## Australia’s National Security

 A Defence Update 2003


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© Commonwealth of Australia 2003

ISBN 0 642 295794


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# Contents

#### Foreword 5

 Introduction 7

 A Changed Strategic Environment 8

 Global Terrorism 11

**The Threat** **11**

**Terrorism in Southeast Asia** **12**

**Australia’s Response** **13**

#### The Threat of Weapons of Mass Destruction 15

**A Layered Response** **16**

#### A Troubled Region 18

**Southeast Asia** **18**
**The South Pacific** **20**
**Papua New Guinea** **20**

**Other Pacific Island Countries** **21**

#### Implications for Defence 23

 ADF Operations 2002-03 26


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4 DEFENCE UPDATE 2003


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## Australia’s National Security: A Defence Update Foreword

This statement follows from the Government’s
consideration of Australia’s strategic interests two years
after the release of the Government’s Defence White
Paper, _Defence 2000: Our Future Defence Force. It_
recognises and sets out our responses to the salient
features in our changing security environment: the
emergence of new and more immediate threats from
terrorism and increased concerns
about the proliferation of
Weapons of Mass Destruction.
This statement also addresses our
continuing concerns about
developments in our immediate
region which have consequences
for Australia’s interests.

Since the horrific attacks of
September 2001 and October
2002, the Government has taken
steps to improve security, both
domestically and internationally.

_Senator the Hon Robert Hill_
_Minister for Defence_ These actions, which include

increased funding to intelligence
agencies, improved immigration controls, new Defence
capabilities to combat terrorism and improvements in
airline security, have quickly and effectively responded
to some of the major threats which have emerged.

This statement reviews the implications for Australia’s
defence posture. It concludes that while the principles
set out in the Defence White Paper remain sound, some
rebalancing of capability and expenditure will be

DEFENCE UPDATE 2003 5


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necessary to take account of changes in
Australia’s strategic environment. This
rebalancing will not fundamentally
alter the size, structure and roles of the
Defence Force, but it will inevitably
result in increased emphasis on


readiness and mobility, on
interoperability, on the development and
enhancement of important new
capabilities and, where sensible and
prudent, a reduced emphasis on
capabilities of less importance.

Senator the Hon Robert Hill
Minister for Defence


6 DEFENCE UPDATE 2003


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# Introduction

On releasing the 2000 Defence White
Paper, the Government undertook to
review our defence posture periodically
to ensure Australia continues to have
the appropriate mix of concepts,
capabilities and forces to meet new
challenges as they arise.

In just over two years since the Defence
White Paper was released, we are in no
doubt that the strategic landscape has
changed. The question for Defence is
whether the strategic tasks which have
underpinned Defence planning and
capability development - the defence of
Australia, operations in the immediate
neighbourhood, coalition operations
further afield and peacetime national
tasks - still provide a sufficiently firm
but flexible foundation for planning and
capability development, particularly
when addressing today’s threats.


What is already clear is that while the
Defence White Paper focused on the
development of capabilities for the
Defence of Australia and its National
Interests, two matters - terrorism and the
spread of Weapons of Mass Destruction,
including to terrorists - have emerged to
new prominence and create renewed
strategic uncertainty. In addition, some
adverse trends in our immediate
neighbourhood have continued.

The changed strategic and security
environment requires responses from a
number of government agencies. This
update considers mainly the challenges
posed by these changes in our strategic
environment and the implications for
the Australian Defence Force (ADF).


_Tactical Assault Group_

DEFENCE UPDATE 2003 7


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# A Changed Strategic Environment


While strategic competition between
nations has not gone away, major power
relations have generally become more
stable. The combination of US military
and economic might and converging
national priorities in eliminating
terrorism have increased the focus of the
major powers on cooperating to advance
shared interests. Russia and the United
States have put their Cold War
confrontation fully behind them with a
new framework for cooperation, based
on shared security interests and
reductions in their strategic nuclear
capabilities. Russia’s acceptance of
NATO enlargement, and its improved
relationships with the EU and other
Western treaty organisations, bode well
for continued stability across much of
the European continent.


notably Japan, the consequences for
regional stability could be greater if
growth stalled or there was social
breakdown within China.

The potential for conventional military
conflict remains in North Asia.
Notwithstanding progress towards
improved relations between North and
South Korea over recent years, the
Korean peninsula remains a potential
flashpoint. Warning time of a conflict
might be short, especially if North
Korea’s nuclear ambitions and
brinkmanship keep tensions high.
For the time being it seems likely that
the issue will be managed through
peaceful means.


Washington’s strong international

the European continent.

posture since September 2001 is evoking

Despite tensions early in 2001, US-China popular anti-Americanism, and not just
relations have stabilised. But strategic in Muslim countries. So far, hostility is
competition between the US and China more a complication in US management
will continue over the of international
next decade, and the relations than a major
possibility of limitation on US
miscalculation over primacy. Even if
Taiwan persists. broad international
While China’s support for the US
economic rise will declines, this will not
pose challenges for prevent Washington
some countries over pursuing a purposeful
the next decade, _Operation Slipper – on patrol in Afghanistan_ agenda against


8 DEFENCE UPDATE 2003


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serious terrorist, US strategic
WMD or other dominance, the
threats. threat of direct

military attack on

Australia and the

Australia is less

US continue to

than it was in 2000.

share many values

P a r a d o x i c a l l y,

and interests, and

however, in some

we jointly benefit

other important

from, and _Operation Slipper deployment in the Gulf_ ways, certainty and
contribute towards, predictability have
global stability and prosperity. decreased because the strategic
Australia’s defence capability is advantage offered by our geography
enhanced through access to US does not protect Australia against rogue
information and technology. Our states armed with WMD and long-range
relationship with the United States ballistic missiles. Nor does it protect
remains a national asset. The United Australia from the scourge of terrorism.
States’ current political, economic, and In some regions of high strategic
military dominance adds further weight significance to Australia, notably North
to the alliance relationship. The alliance Asia and the Middle East, it is still
increases Australia’s ability to conceivable that conflict could occur,
contribute effectively to coalition directly affecting Australia’s interests.
operations.

Less strategic certainty means that our

As a result of a combination of factors emphasis must be on having the
including greater stability in major flexibility and adaptability to answer
power relations and increased the unexpected as much as the expected.

DEFENCE UPDATE 2003 9


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10 DEFENCE UPDATE 2003


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# Global Terrorism

### The Threat


The numerous recent terrorist attacks,
both pre and post September 2001,
demonstrate that terrorism is more than
a transitory phenomenon and is likely
to last for years. A critical strategic and
security dimension for Australia is that
militant extremists in Southeast Asia are
prepared to take up the Al Qaida cause
and that Australia has been identified as
a target.

Twenty-first century international
terrorism, as represented by Al Qaida
and its regional offshoots and affiliates,
differs from the terrorism of the
seventies and eighties. The new
terrorism is more strategically focused.
Its objective is to roll back Western
values, engagement and influence, and
to weaken and ultimately supplant
moderate Islamic governments.


demonstrated both willingness and
capability to inflict massive casualties
on civilian targets as a strategic end.

It is not just increased lethality that sets
Al Qaida apart, but that it draws on
personnel, money and equipment
organised across national borders. Since
September 2001, the international
community has made concerted efforts
to trace international terror networks
and identify the often-shifting alliances
and associations between them. There
is still much work to be done to find and
destroy terrorist leaders and cells, but
even though the main force of terrorist
attacks will often be felt at the national
or regional level, it is a global conflict. It
may eventually be seen as the most
violent phenomenon of the information
age. Al Qaida cells or operatives have
been identified in many countries across
the Middle East, Europe, Southeast Asia,
Africa and the United States, and it is
almost certain
that others have
yet to be found.


In the past, terrorist attacks tended to
focus on obtaining a symbolic or tactical
a d v a n t a g e .
Although this
i n v o l v e d
indiscriminate
killing, large
numbers of
deaths were not
in themselves the
objective. By
contrast, Al Qaida
and its associated
networks have _Australian Embassy East Timor_


While terrorists
lack the resources
of the nation state,
p a r t i c u l a r l y
c o n ve n t i o n a l
military forces,
they have
discovered that


DEFENCE UPDATE 2003 11


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this is not a barrier to strategic effect. The
reality is that terrorism has gained
strategic advantage by turning the
strengths of tolerant and open societies
into weaknesses, and then striking at
vulnerable points to devastating effect.
For Australians, this reality was brought
home in Bali. There remains a great risk
that the mass casualties inflicted in
recent attacks have set the terrorists’
sights even higher, possibly including
the acquisition and use of WMD.


against mainly local targets. We, with
other regional governments, tended to
see them as focused essentially on
domestic issues. Working together we
have now uncovered a much more
worrying picture - that regional
extremist networks are larger, more
capable and more active than we had
believed. The Bali attacks highlighted
links between entrenched militant
regional extremist groups and global
islamist terrorism.


We now know that Jemaah Islamiyah (JI)

### Terrorism in

has a well-established regional network

### Southeast Asia

which sometimes works with Al Qaida in

The Bali attack confirmed that

support of its objectives. We also know

extremist organisations in Southeast

that it has cells operating throughout

Asia are no longer focused exclusively

Southeast Asia, with the stated goal of

on local issues. Regional extremists

creating an Islamic state encompassing

target secular moderate Muslim and

Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore and the

non-Islamic governments, as well as

southern Philippines. We know also that

Western targets. And they receive

JI has planned and conducted attacks in a

inspiration, training, support and

number of regional countries, including

know-how from Al Qaida and Middle

a foiled plot to bomb the Australian, US,

Eastern radical Islamist groups.

UK and Israeli diplomatic missions in

The Australian Government was aware Singapore. There has been a significant
of the existence in our region of effort to bring members of JI to justice in
e x t r e m i s t Singapore, Malaysia
organisations before and Indonesia, but JI
September 2001 and continues to pose a
of the preparedness threat. Recognising
of some, such as the the threat, Australia
Moro Islamic took a lead in
Liberation Front ensuring that JI was
(MILF) and the Abu listed in the United
Sayyaf Group Nations as a terrorist
(ASG), to engage in organisation linked
acts of terrorism _Evacuation following the Bali bombing_ to Al Qaida.

12 DEFENCE UPDATE 2003


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### Australia’s Response

The Australian Government’s response
to international terrorism acknowledges
that the terrorist threat to Australians
and Australian interests has increased, both
domestically and overseas. The problem
cannot be managed by one country alone a targeted bilateral, regional and global
approach is also needed.


The coalition against terrorism - which
includes over 60 countries - is not just
about a shared sense of outrage, but also
about a shared sense of threat. This was
why the Australian Government
invoked the ANZUS Treaty immediately
after 11 September, for the first time in
the treaty’s 50-year history.

The Australian Government’s
contribution to the war has spanned
diplomatic, legislative, police and
intelligence cooperation, capacitybuilding, and financial and border
controls, as well as direct military
activities and broader Defence
c o o p e r a t i o n .
This focus will be
enduring and the
ADF may well be
called on to
contribute to
further efforts in
the War on Terror.


Allowing the threat of terrorism to The Australian Government’s
determine our alliance arrangements contribution to the war has spanned
would be contrary to Australia’s core diplomatic, legislative, police and
principles and values. Our participation intelligence cooperation, capacityas a US ally in the War on Terror might building, and financial and border
attract some criticism. But a weaker or controls, as well as direct military
equivocal response to this threat would activities and broader Defence
not serve Australia well, or decrease our c o o p e r a t i o n .
vulnerability. And This focus will be
this would not

enduring and the

reduce the

ADF may well be

prospect of US

called on to

and other foreign

contribute to

interests being

further efforts in

targeted in

the War on Terror.

Australia, with
the inevitable loss The important
of Australian role of military
lives, or of force in the War on

_Operation Slipper patrol in Afghanistan_

A u s t r a l i a n s Terror has been
abroad being incidental victims of demonstrated in Afghanistan.
terrorism. Australia’s security is affected The removal of the Taliban regime - Al
if there are any regions in the world from Qaida’s host - has eliminated one of the
which terrorists with Al Qaida’s world’s most oppressive governments
ambitions and capacity can operate and given the people of Afghanistan the
internationally with impunity. chance of a better future. Information


DEFENCE UPDATE 2003 13


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gained has added to our understanding
of terrorist networks and disrupted
planned attacks. Importantly, Al Qaida
has lost its unhindered access to terrorist
training camps in Afghanistan. But
actions in disrupting Al Qaida’s
operations in Afghanistan are just the
first step. Much remains to be done and
some further resort to military force is
likely to be needed.

The links between extremist
organisations in Southeast Asia
underline the need for improved
cooperation within the region. During
the last year, Australia entered into
Memoranda of Understanding (MOU)
on Combating International Terrorism


with Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand,
and negotiations are under way with
other governments. The significance of
these arrangements was highlighted by
the joint investigation into the Bali
terrorist attacks, ably conducted by the
Indonesian police with support from the
Australian Federal Police.

The Australian Government is aware
that the majority of Muslims hold
moderate views and that they are no less
victims than other religious, ethnic or
national groups. Moderate Muslims face
the challenge of theology and ideology
thrown up by bin Laden in his attempt
to capture the heart of one of the world’s
great religions.


_Tactical Assault Group_

14 DEFENCE UPDATE 2003


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# The Threat of Weapons of Mass Destruction


There have been some post-Cold War
achievements in arms reduction, notably
to US and Russian nuclear stockpiles.
Yet the threat of proliferation, especially
among rogue states and terrorists,
remains a significant security challenge.

The end of Soviet communism and the
growth of globalisation created an
environment in which the proliferation
of nuclear, chemical and biological
weapons could flourish. WMD
precursors, many of which are dual-use,
are available on the world market, as is
technical expertise. The increased flow
of goods and information around the
world, one of the results of globalisation,
has made it easier to match WMD
demand with potential suppliers.
Biological and some chemical weapons
can be manufactured largely with dualuse equipment and materials.


Asia, is actively pursuing longer-range
ballistic missiles and a developing
nuclear weapon capability. Countries
like Iraq and North Korea see WMD as a
source of international leverage and
domestic legitimacy. The prospect that
Saddam Hussein might threaten to use
WMD against his enemies in the region
or supply WMD to terrorists reinforces
the international community’s efforts to
ensure Iraq is disarmed. Since September
2001 the world community has
become less tolerant of rogue states’
WMD ambitions.

The strategic consequences of WMD
proliferation are profound. If the
international community’s determination
to combat proliferation were to wane
and known rogue states were allowed
such weapons programmes, others
would try hard to emulate them.


WMD are the ultimate asymmetric Furthermore, it would be a strategic
threat. WMD allow weak states miscalculation to underestimate the
prepared to defy resourcefulness,
international norms persistence or
and non-state actors ambitions of
(like terrorist groups) dedicated terrorists.
to strike unilaterally. We know that they
And these states are intend to inflict mass
ambitious: North casualties and we
Korea, for example, know they are
which can already making every effort
strike much of North _Inspecting weapons_ to acquire WMD

DEFENCE UPDATE 2003 15


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capability. In Afghanistan coalition
forces found clear evidence that Al Qaida
was actively pursuing biological,
chemical and nuclear weapons.

### A Layered Response

The international non-proliferation and
export control frameworks remain an
important first line of defence against
WMD. But the frameworks are only
credible and effective if they keep pace
with international developments and
are enforced. Australia is working hard
internationally to ensure this happens
but we recognise the aggressiveness of
determined proliferators. Therefore we
need a comprehensive response - a
layered defence.

Diplomacy is at the forefront.
Strengthening the various multi-lateral
n o n - p r o l i fe r a t i o n
a r r a n g e m e n t s,
intelligence sharing, law
e n f o r c e m e n t
cooperation, financial
and border controls is
similarly important.


states or terrorists, where peaceful
efforts have failed.

Collective responsibility for meeting
such threats to peace and security has
already emerged as a test for the
international community in the twentyfirst century. In deciding whether to
participate in such coalitions, the
Government will look to Australia’s
national security and the extent of our
global interests at stake.

For Australia, prevention of
WMD proliferation is a high priority
for our intelligence agencies and a
specific focus of their cooperation
with our intelligence partners. A
focus of our intelligence efforts in the
region is to monitor trade
in dual-use technologies. The Australian
Government is encouraging regional
governments to
strengthen their
domestic and export
control regimes and
m a i n t a i n i n g
arrangements for
monitoring transshipment points given
the important role many
countries in the region
play in international
trade.


But diplomacy and
international cooperation
will not always succeed:
the Australian Government
may need to consider
future requests to support
coalition military
operations to prevent the
proliferation of WMD,
including to rogue


In the worst case we need
to be ready to respond to
a WMD attack on
Australian soil or against
_Operation Slipper in the Gulf_ Australian interests. The


16 DEFENCE UPDATE 2003


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domestic layer of defence is a shared
responsibility between the States and
the Commonwealth and includes police,
customs and other agencies, but the ADF
has particular knowledge and skills to
contribute. The Incident Response
Regiment has an important role in
supplementing State and Territory
capabilities to respond to a nuclear,
chemical, biological or radiological
incident.

The events of September 2001, North
Korea’s current brinkmanship, and
concerns over Iraq’s capabilities have
reinforced the resolve of the US to push
ahead with establishing an effective


missile defence system. Given the
prospect of the ADF operating more
often with our allies and friends in
regions under threat of WMD
delivered by ballistic missiles, Australia
supports the development of effective
missile defences to protect deployed
military units.

In relation to strategic missile defence,
the US is looking to involve its allies and
this will be an increasingly important
priority in the twenty-first century. We
are continuing our close dialogue with
the US on missile defence, particularly
given our close cooperation on Ballistic
Missile Early Warning.


DEFENCE UPDATE 2003 17


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# A Troubled Region


The 2000 Defence White Paper
acknowledged that countries in
Australia’s immediate region faced
major economic, political, governance
and social challenges. This applied
particularly to Indonesia, East Timor,
Papua New Guinea and other island
states of the South Pacific. In addition,
some of these countries have made little
progress against the daunting economic,
political and social challenges they faced
in the year 2000.


weakened. Slow growth rates,
insufficient employment opportunities
and economic hardship reinforce
popular disaffection with the West as
well as their own governments. Existing
political and leadership weaknesses,
combined with declining governance
standards, increase the vulnerability of
some regional governments even before
the additional challenges of dealing
with terrorism and its economic effects.
In some Southeast Asian countries, these
economic factors
combine with the
misperception that
the War on Terror
targets Muslims to
produce defensive,
n a t i o n a l i s t i c
reactions.


As a consequence of

combine with the

g l o b a l i s a t i o n,

misperception that

Australia’s region is

the War on Terror

more exposed to

targets Muslims to

world events,

produce defensive,

including security

n a t i o n a l i s t i c

threats, than it was.

reactions.

The terrorist attacks
in the US and Bali, There is little

_Operation Citadel patrol in East Timor_

and the arrests in evidence of aggressive
Singapore, Indonesia and elsewhere in development of
Southeast Asia, demonstrate the reach of military capability in Southeast Asia.
terrorism and show that our region is no Southeast Asian nations are more
longer immune. focused on domestic issues and

economic growth than on regional
disputes.

### Southeast Asia

By 2002, most Southeast Asian GDP But diverse internal and transnational
levels had returned to those seen before problems are still likely to produce nonthe Asian financial crisis, but per capita terrorist related security challenges.
incomes had not. Southeast Asian states People smuggling, illegal fishing and
that were struggling economically even money laundering feed off and
before the extent of the terrorism exacerbate existing difficulties.
problem became clear are being further Corruption, population and


18 DEFENCE UPDATE 2003


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environmental pressures add to the
troubles. Together, these challenges
leave our nearer neighbours vulnerable
to transnational threats.

These are important concerns for
Australia. The requirement to conduct
operations in support of civilian
agencies to protect Australia’s borders
and economic interests, including
against people-smuggling and illegal
fishing, continues unabated.

The Australian Government will
continue to place a high priority on law
enforcement and intelligence
cooperation within the region, and to
assist regional governments to enhance
their financial and border controls.


cohesion, its political stability and its
international reputation.

Indonesia remains of enduring strategic
significance to Australia. The
Australian Government attaches great
importance to supporting the
Indonesian Government and its people
as it manages its many challenges.
Indonesia’s territorial integrity remains
in Australia’s national interests.
Geography dictates that the success of
reform in Indonesia - and its efforts to
eradicate terrorism - are crucial to the
future security of both nations.
With its many small islands and
extensive maritime boundaries,
Indonesia’s effectiveness in responding
to transnational threats such as
smuggling         whether of arms,
drugs or people and piracy will
also require
i n t e r n a t i o n a l
cooperation.


But the need to smuggling combat terrorism whether of arms,
puts additional drugs or people political pressure on and piracy will
already stretched also require
Southeast Asian i n t e r n a t i o n a l
g o v e r n m e n t s . cooperation.
Terrorism apart,
**I n d o n e s i a** For these reasons the

Government is

continues to face
issues of poverty, strongly committed

_Operation Relex in Australian waters_

unemployment, to progressing a
democratisation, economic recovery, broad-based relationship with
corruption, governance and legal Indonesia. In the defence arena, we have
reform. At the same time Indonesia made progress in identifying areas such
confronts religious, ethnic and separatist as maritime surveillance and
challenges to its cohesion and stability. intelligence exchanges where we can
The Bali terrorist attacks and other cooperate in our mutual interest. The
attacks across the archipelago over the Government is also considering limited
past two years threaten Indonesia’s social cooperation with the Indonesian


DEFENCE UPDATE 2003 19


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military forces on hostage recovery and
hijack resolution - an area where, in an
environment of heightened terrorist
threat, Australian lives could rest on
effective Indonesian capabilities and
cooperation between the two defence
forces. Effective cooperation is also
occurring between police, immigration
and intelligence organisations.


These are exacerbated by the pressing
national development problems
facing small and isolated nations, and
the limited capacities of their police
forces and wider governance.
Significant progress is still needed to
dispel these concerns.


Given the South Pacific’s economic and

and intelligence organisations.

social decline, Papua New Guinea and

The people of **East Timor, the world’s** the Pacific Island Countries
newest nation, will need our will continue to face serious
support and assistance. East transnational threats, such
Timor faces daunting as crime and unauthorised
challenges, not least in people movements.
establishing effective Political, economic, and
national institutions and a social crises that directly
productive economy. These affect Australia, or in which
challenges will strain its Pacific countries seek
capacity to address security Australian assistance, are
challenges - which are likely to arise at short
largely internal. Australia notice, and might require
is making a significant

involvement, including

contribution to stability

swift deployment of the

and development in East _Operation Citadel East Timor_

ADF. Military or civil

Timor through our

assistance could be required to restore

development assistance and defence

law and order, to evacuate Australians,

cooperation programmes. We also

or to help in humanitarian disasters.

provide approximately 25 per cent of the

The strength of our national interests,

UN peacekeeping force, though our

and our prominent leadership role in the

contribution will draw down over the

region, means that Australia could be

next two years. Australia will continue

called upon to provide assistance to

to assist East Timor when the

the region in times of crisis, and will

peacekeeping operation comes to

need to maintain the capability to

an end.

respond effectively.


### The South Pacific

The 2000 Defence White Paper
pointed to deep-seated social and
political problems in the South Pacific.


### Papua New Guinea

The past two years have seen positive
developments towards the resolution of


20 DEFENCE UPDATE 2003


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the Bougainville crisis with further steps
towards peace under the Bougainville
Peace Agreement. The unarmed ADFled Peace Monitoring Group (PMG) has
facilitated the peace process, and after
ten years of costly rebellion there are
better prospects for a peaceful future. We
envisage that the PMG will be able to
withdraw from around the middle of
2003, but in the meantime it will work
hard to consolidate the peace.


### Other Pacific Island Countries

**Solomon Islands** continues to face
major obstacles to achieving muchneeded stability. The June 2000 coup led
to the formation of an Australian-led
International Peace Monitoring Team
(IPMT) to support efforts to preserve
peace between warring ethnic groups.
The IPMT - which included Defence
(civilian and ADF) participation helped oversee an end to the inter-ethnic
conflict and withdrew in June 2002. But
ethnic conflict has been replaced by a
breakdown in law and order. Violence
is a serious problem, particularly on
Guadalcanal and Malaita, the economy
has been wrecked and internal
authority and government legitimacy
are often undermined. National
institutions seem powerless to halt the
slide, and there has
been little attempt
to galvanise civil
society to restrain
violence and
corruption.


Overall, however, Papua New Guinea’s

conflict and withdrew in June 2002. But

outlook is worrying. Domestically, the

ethnic conflict has been replaced by a

new Papua New Guinea Government

breakdown in law and order. Violence

needs to continue to work to reverse the

is a serious problem, particularly on

negative trends - in particular a stagnant

Guadalcanal and Malaita, the economy

economy, inadequate levels of education

has been wrecked and internal

and health care, and deteriorating law

authority and government legitimacy

and order. Ill-discipline in the Papua

are often undermined. National

New Guinea Defence Force (PNGDF) in

institutions seem powerless to halt the

2001 and 2002 has further undermined

slide, and there has

confidence in this

been little attempt

institution. The

to galvanise civil

PNG government

society to restrain

has recognised the

violence and

need to downsize,

corruption.

reform and
modernise the The Australian
PNGDF. Although Government should
progress remains not be expected to
disappointing, we _Operation Bel Isi II Bougainville_ solve the problems
welcome Prime of Solomon Islands,
Minister Somare’s renewed and anyway cannot do so. It is only the
commitment to substantial PNGDF people and their leaders who can end
downsizing and reform made during his the violence and give Solomon Islands
2002 visit to Australia and will the stability necessary to address its
continue to support the PNG economic and political problems.
Government’s defence reform process. Australia is, however, providing


DEFENCE UPDATE 2003 21


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substantial support to the Royal
Solomon Islands Police through our
aid and Defence Cooperation
Programmes.

The **Fiji Government has political,**
economic and social challenges to face.
Despite recent internal problems, the
Republic of Fiji Military Force (RFMF)
remains an important national
institution and continues to make an


important contribution to peacekeeping
around the world.

There is also cause for concern about
developments in **Vanuatu since the**
2000 White Paper. Again the problems

- such as conflict within the Vanuatu
police force - are in part institutional and
reflect a general decline in governance
across this region.


_Training exercise in New Caledonia_

22 DEFENCE UPDATE 2003


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# Implications for Defence


Compared to 2000, the significance of
the global strategic and security
environment for Australia’s defence and
security has become much more
evident. The global reach of terrorism
was demonstrated by the horrific
attacks in September 2001 and October
2002. The strategic environment of
2003 is being shaped by the threat of
terrorism and the determination to
counter it. This determination extends
as well to another major global threat the proliferation of WMD. In these
international endeavours, the US with its
combination of economic and military
might, is increasingly dominant. These
are some of the ways in which
Australia’s strategic environment is
different from what it was when the
2000 Defence White Paper was released

For the present, the prospect of a
conventional military attack on
Australian territory has diminished,
because of the stabilising effect of US
determination and willingness to act,
the reduction in major power tensions


and the increased deterrent effect of the
US-Australia alliance flowing from US
primacy. The implication is that for the
near term there is less likely to be a need
for ADF operations in defence of
Australia.

Southeast Asia and the South Pacific face
major challenges due to political
weakness, decline in governance,
difficulty in grappling with terrorism
and the economic effects of terrorism. If
these trends continue, there may be
increased calls on the ADF for
operations in Australia’s immediate
neighbourhood.

The changed global strategic
environment, and the likelihood that
Australian national interests could be
affected by events outside of Australia’s
immediate neighbourhood mean that
ADF involvement in coalition
operations further afield is somewhat
more likely than in the recent past. But
involvement in coalition operations is
likely to be of the type witnessed in


_Operation Slipper_

DEFENCE UPDATE 2003 23


_Operation Slipper_


-----

Afghanistan, and which the
Government has considered in Iraq if
necessary - that is, limited to the
provision of important niche
capabilities.


increasing the size of our Special Forces,
the establishment of a Special
Operations Command, and
enhancements to our Counter Terrorist
capabilities, such as raising a new
Tactical Assault Group, advancing some
intelligence projects and purchasing
additional, more capable troop lift
helicopters, with an accelerated inservice date. In response to the
threat of WMD, the Government
has also directed
an expansion of
Chemical, Biological,
Nuclear, Radiological
and Explosive
defence capabilities
through establishment of the Incident
Response Regiment.


In 2000, the Defence White Paper set out

intelligence projects and purchasing

a Defence posture for the times, and

additional, more capable troop lift

provided a framework for Defence to

helicopters, with an accelerated in
structure appropriately to meet the

service date. In response to the

challenges facing Australia. But our

threat of WMD, the Government

strategic circumstances have changed

has also directed

and this has

an expansion of

implications for

Chemical, Biological,

the types of

Nuclear, Radiological

conflict in which

and Explosive

Australia might

defence capabilities

become involved,

through establish
the types of

ment of the Incident

operations the

Response Regiment.

ADF might have
to conduct, and For potential
the capabilities it _Incident Response Regiment_ c o a l i t i o n
might require. contributions, we
These new circumstances indicate a have improved communications
need for some rebalancing of capabilities systems with our allies, enhanced
and priorities to take account of the new Electronic Warfare Self Protection
strategic environment, changes which measures, improved landmine
will ensure a more flexible and mobile protection, clearance and detection, and
force, with sufficient levels of readiness improved ballistic protection for some

assets. In the longer term, Government

and sustainability to achieve outcomes

decisions on the Joint Strike Fighter,

in the national interest.

Airborne Early Warning and Control

The Government has already decided to (AEWACs) aircraft and the Collins
implement a number of measures as a class submarines will increase our
result of the Australia’s new strategic ability to operate with the US and other
environment. These measures include potential partners.


24 DEFENCE UPDATE 2003


-----

Consideration of other Defence
Capability Plan modifications will be
ongoing.

Australia’s strategic environment has
changed. The threats of terrorism and
WMD are real and immediate. For the


foreseeable future, any ADF operations
are likely to occur within the context of
regional contingencies, the War on
Terror, efforts to counter the proliferation
of WMD or to otherwise enhance global
security and stability.


_Airborne Early Warning and Control aircraft_

_Joint Strike Fighter_

DEFENCE UPDATE 2003 25


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### 2

 5 13
 3 6

 4
 1

 12
 9

Operation

### 8

**Operation Slipper** **10**

**1** **Husky**
Sierra Leone **7**
Contribution to the
International Military Advisory and Training Team

**2** **Osier** **5** **Paladin**
Bosnia Middle East
Contribution to UN mandated Contribution to the
Yugoslavia Security Force UN Truce Supervision Organisation

**3** **Mazurka** **6** **Slipper**
Sinai Middle East
Contribution to the Multinational Force and Observers Contribution to the

International Coalition Against Terrorism

**4** **Pomelo**
Eritrea and Ethiopia26 DEFENCE UPDATE 20037 **Southern Ocean**


-----

Operation

**Operation Bastille**

### 11

Operation

**Operation Citadel**

**8** **Relex** **11 Bel Isi II**
North West Approaches Bougainville
To deter suspect illegal entry vessels Contribution to the
from Australian waters Peace Monitoring Group

**9** **Citadel** **12 Bali Assist**
East Timor ADF support to Australia’s response
Contribution to the UN mission to the Bali bombing
in support of East Timor

**13 Bastille**

**10 Cranberry** DEFENCE UPDATE 2003Middle East 27


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28 DEFENCE UPDATE 2003


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