Security Environment_** The cooperative Japan-U.S. partnership, founded on the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements, constitutes the basis for Japan’s foreign policy and helps Japan play a positive role in maintaining the peace and stability of international community, including the promotion of multilateral security dialogues and cooperation in U.N. activities. **2. Various Policies Concerning Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements** **(1)Developments since the Japan-U.S. Joint Declaration on Security** Based on the Japan-U.S. Joint Declaration on Security (April 1996), Japan and the US formulated the Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation (“the Guidelines”) in September 1997. In order to ensure the effectiveness of the Guidelines, Japan implemented measures such as the enactment of the Law Concerning Measures to Ensure the Peace and Security of Japan in Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan. Through these measures, Japan-U.S defense cooperation has become more effective, and the credibility of the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements strengthened. At the Japan-U.S. summit meeting held in May 2003, the two countries agreed to enhance the “Japan-U.S. alliance in a global context,” including the enhancement of collaboration in responding to global challenges, such as international terrorism and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, in cooperation with the international community. **_Recent Policy Consultations between Japan and the United States (in and after 2004)_** The Japan-U.S. defense summit meeting between Yoshinori Ohno, Japan’s Minister of State for Defense and Donald Rumsfeld, the U.S. Secretary of Defense was held in the United States in November 2004 and in February 2005. On the 19th of February 2005, the “two-plus-two” meeting by Defense Minister Ohno, Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld, Foreign Minister Machimura, and Secretary of State Rice was held for the first time since December 2002. In the Joint Statement, the four Ministers confirmed strategic objectives common to Japan and the United States based on the past Japan-U.S. consultations on common strategic objectives. **_Japan-U.S. Bilateral Exercises_** Bilateral exercises conducted by the SDF and U.S. forces are useful in enhancing the tactical skills of both sides. Bilateral exercises are also an indispensable means of facilitating mutual understanding and maintaining close communication under normal circumstances, improving interoperability and ensuring the smooth conduct of a Japan-U.S. joint response in the event of an armed attack against Japan. Such efforts serve to maintain and enhance the credibility of the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements as well as the effectiveness of the deterrent. In November 2004, a Japan-U.S. bilateral exercise, joined by about 11,300 personnel in total from the 32 ----- Joint Staff Council, GSDF, MSDF and ASDF, was held to ensure the smooth cooperation and coordination among SDF services as well as between the SDF and U.S. forces in the event of an armed attack against Japan or a contingency in areas surrounding Japan. **_The Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA) between Japan and the United States_** The basic principle of the ACSA between Japan and the U.S. is that if either side requests the provision of goods or services, the other side should provide those goods or services. Its scope of application includes joint exercises, U.N. PKOs, international humanitarian relief operations, activities conducted in response to unstable situations in areas surrounding Japan, operations needed to repel attacks against Japan at a time of armed attack situation or in a situation where an armed attack is anticipated, disaster relief missions, evacuation operations for Japanese citizens residing overseas, and U.S. forces temporarily stationed in domestic facilities of the SDF. **_Mutual Exchanges of Equipment and Technology_** In view of the progress of technological cooperation between Japan and the United States and the improvement of technological standards, Japan decided to open the way for the transfer of its military technology to the United States in 1983, as an exception to the Three Principles on Arms Exports and other regulations. It has so far determined to provide the U.S. with 14 items of military technology, from portable surface-to-air missile (SAM) technology for U.S. naval vessels to research weapons technologies related to joint technical research on ballistic missile defense. So far, the two countries have concluded arrangements for 12 joint research projects, including arrangements for avionics of the P-3C replacement and software radio. Among these joint projects, seven have already been completed. In May 2003, the two governments concluded an arrangement for the Engineers and Scientists Exchange Program (ESEP). Japan dispatched an engineering official specializing in laser technology to the United States in August 2003, and an engineering official specializing in ammunition technology in March 2005. The Japan-U.S. cooperation in military equipment and technology is meaningful for improving interoperability and for reducing R&D costs and risks, and the two countries have been examining the possibility of expanding joint research projects in the years to come. **_Measures to Ensure the Stationing of the U.S. Forces in Japan_** The stationing of the U.S. Forces in Japan (USFJ) forms core of the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements and also serves as an expression of U.S. commitment to Japan and the Asia-Pacific region. The cost sharing for the stationing of USFJ is important in order to ensure the smooth and effective implementation of the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements. From this point of view, the Government of Japan has made efforts as far as possible within the scope of the Status of Forces Agreement or based on the Special Measures Agreement, with due consideration for the situation of the finances and so forth in Japan. At present, the Defense Agency bears the following costs as the cost sharing for the stationing of USFJ: ―costs for the Facilities Improvement Program for the facilities and areas to be used by USFJ; 33 ----- ―labor costs for USFJ employees locally employed; ―utility costs for official procurement by USFJ; and ―additional costs for the relocation of USFJ training at the request of the Japanese side. Under the present Special Measures Agreement, the Government of Japan has introduced certain measures for savings and rationalization from considerations of the recent situation of Japanese economy and finances and so forth. In addition, the Government of Japan has been promoting various measures concerning the USFJ facilities and areas in order to achieve the objectives of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty and to harmonize with demands from the local communities around the facilities and areas. When a U.S. helicopter crashed in Ginowan city, Okinawa Prefecture in August 2004, the Government of Japan took measures, including convening the Occurrence Subcommittee, taking the seriousness of the accident into consideration. **3. Current Status of Japan-U.S. Strategic Dialogues** So far, Japan has been actively engaged in strategic dialogues with the United States, including realignment issue of U.S. Force structure in Japan, in accordance with the following basic policy. **_Basic Policy_** In view of today’s security environment, the Government of Japan has recently formulated the new NDPG to properly respond to new threats and diverse contingencies, and unpredictable and uncertain elements, including those related to the Korean Peninsula and the Taiwan Strait. The new NDPG has clarified the vision for Japan’s future security and defense capabilities. As shown in the new NDPG, Japan-U.S. Security arrangements are indispensable to the security of Japan and U.S. military presence is vital to the maintenance of peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region where there still exist unpredictable and uncertain elements. Thus, the Government of Japan is actively conducting strategic dialogues with the United States. As part of its military “transformation,” the United States is promoting the review of military posture on a global scale in close coordination with allied countries. In consultations between Japan and the United States, studies on Japan-U.S. future cooperation have been made in line with security policies of the two countries. The Government of Japan has been engaged in bilateral dialogues in accordance with the following principles: 1) to establish the military posture to cope with new threats and traditional challenges, and maintain the deterrence and capabilities of the US Forces in Japan; and 2) to reduce the burden on local communities to enable stable use of the facilities and areas of the US Forces in Japan, indispensable for ensuring safety of Japan and stability of the region. **Common Strategic Objectives** Based on the consultations conducted between Japan and U.S. defense and foreign affairs officials, Japan and the United States confirmed the common strategic objectives to be pursued by the two countries at the “two-plus-two” meeting held in February 2005. The outline of these objectives is as follows. 34 ----- **_Discussion on the security environment (new and emerging threats such as international terrorism and_** proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and persistent challenges that continue to create unpredictability and uncertainty in the Asia and Pacific region) **_To pursue common strategic objectives (through their respective efforts, cooperation under the Japan-U.S._** Security arrangements and other joint efforts based on the alliance) **_To articulate common strategic objectives_** In the region, common strategic objectives include: ―Ensure the security of Japan, strengthen peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region; ―Support peaceful unification of the Korean Peninsula; ―Seek peaceful resolution of issues related to North Korea; ―Develop a cooperative relationship with China, welcoming the country to play a responsible and constructive role regionally as well as globally; ―Encourage the peaceful resolution of issues concerning the Taiwan Strait through dialogue; ―Encourage China to improve transparency of its military affairs; and ―Promote a peaceful, stable and vibrant Southeast Asia. Global common strategic objectives include: ―Promote fundamental values in the international community; ―Further consolidate Japan-U.S. Partnership in international peace cooperation and others; ―Promote the reduction and non-proliferation of WMD; and ―Prevent and eradicate terrorism. **Roles, missions and capabilities** The Joint Statement made at the above-mentioned “two-plus-two” meeting underscored the need, in pursuing the common strategic objectives, to continue examining roles, missions, and capabilities of Japan’s Self-Defense Forces and the U.S. Armed Forces required responding effectively to diverse challenges in a well-coordinated manner. These studies will be made in consideration of Japan’s new NDPG, the legislation regarding responses to armed attacks, the revised ACSA, the progress of cooperation in Ballistic Missile Defense and other recent developments. At present, these studies are being made by defense and foreign affairs officials of Japan and the United States. **Realignment of U.S. Forces in Japan** Studies on the force structure of U.S. forces in Japan are being made, taking into account of the studies on strategic objectives and the roles, mission and capabilities of Japan and the United States, in view of the maintenance of deterrence capability to enable effective concerted response to diverse contingencies by Japan and the United States and the importance of reduction of excessive burdens on local communities to enable U.S. forces in Japan to be stationed in a reliable manner with understanding of local people. 35 ----- In particular, studies on the realignment of U.S. forces in Japan are being made jointly by Japan and the United States by taking into consideration following points: the maintenance of functions to enable effective responses to diverse contingencies; changes in security environment, recent drastic changes in strategies and tactics due to technological breakthrough, and changes in roles to be played by Japan due to the establishment of the new National Defense Program Guidelines and various emergency legislations; and the possibility of relocation of facilities and areas and troops of U.S. forces to reduce excessive burdens on local communities, including Okinawa. **Future Tasks** Strategic dialogues between Japan and the United States, including those on the realignment of U.S. forces in Japan, are conducted at the three stages: 1) strategic objectives, 2) the roles, missions and capabilities of the SDF and the U.S. forces, and 3) review of individual facilities and areas. As clarified at the “two-plus-two” meeting held in February 2005, studies of the first stage were completed. At present, studies of the second and third stages are being conducted in a concentrated manner. Since these studies directly affect the lives of citizens of the regions where the facilities and areas of U.S. forces in Japan are located, it will be necessary to fulfill accountability by explaining the conditions of studies to local communities concerned at the right timing and sounding out opinions in order obtain the understanding of the general public. 36 ----- ### Chapter III Effective Responses to New Threats and Diverse Contingencies and National Defense against Full-scale Aggression Section 1 Effective Responses to New Threats and Diverse Contingencies **1. Responses to Ballistic Missile Attacks** **Japan’s Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD)** **(1) From Study Phase to Initial Improvement** The Defense Agency began studying its air defense system and the technological feasibility of a ballistic missile defense system in 1995. In 1998, the Security Council and the Cabinet agreed to start joint technical research with the United States for parts of a sea-based upper-tier system (the current AEDIS BMD System). The joint research on four major components of the interceptor missiles started in 1999 and is still continuing to date. The Mid-Term Defense Program (FY2001-FY2005) approved by the Security Council and the Cabinet in 2000 declares that “in ballistic missile defense (BMD), Japan will continue to pursue joint Japan-U.S. technical research on a sea-based upper-tier system and take other necessary measures after studying the technological feasibility of such a system.” Japan’s own simulations in addition to the series of tests in US and the US decision to introduce BMD system convinced the Japanese government that a BMD system was technologically viable. With BMD quite suited to Japan’s exclusively defensive defense policy, the Security Council and the Cabinet on December 19, 2003 approved the proposal “On the Introduction of a Ballistic Missile Defense System and Other Measures” and decided to pursue such a system. The Government has started the improvement since FY 2004. Also Japan will introduce new radar(FPS-XX) for surveillance and tracking.C2BMC system (JADGE) is expected to improve Japanese BMD capability by making interceptor and radars share their information promptly and adequately. **(2) Overview of the BMD system** The BMD system being deployed by the Japanese government is based on the idea of a multi-tier defense system relying on improvements to the capabilities of Aegis vessels and PATRIOT systems presently used by the SDFs, both of which will be integral parts of the BMD system (upper-tier interception by Aegis vessels and lower-tier interception by the PATRIOT system). The trajectory of a ballistic missile can be divided into three phases: ①the boost phase, in which the rocket engine firing shortly after the missile is launched, accelerating the missile, ②the mid-course phase, in which the rocket engine has completed firing and inertia carries the missile to outer space (exoatmosphere), and ③the terminal phase, extending from the missile’s subsequent reentry into the atmosphere until impact. Japan’s BMD system adopts a multi-tier weapon system that intercepts in-coming ballistic missiles in the mid-course stage by Aegis vessels, or in the terminal stage by the PATRIOT system. 37 ----- **(3) Future Capability Improvement** The proliferation of ballistic missile technology is proceeding and it is necessary to promote continuous improvement of the capabilities to cope with the advancement of ballistic missiles. Expansion of the defended area and increase of the intercepting chances of conventional ballistic missiles are also expected and it is required to tackle the enhancement of the efficiency and reliability of the system. From these points of view, Japan is striving for enhancement future capabilities through promoting the improvement of the BMD system as well as continuing the joint technical research with the United States that started in 1999. **Improvements in the Field of Legislation and Operation** **(1) Legal Actions on Responding to Ballistic Missiles** When ballistic missiles or other objects fly toward-Japan and it is identified as an armed attack situation, SDF takes actions under defense order. An “Armed Attack Situation” shall be identified taking account of international situation, intention of the adversary, and the military actions comprehensively. Thus, in cases where the adversary’s intention or purpose of the launch cannot be recognized, Armed Attack Situation may not be identified. Even in cases where no armed attack situation is recognized, ballistic missiles may fly toward Japan and impact on Japan’s territory and they may cause a great damage to lives and assets of people in this case, it may become necessary to use the BMD system. Since the former Self-Defense Forces Law failed to provide legal ground for SDF operations against ballistic missiles, amendments were made at the ordinary session of the Diet in 2005. These amendments of the SDF Law were made after due consideration of ①making prompt and appropriate responses and ② securing civilian controls in order to establish necessary grounds for responding to ballistic missiles, etc. when ballistic missiles fly toward Japan where no order of SDF operation has been given. **(2) Operational Efforts** Destruction of ballistic missiles flying toward Japan must be conducted by joint operation of Aegis vessels of the Maritime Self-Defense Force (MSDF), radars of the Air Self-Defense Force (ASDF), Patriot and the command/control and communications system, while the Ground Self-Defense Force (GSDF) will play a primary role in consequence management of the damage caused by the missiles impact on Japan territory. Therefore, the operation of the ballistic missile defense invariably involves a joint operation of the GSDF, MSDF, and ASDF. From the viewpoint of providing effective responses against ballistic missiles in future, establishment of an efficient and effective joint operation system is required. **Missile Defense of the United States and Japan-U.S. Cooperation** **(1) Missile Defense of the United States** Currently, processes are underway for adopting the most appropriate interception systems for each of ①boost phase, ②mid-course phase, and ③terminal phase of ballistic missiles are of trajectory. Since each 38 ----- of these systems has its own advantages and disadvantages, the United States combines these systems to develop mutually complementary multi-layered defense systems and deploying them as soon as they are deemed ready. Detecting long-range ballistic missiles early in their trajectories requires long-range sensors and an extensive surveillance network. The United States already conducts surveillance via satellites, and intends to launch a new Space Tracking and Surveillance System (STSS) with onboard infrared sensors that features improved surveillance area/precision and warning capabilities as well as to expand its ground-based and sea-based radar capabilities. **(2) Japan-U.S. Joint Technical Research** After approval by the Security Council in 1998, the Government decided to begin joint Japan-U.S. technical research on a sea-based upper-tier system (the current Sea-based Mid-course Defense System) from FY1999. The start of joint technical research was coordinated with the United States, and in 1999 the Cabinet approved the exchange of a letter between the Minister of Foreign Affairs and the U.S. Ambassador to Japan regarding joint Japan-U.S. technical research on BMD. Pursuant to that, a memorandum of understanding was signed by the Defense Agency and the U.S. Department of Defense to get the joint technical research underway. This joint technical research involves collaborative efforts by Japan and the United States in the design, prototyping, and necessary testing of interceptor missiles for the Sea-based Mid-course Defense System; presently four major missile components (the nose cone, the second-stage rocket motor, the kinetic warhead, and the infrared seeker) are being designed, developed prototypes, and tested as required. Funds totaling about 25.3 billion yen were set aside for this research between FY1999 and FY2004. The FY2005 budget allocates about 900 million yen to cover testing costs. This joint technical research is focused not on the sea-based system that the United States decided in December 2002 to deploy and that Japan has recently chosen to introduce, but rather on a future system that will have even greater capabilities. Consequently this joint technical research must be continued to ensure Japan is able at present and in future to counter ballistic missile attacks. As noted in statements made by the Chief Cabinet Secretary in 1998 and in 2003, separate decisions will be made on the transitions to the development stage and the deployment stage. **(3) Relevance to Three Principles of Arms Export** Japan’s BMD system will be developed by Japan itself, via improvements to the capabilities of Aegis vessels and the PATRIOT system that Japan already possesses, and thus does not pose a problem vis-à-vis the Three Principles of Arms Export. On the other hand, cooperation with the United States will be required to improve Japan’s BMD capabilities in future and, when the results of the Japan-U.S. joint technical research on BMD aimed at enhancing future capabilities be utilized through a transition to joint development and production, Japan would find itself in the position of exporting arms relating to BMD to the United States. Taking these situations into consideration, the Chief Cabinet Secretary made a statement on the National Defense Program Guidelines formulated December in 2004 as saying “If Japan decides that it will engage in joint 39 ----- development and production of ballistic missile defense systems with the United States, however, the Three Principles will not be applied, under the condition that strict control is maintained, because such systems and related activities will contribute to the effective operation of Japan-U.S. security arrangements and are conducive to the security of Japan.” **(4) Strengthening of Japan-U.S. Cooperation on BMD** The new Mid-Term Defense Program states as measures for strengthening the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements as follows: “The GOJ (Government of Japan) will strengthen Japan-US bilateral efforts to enhance ballistic missile defense (BMD) capabilities, and promote cooperation with the U.S. in the field of defense policy, operations, and equipment and technology.” One week after that, the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) on the BMD cooperation was signed between Defense Agency of Japan and the U.S. Department of Defense in response to the Cabinet decision to exchange letters between the Foreign Minister of Japan and the U.S. Ambassador to Japan about the BMD cooperation. Based on the MOU,the first Executive Steering Committee, a DG level meeting for oversight BMD Cooperation, was held in this June. Also the following matters were confirmed at the Japan-U.S. Security Consultative Committee (SCC) held in Washington in February, 2005. ―Ballistic missile defense (BMD) enhances the ability of Japan and the United States to defend against and deter ballistic missiles attacks and dissuade other parties from investing in ballistic missiles. ―Commitment to close cooperation on policy and operational matters and to advance U.S.-Japan cooperative research in BMD systems, with a view to possible cooperation development, while taking note of achievements in missile defense cooperation, such as Japan’s decision to introduce ballistic missile defense systems and its recent announcement on its Three Principles on Arms Export. The strengthening of the Japan-U.S. BMD cooperation not only leads to the improvement of Japan’s BMD capabilities but also strongly deters the proliferation and use of ballistic missiles in the world. The Defense Agency will continue an aggressive promotion of such efforts. **2. Responses to Attacks by Guerrillas and Special Operation Forces** **Responses to Attacks by Guerrillas and Special Operation Forces** Defense operation shall be conducted against an unconventional armed attack by guerrillas or special operation forces infiltrating into Japan when necessary. The guerilla assault may come as an act of destruction of facilities by members of an irregular force, or as assassination, or surprise attack on a command center by a special operations unit of regular troops. Operations to Respond to Attacks by Guerrillas and Special Operation Forces are as follows. **_Discovery and Prevention of Various Types of Ships_** Efforts will be made to identify ships and submarines transporting guerillas and special operations units as early as possible and to prevent them from advancing through the use of the destroyers and submarines, and the aircraft of the MSDF and ASDF. 40 ----- **_Search and Discovery of Guerillas and Special Operations Units_** In case of possible infiltration into Japan by guerillas or special operations units, the GSDF’s patrol units and others will be engaged in warning and surveillance activities in coastal areas, and should an infiltration actually occur, the patrol units and air units will search and find the guerillas or special operations units. Also, when necessary, units will be promptly deployed to important facilities to protect them. **_Capture and Defeat of Guerillas and Special Operations Units_** When guerillas or special operations units are found, combat units will be promptly concentrated in the area to besiege and capture or defeat them. **Responses to Armed Agents** In dealing with illegal activities by armed agents, the SDF will basically take the following measures depending upon the situation, in cooperation with the police agencies, which have the primary responsibility regarding public security. - In case the identification of invaders or the situation surrounding the incident is uncertain, the SDF will attempt to grasp the situation and enhance the security of its facilities, while cooperating with the police agencies by transporting policemen, providing various materials and equipment, etc. as the occasion demands. - In case the police force cannot maintain security given the revealed facts related to the incident, the SDF will cooperate with police organizations to conduct public security operations in addition to transportation support and equipment provisions in order to suppress the armed agents and guard the facilities. If any armed agents’ activities are regarded as an organized and prepared use of external armed forces, they shall be subject to defense operations. **Responses to Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Weapons** In the event of a so-called NBC terrorist attack in Japan and if it is regarded as an armed attack on Japan from the outside, the SDF will conduct defense operations and implement necessary measures to defend the country and save victims. Also, in the event of an NBC terrorist attack which does not fall under an armed attack from outside but against which the general police alone cannot maintain public security, the SDF will conduct public security operations to suppress the terrorists and assist victims in cooperation with the related agencies. Furthermore, even if an incident does not fall under those that call for defense operations and public security operations, the SDF will conduct disaster relief activities after damage is caused by NBC terrorism in order to rescue the victims and to prevent the expansion of damage. Led by the chemical protection units and medical units of the GSDF, SDF personnel will gather information about the damage caused, conduct decontamination activities, transport the injured and sick, and support the related agencies in conducting medical activities. 41 ----- **(1) Response to Biological Weapons** Biological agents have certain incubation periods, and initial symptoms do not provide clues as what caused those symptoms. If biological agents are dispersed secretly, it might be only after damage has actually spread that people started to suspect the damage is artificially caused. It may therefore be difficult to detect biological terrorism before damage is actually caused by it. Against damage caused by biological agents, medical institutions will be primarily responsible for the treatment of patients, while the SDF will conduct decontamination activities, as well as transportation and medical treatment of victims. **(2) Response to Chemical Weapons** Chemical agents, unlike biological agents, generally cause immediate damage and it is extremely important to take prompt measures at the initial stage. The chemical protection units of the GSDF can deal with such agents with their protective clothing and vehicles, and the units dispatched for disaster relief operations will detect chemical agents, transport and treat victims, and conduct decontamination activities. Even for the event which does not require a disaster relief dispatch of the SDF, the SDF will lend chemical protective clothing and dispatch chemical protection unit personnel as liaison officers among related agencies. **(3) Response to Nuclear Weapon-Related Substances** Nuclear substances might cause various influences over the health of people exposed to them, even by indirect exposure. It is therefore necessary to take appropriate protective measures for and to control exposure to those substances based on their characteristics. To a certain degree, internal exposure caused by inhaling of radioactive substances can be prevented by the use of protective masks and clothing, and external exposure caused by radioactive emissions can be prevented by the use of chemical protection vehicles. In case of damage caused by chemical agents, the chemical protection units equipped with these protective devices will conduct activities, though limited. In such cases, the SDF will measure contamination and transport victims in cooperation with the related agencies. **3. Responses to Invasion on Islands** The National Defense Program Guidelines regards Japan’s geographical feature which is narrow and has long coastal lines and many islands as vulnerable from the security point of view. In particular, because of Japan’s geographical feature as an archipelago, the enemy may invade these islands as one type of armed attack on Japan. **Operations to Respond to Invasions onto Islands** Responses to an invasion on islands are similar in many aspects to a full-scale response to an enemy’s invasion of the mainland, but it is important to detect indications at an early stage through warning and 42 ----- surveillance as well as gathering of military information conducted by the SDF under normal circumstances. If there is an indication noticed in advance, an operation shall be conducted to prevent the invasion by the enemy’s unit. If there is no indication in advance and the islands in question were occupied, an operation shall be conducted to defeat the enemy. To carry out these operations, agile transportation and deployment of units through joint operations are essential, therefore the SDF forces will mutually cooperate and gather their units quickly to prevent and destroy the enemy’s invading troops. **4. Patrol and Surveillance in the Sea and Air Space Surrounding Japan, Response to** **Violation of Japan’s Airspace and Reactions to Armed Infiltration Boats and Other** **Vessels** **Ptrol and Surveillance in the Sea Areas Surrounding Japan/ Warnings and Scrambles** **against Violations of Territorial Airspace** In order to respond quickly a full-scale aggression and a new threat or other diverse situations, the SDF is conducting activities that are directly connected with the security of Japan, constant guard and surveillance activities in its territorial waters and airspace, and in the surrounding airspace and sea areas under normal circumstances. **Response to Submarines Submerging in Territorial Waters** As for submarines navigating under water in Japan’s territorial waters and inland waters, an order for maritime security operations shall be issued under the Cabinet decision of 1996 etc. and the SDF will request the submarine to navigate on the surface of the waters where the submarine is submerging to show the flag. If the said submarine does not respond to the request, a request to leave the territorial waters shall be made. In the early morning of November 10, 2004, an MSDF patrol aircraft (P-3C) confirmed that an unidentified submarine was navigating under water near the Sakishima Islands from south to north. To take necessary actions Mr.Ohno, Minister of State for Defense, after obtaining approval from Prime Minister Koizumi, issued an order at 8:45 a.m. on the same day for maritime security operations to the Commander, of the Self-Defense Fleet. After making a comprehensive consideration over the information, the Government confirmed that the submarine belonged to the Chinese Navy. The Foreign Minister Machimura made a protest to Chinese Minister to Japan Cheng Yong Hua in the evening. This incident required a considerable amount of time from getting intelligence of the submarine entering the territorial waters of Japan to the issuance of the order for maritime security operations. Based on the lessons learned, the Government has newly set out the response plan. **Response to Armed Special Operations Vessels** Generally, responses to suspicious boats are the chief responsibility of the Japan Coast Guard, which is a police agency, but when it is deemed extremely difficult or impossible for the Coast Guard to deal with 43 ----- the issue, an order for the Maritime Security Operations will be given in a timely manner, and the SDF will deal with the issue in cooperation with the Coast Guard. The Defense Agency and the SDF shall enhance the response capabilities for discovering, analyzing and stopping of armed special operations vessels as well as dealing with them after they are stopped, taking into consideration lessons learned from past incidents. **5. Response to Large-Scale and/or Special Type Disasters** **Framework for Disaster Relief Dispatches, Etc.** Disaster Relief Dispatch includes dispatch requested by prefectural governors and other officials (general form of disaster relief dispatch) and discretionary dispatch in exceptional circumstances when the situation is particularly urgent and there is no time to wait for a request. Besides that, there are Earthquake Disaster Prevention Dispatch (when an alert has been issued under the Special Law Concerning Countermeasures for Large-Scale Earthquakes) and Nuclear Disaster Dispatch (when a nuclear emergency situation alert has been issued under the Special Law Concerning Countermeasures for Nuclear Disasters). **Initial Measures for Disaster Relief Dispatches and the Results in Fiscal 2004** **(1) Initial Measures Taken at Disasters** The SDF designates the units that are to take immediate initial measures to ensure prompt disaster relief dispatches. As of June 2005, the GSDF designates approximately 2,700 persons, 410 vehicles, and 30 helicopters as units that can be immediately dispatched for disaster relief activities. The MSDF designates the ships that can conduct emergency operations and has established a standby system for emergency operations by aircraft. Also, the ASDF has established a standby system for emergency aircraft operations. When an earthquake occurs with an intensity of minor-5 or stronger on the Japanese seven-stage seismic scale, the SDF takes the initiative to fly aircraft to gather information about the quake. **(2) Disaster Relief Dispatches Conducted in FY2004** FY2004 was a year that suffered from many natural disasters such as ten landfalls of typhoons which is a record-high, Niigata-Chuetsu Earthquake that observed intensity 7 which was the largest since the Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake. The number of times and the scale of disaster relief dispatches in FY2004 is as follows: 46 times and approximately 146 thousand persons in wind and flood damages and earthquakes; 616 times and approximately 29 hundred persons in transportation of emergency patients; 49 times and approximately 42 hundred persons in search and rescue; 102 times and approximately 19 hundred persons in support to firefighting; and 71 times and approximately 71 hundred persons in other cases. **Efforts under Normal Circumstances for Disaster Relief** **(1) Cooperation with Local Governments** For the SDF to conduct disaster relief activities promptly and appropriately, it is indispensable for the 44 ----- Forces to strengthen cooperation with local governments under normal circumstances. In view of the importance of cooperation with local governments in human resources, in order to provide the knowledge and experience of SDF personnel, retired SDF personnel who have particular expertise in relevant fields, including disaster prevention, are recommended to local governments upon requests from them. As of May 31, 2005, those who are serving as staff responsible for disaster prevention in local governments are 65 officers in 34 prefectures or municipal governments. Also, active-duty SDF personnel are seconded to departments responsible for disaster prevention in the Tokyo Metropolitan Government. **(2) Formulation of a Response Manual for Each Type of Disaster** Based on the lessons learned from the past disaster relief dispatches and disaster prevention exercises, the Defense Agency and the SDF formulated a response manual for various disaster types in November 2000, which summarizes the issues to be noted for each type of disaster. **(3) Responses to Nuclear Accidents** Based on the lessons learned from a criticality accident that occurred at the JCO Ltd. uranium-processing plant in Tokaimura, Ibaraki Prefecture in 1999, the Special Law concerning Countermeasures for Nuclear Disasters was enacted the same year, in order to significantly strengthen nuclear emergency measures. Since the accident in Tokaimura, the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry was conducted a comprehensive nuclear disaster prevention exercise since 2000 (not provided in 2004 because of Niigata-Chuetsu Earthquake). GSDF, MSDF and ASDF have taken part, joining in supporting activities for transportation, local citizens evacuation, and airborne and maritime nuclear radiation observation. They also confirmed the procedures to be followed in the wake of nuclear disasters with other ministers and local governments. To respond to special disasters other than nuclear disasters, the enhancement of the chemical protection units is included in the budget for fiscal 2005. **6. Response to Other Situations** **Improvement of Guard Postures for SDF Facilities** The Police shall primarily deal with terrorism incidents, but to prepare against large-scale terrorist attacks like those that occurred in the United States in September 2001, the Self-Defense Forces Law was amended, which enabled the SDF units to be called upon to guard the SDF facilities as well as the USFJ facilities and sites, and to use weapons as necessary on the usual guarding mission for the SDF facilities. The Defense Agency and the SDF, in order to ensure the effectiveness of the guard operations, which are new duties for the SDF, have conducted exercises at the USFJ facilities and areas throughout Japan since 2003. **Readiness to Transport Japanese Nationals Overseas** 45 ----- In case of disasters, riots or other emergency situations occur overseas, in order to move Japanese nationals overseas and others safely aboard transport aircraft and ships after their jurisdiction is transferred to the SDF personnel from overseas legations at local airports and harbors, the GSDF designates personnel for helicopter units and guidance units to be dispatched to foreign countries on such transport missions. The MSDF and the ASDF also make preparations for transportation missions, designating transport ships and air units, and the personnel to be dispatched for such missions, respectively. On April 15, 2004, ten Japanese nationals engaged in journalism in Samawah, Iraq in order to report on the activities of the GSDF dispatched under the Special Measures Law for Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance in Iraq were transported from the Talil airport to the Mubarak airport in Kuwait by a C-130H transport plane. This was the first transport of Japanese nationals based on Article 100.8 of the Self-Defense Forces Law. **Responses to Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan** The National Defense Program Guidelines provides that the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements shall be strengthened through actively promoting measures such as various operational cooperations including those in the event of emergency situations in areas surrounding Japan. Specifically, the Government will take measures based on the Law concerning Measures to Ensure the Peace and Security of Japan in Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan and the Ship Inspection Operations Law enacted in 1999 and 2000 respectively. **Collection of Military Information** In order to operate the defense forces effectively in various situations, it is imperative to identify events at the earliest possible time and to collect, analyze and share information promptly and accurately as well as to detect symptoms of various situations at an early stage. Under such recognition, in order to enhance our diversified information collection and comprehensive analysis and assessment, the Defense Agency and the SDF will enhance the Defense Intelligence Headquarters and other intelligence sections by various means including improvement of our equipment and devices for information collection, taking into consideration the security environment and technical trend. ### Section 2 National Defense against Full-scale Aggression **1. Operations for Air Defense** Given Japan’s geographical location and the characteristics of modern warfare, an armed attack against Japan likely would take the form of an air raid using aircraft and missiles. On the defense of Japanese air space, the ASDF, in an immediate response to an aerial intrusion, would intercept enemy aircraft as far from Japanese territory as possible in order to prevent casualties to Japanese nationals and damage to national land, and incapacitate the enemy’s ability to continue its attack. 46 ----- **2. Operations for Defense of Surrounding Waters** Another possibility of armed attack against Japan, an island country, may be an attack employing vessels. The MSDF would take the initiative in operations for defending waters surrounding Japan in such a situation. Operations for defending the sea areas surrounding Japan would be conducted mainly by the MSDF in cooperation with the GDSD and ASDF, for which the MSDF will combine various strategies, including anti-surface ship, anti-submarine, and (local) air defense operations. The cumulative effect of these strategies will make it possible to successfully defend the surrounding sea areas, by obstructing the advance of enemy forces and reducing their military strength. **3. Operations to Defend Japanese Territory (Operations to Counter the Landing and/or** **Invasion)** An invading country, in an attempt to occupy territory of Japan, an island country, would likely deploy ground troops using aircraft and vessels. The SDF would counter the enemy’s landing operations at a time when its forces are most vulnerable to Japan’s counterattacks—when they are moving from one point to another and immediately before or after landing. Taking advantage of these opportunities, the SDF would counter enemy forces on beachheads or at landing points in order to destroy them at an early stage of the counter operations. If the enemy attempts to land on a small island in Japanese territory, much of the Japanese counter operations would be the same as those used to counter landing on the main islands of Japan. As an increased deployment of GSDF forces would likely become necessary in such a situation, coordination between the MSDF and the ASDF over transportation of GSDF forces would be more important. Therefore, the three SDF services should strengthen mutual cooperation in order to focus the deployment of their troops on targeted areas at an early time, stop the advance of enemy troops and destroy them. **4. Operations to Ensure the Safety of Maritime Traffic** Sea traffic is a lifeline for Japan. Operations to ensure its safety in emergencies are therefore important not only from the viewpoint of helping Japan counter enemy attacks and helping U.S. forces’ operations support the SDF, but also from the viewpoint of securing the foundation for Japan’s survival. The MSDF ensures the safety of sea traffic by patrolling, escorting ships, and protecting straits and ports. ### Section 3 Measures Related to Responses to an Armed Attack Situation, etc. **1. History of the Enactment of Legislation for Responses to a Situation** Emergency legislation study was started in 1977 by the Defense Agency and in 2004 legislation for responses to a situation was completed by the Diet with approval of Seven Laws and Three Treaties Related to Response to Armed Attack Situations, etc. 47 ----- **2.Outline of the Legislation for Responses to a Situation** **Three Laws Related to Responses to Armed Attack Situation** **(1) Law for Ensuring Peace and Independence of Japan and Security of the State and** **the People in Armed Attack Situation, Etc.** This law aims at contributing to the peace and independence of Japan and the maintenance of the country and the people’s security by prescribing basic matters regarding responses to Armed Attack Situation etc (Armed Attack Situation and situations where an Armed Attack is anticipated) including fundamental principles, responsibilities of the national Government and local governments and cooperation from the people, establishing a posture to respond to such situations and providing matters regarding legislation of necessary laws. **(2) Partial Amendment to the Security Council of Japan Establishment Law** The role of the Security Council of Japan in charge of responses to situations was identified and strengthened through adding deliberation items, reshuffle Members of the Security Council, and newly establishing a special advisory organ. **(3) Partial Amendment to the SDF Law** With a focus on those among category I in the so-called “Emergency Legislation Study” (laws under the jurisdiction of the Defense Agency) and category II (laws other than those under the jurisdiction of the Defense Agency) that require legislation: ①to complementing Article 103 of the SDF Law, authority to move and dispose of trees when using lands or houses and measures when the owners or users of the lands or houses are missing were added; ②in order to smoothly carry out building of defense facilities by the SDF, measures for building defense facilities before the issuance of the order for defense operation were newly established; and ③in order to secure rapid movement of the SDF, provisions relating to emergency transit in defense operations were newly established; ④in order to make smoother the action of the SDF, required special provisions for the application of related laws including the Road Law were newly established; and ⑤necessary special measures, etc. were provided relating to the provision of defense operation allowances, disaster compensations, and other wages for personnel who were ordered to take point in a defense operation. **Seven Laws and Three Treaties Related to Response to Armed Attack Situations etc.** **(1) The Law Concerning the Restriction of Maritime Transportation of Foreign Military** **Supplies etc. in Armed Attack Situation** The Law is established to provide the procedures for detention inspections and cruising conducted by the MSDF in defense operations as well as the judgment procedures at the Foreign Military Supply Tribunal established in the Defense Agency, for the purpose of restricting marine transportation of foreign 48 ----- military supplies (supplies including weapons and foreign military personnel) in Armed Attack Situation in Japanese and international waters (including exclusive economic waters provided for in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Seas, the same shall apply hereinafter). **(2) The Law Concerning the Treatment of Prisoners of War etc. in Armed Attack** **Situation** The Law provides necessary matters regarding procedures for capture and status confirmation of prisoners, internment and treatment at prisoner of war camps during an armed attack situation as well as repatriation, with a view to secure smooth and effective SDF operations for repelling an armed attack while ensuring appropriate implementation of International Humanitarian Law concerning the treatment of prisoners of war under the Geneva Convention Related to the treatment of Prisoners of war of August 12, 1949, or other relevant legislation. **(3) Law Concerning Penal Sanctions against Grave Breaches of the International** **Humanitarian Law** The Law is established to contribute to appropriate enforcement of international humanitarian law, which is applied to international armed conflict, by establishing penal sanctions against grave breaches of the said law together with penal codes. Specifically, punishment provisions are established regarding: ①crime of destroying important cultural property; ②crime of delaying the repatriation of prisoners of war; ③crime of transferring population to occupied areas; ④crime of preventing civilians from departing; and ⑤grave breaches as defined in the Geneva Conventions, with required provisions to establish jurisdiction over crimes committed abroad regarding these crimes. **(4) Partial Amendment of the Self-Defense Forces Law (ACSA-related)** According to an amendment to the Japan-U.S. Acquisition and Cross-Service Agreement (ACSA), required amendments have been made to the Self-Defense Forces Law for the basis and procedure for providing supplies and services from the SDF when implementing a cooperative activity with the United States such as the transport of Japanese nationals abroad in response to disaster relief and situations in areas surrounding Japan. **(5) Law Concerning Measures for Protection of the Civilian Population in Armed Attack** **Situations** Considering the importance of protecting of people’s lives, bodies, and property from Armed Attacks as well as minimizing the damage from such Armed Attacks to the lives of the people and the economy during Armed Attack Situation etc., the aim is to develop a complete system of the nation as a whole to take appropriate and immediate measures together with the Law for Ensuring Peace and Independence of Japan and Security of the State and the People in Armed Attack Situations, Etc. to protect citizens from Armed Attack Situation etc., by stipulating the responsibilities of the national and local governments, cooperative activities that may be undertaken by citizens, and measures for evacuation of population and rescue of 49 ----- refugees, measures related to Armed Attack disaster, etc. **(6) Law Related to Measures Conducted by the Government in Line with U.S. Military** **Actions in Armed Attack Situations, Etc.** The U.S. Military Actions Related Measures Law is established to contribute to national peace and independence, and the safety of the country and citizens by providing measures for encouraging smooth and effective operations by the U.S. armed forces to repel an Armed Attack pursuant to the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty, as well as other measures conducted by the Government of Japan related to U.S. military actions during Armed Attack Situation etc. **(7) Law Related to the Use of Specific Public Facilities in Armed Attack Situations, Etc.** By providing the necessary articles such as drawing up guidelines for the use of specific public facilities (ports, air facilities, roads, waters, airspace, and radio frequencies) in Armed Attack Situations etc, the law aims at comprehensive coordination and appropriate and immediate execution of response measures etc. **(8) Agreement Amending the Agreement between the Government of Japan and the** **Government of the United States of America Concerning Reciprocal Provision of** **Logistic Support, Supplies and Services between the Self-Defense Forces of Japan and** **the Armed Forces of the United States of America** The amendment provides so that the Scope of Application of ACSA can be enlarged to activities necessary to repel armed attacks against Japan in armed attack situations or situations in which an armed attack is anticipated, to promote efforts of the international community to contribute to international peace and security, to cope with large-scale disasters and other purposes, aiming at enhancing closer cooperation between the SDF and U.S. armed forces, thus contributing to smooth and effective implementation of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty Arrangements and efforts related to U.N.-driven efforts for international peace. **(9) Additional Protocol to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, Relating to the** **Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (protocol I)** Protocol I was drawn up in 1977 to complement and supplement the provisions of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 for international armed conflicts. Specifically it provides for the following: ①The Geneva Conventions and Protocol I shall be applied to so-called national liberation wars as well as armed conflicts and occupation between the High Contracting Parties; ②to expand the Coverage of protection for the injured and medical institutions to citizens and civilian supplies, in addition to military personnel and supplies; ③provisions for restriction of combat methods and means of warfare (prohibition of the use of weapons that cause unnecessary suffering etc.); ④provisions for protecting civil defense missions to protect and relieve population from effects caused by hostilities; and ⑤to add and extend a provision about grave breaches so as to punish inhumane actions conducted during international armed conflicts, etc. 50 ----- **(10) Additional Protocol to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, Relating to the** **Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II)** Protocol II was drawn up in 1977 to complement and supplement provisions of Article 3 common to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 for non-international armed conflicts (e.g. civil wars). Specifically it provides for the following: provisions for humanitarian treatment of persons who do not directly participate in hostilities, and protection of the injured and medical staff; and provisions for prohibiting attacks against population and protection to supplies indispensable to the survival of the civilian population (e.g. food) in order to protect the population from danger due to military operations etc. **3. SDF Operations Concerning Civil Protection** **Civil Protection Measures by SDF** **(1) SDF and Protection of People** It is important for the SDF to mutually cooperate with bodies such as the Government, local governments and designated public institutions that implement measures for protecting people in order to implement measures to protect people in armed attack situations, etc. For this purpose, improvement of mutual information systems and joint training shall be encouraged by building a cooperation system for measures for protecting people, while utilizing the cooperation system for preventing disasters during peacetime. On the other hand, during an armed attack situation, it is important for the SDF to promptly repel the attack to minimize the damage to people. The SDF will endeavor to pursue the aforementioned duty that can only be accomplished by the SDF. Therefore, unlike from responses to natural disasters (such as disaster operations) alone in which the SDF can focus its ability, the SDF can naturally spare only a limited portion of its ability (depending on the scale and type of armed attack situations) on activities such as the guidance of evacuating inhabitants. Accordingly, the SDF shall implement measures to protect people as much as it can within the extent in which such activities can be carried out along with its duty to repel the armed attack. **(2) New Establishment of Civil Protection Operations** Along with the enactment of the Civil Protection Law and in order to make assure for the SDF to implement the Civil Protection Law, the Defense Agency has amended the SDF Law so that the SDF can implement Civil Protection Measures in situations where an Armed Attack is anticipated, and has newly established Civil Protection Operations in Article 77.4 of the SDF Law as a new action of the SDF. The details of the operations are no different from the disaster operations in natural disasters, but since they are operations under the circumstances of armed attack situations, provisions have been established regarding the use of arms and the approval of the Prime Minister. Where a defense operation is ordered in an armed attack situation or an internal security operation is ordered as counter measures against an emergency response situation, civil protection measures or emergency response protection measures will be implemented as part of the defense operation or the 51 ----- internal security operation without ordering any civil protection operation, etc. **(3) Details of Civil Protection Measures which SDF is Expected to Implement** The SDF is expected to implement the following civil protection measures or emergency response protection measures in armed attack situations or emergency response situations. Specifically, they include: ①guidance of evacuated inhabitants (guidance, arrangement of people at gathering points, and grasping of evacuation status, etc.); ②relief of evacuated people (supply of food and water, supply of goods, medical activities, search and rescue, etc.); ③responses to armed attack disasters, etc. (grasping of affected statuses, lifesaving activities, fire-fighting and flood-prevention activities, responses to NBC contamination, etc.); and ④swift recovery from armed attack disasters, etc. (removal of dangerous rubble, swift recovery of facilities, etc., and elimination of contamination, etc.) **4. Issues to be Addressed in the Future** **Setup Postures in Accordance with Enactment of Legislation for Responses to a** **Situation** With the enactment of legislation related to responses to a situation, legislative foundation was established to deal with the most important situations for the peace and safety of the country and its citizens in an armed attack against Japan, such as: civil protection measures including inhabitant evacuation measures; measures for restricting maritime transportation of foreign military supplies and measures regarding handling of war prisoners, and; measures necessary to secure the smooth and effective use of ports and air facilities. Since it will be important in the future to secure the effectiveness of these legislations and establish the accompanying operational procedure, it is necessary to positively continue relevant studies. **Formulation of the Basic Guidelines for the Protection of the People and Preparation of** **the Civil Protection Plan** **(1) The Basic Guidelines for the Civil Protection** In March, 2005, for an appropriate and smooth implementation of the Civil Protection Law, the Government formulated the Basic Guidelines for the Protection of the People (hereinafter referred to as “Basic Guidelines”) based on Article 32 of the Civil Protection Law. Besides setting out the basic policy on the implementation of civil protection measures as a nation, these Basic Guidelines stipulate matters that serve as the reference for designated administrative agencies and prefectures in preparing their plans regarding the protection of the people (hereinafter referred to as “Civil Protection Plan”) and for designated public institutions in preparing their service plan on the protection of the people (hereinafter referred to as “Civil Protection Service Plan”). Following the basic policy on the implementation of civil protection measures, the guidelines provide for matters relating to the assumption of armed attack situations, matters relating to establishment of the framework for action and civil protection measures, and matters relating to operations such as responses to emergency response situations and procedures for preparing civil protection 52 ----- plans, etc. while identifying each implementation body. **(2) Preparation of Civil Protection Plan** As future efforts based on the Basic Guidelines, designated administrative agencies and prefectures shall prepare a Civil Protection Plan, along with designated public institutions which will enact a Civil Protection Service Plan by the end of FY2005. Also, by the end of FY2006, municipalities shall prepare a Civil Protection Plan and designated local public institutions a Public Protection Service Plan based on the Civil Protection Plan of their respective prefecture. The Defense Agency and the Defense Facilities Administration Agency shall also prepare a Civil Protection Plan by the end of FY2005 as the designated administrative agencies. The heads of local governments shall consult their respective Civil Protection Council when preparing the Civil Protection Plan. **(3)Implementation of exercises based on the Civil Protection Law** In June 2005, the government announced the implementation of exercises based on the Civil Protection Law through the statement of the Minister of State for emergency legislation Murata. The purposes of the exercises are to build up a closer connection with each organization (including citizens) and to promote a better understanding of Civil Protection Measures. The Defense Agency and the Self-Defense Forces understand the importance of building up closer ties with local governments. and are working on the contents of the exercises based on past experiences of disaster prevention exercises. 53 ----- ### Chapter IV Efforts to Improve International Security Environment Proactively and on Its Own Initiative Section 1 Efforts to Support International Peace Cooperation Activities **1. Overview** The international situation in recent years has provided the Self-Defense Forces (SDF) with increased opportunities to undertake diverse overseas missions on top of the international peace cooperation alignment and international emergency assistance activities, both of which have been conducted by the SDF in the past. This is the reflection of international community’s increased trust in the SDF activities as a result of successful executions of assigned missions for a decade since the dispatch of minesweepers units to the Persian Gulf in 1992, which marked the first overseas operations of an SDF unit. In addition, during their activities abroad, SDF members have stepped up interchanges with the people there and military personnel from many countries, and jointly conducted activities with them. Through these activities, the SDF has been able to demonstrate its organized capability, teamwork and diligence, which has been acquired by years of training and domestic activities since its establishment, and has accomplished overseas missions in a steady manner, while building good relations with countries concerned. These SDF activities overseas have been highly recognized by international organizations, including the United Nations and many countries, and raising expectations for the SDF to play a further role in the international community. The Defense Agency and the SDF is currently dispatching SDF units for overseas missions in line with the International Peace Cooperation Law, the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law and the Law Concerning Special Measures on Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance in Iraq. These activities by SDF contributing to building a more stable security environment were placed as **_one of the roles of defense capability in the 1995 NDPO. The new 2004 NDPG, adopted in December last_** year, calls for the country to strive to **_improve the international security environment to prevent any_** threats from reaching Japan as **_one of the objectives of its security policy. This means that Japan will_** proactively and on its own initiative participate in activities that international community cooperatively undertake to improve international security environment (hereafter “international peace cooperation activities”). This pledge goes beyond the ''ko-u-ken'', (which comes from the translation of “contribution”, but has slightly different connotation) of Japan in the past, which has left the impression that Japan was engaged in such activities only for the sake of others, not in the interest of Japan’s own security. As of May 2005, the Defense Agency and the SDF has been conducting international peace cooperation alignment including Support to Reconstruction Efforts in Iraq, Activities to Support Fight against Terrorism, PKO, International Emergency Assistance and PSI (Proliferation Security Initiative) related activities. 54 ----- **2. Cooperation in Global Efforts to Reconstruct Iraq** **Outline of the Basic Plan and Others** SDF reconstruction activities need to be conducted in accordance with the Law Concerning Special Measures on Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance in Iraq enacted in August 2003, and it calls for the Cabinet to formulate the Basic Plan to define missions to be conducted and conditions including timeframe. First Basic Plan was formulated in December 2003. This Basic Plan stipulates that SDF troops be dispatched to Iraq for up to one year. The Cabinet, however, endorsed a revision on December 9, 2004 to the Basic Plan as Japan's own decision, after examining various factors including; the progress of reconstruction in Iraq; the development of its political process; the local security situation; and activities by multinational forces. The revision has enabled the SDF to continue to undertake its humanitarian and reconstruction operations in Iraq. Following the revision to the Basic Plan, the Minister of State for Defense changed Implementation Guideline and the Prime Minister approved the change both on December 9, 2004. Prior to the Government’s revision of the Basic Plan, Minister of State for Defense Yoshinori Ohno visited Iraq and Kuwait in December and observed activities being conducted there by units of the Ground Self-Defense Force (GSDF) and the Air Self-Defense Force (ASDF). At the GSDF's Samawah camp in southern Iraq, Ohno held talks with Al-Hasani, the Governor of the Muthanna Province, and the then commander of a Dutch military unit being dispatched in Iraq, and took a first-hand look at security and other situations in the Samawah area. Minister of State for Defense Ohno confirmed in Samawah that local people welcomed the activities of GSDF troops and the SDF's continued operations for humanitarian and reconstruction assistance in Iraq are important in light of many demands being filed from local people for Japanese troops to engage in repair work at public facilities such as roads and schools as well as medical support. **SDF Activities** The SDF, based on the special measures law, has provided humanitarian and reconstruction assistance to the country, such as restoration and improvement of schools and other public facilities, provision of medical service, and transportation of aid materials, while building good relations with countries concerned and local communities, in order to contribute to Iraq's independent efforts to rebuild the country. Japan's aid mission to Iraq consists of humanitarian contribution led by the SDF and the Government's Official Development Assistance (ODA) which is under responsibility of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, both of which support each other like “two wheels of the same shaft.” Japan's such efforts to support Iraq have been highly appreciated by the international community. **(1) GSDF’s Humanitarian/Reconstruction Assistance and Support Activities for Ensuring Security** To support Iraqi Reconstruction, GSDF is sending two types of groups to the region; Reconstruction Support Group and Task Planning and Coordination Unit to help Reconstruction Activities. In January last year, the first contingent of GSDF groups and units for supporting Iraqi reconstruction was dispatched. Since then, each group has undertaken aid operations in Iraq for about three months before being replaced 55 ----- by another group, while each unit has operated for about six months before being replaced by another. As of the end of May this year, the sixth contingent of groups and the third contingent of units were operating in Iraq. GSDF personnel belonging to these groups and units are conducting humanitarian and reconstruction assistance operations and support activities for ensuring the area's security as shown below, while taking into consideration demands from local people and respecting local customs. **_Medical Services_** Starting on February 19, 2004, medical officers of the GSDF have been participating in sessions on case studies at four hospitals, including a general hospital in Samawah. The officers have been providing advice and instructions to local doctors on diagnosing diseases and determining the treatment necessary for treating patients. The officers have been also teaching doctors how to use medical equipment provided by Japan under the framework of Official Development Assistance (ODA), which is under responsibility of the Foreign Ministry. Moreover, they have been offering technical advice to paramedics in the Province of Muthanna. They have been also providing medical support to local doctors, including giving technical advice on how to manage pharmaceuticals in warehouses. The GSDF has been helping improve the level of medical service in the Province of Muthanna through these activities. **_Water Supply_** Since March 26 last year, the dispatched SDF has been purifying water, at SDF Camp Samawah, taken from a nearby canal, and supplied it local people through water-supply vehicles of the waterworks bureau of the Province of Muthanna, which have been provided under Japanese ODA framework. SDF water supply support has been succeeded by a water-purifying facility Japan had built near the SDF Camp Samawah under its ODA after its operation started in February 2005. The cumulative water supply by Japan to the province totaled about 53,500 tons. Japan's water-supply activities have been highly appreciated by the people of Muthanna for their significance as one form of support that is directly connected to the lives of local people. The dispatched GSDF also provided about 1,170 tons of water to Dutch troops as part of Japan's support activities to ensure security. **_Activities to Reconstruct and Improve Schools and Other Public Facilities_** Since March 25 last year, the dispatched GSDF have engaged in repair and reconstruction work for damaged walls, floors and electric wiring systems at schools in the Muthanna Province. As of the end of May this year, such work has been completed at 15 schools and 11 other schools are under way. Since March 30 last year, the members have been leveling and paving roads mainly used by local people in the province. As of the end of May this year, such road-improvement works have been completed at 17 places while two other places are now under construction. GSDF units in Iraq are closely cooperating with the Foreign Ministry on road improvement projects, as the roads leveled off by GSDF units are being paved with asphalt using the ODA budget allocated by the Foreign Ministry. The GSDF has been also undertaking repair and reconstruction works for public facilities in the Muthanna Province other than schools and roads, including rebuilding Primary Health Centers (PHC) across the province, the renovation of nursery schools in Samawah, repair work for houses used for 56 ----- low-income earners and the renovation of a water-purifying facility in Warka. As of the end of May this year, such work has been completed at 17 facilities and 17 other public facilities are now under repair work. The reconstruction of these public facilities, directly connected to the livelihood of local people, and has contributed to improving their living conditions. Some GSDF operations are outsourced to local contractors, helping to create jobs in local communities. At the peak, more than 1,000 local people have been hired per day in connection with the GSDF reconstruction mission. The dispatched GSDF units have made great efforts to coordinate closely with local people over public facility improvement projects so that the units' activities can meet the needs and demands of local people. **_Transportation Activities_** GSDF units dispatched to Iraq transported goods and materials for humanitarian and reconstruction use donated by Japan, including medical equipment, from Talill Airport to Samawah in close cooperation with the ASDF. In addition, GSDF units, using their vehicles, transported wounded soldiers of the South Korean military from Ali Al Salem Air Base in Kuwait to Kuwait International Airport. **_Other Activities: Friendly Relations with Local People_** In implementing their assigned missions in Iraq, GSDF recognize the needs to build friendly relations with local people. For that purpose, SDF personnel have been making efforts to promote friendly relations with the people by teaching them origami paper-folding and holding music concerts. In return, local children performed dramas for GSDF members and presented pictures which they had drawn to the members. Through these activities, GSDF members have been able to establish good relations with local people. Reflecting such favorable relations between GSDF and the local community, some local residents staged a rally in support of GSDF operations in Samawah, while others, smiling, wave their hands to GSDF members engaging in operations or in transit for particular operations. These interchanges have become a part of the people's daily life. **_Cooperation with British and Australian Troops Deployed in the Muthanna Area_** In February this year, Dutch military troops started withdrawing from the Province of Muthanna after winding up their mission of ensuring the security of the province. The GSDF has received support from the Dutch military on various fronts, including cooperation extended to; the GSDF's advance team which was sent to Samawah for the research mission before the dispatch of core GSDF units, the GSDF units in their actual deployment, and the GSDF units after they started undertaking humanitarian and reconstruction operations in Samawah. On March 7 this year, British troops replaced the Dutch troops to help ensure security in the province. In May, Australian troops began deployment to Samawah. At present, British and Australian troops are operating for ensuring security in the province. It is important for the dispatched GSDF units to keep in close cooperation with troops of the British and Australian forces when conducting their assigned missions. In order to promote such cooperation, the GSDF units and those of the British and Australian forces have sent liaison officers to each other's camps, and sponsored regular meetings to exchange views, or put on various cultural events. 57 ----- **(2) ASDF Activities for Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance and Ensuring Security** Since March 3 last year, the C-130H planes have airlifted goods and materials donated by Japan for humanitarian and reconstruction use, including medical equipment, similar goods donated by other countries and relevant international organizations, and personnel dispatched by such countries and organizations as well as replenish supplies being used by the dispatched GSDF units. As of the end of May this year, airlifting conducted by the ASDF for the Iraqi mission totaled 152 times with the total goods and materials transported weighing 217.2 tons. **Appreciation of Japan's Efforts in Iraq by Other Countries** Japan's activities in the rebuilding of Iraq have gained appreciation and gratitude from Iraq and many other countries, as mentioned below. A public opinion poll conducted on local people showed that 80% of those answered support the Japanese operations. **_In Iraq_** Iraqi Prime Minister Allawi told Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi during their summit in September last year that Iraq thanks Japan for its participation in reconstruction activities in his country as a member of the multinational force. In the meeting with Prime Minister Koizumi, Prime Minister Allawi quoted the head of an influential tribe in Samawah as telling him recently that his tribe felt gratitude for the SDF operations in Iraq and that Japan and the Japanese people were greatly respected in Iraq. In a letter sent to Prime Minister Koizumi in October last year, Prime Minister Allawi wrote that the SDF being dispatched to Iraq had successfully executed their duty, which were deemed indispensable for satisfying the needs of the Iraqi people and the Iraqi reconstruction. The SDF's contribution is indispensable to maintain momentum which would likely become necessary at an important time when Iraq's political system will be shifted, Prime Minister Allawi also told Prime Minister Koizumi in the letter. Following a decision by the Japanese Government on December 9 last year to extend the duration of the Basic Plan for Japan's humanitarian and reconstruction assistance activities in Iraq, the Iraqi Embassy in Tokyo issued a press statement that Iraq welcomes the Japanese courageous decision. The press statement termed the decision as representing renewed determination by the Japanese people and the Japanese Government to help the Iraqi people to overcome their current problems and representing friendly relations between Iraq and Japan. The Iraqi people will continue to express their gratitude for a friend who does not spare efforts to help rebuild Iraq and establish a democratic society, according to the statement. In addition, Al-Hasani, the Governor of the Muthanna Province, said that his province welcomes the GSDF's extended deployment in Samawah. A survey conducted by Kyodo News on citizens in Samawah in January this year found that 78.3% of those who were asked whether they support the Japanese Government's decision to extend the GSDF operations expressed support for it. Asked about if they are satisfied with the activities of the GSDF, 61.8% of those answered in the affirmative. **_In Other Countries_** 58 ----- U.S. President George W. Bush told Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi during their summit meeting in September last year that the United States thanks Japan for extending support to Iraq and Afghanistan for their efforts to rebuild themselves. Dutch Defense Minister Henk Kamp told Japanese Minister of State for Defense Yoshinori Ohno during the defense ministerial meeting at the Japan Defense Agency in November last year that the Netherlands highly appreciates the JSDF's humanitarian and reconstruction assistance activities in Iraq for various reasons including the fact that the SDF has won local people's trust in its operations, which is very important to conduct operation in the region. With regard to Japan's decision to extend the Basic Plan for the SDF deployment in Iraq for an additional 12 months, a U.S. State Department spokesman said in a news conference that the United States warmly welcomes the decision. The spokesman added that the United States believes the JSDF's continued activities in Iraq will contribute greatly to global efforts to extend humanitarian and reconstruction support to the country. The spokesman also said that the United States highly appreciates Japan's leadership in international efforts to rebuild Iraq. In addition, British Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs Jack Straw said in a press statement following the Japanese decision that Britain welcomes Japan's decision to extend the SDF operations in Iraq. **3. Activities Responding to International Terrorism (Activities in the Indian Ocean and** **Other Areas)** More than three years have passed since MSDF and ASDF began Cooperation and Support Activities in accordance with Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law enacted in October 2001, just after the terrorist attacks taking place in the United States on September 11, 2001. In light of the situation surrounding international terrorist activities, countermeasures carried out by various countries have been continuing in the Indian Ocean for more than three years. The Government assessed anti-terrorist operations being undertaken by these countries and, based on Japan’s own judgment, extended the duration of overseas operations by the SDF and partially revised the Basic Plan to change the content of its operations in October 2004. In April this year, the Government also changed the Basic Plan to extend the duration, marking the seventh revision of the plan. **Cooperation and Support Activities by the MSDF** On December 2, 2001, MSDF began fueling U.S. naval vessels in the Indian Ocean as part of the MSDF’s cooperation and support activities. The destroyer Sawagiri and the supply vessel Towada, which had engaged in relief activities for people affected by combat, joined the three vessels (Kurama, Kirisame and Hamana) in the Indian Ocean. These MSDF vessels also began fueling British naval ships on January 29, 2002. Japan had initially limited the ships to be refueled as a part of its cooperation and support activities to those belonging to the U.S. and British forces. However, the Government of Japan, judging it necessary to increase the operational efficiency of the global fight against terrorism, expanded the scope of countries receiving refueling gradually. As a result, ships from a total of 11 countries have become subject to refueling by Japan’s MSDF. Since October 2004, after the revision of the Basic Plan, Japan has supplied fuel not only to ships but also to ship-based helicopters. Japan also started supplying water to foreign naval ships following the revision. 59 ----- The number of refueling fuel for ships as part of Japan’s cooperation and support activities totaled 520 as of the end of May, 2005, with about 402,000 kiloliters of fuel supplied. The number of refueling for ship-based helicopters totaled 18 times with about 300 kiloliters of fuel. The number of water refueling for the ships came to 20 with about 1,200 tons of water supplied. **Cooperation and Support Activities by the ASDF** The ASDF started transport operations between U.S. Forces Japan (USFJ) bases on November 29, 2001, using C-130H aircraft from the First Transport Wing (Komaki Base in Central Japan), and overseas transport between USFJ bases and U.S. bases in Guam and other areas on December 3, 2001. The ASDF has engaged in transport operations as a part of Japan’s cooperation and support activities for the U.S.-led anti-terrorism operations, mainly using its C-130H transportation aircraft. From July 2002, the ASDF also began using C-1 transportation aircrafts in addition to C-130H transportation aircrafts for transport operations between the U.S. military bases in Japan. Since July last year, it has been using only C-1 aircraft for the domestic transportation. Under these transport operations, the ASDF has airlifted goods and materials of the U.S. military, such as aircraft engines, components, maintenance equipment and clothing. The number of ASDF transport operations since commencing cooperation and support activities totaled 15 for overseas transport and 262 for domestic transport as of the end of May 2005. **World’s Appreciation of Japan’s Contribution** In reference to Japan's efforts to fight against international terrorism, Afghan President Hamid Kharzai said in a speech delivered to a U.N. General Assembly session in September last year that he wishes to express gratitude to all countries, particularly the United States, Japan, Germany, Britain and Canada, which have dispatched their troops and allocated resources, on behalf of the Afghan people. In September of the same year, U.S. President George W. Bush told Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi that the United States thanks Japan for providing support to Afghanistan and Iraq. U.S Secretary of States Condoleezza Rice also expressed gratitude during courtesy call to Prime Minister Koizumi in March this year, saying she wants to deeply thank Japan for its support to rebuild Iraq and Afghanistan, including the SDF's operations in the Indian Ocean. Behind gratitude toward Japan for its operations is the significant contribution being made by its maritime refueling to global efforts to intercept terrorist activities at sea. Vessels engaged in OEF-MIO can maintain operations only for several days if they are not accompanied by supply ships; once the initially loaded fuel is consumed, vessels would have to leave the operation area and call at ports for refueling. This means that the vessels would have to leave the operation area frequently, lowering the overall operational efficiency significantly. In other words, refueling activities by supply vessels play a vital role in enabling continuous and long-term operations. Japan has dispatched supply ships without interruption, a factor that has drawn acclaim from ranking officials among those participating in the operations. Among the officials is a senior military official, who said that some countries were able to send vessels to the operational area in their fight against terrorism because they were supported by MSDF refueling. 60 ----- **4. Efforts for International Peace Cooperation Alignment** Japan, in a bid to fulfill a role commensurate to its international status, has been cooperating, both on human and financial fronts, with global efforts being led by the United Nations to build a peaceful and stable international society. In order to help improve the international security environment, the Defense Agency and the SDF have positively engaged in international peace cooperation alignment. Based on the International Peace Cooperation Law, enacted in 1992, the SDF has dispatched its units and others to Cambodia, Mozambique and East Timor as part of Japan’s cooperation in peacekeeping operations of the United Nations, and to Zaire (currently the Democratic Republic of Congo), Indonesia, Pakistan, Jordan as part of its cooperation in international humanitarian and relief activities. In addition, as part of its efforts to support U.N. peacekeeping operations, the SDF has been sending units and others to the Golan Heights since 1996. **_International Peace Cooperation Alignment in the Golan Heights_** The United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) has been undertaking U.N. peacekeeping operations in a zone called the Area of Separation (AOS), set up to separate the opposing troops of Syria and Israel that have agreed to a ceasefire. Japan's participation in the UNDOF operations is significant because it marks Japan’s personnel contribution to world efforts to achieve peace in the Middle East. The participation is also significant for Japan because it would help train people who can fulfill international missions. Japan decided in December 1995 to dispatch SDF units and others to the UNDOF. In January 1996, the first transport unit of 43 personnel was sent to the Golan Heights, and replaced a Canadian transport unit. Since then, an SDF unit has been sent there every six months on a rotating basis. As of the end of May 2005, the 19th dispatch of the transport unit was operating in the Golan Heights. The dispatched SDF transport unit is in charge of transporting daily goods and materials needed for UNDOF operations from the harbors, airports and commodities markets of Israel, Syria and Lebanon to the UNDOF campsites. The unit also provides logistical support, including repairs of roads which have become slippery due to rain and snowfall, and removal of snow from streets in plateau areas with an altitude of more than 2,800 meters. The ASDF flies a C-130H transport plane and a U-4 multipurpose assistance plane to the Golan Heights every six months to transport goods and materials for the transport unit. Two SDF personnel sent to the UNDOF headquarters oversee planning and coordination of transport and other UNDOF rear-support operations, and are also responsible for publicity and budget-related work. SDF personnel are assigned to the UNDOF headquarters for about one year, and are replaced by other SDF personnel after completing their assignment. SDF personnel working at the UNDOF headquarters as of the end of May 2005 were the 10th class to be sent there. Japan had originally intended to complete its participation in UNDOF operations within two years. However, participation has continued until now after comprehensively examining various factors, such as strong requests from the United Nations, commendation being given to past Japanese operations by the United Nations and relevant countries, and the importance of Japan’s personnel cooperation to peace in the Middle East. Japan's unit dispatch to UNDOF is set to mark its 10th anniversary in January next year. 61 ----- **_International Peace Cooperation Alignment in East Timor_** The United Nations Mission of Support in East Timor (UNMISET) took over peacekeeping operations from the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET), an entity tasked with managing overall administrative affairs in pre-independence East Timor, following its formal independence on May 20, 2002. The Government of Japan decided to dispatch SDF units and others to UNTAET in response to a request from the United Nations to participate in a U.N.-sponsored PKO. Japan has dispatched about 2,300 personnel belonging to the GSDF's engineering units and officers to work at the headquarters of UNTAET to East Timor since February 2002. With the United Nations’ international peace cooperation alignment in East Timor curtailed significantly in May last year, the Japanese SDF decided to end its operations there. The SDF's units completely withdrew from the area in June 2004. Japan's operations in East Timor contributed to stabilizing the area and promoting peace and security in the entire Asian region. A major mission of GSDF contingents dispatched to East Timor was to provide logistical support to UNMISET units undertaking peacekeeping operations in East Timor. The personnel, including a division chief sent to the engineering division of the UNMISET military component headquarters, crafted a framework for Japan's civilian support to East Timor, which called for the use of the engineering ability of the dispatched GSDF contingents. Based on the framework, the GSDF contingents repaired roads and bridges that were indispensable for local people. These roads and bridges are now used as important traffic infrastructure and have supported efforts by East Timor to rebuild itself. The GSDF contingents donated part of equipment and machines they had used during their engineering work to East Timor after completing their mission in the country. They also taught people in East Timor how to operate and maintain these machines and helped them devise engineering plans while offering manager training. This kind of education and donation have paved the way for the people of East Timor to acquire skills and knowledge that would become necessary when they embark on projects to improve the nation's social infrastructure, such as building roads, and to promote restoration work after natural disasters hit the country. This kind of Japan's support of East Timor received acclaim from the United Nations as being ''uniquely Japanese.'' **_Dispatch of Self-Defense Officials to the U.N. Department of Peacekeeping Operations_** In November 2001, the Law on Working Conditions of Defense Agency Officials Dispatched to International Organizations was revised to enable the Defense Agency to send its officials to the PKO Department. The revision was based on the judgment that the agency’s dispatch of officials to the U.N. department would contribute to supporting the United Nations in its efforts towards achieving world peace. Under the revised law, one defense official was dispatched between December 2002 and June this year to the Military Planning Section of the Military Division in the PKO Department of the United Nations, which is located in the United States. This marked the Defense Agency’s first dispatch of an official to the PKO Department. The dispatched GSDF official engaged in planning policies and measures for U.N. PKO. Most recently, an SDF officer dispatched to the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH), set up in June last year, participated in its policy-planning work. 62 ----- **5. International Disaster Relief Operations** In 1992, the International Disaster Relief Law, enacted in 1987 was amended to enable the SDF to participate in international disaster relief operations and to transport its personnel and equipment. Since then, the SDF has maintained its readiness for international disaster relief operations with self-sufficient capabilities, including relief operations and medical treatment, and with the use of its own equipment, organizations and benefits of regular training, even when local support is not available for transport, accommodation, food and water supplies, communications, sanitation, and so forth. **_International Disaster Relief Operations by the SDF and the SDF’s Posture_** International disaster relief operations conducted by the SDF may take different forms according to factors such as the scale of the disaster, the degree of damage, and the requests of the governments of affected countries or international organizations. The SDF’s past record on domestic disaster relief operations indicates possible fields of cooperation to be extended by the SDF overseas for disaster relief. These fields are as follows: ―medical services, such as first-aid medical treatment and epidemic prevention; ―transport of goods, patients, and disaster relief personnel by helicopter; ―ensuring water supplies using water-purifying devices. ―use of transport planes/ships to carry disaster-relief personnel, and equipment to the affected area. Regional units of the GSDF are assigned duties on a six-month rotational basis, to ensure that they can provide medical, transport and water supply services in a self-sufficient manner anytime the need for disaster-relief operations arises. The MSDF and the ASDF are always prepared to have its fleet and air-support team, respectively, transport supplies to its units or units participating in international disaster-relief operations. The ASDF’s air support command is also prepared to provide similar services anytime the need for disaster relief arises. **_International Disaster Relief Activities by Japan after the Large-Scale Earthquake off Sumatra Island_** **_and the Indian Ocean Tsunami_** A large-scale earthquake occurred off Indonesia's Sumatra Island on December 26, 2004, and the subsequent tsunami tidal wave in the Indian Ocean caused devastating damage in areas near the seismic center. On December 27, the Government of the Kingdom of Thailand filed a formal request for Japan's assistance. On December 28, the Japanese Foreign Minister consulted with the Minister of State for Defense concerning the assistance that the SDF could provide. Later on the same day, Minister Ohno ordered MSDF vessels in the Indian Ocean to change their course and head for Thailand and conduct search and rescue operations. These vessels were on the way home after being replaced by other MSDF units following the completion of their anti-terrorist mission based on the Anti-Terrorist Special Measures Law. The three vessels, including helicopters carried by them, recovered 57 bodies of disaster victims who were drifting in the waters and delivered them to Thai authorities. The helicopters also airlifted Japanese troops who had been sent earlier for medical support as well as their equipment. 63 ----- On January 3 this year, the Government of Japan received a request from the Government of Indonesia to provide support to the country to help its people affected by the earthquake and the tsunami. Following its meeting with the Foreign Ministry on January 4, the Defense Agency and the SDF decided to send disaster relief units to Indonesia including an airlifting squadron of the ASDF for disaster relief operations, a disaster relief unit of the MSDF, medical and aircraft-support units of the GSDF, and liaison and coordination officers of the Joint Staff Council. On the transportation front, One C-130H of the ASDF was used to airlift aid goods and materials between Thailand's Utapao, which served as the liaison and coordination center for international disaster relief operations, and Banda Aceh in Indonesia. In addition, three CH-47JA transport helicopters and two UH-60JA multipurpose helicopters of the GSDF, one SH-60J ship-carried helicopter of the MSDF and two air-cushioned landing craft (LCAC) of the MSDF were used to airlift aid goods between areas in the Province of Aceh, and transport heavy machines to be used for reconstruction work in Indonesia. On the medical front, GSDF units provided medical service to victims of the quake and the tsunami in Banda Aceh and took measures to prevent epidemics in the area. Moreover, they had people vaccinated (against measles) on the west coast of the Aceh Province. Three points can be cited as major characteristics of the SDF's international disaster relief operations following the earthquake and the tsunami as shown below. ―Helicopters were dispatched for the first time for international disaster relief operations. GSDF helicopters to be used for the relief operations were carried by the MSDF's transport vessel Kunisaki from Japan. ―During the relief operations, the MSDF's vessel which anchored off Banda Aceh acted as a center for providing logistical support to dispatched GSDF units. This became the **_touchstone for the SDF's_** **_planned shift to joint operation at the end of FY 2005._** ―Three service plus Joint Staff Council members, totaling about 1,000, were dispatched abroad together **_for the same disaster relief mission for the first time in the largest-ever scale._** **6. Proactive Efforts to International Peace Cooperation Activities in the Future Based on** **the New NDPG** Japan has participated in a variety of international peace cooperation activities since the enactment of the International Peace Cooperation Law in 1992. Recently, new ways of participation in international peace cooperation are being explored in Japan in order to meet new kinds of demands which present international situations call for. **_Japan's Efforts toward International Peace Cooperation Activities as Shown in New NDPG_** The new NDPG calls for the SDF to make efforts proactively and on its own initiative to address international peace cooperation activities in order to respond to a new international security environment. Japan should make its own efforts toward that goal based on the recognition that ensuring peace and stability in the global community is an issue of ensuring Japan's own peace and security. **_Review of SDF's International Peace Cooperation Activities in terms of Mission Status_** 64 ----- When the International Peace Cooperation Law was enforced in 1992, it was intended that techniques, experiences and organizational functions that the SDF has accumulated in order to defend Japan can be utilized in peacetime for Japan's efforts to participate in U.N. peacekeeping operations. Therefore, it was generally viewed that Japan's participation in U.N. peacekeeping operations and other international peace cooperation activities should be allowed as long as such participation does not hamper the SDF's execution of its originally intended missions. Activities like international peace cooperation operations are stipulated under Chapter 8 of the Self-Defense Forces Law, which governs miscellaneous rules about the SDF, along with activities to support athletic competition events and the like. A variety of international peace cooperation activities which were later added into the scope of the SDF's operations are stipulated under Chapter 8 of the Self-Defense Forces Law or its supplementary provisions. Since the dispatch of MSDF minesweeping unit to the Persian Gulf, the SDF has stepped up its participation in various kinds of international peace cooperation operations. This has steadily helped the Japanese people to deepen their understanding and expectations for the SDF's international peace cooperation activities while Japan's participation in such activities has been appreciated by the international community. In view of the SDF's past achievements regarding international peace cooperation operations and the need for the SDF to positively participate in such operations in order to ensure Japan's peace and security amid a new security environment, the new NDPG says the SDF will improve its operational system, including how its international peace cooperation activities should be treated from a viewpoint of executing its duty, in order to adequately deal with Japan's participation in such activities. It is significant to make the mission status of the SDF's participation in international peace cooperation activities more adequate and clearer and that would send a clear message to the international community on Japan's keen efforts to help build a stable security environment. It is also meaningful because SDF members can devote themselves to fulfilling their assigned missions for international peace cooperation operations with greater self-awareness and pride. Given these advantages, the Defense Agency is resolved to positively work on the review of SDF's International Peace Cooperation Activities in terms of Mission Status. **_Study on the modality of Japan’s Participation in International Peace Cooperation Activities_** Led by the Cabinet's Secretariat, the Japanese Government is broadly studying general issues about Japan's participation in international peace cooperation activities as well as specific issues like how the SDF's operational system should be improved for Japan to adequately respond to global needs for participation in such operations and how the SDF's international peace cooperation activities should be understood from a viewpoint of accomplishing its missions. In recent years, various proposals were put forward regarding what Japan should do on the international peace cooperation front in response to changes in the international situation. Among them were a report released in May 2002 by the International Peace Cooperation Council, chaired by Yasushi Akashi, former Undersecretary-General of the United Nations, and a report compiled in October last year by the Council on National Security and Defense Capability, chaired by Hiroshi Araki, adviser to Tokyo 65 ----- Electric Power Co. Referring to these proposals, Japan has broadly studied how and on what concept, ideas and principle the country should participate in international peace cooperation operations. The Defense Agency and the SDF have positively taken part in meetings and other opportunities where Japan's international peace cooperation operations were discussed, while taking into account the SDF's past activities and the lesson it has learned from such activities, so that the SDF can contribute to promoting peace and stability of the global society. ### Section 2 Establishing the Basis for Cooperative Relations in the International Community The new NDPG says making active and positive efforts to help improve the international security environment should be regarded as a major role to be played by defense forces. Based on that idea, the NDPG calls for the SDF to promote activities deemed as contributing to world peace and stability, including promotion of security dialogue and defense exchanges such as bilateral and multilateral joint defense exercises, and supporting arms control and disarmament efforts by the Unite Nations and other international organizations. In view of the concept as shown in the NDPG, the Defense Agency and the SDF have been promoting security dialogue and defense exchanges at different levels, and have also sponsored multilateral joint exercises. Further, they have participated in multilateral joint exercises sponsored by other countries in the Asia-Pacific region. In addition, they are stepping up cooperation concerning arms control and disarmament. Through these activities, the Defense Agency and the SDF have been trying to establish the basis for cooperative relations in the international community. **1. Security Dialogue and Defense Relations** **_Significance of Security Dialogue and Defense Relations_** To ensure Japan’s peace and security, it has become increasingly important to build a more stable security environment in the international community, particularly within the Asia-Pacific region, as well as to maintain an adequate level of defense capability and alliance based on the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements. The Defense Agency and the SDF place importance on bilateral relations, multilateral security dialogues such as the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and joint multilateral defense exercises in the Asia-Pacific region in order to improve and strengthen cooperation and cooperative relations among countries in the region. The Defense Agency and the SDF will redouble their efforts to improve the security environment by deepening ties and building wider relations in the region. **_Bilateral Defense Relations_** Bilateral defense relations, involving officials of the two countries in charge of defense affairs, are intended to establish the basis for building cooperation between the countries. The significance of bilateral 66 ----- defense relations lies in the fact that they can be tailored to meet specific needs in bilateral relations and that bilateral confidence established through such exchanges can become a basis on which to effectively promote multilateral security dialogues and others. The Defense Agency has been making active efforts to strengthen bilateral defense relations with countries concerned through exchanges of high level defense officials visits, regular consultations between defense officials, exchanges of units etc. **_Multilateral Security Dialogue_** Multilateral security dialogue is extremely significant because participating countries can deepen their mutual understanding and increase mutual trust by exchanging views on security issues of mutual concern. Such security dialogue can also effectively contribute to bringing about regional peace and stability, with concerned countries having the opportunity to tackle particular issues affecting them under such multilateral framework. In the Asia-Pacific region, in particular, there still exist unpredictable and uncertain factors. Recently, new issues, including proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, have been strongly recognized in the region. Since these issues may become factors in destabilizing the security of the region, promoting a multilateral framework for security dialogue becomes even more important. The Defense Agency believes that it is necessary for defense officials among ARF member countries to enhance mutual confidence during the process of the ARF so that the ARF would become a forum to generate a sense of being part of one community among its members, and thereby stabilize the region’s security environment. From this perspective, the Defense Agency has been continuing its efforts to deepen mutual understanding within the ARF by continuing to participate in the ARF process, by encouraging ARF members to increase the transparency of their defense policies and by promoting frank discussion among members’ defense officials. The Defense Agency believes that it is important for Japan to take the initiative in multilateral security dialogue in order to promote mutual understanding and confidence among defense officials of Japan and other countries through information exchanges and discussions. The Defense Agency also believes that by doing so, Japan can contribute to making the Asia-Pacific region more stable. Based on this perception, the Defense Agency has sponsored seminars and other events to promote multilateral security dialogue at various levels-the Internal Bureau, the GSDF, the MSDF, the ASDF, the National Defense Academy and the National Institute for Defense Studies-and has actively participated in such forums sponsored by foreign countries and other organizations. The Forum for Defense Authorities of Asia-Pacific Region (Tokyo Defense Forum) has been sponsored by the Japan Defense Agency every year since 1996. The forum is designed to contribute to the stability of the Asia-Pacific region by deepening mutual understanding among participating countries on each other’s defense policy and increasing the transparency of their defense policies. Under the forum, defense officials of participating countries have exchanged views on defense policies, and measures and actions being taken by each country to foster mutual trust in the field of defense. In June this year, the 10th Tokyo Defense Forum was held and exchanged views on “Roles of Armed Forces in Disaster Relief and Future Challenges the Potential for Enhanced Regional Cooperation concerning Disaster Relief Operations by Armed Forces” and Chairperson of the Forum made a Chair’s 67 ----- Summary on the contents of discussion to be reported to ARF Ministerial meeting. **_Multilateral Exercises_** The Defense Agency and the SDF will continue to participate on their own initiative and positively in multilateral exercises as they consider that participating in or hosting such exercises will contribute not only to improving their skills but also to helping establish the **_foundation for building cooperative_** **_relationship among participating countries through coordination and exchange of views._** In recent years, SDF participated in Cobra Gold 2005 co-hosted by US Forces and Thai Armed Forces, and WPNS multilateral naval training. In addition, ASDF sent observers to Beach Black hosted by Australian Air Force, and GSDF has invited officers from 15 countries centering in the Asia-Pacific region to Japan to have them observe the Multinational Cooperation program in the Asia-Pacific (MCAP 2004). **2. Efforts for Arms Control, Disarmament and Non-proliferation of Weapons of Mass** **Destruction** In recent years, the international community firmly recognizes the new threat of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), missiles as their means of delivery, and related equipment and materials to terrorists and countries of concern. Addressing non-proliferation issues, such as restricting or managing export of these weapons and their means of delivery, is a pressing issue for the peace and stability of the international community today. Against this background, Japan has pledged to play a positive role in a practical and gradual approach toward nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation aimed at a nuclear-free world, disarmament and non-proliferation of other weapons of mass destruction and missiles as their means of delivery, and a global effort regarding restricting certain conventional weapons. Based on this understanding, the Defense Agency and the SDF is doing a variety of cooperation toward efforts done by the United Nations and other international organizations in the area of arms control and disarmament. The Defense Agency also endeavors to ensure the transparency in armament by disclosing annually relevant information such as the types and the amount of equipment possessed by the SDF in the Defense White Paper. **(1)Treaties related to Disarmament and Non-Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction** **_Nuclear Weapons_** Japan has been continuing its efforts to promote the early entry into force of the CTBT. However, there appears to be no prospect for its entering into force in the near future as 11 countries among the designated countries whose ratification is required for the treaty to take effect have not yet been persuaded. **_Chemical Weapons_** Since 1980, the Defense Agency and the SDF have dispatched GSDF experts on protection from chemical weapons to the negotiations to draft the convention. Since 1997, when the convention came into effect, GSDF experts on protection from chemical weapons have been dispatched to the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), which was established in The Hague, the Netherlands, to 68 ----- monitor the inspection steps stipulated in the convention. With regard to chemical weapons that were abandoned in China, the Defense Agency and the SDF have cooperated in the project by sending three officials, including GSDF officers, to the Cabinet Office, which is in charge of the project. In order to implement the project smoothly, the Defense Agency has also dispatched GSDF officers specialized in chemical weapons and ammunition disposal to China to help the excavation and collection of the abandoned weapons. SDF officers have been so far dispatched to China for four times for the disposal of discarded chemical weapons in the country. Most recently, six SDF officers were sent to Ningan City in Heilongjiang Province in September last year. **_Biological Weapons_** The Defense Agency and the SDF have dispatched GSDF experts on pharmacology and medicine to these negotiations. With regard to Australia Group (AG), The Defense Agency has sent its officials to the AG's annual meeting since 1994. **_Delivery Means (Missiles)_** Japan has been making efforts to make rules and measures more effective to restrict proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery means through sending experts to HCOC meeting and MTCR's annual meeting to offer professional advice, and to exchange views and promote cooperation for it. **_United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC)_** The Defense Agency and the SDF dispatched an MSDF officer who is an expert on missiles to the UNMOVIC Headquarters in February 2001. An officer from the ASDF was later assigned to the post at the Headquarters until March this year to support the UNMOVIC operations. **(2)Arms Control Related Treaties on Certain Conventional Weapons** **_Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons_** The Defense Agency dispatched its officials to the negotiations to draft the original CCW and to add and amend the protocol and also sends its officials to Meeting of the States Parties and the Groups of Governmental Experts of CCW. **_Convention on Anti-Personnel Mines (the Ottawa Convention)_** The Defense Agency and the SDF began disposal of the anti-personnel mines stockpiled by the SDF in January 2000 in accordance with the Ottawa Convention. Japan steadily implemented the destruction of stockpiled anti-personnel mines within four years which is stipulated in the Convention, and destroyed all anti-personnel mines in February 2003, with the exception of a minimum number of anti-personnel mines necessary for the development of and training in mine detection or mine clearance, techniques, as permitted by the convention. Furthermore the Defense Agency has actively supported the international efforts at anti-personnel mines issue through annually reporting to the United Nations the data regarding exceptional possession, in 69 ----- accordance with the provision of the Convention, or sending its officials to relevant international meetings. **_Wassenaar Arrangement (WA)_** The Defense Agency is giving professional advice in reviewing the current WA system aimed at increasing the transparency of weapons transfer and strengthening export control for MANPADS. **_Restriction of Illicit Transactions of Small Arms and Light Weapons_** Ways to restrict illicit transactions of and to reduce excessive accumulation of small arms and light weapons are currently being studied mainly by the United Nations, and Japan is one of the leading members in such effort. **_System of the U.N. Register of Conventional Arms_** The Defense Agency makes additional efforts to improve the transparency of its equipment by providing information on its possession and domestic procurement of conventional arms on a voluntary basis. Moreover, officials of the Defense Agency participate from time to time in expert meetings and others aimed at improving and strengthening the U.N. Register of Conventional Arms. **(3) New International Efforts to Prevent the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction** **_Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI)_** Through their active participations in PSI-related meetings, the Defense Agency and the SDF believe they can play an important role in the PSI by providing relevant organizations and countries with information gathered in patrol and surveillance operations by the SDF’s vessels and aircraft during PSI interdiction operations. The Defense Agency and the SDF also believe they can play other roles in maritime interdiction operations, including stopping suspicious ships and conducting on-the-spot inspections. In October last year, the Defense Agency and the SDF, along with the Foreign Ministry and the Maritime Safety Agency, sponsored an exercise for maritime interdiction operations. The exercise was mainly designed to improve interdiction skills by participating countries and participating organizations, to strengthen their mutual cooperation and to deepen understanding of the PSI by non-PSI member countries. Participants in the exercise demonstrated their training on boarding a suspicious ship and conducting an on-the-spot inspection there. As part of ''outreach'' lobbying activities aimed at strengthening the comprehensive non-proliferation regime, including the PSI, the Defense Agency and the SDF have positively provided the national defense authorities of other Asian countries with information and knowledge that they have obtained through their past interdiction exercises in a bid to garner support from these Asian countries concerning the PSI. The new NDPG calls for Japan to make proactive and positive commitments to international peace cooperation activities in order to further strengthen peace and security for Japan. PSI is one of international peace cooperation activities as called for under the new NDPG. Even during peace time, Japan must engage in PSI activities positively on its own initiative. PSI should be recognized as a security issue that broadly covers defense, diplomacy, law enforcement and export controls. Based on that understanding, Japan 70 ----- should use its total capability and maximize its efforts to help prevent the proliferation of WMD. **(4) U.N. Security Council Resolution 1540 Concerning Non-Proliferation of Weapons of Mass** **Destruction** In April 2004, the U.N. Security Council unanimously adopted a resolution against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction under Chapter 7 of the U.N. Charter, affirming that the proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons as well as their means of delivery constitutes a threat to international peace and security and therefore the United Nations is prepared to take adequate and effective action against such threats. The resolution urges all U.N. Member States to refrain from providing any form of support to non-state actors attempting to develop WMD and their means of delivery, to adopt and enforce appropriate effective laws which prohibit any non-State actor for manufacturing WMD and their means of delivery, in particular for terrorist purposes, and to establish effective border-controls and export-controls to prevent the proliferation of WMD and their means of delivery. Recognizing that the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction could disturb international peace and stability and that preventing such weapons from proliferating to terrorists and other non-State actors is an urgent task, Japan supports the U.N. resolution and holds expectations that all U.N. Member States will observe the resolution. 71 ----- ### Chapter V People and the Defense Agency/SDF Section 1 Basis of Defense Capability **1. Organization and People of the SDF** **Organization of the SDF** The Defense Agency and the SDF consist of a number of organs in order to fulfill their mission of defending Japan. These organs include the Ground Self-Defense Force (GSDF), Maritime Self-Defense Force (MSDF), and Air Self-Defense Force (ASDF), as well as the National Defense Academy, National Defense Medical College, National Institute for Defense Studies, Technical Research and Development Institute (TRDI), Central Contract Office, and Defense Facilities Administration Agency. The Minister of State for Defense is in charge of the SDF and is under the direction and supervision of the Prime Minister, supported by the Senior Vice Minister for Defense and two Parliamentary Secretaries for Defense. The Administrative Vice Minister of Defense supports the Minister of State for Defense in supervising administrative work and the Defese Counselors in setting up the basic policies, respectively. The Internal Bureau, the Ground Staff Office, Maritime Staff Office, Air Staff Office, and Joint Staff Council support the Minister of State for Defense. The Internal Bureau is responsible for basic policies relating to the work of the SDF. The Director-General of the Secretariat and Directors-General of Bureaus, as part of their own responsibilities, support the Director General of the Defense Agency regarding the Minister’s instructions and approvals to the Chiefs of Staff and Joint Staff Council. The Ground Staff Office, Maritime Staff Office, and Air Staff Office are administrative centers for those respective services, with the Chief of Staff at each Staff Office acting as the top-ranking expert adviser to the Director General. The Joint Staff Council includes the Chairman of the Joint Staff Council and the Chiefs of Staff of the GSDF, MSDF, and ASDF, who support the Minister of State for Defense in matters pertaining to the the SDF, such as matters related to joint operations. The Defense Agency and SDF are planning to have a new joint operation system by the end of FY 2005. **_Defense Agency Transition to a Ministry_** The 1997 final report by the Administrative Reform Council listed the Defense Agency’s transition to a ministry as an issue to be discussed in the political arena. Since the report was published, active debates have taken place in the Diet. The Defense Ministry Establishment Bill was submitted by a group of lawmakers to the 151st ordinary session of the Diet in June 2001 and carried over to consecutive sessions since then. In October last year, at the 157th extraordinary session, the bill was scrapped concurrently with the dissolution of the House of Representatives. In recent years, national defense and other functions of the SDF have had an increased importance in national administration. More specifically, the SDF has been called on more frequently to protect national 72 ----- peace and security, and the international community has asked Japan to contribute more toward world peace in the uncertain international situation. Taking the increased importance of the duties and role of the SDF into account, the Defense Agency regards it important for Japan to establish a ministry as an administrative organ in charge of national defense. Most countries have a ‘ministry’ for national defense. In addition, the establishment of such a ministry would contribute to the enhancement of state functions for security and crisis management, and articulate both internationally and domestically, the Japanese government’s commitment to these functions. **SDF Personnel** The SDF personnel comprises uniformed Regular Personnel, uniformed Ready Reserve Personnel, uniformed Reserve Personnel, Candidates for Reserve Personnel, administrative officials, technical and engineering officials, instructors, and others. **(1) SDF Regular Personnel** SDF Regular Personnel enlist on their own free will on a volunteer basis and are initially appointed as a general Officer Candidate, student candidate for enlisted (upper), enlisted (upper) candidate, Private (GSDF), Seaman Apprentice for MSDF, Airman for ASDF, or SDF youth cadet. Service with the SDF Regular Personnel differs significantly from the regular civil service as it involves an early retirement system and a short-term service system, which are intended to preserve the strength of the forces. With the early retirement system, retirement comes at a younger age compared to that for civilian public servants. Meanwhile, under the short-term service system, service may be completed in two or three years, and many in the Private, Seaman Apprentice, or Airman ranks are enlisted under this system. It has been promoted to take measures such as carrying forward the networking of reemployment information of each SDF, and improving the abilities of job seekers through the enhancement of job training subjects as well as reemploying retiring uniformed personnel in the public sector. **(2) SDF Ready Reserve Personnel, SDF Reserve Personnel, and Candidates for SDF-Reserve** **Personnel** Many countries other than Japan have developed similar systems that promptly and appropriately secure human resources when preparing for national emergencies. In Japan, to effectively respond to various situations, and sufficiently react to changing situations, systems for SDF Reserve Personnel, etc. are established. SDF Ready Reserve Personnel, SDF Reserve Personnel, and Candidates for SDF-Reserve Personnel normally go about their usual employment but are expected to attend training and education sessions in order to maintain their required level of skills. They are to take leave or vacations or adjust their job schedules every year to attend those sessions. To make such a system work smoothly, it is essential to obtain the understanding and cooperation of companies employing SDF Ready Reserve Personnel, SDF Reserve Personnel, and Candidates for SDF-Reserve Personnel. 73 ----- The Candidates for SDF-Reserve Personnel system was introduced in 2001. The system was designed to secure a stable force level of SDF reservists in the future and make good use of civilian expertise from the perspective of increasing opportunities for people’s contact with the SDF and cultivating and expanding a foundation for national defense. Candidates for SDF-Reserve Personnel are divided into the two categories of general candidates (security personnel in a rear area, etc.) and technical candidates (medical personnel, language experts, computer experts, architects, vehicle maintenance personnel, etc.). They and training sessions for these candidates started in FY 2002. They are recruited from volunteer applicants who have no experience as uniformed SDF personnel, and after completing the necessary education and training of 50 days in three years for general candidates or 10 days in two years for technical candidates, they are appointed as SDF Reserve Personnel. **(3) Administrative, Technical and Engineering Officials, Instructors, and Other Civilian Personnel** The Defense Agency employs some 24,000 civilian officials, approximately 10% of the overall strength of uninformed personnel, and includes administrators, Technical and Engineering Officials, and Instructors. Administrative officials undertake the planning and implementation of defense policies in the Internal Bureaus, and handle those management activities required for the effective operation of the SDF and the intelligence activities of the Defense Intelligence Headquarters. Administrative personnel also respond directly to public concerns related to the activities of the Defense Agency, including the provision of base countermeasures and logistic support (maintenance, repairs, etc.) throughout the country. Technical and Engineering officials at the TRDI and other organizations carry out research, development and other projects in order to maintain and improve the qualitative level of the nation’s defense capability. Instructors at the National Institute for Defense Studies conduct work on the management and operation of the SDF, and Instructors based at the National Defense Academy and the National Defense Medical College are responsible for training highly qualified personnel. **(4) Measures on Personnel Matters** The Defense Agency is implementing various personnel measures for the new era and is considering new measures. **_Promotion of Measures to Support Policy for Upbringing the Next Generation_** With the rapid declining of birth rate within Japan in the background, the Supporting Policy for Upbringing Next Generations Act has been established in July 2003 to promote formulation of a society where children who take on the future society can be born and be brought up in good health. In response to this, in November of 2004, the Defense Agency has also established the “Committee of the Defense Agency to Promote the Supporting of Upbringing Next Generations.” In order to provide a working environment where personnel can raise children with joy by striking the balance between work and family, the “Action Plan of the Defense Agency as Specific Propeitor” has been created in March of 2005. Specifically, efforts have been made to promote acquisition of child-care leave and special leave by male personnel, and discussion on establishment of a day care center for children within the Agency is underway. 74 ----- **_Efforts Concerning Mental Health and others_** The Defense Agency has been carrying out various activities on mental health under the recognition that maintaining the mental health of SDF personnel is extremely important to have them perform the important task of defending the country with a firm sense of duty. As a pressing mental health related issue, activities concerning PTSD and CIS (Critical Incident Stress) are under study by the Defense Agency/SDF. On the other hand, during the several past moths, a series of cases breaking service disciplines including atrocious crimes have been committed by SDF personnel who have to have strict disciplines. Since these cases might result in significant loss of trust toward Defense Agency/SDF, Defense Agency has been conducting a comprehensive and intensive review on the issues related to personnel and education under the leadership of Senior vice Minister. **_SDF Medical Officers (taken from column)_** SDF medical officers working at SDF hospitals and bases/camps help make SDF robust through managing the health of SDF personnel as a routine mission with special techniques attained by training. In recent years, they have also been playing an important role in various SDF activities in Japan and overseas, including disaster relief efforts, international emergency assistance activities, activities conducted in keeping with the Law Concerning Special Measures on Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance in Iraq, and activities in the Indian Ocean based on the Anti-terrorism Special Measures Law. While expectations of SDF activities are on the rise both at home and abroad and the importance of SDF medical officers has come to be widely recognized, the Defense Agency and the SDF are confronting the issue of “early retirement.” We have continuously seen many medical officers retire early before completing 9-year service commitment they accepted upon graduation from the National Defense Medical College. In FY2004, 78 medical officers left, of whom 32 took early retirement within their service commitment period. Even general practitioners who are not SDF medical officers are required to accumulate a broad range of case histories as medical science grows increasingly sophisticated and specialized and SDF medical officers are no exceptions. However they see only limited types and numbers of case histories because they are dealing with healthy SDF personnel in providing health management; this is supposed to be one major reason for the growing number of medical officers opting for early retirement. To satisfy the motivation and passion of SDF medical officers to maintain and improve their skills as doctors and to gain more clinical experience, the Defense Agency and the SDF has established an internal “Committee on the Prevention of Early Retirement by SDF Medical Officers” headed by Director General of Health and Medical Affairs to study measures toward solutions. **2. Discussion on Organization of the Defense Agency** As referred to in the new National Defense Program Guidelines, the defense capability must be built-up based on the idea that a flexible and effective multi-functional defense capability is necessary toward the future. Discussion is underway to meet such circumstances, to improve the system to meet demands of a sufficient defense system, and to establish an ideal future support system for the Minister of 75 ----- State for Defense who executes civilian control. Since August of 2004, the following items have been under study: ―modality of functions/structures of the Agency’s internal bureaus and other organizations; ―reorganization of acquisition system; ―modality of roles/functions/structures of facility administration; ―modality of functions/structures of regional organizations; and ―modality of roles/relationship between SDF uniformed personnel and un-uniformed officials. An interim report was issued in December of 2004, and work is still underway to carry out necessary organizational reform in FY 2006, in principle. **3. Education of SDF Personnel** Education and training is the most important basis on which the SDF enhances its capability to perform its duties from the viewpoint of human resources. Working within a variety of constraints and giving close attention to the prevention of accidents and other safety concerns, the SDF is committed to educating its personnel, training its units to make them strong, and improving its readiness to deal with any situation. **(1) Present Status** Training highly proficient personnel is indispensable if units are to perform their duties successfully. SDF personnel receive the following education and training at SDF schools and training units. a. Basic Education Immediately after Joining the SDF b. Education throughout the Service c. Education to Cultivate the Qualifications, Knowledge, and Skills of Personnel d. Various Learning Opportunities **(2) Timely Efforts for Educational Programs** Taking into consideration the current situation, in which Japan has more opportunities to take part in international activities and have a more active relationship with other countries, the SDF has appropriately added language programs to learn English, Russian, Chinese, Korean, Arabic, and other languages to the existing curricula. To further the understanding of other countries, the SDF accepts students from other countries. Furthermore, as part of education and training program for the international peace cooperation assignments, the SDF dispatches its officers to Scandinavian countries, which have frequently joined U.N. peacekeeping operations (PKO), or other relevant countries or areas. **_Individual Staff Training and Unit Training_** The purpose of training in the GSDF, MSDF, and ASDF can be divided into that for individual SDF personnel, which improves the proficiency in their respective fields, and that for units, which builds up the systematic action of units. **_Joint Training_** 76 ----- In order to deploy defense capability in the most effective way in the event of an armed attack on Japan, the GSDF, MSDF, and ASDF must conduct training in joint operations during peacetime. Therefore, the SDF has conducted and improved joint training involving the cooperation of more than two forces. Joint training is classified into function-specific training, operation-specific training, and joint exercises. Among them, joint exercises are planned and conducted under the direction of the Joint Staff Council. Comprehensive disaster prevention exercises and Japan-U.S. combined joint exercises have been conducted. The Japan-U.S. combined joint exercises of FY 2005 (Command Post Exercise) is planned to be executed with its goal as preparation toward transition to the joint operation system at the end of FY 2005. **_Safety Management_** Because the SDF’s main mission is to defend Japan, SDF training and activities are inevitably accompanied by risk. At the same time, accidents that cause injury or loss of property to the public or the loss of life of SDF personnel must be avoided at all costs. Continuous review and improvement are vital for safety control, and it is a crucial issue that must be dealt with by joint efforts of the Defense Agency/SDF. **4. Efforts to Strengthen Information and Communications Capability, etc.** Information and Communications in Defense Agency/SDF are the basis for control from the central; headquarters of GSDF, MSDF, and ASDF; to the low-end units. In other words, it is the nervous system of the Defense Agency/SDF. The new National Defense Program Guidelines, drafted in December of 2004, places emphasis in regards to this point. Efforts to enhance information and communication capability, etc. connect directly to the capability of the SDF to execute duties. **(1) Response to the Information Technology Revolution** ―Creation of an Advanced Network Environment ―Enhancing Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence Functions ―Assurance of Information Security To protect the intelligence and communication infrastructure of the Defense Agency and the SDF that utilizes computers from cyber attacks, the Defense Agency carries out as follows: ―improvement in safety characteristics of the system itself (e.g. firewall); ―improvement in protection capability of the system (e.g. constant surveillance by the protection unit); ―improvement in rules to control and utilize the system; ―enhancement of the capability of the system administrator, user etc; ―sharing, etc. of security information with organs concerned; and ―investigation and research of technology to react toward the most recent cyber issues. Along with the above, the Defense Agency actively contributes to the activities of the government including the sending off of personnel to the Cabinet Secretariat’s National Information Security Center (NISC), and supporting of the Cryptography Research & Evaluation Committees (CRYPTREC) mandated to the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications; and the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry. 77 ----- **(2)Future Policy for Information and Communications (Action Plan)** **_Purposes_** To respond to the new operational needs of the SDF, such as the promotion of joint operation and smooth execution of the international peace cooperation activities, it has become a task to prepare the wide-range and maneuverable information and capabilities system by active use of the information and communications infrastructure constructed based on the IT Outline. For this reason, the Defense Agency has set five policy targets concerning information and communications. As a concrete project plan for the coming five years, the “Future Policy for Information and Communications (Action Plan)” has been included in the new Mid-Term Defense Program (MTDP). **_Five Policy Targets_** ―Enhancement of Concentration/Communication of Information in the Chain of Command (Vertical Direction) ―Promotion of Sharing Information within Units (Horizontal Direction) ―Establishment of the Capability against Cyber Attacks ―Promotion of Information with External Organizations ―Enhancement of Various Telecommunication Infrastructures **5. Promotion of Comprehensive Acquisition Reforms** On enhancement and maintenance of defense capability, effective and efficient acquisition of equipment and material is vital. **(1) Promoting of Acquisition Measures** **_Promoting of Acquisition Policy through the Entire Life-cycle of Equipment_** In equipment acquisition, the Integrated Project Team (IPT) was established. Equipment acquisition will be carried out by the so-called project management method, meaning that overall project information is concentrated to the Project Manager (PM), and management of various business are unified throughout the equipment’s life-cycle, while coordinated with the defense plan. The goal is to carry out necessary studies toward equipment acquisition under project management; carry out trial run of project management of some equipment by using IPT/PM; and establishing scope, method, authority, procedures, etc. for target equipment under project management by IPT/PM. Additionally, to achieve unitary management of equipment acquisition work, and optimize the function performance, schedule and cost of the equipment throughout its life-cycle, examination on the equipment acquisition related organizations has been proceeded in the below listed direction. ―Establishment of a Procurement System to Achieve Maximum Performance Regarding Quality, Schedule, and Cost ―Establishment of a Supply System to Provide the Necessary Goods at the Necessary Time to the Units at a Low Cost 78 ----- ―Efforts toward Efficiency-Improvement of Procurement Service and Quality-Improvement of Equipment etc. ―Strengthening of Coordination in Acquisition and Supply with Various Nations through Global Dialogue **_Improvement in Transparency and Fairness_** Based on the acknowledgement that one effective means to assure the rightness of the acquisition is to improve the transparency of the acquisition deskwork, efforts are carried out to improve the transparency of private contracts, strengthen cost audit and system investigation, and enhance the consultation system for the procurement operation. Study is underway to strengthen the procurement audit operation. **_Improvement in Personnel Qualification_** To steadily develop each operation of the Comprehensive Reforms, it is necessary to improve the quality of individual personnel, limited in numbers. For this purpose, activities such as introduction of the computer training system to the Central Contract Office, bringing-up of specialists to promote project management of equipment, and securing human resources that have the know-how of company management and production control. **(2)Enhancement and Strengthening of Defense Production and Technological Bases** In order to “acquire high-quality equipment in a short term, at a low cost,” it becomes essential to maintain defense production and technological bases that are capable to design, manufacture, and maintain equipment. The maintaining of these bases are effective, even if equipment is procured from foreign nations, from the viewpoint of securing negotiating capability with the counterpart nation, and acquiring equipment at the best advantageous condition for our nation. **6. Enhancement of Technological Research and Development** The committee compiled the Guidelines for Defense Research and Development in June 2001 to propose the future direction of defense research and development as well as necessary organizational changes. Moreover, to further evolve the content presented in the research and development guideline, the target for future research and development has been discussed in talks on the future policy for defense capability, and the Comprehensive Acquisition Reform Promotion Committee. The talks has been in the direction of following: ―planning the technological strategy from the mid- and long-term view; ―introducing new R&D methods to flexibly respond to cutting edge technology etc; ―positive introduction of commercial technology with rapid development in science and technology; and ―assuring effectiveness of the system to revise the project. **7. Measures for Protection of Classified Information** 79 ----- In response to the compromise of classified information that occurred in September 2000, the Defense Agency studied recurrence prevention measures. This has led to necessary reviews concerning the system for protection of classified information and measures have been taken including: ―improvement of procedures for handling classified information with a view to preventing compromise by drawing a clear distinction and strict limitation on those who are permitted to handle classified information and improving methods to designate and classify information; ―giving strict directions to SDF personnel on procedures concerning contact with foreign parties, such as military attaches; and ―giving strict directions on discipline guidance. In addition, an amendment to the Self-Defense Forces Law, which imposes more strict punishment to those violating the confidentiality obligation, was enforced in November 2002. ### Section 2 SDF Activities that Benefit the People **1. Activities in Civic Life** SDF has been useful in helping stability of public national life through conducting activities including Disposing of Dangerous Objects, Activities in the Medical Field, Cooperation in Sporting Events, Education and Training Commissions, Transportation Support, Participation in State Ceremonies, Support for the Japanese Antarctic Research Expedition **2. Activities of the Defense Agency/SDF** As the activities of the SDF grow extensive, the people’s interest in national defense has been increasing and public awareness of the SDF has been changing. The activities of the SDF include humanitarian and reconstruction assistance in Iraq, cooperation and support activities in the Indian Ocean, international peace cooperation assignments at Golan Heights, international disaster relief activities commencing with the activities at the site of the South Asian Tsunami, and disaster relief missions to Nigata Chuetsu earthquake. In response to changing public awareness and needs, the Defense Agency and the SDF continue to work hard in their public relations activities so that the current state of SDF affairs is understood better. - Mass Media Public Relations ―Establishment of “Press Secretary” in the internal bureau from April 2005 ―The Defense Agency’s Web site in particular attracts approximately 250,000 visitors every month - Events and the Opening of SDF Facilities to the Public ―SDF Marching Festival, Army, Fleet, Air Review - Enlistment Experience Programs ―Experiencing SDF activities, or hard training and “One Day SDF Tour for Women” - Other Public Relations Activities by SDF Personnel ―Participate in a number of events sponsored by the general public ―Open sports fields, gymnasiums, and swimming pools in response to requests from the local 80 ----- community. - New Efforts ―Participation by SDF personnel to university lectures as panelists on security issues ―Local lecture meetings by participation from unit commanders **3. Information Disclosure to Promote Fair and Democratic Administeration** In response to the enforcement of the Law for the Protection of Personal Data Held by Administrative Organs, the Defense Agency has prepared procedures to disclose, revise and cease the utilization of personal information, along with taking measures to secure the safety of personal information. Additionally, the Defense Agency opened eight personal information protection counters in total at Internal Bureau (Ichigaya) and seven prefectural liaison offices throughout the country to receive requests for disclosure, revision and cease of the utilization of personal information and implement disclosure. The Defense Facilities Administration Agency has a total of 12 information counters for disclosing possessed personal information, etc. that offer similar services at the Agency, Defense Facilities Administration Bureaus, and Defense Facilities Administration Branches. ### Section 3 The Defense Agency, SDF, and Local Communities **1. Cooperation from Local governments** **_Cooperation for SDF Personnel Recruitment_** The task of recruitment is carried out at SDF prefectural liaison offices with the help of prefectural and municipal governments, schools, private recruitment counselors, and other bodies. Cooperation by local governments and other organizations that have close ties with local communities and an in-depth knowledge of the region is deeply significant to this end. The SDF, nevertheless, anticipates that recruitment will become much more difficult in the medium to long term, with the population of males between the ages of 18 and 26 eligible to become Private (GSDF), Seaman Apprentice (MSDF), or Airman 3rd Class (ASDF) in the Short-Term Service falling from a peak of about 9.0 million in 1994, and more students going on to higher education after high school. The cooperation of local governments and other relevant organizations is indispensable to secure people of higher quality and maintain its strength and vitality for the SDF to fulfill various duties. **_Support for Employment of the Retired SDF Personnel_** Because the Defense Agency does not possess the right to independently introduce its own personnel to employment, the SDF Assistance Foundations conduct free employment introduction activities and other programs for retiring SDF personnel with the permission of the Minister of Health, Labor and Welfare and the Minister of Land, Infrastructure and Transport. In addition, various local organizations help retiring SDF personnel find new jobs. 81 ----- **_Support for and Cooperation in SDF Activities_** SDF camps and bases are located in all prefectures of Japan and are close with the local community. Cooperation and support from the local community, starting with local governments and other relevant organizations, are essential for the management of camps and bases, education and training, and disaster relief operations. **2. Measures to Ensure Harmony between Defense Facilities and Surrounding Local** **Communities** **Issues concerning Defense Facilities and Efforts toward a Solution** Defense facilities have a wide range of uses, such as maneuver areas, airfields, ports and harbors, and barracks. As of January 1, 2005, the land area covered by defense facilities accounted for approximately 1,398 km[2 ]or 0.37% of the nation’s land. Of this, SDF facilities occupy about 1,081 km[2 ], about 42% of which is located in Hokkaido. According to categories by usage, maneuver areas account for roughly 75% of the total. On the other hand, facilities and areas to be exclusively used by the U.S. Forces, Japan (USFJ) take up about 312km[2 ]of land, of which approximately 37 km[2] is jointly used by the SDF under the Status of Forces Agreement. Many defense facilities, such as airfields and maneuver areas, require extensive tracts of land, and some defense facilities compete with cities and industries in small plains owing to the geographical features of Japan. The Defense Agency is, therefore, working on the measures described below to achieve harmony between defense facilities and surrounding areas. **Consideration on Improvement of Living Environment around Airfields** The Defense Agency has held nine meetings in total of the Council for the Improvement of the Living Environment around Airfields, which consists of outside experts, to use as a material for consideration on what measures should be taken in the future. The council compiled a report in July 2002 **Efforts toward New Measures** Along with measures to improve the living environment, including subsidies for sound-insulation projects on houses, the Defense Agency strives to improve new measures, based on a proposal from the council for measures compiled in the report above. Major measures are listed below: ―giving subsidies for the construction of a solar power generation system as a part of the sound-insulation projects (i.e. monitoring); ―promoting sound-insulation projects; ―giving support to develop communities, paying attention to the characteristics of the vicinity in which the defense facilities are located; ―renovating community facilities; and ―pro-actively utilizing/making good use of properties in the vicinity of airfields, **3.** **Environmental Conservation Efforts** 82 ----- **_Environmental Conservation Measures at SDF Facilities_** While it maintains facilities, such as maneuver areas and barracks, all over the country and operates and maintains a lot of equipments such as aircraft, ships, and vehicles, the SDF is committed to the promotion of specific measures including those to conserve air and water quality, conduct recycling activities, and dispose of waste as well as those to improve environmental conservation facilities; conduct environmental surveys; and disseminate environmental conservation measures at SDF camps (bases) and maneuver areas; and environmental impact reduction. **_Measures for Environmental Issues concerning USFJ Facilities and Areas_** The Government of Japan is addressing environmental issues through the framework of the Japan-U.S. Joint Committee and other occasions so that adequate consideration can be given to public safety in Japan and the lives of its citizens. **4. Measures Concerning the USFJ Facilities and Areas** Ensuring the stable use of the USFJ facilities and areas is essential for the achievement of the objectives of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty. In order to harmonize the stable use of these facilities and areas with demands of the surrounding local communities, the Government of Japan has been implementing measures for the Iwakuni Runway Relocation Project and the Acquisition of Landing Practice Site for Carrier-Based Aircraft. As a result of the discussions, Japan and U.S. reached a common understanding regarding the basic idea on release of the six facilities in Yokohama city area (Kamiseya Communication Station, Fukaya Communication Site, Tomioka Storage Area, Negishi Dependent Housing Area, Koshiba POL Depot (Portion), and non-contiguous area of “Ikego Housing Area and Navy Annex”); and the construction of approximately 700 units of US family housing in the Yokohama city portion of Ikego Housing Area and Navy Annex. The Japan-U.S. Joint Committee agreed upon the result of this consultation in October 2004. ### Section 4 USFJ Facilities and Areas in Okinawa **1. Measures to Cope with Realignment, Consolidation, and Reduction before the** **Establishment of SACO** The concentration of USFJ facilities and areas in Okinawa has led to strong calls for their realignment and reduction on the grounds that regional promotion and development projects are restricted, and the lives of residents are seriously affected. In view of these circumstances, both countries have continued their efforts to realign, consolidate, and reduce USFJ facilities and areas, focusing on issues that are strongly voiced by local communities. **2. Measures to Resolve Issues Relating to USFJ Facilities and Areas since the** 83 ----- **Establishment of SACO** **Circumstances Surrounding the SACO Establishment** Public interest in issues concerning Okinawa heightened across the country in response to an unfortunate incident that occurred in 1995 as well as the refusal of the then-governor of Okinawa to sign land lease renewal documents in accordance with the Special Land Lease Law. The Government established the Okinawa Action Council between the central government and Okinawa Prefecture as well as SACO (Special Action Committee on Okinawa) between Japan and the United States in 1995. Since then, intensive discussions were made for about one year, and the SACO Final Report was compiled in 1996. **Overview of the SACO Final Report** The SACO Final Report stipulates the return of land (the total return of six facilities including Futenma Air Station, and the partial return of five others, such as the Northern Training Area), the adjustment of training and operational procedures (the dispersal and implementation of Artillery Live-Fire Training over Highway 104 in maneuver areas on mainland Japan, etc.), the implementation of noise-reduction initiatives, and improvement in operational procedures under the Status of Forces Agreement. **Progress of the SACO Final Report** As a result of attempts to materialize the SACO Final Report, the release of the Aha Training Area and the northern part of Camp Kuwae (about 38 ha) has been realized. In addition, eight projects, including the return of Futenma Air Station, have been agreed upon with the understanding of related local municipalities, and the relocation work has partially started. In total, nine of eleven projects on the return of land have made steady progress. As for projects other than the return of land, almost all have been implemented. Taking the governor’s views into consideration, the Defense Agency is committed to continuing maximum efforts toward the realization of the SACO Final Report with the understanding and support of the local community. **_The Return of Futenma Air Station_** Making utmost efforts to prevent serious negative effects on the livelihoods of the local residents and the natural environment, the Consultative Body on Construction of Futenma Replacement Facility was established as a forum for the Government, Okinawa Prefecture, and the local municipalities in 2003 with the aim of promoting the smooth construction of the replacement facility. The Defense Agency is steadily working on the implementation of the Basic Plan on the replacement facility. As for environment impact assessment, procedures regarding the scoping document for the environmental impact assessment started in April 2004. Moreover, technical site survey is being implemented from April 2003 to collect necessary data for studying seawall structures of the replacement facility, taking into account the ragged and steep sea-bottom terrain of the relocation site. 84 ----- **Efforts toward Use of Returned Land Used for USFJ Facilities and Areas** On release of the land used for USFJ Facilities and Areas, the Defense Agency has been taking measures to restore vacated land to its original state by removal of buildings and structures, and to supply benefits to the owner of land based on the Special Measures Law for USFJ Land Release. Moreover, measures to restore the land to its original state by removal of contamination, etc. has been taken based on the “Policy toward tasks and countermeasures per each activity field related to promotion and facilitation of utilizing returned land used for Futenma Air Station site.” This policy has been decided by the Council for the Preparation for Use of Vacated Land consisting of Okinawa Prefecture and Minister of State for Okinawa in December 2001. In addition, based on the Special Measures Law for Okinawa Development, which took effect in April 2002, the Defense Agency will supply benefits to the owner of large-scale vacated land and designated vacated land having been used for USFJ facilities and areas. In October 2003, “the vacated land north of Camp Kuwae” was designated as a designated released land. The Defense Agency will be committed to make continued efforts to promote and facilitate utilization of the vacated land in cooperation with related government bodies, and prefectural and municipal governments. 85 -----