**Dr. Peter Struck**
Bundesminister der Verteidigung
Mitglied des Deutschen Bundestages

Stauffenbergstr. 18, 10785 Berlin
11055 Berlin

+49 (0)1888-24-8000
+49 (0)1888-24-8004


HAUSANSCHRIFT

POSTANSCHRIFT

TEL

FAX

I hereby promulgate the

**DEFENCE POLICY GUIDELINES**

for the area of responsibility of the

Federal Minister of Defence

Berlin, 21 May 2003


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**Contents**

Page

**I.** **Defence Policy Guidelines for a Changed Security Environment** **3**

**II.** **Key statements** **4**

**III.** **German Security: Risks and Opportunities** **6**

**IV.** **Principles and Interests of German Security Policy** **8**

**V.** **German Defence Policy** **10**

**V.1 Multinational Integration** **10**

**V.2 The Bundeswehr on Operations** **12**

**V.3 Resources** **14**

**VI.** **Mission of the Bundeswehr** **15**

**VII.** **Tasks of the Bundeswehr** **16**

**VIII. Consequences for the Bundeswehr** **19**

**VIII.1 Strength and Structure of the Bundeswehr** **20**

**VIII.2 Capabilities of the Bundeswehr** **20**


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**I.** **Defence Policy Guidelines for a Changed Security Environment**

1. The security situation has changed fundamentally. New security policy
risks and opportunities call for changed capabilities.

2. The mission, tasks and capabilities of the Bundeswehr are consistently
oriented on the anticipated security situation and Germany’s security
commitments as a NATO and EU partner. At the same time, they take
account of the available resources.

3. The comprehensive reform of the Bundeswehr that is already under
way will be further developed. In this connection, special emphasis is
being placed on the prioritisation and shaping of the Bundeswehr’s
tasks in the new strategic conditions. Universal conscription in an
adapted form remains an indispensable requirement for the operational
readiness, effectiveness and economic efficiency of the Bundeswehr.

4. The reprioritisation of the tasks of the Bundeswehr and the ensuing
conceptual and structural consequences correspond with the broad
understanding of defence that has evolved over the past few years.

5. According to Article 87a of the Basic Law, the Federation establishes
Armed Forces for purposes of defence. Defence as it is understood
today means more, however, than traditional defensive operations at
the national borders against a conventional attack. It includes the
prevention of conflicts and crises, the common management of crises,
and post-crisis rehabilitation. Accordingly, defence can no longer be
narrowed down to geographical boundaries, but contributes to
safeguarding our security wherever it is in jeopardy. The Federal
Constitutional Court and the German Bundestag have confirmed that
Bundeswehr operations conducted within the context of collective
security systems are compatible with the Basic Law.

6. German defence policy comprises the preventive security action
Germany takes within the scope of its foreign and security policy.
Armed Forces are an integral part of a foreign and security policy that
aims at the prevention and containment of crises and conflicts.


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7. The present Defence Policy Guidelines

-  lay down the principles of shaping defence policy,

-  prioritize tasks and determine parameters for the capabilities of
the armed forces of the future within the scope of the overall
obligation of the state to take preventive measures for
safeguarding Germany’s security.

8. These Defence Policy Guidelines are the binding foundation for the
work performed in the area of responsibility of the Federal Minister of
Defence. In view of constantly changing security policy challenges,
these Guidelines will be regularly reviewed and further developed.

**II.** **Key statements**

9. Germany’s security environment is characterised by changed risks and
new opportunities. At present, and in the foreseeable future, there is no
conventional threat to the German territory. The Bundeswehr’s
spectrum of operations has changed fundamentally.

10. The security situation calls for a security and defence policy that is
geared to the prevention and containment of crises and conflicts; such a
policy must comprise the entire spectrum of instruments and options for
action relevant to security policy and must be based on common action
with allies and partners. The Bundeswehr focuses on operations in the
context of conflict prevention and crisis management as well as in
support of allies, also beyond NATO territory.

11. Multinational preventive security measures are one of the basic factors
determining German defence policy. With the exception of evacuation
and rescue missions, the Bundeswehr will conduct armed operations
only together with allies and partners in a UN, NATO and EU context.

12. Traditional national defence against a conventional attack, which
previously solely determined the structures of the Bundeswehr, no
longer corresponds with the actual security policy requirements. The
capabilities that had been kept available solely for this purpose are no
longer required. However, it must be ensured that the ability to conduct
national defence operations against a conventional attack can be
reconstituted within a foreseeable, albeit prolonged, period of time.


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13. The Bundeswehr is being further developed with the intention of
achieving a balance between its mission, tasks, equipment and
resources. In view of the changed security situation, the tasks of the
Bundeswehr will be reprioritised. Its capabilities will be adapted
accordingly. In future, financial resources will be used mainly for the
provision of the military core capabilities.

14. A capability-oriented overall approach integrating all the armed services
and organizational areas is being developed for procurement and
equipment planning. Armaments cooperation within a European and
transatlantic framework is to be given precedence over the realisation of
projects under national responsibility.

15. To orient itself more strongly and quickly on the more probable tasks of
international conflict prevention and crisis management the
Bundeswehr needs armed forces that are categorized according to their
operational readiness and availability and can be employed rapidly and
effectively in combined operations with other nations’ forces. This calls
for a capability profile focusing on six essential, interlinked capabilities:

-  Command and control,

-  intelligence collection and reconnaissance,

-  mobility,

-  effective engagement,

-  support and sustainability,

-  survivability and protection.

16. Conscription in its adapted form remains an indispensable requirement
for the operational readiness, effectiveness and economic efficiency of
the Bundeswehr. In the future, too, the need to protect Germany and its
citizens including the required ability to reconstitute for national defence
as well as to provide support in the event of natural disasters and
emergencies provide reasons – beside other reasons –for the retention
of universal conscription.

**III.** **German Security: Risks and Opportunities**

17. Regardless of the politically advantageous changes in the past few
years, Germany’s security environment is not free from military and
non-military risks jeopardizing and threatening its security and stability.


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18. The attacks of 11 September 2001 have shaken the civilized world to its
very foundations. Subsequent terrorist attacks have heightened the
awareness of asymmetric threats that may occur anywhere in the world
and may be directed against anyone.

19. It is mainly religiously motivated extremism and fanaticism in
combination with the worldwide reach of international terrorism that
threaten the achievements of modern civilization such as freedom and
human rights, openness, tolerance and diversity.

20. The further development of weapons of mass destruction combined
with long-range delivery means can also pose a threat to the
populations and countries of Europe. Forces on operations abroad are
particularly endangered. The risks connected with proliferation have
been aggravated by the attempt of terrorist groups to gain access to
weapons of mass destruction.

21. The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction can only be prevented
and contained by comprehensive non-proliferation policy measures and
a regulatory framework put in place by the international community and
shaped in accordance with transparent rules. These political crisis
prevention activities need to be complemented by measures to protect
against risks resulting from proliferation. Appropriate civilian and military
assets and capabilities need to be developed in order to counter threats
stemming from non-government actors.

22. Global non-proliferation treaties and export controls on armaments
need to be improved. Resolving regional conflicts can help to induce
states to renounce weapons of mass destruction.

23. There is still the possibility of nationalistically and ethnically motivated
violent conflicts in Europe, often fostered by criminal structures. The
persistently unstable security situation in the Balkans continues to call
for special commitments to be made by the European nations. Military
contributions to shaping a secure environment for lasting political and
social normalisation will remain indispensable.

24. Europe is directly affected by crises at its southern and southeastern
periphery. The changed security situation poses new challenges to both
NATO and the EU.

25. Resolving the multifarious regional crises and conflicts remains a matter
of outstanding importance to security and stability in Europe and the
world. Unresolved political, ethnic, religious, economic and social


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conflicts combined with international terrorism, organised crime on an
international scale and increasing migratory movements directly affect
German and European security. They can only be countered by a
comprehensive security concept and a global collective security system.

26. Modern information societies depend on information and
communication systems and are therefore vulnerable. Easy access
and use and insufficient protective measures increase the risks to
states, societies and their infrastructure and facilitate the manifold forms
of information warfare.

27. Due to its high volume of foreign trade and the related special
dependence on vulnerable transport routes and means, the German
economy is exposed to additional hazards.

28. The huge political upheavals in Europe and the end of the Cold War
that had had a global impact, however, have also resulted in new
opportunities for security and stability. The broad international antiterror coalition forms the basis for effective prevention and combatting
of this threat. This coalition also opens up new options for taking
common risk prevention action, even between states with differing
cultures and religions. The fight against terrorism is based on
international law and in particular on the Charter of the United Nations.

29. German security policy gains additional options for action in a united
Europe. It is important to further develop cooperative strategies for
multilateral risk prevention and international conflict resolution together
with our allies and partners in NATO and the EU, and in cooperation
with Russia and other partner nations. Thus, the opportunities for
regional and even global preventive security measures can be exploited
and risks to security policy can be reduced. Disarmament and arms
control remain essential factors of the global security order.

30. The progressing development and strengthening of the Euroatlantic
security structures create an area of stability that is unique in the world.
The opening of NATO and the EU to new members strengthens
security and stability but also requires members to assume more
obligations.

31. Germany is benefiting from these developments in Europe. At present,
and in the foreseeable future, there is no apparent conventional threat
to the German territory.


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32. NATO’s adaptation to the changed security environment provides the
basis for the alliance’s ability to perform its central role in the future, too.
The United States of America remain indispensable to European
security.

33. The European Union’s integration in the field of security policy and the
resulting capacity of action are core elements in safeguarding peace
and stability in Europe. By adopting the European Security and Defence
Policy (ESDP), the EU is enhancing its instruments for concerted action
in conflict prevention and crisis management operations, also beyond
European borders. ESDP is no substitute for but rather a necessary
supplement to NATO that strengthens the Alliance and forms the core
of a European pillar of the Alliance. Already today, the EU and NATO
see themselves as strategic partners in international conflict prevention
and crisis management activities.

34. Russia’s reorientation in the field of foreign policy opens up new
opportunities for a constructive cooperation in Europe and in a global
framework. The decision taken at the World Summit 2002 to admit the
Russian Federation to the G8 as a full-fledged member, the
intensification of the dialogue within the scope of the NATO-Russia
Council and the common measures taken against terrorism form the
foundation for an even closer long-term cooperation on security issues.

**IV.** **Principles and Interests of German Security Policy**

35. The first and foremost goal of Germany's security policy is to ensure the
safety and protection of its citizens. To achieve this goal, it uses the
existing global and regional security institutions such as the United
Nations (UN), the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe
(OSCE), the North Atlantic Alliance (NATO) and the European Union
(EU). The multiplicity of tasks requires a consolidated national security
policy with flexible and well-coordinated instruments which must in the
medium term be merged into a national security concept.

36. German security policy is comprehensive and takes political, economic,
ecological, social and cultural conditions and developments into
account. It is not possible to guarantee security primarily or solely by
military means. Preventive security policy includes political and
diplomatic initiatives and action in the fields of economic and
development policy as well as constitutional, humanitarian and social
measures.


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37. Nevertheless, the political will and ability to enforce or restore freedom
and human rights, stability and security with military means, if
necessary, are a sine qua non of a credible comprehensive approach to
security policy. The Basic Law and international law form the basis on
which all Bundeswehr missions are conducted.

38. Under the circumstances prevailing today, no state can ensure peace,
security and prosperity on its own. Developing the international
environment in harmony with German interests, coping with complex
challenges, containing risks and threats and protecting Germany from
them are tasks which cannot be accomplished by going it alone. Joint
efforts are needed.

39. The new security policy opportunities and complex risks call for a
German security and defence policy that is geared to the prevention of
crises and conflicts, _encompasses the full range of available_
instruments and options relevant to security policy, and is organised
_jointly with allies and partners in NATO and the EU. Its goal is to_
prevent violence by taking proactive and containment measures.
National and international early warning and reconnaissance
capabilities are vital prerequisites for this.

40. In terms of German security and defence policy, this has three
consequences:

Firstly: The _transatlantic partnership remains the bedrock of our_
security. Now and in future, there can be no security in and for Europe
without the United States of America. Germany will continue to make a
substantial contribution to the transatlantic partnership.

Secondly: The _European area of stability is strengthened by a broadly_
based, cooperative and effective EU security and defence policy.
Globalisation also calls for a Europe fully capable of acting. The
European Security and Defence Policy is based on the strategic
partnership with the North Atlantic Alliance and enables the Europeans
to act independently where NATO as a whole is not willing or there is no
need for NATO to become involved.

Thirdly: Germany is actively participating in UN and OSCE efforts so as
to provide for its own security, to ensure that human rights and
international law are respected worldwide, to promote sustainable
economic progress and social development, to conserve the natural
resource base and to bridge the gap between the poor and the rich
regions of the world.


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**V.** **German Defence Policy**

41. German defence policy is determined to a large extent by three factors:

-  multinational integration of the Bundeswehr within the framework of a
foreign policy focused on European integration, transatlantic
partnership and global responsibility,
-  the changed operational spectrum of the Bundeswehr and the
increased number of international operations,
-  available resources.

**V.1** **Multinational Integration**

42. With the possible exception of evacuation and rescue missions, the
Bundeswehr will conduct armed operations only together with allies and
partners in a UN, NATO and EU context.

43. The UN has a crucial role to play in mastering the challenges of the
21st century. According to the Charter of the United Nations, the UN
Security Council has the primary responsibility for maintaining
international peace and security.

44. The nature of UN-led international peace missions has changed
considerably. Such missions range from typical "blue-helmet" missions
to conflict prevention by political means and preventive troop
deployment to the employment of armed forces to contain conflicts and
stabilise the political situation. Increasingly, it is also a matter of ending
intra-state conflicts and restoring conditions in which the population can
live in peace. To achieve this, peacekeeping missions need military,
civilian and police capabilities in a balanced proportion.

45. The willingness to make substantial contributions and active
participation in the work of all UN bodies as well as in the practical work
done by the UN in crisis areas maintain and strengthen Germany's
influence on the future role of this world organisation.

46. Germany's NATO membership is the cornerstone of its security. At the
beginning of the 21st century, NATO still remains the guarantor of
stable security in Europe, a collective defence alliance and a
transatlantic forum for consultation. As such, it makes a key contribution
to the shaping of a pan-European order of peace and ties Europe's
security to the security of North America.


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47. Crises and conflicts, threats and their underlying causes over a widened
geographical area have an ever more frequent and pronounced effect
on the Alliance. NATO must square up to these challenges and be
capable of defending the vital security interests of its members.
Germany will make an adequate contribution so that NATO, in
conformity with the Washington Treaty and the UN Charter and on the
basis of its Strategic Concept, can accomplish the full spectrum of its
tasks and respond collectively to the new challenges, from whatever
direction they may come.

48. Germany has its armed forces integrated in NATO to a greater extent
than any other ally. Within the Alliance, it has a crucial role and
responsibility for the future course of NATO.

49. NATO intends to set up a rapid reaction force and to improve military
capabilities for protection against weapons of mass destruction and
ballistic missiles and for defence against terrorism. The Bundeswehr will
contribute to these projects as far as its capabilities permit.
Compatibility with the build-up of capabilities under the ESDP will be
ensured.

50. The EU is the nucleus of the European area of stability. For the sake of
its political credibility and effectiveness, it must have the ability to take
action in all fields of politics. The EU must have a wide range of civil
and military capabilities at its disposal with which to respond to crises
affecting Europe. ESDP is therefore a decisive step towards Europe's
deeper integration and enhanced capacity for action in security matters.
The goal is the creation of a European Security and Defence Union as
part of a fully developed Political Union.

51. Over the past few years, Germany has played a key role in EU
decision-making on the shaping of ESDP. The achievement of the
European force goals and the elimination of identified capability deficits
at national and European level, as well as the commitment of reported
military capabilities and means are the yardstick for the degree to which
Germany and its partners are fulfilling their obligations within the
framework of the EU.

52. Assets reported to NATO and the EU will be available to both
organisations.

53. Germany's commitment to provide a rapid response capability within the
context of NATO and the EU make an equally rapid political decisionmaking capability at national level imperative.


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**V.2** **The Bundeswehr on Operations**

54. The operational spectrum of the Bundeswehr has undergone
fundamental changes over the past decade. The intensity, extent and
duration of operations place varying and increasing demands on the
armed forces.

55. The Bundeswehr is called upon when it comes to evacuating German
citizens in an emergency and providing humanitarian aid. Together with
armed forces of friendly and partner nations, it participates in
peacekeeping, peace building and peace enforcement operations. The
Bundeswehr thus helps to prevent or end violent conflicts. Through
stabilisation and deterrence, it counteracts aggravation of crises and
conflicts and enables the consolidation of peace processes. It is
furthermore involved in operations to fight international terrorism,
thereby also acting in support of allies.

56. Moreover, the Bundeswehr makes a wide range of military contributions
in the areas of operation, from helping to ensure security and order in
the respective area and supporting humanitarian measures to making
provisions for the protection of deployed forces – to include forces of
other nations – down to taking precautions against attacks with
weapons of mass destruction. The Bundeswehr is more frequently
assuming a leading role in multinational operations.

57. Given the new comprehensive approach to a modern security and
defence policy and its attendant demands, it is impossible to
predetermine future operations in terms of their intensity or geographic
location. The political aim will define the goal, location, duration and
type of an operation. The necessity for the Bundeswehr to participate in
multinational operations may arise anywhere in the world and at short
notice and may extend across the entire mission spectrum down to
high-intensity operations.

58. There are no clear-cut dividing lines between the various types of
operations. Rapid escalation of a conflict as a result of which a
peacekeeping mission will transition to a higher-intensity operation can
never be ruled out.

59. Current and future Bundeswehr missions require that the armed forces
be sufficiently capable of participating in multinational operations
covering the entire operational spectrum of conflict prevention and crisis
management and providing support to allies even beyond the
boundaries of Allied territory.


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60. The present basic parameters for the number and dimension of
potential operations must be reviewed and adjusted in order to ease the
– sometimes excessive – burden on the deployment forces.

61. In putting the Bundeswehr on track for the tasks ahead it is necessary
to concentrate on improving the mission-essential range of capabilities.
Interoperability and the capacity for concerted multinational action with
allies on operations need to be enhanced.

62. In view of the new international environment, capabilities solely
designed for traditional national defence against an adversary using
conventional means are no longer needed. Due to the scarcity of
resources which demands concentration of effort, they can no longer be
provided without adversely affecting the capabilities needed in future.
What must be retained, however, is a capability allowing reconstitution,
within a foreseeable, albeit prolonged, period of time, of the assets
needed to conduct national defence against a conventional attack. This
requires the retention of conscription. In addition, the armed forces must
be capable of making an adequate contribution – as part of an overall
national effort – to preventing, repelling and coping with terrorist attacks
as provided for under prevailing law and protecting Germany against
asymmetric threats. This also makes the retention of conscription
indispensable.

**V.3 Resources**

63. The numerical strength of the armed forces and the principles of their
organisation will be determined by their mission and the budget
established in response to it. Medium-term financial planning is the
basis to which Bundeswehr planning is tied.

64. The defence budget is currently characterised by almost constant
operating expenditure, a high percentage of personnel costs and
insufficient investments in equipment, whilst at the same time there is
considerable overplanning and a high percentage of resources are
committed by contract. Due to limited funds, structural reorientation and
material modernisation are still out of alignment. It is therefore
necessary to reallocate funds within the defence budget in favour of
investments.

65. Procurement and equipment planning will be oriented even more
stringently to a capability-focused, overall approach across all services
and organisational areas, coordinated at multinational level. Given the


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high costs of multinational missions and combined joint operations, as
well, it is imperative to think and act in a strictly jointness-oriented way
with a corresponding command structure.

66. The available resources are chiefly committed to the maintenance and
improvement of military core capabilities. Of decisive importance in this
respect are the efforts to enhance efficiency in the Bundeswehr, also in
cooperation with trade and industry.

67. Savings are achieved through armaments cooperation, cutbacks in
dispensable capabilities, standardisation, task sharing, functional
worksharing arrangements and role specialisation. The progress of
political integration in Europe as well as the limited financial leeway
enhance both the necessity and opportunities for greater
multinationality.

68. Pooling of national assets in a European and transatlantic context is a
prerequisite of armaments cooperation. Common planning, common
procurement, common operation of weapon systems and common
training provide the framework for what has become necessary and
possible from a security point of view as a result of European
integration and the development of ESDP and which is already
becoming manifest in a more effective European armaments
cooperation policy. Concerted efforts are being made to establish a
European Armaments Agency.

69. As a prerequisite for this ability to cooperate, Germany will maintain an
efficient and competitive industrial base in core areas of technology
affording it some leverage in the development of key weapon systems.
This will promote the capacity to play a constructive role in an Alliance
and European context and is thus an element of German security
policy. The merger of national defence industry capacities will remain a
matter of great importance.

**VI.** **Mission of the Bundeswehr**

70. The mission of the Bundeswehr is an integral element of the state's
overall obligation to provide security for the citizens of our country, to
defend our system of values and to protect our interests within the
European and transatlantic context.


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71. The Bundeswehr, as an instrument of a comprehensive and proactive
security and defence policy,

-  safeguards the capacity for action in the field of foreign policy,
-  contributes to stability on a European and global scale,
-  ensures national security and defence and helps defend allies,
-  supports multinational cooperation and integration.

72. An efficient Bundeswehr is crucial for a constructive and creative
security and defence policy. In order for Germany to safeguard its
interests and international influence and to play an active role in
peacekeeping, it provides forces of adequate strength which can rapidly
and effectively be employed together with the forces of other nations.
This includes the support of allies, on the periphery of allied territory or
in a geographically even wider context.

73. The Bundeswehr has become an indispensable instrument of a
comprehensive conflict prevention and crisis management policy. Its
contribution to multinational security insurance and the strengthening of
international security organisations promotes European and global
stability.

74. The defence of Germany against external threats continues to be the
political and constitutional raison d'être of the Bundeswehr. As the
guarantor of national security, the Bundeswehr protects and defends
Germany against any threat to its population and territory and
contributes to the defence of its allies.

75. In view of the fact that Germany is under increased threat from terrorist
attacks, the protection of its population and territory assumes added
importance and places further demands on the Bundeswehr in terms of
the performance of domestic tasks and hence its cooperation with
Federal and State interior authorities.

76. The Bundeswehr makes an important contribution to the building of
friendly relations through comprehensive cooperation and exchange
programmes with partner forces all over the world. At the same time the
Bundeswehr is instrumental in promoting integration and confidence
building in Europe through multinational cooperation within the
European and NATO context and furthers the political goal of creating
an independent European capacity for action.


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**VII.** **Tasks of the Bundeswehr**

77. The tasks of the Bundeswehr derive from the mission it has been
assigned under the constitution and from the goals of German security
and defence policy.

78. _International conflict prevention and crisis management – including the_
fight against international terrorism – are the likelier tasks to be fulfilled
by German armed forces for the foreseeable future and put
considerable strain on the Bundeswehr.

These tasks are the major determinants of the capabilities, the
command and control system, the degree of availability and the
equipment of the Bundeswehr. They do in fact determine the structure
of the Bundeswehr.

In terms of intensity and complexity, conflict prevention and crisis
management operations do not differ from, and may even turn into,
operations conducted in support of allies. Both types of operations
therefore require basically the same military capabilities.

79. _Support of allies comprises the preservation of their territorial integrity,_
to include their territorial waters and airspace, as well as their political
sovereignty and freedom of action. It also includes support in the fight
against terrorism and the protection of their populations and vital
infrastructure.

Should allies be attacked, or in the event of crises and conflicts which
might escalate into an actual threat to allies, Germany's obligation to
render assistance will apply. It will also apply to the support of allies in
the defence against asymmetric, notably terrorist, attacks.

An attack on the Alliance as a whole that would pose an existential
threat would place the most complex demands on the state and its
armed forces and would presuppose a fundamental reversal of the
political developments of the past few years or the emergence of totally
new political constellations. It is unlikely to occur.

80. The contribution which the Bundeswehr will make in future to the
_protection of Germany and its citizens, as part of a national security_
concept, will be substantial and markedly different, involving numerous
new sub-tasks.


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National defence in an Alliance context remains the task of the
Bundeswehr as an expression of national sovereignty and collective
security insurance against perilous developments of the security
situation which, while currently unlikely, cannot be totally ruled out for
the future. It may call for a considerable increase in own force
strengths. The necessary additional forces can be re-established within
the necessary time frame, should the security and strategic situation so
require. Such reconstitution is ensured primarily through universal
conscription.

For the protection of the population and vital infrastructure of our
country against terrorist and asymmetrical threats, the Bundeswehr will
have forces and means ready commensurate with the risk. Although
this is first and foremost a task to be fulfilled by internal-security forces,
the armed forces will be available to act, within the scope of the law in
force, whenever they alone possess the capabilities needed or when
the protection of the citizens and of critical infrastructure can only be
provided by the Bundeswehr. Conscripts and reservists will thus be
employed in their classic role, the protection of their country and fellow
citizens.

Surveillance of German airspace and maritime waters and air and
maritime sovereignty tasks in cooperation with other ministries is a
permanent task.

For rendering support to the armed forces of allies and partners in
Germany, the Bundeswehr needs no additional capabilities of its own
but can accomplish these tasks by using available own capabilities and
taking recourse to civilian assets.

81. As a matter of principle, _rescue and evacuation operations will be_
conducted as a national responsibility; however, participation of allies
and partners is possible. This task is not limited by geographical
boundaries and requires a particularly high readiness level of special
forces.

82. Being permanent military tasks, _partnership and cooperation support_
political measures for crisis and conflict prevention and post-crisis and
post-conflict rehabilitation and promote stability by building confidence.
They create the precondition for transparent common action and
include participation in multinational activities and exercises as equal
partners. This also includes arms control measures.


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83. If the constitutional requirements are met, the _Bundeswehr renders_
supplementary _assistance in the event of natural disasters and very_
serious emergencies at home, and in humanitarian assistance and
disaster relief operations abroad. Such assistance by the Bundeswehr
has recently assumed a new quality. It is being rendered at home and
abroad using available forces, means and facilities. When provided as a
contribution to the restoration of social order and infrastructure in crisis
areas, such assistance can be conducted as an independent operation.
The procedures for conducting such operations must be further
developed in collaboration with other government institutions and
civilian relief agencies.

**VIII.** **Consequences for the Bundeswehr**

84. The Bundeswehr’s employment in international conflict prevention,
crisis management and anti-terrorism operations has a decisive impact
on its further transformation towards an army on operations.
Accordingly, suitable and sufficient forces must be kept available at high
readiness and with a rapid response capability. Forces to be employed
early on must be capable of being deployed quickly to the crisis area
already in the initial phase of an operation.

85. It is above all against the background of potential regional conflicts or
terrorist attacks that the capability to support alliance partners remains
necessary. To a greater extent than before, the armed forces must be
oriented on harmonising their capabilities, means and structures with
those of their partners, thus avoiding the duplication of capacities. It is
also possible to dispense with certain individual capabilities if these can
be provided or taken over by other nations’ forces. Structures must
reflect the fact that the warning time of an attack on the alliance as a
whole has become much longer and can be exploited politically and
militarily.

86. The traditional national defence in an alliance context against
conventional attacks, which previously had played a decisive role in
determining the Bundeswehr’s structures, no longer corresponds to the
actual security policy requirements. On the other hand, the protection of
Germany and its citizens including air and sea surveillance as well as
the performance of air and maritime sovereignty tasks have gained in
importance. Germany’s protection capabilities in these fields are being
reoriented and require consistent gradation of availability, readiness
and training of the armed forces, and the exploitation of the synergy of
all national instruments of preventive security.


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87. The future task spectrum calls for Bundeswehr personnel who are
excellently qualified and highly motivated and capable of responding to
the challenges of a security environment that has become more
complex. The attractiveness of service in the Bundeswehr must
therefore be ensured in order to be able to compete with trade and
industry in recruiting new personnel and increasing the proportion of
women. The potential of reservists must be utilised consistently to
complement the capabilities of the standing forces.

88. With its manifold tasks, the Bundeswehr plays a highly important role in
German society and politics for which it deserves unreserved support.
At the same time, the Bundeswehr continues to develop its concept of
Innere Führung in order to adapt this to the new demands of operations
and enhance the integration of the armed forces in society. The same
applies to the cultivation of tradition and to civic education in the armed
forces.

**VIII.1 Strength and Structure of the Bundeswehr**

89. The Bundeswehr’s tasks have a decisive impact on the development of
its concept. Conflict prevention and crisis management operations
require the Bundeswehr to be highly professional and flexible. A high
degree of interoperability is the crucial prerequisite for multinational
missions and combined operations. Furthermore, the increased
demands necessitate unrestricted application of jointness in thinking
and acting. The Bundeswehr’s overall capability therefore takes priority
over the capabilities of the individual services.

Maintaining and improving the military core capabilities is of paramount
importance. Facilities and services of the Bundeswehr not directly
required to attain this goal are being subjected to critical examination.

90. The Bundeswehr’s orientation on its more probable tasks requires
forces of graduated readiness and availability. Military capacities for
international conflict prevention and crisis management and for the
support of alliance partners must be rapidly available and sustainable.
An appropriate number of forces will also be kept available for the
protection of Germany. In the event of a recognisable deterioration of
the situation, these forces can then serve as the core for reconstitution
for national defence.


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**VIII.2 Capabilities of the Bundeswehr**

91. To be able to cope with its tasks, the Bundeswehr will have efficient
forces capable of being employed rapidly and effectively in combined
operations with other nations’ forces. This requires a capability profile
comprising six essential, interlinked capability categories:

− Command and control;
− Intelligence collection and reconnaissance;
− Mobility;
− Effective engagement;
− Support and sustainability;
− Survivability and protection.

92. Considering the security situation, there is no requirement to furnish all
sub-capabilities with state-of-the-art, high-quality materiel, nor are there
the financial resources. This is why, based on mid-term financial
planning, procurement and equipment planning will be developed so as
to reflect the Bundeswehr’s tasks. Priority continues to be given to the
sub-capabilities that the Bundeswehr does not have at present, i.e.,
“strategic deployment”, “global reconnaissance” and “efficient,
interoperable command and control systems and means.” The basic
missile defence capability, which also includes protection of deployed
forces against rockets and missiles, needs to be further improved.

93. In addition, it is vital to acquire or enhance those sub-capabilities
suitable to render the required military contribution to combating
international terrorism.

94. Measures for the protection against the effects of information warfare
are to be developed in the medium to long term.

95. Procurement and equipment planning must be stringently oriented to a
capability-focused, overall approach across all services and
organisational areas, coordinated at multinational level.


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