# 1994 White Paper on Defence **Table of Contents** Highlights Introduction International Environment Recent Progress International Security Concerns Global Pressures Resurgence of Old Hatreds Proliferation Constraints on Policy-Making Domestic Considerations Combat-Capable Forces Protection of Canada Providing for the Defence of Canada and Canadian Sovereignty Protecting Canadians Objectives Canada-United States Defence Cooperation Evolving Security Challenges Bilateral Defence Principal Arrangements Looking to the Future Objectives Contributing to International Security A Canadian Perspective on Multilateral Operations The Range of Choice Training for Multilateral Missions Organizations and Commitments Objectives Implementing Defence Policy Management, Command and Control Personnel Issues Total Force Operational Maritime Forces Operational Land Forces Operational Air Forces Conclusion ----- # Highlights Introduction 1. The primary obligation of the Department of National Defence and the Canadian Forces is to protect the country and its citizens from challenges to their security. In the final analysis, a nation not worth defending is a nation not worth preserving. 2. The Government has just completed a comprehensive review of defence policy. In so doing, it fulfilled its commitment to wideranging consultations by involving Parliament and listening to the views of ordinary citizens, defence experts, disarmament advocates and non-governmental organizations. 3. The Report of the Special Joint Committee on Canada's Defence Policy played an integral role in shaping Canada's new defence policy. Virtually all its recommendations are reflected in the White Paper. 4. The consensus achieved on the way ahead for an effective, realistic and affordable policy calls for multi-purpose, combatcapable armed forces able to meet the challenges to Canada's security both at home and abroad. # Chapter 1 - International Environment 5. The Cold War is over. Yet Canada faces an unpredictable and fragmented world, one in which conflict, repression and upheaval exist alongside peace, democracy and relative prosperity. 6. As a nation that throughout its history has done much within the context of international alliances to defend freedom and democracy, Canada continues to have a vital interest in doing its part to ensure global security, especially since Canada's economic future depends on its ability to trade freely with other nations. **Recent Progress** 7. The breakup of the Soviet Union significantly reduced the threat of annihilation that faced Canada and its allies for more than 40 years, and the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and German unification marked an end to the division of Europe into hostile blocs. 8. Significant progress has been achieved in the elimination, reduction and control of various weapons. 9. Progress has also been made in resolving several protracted regional conflicts. **International Security Concerns** 10. The world's population is growing rapidly, putting pressure on global political, financial and natural resources, as well as on the environment. In addition, the past decade has seen exponential growth in the number of refugees and of people displaced within their own countries. The breakdown of authority in certain states is yet another source of instability. 11. Increasingly, armed forces are being called upon to ensure safe environments for the protection of refugees, the delivery of food and medical supplies, and the provision of essential services in countries where civil society has collapsed. And yet, the international community cannot intervene every time these pressures reach the breaking point. 12. Among the most difficult and immediate challenges to international security are civil wars fuelled by ethnic, religious and political extremism. The absence today of adversarial relations among the world's great powers suggests that, in the future, regional conflicts are more likely to be contained. That being said, Canada cannot escape the consequences of these conflicts, whether in the form of refugee flows, obstacles to trade, or damage to important principles. 13. The spread of advanced weapon technologies has emerged as another security challenge of the 1990s. The transfer of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missile delivery capabilities to so-called "rogue" regimes is of particular concern. 14. Diminishing resources make it more difficult for advanced industrial states to cope with global security challenges. 15. The world is neither more peaceful nor more stable than in the past. Canada's defence policy must reflect the world as it is rather than the world as we would like it to be. ----- # Chapter 2 - Domestic Considerations 16. Defence policy must respond to challenges at home – in particular to current fiscal circumstances. 17. At the present time, our prosperity – and with it our quality of life – is threatened by the steady growth of public sector debt. This situation limits governmental freedom of action in responding to the needs of Canadians. 18. The Special Joint Committee called for a period of relatively stable funding for defence, but at lower levels than those set out in the 1994 budget. 19. Although National Defence and the Canadian Forces have already made a large contribution to efforts to reduce the deficit, the Government believes that additional cuts are both necessary and possible. 20. As a result of this, the Department of National Defence and the Canadian Forces will do less in some areas. The Department and the Forces will also reshape the defence program and operate more efficiently to deliver the elements of the policy outlined in the White Paper. # Chapter 3 - Combat-Capable Forces 21. At present, there is no immediate direct military threat to Canada, and today's conflicts are far from Canada's shores. However, Canada cannot dispense with the maritime, land and air combat capabilities of modern armed forces. 22. We must maintain a prudent level of military force to: ## � deal with challenges to our sovereignty in peacetime; � generate larger forces if needed; and � participate effectively in multilateral peace and stability operations and, if and when required, in the defence of North America and our allies in Europe, and in response to aggression elsewhere. 23. We must take account of the changing face of peacekeeping. The nature of these operations has changed considerably and now poses far more risks to our personnel. 24. This combination of military requirements has led the Government to conclude that the retention of multi-purpose combatcapable forces is in the national interest. These forces provide the Government with a broad range of military options at a cost consistent with our other policy and fiscal priorities. 25. Canada needs armed forces that are able to operate with the modern forces maintained by our allies and like-minded nations against a capable opponent – that is, they must able to fight "alongside the best, against the best". 26. The challenge will be to design a defence program that delivers capable armed forces within the limits of our resources. By making difficult choices and trade-offs, we will be able to preserve the core capabilities and flexibility of a multi-purpose force. This force will enable Canada to attend to its security needs, now and in the future. # Chapter 4 - Protection of Canada 27. Taken together, the size of our country and our small population pose unique challenges for defence planners. 28. While some might argue that the dramatic changes abroad have eroded the traditional role that the Canadian Forces play in the defence of Canada, it would be a mistake to dismantle their capacity to defend our country. Canada should never find itself in a position where the defence of its national territory has become the responsibility of others. 29. The Forces must be capable of mounting effective responses to emerging situations at home. Specifically, the Canadian Forces will: ## � demonstrate, on a regular basis, the capability to monitor and control activity within Canada's territory, airspace, and maritime areas of jurisdiction; ## � assist, on a routine basis, other government departments in achieving various other national goals in such areas as fisheries protection, drug interdiction, and environmental protection; ## � be prepared to contribute humanitarian assistance and disaster relief within 24 hours, and to sustain this effort for as long as necessary; ----- ## � maintain a national search and rescue capability; � maintain a capability to assist in mounting, at all times, an immediate and effective response to terrorist incidents; and, � respond to requests for Aid of the Civil Power and sustain this response for as long as necessary. # Chapter 5 - Canada-United States Defence Cooperation 30. The United States is Canada's most important ally and the two countries maintain a relationship that is as close, complex, and extensive as any in the world. 31. As strategic arms reduction treaties between the United States and Russia are implemented over the next decade, stability will be enhanced. Nevertheless, potential challenges to continental defence remain: Russia retains strategic nuclear forces able to reach North America and a number of states have acquired, or are seeking to acquire, weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery. 32. Canada-US defence cooperation continues to provide highly valued stability in a volatile and turbulent world. Though CanadaUS defence cooperation continues to serve this country's fundamental interests extremely well, certain arrangements require updating: ## � Canada will contribute to aerospace surveillance, missile warning, and air defence capabilities at a significantly reduced level. ## � In the negotiations on the renewal of the NORAD agreement, Canada will seek to preserve its benefits and examine closely those areas which may need to change in accord with evolving challenges to continental security. ## � Canada supports ongoing discussions on the possible expansion beyond North America of NORAD's missile warning function, and is interested in gaining a better understanding of missile defence through research and in consultation with like-minded nations. ## � The possibility of developing a space-based surveillance system for North America in the next century will be explored, subject to a variety of military, financial and technological considerations. 33. Canada will continue to rely on the stability and flexibility of its relationship with the United States to help meet defence requirements in North America and beyond. To that end, the Department and the Forces will: ## � maintain the ability to operate effectively at sea, on land, and in the air with the military forces of the United States in defending the northern half of the Western hemisphere. This includes plans for the provision of forces already tasked for other missions to the defence of the continent, consisting of: ## � a joint task force headquarters; � a maritime task group on each coast; � a brigade group with associated support elements; � two squadrons of fighter aircraft; and � a squadron of transport aircraft. � begin formal negotiations with the United States on the renewal of the NORAD agreement that expires in 1996, ensuring that its provisions reflect North American aerospace defence priorities; ## � as part of a renewed NORAD agreement, cooperate in: � the surveillance and control of North American airspace; � the collection, processing and dissemination of missile warning information within North America; and � the examination of ballistic missile defence options focused on research and building on Canada's existing capabilities in communications and surveillance; and ## � maintain Canada's participation in the Canada-US Test and Evaluation Program, the Defence Production and Development Sharing Arrangements, and other existing bilateral arrangements. # Chapter 6 - Contributing to International Security 34. The complex problems that confront the international community today defy easy solutions. Nevertheless, Canada will remain a strong advocate of multilateral security institutions. We will continue to play an active role in the UN, in NATO and in the CSCE, and we will develop our defence relationships with other countries, especially in the Asia-Pacific region and Latin America. **A Canadian Perspective on Multilateral Operations** 35. In recent years, multilateral operations have expanded to encompass the complete range of military activity – from preventive deployments to enforcement actions. ----- 36. The design of all missions should reflect certain key principles and essential operational considerations: ## � There be a clear and enforceable mandate. � There be an identifiable and commonly accepted reporting authority. � The national composition of the force be appropriate to the mission, and there be an effective process of consultation among missions partners. ## � In missions that involve both military and civilian resources, there be a recognized focus of authority, a clear and efficient division of responsibilities, and agreed operating procedures. ## � With the exception of enforcement actions and operations to defend NATO member states, in missions that involve Canadian personnel, Canada's participation be accepted by all parties to the conflict. ## � The size, training and equipment of the force be appropriate to the purpose at hand, and remain so over the life of the mission. ## � There be a defined concept of operations, an effective command and control structure, and clear rules of engagement. 37. Canada will maintain its specialization in multilateral operations. Certain international scenarios will result in a prompt Canadian response, such as the need to come to the defence of a NATO state. In other circumstances, Canada will be more selective and commit forces if suitable personnel are available in sufficient numbers, if they can be appropriately armed and properly trained to carry out the task, and if they can make a significant contribution to the success of the mission. 38. Consistent with this perspective, Canada will commit maritime, land, and air forces (as well as support elements) to the full range of multilateral operations, including: ## � preventive deployment of forces; � peacekeeping and observer missions; � enforcing the will of the international community and defending our NATO allies; � post-conflict peacebuilding (including humanitarian assistance); and � measures to enhance stability and build confidence. 39. Combat training remains the best foundation for the participation of the Canadian Forces in multilateral missions. 40. Canada will support and contribute to the enhancement of peacekeeping training at the Lester B. Pearson Canadian International Peacekeeping Training Centre at Cornwallis, Nova Scotia. # Organizations and Commitments **Strengthening the UN** 41. Canada is in favour of a vigorous and effective United Nations and we will enhance our ability to contribute to UN operations. 42. The Canadian Forces will remain prepared to deploy on UN operations contingency forces of up to a maritime task group, a brigade group plus an infantry battalion group, a wing of fighter aircraft, and a squadron of tactical transport aircraft. Were these forces to be deployed simultaneously, this could conceivably involve as many as 10,000 personnel. 43. Within this upper limit, Canada will increase its commitment of stand-by forces to the UN to two ships, one battle group, one infantry battalion group, one squadron of fighter aircraft, a flight of tactical transport aircraft, a communications element, and a headquarters element. If deployed simultaneously, this would represent a commitment of 4,000 personnel. 44. The Forces will also remain prepared to deploy, for limited periods, medical personnel, signal units, and engineers in humanitarian relief roles. **NATO: Participation and Reform** 45. Canada will remain a full member of NATO and will work toward striking an appropriate balance between the Alliance's traditional mission and its newer roles. 46. Canada gives its full support to NATO expansion, but continues to believe that this question must be addressed very carefully. We will participate in multilateral and bilateral programs that aim to gradually integrate all of our North Atlantic Cooperation Council partners into an effective security order for the Northern Hemisphere. 47. Canada will also remain a strong supporter of reform within NATO and believes that NATO's reservoir of military competence and capabilities should make a greater contribution to UN operations. ----- 48. Canada will insist that the Alliance become a more efficient organization. NATO's large and costly bureaucracy needs to be reduced, and the military budget should be spent on activities that are relevant to current needs. 49. In the event of a crisis or war in Europe, the contingency forces that Canada will maintain for all multilateral operations would immediately be made available to NATO. **Objectives** 50. The Government is renewing Canada's traditional commitment to participate in the military dimension of international security affairs. By choosing to maintain a multi-purpose, combat-capable force, Canada will retain the capability to make a significant and responsible contribution to international peace and stability, whether within a UN framework, through NATO, or in coalitions of likeminded countries. The Canadian Forces will: ## � maintain the capability to assist the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade in the protection and evacuation of Canadians from areas threatened by imminent conflict; ## � participate in multilateral operations anywhere in the world under UN auspices, or in the defence of a NATO member state, and, to that end: ## � be able to deploy, or redeploy from other multilateral operations, a joint task force headquarters and, as single units or in combination, one or more of the following elements: ## � a naval task group, comprised of up to four combatants (destroyers, frigates or submarines) and a support ship, with appropriate maritime air support, ## � three separate battle groups or a brigade group (comprised of three infantry battalions, an armoured regiment and an artillery regiment, with appropriate combat support and combat service support), ## � a wing of fighter aircraft, with appropriate support, and � one squadron of tactical transport aircraft; � provide, within three weeks, single elements or the vanguard component of this force and be able to sustain them indefinitely in a low-threat environment and, within three months, the remaining elements of the full contingency force; ## � earmark an infantry battalion group as either a stand-by force for the UN, or to serve with NATO's Immediate Reaction Force; and, ## � have plans ready to institute other measures to increase the capabilities of the Canadian Forces to sustain existing commitments or to respond to a major crisis; ## � maintain the following specific peacetime commitments to NATO: � one ship to serve with the Standing Naval Force Atlantic, � aircrews and other personnel to serve in the NATO Airborne Early Warning system, � approximately 200 personnel to serve in various NATO headquarters, and � the opportunity for Allied forces to conduct training in Canada, on a cost-recovery basis; � make three notable changes to its NATO peacetime commitments. Specifically, Canada will: � terminate its commitment to maintain a battalion group for the defence of Northern Norway and propose to contribute an equivalent unit to a NATO force designed to deploy rapidly anywhere within Alliance territory, including Norway; ## � assign, on an occasional basis, one ship to NATO's Standing Naval Force Mediterranean; and � scale back its contribution to the NATO Infrastructure Program so as to be able to expand our bilateral contact programs with Central and Eastern Europe under the Military Training Assistance Program. ## � expand bilateral and multilateral contacts and exchanges, in response to changing geographic priorities, with selected partners in Central and Eastern Europe, the Asia-Pacific region, Latin America and Africa, with a particular emphasis on peacekeeping, confidence-building measures, and civil-military relations; and, ## � support the verification of existing arms control agreements and participate in the development of future accords. # Chapter 7 - Implementing Defence Policy 51. The new defence policy heralds a fundamental transformation of the way in which the Canadian Forces and the Department of National Defence will conduct their operations and do business in the coming years. 52. Most areas of defence will be cut. The relative weight of the naval, land and air establishments will be altered to allow for the transfer of more resources to where they are most needed – mainly to operational land forces. Everything is being made leaner. Everything is undergoing the closest scrutiny. 53. These measures will ensure that the Canadian Forces remain well commanded, properly trained, and adequately equipped for the missions the Government asks them to carry out. ----- **Management, Command and Control** 54. While the structural foundations of the Department and the Canadian Forces are basically sound and capable of meeting the challenge, they can be further streamlined. We will, by 1999, reduce headquarters staffs by at least one-third. 55. In the Government's view, the civilian-military integration of National Defence Headquarters (NDHQ) continues to prove its worth. There is no compelling reason to reverse it. 56. A new command and control structure will be put into place by mid-1997. The command of military operations will continue to be exercised by the Chief of the Defence Staff and one layer of headquarters will be eliminated. **Capital Program, Procurement and Industrial Impact** 57. National Defence is radically restructuring plans to purchase capital equipment. Planned acquisitions will be cut by at least 15 billion dollars over the next 15 years. 58. New equipment will be acquired only for purposes considered essential to maintaining core capabilities of the Canadian Forces, and will be suited to the widest range of defence roles. Emphasis will be on extending the life of equipment. Wherever possible, the Forces will operate fewer types of equipment than is now the case, and purchase equipment that is easier to maintain. 59. DND will adopt better business practices. This means, inter alia: ## � greater reliance on a "just-in-time" delivery system to reduce inventory costs; � procurement of off-the-shelf commercial technology whenever possible; � an enhanced partnership with the private sector; � the transfer or contracting out of support functions and activities to Canadian industry; and � a streamlined, more efficient materiel support process. 60. Multi-purpose, combat-capable forces require the support of a technologically sophisticated industrial base. National Defence will work with Industry Canada, as well as Public Works and Government Services Canada, towards harmonizing industrial and defence policies to maintain essential defence industrial capability. **Infrastructure and Support** 61. Further reductions of defence infrastructure and support are both possible and necessary. Action is underway to extend the rationalization process beyond the measures mandated in the 1994 federal budget. **Defence Studies** 62. The modest program of assistance to Canadian universities and other institutions involved in defence studies will be maintained, and a chair of defence management studies will be established. **Personnel Issues** 63. Personnel cuts will continue. 64. The Government will amend the National Defence Act as appropriate to meet modern military requirements. In particular, this will involve amendments to the military justice system as it relates to both courts martial and summary trials. 65. The Government will place more emphasis on renewable, short-term periods of service for members of the Canadian Forces. The actual period of service for engagements will depend upon the skills and training required to do the job. 66. Reservists participating in and returning from operational assignments will benefit from the same post-operational care now available to the Regular Force. 67. Military career paths will be restructured to reduce the number of postings and assignments. This will: ## � result in fewer relocations; � ease the burden on military personnel and their families; and ----- ## � result in savings for the government. 68. The Forces will reduce military staff in certain occupations and trades as functions are contracted out or reassigned to civilian employees. The ratio of general officers and senior civilian officials to overall strength, as well as the ratio of officers to noncommissioned members in the Regular Forces and the Reserves, will be significantly decreased. 69. The percentage of women in the Canadian Forces is among the highest of any military force in the world. Nevertheless, the commitment to making military careers more attractive to women will be reinforced. 70. The need for "universality of service" in the military remains paramount. At the same time, the Department and the Forces will ensure that equitable employment opportunities continue to exist for all Canadians, regardless of gender, race, sexual orientation, or culture. Likewise, the workplace policy of "zero harassment" will be strictly enforced. **Civilian Workforce** 71. Our civilian employees will continue to play critical roles, although their overall numbers will be reduced to approximately 20,000 by 1999. **Total Force** 72. The Government remains convinced that the Total Force approach is the right one for Canada, but changes are needed to reflect Canada's requirement for ready forces. 73. The new strategic environment has prompted the Government to reconsider the traditional approach to mobilization planning. These plans will be revised to reflect post-Cold War requirements. 74. By 1999, the Regular Force and the Primary Reserve will be reduced to approximately 60,000 and 23,000, respectively. 75. The Government agrees with the Special Joint Committee that the land force must be expanded. Approximately 3,000 soldiers will be added to the army's field force. Additional resources will be provided through reductions in headquarters, restructuring of the three environments and a reduction in the size of the Reserves. 76. The Reserves are a national institution and provide a vital link between the Canadian Forces and local communities. Their main role will continue to be the augmentation, sustainment and support of deployed forces. 77. While the number of reservists will be reduced, their quality and overall ability to provide the Total Force with trained personnel for unit augmentation will be significantly improved. 78. A thorough examination of all elements of the Primary and Supplementary Reserves will be conducted. A greater proportion of the Reserves' resources must go towards improving their operational capability and availability. The new strategic and fiscal environment requires streamlining of reserve organizations and rank structures. 79. The Government will also enhance the Canadian Rangers' capability to conduct Arctic and coastal land patrols, and will modestly increase the level of support to Cadet organizations. **Operational Maritime Forces** 80. Multi-purpose maritime combat capabilities are maintained to carry out a wide range of domestic and international operations. The Canadian Forces have substantially reduced anti-submarine warfare activities connected with the protection of shipping and countering missile-carrying submarines in the North Atlantic, while increasing their participation in UN and multilateral operations. 81. To carry out these tasks adequately, Canada's navy will require: ## � new, affordable shipborne helicopters as a replacement for the Sea King; � the retention of the support ship HMCS Provider, previously slated to be paid off in 1996; and � 12 Maritime Coastal Defence Vessels. 82. In keeping with the Special Joint Committee's recommendation, the Government intends to explore the option of acquiring four recently constructed Upholder-class submarines. ----- **Operational Land Forces** 83. The importance of the Canadian Forces' mission to support an allied land campaign in Central Europe has diminished, allowing the withdrawal of our forces from Europe. Multi-purpose combat capabilities are now maintained to carry out a wide range of domestic and international operations. 84. To carry out these tasks adequately, Canada's land forces will require: ## � new armoured personnel carriers; � modernization of other suitably armoured personnel carriers in the current fleet; and � the eventual replacement of the fleet of Cougar armoured training vehicles. **Operational Air Forces** 85. The focus of air planning and operations has shifted from missions driven primarily by the former Soviet threat to a more balanced set of national and international priorities. Multi-purpose combat capabilities are now maintained to execute a wide variety of domestic and international operations, as well as to provide support to maritime and land operations. 86. To carry out these tasks adequately, Canada's air forces will require: ## � a replacement for the Labrador search and rescue helicopters; and � acquisition of a small number of precision-guided munitions for the CF-18. 87. Expenditures on fighter forces and support will be reduced by at least 25% through retirement of the CF-5 fleet, cuts in the cost of fighter-related overhead, reductions in the annual authorized flying rate and by cutting the number of operational aircraft from 72 to between 48 and 60. These changes will delay the need to buy a replacement aircraft well into the next century. 88. In the absence of valid offers to buy the VIP A-310 Airbus, and in recognition of the future demand for strategic airlift support, it will, as recommended by the Special Joint Committee, be reconfigured for a strategic transport and air cargo role. **Conclusion** 89. The Government believes the defence policy enunciated in the White Paper reflects a Canadian consensus. 90. The White Paper affirms the need to maintain multi-purpose, combat-capable sea, land and air forces that will protect Canadians and project their interests and values abroad. It also concludes that their traditional roles should evolve in a way that is consistent with today's strategic and fiscal realities. 91. The new policy recognizes that the defence budget will be under continuing pressure as the Government strives to bring the deficit under control. More reductions can and will be accommodated, including further reductions in personnel, infrastructure and the capital program. 92. The White Paper provides Canada's men and women in uniform and their civilian colleagues the direction they require to carry out their duties on behalf of the nation, whether the world of the future is a peaceful and stable one, or is plagued by increasing violence within and among states. 93. Whatever the future brings, the new defence policy will enable Canada to respond and adjust as necessary to deal with the range of challenges to our security that could arise, now and into the next century. ----- # Introduction The past year has marked a significant turning point in the history of the Department of National Defence and the Canadian Forces. Responding to a fundamental reordering of international affairs and the need to confront important economic realities at home, the Prime Minister announced in November 1993 a comprehensive review of Canadian defence policy. In February 1994, a Special Joint Committee of the Senate and House of Commons was established to consult Canadians on all aspects of this issue. With the new defence policy outlined in this White Paper, the Government has fulfilled its commitment. The Special Joint Committee on Canada's Defence Policy travelled across the country listening to the views of ordinary citizens, defence experts, disarmament advocates and non-governmental organizations. It sought the advice of our allies and saw at first hand the tasks performed by our forces in Canada, in support of NORAD and NATO, and on peacekeeping and humanitarian operations abroad. Beyond the work of the Committee, the Government made a concerted effort to involve Parliament in the formulation of defence policy. During the past year, Parliament held special debates on issues such as peacekeeping and cruise missile testing, ensuring that our decisions took full account of the concerns of Canadians from across the political spectrum. As Minister of National Defence, I conducted a personal policy review by meeting with interested groups, giving a number of speeches and interviews, and responding to many enquiries from citizens who expressed their opinions on defence issues. I co-chaired, with my colleagues the Ministers of Foreign Affairs and of International Trade, a National Forum on Canada's International Relations. Together, we established a process that allowed the Foreign Policy Review and Defence Policy Review to proceed in harmony. I followed closely the work of the Special Joint Committee Reviewing Canada's Foreign Policy, whose recommendations have been carefully assessed in preparing this White Paper. The Prime Minister, the Minister of Foreign Affairs and I also exchanged views with our Alliance partners, both on a bilateral basis and at NATO meetings. Within the Department of National Defence, I sought the advice of civilian officials and military commanders. Senior members of the Department and the armed forces appeared before the Special Joint Committee. In addition, Canadian Forces bases and stations across the country held open houses, informing local communities about the review of defence policy and encouraging their participation. The Report of the Special Joint Committee played an integral role in shaping Canada's new defence policy. Virtually all its recommendations are reflected in this White Paper. In a few cases, after further examination, the Government has preferred to adopt an alternate approach, but the intent of the Committee is met. The Committee's recommendation concerning the size of the Regular Forces was judged to be inconsistent with the financial parameters within which the Department of National Defence must operate. Cuts to the defence budget deeper than those envisioned by the Committee will be required to meet the Government's deficit reduction targets. The defence of Canada and Canadian interests and values is first and foremost a domestic concern. The primary obligation of the Department of National Defence and the Canadian Forces is to protect the country and its citizens from challenges to their security. For the men and women who defend Canada, ultimately with their lives, this entails a level of responsibility and sacrifice that far surpasses that of most other professions. In putting service before self, the Canadian Forces, drawn from all walks of life and every region of the country, exemplify the high ideals of our society and demonstrate how we can come together to solve common problems. At a time when the continued existence of the nation is being debated and national symbols take on more importance than ever, the unifying role of the Department and the Forces can only help to build a stronger, more dynamic and prosperous country. In the final analysis, it may be said that a nation not worth defending is a nation not worth preserving. The consensus achieved on the way ahead – an effective, realistic and affordable policy, one that calls for multi-purpose, combatcapable armed forces able to meet the challenges to Canada's security both at home and abroad – will serve to guide the work of the Department and the Forces into the next century. Together, we can take pride in a new defence policy that meets Canada's needs and fulfils our obligations, both to the nation and to our men and women in uniform. # The Honourable David Collenette, P.C., M.P. Minister of National Defence ----- # Chapter 1 International Environment The Cold War is over. The Warsaw Pact has been disbanded and the Soviet Union no longer exists. In a few short years, we have witnessed a fundamental realignment in the global balance of power, yielding significant advances in arms control, conflict resolution and democratization. We have also seen the outbreak of localized, violent disputes, arms proliferation, as well as the often fruitless struggles of collective security organizations to cope with the challenges of the new era. Progress toward a safer world, most evident in the dramatically reduced threat of global war, is balanced by the persistence of conflict within and between states. It is impossible to predict what will emerge from the current period of transition, but it is clear that we can expect pockets of chaos and instability that will threaten international peace and security. In short, Canada faces an unpredictable and fragmented world, one in which conflict, repression and upheaval exist alongside peace, democracy and relative prosperity. As a nation that throughout its history has done much within the context of international alliances to defend freedom and democracy, Canada continues to have a vital interest in doing its part to ensure global security, especially since Canada's economic future depends on its ability to trade freely with other nations. # RECENT PROGRESS **Global Relations.** The breakup of the Soviet Union significantly reduced the threat of nuclear annihilation that faced Canada and its allies for more than 40 years. The dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and German unification marked an end to the division of Europe into hostile blocs. The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), with its broad membership and comprehensive approach to security, has become an important mechanism for upholding the principles - human rights, economic freedom and the peaceful resolution of disputes - enshrined in the November 1990 Charter of Paris. A new transatlantic and pan-Eurasian security framework is beginning to take shape, embodied in the CSCE and two of NATO's creations, the North Atlantic Cooperation Council and Partnership for Peace. Despite some notable exceptions, democracy is taking hold in Central and South America, as well as in parts of Asia, the Middle East and Africa. **Arms Control.** Significant progress has been achieved in the elimination, reduction and control of various categories of weapons. The Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe and follow-on agreements provide for stable, predictable and verifiable reductions of equipment andpersonnel on that continent. The Open Skies Treaty, the United Nations arms register, and confidence-building measures carried out through the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe have reinforced the tendency toward openness and transparency in military matters. The strategic arms reduction treaties (START I and II) and steps taken by Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Belarus in support of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation hold the promise of deep reductions in strategic nuclear weapons. Likewise, the Chemical Weapons Convention, signed by 158 countries since January 1993, of which 16 have ratified, calls for the destruction of these arsenals, though much work remains before this goal can be achieved. Other multilateral initiatives are underway to stem the production and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery, including: ## � efforts to secure the indefinite extension of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1995 and conclude a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty; ## � stronger International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards; � work on establishing a verification compliance regime for the 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention; � the beginning, if a mandate is agreed, of negotiations on a "cut-off" convention on fissile material; and � the expansion and strengthening of the Missile Technology Control Regime. These efforts represent an ambitious arms control agenda that will see sustained and complex negotiations in the years ahead. **Regional Conflict Resolution.** Notwithstanding frequent outbursts of violence the world over, progress has been made in resolving several protracted regional conflicts. The process of reconciliation in El Salvador culminated in the 1994 general election, mirroring the trend towards democracy and the rule of law across much of Latin America. South Africa held a country-wide election this year, ending apartheid and white minority rule. The Middle East peace process has also yielded progress, most notably Palestinian self-rule in Gaza and Jericho, an Israeli-Jordanian peace treaty, and the outline of an eventual peace agreement between Israel and Syria. ----- # INTERNATIONAL SECURITY CONCERNS **Global Pressures** The world's population is fast approaching 6 billion, with another 90 million added to the total every year. Projections vary, but most observers believe the world will have between 8 and 12 billion people by 2050. If future generations are to enjoy the same opportunities as the current one, agricultural and energy production will have to multiply several times over. This requirement will put enormous pressure on the world's political and financial resources, overand above the severe environmental damage and depletion of natural resources that are likely to result. UN peacekeeping and humanitarian operations are playing a critical role in responding to the immediate consequences, both direct and indirect, of global population and resource pressures. Armed forces are being called upon increasingly to ensure a safe environment for the protection of refugees, the delivery of food and medical supplies, and the provision of essential services in countries where civil society has collapsed. At the same time, the complexity, escalating costs, and risks associated with peacekeeping in the 1990s, the financial difficulties facing the United Nations, and declining defence budgets in most industrialized countries mean that the international community cannot intervene every time these pressures reach the breaking point. Clearly, the world's ability to deal with the consequences of overpopulation, environmental degradation and resource depletion is already severely constrained and is likely to become more so in the years ahead. **Refugees.** The past decade has seen exponential growth in the number of refugees. According to UN estimates, some 20 million people worldwide have been forced to flee their countries in response to war, famine, deprivation, and ethnic, clan, tribal or religious strife, often of horrific proportions. An equal number of people have been displaced within their own countries. Once uprooted, these populations risk causing further unrest in their new locations. They are often viewed as restive, even subversive, by host governments, particularly if they alter what is perceived as a favourable demographic balance within society. Large numbers of displaced persons put a heavy burden on existing infrastructure, resources and the environment, provoking resentment on the part of the local population. **`Failed States'** The breakdown of authority in certain states is another source of instability. It is characterized by chaos, violence and the inability of political leaders to provide the population with the most basic of services. In recent years, this problem has not been confined to any specific region of the world or even to countries with particularly low Standards of living. Examples as diverse as Somalia, the former Yugoslavia, Rwanda and Afghanistan illustrate the extent of the problem. The international community remainsheavily engaged in attempts to respond, but success in confronting challenges engendered by scarcity and war is not easily achieved. **Resurgence of Old Hatreds** Among the most difficult and immediate challenges to international security are the civil wars fuelled by ethnic, religious and political extremism that broke out in the Balkans and areas of the former Soviet Union following the collapse of communism. In recent years, rival groups have clashed in a number of these states. Other regions of the world, most notably parts of Africa and Asia, have seen the strength of fundamentalist groups grow considerably, with civil wars and other violent manifestations showing no signs of abating. Many of these conflicts have proven relatively immune to regional or multilateral diplomacy and intervention. The task of maintaining ceasefires in the midst of civil wars is especially difficult, given the absence of coherent front lines, lack of discipline among the warring sides, civilian populations subject to horrible depredations and atrocities and, most important, a reluctance by combatants to respect such ceasefires. Ongoing violence in the former Yugoslavia starkly underlines the dangers associated with attempts by national groups to redraw borders in an effort to create ethnically homogeneous states. The Bosnian civil war may portend similar conflicts elsewhere in the Eurasian landmass. In many regions, a patchwork of minorities live intermingled with no clear lines of demarcation between them. Competing territorial claims could raise tensions and eventually provoke hostilities. Most abhorrent is the practice of "ethnic cleansing", the ugly euphemism for outright massacres or expulsions carried out with the objective of achieving ethnic or religious purity in a given geographic area. Borders redrawn in the wake of ethnic cleansing are highly unstable, as uprooted people often seek the return of lost territory, usually through violent means. However horrendous the impact for the local populations caught in the middle of civil wars, the absence today of adversarial relations among the world's great powers suggests that these conflicts are more likely to be contained. At the same time, Canada cannot escape the consequences of regional conflict, whether in the form of refugee flows, obstacles to trade, or damage to important principles such as the rule of law, respect for human rights and the peaceful settlement of conflicts. Even where Canada's interests are not directly engaged, the values of Canadian society lead Canadians to expect their government to ----- respond when modern communication technologies make us real-time witnesses to violence, suffering and even genocide in many parts of the world. Thus, Canada continues to have an important stake in a peaceful and stable international system. **Proliferation** The spread of advanced weapon technologies to areas of potential conflict has emerged as another major security challenge of the 1990s. Whether sophisticated armaments are acquired abroad or produced indigenously, their introduction into volatile regions undermines stability, poses a threat to neighbouring states, defeats arms control initiatives, and complicates military planning and operations, as Canada and other members of the UN Coalition experienced first-hand during the Gulf War. It will take nearly a decade to implement fully the strategic arms reduction treaties. Denuclearization is a demanding process, involving warhead storage and dismantlement, the removal, warehousing or elimination of dangerous substances, and silo destruction. Moreover, while Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine are implementing agreements governing the return of nuclear weapons to Russia, this consolidation has not yet been completed. Russia has a solid record of central control extending over half a century, but the sheer size of its nuclear stockpile- some 25,000 nuclear charges of all kinds scattered over more than 100 sites - makes this material vulnerable to loss or theft. It is critical that these weapons, and the fissile material from dismantled weapons, be stored under the strictest physical and inventory safeguards. The arms trade remains lively even if the global market for weapons has shrunk. Significant overcapacity in world defence production exists despite efforts at conversion of military industries. Some states have not instituted the appropriate legislative or administrative mechanisms for controlling arms exports. For many, weapons sales constitute one of the few reliable sources of hard currency. Often, the incentive to sell outweighs concerns about the likely threat to regional or global stability. One consequence is the extensive trade in small arms, including hand-held automatic weapons, hand grenades and land mines. Indeed, men, women and children in 62 countries daily face the threat of being killed or maimed by some 85 million land mines sown at random. Another consequence is the risk that unemployed or under-employed scientists and technicians previously involved in the production of advanced systems will migrate to countries with clandestine weapons programs. Already, organized criminal elements have shown an interest in the lucrative trade in sophisticated weapons and materials. The transfer of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missile technologies to so-called "rogue" regimes is of particular concern. These transactions take place, albeit more slowly and with more difficulty, despite the export controls on materials and equipment put in place by countries such as Canada. This then leaves the international community little recourse other than condemnation or punishment after the fact. Similarly, the increasing prevalence of technologies with both civilian and military applications, and the globalization of production and marketing of weapon systems, makes proliferation that much harder to prevent or control, and makes it more likely that the transfer of resources, skills and technology will be irreversible. **Constraints on Policy Making** Advanced industrial states themselves face considerable uncertainty at home, which complicates their ability to cope with global security challenges. Many Western economies are still characterized by relatively high unemployment, volatile currencies, and large accumulated national debts. The trend toward globalization, exemplified by the conclusion of the Uruguay Round of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, is balanced by an increasing preoccupation with domestic challenges. At a time of diminishing resources, little money is available to deal with the demands of post-industrial society - the need to repair obsolescent infrastructure, protect and foster a sustainable environment, care for an aging population, improve job training and reform entitlement programs - let alone military priorities in various regions of the world. Canada and most other NATO allies have seen their military budgets decline, acknowledging the fundamental changes on the world scene and the need to reduce overall government expenditures. Under the best circumstances, predicting international trends is challenging. Given the unsettled nature of global affairs, it is impossible to foresee with any degree of certainty how international affairs will develop in the years to come. In light of the much reduced threat of global war, the world may not be as immediately dangerous today, at least for Canada, yet it is neither more peaceful nor more stable. It would, of course, be wrong to concentrate attention exclusively on extreme cases of disorder in some regions at the expense of real progress elsewhere. Yet, given recent trends, it seems prudent to plan for a world characterized in the long term by instability. Canada's defence policy must reflect the world as it is, rather than the world as we would like it to be. Under these conditions, the most appropriate response is a flexible, realistic and affordable defence policy, one that provides the means to apply military force when Canadians consider it necessary to uphold essential Canadian values and vital security interests, at home and abroad. ----- # Chapter 2 Domestic Considerations Defence policy must respond not only to an uncertain and unstable world abroad, but also to challenging circumstances at home. In designing a new defence policy, the Government has sought to remain attentive to the very important domestic influences on Canada's defence posture and, in particular, to current fiscal circumstances. The Government's broad program for political, social, and economic renewal is focused on preserving the values that make Canada one of the most fortunate countries in the world. At the present time, however, our prosperity - and with it our quality of life - is threatened by the steady growth of public sector debt. The accumulated debt of the federal and provincial governments currently stands at approximately $750 billion; the federal government's annual debt servicing payments in 1994-95 alone will amount to $44 billion - more than the budget deficit of $39.7 billion and some 27% of the total federal budget. This situation limits governmental freedom of action in responding to the needs of Canadians and constrains the ability of governments at all levels to deliver essential services. To deal with this problem and avert a crisis of confidence in the Canadian economy, the federal government has been cutting its expenditures. The Economic and Fiscal Update issued in October 1994 confirmed in no uncertain terms the Government's intention to meet the fiscal challenge presented by both the deficit and the debt. Over the past several years, the need to control the federal deficit has led to significant cuts in most areas of spending, including defence. Indeed, as the accompanying chart illustrates, the defence funding assumptions contained in the 1994 budget envisaged a level of defence spending in the year 2000 that, in real terms, would be less than 60 percent of that assumed in the 1987 Defence White Paper. In an environment of fiscal restraint, the Government must continue to constrain all expenditures, including those devoted to defence. The report of Parliament's Special Joint Committee on Canada's Defence Policy took account of this basic reality. It called for a period of relatively stable funding, but at lower levels than those set out in the 1994 budget. Although National Defence and the Canadian Forces have already made a large contribution to the national effort to reduce the deficit, the Government believes thatadditional cuts are both necessary and possible. The details of the Department's future funding will be set out in the upcoming budget. Budget Defense Reduction The Department and the Canadian Forces have absorbed past reductions in a variety of ways. Canadian defence commitments have been revised, personnel levels cut back, operations and maintenance budgets shrunk, defence infrastructure reduced, and capital programs cancelled or delayed. As a consequence of the further decline in defence expenditure that forms the fiscal context of this paper, cuts will be deeper, and there will be more reductions, cancellations, and delays. In some areas, the Department of National Defence and the Canadian Forces will do less. The Department and the Forces will also reshape the defence program and operate more efficiently to deliver the elements of the policy outlined in this White Paper. Although fiscal considerations are a key factor in formulating an appropriate and realistic defence policy, the Department and the Canadian Forces must also take account of a variety of other domestic developments. Canadians have asked for the renewal of responsible government. They want government to show leadership in addressing a demanding political, financial, economic and social agenda. They ask it to be efficient with its use of the taxpayer's dollar: if private industry has had to restructure in light of difficult economic circumstances, government must do the same. Canadians look to government to be effective in developing innovative and constructive measures to address current and future challenges. They demand it be ethical in the style and substance of its decisions, and open in consulting Canadians on important issues. Beyond meeting these fundamental requirements, all government departments must be mindful of other current issues. These include the need to foster a strong sense of nationhood, to promote industrial growth and international competitiveness, to protect the environment, to provide training for youth and for Canadians affected by economic restructuring, and to ensure that government adapts to demographic changes in the workforce as well as in society as a whole. Notwithstanding the unique vocation of the Department of National Defence and the Canadian Forces, the new defence policy set out in this White Paper takes account of these considerations as well. ----- # Chapter 3 Combat-Capable Forces Canada cannot dispense with the maritime, land, and air combat capabilities of modern armed forces. It is true that, at present, there is no immediate direct military threat to Canada and that today's conflicts are far from our shores. Even so, we must maintain a prudent level of military force to deal with challenges to our sovereignty in peacetime, and retain the capability to generate forces capable of contributing to the defence of our country should the need arise. Beyond this basic national requirement, were Canada to abandon the capability to participate effectively in the defence of North America, NATO-Europe allies, and victims of aggression elsewhere, we would stand to lose a significant degree of respect and influence abroad. Canada's commitment to remain an active participant in multilateral efforts to promote collective security is a reflection of our values and interests. ## � Canadians believe that the rule of law must govern relations between states. � Canadians have deemed their own security indivisible from that of their allies. � Canadians have a strong sense of responsibility to alleviate suffering and respond, where their efforts can make a difference. These are the abiding foundations of Canada's commitment to collective security. They have proven their worth in the past and remain equally valid in a global environment that is increasingly interdependent. # Collective Security and the Changing Face of Peacekeeping. If we are to make a significant contribution to collective security, we must recognize that the nature of multilateral operations in support of peace and stability has changed considerably. Indeed, `peacekeeping' operations have evolved from mainly interpositional and monitoring operations to undertakings that are far more ambitious - and pose far more challenges and risks to our personnel. Canada's traditional goals - the deterrence and reversal of aggression, the peaceful settlement of disputes, and the relief of civilian populations - remain constant. It is the context that has changed. If the Canadian Forces are to play a role in collective security, they must remain a capable fighting force. # Collective Defence. With the transformation of the strategic environment, the role of our collective defence relationships with NATO-Europe and the United States will change. It would be a mistake, however, to discount the merits of these arrangements. From a Canadian perspective, collective defence remains fundamental to our security. ## � First, our allies are countries to which we are bound by political values, interests, and traditions that we have an interest in upholding and fostering. ## � Second, the practical benefits of collective defence - standardized equipment and procedures, as well as the accumulated experience of joint operations - are of great value to international efforts in support of collective security. ## � Third, were a serious military threat to Canada or its allies to emerge, Canada would, once again, seek its security in collective defence arrangements. It is, therefore, important that such arrangements be maintained in peacetime as it would be very difficult to revive them in a crisis. # Managing a Full Spectrum of Conflict. Over the past 80 years, more than 100,000 Canadians have died, fighting alongside our allies for common values. For us now to leave combat roles to others would mean abandoning this commitment to help defend commonly accepted principles of state behaviour. In short, by opting for a constabulary force - that is, one not designed to make a genuine contribution in combat - we would be sending a very clear message about the depth of our commitment to our allies and our values, one that would betray our history and diminish our future. Beyond this, because we cannot expect our political influence in global and regional security arrangements to be significantly out of proportion to our military contributions, we must make the required investment in our armed forces if we are to play any kind of role in shaping our common future. The Government has concluded that the maintenance of multi-purpose, combat-capable forces is in the national interest. It is only through the maintenance of such forces that Canada will be able to retain the necessary degree of flexibility and freedom of action when it comes to the defence of its interests and the projection of its values abroad. Importantly, the maintenance of core combat capabilities forms the basis for the generation of larger forces should they ever be needed. Indeed, it is the Government's view that from the perspective of promoting our values, protecting our interests, insuring against uncertainty, or even providing value for money, an investment in forces capable only of constabulary operations would be very difficult to justify. ----- The challenge will be to design a defence program that will deliver capable armed forces within the limits of our resources. A country of Canada's size and means cannot, and should not, attempt to cover the entire military spectrum, but the Canadian Forces must be able to make a genuine contribution to a wide variety of domestic and international objectives. # Flexibility, Capabilities, and Choices. While the maintenance of specialized combat skills and capabilities is essential, the decision to retain combat-capable forces should not be taken to mean that Canada must possess every component of military capability. Indeed, although the Canadian Forces have, over the years, had to divest themselves of several specific capabilities - including aircraft carriers, cruisers, medium-lift helicopters, medium-range patrol aircraft, as well as separate fleets of fighter aircraft for air defence and ground attack roles -they have continued to meet Canada's domestic needs and make effective contributions to international peace and security. We believe that this tendency to specialize in those multi-purpose capabilities we have deemed essential has not undermined our ability to protect our interests or diminished our ability to meet obligations to allies. Canada needs armed forces that are able to operate with the modern forces maintained by our allies and like-minded nations against a capable opponent - that is, able to fight `alongside the best, against the best'. To maintain this general capability, we have had to make some difficult choices. We will continue to assess the relative costs and benefits of various capabilities in order to make trade-offs which, while difficult, will be essential if the Forces are to contribute to a broader range of Canadian objectives. It would be misguided to invest in very specific forces and capabilities, whether at the higher end of the scale (aircraft designed for anti-tank warfare, for example) or at the lower end (forces limited to minimal-risk peacekeeping operations). To opt for either approach would be to forego the capability and flexibility that are inherent in a multi-purpose force. In short, the maintenance of multi-purpose forces represents a pragmatic, sensible approach to defence at a time of fiscal restraint, one that will provide government with a broad range of military options at a price consistent with the Government's other policy and fiscal priorities. The Government's approach to defence is to maintain the Canadian Forces as a fundamental national resource which makes important contributions to a range of Canadian objectives. The policy and intelligence capabilities of the Department and the Canadian Forces will ensure that the Government has access to independent Canadian advice as the basis for sound decisions. Beyond this, our investment in the Forces' training and equipment will yield a capable fighting force whose skills can be applied not just to a number of specialized tasks, but also to a variety of domestic and international objectives. The retention of multi-purpose, combat-capable forces represents the only prudent choice for Canada. It is only through the maintenance of the core military capabilities that define such forces that, come what may, Canada will be able to attend to its own security needs - both now and in the future. ----- # Chapter 4 Protection of Canada Taken together, the size of our country and our small population pose unique challenges for defence planners. Our territory spans nearly 10 million square kilometres - fully 7% of the world's landmass. We are bordered by three oceans which touch upon over 240,000 kilometres of coastline. We are charged with the control of our airspace as well as the aerial approaches to Canadian territory. Beyond our coasts, Canada seeks to maintain political sovereignty and economic jurisdiction over 10 million square kilometres of ocean in the Pacific, Atlantic, and Arctic. Our geography is not merely vast; it is also diverse and extremely demanding. It imposes significant burdens on our military personnel, their training, and their equipment. Canada's territory encompasses mountainous terrain, fjords, vast plains, rainforests, desert conditions, and the unique ecology of the Arctic. Our climate is harsh. Indeed, the economic livelihood of many Canadians is found in remote, difficult environments including three oceans, the North, and distant mines and forests. Canadians treasure their country, which is rich in both natural beauty and natural resources. They have made it clear to successive governments that they are firmly committed to the protection of both. They are concerned about environmental wellbeing in general, as well as the management of specific resources, such as the forests and fisheries, which have become urgent issues over the past several years and which will require renewed vigilance and enhanced management. # Providing for the Defence of Canada and Canadian Sovereignty Sovereignty is a vital attribute of a nation-state. For Canada, sovereignty means ensuring that, within our area of jurisdiction, Canadian law is respected and enforced. The Government is determined to see that this is so. Some have argued that the recent dramatic changes abroad have eroded the traditional rationale for the role that the Canadian Forces play in the defence of Canada. It would be a grave mistake, however, to dismantle the capacity to defend our country. Canada should never find itself in a position where, as a consequence of past decisions, the defence of our national territory has become the responsibility of others. **Aid of the Civil Power.** Throughout Canadian history, provinces have been able to call upon the armed forces to maintain or restore law and order where it is beyond the power of civil authorities to do so. Section 275 of the National Defence Act states that the Canadian Forces: ## � are liable to be called out for service in aid of the civil power in any case in which a riot or disturbance of the peace, beyond the powers of the civil authorities to suppress . . . is, in the opinion of an attorney general, considered as likely to occur. The role of the Canadian Forces in this context is very precisely defined. When a riot or disturbance of the peace occurs or is likely to occur that is beyond the powers of the civil authorities to control, a provincial attorney general may require the Canadian Forces to be called out in Aid of the Civil Power. In this situation, the Chief of the Defence Staff determines the nature of the response. The Canadian Forces do not replace the civil power; they assist it in the maintenance of law and order. In recent times, the use of the Canadian Forces in this role has been comparatively infrequent. Nevertheless, the crisis at Oka in 1990 served to remind us that such situations can arise. The Forces played a crucial role in defusing the crisis. They demonstrated that the ability to call upon disciplined, well-trained, and well-commanded military personnel is invaluable in providing government with an effective means to deal with potentially explosive situations. The Canadian Forces may be called upon to assist civil authorities in situations other than Aid of the Civil Power. The Forces might, for example, be called on to counter acts of terrorism that exceed the capabilities of police forces. In addition to other military resources, the Canadian Forces maintain a special task force that provides an enhanced capability to respond to any such act immediately and effectively. **Providing Peacetime Surveillance and Control.** The provision of surveillance and control is an integral part of the Forces' activities in Canada. Even at a time when there is no direct military threat to Canada, the Forces must maintain and exercise the basic navy, army, and air force skills to ensure effective control over our territory, airspace, and maritime approaches. In and of itself, maintaining the capability to field a presence anywhere where Canada maintains sovereign jurisdiction sends a clear signal that Canadians will not have their sovereignty compromised. ----- Responsibility for many of the Government's activities in the surveillance and control of Canadian territory, airspace, and maritime areas of jurisdiction lies with civilian agencies such as the Department of Transport. The Canadian Forces, however, make a valuable contribution to this demanding task, which often requires capabilities of greater readiness and reach than those available to civilian agencies. The capability to deploy highly trained Canadian Forces personnel and their specialized equipment anywhere in Canada at short notice also contributes to the attainment of national objectives in such areas as environmental protection, search and rescue, disaster relief, drug interdiction, and fisheries protection. **Securing Our Borders Against Illegal Activities.** Canadians face an increasing challenge from those who would exploit the vast size and resources of our country for illegal activities. This applies to the illegal trade in narcotics and other contraband substances, as well as the smuggling of illegal immigrants into Canada. In supporting the activities of other government agencies, the Canadian Forces play a significant role in countering such activities. During the renewal of the North American Aerospace Defence (NORAD) Agreement in 1991, Canada and the United States agreed to give NORAD a role in counter-narcotic monitoring and surveillance. This is an ancillary mission to which the capabilities of our maritime and land forces have also been applied, and illustrates how existing structures and capabilities can be adapted to address new problems. **Fisheries Protection.** Canadians have made clear their wish to protect Canada's fisheries from illegal and highly damaging exploitation. With the dwindling of major fish stocks, the issue has become more urgent. The Canadian Forces have made an important contribution to fisheries patrols for more than 40 years. The Department of National Defence and the Department of Transport now participate in a comprehensive federal effort, led by the Department of Fisheries and Oceans. The Canadian Forces will devote a significant number of flying hours and ship days to fishery patrols. This arrangement is a good example of interdepartmental cooperation yielding an efficient use of government resources. One of the most pressing issues in the current East Coast fishery crisis is that of predatory foreign fishing on Canada's continental shelf outside of our 200-mile exclusive fishing zone. Such fishing imperils the future of the fishery and contradicts the spirit of internationally agreed conservation measures. The Government has begun to take action against such activities. While it is the Government's policy to avoid engaging in enforcement action beyond 200 miles unless absolutely necessary to protect a vital natural resource, the Canadian Forces must be capable of taking such action. Interdepartmental cooperation has been markedly enhanced in response to the recommendations of the Osbaldeston Report and the 1990 report of the Standing Committee on National Defence on maritime sovereignty. Secure communications have been installed, standard operating procedures have been developed, and acquisition policies are addressing the potential benefits of having common and interoperable equipment. **Environmental Surveillance.** The Government has identified environmental protection as a major priority. It has emphasized the prevention of pollution and the promotion of "green" practices in its day-to-day operations. The Department of National Defence and the Canadian Forces have been at the forefront of efforts to meet these goals. Indeed, all planning and operations (and this includes allied activity in Canada) are now designed with environmental stewardship firmly in mind. Beyond this, the Department of National Defence has concluded a memorandum of understanding with the Department of the Environment with respect to the use of the Canadian Forces in environmental surveillance and clean-up. The agreement sets out the role of theDepartment and the Forces in assisting the Department of the Environment in the event of a serious environmental incident. In addition, as the Forces carry out their routine surveillance missions, they will seek to identify and report potential and actual environmental problems. # Protecting Canadians **Disaster Relief.** The Canadian Forces play a key role in responding to natural and man-made disasters. Not only is the Minister of National Defence also the Minister Responsible for Emergency Preparedness, but, as part of a broader initiative to reduce the size of government, the administration of emergency preparedness planning - once carried out by a separate agency - has been absorbed by the Department of National Defence. Memoranda of understanding between the Department and other government agencies govern the coordination of resources in response to emergencies, and the Department will make an immediate and effective contribution to disaster relief. ----- **Search and Rescue.** The Department of National Defence and the Canadian Forces make a vital contribution to the maintenance and operation of Canada's search and rescue capability. While elements of this capability are provided by other federal and provincial organizations, the Canadian Forces: ## � are responsible for air search and rescue; � provide significant resources to assist the Coast Guard in marine search and rescue; � assist local authorities in land search and rescue; and, � operate three Rescue Coordination Centres which respond to thousands of distress signals every year. Search and rescue represents a significant challenge for Canadian Forces personnel and their equipment. The distances involved can be enormous and the operating conditions very difficult. Nevertheless, for Canadians, safeguarding human life remains an absolute priority, and the Canadian Forces will continue to play a major role in this vital area. **Objectives** The decline in the direct military threat to Canadian territory has not eliminated an on-going role for the Canadian Forces at home. We will maintain a level of military capability sufficient to play an appropriate role in the defence of Canada. The Forces will honour the statutory requirement to respond to requests for Aid of the Civil Power. Through the assistance they provide to civil authorities, the Canadian Forces will help protect Canadian sovereignty, and carry out a wide variety of secondary roles. The Forces will be capable of mounting effective responses to emerging situations in our maritime areas of jurisdiction, our airspace, or within our territory, including the North. Specifically, the Canadian Forces will: ## � demonstrate, on a regular basis, the capability to monitor and control activity within Canada's territory, airspace, and maritime areas of jurisdiction; ## � assist, on a routine basis, other government departments in achieving various other national goals in such areas as fisheries protection, drug interdiction, and environmental protection; ## � be prepared to contribute to humanitarian assistance and disaster relief within 24 hours, and sustain this effort for as long as necessary; ## � maintain a national search and rescue capability; � maintain a capability to assist in mounting, at all times, an immediate and effective response to terrorist incidents; and, � respond to requests for Aid of the Civil Power and sustain this response for as long as necessary. ----- # Chapter 5 Canada-United States Defence Cooperation The United States is Canada's most important ally and the two countries maintain a relationship that is as close, complex, and extensive as any in the world. Canada and the US are partners in the world's largest bilateral trading relationship. The undefended border between them is evidence of the common political, economic, social and cultural values Canada and the US share as advanced industrial democracies. Geography, history, trust and shared beliefs have also made the two countries partners in the defence of North America. # Evolving Security Challenges Since 1940, when President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Mackenzie King signed the Ogdensburg Agreement, which acknowledged the indivisible nature of continental security and pledged mutual assistance in the event of hostilities, Canada-US defence cooperation has persisted through more than five decades of evolving challenges. North America's security environment is changing again. Russia retains the bulk of the former Soviet strategic nuclear arsenal, currently numbering some 10,000 warheads. However, under the terms of the strategic arms reduction treaties (START I and II), nuclear weapons are slated for deep reductions, with the strategic warhead total on each side limited to between 3,000 and 3,500. Multiple-warhead intercontinental ballistic missiles, the most destabilizing component of US and Russian nuclear forces, are to be eliminated by 2003. As implementation of START I and II proceeds over the next decade, stability will be further enhanced. The risk to North America posed by these weapons has diminished with the reduction in tensions, and additional security will be achieved as arms reductions go forward. Potential challenges to continental defence remain, however, especially if one looks beyond the near future. Nuclear weapons continue to occupy a central role in Russian military doctrine. The vast majority of Russia's strategic nuclear arsenal remains in place, with significant financial and environmental obstacles blocking a speedy implementation of the reductions mandated under START I and II. China also maintains strategic nuclear forces able to reach North America, and is continuing to modernize its intercontinental systems. The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery is another concern. A number of states have acquired, or are seeking to acquire, nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, as well as ballistic missile delivery capabilities. Intercontinental threats constitute a longer-term problem. None of the nations with the potential to develop this capability is expected to possess ballistic missiles able to reach North America until well into the next century. Yet nuclear, chemical, biological and theatre missile programs cannot be discounted in planning for future contingencies. One reason is that sophisticated delivery mechanisms are not required in the case of chemical and biological weapons. In addition, weapons of mass destruction already or may soon threaten Canada's friends and allies in Europe and elsewhere, and Canada may want to retain the option of deploying forces to areas where they could face such weaponry. # Bilateral Defence The institutional basis of Canada-US defence cooperation provides highly valued stability in a volatile and turbulent world. As strategic and fiscal realities evolve, however, so too must our bilateral defence arrangements. Canada will continue to modify its defence relationship with the United States, consistent with the priorities of the new era. Canada-US defence cooperation is defined by a wide range of bilateral arrangements, including formal government-togovernment agreements, interdepartmental memoranda, and service-to-service understandings. These arrangements cover, among other things, joint planning and operations, combined exercises, defence production, logistics, communications, research and development, and intelligence sharing. In addition, there exist numerous bilateral fora involving regular consultations, discussions and meetings. In examining these arrangements, the Government came to several conclusions. First, Canada-US defence cooperation continues to serve this country's fundamental interests extremely well. Second, the Government wants the Canadian Forces to maintain the ability to work closely with their US counterparts in a variety of situations. Third, even if the Government decided to reduce significantly the level of defence cooperation with the United States, Canada would still be obliged to rely on the US for help in protecting its territory and approaches - and this assistance would then come on strictly American terms, unmitigated by the influence Canada enjoys as a result of its defence partnership with the United States and with our other NATO allies. Finally, while some aspects of the relationship will remain largely unchanged, certain arrangements require updating. # Principal Arrangements Permanent Joint Board on Defence. Created by the Ogdensburg Agreement of 1940, the Permanent Joint Board on Defence is the senior advisory body on continental security and is composed of two national sections made up of diplomatic and military ----- representatives. Its meetings have served as a window on Canada-US defence relations for more than five decades. The Board has examined virtually every important joint defence measure undertaken since the end of the Second World War, including construction of the Distant Early Warning Line of radars, the creation of the North American Air (later Aerospace) Defence command in 1958, the bi-national operation of the underwater acoustic surveillance system and high-frequency direction finding network, and the decision to proceed with the North American Air Defence Modernization program in 1985. In recent years, the Board has proven effective as an alternate channel of communication, one through which the resolution of difficult issues has been expedited. In particular, it has helped devise imaginative solutions to the types of problems engendered by the new global security context, such as cost-sharing in an era of declining budgets. The Government believes that the Board will remain a valuable forum where national interests are articulated and where frank exchanges on current issues allow discussion of the full spectrum of security and defence issues facing our two countries. # Military Cooperation Committee. Established in 1945, the Military Cooperation Committee has served as a vehicle for combined military planning for the defence of North America. Its first task was the revision of the wartime Canada-United States Defence Plan. Over the years, this plan has evolved into the Canada-US Basic Security Plan, which provides for the coordinated use of both countries' sea, land and air forces in the event of hostilities. Today, the Military Cooperation Committee acts as a direct link between national military staffs. As part of the Basic Security Plan, Canada has traditionally assigned forces already tasked for a variety of other missions to the defence of the continent. In the new emerging North American security environment, these forces will now consist of: ## � a joint task force headquarters; � a maritime task group on each coast; � a brigade group with associated support elements; � two squadrons of fighter aircraft; and � a squadron of transport aircraft. # Cooperation on Land. Cooperation between the land forces of Canada and the United States is focused on training. A 1968 Exchange of Notes sets out principles and procedures related to the cross-border movement of troops, enabling land force units from one country to have ready access to training facilities of the other. Additional agreements govern the temporary exchange of small land force units for training purposes, and to oversee bilateral training initiatives and exercises, such as those arranged within the context of the America-Britain-Canada-Australia Armies program. # Cooperation at Sea. The maritime dimension of Canada-US cooperation in the defence of North America involves the surveillance and control of vast ocean areas on both coasts and in the Arctic. This mission is carried out in close partnership with the United States Navy and Coast Guard, and includes planning, operations and logistic support. Bilateral exercises at sea are held regularly, offering an opportunity to evaluate defence plans, improve operational Standards, and enhance the ability of Canadian and US forces to work together. The two countries share surveillance data, as they have done for many years, supported by the joint operation of facilities such as the Canadian Forces Integrated Undersea Surveillance System, which recently opened in Halifax. Exchange of information and services also takes place in support of search-and-rescue and anti-narcotics operations. Both countries benefit from agreements involving the exchange of fuel and materiel between ships at sea, the shared use of test and evaluation ranges, and support provided during ship visits. Canada's maritime forces have significantly expanded their close cooperation with the United States Navy off North America's Pacific coast. Finally, Canadian and US maritime forces have cooperated in recent years to provide humanitarian relief to areas devastated by natural disasters, as in the aftermath of Hurricane Andrew in 1992. # North American Aerospace Defence Agreement (NORAD). The NORAD agreement formalized over a decade of ad hoc Canada-US cooperation on continental air defence which began shortly after the Second World War. Under the agreement, an integrated headquarters assumed operational control over forces made available for air defence. Since then, NORAD has evolved to meet the challenges to North America posed by changing weapons technologies. ----- In today's changed geostrategic circumstances, Canada will maintain aerospace surveillance, missile warning, and air defence capabilities at a significantly reduced level. The Government believes it is prudent to preserve the ability of Canada and the US to regenerate forces should a strategic threat to the continent arise in the future - in effect, maintain a modicum of equipment, infrastructure and expertise - while reducing operating levels to those required for current peacetime activities. The North Warning System of radars and forward operating locations will be maintained at a reduced level of readiness. Upon completion, the cost of operating and maintaining the system on an annual basis will be significantly lower. It will retain, however, the capability to conduct higher levels of surveillance and control operations at full readiness should the need arise. In the coming months, formal negotiations will begin on the renewal of the NORAD agreement, the current extension of which expires in 1996. Canada will seek to preserve the benefits of this longstanding cooperation on aerospace defence matters. The Government will examine closely those areas which may require updating in accordance with evolving challenges to continental security. Canada will work towards an agreement that furthers our national interest and meets our defence needs, now and into the 21st century. # Canada-United States Test and Evaluation Program. In 1983, the Canada-US Test and Evaluation Program was established as an umbrella agreement allowing the US military access to Canadian test facilities. Over the past decade, sonobuoy technology, anti-armour munitions, upgrade packages for the F/A-18 fighter aircraft and, most notably, unarmed cruise missiles have undergone testing in Canada. In February 1993, the program was renegotiated and renewed for a 10-year period. Under the terms of this agreement, Canada has reciprocal access to US testing facilities. In addition, each country has agreed to charge only incremental costs -those related to the conduct of a specific test at the facility, rather than the expenses related to the operation of the entire facility - thereby reducing significantly the cost of Canadian testing, evaluation and certification carried out in the United States. The Government considers the Test and Evaluation Program an integral component of our bilateral defence relationship. The agreement allows us to test in a cost-efficient manner a variety of key Canadian systems in the United States. In turn, we allow the US to test certain systems deemed essential to continental and global security, subject to approval on a case-by-case basis. The agreement is also very flexible, allowing easy adaptation to changing circumstances. Earlier this year, both Governments announced the end of cruise missile testing in Canadian airspace. # Defence Production/Defence Development Sharing Arrangements. Another aspect of Canada-US defence cooperation consists of an extensive network of defence production, research, and development arrangements. Signed in 1956, the Defence Production Sharing Arrangement has allowed Canadian firms to compete on an equal footing with their American counterparts in the US market. Since 1963, the Defence Development Sharing Arrangement has assisted Canadian firms in developing goods for use by the US military. These arrangements rest on the principle that, given the interdependent nature of North American defence, both countries benefit from the economies of scale arising from specialization. Canada has long recognized that its own defence market is too small to support a defence industrial base which can meet all the requirements of the Canadian Forces. These arrangements have allowed Canada to take advantage of large-scale US production as well as demand for defence-related goods both in the United States and among our European allies. This is all the more important in an era of diminished resources and increased competition, particularly given that the Uruguay Round of multilateral trade negotiations failed to make much progress in the areas of defence procurement and research. These arrangements also allow Canadian firms to stay in touch with developing technologies and help Canada generate and sustain high-technology jobs in the defence and civilian sectors. # Looking to the Future **Space.** In recent years, space has emerged as an increasingly important component of the global security environment. Space already supports the traditional military activities of the maritime, land, and air forces, including command, control and communications, intelligence gathering, surveillance, navigation, mapping, meteorological services and arms control verification. With the advent of missile warfare, the role of space in protecting the modern state has taken on added significance. Looking ahead, the possibility of developing a space-based surveillance system for North America in the next century will be explored, subject to a variety of military, financial and technological considerations. ----- **Missile Warning and Defence.** Canada supports ongoing discussions with the United States, NATO allies, and other partners on the possible expansion beyond North America of the missile warning function currently discharged by NORAD, whose value was demonstrated during the Gulf War. The Government has followed with interest the evolution of US defence policy and strategy in recent years toward an emphasis on ground- and sea-based theatre missile defence systems. Canada welcomes the decision by the American government to adhere to the strict interpretation of the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. Indeed, we see a strong commitment on the part of the United States to developing a missile defence posture that enhances global stability and is consistent with existing arms control agreements. For now, Canada is interested in gaining a better understanding of missile defence through research and in consultation with likeminded nations. In the future, Canada's potential role in ballistic missile defence will not be determined in isolation, but in conjunction with the evolution of North American and possible NATO-wide aerospace defence arrangements. Canadian involvement in ballistic missile defence would also have to be cost-effective and affordable, make an unambiguous contribution to Canada's defence needs, and build on missions the Forces already perform, such as surveillance and communications. **Objectives** For more than five decades, Canada and the United States have cooperated in the defence of North America and in support of international peace and stability. The benefits of continuing this relationship are as valid today as ever before. First, Canada gains inestimable training and operational experience applicable not only to North America, but also to UN and other multilateral missions abroad. Second, Canada retains an influential voice in US defence policy formulation in areas where our security interests are directly involved. Third, Canada obtains access to significant defence-related information that would not otherwise be available. Fourth, Canadian companies benefit from access to important technologies and the large US defence market. As circumstances have evolved over the years, so too have Canada-US defence relations, taking account of new strategic and fiscal realities. The turbulent nature of global affairs and the need to make the most of the limited resources available for defence are leading again to further changes. Modifications to existing bilateral arrangements and the upcoming negotiations on NORAD's renewal are important elements of this process. Meanwhile, Canada will continue to rely on the stability and flexibility its relationship with the United States provides to help meet this country's defence requirements in North America and beyond. **To this end, the Department and the Forces will:** ## � maintain the ability to operate effectively at sea, on land, and in the air with the military forces of the United States in defending the northern half of the Western hemisphere; ## � begin formal negotiations with the United States on the renewal of the NORAD agreement that expires in 1996, ensuring that its provisions reflect North American aerospace defence priorities; ## � as part of a renewed NORAD agreement, cooperate in: � the surveillance and control of North American airspace; � the collection, processing and dissemination of missile warning information within North America; and � the examination of ballistic missile defence options focused on research and building on Canada's existing capabilities in communications and surveillance; and ## � maintain Canada's participation in the Canada-US Test and Evaluation Program, the Defence Production and Development Sharing Arrangements, and other existing bilateral arrangements. ----- # Chapter 6 Contributing to International Security Canadians are internationalist and not isolationist by nature. We uphold a proud heritage of service abroad. We take pride in Lester B. Pearson's Nobel Prize for Peace not simply because it did a great Canadian considerable honour, but because it was a reflection of our evolving international personality. More than 30 years later, Canadians could once again take pride in their contribution to peace as the Nobel Peace Prize was awarded in recognition of the work of peacekeeping personnel. Multilateral security cooperation is not merely a Canadian tradition; it is the expression of Canadian values in the international sphere. We care about the course of events abroad, and we are willing to work with other countries to improve the lot of all manner of peoples. Canadians are not blind to the lessons of history. Although they recognize that states will want to devote resources to pressing domestic concerns, their experience of two world wars and the Korean conflict has made them wary of the peacetime temptation to believe that their security is assured - particularly when based on wishful predictions about the future. Canada's experience has also underscored the need to develop and maintain effective multilateral institutions that can address security and stability - and that can respond effectively to aggression should other measures fail. As a reflection of the global nature of Canada's values and interests, the Canadian Forces must contribute to international security. We should continue to play an active military role in the United Nations, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. We should develop our defence relationships with the nations of the AsiaPacific region and Latin America, and contribute, where possible, to the security of the Middle East and Africa. The complex security problems that confront the international community today defy easy solutions. Nevertheless, there is a strong desire to address these problems throughmultilateral institutions. This derives not only from the state of global political relations, but also from the sense that, at a time when many countries are reducing their military expenditures to devote more resources to domestic issues, multilateral cooperation represents a sound way to pool national resources and use these to the greatest benefit. Thus, now more than ever, multilateralism needs and deserves our support - not only in terms of our words and ideas, but also in terms of tangible Canadian contributions to international security and well-being. # A Canadian Perspective on Multilateral Operations Over the past few years, the nature of multilateral operations undertaken in support of the United Nations has changed enormously. Where, in the past, these operations were comprised largely of traditional peacekeeping and observer missions, the range of operations has expanded to encompass the complete range of military activity - from preventive deployments to enforcement actions such as the Gulf War. Indeed, the broader nature of these operations has been well-noted in the 1993 report of the UN Secretary-General, Agenda for Peace. As operations in support of UN objectives have evolved, there have been both successes and failures. There have been some very successful operations, such as the mission of the United Nations Transition Assistance Group, which assisted Namibia's transition to independence. The multinational operation in the Gulf in 1990-91, in response to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, enforced economic sanctions against Iraq and, when this failed to yield Iraqi compliance with UN resolutions, restored Kuwaiti sovereignty in a brief but effective military campaign. There have been notable disappointments as well. The UN operation in Somalia began as a worthy and ambitious undertaking to restore order, deliver desperately needed humanitarian assistance, and facilitate national reconstruction. As the operation comes to an end, it seems clear that at least two of these three objectives have not been achieved. Similarly, UN operations in the former Yugoslavia have undoubtedly saved lives, but they have also underscored the challenge presented by mission mandates that undergo constant change, and the difficulty of bringing the resources of regional organizations, such as NATO and the European Union, to bear on UN objectives. In yet other cases, such as Rwanda, the UN has been simply unable to act in a timely fashion. Canada - which has consistently been a strong advocate of multilateralism in general, and the UN in particular - has been an active player in the recent surge of UN operations. Canada will remain a strong advocate of multilateral security institutions. We also believe, however, that the objectives and conduct of multilateral missions in support of peace and stability must reflect a clear sense of perspective. Some of the considerations that need to be taken into account are common to all multilateral operations. Others pertain to the involvement of specific multilateral security organizations - in particular, the UN and NATO. **General Considerations.** Canada's extensive experience with multilateral operations has led us to identify certain characteristics in the purpose, design and operational conduct of a mission that enhance its prospects for success. These missions should address genuine threats to international peace and security (as, for example, in the Gulf or the former Yugoslavia) or emerging humanitarian tragedies (such as the situations in Somalia and Rwanda). They must not become ends in themselves; they must be part of a comprehensive strategy to secure long-term, realistic, and achievable solutions (such as the UN's operations in Central America). ## � The design of all missions should reflect certain key principles: ----- ## � There be a clear and enforceable mandate. � There be an identifiable and commonly accepted reporting authority. � The national composition of the force be appropriate to the mission, and there be an effective process of consultation among missions partners. ## � In missions that involve both military and civilian resources, there be a recognized focus of authority, a clear and efficient division of responsibilities, and agreed operating procedures. ## � With the exception of enforcement actions and operations to defend NATO member states, in missions that involve Canadian personnel, Canada's participation be accepted by all parties to the conflict. Canada's experience - which encompasses UN, NATO, and other multilateral undertakings - also suggests that successful missions are those that respect certain essential operational considerations. ## � The size, training and equipment of the force be appropriate to the purpose at hand, and remain so over the life of the mission. ## � There be a defined concept of operations, an effective command and control structure, and clear rules of engagement **The UN and NATO.** Canada's experience has also shaped the Government's perspective on the respective roles to be played in multilateral operations by the two most important multilateral security institutions to which Canada belongs - the UN and NATO. Canada's ongoing participation in both organizations reflects the belief that each has a valuable contribution to make in the evolution of international peace and stability. At the same time, each organization has its own strengths, weaknesses, and limits. Historically, the UN has only rarely been able to achieve the level of consensus required to act militarily. As a consequence, it lacks the staff and the required experience in the planning or generation of multinational forces that would enable it to make use of the military potential of its member states in the most timely and effective manner. Indeed, that the UN even has forces at its disposal is subject to the willingness of individual member states to contribute such forces at the time. The focus of NATO has been narrower: the Alliance is dedicated to the collective defence of its member states. Its restricted membership of 16 like-minded countries has made consensus easier to achieve. As a result, it has much more experience in the design and generation of multinational forces - for defensive purposes - as well as with the planning andexecution of joint operations. Moreover, the commitment to participate in the defence of an Alliance country is virtually automatic for all member states. Canada is strongly in favour of a vigorous and effective United Nations, capable of upholding the political values and procedural means set out in its Charter, and believes that situations requiring international military action should be dealt with in accordance with the terms of the Charter. The UN's pre-eminent authority to conduct operations requiring the force of arms derives from its membership, which is nearly universal in its scope, and the terms of its Charter, which sets the existing ethical and legal context for relations between and, to some extent, within states. Yet, the UN suffers from serious problems. The organization is plagued by a chronic funding crisis, owing to the failure of member states to honour their financial obligations, and the recent spate of very large, extraordinarily complex, and extremely expensive operations which have put a significant strain on its financial resources. In addition, the Security Council requires reform if it is to serve the international community adequately. Its decision-making needs to be made more transparent. Its resolutions should be more carefully drafted. Non-members of the Council - especially troop contributors - need to be consulted more systematically. In terms of the internal workings, the UN has not been able to discharge effectively its expanded post-Cold War role. Bureaucratic reform, streamlining, and cost-cutting are essential to restore its credibility. Once the UN has determined its goals, identified the means to achieve them, and set its strategy on a given issue, it should be able to execute its decisions in a timely and effective manner. A standing UN force may provide one option to solve the UN's longstanding problems with respect to the ready availability of forces. The practical issues involved in the establishment of such a force are complex, and Canada intends to see the issue studied thoroughly. In the interim, we will, on a national basis, enhance our ability to contribute to UN operations. Within the limits of our resources, we will strive to respond expeditiously to UN requests for expertise, individual personnel, and entire field units. Canada will also remain a strong supporter of a reformed NATO. Canada believes that NATO's reservoir of military competence and capabilities should make a greater contribution to UN operations. The Alliance will only do so, however, if its relationship with the global organization is clearly and appropriately defined and widely understood. NATO will make its most valuable contribution to multilateral operations by providing the UN with the vigorous military support that it currently lacks. In carrying out this role, the Alliance should resist the temptation to intrude on the provision of political and strategic direction for the mission; that responsibility must rest with the Security Council. For its part, the UN needs to recognize that when it calls upon NATO to provide effective military support, the Alliance's proven chain of command and operating procedures should not be constrained by political or military guidance that is unclear, hesitant, or divisive. Such guidance impairs NATO's operational efficiency and effectiveness, does not advance the cause of UN objectives, and ultimately diminishes the credibility of both organizations. ----- **National Considerations.** Canada must remain prepared to contribute forces to a wide range of UN and other multilateral operations. Certain international scenarios will result in a prompt Canadian response, such as the need to come to the defence of a NATO state or respond to the emergence of a comparable threat to international peace and security. Although this general commitment is clear, under more normal circumstances Canada can and must be selective if it is going to remain in a position to play a meaningful role. Canada cannot, and need not, participate in every multilateral operation. Our resources are finite. We may not agree with the purpose or organization of a given mission. We may not be convinced of its prospects for success. We may be otherwise engaged. Moreover, Canada is not obliged to take on a major portion of every operation or to contribute forces for longer than seems reasonable. Nevertheless, Canada will maintain its specialization in multilateral operations. We will commit forces to such operations if suitable resources are available, and if our personnel can be appropriately armed and properly trained to carry out the task and make a significant contribution to the success of the mission. # The Range of Choice Canada's record of commitment to multilateral operations is unsurpassed. While the number of operations in which Canadian Forces personnel have been involved is striking, what is equally important is that these operations have encompassed almost the complete spectrum of military activity. Subject to the principles outlined earlier, the Government is willing to commit maritime, land, and air forces (as well as support elements) to the full range of multilateral operations, including those set out below. **Preventive Deployment of Forces.** This entails the deployment of forces between parties to an imminent dispute prior to the outbreak of conflict to defuse tension, enhance confidence, and prevent minor incidents from escalating inadvertently to full-scale hostilities. The Government sees great value in these deployments, as part of a broader diplomatic strategy to resolve a dispute peacefully and prevent the outbreak of hostilities. Indeed, Canada was one of the initial participants in the very first preventive deployment of UN forces, to the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia in 1993, an operation designed to lend a measure of stability to a tense part of the Balkans. **Peacekeeping and Observer Missions.** These missions represent the traditional kind of `peacekeeping', on the Golan Heights, or in Cyprus. They entail the positioning of impartial forces between the parties to a ceasefire, and involve the monitoring of agreements during the course of negotiations intended to lead to a political solution. In recent years, these operations have not enjoyed the same profile as other multilateral operations, including missions in the former Yugoslavia, Somalia, and Cambodia. Nevertheless, where there is a desire to move from a situation of armed conflict to political resolution, traditional peacekeeping missions canmake a valuable contribution in assisting the transition. Canada's expertise in this field is unsurpassed, and the Government is committed to the continued participation of the Canadian Forces in such operations. Enforcing the Will of the International Community and Defending Allies. The most ambitious operations of the past few years have used armed force, under multilateral auspices, to enforce the will of the international community - not only in cases of conflict between states, but within states as well. Recent examples of such operations have included: ## � the enforcement of economic sanctions or arms embargoes; � the use of armed forces to create secure conditions for the delivery of aid; � the denial of air space through which hostile forces could prosecute a military campaign or attack civilian populations (`no-fly zones'); ## � the protection of civilian populations and refugees in `safe areas'; and, � the provision of deterrence or defence for a UN or NATO member state against armed attack. The Canadian Forces have been involved in every type of operation listed above, requiring a wide range of military training and capability. Our personnel have helped enforce economic sanctions off Haiti and the former Yugoslavia. They have sought to restore order and ensure the delivery of humanitarian aid in Somalia. As part of UNPROFOR, they have done the same in Croatia, while supplementing this activity by helping to monitor the `no-fly zone' and participating in the protection of `safe areas' in BosniaHercegovina. In 1990-91, the Canadian Forces were part of the multinational coalition that reversed Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. Finally, throughout this period, the Canadian Forces have continued to train with NATO allies to preserve the Alliance's capability to defend against armed attack. Ethnic and religious tensions, the increasing number of `failed states', and the persistence of inter-state conflicts over borders and resources, strongly suggest that the future nature of multilateral military operations must be multi-dimensional to address a full range of challenges. The goals of these missions - the protection of civilian populations and refugees, national reconstruction, upholding international law, and opposing aggression - are invariably unimpeachable. That does not mean, however, that they will always go smoothly or will not pose significant risks to Canadian Forces personnel - particularly in an environment where the proliferation of advanced weaponry is becoming the rule rather than the exception. Nevertheless, Canada will remain prepared to contribute forces to such operations, whether they are authorized by the UN, or as part of the efforts of regional organizations such as NATO or the CSCE. ----- **Post-Conflict Peacebuilding.** The rehabilitation of areas that have been the scene of armed conflict represents an important contribution that the training, skills, and equipment ofour armed forces can make to security abroad. Past instances of such contributions include the provision of humanitarian relief supplies and the use of engineers to rebuild infrastructure and remove land mines. Following the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, Canada took the additional step of training refugees to recognize and disarm land mines. These activities can make an invaluable contribution in building a more durable peace, and the Government will explore ways in which the Canadian Forces can contribute further. Prior to taking office, the Government noted that the relationship between the military and civilian aspects of the new multilateral missions was an area that needed to be explored. The Government will build upon the excellent progress that has already been made. Our accumulated experience with such military-civilian coordination from missions in Ethiopia, Somalia, and Rwanda suggests that armed forces have a critical role to play at the outset of these missions in the establishment of a secure environment and the provision of basic support (such as transport, emergency medical assistance, logistics and communications). Over the long-term, however, reconstructive activities - be they the administration and enforcement of civil law, the provision of medical care, or the distribution of humanitarian aid - are best left to civilian organizations. **Measures to Enhance Stability and Build Confidence.** Arms control and measures to build confidence represent an important way to prevent or limit conflict and foster stable relations between states. Over the past two years, for example, implementation of the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe destroyed over 7,000 tanks from the countries of the former Warsaw Pact - a total sufficient to equip 32 Soviet-style army divisions. The ability to inspect and verify compliance remains crucial to the relative success or failure of these arrangements. The Department of National Defence and the Canadian Forces have played their part in past operations of this type and, within the limits of their resources, this will continue. One of the most interesting and productive means to enhance stability and build confidence has been through multilateral and bilateral contacts between the civilian and military staffs of various countries. Such contacts - which may range from brief visits to full-fledged staff talks and exchanges - serve to build transparency, confidence, and trust through direct personal contact and greater familiarity with differing perceptions of defence issues as well as military culture and doctrine. The Canadian Forces have used such bilateral and multilateral contact programs to discuss a variety of questions, from defence planning to civil-military relations. Exchanges with military forces from Central and Eastern Europe and the Commonwealth of Independent States have shown great promise. The Government will now expand this program of exchanges and extend its scope to include other countries. To this end, we will increase substantially the budget devoted to the Military Training Assistance Program to build up contact programs with Central and Eastern Europe, the Commonwealth of Independent States, Asia, Latin America, and Africa. # Training for Multilateral Missions The Government believes that combat training - undertaken on a national basis as well as with allies - remains the best foundation for the participation of the Canadian Forces in multilateral missions. In situations short of war, such training equips Canadian Forces personnel with the complete range of skills that may be needed to meet the varied demands of the unexpected situations they will encounter. Canada will support and contribute to the enhancement of peacekeeping training. ## � Recent experiences in UN operations have confirmed the value of cultural sensitivity, international humanitarian law, and dispute resolution training prior to deployment. Such training has always formed part of the preparation for Canadian peacekeepers sent abroad; it will be further enhanced. ## � The Government has assisted in the establishment and funding of the Lester B. Pearson Canadian International Peacekeeping Training Centre at Cornwallis, Nova Scotia, under the auspices of the Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies. The Department will sponsor peacekeeping training at the Centre for military personnel from countries participating in NATO's Partnership for Peace and developing countries under the Military Training Assistance Program. # Organizations and Commitments **Strengthening the United Nations.** Canada - which has unfailingly lent its political and financial support to the United Nations - remains committed to UN reform. In the security sphere, Canada brings superbly qualified personnel, significant military capabilities, and a great deal of experience to UN operations. Other countries look to Canada for leadership. In addition to its solid record in the financial support of UN operations, Canada has already taken the lead in providing UN headquarters with military expertise to improve its planning and operational capabilities. Canada will continue to advocate that funding arrangements for UN operations be improved. We will also ----- work toward the further enhancement of the UN's command and control system, as well as the development of its administrative and logistics capabilities. Where the participation of the Canadian Forces in UN peacekeeping operations was once subject to a numerical `ceiling' or planning figure of 2000 personnel, our recent experiences suggest that we would be better served by a more flexible approach. As a matter of general principle, the Canadian Forces will remain prepared to deploy on UN operations contingency forces of up to a maritime task group, a brigade group plus an infantry battalion group, a wing of fighter aircraft, and a squadron of tactical transport aircraft. Were these forces to be deployed simultaneously, this could conceivably involve in the order of 10,000 military personnel. Within this upper limit, Canada will increase its commitment of stand-by forces to the UN from a battalion, an air transport element, and a communications element to the vanguard component of its contingency forces - that is, two ships (one on each coast), one battle group, one infantry battalion group, one squadron of fighter aircraft, a flight of tactical transport aircraft, a communications element, and a headquarters element. If deployed simultaneously, this would represent a commitment of 4,000 personnel, which could then be sustained indefinitely. The Forces will also remain prepared to deploy, for limited periods, selected specialized elements of the Canadian Forces medical personnel, transport and signals units, and engineers - in humanitarian relief roles. Other Canadian contributions, such as the provision of observers and technical specialists will be undertaken as feasible. **NATO: Participation and Reform.** Canada will remain a full and active member of NATO. The monolithic threat to Western Europe has disappeared and, for now, the principal responsibility for European defence must lie with the Europeans themselves. At the same time, the Government values the transatlantic link that NATO provides, and recognizes that, since 1990, the Alliance has made progress in adapting to a post-Cold War world. Those aspects that reflect a cooperative approach to European security relations, including the creation of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC), Partnership for Peace, and the development of the Combined Joint Task Force concept, are especially notable. Canada will press for additional change. The Alliance's fundamental and primary role is to provide for the collective defence of its member states. NATO can, however, make a greater contribution to collective and cooperative security than is currently the case, and the Government will work toward striking an appropriate balance between the Alliance's traditional mission and its newer roles. Canada will be an active participant in the Alliance's ongoing efforts to reach out to the countries of Central Europe as well as to those of the Commonwealth of Independent States. We give our full support to NATO expansion, but continue to believe that this question must be addressed very carefully - certainly, the process must not exacerbate Russian fears of encirclement or exclusion. Canada will participate in multilateral and bilateral programs that aim to integrate gradually our NACC partners into an effective security order for the Northern Hemisphere. Finally, Canada will insist that the Alliance become a more efficient organization, in terms of its budgets and operating costs - in the same way that national defence departments in all member states have had to adjust to fiscal restraint. In particular, we will propose that NATO's large and costly bureaucracy be reduced, and that the military budget be spent on activities that are relevant to the new environment. The Government's perspective on NATO underpins the future of Canada's Alliance commitments. In the event of a crisis or war in Europe, the contingency forces that Canada will maintain for all multilateral operations would immediately be made available to NATO. Should it prove necessary, Canada would mobilize further national resources to provide the additional forces required to fulfil Canada's commitment to the Alliance as set out under Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty. Apart from this general commitment to contribute forces to the defence of Alliance territory, Canada will maintain a number of specific peacetime NATO commitments. Set within the context of Canada's earlier slate of Alliance commitments, there are three important changes. First, Canada will terminate its commitment to maintain a battalion group to serve with Allied Command Europe's Mobile Force (Land) or the NATO Composite Force in the defence of northern Norway. The evolution of European security and of NATO's strategic posture suggests that this battalion group could make a more useful contribution to a NATO force designed to deploy rapidly anywhere within Alliance territory, including Norway. As a result, we would be willing to contribute an infantry battalion group to NATO's Immediate Reaction Force. The battalion group's equipment, which is currently prepositioned in Norway and is particularly well-suited to northern operations, will be returned to Canada to help offset the needs of larger Regular Land Force combat units and the Militia. Second, Canada will supplement its contribution to NATO's Standing Naval Force Atlantic with the assignment, on an occasional basis, of one ship to NATO's Standing Naval Force Mediterranean. This initiative will further extend the benefits that our naval personnel gain from operating with allied navies, and is in keeping with NATO's broader geographic focus. ----- Third, Canada has been a major net contributor to the NATO Infrastructure Program. This program once provided a cost-efficient way to pool funds from the Alliance countries to construct infrastructure for collective defence. In light of changes in the European security environment, the full post-war recovery of Western Europe's economy, and the need to address cooperative security needs in Central and Eastern Europe, Canada will scale back its contribution to this program and devote some of these funds to the expansion of our bilateral contact programs with Central and Eastern Europe under the Military Training Assistance Program. **A Continuing Role in the CSCE.** Canada has played an active role in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) since its inception in 1973. Our participation has included the signing of the original document (the Helsinki Final Act of 1975), the Stockholm Document on confidence-building measures in 1986, the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe in 1990, and the Vienna Documents of 1990 and 1992. Canada has also contributed forces to the European Community Monitor Mission in the Balkans (which wascalled for by the CSCE), and lent operational support to the CSCE mission in Nagorny-Karabakh. The CSCE is the only organization addressing regional security concerns in Europe that includes Russia as well as virtually all the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. This gives the organization a particular role in building confidence among its members. It also opens the possibility that the organization, which has played a significant role in forestalling conflict, can also play a role in resolving conflict - a role that could include a range of peacekeeping and related operations. To the extent that the CSCE arrives at a consensus in favour of performing these functions, Canada will be prepared to support such activities within the constraints imposed by budgetary considerations and the availability of suitable resources. The CSCE lacks an effective decision-making mechanism. Indeed, despite recent measures to upgrade its administrative machinery, it remains more a process than an organization. Yet, through encouraging transparency between its member states and regional organizations (such as NATO and the WEU), as well as the gradual development of a pan-European code of conduct, the CSCE stands to make a valuable contribution to European security over the long term. Canada will remain an active participant in this forum. **Reaching out to Asia-Pacific.** Aside from its role in the Korean War, Canada's participation in Asia-Pacific security affairs since the end of the Second World War has been largely limited to the commitment of forces to various peacekeeping and observer missions (including the International Commission for Supervision and Control in Vietnam, and the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia), along with participation in the `RIMPAC' air and naval exercises with the United States, Japan, Australia, and, on occasion, other Asia-Pacific countries. As our interest in Asia has grown over the past few years, Canada has become more active in a variety of regional security initiatives - particularly through the encouragement of regional security dialogues such as the Asia Regional Forum, the Council for Security Cooperation in Asia Pacific, and the Canadian Consortium on Asia Pacific Security. All of these activities will continue, and, as our economic stake in the region grows, Canada will play a more active role in its security. To this end, we will expand the current program of bilateral military contacts we maintain with a variety of Asian countries, including Japan, South Korea, and members of the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN). These contacts are currently limited to the presence of defence attaches in selected capitals and the conduct of periodic staff talks and conferences. Our activities in the Asia-Pacific region will be broadened gradually to include a more regular program of visits and exchanges in the area of peacekeeping, including programs at the Lester B. Pearson Canadian International Peacekeeping Training Centre. **A Continuing Role in Other Regions.** In addition to its role in the Gulf War, Canada has taken part in more than thirty peacekeeping, observer and humanitarian relief missions in Latin America, the Middle East, and Africa since 1947. Canada's commitment to the stabilityof these regions through the UN and, where appropriate, regional organizations will continue. The Government will lend greater emphasis to the Latin American dimension of our security policy, both bilaterally and through the Organization of American States. We will assist Latin American countries in such areas as peacekeeping training, confidence-building measures, and the development of civil-military relations. In Africa, Canada will encourage the development of a regional capability to undertake peacekeeping missions, both on a bilateral basis and through programs being undertaken at the Lester B. Pearson Canadian International Peacekeeping Training Centre. # Objectives The Government is renewing Canada's traditional commitment to participate in the military dimension of international security affairs. Canada will remain an active participant in the UN and NATO, but will push for additional reform within these institutions to make them more relevant, timely, efficient, and effective. Canada will continue to participate in the CSCE, and, within the limits of available resources, more fully develop defence relations with the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, Latin America, the Asia-Pacific region, and Africa. The dramatic expansion of UN operations - both in terms of number and scope -confronts Canada with some difficult choices. Owing to financial constraints, Canada will have to be selective in its commitments. Canadians will also have to accept that some missions will entail a considerable amount of risk. Nevertheless, by choosing to maintain a multi-purpose, combat-capable force, ----- Canada will retain the capability to make a significant and responsible contribution to international peace and stability, within a UN framework, through NATO, or in coalitions of like-minded countries. To this end, the Canadian Forces will: ## � maintain the capability to assist the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade in the protection and evacuation of Canadians from areas threatened by imminent conflict; ## � participate in multilateral operations anywhere in the world under UN auspices, or in the defence of a NATO member state, and, to that end, ## � be able to deploy, or redeploy from other multilateral operations, a joint task force headquarters and, as single units or in combination, one or more of the following elements: ## � a naval task group, comprised of up to four combatants (destroyers, frigates or submarines) and a support ship, with appropriate maritime air support, ## � three separate battle groups or a brigade group (comprised of three infantry battalions, an armoured regiment and an artillery regiment, with appropriate combat support and combat service support), ## � a wing of fighter aircraft, with appropriate support, and, � one squadron of tactical transport aircraft; � provide: � within three weeks, single elements or the vanguard components of this force and be able to sustain them indefinitely in a low-threat environment, and ## � within three months, the remaining elements of the full contingency force; � earmark: � an infantry battalion group as either a stand-by force for the UN, or to serve with NATO's Immediate Reaction Force; and ## � have plans ready to institute other measures to increase the capabilities of the Canadian Forces to sustain existing commitments or to respond to a major crisis; ## � also maintain the following specific peacetime commitments to NATO: � one ship to serve with the Standing Naval Force Atlantic, � one ship to serve, on an occasional basis, with the Standing Naval Force Mediterranean, � aircrews and other personnel to serve in the NATO Airborne Early Warning system, � approximately 200 personnel to serve in various NATO headquarters, � participation, at a reduced level, in the NATO infrastructure program, and, � the opportunity for Allied forces to conduct training in Canada, on a cost-recovery basis; � in response to changing geographic priorities, expand bilateral and multilateral contacts and exchanges with selected partners in Central and Eastern Europe, the Asia-Pacific region, Latin America, and Africa, with a particular emphasis on peacekeeping, confidence-building measures, and civil-military relations; and, ## � support the verification of existing arms control agreements and participate in the development of future accords. ----- # Chapter 7 Implementing Defence Policy Canada's military circumstances have changed enormously over the past seven years. Over the same period, the financial condition of the country has worsened considerably. For these reasons "business as usual" is no longer an acceptable approach to defence policy. The defence policy put forward in this White Paper is hard-nosed and realistic, but also mindful of our global responsibilities. It allows us both to uphold our essential military traditions and renew our commitment to global stability. It clearly represents a major evolution - a step change in Canadian defence policy. It heralds a fundamental transformation of the way in which the Canadian Forces and the Department of National Defence will conduct their operations and do business in the coming years. In setting this new course, the Government has had to make hard choices. Most areas of defence will be cut - staff, infrastructure, equipment, training, operations - some substantially more than others. The relative weights of the naval, land and air establishments that have prevailed for many years will be adjusted, primarily to allow for the transfer of resources to where they are most needed - mainly to land combat and combat support forces -in response to the added emphasis being placed on multilateral activities, and particularly peace and stability operations. Maintaining the essential capabilities of the Canadian Forces at a time of fiscal restraint represents a difficult challenge. The defence program has been substantially revised to reflect only the most essential priorities. Everything is being made leaner everything is undergoing the closest scrutiny. Major cuts in headquarters and support activities will mean more resources devoted to combat forces and less to administrative overhead. This will ensure that the Canadian Forces remain well commanded, properly trained, and adequately equipped for the missions the Government asks them to carry out. # Management, Command and Control **Reductions of National Defence Headquarters and Subordinate Headquarters.** While the structural foundations of the Department and the Canadian Forces are basically sound and capable of meeting the challenge, they can be further streamlined. The Department of National Defence and the Canadian Forces will, in particular, continue to improve resource management through initiatives such as Defence 2000 to ensure the best possible use of resources at all levels of the organization. This management policy emphasizes the delegation of decision-making authority, the empowerment of personnel, the elimination of `red tape' and overlappingfunctions, and the promotion of innovation. The Department and Forces will, by 1999, reduce by at least one-third the personnel and resources committed to headquarters functions. **Integrated Headquarters.** The integrated National Defence Headquarters (NDHQ) has been in existence for more than 20 years. NDHQ fosters a close military-civilian relationship and brings together a wide range of knowledge, skills and perceptions, which all contribute to more focused, coherent, and efficient defence management. At the strategic level, military activity is intertwined with - and inseparable from - social and economic considerations, as well as public and policy imperatives. This was most clearly demonstrated during the Gulf War and the crisis at Oka. International, military, financial, public and Cabinet concerns had tobe reconciled promptly, and prudent choices made. A responsive headquarters is also essential if we are to maintain our very active role in peacekeeping and other multilateral operations. Thus the Government can see no compelling reason that would justify reversing the civilian-military integration of National Defence Headquarters. **Command and Control.** The Canadian Forces' command and control structure has proven both responsive and adaptable, but takes up too large a proportion of the resources available to defence. In response to the recommendations of the Special Joint Committee on Canada's Defence Policy, a new command and control structure will be put into place by mid-1997. It will be based on sound military command and control principles, and respond to the need to increase the proportion of operational personnel - thus increasing the "tooth-to-tail" ratio. The command of military operations will continue to be exercised by the Chief of the Defence Staff - normally through a designated operational commander - and one layer of headquarters will be eliminated. **Capital Equipment Program.** The changed security environment and current fiscal circumstances demand that National Defence radically restructure plans to purchase capital equipment. The emphasis will be on extending the life of equipment wherever cost-effective and prudent. New equipment will be acquired only for purposes considered essential to maintaining core capabilities of the Canadian Forces, and will be suited to the widest range of defence roles. Wherever possible the Canadian Forces will operate fewer types of equipment than is now the case and purchase equipment that is easier to maintain. The Department will also explore innovative ways to ----- acquire and maintain equipment. Planned acquisitions will be cut by at least 15 billion dollars over the next 15 years. As a result, a large number of projects currently in plans will be eliminated, reduced or delayed. **Procurement.** The Department of National Defence will adopt better business practices - greater reliance will, for example, be placed on "just-intime" delivery of common usage items to reduce inventory costs. The Department will increase the procurement of off-the-shelf commercial technology which meets essential military specifications and Standards. Full military specifications or uniquely Canadian modifications will be adopted only where these are shown to be absolutely essential. The Department will also enhance its partnership with theprivate sector. Where business-case evaluations demonstrate potential for increased cost effectiveness, support activities currently conducted "in house" will be transferred completely to Canadian industry or shared with private industry under various partnership arrangements. The Department will continue to seek out new ways to support operational forces. The materiel supply system and its processes will become markedly more efficient through consolidation and the adoption of advanced technology. Further steps will also be taken to modernize and streamline the procurement process in consultation with other concerned departments. **Industrial Impact.** In the midst of all these changes it is important to recognize the relationships between Canadian defence policy and Canadian industry. In today's world, multi-purpose, combat capable forces require the support of a technologically sophisticated industrial base to be effective. In addition, in all leading industrial nations there is a close linkage between expenditure on defence R&D and procurement and the growth of many high technological sectors. In Canada, almost 60,000 people are employed in high technology industries like aerospace and electronics, which are linked to defence procurement. These linkages extend far beyond the production of defence equipment to include technological spin-offs into commercial products and access to international markets. The challenge of lower R&D and capital spending and more off-the-shelf purchasing will be to maintain and improve the industrial impact of those expenditures which remain. To this end, National Defence will work with Industry Canada, as well as Public Works and Government Services Canada, towards harmonizing industrial and defence policies to maintain essential defence industrial capability. The Government will seek to foster defence conversion, overall industrial growth, and the international competitiveness of Canadian firms consistent with our international trade agreements. **Infrastructure and Support.** Although National Defence has made considerable headway in reducing defence infrastructure and support, further reductions are both possible and necessary. Action is underway to extend significantly the defence infrastructure and support service rationalization mandated in the 1994 federal budget. **Defence Studies.** The Government agrees with the finding of the Special Joint Committee that the modest program of assistance to Canadian universities and other institutions involved in defence studies is a highly worthwhile investment. This program will be maintained. A chair of defence management studies will also be established. # Personnel Issues **Personnel Reduction.** Personnel cuts will continue. The reductions will be implemented in an orderly, fair and equitable manner. The Government is firmly committed to dealing humanely and reasonably with those of its employees whose jobs are eliminated, and to working with the unions. **Code of Service Discipline.** The Code of Service Discipline, set out in the National Defence Act, has been in existence for almost 45 years with only limited amendments. Therehave been significant changes in Canadian social and legal Standards during that time. The Government will amend the National Defence Act to update its provisions to meet modern military requirements. This will involve, in particular, amendments to the military justice system as it relates to both courts martial and summary trials. **Terms of Service.** The Government will place more emphasis on renewable, short-term periods of service for members of the Canadian Forces. The period of service for engagements will depend upon the skills and training required to do the job. Reservists participating in and returning from operational assignments will benefit from the same post-operational care now available to the Regular Force. ----- **Personnel Policy.** Military career paths will be restructured to reduce the number of postings and assignments that a permanent member of the Canadian Forces can expect over a lifetime of service. This policy will result in fewer relocations, and thus ease the burden on military personnel and families, and save money for the Government. The Canadian Forces will reduce military staff in certain occupations and trades as functions are contracted out or reassigned to civilian employees. The new command and control structure will substantially reduce the overall number of senior positions, and the ratio of general officers and senior civilian officials to overall strength, as well as the ratio of officers to non-commissioned members in the Regular Forces and the Reserves, will be significantly decreased. The percentage of women in the Canadian Forces is among the highest of any military force in the world. Nevertheless, the commitment to making military careers more attractive to women will be reinforced. Although the need for "universality of service" in the military remains paramount, the Department and the Forces will ensure that equitable employment opportunities continue to exist for all Canadians, regardless of gender, race, sexual orientation, or culture, and will strictly enforce the policy of "zero harassment" in the work place. Proposals for enhancing the federal government policy on reserve leave will be developed. The Government will encourage, and seek out new ways for other levels of government and private companies - particularly small businesses - to do the same. The Canadian Forces will also emphasize the importance of availability for active duty when recruiting reservists. **Civilian Workforce.** The civilian workforce is an integral component of the Defence team. Highly qualified public servants play a wide variety of essential roles within the organization in support of the achievement of the defence mission, from the delivery of skilled services at local levels to the provision of professional administrative, scientific and academic services. While the overall numbers of civilian employees will be further reduced to approximately 20,000 by 1999, our civilian employees will continue to play critical roles in the effective implementation of the new policy. # Total Force The Canadian Forces are a unified force of maritime, land and air elements. Their structure is based on a Total Force concept that integrates full- and part-time military personnel to provide multi-purpose, combat-capable armed forces. Under the Total Force concept, Regular Forces are maintained to provide the Government with a ready response capability; Reserve Forces are intended as augmentation and sustainment for Regular units, and, in some cases, for tasks that are not performed by Regular Forces - such as mine countermeasure operations. The concept also provides the framework for training and equipping the Reserves. Progress has been made in the implementation of the Total Force concept, with many reservists now fully ready to undertake Regular Force functions. Indeed, in recent years, several thousand reservists have served in demanding missions at home and abroad. The Total Force approach is right for Canada. The Government recognizes the continuing need for a national mobilization framework; however, changes are needed to reflect Canada's requirement for ready forces if it is to be able to meet domestic needs and contribute to multilateral operations. **Mobilization.** The new strategic environment has prompted the Government to reconsider the traditional approach to mobilization planning. Mobilization plans must provide for a graduated and orderly transition from routine peacetime operations to higher levels of involvement, which ultimately could include the total mobilization of the nation. Accordingly, mobilization plans will be revised on the basis of a new, four-stage framework. ## � The first stage of a response to any crisis or emergency would involve "force generation"; that is, all measures needed to prepare elements of the Canadian Forces to undertake new operational tasks, and to sustain and support them. These functions will be undertaken within the existing resource framework of the Canadian Forces. They will include the training and preparation of reservists to augment the Regular Force. ## � The next stage, "force enhancement", would involve the improvement of the operational capabilities of the existing forces through the allocation of more resources. It would be undertaken without permanent change in the posture or roles of the Canadian Forces, although the formation of temporary units or specialist elements could prove necessary. This level of mobilization is similar to actions taken in response to the 1990 war in the Persian Gulf and all current peacekeeping commitments. ## � "Force expansion", the third stage, would involve the enlargement of the Canadian Forces - and perhaps selected elements of the Department of National Defence -to meet a major crisis or emergency. It will involve permanent changes in the roles, structures, and taskings of the Canadian Forces - and could call for theformation of new units, the ----- enhancement of existing facilities, and the procurement of additional equipment. This stage is similar to the structural and role changes undergone by all elements of the Canadian Forces and the Department of National Defence in 19501952, when Canada provided armed forces to the United Nations' multinational force in Korea, and to the newly formed NATO in Europe. ## � Finally, while a major global war is highly unlikely at this time, it remains prudent to have ready "no-cost" plans for total "national mobilization". This fourth step could touch upon all aspects of Canadian society and would only come into effect with the proclamation by the Governor-in-Council of a "war emergency" under the Emergencies Act. **Revised Force Posture.** By 1999, the strength of the Regular Forces will be reduced to approximately 60,000 and the Primary Reserve to approximately 23,000. This, together with the new mobilization concept and renewed emphasis on multilateral operations in support of global stability, will dictate a number of force structure adjustments. In light of the need to maintain adequate states of readiness - to respond to UN or other multilateral taskings, for example - the current balance between regulars and reservists in operational units is no longer appropriate. The Government agrees with the Special Joint Committee that the land force must be expanded. A total of approximately 3,000 additional soldiers will be added to the army's field force. The additional resources will be provided through reductions in headquarters, restructuring of the three services, and a reduction in the size of the Reserves. **Reserves.** The Reserves are a national institution and provide a vital link between the Canadian Forces and local communities. Their primary role will be the augmentation, sustainment, and support of deployed forces. While the overall number of reservists will be reduced, the quality and overall ability of the Reserves to provide the Total Force with trained personnel for unit augmentation will be significantly improved. A thorough examination of all elements of the Primary and Supplementary Reserves will be conducted with the aim of enhancing their ability to respond to new requirements and the new mobilization approach. The Government recognizes that a greater proportion of the Reserves' resources must go towards improving their operational capability and availability. In particular, the Militia structure requires attention and rejuvenation to ensure that units are more efficient and better able to contribute to the Total Force concept. Consideration will also be given to assigning more service support roles - such as medical, logistics, communications and transport functions - to the Reserves. To the extent that changes may also be required in the Naval, Air and Communications Reserves, the same general pattern will be followed. The Supplementary Reserve, comprised of former military personnel who could augment the Regular Force in an emergency, will be maintained, but will no longer be funded. Many reserve units, despite long and honourable service, have diminished in size and effectiveness in recent years and their armouries are under-used. The new strategic and fiscal environment will require a streamlining of reserve organizations and rank structures. Every effort will be made to maintain the traditions and effectiveness of reserve regiments. However, local communities must take more responsibility to help sustain Reserve traditions and activities. The Canadian Rangers reflect an important dimension of Canada's national identity and the Government will enhance their capability to conduct Arctic and coastal land patrols. The Government will also modestly increase the level of support to Cadet organizations to help expand their role in building citizenship and advancing national unity. # CANADIAN DEFENCE PERSONNEL **Operational Maritime Forces** Since the end of the Cold War, Canada's maritime forces have maintained multi-purpose combat capabilities to carry out a wide variety of domestic and international operations. They have substantially reduced anti-submarine warfare activities connected with the protection of shipping and countering missile-carrying submarines in the North Atlantic, while increasing their participation in UN and multilateral operations. The navy will be able to form a task group on the West Coast and another on the East Coast from among units of the Atlantic and Pacific fleets. To facilitate this new focus, naval ships are being re-distributed to achieve a better balance between Canada's two open-water oceans. Cooperation and coordination between the various government fleets will continue to be improved. Canada's maritime forces will be adequately equipped to carry out their new array of tasks. There is an urgent need for robust and capable new shipborne helicopters. The Sea Kings are rapidly approaching the end of their operational life. Work will, therefore, begin immediately to identify options and plans to put into service new affordable replacement helicopters by the end of the decade. The Special Joint Committee on Canada's Defence Policy found that submarines can conduct underwater and surface surveillance of large portions of Canada's maritime areas of responsibility, require relatively small crews, can be operated for roughly a third of the cost of a modern frigate, and work well with other elements of the Canadian Forces. It also recommended that, if it should prove possible in the current environment of military downsizing around the world to acquire three to six modern diesel electric submarines on a basis that was demonstrably cost effective (i.e., that could be managed within the existing capital budget), then the Government should seriously consider such an initiative. The United Kingdom is seeking to sell four recently ----- constructed conventional submarines of the Upholder-class, preferably to a NATO partner. The Government intends to explore this option. To maintain sufficient capability to sealift troops, equipment and supplies for multilateral operations, the support ship HMCS Provider (initially slated to be paid off in 1996) will be retained in service, and plans for the eventual replacement of the existing fleet will be considered. Starting in 1995, the navy will receive the first of 12 modern Maritime Coastal Defence Vessels (to be crewed primarily by reservists), intended to provide a coastal defence and mine countermeasure capability that has been lacking. # Operational Land Forces The importance of the Canadian Forces' mission to support an allied land campaign in Central Europe has diminished, allowing the withdrawal of our forces from Europe. Multi-purpose combat capabilities are now maintained to carry out a wide variety of domestic and international operations. Canada's land forces will be adequately equipped to carry out their new array of tasks. The materiel of the three brigade groups will be improved. Current plans call for the acquisition of a variety of modern equipment essential to the maintenance of a multipurpose combat-capability. There exists, for example, a recognized operational deficiency in the armoured personnel carrier fleet. Its mobility, protection and defensive firepower must be brought into line with the modern requirements of environments likely to be encountered in today's UN and other multilateral missions. The Canadian Forces will, therefore, acquire new armoured personnel carriers for delivery, commencing in 1997. Modernization of part of the present inventory will add other suitably armoured personnel carriers to the fleet. The relatively new Bison APCs will be retained in service. The fleet of Cougar armoured training vehicles that are part of the army's close-combat, direct-fire capability in peace and stability operations will eventually have to be replaced. # Operational Air Forces The focus of air planning and operations has shifted from missions driven primarily by the former Soviet threat to a more balanced set of national and international priorities. Multi-purpose combat capabilities are now maintained to execute a wide variety of domestic and international operations, as well as to provide support to maritime and land operations. Canada's air forces will be adequately equipped to carry out their new array of tasks. The Labrador search and rescue helicopters will be replaced as soon as possible. While this role may be performed using the same helicopter that we acquire for the maritime role, we also intend to explore other possibilities, including different forms of partnership with the private sector for aircraft maintenance, and potentially, alternative arrangements for financing acquisition of a replacement. Expenditures on fighter forces and support will be reduced by at least 25% as recommended by the Special Joint Committee on Canada's Defence Policy. To achieve these savings, the Department will retire the CF-5 fleet, cut the cost of fighter-related overhead, reduce the annual authorized flying rate, and cut the number of operational aircraft from 72 to between 48 and 60. The initial training of fighter pilots to operational Standards will be modified, with fighter lead-in training formerly done on the CF-5 apportioned between the Tutor jet trainer and the CF-18. These changes will serve to prolong the life of the CF-18 fleet and delay the need to buy a replacement aircraft well into the next century. The multi-purpose capability of the CF-18 will be enhanced through the acquisition of a small number of precision-guided munitions. This will afford the Government a very accurate close air support capability and maximize the usefulness of the aircraft. It will, in particular, provide new options for the use of this sophisticated weapons system in circumstances applicable today with ammunition so accurate as to minimize damage outside the target area. In the absence of valid offers to buy the VIP A-310 Airbus, and in recognition of the future demand for strategic airlift support, it will, as recommended by the Special Joint Committee, be reconfigured for a strategic transport and air cargo role. ----- # Conclusion Several years after the fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of the Soviet empire, Canada finds itself in a world fundamentally transformed, characterized by considerable turbulence and uncertainty. Similarly, at home, Canadians now live and work in a society of more limited resources and new challenges, where many of the old rules and certainties have lost their validity. In these circumstances, ensuring Canada's security and defining an appropriate role for our armed forces is more than ever a challenge for all Canadians. With this White Paper, the Government has fulfilled its obligation to provide Canadians with an effective, realistic and affordable defence policy. From the outset, our objective was not to discard sound practices in favour of simplistic solutions. Rather, the Government was committed to reviewing carefully every aspect of Canada's defence policy so that it could make reasoned judgements on how best to ensure the nation's security and well-being. At the heart of our approach were extensive and farreaching public consultations, lasting for most of 1994. The Government believes the defence policy enunciated in this White Paper reflects a Canadian consensus. The White Paper affirms the need to maintain multi-purpose, combat-capable sea, land and air forces that will protect Canadians and project their interests and values abroad. It also concludes that to maximize the contributions of our armed forces, their traditional roles -protecting Canada, cooperating with the United States in the defence of North America, and participating in peacekeeping and other multilateral operations elsewhere in the world - should evolve in a way that is consistent with today's strategic and fiscal realities. The Canadian Forces will maintain core capabilities to protect the country's territory and approaches, and to further national objectives. Given that the direct military threat to the continent is greatly diminished at present, Canada will reduce the level of resources devoted to traditional missions in North America. It will, however, remain actively engaged in the United Nations, NATO, and the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. It will become more actively involved in security issues in Latin America and the Asia-Pacific region. To achieve these goals, the Regular and Reserve Forces will both be reduced and refocused, the command and control system will be reorganized, and affordable equipment will be purchased so our troops have the means to carry out their missions. The Department of National Defence and the Canadian Forces will operate more efficiently, making optimum use of infrastructure and equipment, and ensuring full value is derived from the skills, experienceand professionalism of Canada's armed forces and civilian defence employees. The Government will also work towards harmonizing industrial and defence policies to maintain essential defence industrial capabilities. This policy recognizes that the defence budget will be under continuing pressure as the Government strives to bring the deficit under control. More reductions can and will be accommodated, including the military reductions outlined in this Paper and cuts in the Department's civilian workforce arising from a number of additional facilities closures and consolidations. Further savings will be achieved through the elimination, reduction or delay of major acquisition projects currently included in the capital program. Only a few major re-equipment programs remain affordable, and these will directly support the new defence priorities identified in the White Paper. Taken together, these measures will have substantial implications for the Department and the Forces, their members and employees, as well as for local communities and the private sector across Canada. This White Paper provides Canada's men and women in uniform and their civilian colleagues the direction they require to carry out their duties on behalf of the nation, whether the world of the future is a peaceful and stable one, or is plagued by increasing violence within and among states. Indeed, whatever the future brings, the new defence policy will enable Canada to respond and adjust as necessary to deal with the range of challenges to our security that could arise, now and into the next century. -----