**&** ###### EFENDING ##### AUSTRALIA :- Defence White Paper 1994 ----- **DEFENDING** **AUSTRALIA** Defence White Paper 1994 Australian Government Publishing Service Canberra ----- PREFACE This White Paper, Defending Australia explains how the Government will manage Australia's defence into the next century. It is the most comprehensive review and restatement of the Government's defence policy since the publication of _The Defence_ _ofAustralia, 1987, which established a clear and rigorous analytical basis for defence_ © Commonwealth of Australia 1994 self-reliance. Since then, strategic circumstances in our region and around the world have changed, and new trends have emerged which will transform Australia's **ISBN 0 644 35364 9** strategic environment over coming years. Military technology has developed, and **This work is copyright. Apart from any use as permitted under the** **_Copyright Act_** the Australian Defence Force has undergone major reforms and developed **_1968, no part may be reproduced by any process without prior written permission_** substantial new capabilities. Over the same period, Australia's economic, **from the Australian Government Publishing Service. Requests and inquiries** technological, and social development have changed the domestic context in which **concerning reproduction rights should be directed to the Manager, Commonwealth** we plan and develop our defence capabilities, and our international policies and **Information Services, Australian Government Publishing Service, GPO Box 84,** **Canberra ACT 2601.** outlook have evolved even further to give greater emphasis to the importance of engaging with our region. This White Paper explains how the Government's defence policy can and will respond to these changes. While the fundamental precepts of self-reliance remain valid, the approaches we take to developing and sustaining our defence capabilities and strategic relationships will need to continue to evolve. Defending Australia builds on important changes to our defence policies announced in a number of statements and reviews published over the last four years, including the 1990 _Report_ _on the Defence Force and the Community, the 1991 Force Structure Review, the_ _1992 Price Report on Defence Policy and Industry and the 1993 Strategic Review._ From that foundation, it looks ahead fifteen years to describe the key international trends that will shape our strategic environment, and to explain how the different elements of our defence policy will develop to meet the challenges ahead. Our strategic circumstances at present are not threatening, but they are likely to become more demanding over the next fifteen years. Our defence capabilities will be developed so we can continue to be able to deter or defeat any credible armed attack, and our regional defence relationships and alliances will evolve to limit the possibility that armed attack on Australia might even be contemplated. As Australia's industrial and technological capabilities develop, and the demands on our defence capabilities increase, we will rely increasingly on our own national support base to underpin our defence. As our population and social structures change, the Australian Defence Force will change the way we employ people to conform to new social, economic and military realities. This publication is set in lipt Times Roman with lipt and 12pt Avant Garde headings. The cover is printed on 300gsm Encore Supergioss Artboard and the text is printed on 1 OOgsm Impress Matt Art. ----- **1205E** **14OE** The decisions we make on these issues over the next few years will determine the `100*E` `RUSSIA` shape of Australia's defence well into the next century because major defence capabilities and strategic relationships take decades to develop. That is why this White Paper looks ahead fifteen years. It aims to explain to all Australians how their defence is planned and managed, and how it will develop in the years ahead. It will also help to inform other countries, including our regional neighbours, about `CHINA` the rationale of our defence posture, and so ensure there is no scope for misunderstanding. The publication of this White Paper is thus itself a contribution `AIWAN` to our future security. 2ON ,-/ n `ktMIANA` **\20N** .reJrAcaPMLlPPNES MLA ``` AM ISLANDS ``` Above all, this White Paper reaffirms the Government's commitment to ensuring AJAM. :wesueesc that in the decades ahead Australia will continue to be secure from military threat. SPRMANDSATLY. / - " PALAU. FEEAT5D STATES .OF `GANDS` ItL A PACIFIC OCEAN ``` KFIsATI NAIM ``` `'` Ls o [NE.SIA] SMONION ISL `ANDS` 0 - llfiSTMAS _AJLS 'TI--- .d P AUTh r ' **t.** **.TUVALU** ``` C= ISLANDS TOKELAU IAUST) VANUATU ``` INDIAN `OCEAN` `WESTERN` ``` AUSTRALIA NEW TWA ``` ROBERT RAY Canberra `Brisbane 4` ``` NORFOLK ISLAND ``` Minister for Defence November 1994 205S `Perth-` `Sydney'` `^ /LORD HUM ISLAM` `(AUST)` ``` NEW ZEALAM^1- ``` SOUTHERN OCEAN 40'S `MAMIJARE ISLAND.` LOS KERGIAN `21A,` UTAND IS -AND **60S** ANTARCTICA 100'E 140'E AZIMUTHAL EQUIDISTANT PROJECTION Only distances measured from Darwin are correct. 500 1000 1500 2000 2500 3000 3500 4000 nautical miles 1000 2000 3000 4000 5000 6000 7000 kilometres © Royal Australian Survey Corps 1994. ----- TABLE 0F CONTENTS Page reface 1co...................... V PART I: THE FOUNDATIONS OF DEFENCE POLICY Chapter One: Defence and Australia's Security .........................3 Chapter Two: Australia's Changing Strategic Outlook ...................7 The Major Powers ...........................................................7 Economic Growth and Political Change ..................................9 New Challenges to our Defence Policy....................................10 Chapter Three: Australia's Defence Policy ...............................13 Capabilities for the Defence of Australia .................................13 International Defence Interests ............................................16 Managing Defence Policy ..................................................17 PART II: CAPABILITIES FOR THE DEFENCE OF AUSTRALIA Chapter Four: Planning Australia's Defence Capabilities ................21 Planning the Defence of Australia .........................................21 Strategic Geography ................................................21 Levels of Capability..................................................22 Capabilities and Threats ......................................22 Major Conflict .................................................23 Short-Warning Conflict ........................................24 Australia's Defence Posture ................................................25 UsingGeography.....................................................26 Using Technology .....................................................26 Depth in Defence ....................................................28 Australian Defence Force Roles .....................................30 Preparedness.............. ........................................... 31 Adaptability..........................................................32 Versatility.............................................................33 Force Development Priorities ........................................34 ----- Chapter Five: Developing Australia's Defence Capabilities .............. 37 Call-Out Protection [..................................................] 81 Employer Support [....................................................] 81 Command, Control and Communications ................................. [37] Reserves in the Community [..........................................] 81 Intelligence Collection and Evaluation .................................... [38] Environmental Information ........................................... [39] Surveillance of Maritime Areas and Northern Australia ................... [40] PART III: INTERNATIONAL DEFENCE INTERESTS Maritime Operations ....................................................... [42] Air Defence in Maritime Areas and Northern Australia .................... 46 Land Operations ........................................................... 48 Chapter Eight: Regional Engagement [....................................] 85 Strategic Strike ............................................................. 52 86 Support of the Force ....................................................... 52 South-East Asia [............................................................] TransportFacilities and Infrastructure[..............................................................] .......................................... 5353 Malaysia and Singapore Indonesia [.............................................................][.............................................] 8689 Logistic Support Capabilities ........................................ [54] Other South-East Asian Countries [................................... ]90 Other Forms of Support .............................................. 55 North-East and South Asia [..................................................] 90 92 Resources ................................................................. 55 South-West Pacific [.........................................................] 93 Multilateral Security [........................................................] Chapter Six: Defence Personnel ........................................... 57 Chapter Nine Alliances [...................................................] 95 The Special Nature of Military Service ..................................... [57] Adjusting the Culture ....................................................... 58 The United States Alliance [.................................................] 95 Restructuring ........................................................ 59 MutualSupport [.......................................................] 96 Practical Benefits to the Australian Defence Force [................ ]96 Defence Personnel Numbers ........................................ [59] One Organisation .................................................... 60 Joint Defence Facilities [..............................................] 98 Commercial Support ................................................. 60 Regional Interests [...................................................] 99 The Total Force ....................................................... 61 GlobalSecurity [......................................................] 99 Meeting Future Requirements .............................................. [61] The New Zealand Alliance [................................................] 100 Attracting the Best People ......................................... [62] Closer Defence Relations [........................................... ]101 Training and Developing Personnel .................................. [63] Other International Interests [...............................................] 102 Responding to Social Change ............................................. [64] Women in the Australian Defence Force ............................ 65 Equality in the Workplace ........................................... 66 Chapter Ten: Supporting Global Security [.................................] 103 Pay and Allowances ................................................. 66 104 Conditions of Service ..................................................... 67 Peace Operations [..........................................................] 108 Social and Family Issues ............................................. 67 Non-Proliferation and Arms Control [........................................] Housing and Accommodation ..................................... 68 Reducing the Problems of Relocation .............................. [68] The Longer Term Challenge ............................................... 69 PART IV: NATIONAL DEFENCE SUPPORT Chapter Eleven: Defence and Australian Industry.. ...................... [113] Chapter Seven: Reserves .................................................. 73 113 Australian Industry [..........................................................] Reserves in the Total Force ................................................. 73 Defence's Industry Needs [..................................................] 115 Employing Reserves ......................................................... 75 Enhancing Australian Industry's Contribution to Defence [.................] 116 NavyReserve ......................................................... 76 Linking Equipment Acquisition and Through-Life Support [...........] 117 Army Reserve ........................................................ 76 Improving Defence Purchasing [......................................] 117 Army Reserve Recruiting and Retention ...................... [77] Commercial Support [................................................] 118 Air Force Reserve ................................................... 77 Improving Communication [.......................................... ]119 ReserveTraining ............................................................. 78 Promoting Industry Development [.........................................] 120 Army Reserve Training ...................................................... 79 Materiel Cooperation and Defence Exports [........................] 121 Availability of Reserves for Duty ............................................ [80] ----- Chapter Twelve: Science and Technology ............................... 125 Science, Technology and National Defence .............................. [125] The Defence Science and Technology Organisation ..................... [126] Defence Science and the Australian Defence Force .............. 127 Other Sources of Science and Technology ............................... [129] Defence Science and Australian Industry ................................. [130] International Cooperation in Science and Technology ................... [131] Defence Science and Regional Engagement ...................... 131 Support for Global Security ......................................... [132] Managing Change in Defence Science ................................... [133] Chapter Thirteen: Defence and the Australian Community ............. 135 Supporting the Civil Community ........................................... [136] DisasterRelief ........................................................ 136 Civil Defence ......................................................... 137 Search and Rescue .................................................. 137 Counter-Terrorism ................................................... 138 Customs, Immigration and Fishing Zone Surveillance ............... 138 OtherSupport ........................................................ 139 Funding Defence's Contribution to the Community ................ 139 Contributing to the National Economy .................................... [140] Supporting Wider Interests in the Region .................................. 141 Defence and the Environment ............................................. [141] PART V: FUNDING OUR DEFENCE EFFORT Chapter Fourteen: Resources and Programming ......................... 145 Funding Defence Capabilities ............................................. [146] Investment ........................................................... 146 Operations ........................................................... 148 Personnel ............................................................. 149 Managing Defence Resources ............................................. [149] Five Year Budget ..................................................... 150 Conclusion ................................................................. 150 SUMMARY ...................................................... ........... 153 APPENDIX: The Australian Defence Organisation Today .................. 161 ----- 1.1 The Government has a fundamental responsibility to ensure Australia's defence. It meets this responsibility by ensuring that we can prevent or defeat the use of armed force against us. To do that we maintain defence forces and pursue national policies which support defence efforts, sustain favourable regional and alliance relationships and contribute to global security arrangements. 1.2 Maintaining a defence force capable of ensuring that armed force is not successfully used against Australia is essential because armed force remains a factor in international affairs. It continues to be one of the ways in which national power can be asserted and national self interest pursued. The end of the Cold War has reduced global threats, but at other levels the use of military force has not diminished and indeed may become more common. As the constraints imposed by the Cold War are lifted, and the economic and technical means to acquire military power become more widespread, so the use of that power to attain national objectives and international influence may grow. 1.3 Alliances, regional links and global security arrangements enhance our security environment by making attacks on Australia less likely and increasing the prospect of support from others. They also contribute to efforts to minimise the role of armed force in international affairs and establish credible, rules-based regimes for conflict resolution. Effective military capability is essential to our defence, however, because armed force can only be resisted ultimately by armed force. In Australia's case, the force on which we rely must be our own because our security environment and national interests are unique. 1.4 Australia's future security - like our economic prosperity - is linked inextricably to the security and prosperity of Asia and the Pacific. Australia's strategic engagement with the region is an integral element of our national effort to make our place in the region. Our defence relationships underpin the development of closer links in other fields. Our ability to defend ourselves and contribute to regional security does much to ensure that we are respected and helps us engage in the region by giving confidence that we can manage uncertainty and assure our security. _1.5 [Australia's strategic stance is, in the broadest possible sense, defensive.]_ We will not use armed force except to defend our national interests, and we do not envisage resorting to armed force other than in response to the use or threat of ----- 1.10 While maintaining essential military capabilities and helping deter force by others. We have no disputes with other countries which might be expected aggression against Australia, the Australian Defence Force plays a key role in to give rise to the use of force, and no reason at present to expect that disputes of maintaining the international policies and relationships which help ensure the that sort will develop. security of Australia and its interests. The professionalism and capabilities of the 1.6 Nonetheless, our region is one of great dynamism, strategically as well Australian Defence Force mean Australia is among the first countries to be called on to assist in international security and humanitarian crises. In responding to as economically. The next fifteen years will see great change in our strategic peace enforcement and peace building demands in the Middle East, Namibia and environment. With the end of the Cold War, important new uncertainties have Cambodia, and the humanitarian crises in Somalia and Rwanda, the Australian emerged about the future strategic situation in Asia. Economic growth will increase the power of nations in our region, and political change may make their policies Defence Force has proven an effective instrument of national policy. less predictable. Because of these uncertainties, we acknowledge the possibility 1.11 The Australian Defence Force also serves the nation well at home. In that our security environment could deteriorate, perhaps quite seriously in the future. We recognise that at some time in the future armed force could be used against us recent times, Australian Defence Force personnel have played key roles in the national response to major floods and bushfires, and its services continue to be and that we need to be prepared to meet it. called upon, and given readily, in search and rescue missions. 1.7 If we are to do that, Australia must develop and maintain adequate forces 1.12 Important as these international and domestic activities are for Australia, today. A military force that has been neglected in peace cannot be revived quickly they do not determine the force structure of the Australian Defence Force. The when a threat emerges. The military capabilities required to defend Australia must structure of the Defence Force is determined by its essential roles in providing for be sustained continuously if they are to be available and effective when they are needed because the necessary technologies and skills take a long time to develop. the defence of Australia. Modern military capabilities are enormously complex. Defence equipment 1.13 We are rightly proud of our Defence Force, which by its ideals and embodies the most advanced technologies, and may take decades to acquire and achievements over nearly a century has done so much to define our national identity. bring into service. Our defence self-reliance underpins our national self-confidence. Maintaining the capabilities to defend ourselves is important in the way we see ourselves as a nation. 1.8 The skills to operate modem weapons also may take decades to develop. To ensure that we can continue to be confident that we have those capabilities, our The Australian Defence Force's skills need to be honed and tested continually if defence policy will need to continue to adapt to meet changing strategic we are to be sure that our forces would be able to prevail in conflict. The same is circumstances. This White Paper describes how that will be done, as our domestic true of Australian industry, whose capacity to support our forces in conflict is an and international environment changes over the next fifteen years. integral part of our defence capability. This capacity must be nurtured carefully in peace. Also underlying the technology and skills of our Defence Force are the distinctive human qualities which are still integral to the profession of arms. Modem war still demands the age-old qualities of dedication and discipline, courage and comradeship. These qualities are inculcated by the Australian Defence Force, building over generations on the esprit of our fighting forces. If the men and women of the Australian Defence Force are to serve us well in war, we must continue to nurture them in peace. 1.9 Moreover, by developing and maintaining the capabilities of the Australian Defence Force in peace, we are not just preparing to resist aggression. We are helping to make war less likely. We are less likely to be subject to armed attack because our Defence Force clearly is capable of defeating any credible use of force against us. By sustaining forces which can effectively resist aggression, we help to prevent it. ----- 2.1 For most of the last fifty years, the strongest threat to Australia's security was the possibility of global war between the superpowers. That threat has now faded. Australia's national interests, including our economic interests, could still be affected very seriously by events in Europe, the Middle East and elsewhere. As long as the threat of global war remains low, however, the likelihood of armed attack on Australia will depend on strategic developments in Asia and the Pacific, and particularly in Asia itself. 2.2 The region is now comparatively peaceful. The Korean Peninsula and South Asia remain areas of international tension and potential conflict; in the South China Sea, well-armed nations have competing territorial claims; in some countries, including Cambodia, the authority of sovereign governments is challenged severely; and elsewhere political repression holds back economic and social development. Generally, however, the stable pattern of strategic relationships in Asia and the Pacific over the last twenty years has enabled economies to grow and more effective governments to evolve, while the end of the Cold War has allowed many of the tensions and conflicts of the past to be resolved or eased. 2.3 Yet the relative peace in Asia may not last. The pattern of stable strategic relationships which has underpinned Asia's security in recent years is changing. The two major influences are the shifting relationships between the major regional powers, and economic and political change throughout Asia. THE MAJOR POWERS 2.4 During the Cold War, the two superpowers and their relationships with China and Japan dominated strategic affairs in Asia and the Pacific. The United States and the Soviet Union had vital interests throughout the region, and the military capabilities to protect those interests. The uneasy bipolar balance constrained significant shifts in the strategic relationships between other countries in the region. Maintaining this balance was demanding, but it did produce a measure of stability throughout the region. Now some of the constraints are being loosened following the end of the Cold War. _2.5 [Russia is still a major territorial power in Asia, but has lost the political]_ motive and some of the military means to sustain a major strategic presence in the Western Pacific beyond its borders. It remains strategically important in North- ----- East Asia, and in the longer term it may again be a key player in Asia's wider ECONOMIC GROWTH AND POLITICAL CHANGE strategic affairs. For the foreseeable future, however, it is likely to be more preoccupied with internal affairs and problems in other former Soviet republics, 2.9 The second key factor shaping our strategic environment is the continuing and so carry much less weight in the strategic balance in Asia and the Pacific. rapid economic growth and political change in Asia. Many Asian economies will continue to grow strongly, and their technological capabilities will expand. These 2.6 The United States has emerged from the Cold War with a strong military developments have direct strategic consequences. Strategic potential - the capacity presence in the Western Pacific, and will remain strategically engaged in Asia for to develop and support military forces - depends directly on economic strength and as far ahead as we can see. It has important strategic and growing economic interests technological depth. The capacity of most countries in Asia to buy or build modern in the region, and will retain the ability to deploy and project very substantial defence equipment, and operate it effectively, will grow very substantially in coming forces into Asia. It will retain strategic commitments to Japan, South Korea and years. This is important for defence planning, because a nation's strategic potential other allies, including Australia, and be an important participant in multilateral may be a better indication of its long-term strategic significance than its current regional security affairs. As a result, the United States will continue to make a military capabilities. major contribution to the security of Asia and the Pacific. Nonetheless, the United States engagement in the region is changing. With the collapse of the former 2.10 Economic growth has enabled sustained increases in defence budgets Soviet Union, trade and economic issues will be more significant factors in its and the development of sophisticated military capabilities, particularly advanced interests than in earlier decades. Changes within the region, for example in Korea, naval and air forces. This is not a result of economic growth alone: it reflects could affect the US presence, and the US-Japan relationship may become more changing strategic perceptions and priorities. Armed forces are developing new complex. Although the United States will remain the strongest global power, the roles as internal security becomes less demanding and external defence takes higher relative military strength of others in Asia will grow over time. The United States priority. This is not necessarily destabilising. Indeed, enhanced capabilities for will remain a major contributor to security in the region over the next fifteen years, defence can support regional security. We expect all countries to be capable of but it will neither seek nor accept primary responsibility for maintaining peace and their own defence. Nevertheless, military developments over the next fifteen years stability in the region. will also add to the scale and intensity of combat which could be sustained, and will widen the range of military options available to many regional nations. 2.7 As a result of these changes, the strategic affairs of the region will be increasingly determined by the countries of Asia themselves. A new strategic 2.11 One particular concern is the potential for proliferation of nuclear, architecture will evolve as the structures of recent decades fade. Much will depend chemical and biological weapons and ballistic missiles. Such weapons already on the policies of the major Asian powers - Japan, China and India - and on their exist or could be developed readily by a number of Asian countries. The further relationships with one another and with other countries in the region. Perceptions spread of weapons of mass destruction would be destabilising. of China's continuing economic growth and increasing political and military influence will be important, as will Japan's response to such factors as diminished 2.12 Over the next fifteen years, the most important focus of economic growth US concern about Russia, China's approach to the region and the possible in Asia will be China. If the patterns of recent years are sustained, China's economy reunification of Korea. will become the largest in Asia and the second largest in the world within the next fifteen years. This will affect global power relationships and become a dominant 2.8 As these key relationships develop, the stability the Cold War imposed factor in the strategic framework of Asia and the Pacific. Economic growth is on the region will be replaced by a more fluid and complex environment. A number already allowing China to increase its military capabilities, especially of its maritime of positive factors suggest that a new strategic balance will emerge in Asia to forces. China is likely to continue to pursue its strategic objectives by a combination underpin peace and security, including the development of regional processes to of diplomatic, political and economic means, underpinned by its growing military foster trust and confidence on security matters and growing economic strength. interdependence. The successful initiation of APEC and the ASEAN Regional Forum shows that the region can agree on broad goals. These developments give 2.13 Japan's economic and industrial strength already gives it huge strategic grounds for optimism. However, ethnic and national tensions, economic rivalry, potential, and its armed forces are, and will remain, among the most substantial in disappointed aspirations for prosperity, religious or racial conflict, or other problems Asia. Whether more of Japan's strategic potential translates into military power, could produce an unstable and potentially dangerous strategic situation in Asia and or its defence posture changes in other ways, will depend on how it perceives the the Pacific over the next fifteen years. capabilities and dispositions of its neighbours, and especially on Japan's confidence ----- in its security alliance with the United States. That in turn is likely to depend on Now we need to take account of a more complex and changeable strategic developments in the Korean peninsula, and on the broader trend of US-Japan environment. Australia's ability to help shape that environment will become more relations. important to our security, and our policies will need to encompass a wider range of possible outcomes than in the more predictable decades of the Cold War. 2.14 India's economy is also likely to grow strongly in the next fifteen years. This will allow it to strengthen its already substantial forces and to exert increased 2.20 Second, economic growth and expanding military capabilities throughout influence, particularly in the Indian Ocean. Asia mean that the nature and scale of forces that could be brought to bear against Australia, and to which the Australian Defence Force needs to be able to respond, 2.15 South-East Asia's economies will continue to expand, and most countries will increase steadily over the next fifteen years. will continue to upgrade their armed forces. They have started from a relatively low base, but over the next fifteen years the strategic potential and military 2.21 Our strategic environment will become more demanding over the period capabilities of most ASEAN countries will increase markedly. covered by this White Paper. The challenge for our defence policy will be to ensure that we can continue to ensure Australia's security in these more demanding 2.16 The development of Indonesia's economy is potentially the most important circumstances. strategic development in South-East Asia over the coming decade and beyond. Indonesia already has the largest economy in South-East Asia, as well as the largest population. If its economy can sustain high rates of growth, by 2020 it could equal Australia's. At the same time, Indonesia's armed forces will continue to develop their capabilities and professionalism. 2.17 The effects of these economic and military developments on the security of the region clearly will depend on political events in key countries. Significant evolution of Japan's political system seems likely. China's system of government is under pressure as it moves to become a modern industrial state undergoing huge economic and social change. Korea may well be unified, introducing a substantial new strategic element. The relationship between China and Taiwan is likely to evolve in response to political change in both, but in a direction that is not easy to foretell. Vietnam will face major challenges to adapt its political system to the demands of the modern world, and how it does that will determine whether its potential is realised. Indonesia will undergo an important leadership transition at a time of rapid economic growth and social change. NEW CHALLENGES TO OUR DEFENCE POLICY 2.18 The long-term trends in regional security affairs we have identified will develop slowly, but are likely over the next fifteen years to affect our strategic circumstances significantly. They will have important and direct consequences for the development of Australia's defence policy. 2.19 First, the end of the Cold War means the passing of the structures which have shaped the regional strategic environment. Previously, our defence planning has been able to assume a degree of predictability in our strategic circumstances. ----- 3.1 The global and regional changes which are making our strategic outlook more demanding are also producing new patterns of relationships. One of the Government's major objectives is to establish Australia's place in these emerging patterns and to shape them to meet Australian interests. Australia's security as well as its prosperity in the decades ahead will depend on how well we do that. This requires an integrated approach across the range of foreign, defence, trade, immigration and other international policies, as well as domestic policies on economic, industrial, social and environmental issues. 3.2 The Government's defence policy contributes to this integrated national effort in two related ways - by ensuring that we are able to defend Australia from armed attack, and by sustaining our alliances and contributing to a global and regional environment in which attack on Australia is less likely. These are the key elements of our defence policy. CAPABILITIES FOR THE DEFENCE OF AUSTRALIA 3.3 The foundation of the Government's defence policy is self-reliance, which requires that Australia maintain the military capabilities to defend our country without depending on help from other countries' combat forces. This approach to defence reflects our view of ourselves. Self-reliance in defence is essential to the Government's broader conception of Australia as a nation, proud of our continent and our achievements, and committed to preserving them. 3.4 Defence self-reliance also reflects strategic realities. Australia's security is not so vital to other nations that we can assume others would commit substantial forces to our defence. This will become increasingly so as our strategic environment becomes more complex. Our alliance with the United States does not mean we can expect it to provide for our defence. Indeed, that alliance obliges us to provide effectively for our own defence. Regional cooperation will be important in promoting a more secure environment, but it will not evolve into a collective defence arrangement which could subsume the defence of Australia into a wider regional defence organisation. Nor could we expect the United Nations to defend Australia. So defence self-reliance remains essential for us. ----- _3.5 At the same time the development of our economy and technological_ 3.8 This challenge provides a rigorous analytical basis for determining our skills has made self-reliance more achievable. By carefully planning and managing defence needs. It gives clear criteria for making the complex choices required in resources, efficiently using the advantages of our strategic environment, and capability planning, and helps ensure the efficient use of our resources. The scale exploiting the opportunities offered by technological developments, we can continue of the task relative to national resources means that we cannot afford to spend to sustain a self-reliant defence posture in the more demanding strategic money on capabilities which are not essential to it. circumstances of the future. This will be important not just to our security, but to our national independence, international standing and self-respect. 3.9 In developing capabilities for the defence of Australia, we seek forces which provide a range of cost-effective options. Our objective would be a cessation of hostilities as rapidly and conclusively as practicable, consistent with protecting the range of national interests involved. These would include preserving our territorial integrity and economic interests, protecting Australian lives and property, maintaining our international standing, and avoiding unnecessary risks to the personnel and platforms of the Australian Defence Force. 3.10 A key feature of our defence is the need for our forces to be supported as much as practicable by Australia's wider resources. We seek to draw on the full range of skills and capabilities within the Australian community. This is necessary to ensure not only an adequate number of suitable personnel, but also effective support for our forces in times of conflict. 3.11 Planning for the defence of Australia takes full account of our broader strategic interests. Australia has important interests beyond the defence of our own territory, and the Australian Defence Force will be called upon in the future, as it has been in the past, to undertake activities and operations elsewhere in our region, and in other parts of the world, in cooperation with neighbours, allies and international institutions, particularly the United Nations. Recent deployments in the Gulf, Namibia, Cambodia, Somalia, Rwanda, the South Pacific and elsewhere, as well as our continual defence deployments around the region, have demonstrated 3.6 Our highest defence priority is therefore to build, maintain and support that capabilities developed for the defence of Australia are sufficiently versatile to forces for the defence ofAustralia. By this we mean specifically that we should be fulfil a wide range of other tasks. We do not need to make these activities a primary capable, without combat assistance from other countries, of defeating any attack basis for our defence capability planning, because forces developed for the defence which could credibly be mounted against Australia. This task determines the of Australia give us a sufficient range of options to meet them. capabilities we require in the Australian Defence Force. 3.7 Our approach to the defence of Australia emphasises understanding our INTERNATIONAL DEFENCE INTERESTS strategic environment and guarding our sea and air approaches. It requires capabilities which can deny our approaches to an adversary, as well as capabilities 3.12 Our defence policy recognises that Australia's security from armed attack to defeat incursions onto our territory. It therefore goes beyond our shores to include does not depend on our defence capabilities alone. It also depends in fundamental a range of direct interests which are important to our defence. That requires us to ways on maintaining a global and regional environment and a set of international cover a vast area; over 10 per cent of the earth's surface. While our stance is relationships in which the use of armed force against Australia is made less likely. fundamentally defensive, the Australian Defence Force is not limited to defensive Working with other countries is therefore an essential element of our defence policy. operations. We will continue to develop capabilities which allow the Australian As well as seeking self-reliance in the defence of Australia, we also seek diplomatic Defence Force, in responding to any use of force against Australia, to take the support and the cooperation with friends and allies to develop and sustain our own operational initiative within that area, and in some circumstances beyond it. efforts for the defence of Australia. ----- 3.13 The relationships and arrangements we value range from bilateral alliances national interest in preventing the spread of weapons of mass destruction among through less formal international relationships and groupings to active support for countries from which they could be used against Australia. Such a development multilateral security institutions and regimes. We have always recognised that could seriously complicate and add to the cost of Australia's defence. Australia cannot be secure in an insecure region, and we have worked hard over many decades to support security in the region. This task is becoming more important as the regional security situation becomes more fluid and complex, and MANAGING DEFENCE POLICY more dependent on the countries of the region themselves. In coming years, Australia will need to do more to ensure that our strategic environment develops in 3.18 Defence policy is coordinated carefully with other elements of the ways which are consistent with our interests. Active engagement in the strategic Government's international approach to reinforce our overall national security affairs of the region will be as important to Australia's long-term security as interests. As new forms of regional security interaction develop, the elements of economic engagement will be to our prosperity. our security policy will work even more closely together. Many areas of national policy contribute to Defence objectives, and Defence contributes to other national 3.14 Other regional countries recognise that the same is true for them, and as security interests. The Government has established effective mechanisms to a result the scope for cooperation at both the bilateral and multilateral levels is coordinate overall security policy, especially between the Departments of Defence. increasing. Bilateral defence relationships, especially in South-East Asia, will Foreign Affairs and Trade, and Prime Minister and Cabinet. The Strategic Policy expand as our levels of military capability converge and as we increasingly recognise Coordination Group is a forum for frequent high-level consultation and a mechanism shared strategic interests. Multilateral cooperation offers a framework in which for coordination on the full range of strategic and security-related issues, as are trust, confidence, and mutual understanding can be developed; disputes can be regular consultations among the key Ministers involved. The activities of the avoided or resolved; and the more demanding strategic environment can be intelligence community are also carefully coordinated to serve the needs of national managed. strategic policy making. 3.15 Our treaty relationship with the United States, though more than four 3.19 The principal elements of our defence policy must be coordinated closely decades old, continues to be a key element of our defence policy. It serves Australian, so we can respond to the challenges of our more demanding strategic environment. US and regional interests. It helps strengthen regional security by supporting US The planning and development of our defence effort will need to take account of strategic engagement and activities in the region, and helps us maintain our own the increased capabilities which could be brought to bear against Australia, as well defence capabilities. We will work hard to keep the alliance vigorous and relevant as social and economic changes within Australia that affect the way we develop in changing circumstances. Our US alliance, and also our relationship with New and sustain our forces. The pursuit of our international defence interests will need Zealand, will remain important to our defence policy over the next fifteen years. to adapt to changes in the policy and approaches of our allies, new opportunities and issues in our region, and new global agendas. 3.16 At the global level, Australia is a proponent of consultative and multilateral security regimes. Our national interests are served by ensuring the existence of effective UN mechanisms for conflict prevention, management and resolution. As a middle power, we have a particular interest in fostering an orderly international system in which agreed norms of conduct constrain the use of force, and in supporting international institutions which give us important opportunities to shape that system. We support UN and other multinational peacemaking and peacekeeping endeavours because we consider that institutions which are effective, and are seen to be so, in crises today are more likely to be effective in helping to protect Australia's interests should they be challenged in the future. 3.17 In the same sense, our active involvement in negotiating and implementing arms control and non-proliferation regimes reflects not only an abhorrence of the use of weapons of mass destruction and inhumane weapons, but also our strong ----- #### PART II **Capabilities for the** **Defence of Australia** ----- PLANNING THE DEFENCE OF AUSTRALIA 4.1 Careful planning for the defence of Australia ensures that we have the level and mix of capabilities necessary for defence self-reliance. The posture and forces we require are determined by our strategic geography and by the nature and level of capabilities which could credibly be used against us. This approach provides a rigorous, enduring basis for disciplined planning, even as our strategic circumstances become more demanding. Strategic Geography 4.2 Our strategic geography is central in planning our defence posture and capabilities. Australia's location, size, population and infrastructure provide both advantages and challenges for our defence. As an island continent, the primary focus of our defence effort is on our sea and air approaches, which can be turned to our decisive advantage. An adversary attacking Australia would have to project and sustain forces across our sea and air approaches where hostile ships and aircraft are relatively easy to detect and attack, and will become increasingly so as technologies develop. We can therefore make it difficult for an adversary to mount or sustain an attack on our territory by denying our sea and air approaches to hostile ships and aircraft. 4.3 Australia could be most easily attacked in the north, where our sea and air approaches are shortest, so we need to pay particular attention to defending that area by being able to undertake operations in our northern approaches and across northern Australia. While our sparsely populated north provides great strategic depth, an adversary may seek to exploit the vast distances and dispersed population to mount small attacks at isolated locations. Those challenges mean that our forces must be highly mobile to allow rapid deployment into areas of contention and to conduct dispersed operations over wide areas. They must also be familiar with the difficult operating environment to gain advantage over a less well acclimatised adversary. 4.4 Our defence planning is also shaped by our human geography. We have a relatively small population but a strong education, technology and industry base. Our defence approach therefore gives priority to capabilities which rely on high ----- technology rather than on large numbers ofpersonnel. That fits well with the priority, 4.6 Moreover, the motive and intention to attack Australia would not arise derived from our physical geography, we give to naval, air and highly mobile land instantaneously. Countries do not readily resort to armed force to resolve disputes. forces which are technology intensive. In Australia's circumstances, significant changes in policy and attitude toward us, quite contrary to present trends, would be needed for any threat to emerge. We have a responsible approach to regional and wider international relationships and we maintain an evidently strong defence capacity; these help make such a change unlikely and help to ensure that we could expect clear and early indications of any changes. - ___5_• 4.7 Our planning recognises, however, that hostile motives and intentions - ._ -. can develop much more quickly than military capabilities can be built up. We : - cannot wait until a threat emerges because our forces could not be expanded faster than the emerging hostile motive or intention towards Australia. Australia therefore needs to maintain a defence force which can defeat those capabilities which could credibly be brought to bear against us in our sea and air approaches and on our territory. - '. - Major Conflict 4;... _4 . ..._ _._ _.._-._ _._ _._ S 4.8 The scale of forces which could credibly be deployed in our approaches --"S. S - or on our territory is limited by the nature of capabilities developed by countries in *:1 - :•• our region and by our distance from powers with more substantial military forces. No country in Asia has developed the forces required to mount a major conventional attack on Australia sufficient to seize and hold significant territory on our continent. Levels of Capability An adversary would need extensive amphibious and air capabilities to land and support a substantial land force, and strong sea and air capabilities to protect this force from reaction by Australian forces. Capabilities and Threats 4.9 Moreover, while military capabilities are expanding throughout the region, _4.5 Within the priorities shaped by Australia's strategic geography, the defence_ no country is currently acquiring the range and scale of forces necessary for an posture and capabilities we need are determined by the nature and level of opposing operation of this magnitude. Nor does any country appear to have plans to develop capabilities which might credibly confront us. Our planning focuses on capabilities such forces. The massive capital investment required far exceeds the programs rather than threats. The existence of military capabilities which could be used any countries in the region are now undertaking. In addition, the development of against Australia does not in itself pose a threat to us. A threat of armed conflict these capabilities would need many complex new operational and support skills, only arises when, in addition to the required military capability, there is a cause and the establishment of new command structures and expertise. which provides a motive, and an intention to use force in regard to that dispute. We believe no country at present has either a motive or an intention to attack 4.10 Military capabilities on this scale cannot be developed in secret. We are Australia, and we have no reason to expect that any country will develop such a confident that our intelligence would detect at an early stage the development of motive or intention. Our defence planning is therefore not based on an expectation such forces. We know from our own experience that the capabilities required of threat to Australia from any country. could not be developed from the existing low base in much under a decade. On the basis of these judgments, rather than on any attempt to predict the future, we are confident that we would have sufficient warning time to adapt and expand our own forces to defend Australia against a major attack of this sort. In turn, our response ----- would complicate any potential adversary's planning. While Australia maintains the availability of sophisticated equipment, and the increasing capacity of many the ability to adapt and expand our forces quickly enough to meet any development countries to acquire and operate advanced military systems, are raising the level of by others of forces for major attack on our continent, we do not need to maintain capability in the region. These developing capabilities, especially in naval and air the actual force structure for such operations now. forces, will increase the potential scale of short-warning conflict. 4.15 These developments also change the nature and likely conduct of conflict. Short-Warning Conflict The range at which engagements can occur is increasing. The greater accuracy and lethality of weapon systems demands greater attention to stealth, deception 4.11 We do need, however, to be prepared to meet the increasingly demanding and self defence capabilities, particularly of key assets. Air defence is increasingly range of conflict which could credibly be undertaken, should political circumstances important. Effective command and control of force elements, and layers of defensive change, with capabilities which are now available in the region, or which are likely systems, will be necessary for survivability. The demand for accurate and timely to be introduced within a few years. The types of conflict which could be sustained information is becoming greater, not only for the security of forces but also for the with these capabilities are called short-warning conflicts. While our survival as a coordination and application of available assets. At the same time, the vulnerability nation would not be at stake in such a conflict, great damage could be done to our of essential command and control systems to countermeasures is increasing. national interests if we were unable to deal with the adversary and to settle the conflict on terms favourable to Australia. This might be no easy task. We need to 4.16 It is not possible to predict precisely how fast and how far increases in maintain forces to deal with short-warning conflict because we would not have capability will proceed over the next fifteen years. That will depend on a range of time to develop additional capabilities within the relatively short notice we might factors, including strategic developments, availability of weapons from major receive of the development of motive or intention to attack Australia. suppliers, economic growth and political developments. Our planning recognises nevertheless that the recent trend of increasing military capabilities in the region 4.12 The scale and intensity of short-warning conflict could range from small will be maintained, and may accelerate. That will require us to develop Australia's raids to larger and protracted operations. An adversary deterred from mounting defence capabilities to ensure that we remain able to defeat any forces which could larger attacks by our capacity to respond might nevertheless attempt to mount a credibly be brought to bear against Australia in our sea and air approaches or on series of lower level raids and other harassing actions. Countering these lesser our territory in a short-warning conflict. forms of short-warning conflict could be demanding. This would be so especially if the adversary applied undeclared and limited force, in dispersed locations and over a long time, although in these circumstances Australia would of course have AUSTRALIA'S DEFENCE POSTURE available the option of escalation, including the possibility of strategic strike. 4.17 Our planning for the defence of Australia focuses on the development of 4.13 Equally, our planning for short-warning conflict must acknowledge that a defence posture which exploits our natural advantages in geography, the once conflict starts, an adversary could use most of its effectively available development of technology and our wider national strengths to achieve our capabilities. This will become increasingly significant for our defence planning fundamental defence objective as efficiently as possible. This posture gives primacy as high technology weapon systems become more widely available. In short- to three key tasks: warning conflicts, there will still tend to be fewer and less intense engagements than in major conflicts, in part because of constraints on the use of some types of ensuring timely warning of significant developments in our strategic weapon and because of the limited numbers of platforms involved. However, the environment; use of high-technology weapons cannot be ruled out in any conflict in which they are available, especially where they could achieve decisive effects at relatively maintaining a force able to defeat current or planned capabilities which low risk and cost. could credibly be used against us in short-warning conflict; and 4.14 In planning Australia's defence capabilities over the next fifteen years, maintaining the adaptability to expand or redirect our defence and national our most important challenge will be to adapt to the greater demands possible in effort in response to developments in regional capabilities and to more short-warning conflict as capabilities in the region increase. While we do not demanding forms of conflict which could emerge in the longer term. expect any country to develop the capability to mount major attacks on Australia, ----- Using Geography 4.23 Our land forces also play an essential role in the defence of Australia. By exploiting new technology in areas including surveillance, mobility and firepower, 4.18 Our approach to these tasks is based on exploiting our geography. Our the land force can complicate an adversary's planning and make the risk and cost strategic geography is such that substantial forces would be needed to mount a of action on Australian territory very high. major attack on Australia. This enables us to be confident that we can detect and respond effectively to the development of such forces. In preparing for short- 4.24 While new technologies provide new opportunities for Australia's defence, warning conflict, we can exploit the vast distances which an attacker would need they will also expand the challenges we face. Many countries in our region will to cross. This ensures that we would have early warning of the deployment and continue to develop modern capabilities and the skills to operate, support and launch of hostile forces in our sea and air approaches. This would allow us, as far maintain them. This poses a challenge for both our present and future defence as practicable, to engage those forces in our approaches, outside an adversary's planning. Our planning is based not just on likely developments over the next weapons launch range of our assets and territory. fifteen years, but on an awareness that the decisions taken over that time will lay the foundations for our defence capabilities further into the future when our strategic 4.19 Developing our capabilities to take advantage of our strategic geography circumstances and relative technological capability may have changed even more means, most importantly, making our sea and air approaches an effective barrier to significantly. attack. We therefore give clear priority to the naval and air capabilities required to deny our sea and air approaches to an adversary so that we can limit the lodgement 4.25 Our defence planning will need to accommodate these changes. Until now, we have been able to sustain a technological edge over the full range of and support of land forces or the mounting of air attacks. capabilities that could be brought to bear against us. Over the longer term that 4.20 We also seek to turn the vast and difficult areas of northern Australia to advantage will not be maintained as economic growth and technological development increase the strategic potential of countries throughout our region. our advantage by ensuring that we can operate better there than any adversary. Our forces are familiar with the environment of northern Australia, and our We will therefore become more selective about identifying those areas in which we need to maintain a decisive lead, and give priority to them. These will be areas equipment is optimised for conditions there. The capacity to draw on available in which we can reinforce our natural advantages in geography, or ones we judge civil resources and the development of essential defence infrastructure in northern to be particularly decisive to success in combat, and we will aim to build on our Australia will enable the Australian Defence Force to sustain the necessary scale established strengths where possible. Not least of these strengths is the effectiveness of operations with a major advantage over any adversary, who would have to operate of our training and discipline. We seek individual and collective skills which allow in an unfamiliar environment and at great distances from support infrastructure. us to achieve the full effect from available assets. Using Technology 4.26 In these ways, we will continue to develop excellence in those key areas which are needed to give us the decisive edge where it counts most. Among the key areas for development will be: 4.21 The second key element in developing our defence posture is the exploitation of technology. The development of modern defence technology offers intelligence collection, evaluation and distribution; important new opportunities for our defence. As a result of technological advances in radar and other areas of surveillance, major platforms and force concentrations surveillance and reconnaissance; in our sea and air approaches will become easier to detect. The chances of success in projecting significant forces across our approaches against effective maritime command and control; forces would be limited, and the price of trying would be high. key weapons and sensors; and 4.22 Australia's forces already provide a formidable capacity to monitor our sea and air approaches and deny them to an adversary. With careful development electronic warfare. of our naval and air forces, we can continue to make the potential costs and risks of substantial attack on Australia so high that an adversary would be unlikely to attempt such action. ----- Depth in Defence 4.31 Given the wide lan-e of situations v hich could develop in short-warning conflict, we need flexible concepts for the use of our capabilities. A purely defensive response to any form of armed aggression would be very demanding on the 4.27 The successful use of our geographical and technological advantages, Australian Defence Force, and could result in high costs for Australia for a relatively backed by the diverse resources of our national support base and our thorough modest investment by an adversary. Our response to conflict would therefore include understanding of our region, provides Australia with a defence posture of great options to respond proportionately against the aggressor's own interests, including depth, drawing on every dimension of our defence effort. Geographically, the if necessary with strikes against military assets or selected infrastructure. The depth in our defences is derived from our ability to detect and engage hostile forces possibility of such action would increase the level of defensive measures an with a layered series of capabilities from distant surveillance and strike, through adversary would need to take, thus reducing the level of offensive effort that could maritime and air patrol and interdiction forces, to air defence and land forces on and over our own territory. be directed against our forces or territory; and it could deter attack altogether. 4.32 Depth in defence requires responsive national mechanisms; effective 4.28 The technological depth of our defences means that at every stage of an command and control of a cohesive Australian Defence Force; carefully targeted adversary's operations, from planning to execution, the adversary would expect us intelligence and surveillance operations; and highly capable, responsive and mobile to be able to detect and respond to those operations. An important element of this forces that can deal with threats quickly and decisively. To make the most effective is the depth of our knowledge of our region, which ensures that we would have use of each of our operating environments - sea, land and air - the Australian Defence early warning of the development of more significant capabilities, and of the Force is structured in such a way that anyone wishing to apply military force against emergence of hostile motives and intentions towards us. us would need to contend with the coordinated and efficient action of all our forces under joint operational command. 4.29 At the national level, the depth in our defences derives from our ability to draw on a wide range of national resources to provide the greatest practicable opposition to any adversary. That requires integrating a range of civil assets and capabilities into our defence effort. Such integration includes collaboration with Australian industry to supply, repair and modify equipment and to provide through- life support; increasing reliance on the broader national infrastructure for transport and telecommunications; an extensive shift to commercial support for Defence activities in areas as diverse as aircraft maintenance and catering; and cooperation with Coastwatch and the people of northern Australia to ensure warning of hostile movements in a conflict. Our ability to draw on our wider national resources as part of our defence effort will become increasingly important as our strategic circumstances become more demanding. It enables us to sustain our relative capabilities more efficiently, and provides a wider base of expertise to draw on for developing and supporting high-technology systems. More broadly, the closer integration of Defence and the civil community strengthens Defence by making the Services more appealing employers, and provides important benefits to the community as well. 4.30 The result of effectively integrating our geographical and technological advantages, our knowing the region and having a wider national support base is that at no stage would an adversary be able to assume freedom of deployment or action. Caution would be necessary at all stages. Any adversary would be presented with a comprehensive array of capabilities, employed in a measured way for offensive and defensive operations. ----- 4.33 In our sea and air approaches, the coordination of naval and air forces 4.36 To perform these roles successfully, the Australian Defence Force depends allows us to deploy our forces in ways that make an adversary's operations difficult, critically on our ability to support and sustain operations. This requires a significant or to channel hostile forces into areas where they can be most easily dealt with by national effort and close cooperation between the Force's logistic resources and the land force. In turn, land force operations will be closely coordinated not only those of the community as a whole. There are key tasks which only the Australian with maritime forces but also with activities of civil authorities and the civil Defence Force can undertake, but increasingly non-operational functions will be community, both to draw upon their capabilities and to provide a measure of accomplished through national support. protection. 4.34 As far as possible, capabilities acquired by the Australian Defence Force Preparedness will have characteristics which enable them to contribute to a number of operational roles. For example, the way our land and air forces prepare to deal with potential 4.37 The successful implementation of our defence posture requires the incursions is influenced by the quality of our intelligence about an adversary's Australian Defence Force to be ready to undertake operations when needed, and to intentions and the capacity of our naval and air elements to intercept hostile forces. be able to sustain operations for as long as needed. These two characteristics of The structure of our naval and air elements is influenced in turn by how they can readiness and sustainability together constitute the Force's preparedness. best work together to patrol our sea and air approaches and defeat hostile forces in those approaches. Forces structured this way will best prevent successful attacks 4.38 Careful attention is given to the degree of readiness we require in different on our territory, our offshore islands, our shipping and offshore resources, and elements of our Defence Force in our strategic circumstances. Prudence requires ensure our capacity to re-supply northern Australia. that we hold sufficient forces at relatively high readiness to deal with events which could arise with little warning. However, even the lower levels of short-warning conflict are unlikely to occur without a clear indication of deterioration in relations, Australian Defence Force Roles and probably also notice of military preparations. Readiness is expensive, requiring higher rates of training activity, including expensive collective training and live _4.35_ To achieve this posture for the defence ofAustralia, Defence needs to be weapon firing, near complete staffing, and fully provisioned and maintained able to undertake the following key roles: equipment holdings. Readiness must therefore be held carefully at the level appropriate to our strategic circumstances and program of activities. - command, control and communications; 4.39 Relatively high levels of readiness are required in capabilities which - intelligence collection and evaluation; contribute to intelligence and surveillance; patrol and response in our sea and air approaches; some elements of our strike capability; and land force surveillance, - surveillance of maritime areas and northern Australia; reconnaissance, ready reaction and special forces elements. These forces need to be especially well trained, both individually and as operational units, well equipped - maritime patrol and response; and familiar with their likely areas of operations. Many Australian Defence Force units are now located in the north and west of the continent during peace, and - protection of shipping, and offshore territories and resources; increased opportunities are being provided for other units to train regularly in those areas. Individual and unit skill levels are also promoted through training and - air defence in maritime areas and northern approaches; exercising with allies and regional countries, and participating in multinational activities. - defeat of incursions on Australian territory; 4.40 Sustaining forces in combat requires provision of sufficient consumables - protection of important civil and defence assets, including infrastructure to support the rates of activity; maintenance, repair and replacement of assets and and population centres; and equipment; and the relief of deployed forces. It is essential to have reliable and assured sources of support and supply, or adequate stockholdings, and the capacity strategic strike. to deliver the support to the operational areas where and when it is needed. ----- Sustainability is particularly demanding in relation to high-cost items such as population to support our national defence effort; and effective planning for the missiles, which require periodic inspection and may have components with a limited management of our national response, including relationships with the civil shelf-life. Careful attention is paid to maintaining sufficient stocks of key items to community and between various levels of government. Such adaptability allows sustain combat for as long as might be necessary in our strategic circumstances. our force to be smaller now than we would need if we sought to maintain all the However, stocks are expensive to hold, and we must be careful not to waste resources capabilities which we might be need in the more distant future, or if we did not by building up stocks to levels higher than our strategic circumstances require. have the capacity to adapt quickly. Access to a range of reliable sources of resupply is important in reducing our need to hold expensive stocks, and is given high priority in preparedness planning. 4.46 The extent to which Australia can rely on the adaptability of our defence Sustainability also depends on repair and maintenance capabilities, both in the capabilities to meet future demands depends on our confidence that lead times for Defence Force itself and in the wider community, and on training systems for the the introduction of new capabilities would be shorter than the warning we would timely provision of reinforcements and replacements. have of the need for them. As military capabilities and technology in our region grow, the demands on our capacity to adapt our forces will grow. Lead times to 4.41 Sustainability involves complex judgements about the nature, dispersion develop new capabilities involve materiel acquisition and the development of and duration of operations, together with assessments of lead times for the doctrine, skills and experience in using and maintaining defence equipment. In acquisition of goods and services. Reliance on commercial sources and confidence general, lead times are longer for those capabilities which rely on technologically in international supply support arrangements not only reduce resource demands complex systems and which demand sophisticated training, exercising and support. but also the risk inherent in the complex judgements involved. 4.47 Ensuring sufficient adaptability to meet future challenges has several 4.42 Our overall preparedness levels are influenced both by planning for the important dimensions: defence of Australia and by the Australian Defence Force's peacetime program of activities and exercises. This includes counter-terrorism capabilities; the Defence it is influenced by the capacity of the national infrastructure to support Force's contribution to other national tasks such as fisheries patrol, coastal the Australian Defence Force, not only in acquiring materiel but also in surveillance, and assistance to the civil community; participation in bilateral and providing services and through-life support so the Force can concentrate multilateral exercises and activities; and contributions to peace operations and other its efforts on combat functions; activities in support of our international policies. it requires all the forces, including Reserves, to contribute effectively to 4.43 We will continue to emphasise strengthening the long-term capacity of operational activities, and in the case of Navy and Air Force, to have our Defence Force through investment, rather than on sustaining higher levels of available trained personnel to enable an early increase in the rate of effort preparedness than our present strategic circumstances and levels of activity require. from existing platforms; and it would be assisted by the existence of a base of trained personnel, Adaptability especially junior officers and experienced non-commissioned officers, to reduce the lead time for military staff development. 4.44 While our planning focuses on short-warning conflict, it also considers those higher levels of conflict which could occur in the longer term as major new capabilities develop in our region. Our approach to these forms of conflict has two Versatility parts: maintaining an intelligence capability which ensures timely warning of major capability developments; and having the adaptability to modify and expand our 4.48 An Australian Defence Force structured primarily for the defence of own capabilities relatively rapidly if necessary. Australia will possess significant capabilities which can be used flexibly in a wide range of activities. It has considerable versatility. The Australian Defence Force 4.45 Adaptability is also a characteristic of our wider national defence effort. thus provides many options for undertaking activities which flow from other It requires a flexible defence capability base which we can enhance or expand; a elements of our defence policy or in support of wider government interests. national industrial, scientific and technological base which allows us to redirect and expand our defence effort in a timely way; the skills and capacity of our ----- 4.49 The versatility of the Defence Force has been demonstrated well by the _4.51 Planning for the defence ofAustralia is dynamic. Constant improvement_ deployments in support of UN and other peace operations. Our capabilities have is required simply to maintain relative capability. Force development is continuous, met our needs in these areas. Given the discretion we have in choosing whether responding to changing strategic circumstances, and the evolution of military and how to employ defence capabilities to support these tasks, the available options technology and the nature of conflict. Important to this process is the matching of will be adequate in virtually all situations of interest to Australia. If situations personnel, training, equipment, organisation, structure, deployment, preparedness arose where the Force lacked the specific characteristics to provide adequate options, and doctrine, all components of capability. we would consider some marginal variations to force structure. The justification for this would be examined on a case-by-case basis. Variations might include, for _4.52 As regional capabilities grow, we need an active force development_ example, adopting compatible communications standards to allow interoperability program simply to preserve existing levels of defence effectiveness. Emphasis with allied or regional forces, or adjusting the timing of the acquisition of capabilities needs to be given therefore to preserving the investment program so that our for use in multinational activities. platforms remain effective and our skills in applying force are preserved. This will provide challenges in both our acquisition and personnel programs. Force Development Priorities _4.50 Our present defence capabilities, and the substantial developments we_ have underway, provide a strong foundation for building the Defence Force over the next fifteen years and beyond to meet the needs of our defence posture. We have, and are developing, strong and expanding intelligence capabilities and enduring intelligence relationships with friends and allies; modem surveillance assets, including the unique capability of the Jindalee Operational Radar Network; potent capabilities for patrolling and guarding our sea and air approaches and for longer range strike operations, including F 111 and F/A- 18 aircraft, guided missile and ANZAC frigates, and the Collins class submarines; and flexible and mobile land forces increasingly based in northern Australia and well equipped for operations there. Our task in coming years is to develop these capabilities further to continue to ensure that we can defeat forces which could credibly be brought to bear against us. In doing that, we will give priority to: developing the Australian Defence Force as an integrated whole, including command arrangements and doctrine at the operational level; carefully identifying areas and capabilities in which we need to maintain a high degree of excellence, in particular, command, control and communications; and which effectively use our strategic geography, in particular, maritime and air capabilities; cultivating our ability to expand and enhance our forces in response to significant new capabilities which might be brought to bear against us; and strengthening our national support base for defence. ----- 5.1 The Australian Defence Organisation today possesses a wide range of substantial capabilities, as set out in Appendix A. The combat capabilities, and most combat support capabilities, reside in the Australian Defence Force, although some - notably, intelligence collection and evaluation and significant support capabilities - reside predominantly in the civilian elements of the Defence Organisation. The capability developments proposed in this Chapter will ensure we can meet defence needs as our strategic environment becomes more demanding over the next fifteen years and beyond. _5.2 [Many platforms and assets can contribute to more than one of the key]_ defence roles, either at different times or simultaneously. Thus they contribute very broadly to the Australian Defence Force's capacity to defend Australia. In this Chapter, assets are treated under the role or roles to which they make the major contribution, rather than considering in detail the full breadth of the contribution they could make to other roles. COMMAND, CONTROL AND COMMUNICATIONS 5.3 Effective command and control of Australia's forces is fundamental to success in any conflict, just as it is to the efficient management of force elements participating in peacetime activities. _5.4 [The revolution in information technology is changing the ways in which]_ armed forces are commanded and controlled, allowing much more efficient use of military capabilities and better coordination of activity at all levels. These developments will continue over coming years. The successful exploitation of new command and control capabilities will be increasingly important to Australia's defence because it will allow us to use our ships, aircraft and land forces to maximum effect. _5.5 [Our capacity for tactical level command is good, but we have not been as]_ proficient in joint operational command of our forces. To provide for more effective command at the operational level, the existing joint headquarters will be collocated by 2000. This will provide more flexible options for operational command: where necessary, the appointment of a Commander Joint Forces Australia, the appointment of a lead Joint Force Commander or continuation of our present system. A ----- transitional arrangement will be established in 1995 at the existing Maritime _5.10 [Information is drawn from a wide range of sources to prepare intelligence]_ Headquarters site at Potts Point. This will help define joint operational concepts, assessments. Collectively, the Defence Signals Directorate and the Defence requirements and staff processes. Intelligence Organisation have significant capability to provide information am analysis to meet the demands of the Defence Organisation and the Government 5.6 The collocated joint force headquarters will be supported by a Joint Collaboration with other countries with whom we have intelligence-sharing Command Information Support System which will be acquired progressively over arrangements, especially the United States, is essential in meeting the demand for the next few years. This will interface with the Australian Defence Force Distributed intelligence. Intelligence System and single Service command support systems, such as the Australian Army Tactical Command Support System, which are currently being 5.11 In the medium term, further development of Australia's defence developed. intelligence will use advances in technology to ensure ready availability of data to commanders at all levels. The Australian Defence Force Distributed Intelligence 5.7 These evolving command and control arrangements are supported by System will ensure that information is processed and disseminated quickly and flexible strategic level communications which draw wherever possible on civil securely. It will be complemented by high speed, high capacity communications networks and systems, backed up by a minimum emergency Defence network. which will allow users at the strategic, operational and tactical levels to gain access The Australian Defence Force also operates a range of modern communications to the intelligence necessary to support their decision-making. systems which provide coverage of Australia and our sea and air approaches for mobile naval, land and air forces. A joint, Australia-wide high frequency radio communications system is being established to provide a reliable, integrated service at reduced operating costs. The new tn-Service facilities will be constructed at four sites including one at Wagga Wagga to replace the existing Navy _5.12 [While the collection and analysis of environmental information is not]_ communications facility in Canberra. always a high profile activity, it is essential to enable the Australian Defence Force to operate effectively in northern Australia and the adjacent sea and air approaches. _5.8 Familiarity with space systems and research will be important. Further_ This information improves the performance of our sensors and weapons and gives development of integrated joint communications systems will include satellite a natural advantage to our forces. The ports, shipping routes and focal areas in the communications, initially using civil satellites and military transponders. The cost waters of our sea and air approaches attract the highest priority for hydrographic effectiveness of military satellites, with broader applications such as surveillance, and oceanographic information, while our coastal areas and offshore territories will be examined. As the relative costs of space-based systems decline, they may attract priority for land survey. It is also important to provide meteorological and well become a cost-effective means of meeting national surveillance and ionospheric information across those regions. communications needs. We are also moving into an era in which communications and computer systems will merge in seamless networks. This will require careful 5.13 Environmental information is collected by various elements of the attention to security needs, including the acquisition of security devices and systems Australian Defence Force: hydrographic information by Navy using its survey ships capable of protecting Australian information. and aircraft; opportunity tasking of Navy ships and data exchange programs; and land survey information by the Army Survey Regiment. Various State and local government authorities and agencies provide extensive data and information. Civil INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION AND EVALUATION organisations are used wherever possible for activities such as remote sensing. _5.9 Our defence planning and strategy rely on timely warning of changes in_ _5.14 [We will continue to give high priority to the collection of information]_ our strategic environment, particularly developments in political attitudes and about our operational environment, making optimum use of commercial support. military capability, including the introduction into our region of any significant We will also emphasise maintaining the existing capacity to collect and process new capabilities. Collection, evaluation and distribution of intelligence information environmental information and improve the integration of geographic information allows the timely development of our defence posture and force structure in ways with command, control and combat support systems. The survey ships HMAS appropriate to our circumstances, and contributes to effective command and control Flinders and Moresby, which are approaching the end of their economic lives, will of our forces in operations and during peacetime activities. be replaced by two new hydrographic ships. We are also evaluating options to ----- supplement Australian Defence Force hydrographic capacity and meet oceanographic needs with contractor support. Finally, Army mapping systems will be updated. SURVEILLANCE OF MARITIME AREAS AND NORTHERN AUSTRALIA 5.15 The ability to locate and monitor potentially hostile forces in our sea and air approaches and on our territory is essential to prevent or nullify threats to our interests. The Australian Defence Force possesses significant capabilities to detect and monitor aircraft, ships and submarines in the sea and air approaches to our territory. The capability to detect and monitor any forces which may have lodged on our territory is more limited. The capability for wide area surveillance will continue to be improved over the coming decade with the introduction of new high technology systems. _5.16 The Jindalee Operational Radar Network will be completed to provide_ broad area surveillance coverage of ships and aircraft in Australia's sea and air approaches. Ground based microwave radars, surface combatants with a range of active and passive sensors, including naval helicopters, and maritime patrol aircraft such as the P3C Orion, all contribute to surface and air surveillance. While our detection capabilities are good, localisation of detected air targets needs further attention. Towed acoustic arrays are being fitted to the Collins Class submarines to provide a further capacity for detecting ships and submarines, and similar arrays will be fitted later to surface ships. Maritime patrol aircraft and naval helicopters carry sonobuoys which can detect submarines within localised areas. The feasibility 5.18 Further development of Australia's capacity for surveillance will focus of fixed seabed acoustic arrays for wide area maritime surveillance will be on better integrating surveillance information from a variety of sensors, and ensuring investigated. our sensors remain effective against evolving electronic countermeasures. The Defence Force will also enhance its capacity for precise location and tracking of 5.17 Surveillance of northern Australia can be carried out using both air and ships, aircraft and small widely dispersed ground force groups. land force assets. Fl 11 aircraft can undertake specific reconnaissance tasks, day and night. Other Australian Defence Force aircraft, such as helicopters, can also 5.19 A promising area of investigation is the use of unmanned aerial vehicles undertake aerial reconnaissance or deploy forces for ground patrolling. Land force for surveillance of land and maritime environments. These remotely controlled elements, such as reconnaissance squadrons, special forces and regional force aircraft can employ a variety of sensors and be operated by land and naval forces to surveillance units, supplemented as necessary by infantry units, can cover large provide flexible and responsive surveillance coverage. The available options are land areas using a variety of armoured and other reconnaissance vehicles. Ground being examined to determine their cost effectiveness relative to other systems such surveillance is enhanced with systems such as night vision devices, advanced radios as piloted aircraft and space based platforms and the extent to which they can and global positioning satellite navigation equipment. Most of these systems, complement the wider Australian Defence Force surveillance effort. For example, however, are restricted in area of coverage or application. unmanned aerial vehicles may meet part of the need to replace Army's Kiowa reconnaissance helicopters and to provide aerial surveillance from Navy's patrol combatants. ----- 5.20 Australia's air surveillance capability includes a range of overlapping developed further to ensure the sensors and weapons earned by our platforms remain systems extending from the wide area coverage provided by the Jindalee Operational effective in the face of developments in technology, and that new platforms such Radar Network to the local area coverage of radars and other sensors on aircraft as the ANZAC frigates are fitted with necessary sensors and weapons, including and ships. Our total capability enables initial detection of aircraft at long range helicopters. and subsequent precise localisation and classification. This significant reliance on combat aircraft to localise and classify unknown targets can also be inefficient and 5.24 The P3C Orion aircraft can patrol large maritime areas and intercept hostile place the combat aircraft itself at undue risk. Thus the Defence Force needs an air ships or submarines using a variety of sensors and precision missiles and torpedoes. surveillance system which can provide intermediate-range detection, localisation The P3C fleet will undergo a major upgrade over the remainder of this decade te and classification of air targets, and control any subsequent interception. Such a improve significantly its surveillance capacity and to extend its operational life. capacity could be provided by an airborne early warning and control capability. F 111 and F/A- 18 aircraft can also use stand-off precision weapons to defeat hostile ships. 5.21 Defence has continued to monitor developments in airborne early warning and control technology to identify an affordable option which meets Australia's _5.25 [Our surface combatant fleet, with air support and ship-borne helicopters,]_ needs. Recent developments in radar technology present a number of possibilities. has the reach and endurance, particularly when supported by afloat support ships, The Government has approved the first stage of the acquisition of a suitable aircraft: to patrol our large maritime areas of interest and respond to threats. Australia's six a project definition study, planned for completion in _1995, to define the technical_ guided-missile frigates (FFGs) will be upgraded to extend their operational life characteristics and costs of options and their potential contribution to wider and ensure their survivability in the increasingly sophisticated maritime warfare Australian Defence Force surveillance, command and control arrangements. environment. Subsequently, a suitable airborne system should be acquired by about 2000. 5.26 The introduction into service over the next ten years of eight ANZAC frigates will significantly enhance our surface combatant fleet, improving our MARITIME OPERATIONS capacity for maritime patrol and response and protection of shipping. The first of the ANZAC frigates was launched in Melbourne in September 1994 and the last 5.22 A primary objective in defending Australia would be to prevent hostile will be launched by 2002. Planning has begun to identify the required surface forces from reaching our territory or from launching successful attacks against combatant force capabilities after the three guided-missile destroyers (DDGs) leave Australia's interests in our sea and air approaches. The Australian Defence Force service, currently planned from about 2000. maintains capabilities for patrolling our sea and air approaches, responding quickly and decisively to any emerging threat, and protecting shipping, territories and _5.27 [A new class of patrol vessel will be acquired to replace the Fremantle]_ resources in these approaches. This protection could involve countering a number Class Patrol Boats. The new vessels will have more capable combat systems, of threats, including the mining of focal areas and port approaches, attacks on weapon and sensor suites, allowing better integration with other maritime assets merchant shipping or civil aircraft in our sea and air lines of communication, or and hence a capacity for surface warfare in coastal and inshore waters. A contract raids on our offshore resource infrastructure and territories. Capabilities for maritime was let in 1993 for an Australian design which will be submitted to Malaysia for operations are based around a mix of aircraft, ships and submarines, each fitted consideration in its plans to acquire a large number of offshore patrol vessels. with appropriate sensors and weapons. These force elements are also able to Selection of that design by Malaysia could provide an important opportunity to contribute to strategic strike and air defence in the sea and air approaches to Australia. develop a collaborative acquisition project and support program between Australia and Malaysia. Timing of the acquisition of the new patrol vessels has yet to be _5.23 The Government has made a substantial investment in recent years in_ decided. In the meantime, the option to extend the life of the Fremantle Class surface ships and submarines. This reflects the strong maritime emphasis in the remains available. concept of depth in defence. Investment will continue in maritime forces, with approved or planned projects to upgrade maritime fixed wing aircraft and acquire 5.28 In future, all major surface combat units will be equipped with helicopters mine warfare vessels, surface combatants and an enhanced naval aviation capability. to extend the effectiveness and range of the ships' combat systems. Seahawk With the increasing availability of precision weapons, long-range sensors, and helicopters currently operating from our surface combatants increase the effective 'clever' countermeasures, the demands which could be placed on our patrol range of the ships' sensors and weapons, and possess systems to locate and if platforms are increasing. Australia's capacity for maritime operations will be necessary defeat hostile submarines. The Sea King utility helicopters operated by Navy will be modified to extend their life until about 2010, delaying the need to ----- _5.29 Helicopters will be acquired for the ANZAC frigates. A decision on the_ involve a cost penalty. Some merchant ships - including those supporting Australian number and type will be made in 1995-96. Acquisition of a common type of Defence Force operations - may, however, be unable to avoid threat areas. The helicopter for other surface combatants is also being considered. The ANZAC Australian Defence Force therefore maintains a capability for escorting ships using frigate helicopters will be equipped to undertake surface surveillance and its fleet of surface combatants, assisted by a range of aircraft where their reach and reconnaissance tasks and to provide data on over-the-horizon contacts. Some of endurance permit. Australia's offshore territories and oil and gas resources the helicopters may be equipped with an air-to-surface missile. To optimise logistic infrastructure would be protected by a combination of maritime patrol aircraft and support arrangements and minimise costs, the Government will seek the greatest surface combatants, air defence using F/A-I 8 aircraft and ground-based missiles. practicable level of commonality in helicopter types across the Australian Defence and deployment as necessary of land forces. Force. _5.34 [Harpoon missiles, a key element in our capacity for maritime operations,]_ _5.30 The force of six Collins Class submarines being introduced over the_ are deployed on a range ofAustralian Defence Force aircraft, ships and submarines. remainder of this decade will provide a very substantial capacity for maritime patrol We will continue to improve our precision missile capability. and response, maritime strike and support of a number of other roles. Our fleet of Collins Class submarines will be an important element of our capacity to deny our sea approaches to hostile shipping and to mount strike operations at long range. These submarines are difficult to detect and therefore are less vulnerable than surface ships and aircraft, while their sensors and weapons allow them to detect and attack shipping with accuracy at long range. 5.31 Six Collins Class submarines are considered appropriate to meet current and foreseeable needs, and additional submarines will not be acquired now. The priority for acquiring additional submarines will be reviewed after the - commencement of the first five year Defence budget in 1996-97, taking into account Australia's strategic circumstances. Early in the new decade, planning will commence on an upgrade of the six submarines to ensure that they remain effective in the face of developing technology and to take account of developments in conventional air-independent propulsion systems. Defence will also continue to monitor the need for more capable submarine-launched missiles. _5.32 Six Huon Class minehunters will be constructed in Newcastle over the_ remainder of this decade to balance the planned Australian Defence Force mine countermeasures force. This force will have a significant capacity to detect and neutralise mines in port approaches, confined shipping routes and focal areas. The new vessels will complement existing assets which include two Australian-designed inshore minehunters and a number of small vessels which can tow the Australian- designed mine sweeping system. Planning includes the acquisition, as necessary, of craft of opportunity such as fishing boats or tugs to enhance mine sweeping capacity. Mine clearance divers also contribute to our mine countermeasures 5.35 The Government has acquired two heavy landing ships to replace the capability. A mine warfare systems centre is being built at HMAS Waterhen in training ship HMAS Jervis Bay and the heavy landing ship HMAS Tobruk. They Sydney to provide operational, logistic and training support of the mine will be modified to provide a capacity for training, afloat medical support and countermeasures force. helicopter operations. These ships will enable the transport of land force groups of up to battalion size with tanks, other vehicles and equipment. These ships will be 5.33 Attacks on shipping beyond Australia's port approaches could be avoided able to carry sufficient helicopters to land platoon size groups of up to 30 personnel during a conflict by re-routing ships away from threat areas, though this would in a single lift. Following their modification in 1995-96, they are expected to ----- provide a further twenty years service. Future requirements for a logistics over- area air defence missiles and their associucd iniccraicd enor and conuinind and the-shore capability in support of land force operations are the subject of further control systems will also be monitored. analysis. 5.40 Hostile aircraft with beyond-visual-range precision-guided missiles pose _5.36 With the introduction of new platforms such as minehunters, ANZAC_ a very high risk to ships. Our surface combatants are fitted with a range of anti- frigates and Collins Class submarines, Navy personnel numbers will need to missile defence systems such as the close-in weapons system, and SEA SPARROW increase. Opportunities to offset this increase by reducing uniformed personnel and STANDARD missiles which can destroy incoming missiles and, in some numbers in support areas are limited in Navy, which already relies extensively on circumstances, the launch aircraft. Australia is involved in a program to develop civil support. The present Navy full-time personnel strength of 14,800 will therefore an upgraded SEA SPARROW system, and we will look at options for retaining or be increased marginally to support the increased capabilities. While it is desirable replacing the STANDARD missile system in order to maintain an area air defence for submarines to be crewed by volunteers, all entrants to the Navy will continue capacity on the FFG frigates through to their end of life. The NULKA decoy to be liable for submarine service. Among other measures, a selection process is system will be installed in a number of ships. being introduced which will identify and encourage personnel with suitable sea experience to qualify as submariners to relieve crew shortfalls. 5.41 Air Force's Macchi MB326H lead-in fighters which provide essential introductory training for the crews of both fighter and strike aircraft will be replaced by 2000 as they reach their airframe life. Industry has been invited to register AIR DEFENCE IN MARITIME AREAS AND NORTHERN interest in tendering for replacement options. The Government will consider AUSTRALIA acquiring as a new lead-in fighter an aircraft which would contribute to other defence operational and training tasks, such as close air support for the land force and air _5.37 Aircraft with long-range precision weapons could cause significant_ defence training for the fleet. This will reduce the burden on the airframe fatigue damage to important Australian assets in our sea and air approaches and on our life of the F/A- 18 aircraft and release them for more demanding tasks. territory. Thus, the Australian Defence Force maintains a capacity to intercept and defeat hostile aircraft and missiles. A timely and effective response to air threats 5.42 The surveillance and command and control elements of our air defence requires surveillance, command and control and response capabilities, integrated system will be enhanced with the planned acquisition of the airborne early warning into a coordinated total air defence system. and control capability. In addition, facilities and equipment for an air defence control and reporting unit are being established at the Tindal Air Force Base. Up to _5.38 Australia's three squadrons ofF/A- 18 fighter aircraft provide our primary_ six new mobile ground air defence radars will also be acquired. air defence response. Their effectiveness in a conflict would be enhanced by forward basing to Darwin and one or more of the unmanned air bases in northern Australia, and by the availability of aerial refuelling aircraft. The Government will commence a program this decade to upgrade the capability of the F/A- 18 fleet. This program will ensure that new sensor, electronic counter-measures and weapon systems are compatible and fully integrated with the F/A-i 8's current avionics, weapons and sensor suite, and will be managed to enable the aircraft to remain fully effective until their replacement around _2015. Early upgrade of the aircraft's radar is planned,_ with precise timing influenced by the plans for upgrades by other users such as the United States and Canada. _5.39 Ground-based air defence missiles such as RBS-70 and Rapier provide a_ limited capacity for point defence of selected vital assets. Longer term developments in precision-guided munitions and ground-based surface-to-air missile defences are being monitored to ensure that our point air defence capacity remains viable, particularly when the existing Rapier and RBS-70 systems reach obsolescence in about 2000 and 2005 respectively. In addition, options for mobile ground-based ----- LAND OPERATIONS year in the case of the least prepared Reserve battalions. In the event of warning of the emergence of a threat, the readiness levels of all units could be raised _5.43 The Australian Defence Force possesses a substantial capacity to prevent_ appropriately. large hostile forces from landing and being sustained on our territory. However, smaller groups could penetrate our shores anywhere across the north. It is not _5.48 [With the introduction of the Ready Reserve scheme and a more clearly]_ practicable to have a continuous land force presence everywhere. Australian defined role for the General Reserve as part of the Total Force, existing infantry Defence Force operations in northern Australia thus have several dimensions: readiness levels are now considered broadly sufficient for the defence of Australia surveillance and reconnaissance, protection of assets and infrastructure, and in our present circumstances. The exception to this could be in the period of any interception and defeat of hostile forces. conflict prior to call-out and preparation of the Reserve, when considerable demands would be placed on our four Regular battalions to protect important assets across a _5.44 The Australian Defence Force's capability to intercept and defeat small,_ vast area. The availability of a fifth infantry battalion would greatly enhance our widely dispersed land force groups is based on close coordination ofjoint maritime capacity for initial land operations in the defence of Australia. and air forces operating in our sea and air approaches, and joint air and land forces operating on or over our territory. Land force surveillance and reconnaissance is _5.49 [The scope of savings and efficiencies programmed by Army through a]_ provided by a combination of Regular and Reserve units. Mobile units deployed range of initiatives will free up the personnel and operating resources necessary to from forward bases by fixed and rotary wing aircraft or ground transport vehicles raise a fifth Regular battalion. The battalion, which will include one Reserve would combine with aviation and other components of the land force as well as air company, will be raised over the next three to four years as the resources become assets to provide the necessary response. available. An additional infantry battalion maintained for the defence of Australia will improve the versatility of the Force, provide greater flexibility for contributions _5.45 Effective protection of civil and defence assets would be a priority in_ to UN and other peace operations. and contribute to combined exercises in the conflict, but it would be impossible to provide close protection for all potential region. targets. Even if the threat to such assets was perceived to be relatively low, the Australian Defence Force would need to maintain a visible presence in northern _5.50 [A review of the land force, to be completed by late ][1995, ][will establish]_ Australia in order to provide the local community with confidence, encourage what further adjustment to its structure is necessary. This review will address a 'business as usual' and coordinate with the activities of the civil authorities and the range of issues including the number and readiness of infantry units, the benefits community. The Australian Defence Force capability to protect vital assets on the of additional ground reconnaissance units, the balance between Regular and Reserve Australian mainland is based on a joint force, including land and air components. elements of the force and the resource implications of any options for further change. In the early stages of a conflict, Regular infantry units and airfield defence guards would protect vital assets, assisted by air patrols and ground reconnaissance of _5.51 [The Ready Reserve scheme, which is a specific component of the wider]_ likely approach routes. If circumstances warranted 'call-out', the Reserve infantry Reserve force, was introduced as a first step in matching the Reserve structure brigades would boost significantly the number of troops available, freeing some better to the demands of short-warning conflict. It has elements in all three Services. Regular units for response and other tasks. but its major component is the infantry brigade in Brisbane. The scheme has attracted many very capable people to the Australian Defence Force and provides _5.46 In developing a land force which can contribute effectively and_ units at relatively high readiness. After three years of development it is appropriate appropriately to these important roles and tasks, a balance must be established now to review progress. A review of the Ready Reserve program will be initiated. between Regular and Reserve elements, and between combat and combat support units. This balance will vary over time in response to changing technology and to _5.52_ The structure and evolving role of Reserves in the Total Force is discussed readiness considerations. more fully in Chapter Seven. _5.47 Central to considerations of balance is the strength of the infantry_ _5.53 [In addition to the structural changes planned for the land force, the]_ component of the land force, and in particular the balance between Regular and Australian Defence Force's capacity to defeat incursions will also be developed to Reserve infantry units. Army at present maintains 21 infantry battalions in total: 4 enhance the mobility of surveillance, reconnaissance and response forces through Regular, 3 Ready Reserve and 14 General Reserve. These provide troops at upgrades and acquisition of aircraft and vehicles. Emphasis will also be given to readiness levels varying from less than a month in the case of the Sydney-based ensuring the provision of firepower, including from both fixed wing aircraft and Parachute Battalion and the Townsville-based Rapid Deployment Force, to about a helicopters. ----- _5.54 The Kiowa helicopter fleet will be replaced by a new aerial surveillance,_ _5.60 [Infantry and reconnaissance units in Army can be supported by]_ reconnaissance and fire support capability for the land force toward the end of this considerable firepower through a combination of artillery, helicopters, tanks and decade. The new capability may involve a combination of fixed wing aircraft, other armoured vehicles. Air assets such as the Fill strike aircraft and the F/A- 18 helicopters with single or multi-role functions and unmanned aerial vehicles. fighter can provide additional support if necessary. Surface ships also can provide naval gunfire support in coastal areas. Defence will continue to review fire support _5.55 Four D-model Chinook helicopters have been acquired to provide a_ options as existing assets approach the end of their economic lives. capacity for the tactical transport of fuel, supplies and equipment, the evacuation of casualties and the movement of troops in platoon groups. The Government will consider acquiring more utility helicopters, some equipped for operations in a maritime environment, to provide for air transport of an additional infantry company. All _5.56 The Caribou tactical transport aircraft provides the Australian Defence_ Force with important access to poorly prepared landing strips, including in wet weather conditions, in areas where runways capable of supporting C130 aircraft are not available. The Caribou has been in service for several decades and is becoming expensive to maintain. Options to replace the capability provided by the Caribou are being reviewed and include both fixed and rotary wing aircraft. The timing of the replacement will depend on progress with the approved replacement of the C13OE fleet and introduction of the new Chinook helicopters. _5.57 New land force vehicles will be acquired to give greater mobility and_ better personnel protection. The fleet of 113 tracked armoured vehicles will also undergo a limited modification program to overcome existing deficiencies and extend their life well into the next century. New light reconnaissance vehicles based on commercial standards will be acquired this decade, and a lightly armoured transport vehicle will be acquired to provide mobility to infantry brigades. The present fleet of trucks will be replaced early in the next decade. These projects will be managed to provide opportunities for Australian industry and reduce subsequent through-life costs, including adopting civil standards to the maximum extent practicable. 5.61 Tanks provide a base from which to adapt the force to meet the demands of major conflict. Their mobility, protection and firepower would also enable them _5.58 Night vision devices are already available in the Australian Defence Force._ to contribute significantly in short-warning conflict. The present fleet of 103 Additional devices will be acquired to enable more night operations. The capability Leopard tanks is adequate for these purposes, and will be supported until at least will be enhanced further through acquisition of Global Positioning Satellite 2010. A proposal to purchase surplus German Leopard tanks to replace the older navigation systems for use by mobile elements of the Australian Defence Force. Australian Leopards will not be taken up as it is not cost effective. When necessary, Acquisition of unattended ground sensors and ground surveillance radars to detect the Leopard tanks will be replaced by smaller tanks suited to our northern and monitor small hostile groups is also planned. environment and fitted with a state-of-the-art combat system. _5.59 Additional Australian-manufactured single channel radios will be acquired_ 5.62 Recognising that technology is increasing the demands which could be to complement existing RAVEN radios. A field trunk communications network placed on soldiers, Defence has initiated a project to identify and plan developments being acquired will use commercial satellites as well as microwave and high which will ensure our soldiers continue to be equipped to meet emerging challenges. frequency transmissions. The project will focus on increasing the endurance, self-protection, communications and geographic awareness of the individual soldier by exploiting and integrating leading-edge technology. ----- STRATEGIC STRIKE elements of this support, as is the priority the Government gives to a national capacity for the maintenance, repair and modification of defence equipment (see Chapters _5.63 The Australian Defence Force retains a capacity to undertake strategic_ Eleven and Twelve). strike operations against the interests of an adversary. This includes an ability to strike ships, land-based forces and infrastructure. _5.70 [Judgements about how to provide support for combat forces are]_ continually refined as strategic developments occur. In general, we will seek support _5.64 Against an adversary's infrastructure, special forces could be deployed,_ from commercial sources in our national support base, although the Australian or Fill or F/A- 18 aircraft could strike specific targets from the air with precision Defence Force will continue to possess those logistic support capabilities required munitions, by day or night and in all weather conditions. in operations. _5.65 Our Collins Class submarines provide a very significant capacity to strike_ ships using a variety of sensors to locate targets and a combination of missiles and Transport torpedoes. Even without launching an attack, submarines by their very nature would create significant uncertainty for an adversary and force precautionary _5.71 [Australia has many civil transport assets which could assist the movement]_ defensive measures. They are therefore an important means of discouraging attacks of forces and supplies, so the Defence Organisation gives high priority to developing on Australia. Attacks on ships could also be undertaken using precision-guided mechanisms for their use during conflict. As civil transport may not, however, be weapons launched from our Fill, F/A- 18 or P3C aircraft or ships. able in all circumstances to meet all defence demands, the Australian Defence Force maintains its own capability to provide for certain essential transport needs. _5.66 Advances in air defence technology, sensors and weapons increase the_ This involves transport aircraft such as the C130 fleet, as well as a large number of risks to air assets, so further development of the Australian Defence Force's air trucks and amphibious and afloat support ships. strike capability will ensure our aircraft retain adequate self-protection systems and a capacity to deliver weapons precisely at sufficient range to avoid defensive _5.72 [The large area, hostile terrain and limited infrastructure of northern]_ systems. Australia make air transport essential, both to support deployed land forces and to support bases in remote areas. Australia's fleet of commercial aircraft has some limitations in terms of its capacity to carry large items of equipment and to operate SUPPORT OF THE FORCE into poorly prepared air strips. We will therefore continue to give high priority to maintaining a capable air transport fleet in the Australian Defence Force. The _5.67 Successful defence relies not just on the possession of military capabilities,_ Government has already approved the replacement of the twelve ageing C130E but also on the ability of the nation as a whole to sustain these capabilities in peace strategic transport aircraft with new C130 aircraft, and will consider options to and during a conflict. retain the airlift capability provided by the twelve Ci 30H aircraft. _5.68 Although the Australian Defence Force requires combat capabilities_ necessary for the defence of Australia, complete self-sufficiency in the logistics Facilities and Infrastructure and other support of the Force is neither practicable nor affordable. Indeed, to seek such self-sufficiency would be so demanding of resources that it would _5.73 [The availability of facilities and infrastructure such as bases, training]_ constrain significantly the range of combat capabilities we could afford to maintain, areas, airfields and roads contributes significantly to defence force effectiveness. and so weaken our overall defence effort. Careful judgements are made on the The Government's program of enhancing such facilities in the west and north of balance between investment in combat capabilities and investment in their support, Australia is nearing completion. in order to achieve an optimum combination of combat strength and supportability. _5.74 [Relocation of several land force units to the north of Australia will be]_ _5.69 Defence pays careful attention to ensuring reliability of supply, seeking_ completed during this decade. They will occupy newly constructed facilities near supply from Australian sources where practicable. Where it is necessary to use Darwin. The 2nd Cavalry Regiment, which is already established near Darwin, overseas sources, it seeks multiple suppliers and holds appropriate stocks. Standing will be joined by the end of the decade by elements of the IstArmoured Regiment, agreements with allies and other countries and comprehensive planning are vital the 5th/7th Battalion Royal Australian Regiment and the remaining elements of 1St ----- Brigade. Furthermore, a new field training area will be acquired in northern Other Forms of Support Australia. 5.81 The Defence Organisation relies on a range of other forms of support _5.75 The chain of northern air bases will be completed later this decade when_ both in peace and in conflict. For example, Defence must protect its facilities and work on the Scherger Air Force Base on Cape York Peninsula is completed. Together information from theft or criminal damage. Commercial security firms provide with aerial refuelling, these bases will allow Australian Defence Force aircraft to facilities security on a number of Defence bases, while information security is operate at long ranges and to remain on task for extended periods over a much undertaken in-house. This second area will face new challenges as information larger portion of northern Australia and its sea and air approaches than was hitherto systems continue to proliferate and advance and communications systems become possible. more complex. 5.76 We are developing facilities at HMAS Stirling in Western Australia to 5.82 Catering, cleaning and other functions must also be undertaken at fixed accommodate all of the submarine force, about half of the surface force and Defence bases, and in the field. Often commercial contractors perform these associated naval helicopters. Naval facilities in Darwin will also be upgraded as functions, although some Australian Defence Force personnel continue to provide necessary to accommodate new patrol vessels and hydrographic survey ships. catering and other essential support on ships and in support of deployable units. Defence also maintains a limited number of military police, firefighting and air _5.77 While commercial firms undertake the construction of permanent_ traffic control services, and administrative support functions to meet the essential facilities, the Australian Defence Force maintains some in-house capacity with its needs of operational units when deployed to a combat area. land force engineer units to provide construction and engineering support in operational areas. _5.83 Defence must ensure that its people are fully fit for operational duties,_ and can be treated promptly if they are wounded or injured. This is not only an essential responsibility to its people, but is also essential to maintain the effectiveness Logisfic Support Capabilities of our combat capability. As there is little demand in peace for certain medical skills which are very important in conflict, the Australian Defence Force relies on _5.78 The ability to keep defence equipment operational throughout a conflict_ the availability of Reserve health specialists for combat support in a number of is fundamental to Australian Defence Force effectiveness. As Defence spends areas. Army maintains a field hospital, and medical facilities will be installed on more than $1 billion annually on equipment replenishment, repair and overhaul, it the recently acquired training and helicopter support ships. is constantly seeking opportunities for efficiencies. Civilian support is used wherever it is cost effective, but the Australian Defence Force must retain a capacity to provide for essential repair and maintenance and the supply of spares and RESOURCES consumables in combat areas. _5.84 The capability developments outlined in this Chapter will ensure we can_ _5.79 The introduction of supply system and aircraft maintenance information_ provide for the defence of Australia in the more demanding strategic environment management systems will improve the joint management of logistic support of the future. Achieving our priorities will present many challenges. To meet functions. The rationalisation of warehousing arrangements will continue under these, it will be important that we continue to provide resources for investment in the Defence Logistics Redevelopment Project, involving the establishment of a future capabilities. The nature of this investment will shift in the future from ships, central storage and distribution facility at Moorebank in Sydney and leading to which were the focus in recent years, to aircraft. substantial savings and greater effectiveness in the supply system. _5.86 Despite the continuing emphasis on equipment investment, the more_ 5.80 Modern technology will increasingly be introduced in logistic complex Defence Organisation of the future will need increasingly skilled people, organisations to reduce support costs. We are acquiring, for example, automatic so we must provide sufficient resources to fund our most important asset - our test equipment, module replacement and increasingly reliable systems, to reduce people. either the cost of support or at least demands in operational areas to support much of the Australian Defence Force's equipment. The implementation of an increased level ofjoint logistics support capabilities and commonality of systems, procedures and components between the three Services will improve the efficiency of support. ----- 6.1 The Australian Defence Force's tradition of military excellence is based on the professionalism and competence of its people, both at home and abroad. Recent deployments in the Gulf War, Namibia, Cambodia, Somalia, Rwanda and elsewhere have reinforced this. 6.2 In the face of a wide range of social, demographic, technological, industrial, cultural and legal changes in Australia, recruiting and retaining people with the skills, professionalism and discipline required by the Australian Defence Force is and will be challenging. Our response to these challenges covers a broad front. Existing initiatives include improved housing, family support programs, reviews by the Defence Force Remuneration Tribunal, national accreditation of military training and early determination of deployment allowances. 6.3 People are fundamental to all our defence capabilities. For the Defence Organisation to respond to more demanding strategic circumstances, personnel policies are directed at ensuring maximum return from uniformed personnel and welding all personnel, military and civilian, full-time and part-time, into a single team, Defence's one organisation. Fair and reasonable pay and conditions will be maintained for all staff, and the special features of military service will be recognised. High quality, cost-effective training will continue to be provided to enhance staff development and practice. Personnel management will be based on merit and equal employment opportunity, and demand exemplary standards of performance and conduct. THE SPECIAL NATURE OF MILITARY SERVICE 6.4 Defence Force service imposes special demands and impacts on families. Australian Defence Force personnel often work under arduous physical conditions for extended periods. Both on and off duty, they are subject to strict disciplinary requirements, backed by the punishment provisions of the Defence Force Disciplinary Act. They must render service as ordered, and the opportunity to take into account personal preference or convenience is less than might be found in most other forms of employment. They must also maintain high standards of health and physical fitness so that they can withstand the physical and mental stresses associated with armed conflict, and are subject to compulsory early retirement well before the age of sixty five. ----- _6.5 In addition, Australian Defence Force personnel can be relocated at short_ Restructuring notice, and their employment often involves frequent and extended absences from home. In a society that emphasises the freedom of the individual, these restrictions 6.8 A program of restructuring in the Defence Organisation has been initiated contrast sharply with the personal liberties normally enjoyed by most Australians. in response to the changing demands of our national defence effort. This program will continue, with the following key objectives: 6.6 Consequently, the Government will provide Australian Defence Force personnel with a package of pay, conditions of service and other benefits, including developing Defence as one organisation, with civilian and military housing, designed specifically around the special nature of military service. The personnel working closely together, and with military personnel in the elements of this are not fringe benefits but prerequisites for members to meet the Australian Defence Force working cohesively as a Total Force; demands of military service. maximising combat capabilities by reducing the numbers of Service personnel involved in administrative and base support functions and by using commercial and civilian support and maintenance where operationally feasible, practicable and cost effective; meeting the strategic focus on northern and western operations by extending western basing for Navy and northern basing for more Army units, and enhancing Air Force's forward deployment capacity; and making greater use of Reserves, including the Ready Reserve, as key elements of the Total Force. Defence Personnel Numbers - •_.v 6.9 Since the Force Structure Review, 1991, and as shown in Table 6.1, Defence civilian personnel numbers have been reduced by some 16 per cent, while **pp4** full-time military personnel numbers have been reduced by about 15 per cent. These reductions have been the result of a number of factors: ADJUSTING THE CULTURE the savings resulting from the Force Structure Review, 1991 and related initiatives; 6.7 Our approach to the use of Service personnel is adapting in response to change in both our society and our strategic circumstances. This involves significant reductions to overcome structural imbalances in rank and skill levels due organisational and cultural change to obtain the most cost-effective output from to lower than expected separation rates, and to offset increases in per our limited military and civilian personnel resources. capita salary costs; recruitment shortfalls in specific employment and skills categories; reduced recruitment levels to assist in achieving longer term stable personnel levels as soon as possible; and achievement of additional savings from Tier Two of the Commercial Support Program. ----- Table 6-1: Number of Permanent Personnel in the Defence Force, as well as an increase in the proportion of more senior staff. While Defence Organisation commercial support offers opportunities for cost savings in some areas, and establishes closer links between Defence and the community, it does not replace the need for military personnel in operational functions to meet Australia's essential Year at 30 June Navy Army Air Force Total Civilian military capability needs. 6.13 To achieve maximum defence effort, we need to make careful judgements 1991 15894 31143 22121 69158 _25006_ about functions performed by military personnel, Defence civilians and industry. It is no longer appropriate to measure defence capability simply by the number of 1992 15395 30157 21502 _67054_ 23832 personnel in uniform. We will continue to seek opportunities for wider commercial support so that we can enhance operational capabilities within available resources. 1993 15041 28054 19345 62440 22105 At the same time, we need to be conscious of the requirements for combat deployability and readiness, employment skills, relative costs and the need for 1994 14776 26347 17807 _58930_ 20966 relief from duty in remote locations. 6.10 Since 1989, the number of civilian personnel in the Senior Executive Service in the Defence Organisation has been reduced by some 25 per cent, while The Total Force the number of senior military officers of colonel equivalent rank or higher has also been reduced. 6.14 The Australian Defence Force will use its skilled military personnel efficiently, developing a Total Force in which all elements work together in a coordinated effort under joint operational command. Given these evolving joint One Organisation command arrangements the Total Force recognises that Reserves are a fundamental part of our force structure, and they are allocated specific roles in the defence of Australia. It is a flexible concept that allows the Regular-Reserve balance - and 6.11 Defence's one organisation approach emphasises the need for close the balance between active and inactive Reserves - to be adjusted to meet changing integration of all Australian Defence Force and Defence civilian personnel employed in policy, administrative and support functions. It increases efficiency by eliminating demands. duplicated effort caused by parallel Service and civilian structures. Although extensive restructuring and productivity increases have been achieved, scope for further progress remains. We will continue to develop the structure of the Defence MEETING FUTURE REQUIREMENTS Organisation to improve efficiency and effectiveness, including through integrating more support functions and creating a closer understanding between the various 6.15 The one organisation approach, increased use of commercial support and elements of the organisation. integration of Reserves into the Total Force all improve the efficiency of the Defence Organisation and enable it to meet its responsibilities with fewer full-time personnel. Nonetheless, the Australian Defence Force remains one of Australia's largest Commercial Support employers, and will continue to recruit substantial numbers of full-time Service personnel to maintain the professional expertise underpinning its credibility. Highly skilled people are needed throughout the Defence Organisation. At present, there 6.12 The Defence Organisation now draws widely on the skills of the Australian are few difficulties in attracting suitable civilian staff, but the Australian Defence community for support and better integrates its activities into those of the Force faces competition with other employers to attract applicants with the aptitude, community. The maintenance of our combat capabilities has been assisted by the skills and fitness needed to meet military requirements. Commercial Support Program by testing whether better value for money can be obtained by contracting out many functions which do not require military skills or 6.16 Personnel policies and recruitment practices need to take into account need to be performed within the Department of Defence (see Chapter Eleven). the many social and economic factors at work to ensure that military service is The shift of support services to contractors, together with more complex defence recognised byjob seekers as an attractive and rewarding occupation. This must be technology, is also leading to an increase in per capita labour costs in the Australian ----- accomplished within a framework of significant social change, and in a period colleges will continue, and general Defence recruitment will be more focused. when economic growth, industrial expansion and technological change are Specific attention will be given to high school students in Years 7 to 10 to encourage combining to create a highly competitive labour market. them to consider a Defence career and to continue studies in subjects needed to qualify for Defence employment. Attracting the Best People Training and Developing Personnel 6.17 Defence recruitment is subject to demand pressures not always linked to the general state of the national labour market. Professional personnel such as 6.21 The quality and depth ofAustralian Defence Force training is a significant engineers, pilots and telecommunications and electronics technicians are among recruiting incentive, and the Defence Force will always provide basic and advanced those for whom there can be sudden, heavy national and international demands at training covering a wide range of occupational skills. To maintain this extensive almost any point of the business cycle. Further, the special problems associated training and development capacity, the Defence Force will continue to rationalise with service in some elements of the Australian Defence Force, such as submarines, training common to all three Services and to out-source non-military skills training increase the difficulty of attracting enough suitable volunteers from within the to civilian institutions wherever practicable and cost effective. Services. Finally, the increasing trend to a high technology, highly trained but numerically smaller Australian Defence Force reduces the demand for people with 6.22 The widespread and increasing use of simulation technologies offers new limited skills and education, who are most readily available because of less employer opportunities for efficient, effective, and lower cost alternatives to live training. competition. New information systems technologies, distance learning techniques and multi- media interactive systems provide better and more comprehensive training, 6.18 While the total strength of the Defence Organisation has reduced particularly in remote locations. This will yield significant benefits by reducing appreciably, the turnover of skilled personnel means that the demand for new the time personnel spend at training schools far from their normal posting locality. Australian Defence Force recruits will remain high. Competition with other employers is likely to be most intense for people in the preferred 17 to 24 age 6.23 Also, the Australian Defence Force will continue to seek civil accreditation group. The Australian Defence Force and the Department of Defence will continue for its education and training programs, and generally adopt standards consistent their efforts to ensure that young Australians, including those from Aboriginal and with those applied elsewhere in the Australian community. This helps Service migrant groups, are more aware of the many positive rewards of service in the people to enter civilian employment when they leave the Australian Defence Force, Defence Organisation, and thus able to make a more informed comparison between and increases the skills base of the Australian community. Conversely, the Defence Defence and other employers when choosing an occupation. Force is also broadening its recognition of civil qualifications. This increases the scope for lateral recruitment from the community. 6.19 The Australian Services Cadet Scheme provides valuable introductory experience of Service life to many young people. Research indicates that the 6.24 Australian Defence Force officer development requires considerable significant proportion of cadets who subsequentlyjoin the Australian Defence Force investment over a long period. Officers need at least fifteen years of commissioned have lower separation and failure rates during initial training than other recruits, service to develop the necessary combination of professional knowledge, experience and a subsequent retention rate well above the Australian Defence Force average. and skill to command a modern frigate, infantry battalion or fighter squadron. The Government will continue to support the Cadet Scheme. During this time, they attend a succession of increasingly complex and demanding training courses, and are given appointments of progressively higher responsibility. 6.20 The Australian Defence Force is also developing a number of other approaches that permit greater flexibility in meeting its anticipated recruiting needs. 6.25 Officers are also required to further their education as they progress in These are directed mainly to widening the scope for lateral recruitment of personnel rank. This process starts during pre-commissioning training at the Australian with relevant skills and qualifications gained through civilian training and Defence Force Academy and the single-Service officer training establishments. It employment. Members of the Reserves (both active and inactive) will also be continues at single-Service staff colleges, then the Joint Services Staff College and encouraged to undertake varying periods of full-time service. Concurrently, options finally the new Australian College of Defence and Strategic Studies. Only those for introducing a mix of short and long fixed-term career appointments will be officers selected on the basis of regular appraisal reports as having the most potential examined. Direct recruiting from the graduate stream of universities and TAFE to succeed attend the next, higher level. Officers are also encouraged and assisted to gain relevant post-graduate qualifications. ----- 6.26 Senior non-commissioned officers also need time and effort to develop. Advanced skills training is given only to those thought suitable to perform more 6.29 We will need to offer competitive pay and conditions of employment to complex tasks. This contrasts with older training methods which tended to impart enable Defence to compete for both trained personnel and suitable recruits. Just as lengthy training immediately after entry. This more sequential, job-specific training importantly, Defence aims to be widely recognised as a fair employer, committed is complemented by successive levels of management and leadership training to to the well-being of its personnel, dealing with them on the basis of merit and prepare non-commissioned officers for increased leadership and administrative equal employment opportunity, and meeting their reasonable expectations. responsibilities as they progress in rank. 6.30 The Australian Defence Force must face the prospect of high separation rates. Many young Australians will not remain with the one employer throughout their working lives; increasingly, they see changing employment as broadening their knowledge, experience and opportunities. Although in some career streams Australian Defence Force employment offers variation, change and the chance to develop multiple skills, in other cases such opportunities are limited. Thus, many # L1 Defence Force personnel will seek other employment after about six years' service, and few may serve beyond fifteen years. The attractiveness of service in the Defence Force increasingly will be affected by the short-term expectations of individual members. 6.31 In these conditions, the Defence Organisation must ensure the talents of all its people are best used. Employment and advancement therefore will continue to be determined strictly on the basis of the ability of individuals to perform the work required. Women in the Australian Defence Force 6.32 Since December 1992, women have been eligible to compete for about 99 per cent of Navy and Air Force positions and 67 per cent of Army positions. Apart from some minor areas related to specific occupational health concerns, the only categories of employment not open to women are mine clearance diver in the 6.27 The professional approach to training in the Australian Defence Force Navy, the combat arms (infantry, armour, artillery and combat engineers) in the also applies to Defence civilian staff. Staff mobility is encouraged to provide Army and airfield defence guards in the Air Force. breadth of experience, and a full range of training and development opportunities is provided. We will emphasise civilian attendance on Service training courses 6.33 The number of women in the Australian Defence Force has increased by and reciprocal arrangements for Defence Force members on civilian courses. over 1,000 since 1987. Women now occupy over 12 per cent of all Regular Service positions. This percentage will grow steadily. RESPONDING TO SOCIAL CHANGE 6.34 Although employment opportunities for women now are much more comprehensive, recent research indicates a significant difference in long term career 6.28 Significant changes in organisational culture will occur as Defence adapts intentions, with some 50 per cent of women, compared with only 13 per cent of its personnel management practices and administrative procedures to keep pace men, expressing the intention to separate from the Australian Defence Force before with evolving social standards and expectations. The challenge for the Defence completing twenty years' service. Although the twenty year point will have less Organisation is to accomplish these changes in a balanced way, recognising so far significance in future following the introduction of new military superannuation as its Service personnel are concerned that military service retains many special arrangements, the Defence Organisation still must gain maximum benefit in length features that need particular consideration. of service from all personnel for its investment in training and education. ----- _6.35_ We have recently introduced a number of initiatives to ensure that women 6.40 The Defence Force Remuneration Tribunal fixes military pay. and in the Australian Defence Force achieve their maximum potential. These include: allowances paid as salary. The Tribunal will continue as an independent body in recognition of the special features of military service. establishing a Defence Advisory Forum on Discrimination, comprising senior executives from the corporate sector, tertiary institutions and the 6.41 The Government must provide for the welfare ofAustralian Defence Force Public Service, to advise on appropriate strategies to deal with personnel involved in TIN and other multinational force deployments overseas. In discrimination issues within the Defence Organisation; particular, allowances paid in recognition of the unusual hazards, including those to health, will not be regarded as normal income for taxation and social welfare initiating a study to identify cultural and institutional barriers which purposes. impede women achieving senior positions in the Defence Force; 6.42 Allowances, subsidies and special conditions of service are available to studying further the reasons why more women in the Defence Force do Australian Defence Force personnel in various circumstances, such as when they not seek a long-term military career; and are involved in peacekeeping commitments or situations of particular personal risk or inconvenience. Such allowances and conditions of service compensate introducing a set of performance indicators to monitor achievement of military members for the special nature of their Defence Force employment. greater responsibility by women in the Defence Force. 6.36 For civilian staff, Defence will continue to promote the effective CONDITIONS OF SERVICE employment of women through better focused equal employment opportunity policies and practices, including consultative processes. 6.43 The strong esprit de corps of Australian Defence Force units remains a significant factor in their successful performance. This in turn depends heavily on maintaining the morale of the individual. Conditions of service for the Defence Equality in the Workplace Force are developed with this in mind and take into account issues affecting the lifestyle, personal relationships and family responsibilities of all Service personnel, 6.37 The Government is committed to ensuring a working environment which including Reserves. emphasises equality of opportunity and freedom from discrimination or harassment. Unfair behaviour will not be tolerated in the Defence working environment. Social and Family Issues 6.38 The Government supports the findings of the Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade in its recent report on Sexual Harassment in 6.44 To ensure the Australian Defence Force is well prepared to operate in the Australian Defence Force and the substance of the Committee's remote areas of the country, a number of elements are progressively moving to the recommendations. These include disseminating widely comprehensive guidance north and west. More Navy ships are home-porting in Western Australia, more and ensuring all officers with command responsibilities receive training in gender Army units are moving to bases in the Northern Territory and the frequency and awareness and prevention of unacceptable sexual behaviour. size of Air Force forward deployments is also increasing. The introduction of large numbers of Defence personnel and their families into relatively small and isolated communities can create a significant social impact. Moreover, such postings Pay and Allowances can involve marked personal disadvantages. The often harsh climate, limited educational opportunities for children, reduced employment opportunities, limited 6.39 The Government-will ensure all staff in the Defence Organisation are medical facilities and isolation from the direct support of extended family and remunerated fairly and equitably, taking account of Government employment friends all pose significant hardships for many Defence personnel. Special attention policies and trends in the labour market and society generally. Remuneration for is therefore being given to the need for flexible support policies for Service personnel both military and civilian personnel recently increased with productivity and their families. improvements. These increases may provide incentives to develop the capacity for further such increases. ----- 6.45 More Defence personnel are now single parents; more Service personnel working toward the adoption of standard school class nomenclature and starting have partners who are also serving; and like others in the general community, a ages, and gives high priority to achieving a standard national curriculum for all significant proportion of Defence families depend on two incomes. As more levels of education. It will continue to urge the States to assist members of the Australian Defence Force elements move to the north and west, these factors impact Australian Defence Force (and all Australians who relocate between States) to increasingly on Defence personnel management and retention. ensure for their children the standard of education available to most other children. 6.46 The Government recognises how important the family is in contributing 6.51 These difficulties can be partially alleviated by greater posting stability, to overall career satisfaction. Accordingly, it emphasises family support measures, but operational and training demands and the increasingly wide geographical providing family support services to help dependants manage problems associated dispersion of the Australian Defence Force make this difficult. In particular, Service with frequent and sometimes long separations. The Government funds community- officers normally require a range of appointments for effective career development, based family support projects, provides work based child care facilities and operates and this involves a variety of employment locations. The Government recognises an 008 information hot-line. these complications, but considers improved personnel management practices could provide a greater level of locational stability. Accordingly, most Service appointments should be for a minimum of three years, and members should receive Housing and Accommodation consecutive postings in the same geographic locality as far as practicable. A member's preferences regarding the locality of postings will be met where this is 6.47 Both families and single personnel need assurance of an acceptable consistent with the interests of the Defence Force. standard of housing wherever they are obliged to live. The Government provides accommodation for Defence members in line with community standards and will continue to subsidise rents. The Defence Housing Authority effectively provides THE LONGER TERM CHALLENGE suitable housing for members with families. 6.52 As differences in military technologies narrow, the relative effectiveness 6.48 Members of the Australian Defence Force are encouraged to purchase of our capabilities will depend increasingly on the human factor - better their own homes through the Defence Home Owner Scheme and the Home Purchase commanders, higher levels of skill, more individual initiative and more effective and Sale Expenses Allowance. In more remote areas and in comparatively small teamwork. northern communities, suitable accommodation is not available for sale or rent. In these circumstances, Defence must provide facilities for both accompanied and _6.53 To maintain the capability priorities set out earlier, we need to sustain_ unaccompanied personnel. Where older accommodation exists, it is being upgraded our investment program at the highest practicable levels. At the same time operating or replaced. This applies also to single members' messing facilities in Service costs will rise, not only to meet increased levels of activity and exercising in the establishments. region but also to hone individual and collective skills. The key personnel management and leadership challenge will be to recruit and retain Defence Force personnel in the numbers and with the skills and experience required for the defence Reducing the Problems of Relocation capabilities we need. This challenge will be exacerbated by declining community interest in the ethos of military service. Already, only 8 per cent of school leavers 6.49 Service personnel are likely to be relocated many times during their even consider joining the Defence Force as a desirable occupation. employment and this can cause significant difficulties for them and their families. Partner employment is a particular problem associated with Defence relocations. _6.54 It is expected that per capita costs of Service personnel will rise faster_ Spouses and partners often cannot regain suitable employment. This leads to than those of their civilian equivalents. Costs will increase as more of the Defence personal frustration, interrupted career development and financial hardship for Force moves to the north. With support functions being transferred to the civil families depending on two incomes. sector, the personnel profile of the Australian Defence Force will change. A number of labour-intensive functions will be performed by contract, so the number of less 6.50 The personal relationships of children suffer from frequent relocations, skilled Defence Force jobs will fall. Technology brings with it higher training and these can be exacerbated by the difficulties of settling into an unfamiliar program costs and produces a range of skills readily marketable in industry. There is also of study and the need to join classes of a different age group. The Government is ----- likely to be a high throughput in expensive training as the Services find it expectations must be accommodated as the Defence Force cannot be at odds with increasingly difficult to compete with the locational stability offered by civilian the community. employment or the flexibility of remuneration available in the private sector. 6.60 To meet these challenges the Defence Force must move closer to the _6.55 So far, Defence has directed the savings made in efficiency gains to its_ wider community. The Commercial Support Program should be regarded not only investment program. Increases in remuneration of staff were met by as an efficiency measure but also as part of a wider strategy in which more of the supplementation of Defence appropriations. This allowed us to upgrade or acquire community becomes involved in ensuring the security of the nation. Over time, platforms and systems without real growth in the Defence budget. Under present this will increase community understanding of defence, increase respect for the industrial relations policies, the first call on efficiency gains is for remuneration. Defence Force and create a greater recognition of the career opportunities that As the main efficiency gains are made from undertaking tasks with fewer people, military service provides. the inevitable trend is toward a smaller, more highly paid force. There are limits, however, to how far this can be taken before the Force becomes too small to sustain 6.61 Studies are underway to determine the number of personnel required in the required diversity and depth of skills within viable career structures. uniform. These studies should establish within the capabilities required for the defence of Australia those functions which only uniformed personnel can perform. _6.56 Decisions of the Defence Force Remuneration Tribunal impact directly_ The studies will take account of the requirements of operational functions and on the Defence Organisation. The Tribunal must make decisions on industrial training and development structures so that the career expectations of Service relations principles rather than capability requirements, yet the Defence budget is personnel can be met at the same time as the Defence Force draws maximum no longer supplemented for increases in personnel costs. The result is that every support from the community at large. Tribunal decision has implications for our defence capabilities. 6.62 Recognising the importance of personnel to Defence Force capabilities, 6.57 Difficulties in recruiting are reflected in increased recruiting costs. It the Government has initiated a wide ranging review of the principles which underpin will be increasingly difficult to attract and retain the skilled people needed in a Australian Defence Force personnel policies and procedures. An external consultant modem, effective defence force as society attaches less importance to concepts of will complete this review in 1995. The review will examine the social, economic service; as several changes of career during a working life become common practice; and industrial trends influencing the development of Australian Defence Force as expectations of living and leisure standards grow; and as other outlets for personnel policies; report on the adequacy of the existing policy framework; assess adventure become available. The relative sense of security enjoyed by most the relevance of the major factors currently guiding personnel policy; and identify Australians heightens this recruiting challenge. the key elements of future Australian Defence Force personnel strategies. 6.58 Changes in the way in which armed forces operate and are organised and managed inevitably impact on the ability of the Australian Defence Force to recruit and retain personnel with the attributes and skills it needs. The traditions of the three Services are challenged by the necessary emphasis on joint command and operations, the closer integration of Service and civilian personnel, and the need for economies. Reductions in the size of the Force, necessary to achieve better cost effectiveness, have also tended to diminish career prospects in some areas. Furthermore, the move toward higher technology systems tends to enhance the prominence of technologists at the expense of warriors. These changes are all necessary to the continuing modernisation of the Australian Defence Force, but they have to be managed in ways that retain the essential elements of that ethos which enables Service personnel to accept the risks of combat. _6.59 At the same time, the Defence Force is under pressure to meet community_ expectations about personal freedom and equality of opportunity. This poses particular challenges for traditionally organised and disciplined Services, but these ----- 7.1 Reserves have always been an important part ofAustralia's defence. They have a long and proud tradition of service to the community in peace and war, and they link the Australian Defence Force and the wider Australian community. Today. Reserves represent over a third of the total personnel strength of the Australian Defence Force and as functions are redistributed this proportion will grow. Reserve elements no longer exist solely to assist rapid expansion of the permanent forces during mobilisation for war. Instead, Reserves now have specific roles in defending Australia in short-warning conflict, both as individuals and as formed units. In peace, they perform a number of essential tasks on a permanent part-time basis. They are, therefore, a fundamental part of the Total Force. 7.2 Recent legislation facilitates this new role for Reserves. Call-out is now possible in circumstances short of a declared defence emergency. To prepare Reserves for this increased responsibility, the structure of the Reserve component and their training and equipment will be improved. 7.3 Such arrangements are constrained in peace by what can be demanded of citizens who volunteer to defend Australia when needed. Part-time military service competes with civilian employment, family life and other interests. Nevertheless, training systems which make reasonable demands on time, and enable Reserves to be at the standard required for the tasks allocated to them, can and will be put in place. Furthermore, appropriate conditions of service will protect the interests of Reserve members and encourage more Australians to see service in the Reserve as worthwhile and rewarding. RESERVES IN THE TOTAL FORCE 7.4 Australian Defence Force Reserves are part of a continuum of Defence personnel. This continuum, with commensurate conditions of service, extends from Regular or full-time members, through active Reserves with training commitments, to inactive Reserves with no training obligations. The Ready Reserve Scheme, introduced after the review of **The Defence Force and the Community** in 1990 and the Force Structure Review [in 1991, involves one year of concentrated] full-time training followed by a minimum of 50 days training in each subsequent year. ----- 7.5 The number of personnel in each Reserve category is shown in Figure 7.9 Defence personnel who transfer to the Inactive Reserves have no further 7-1. training obligation and are unpaid unless they volunteer for duty. While skills from previous Australian Defence Force service degrade over time, the Inactive Figure 7-1: Number of Reserve Military Personnel at Reserve provides a cost-effective source of partly trained but experienced personnel 30 June 1994 to support the Australian Defence Force if needed. In this way they contribute to the adaptability of the Force. 7.10 Regulars leaving full-time service will be encouraged to transfer to the Reserves. The Government will examine whether establishing incentives or obligations will maximise the retention in the Reserve of these valuable people. Reserves With Training Obligation Transfer between full-time and part-time components of the Australian Defence Force will be made easier. Ready Reserve 108 2462 199 2769 General Reserves 1321 22842 _1253_ _25416_ EMPLOYING RESERVES Reserves Without Training Obligation 3528 3608 2967 10103 7.11 Reserves form a significant proportion of Australian Defence Force Total Number of Reserves _4957_ 28912 4419 38288 capability. For example, they provide most of our specialised surgeons, the basis for our Naval Control of Shipping capability, and the Army's Regional Force Proportion of Total Force _25.1%_ _52.3%_ 19.9% 39.4% Surveillance units, which draw on the special skills of Aboriginal and Tones Strait Islander members. 7.6 The terminology used to describe Reserve forces varies between the three 7.12 As part of the Total Force, Reserves can contribute increasingly to Services. For example, at present Reserves with a training obligation are termed Australia's international defence interests. Reserve call-out provisions do not require General Reserves in the Navy and Army, and Active Reserves in the Air Force. individual Reserve members to join UN peacekeeping or humanitarian relief forces. Reserves without a training obligation are termed Standby Reserves in Navy, Members with the skills and military training, however, can volunteer and serve Inactive Reserves in the Army and General Reserves in the Air Force. This for periods of full-time duty, as some did for the Western Sahara, Cambodia and terminology will be standardised. Somalia operations. The Australian Defence Force field hospital now deployed to Rwanda includes Reserve medical specialists. The Government will improve 7.7 Reserve personnel offer the Total Force many significant benefits. They standards of Reserve training, so Reserves can participate more in UN and other bring to the Australian Defence Force a range of skills acquired in their day-to-day multinational activities. lives. Some of these skills are useful during conflict but are not maintained on a full-time basis due to a lack of demand, for example, medical and legal skills. 7.13 The Army employs Reserves differently from the other two Services. Reserves can bring best practice civilian management, professional and trade skills The Navy and Air Force do not generally maintain operational units of mainly to enhance Australian Defence Force processes. Where full-time activity is not Reserves. Instead, skilled Reserve personnel are integrated individually or in small needed in peace, and high readiness levels for conflict are not a concern, Reserves numbers into full-time Regular operational and support units. The Navy and Air provide a cost-effective capability. Conversely, Reserves learn skills in the Services Force maintain only a relatively small number of active Reserves, and obtain which often benefit the civilian workplace. additional volunteers from the inactive Reserve who bring skills and experience from previous Regular service. These Reserves assist the rapid increase in rates of 7.8 Reserve service allows Regulars leaving the Australian Defence Force to effort required for operational deployment, and enable the expansion of intelligence, serve on a part-time basis, so the Force continues to use these skills and experience. communications and headquarters staff functions for 'round-the-clock' operations. In some cases, these skills are not available in the civilian community. This transfer Wider use of active Reserves, both as individuals and as formed groups in the of skills and experience also benefits the Reserve component and establishes Navy and Air Force, will be encouraged. linkages which strengthen the Total Force. ----- 7.14 The Army also employs individual Reserve members in this way, but it 7.18 Inactive Reserves have no peacetime training obligations, but provide a maintains formed units of mostly General Reserves. These units make up over valuable source of former Regular and Reserve personnel to expand the land force half of the Army's combat force. The principal difference between Regular and when needed. Reserve units is in their level of experience and collective training. Therefore, on call-out, Reserve units need a period of intensive full-time collective training in 7.19 A review of the effectiveness of the present Army structure, including accordance with their notice to move before they would be ready for their assigned Reserve components, will be completed by late 1995. Decisions made on ITIISS1Ofl. recommendations arising from the Review will be implemented over several years. The desired outcome of the Review will be Reserve units capable of undertaking the roles and tasks assigned to them as part of the Total Force within required Navy Reserve readiness periods. Accordingly, Reserve units are to be staffed, trained and equipped for their operational roles. 7.15 The Navy Reserve comprises the Ready Reserve, the General Reserve and the Standby (or inactive) Reserve. They contribute to Navy capabilities by providing trained personnel to serve on a part-time basis. The level of contribution Army Reserve Recruiting and Retention they make to each force element in the Navy varies. The Reserves manage Naval Control of Shipping and are involved significantly in intelligence and minesweeping, 7.20 Army Reserve recruiting and retention rates affect capability and costs. including through Reserve Mine Warfare Groups being established in several High personnel turnover rates are a common problem for most volunteer service locations around Australia. In other areas where readiness requirements or a high organisations, both in Australia and overseas, especially where young people are rate of peacetime activity preclude a high level of Reserve involvement - such as in involved. Although annual separation rates in the Navy and Air Force Reserves surface combatants and submarines - individual Navy Reserves provide additional generally remain between 5 and 10 per cent, the rate in the Army General Reserve capacity to Regular crews. - which has proportionally more younger people than the other two Services - is about 20 per cent. While this rate is similar to those of Army volunteer Reserves in 7.16 The Navy is improving procedures for volunteer Reserves to undertake comparable countries, an improved retention rate would reduce costs and enhance full-time service in circumstances short of call-out. At present, Navy Standby capabilities. Accordingly, action will be taken to reduce Reserve separation rates Reserves regularly carry out Australian Defence Force duty, both part-time and and improve the quality of recruits. Measures will include providing a suitable temporary full-time, for up to three months each year. This increased experience package of Service benefits, making clear the Government's commitment to using provides greater flexibility in the operational employment of Reserves. Reserves, and seeking an undertaking from Reserve members that they are able to fulfil their obligations on call-out. Improvements in training and assurances that assigned roles are relevant will also increase the motivation of Reserve members. Army Reserve 7.17 The Army Reserve comprises the Ready Reserve, the General Reserve Air Force Reserve and the Inactive Reserve. Of Army's combat force, approximately 60 per cent is comprised of the first two groups. The Ready Reserve and General Reserve 7.21 The Air Force Reserve comprises the Ready Reserve, the Active Reserve, constitute eight brigades. Of these, two have been allocated manoeuvre roles; four the Specialist Reserve and the General (or inactive) Reserve. Except for the Ready have been allocated vital asset protection tasks in northern Australia; and two are Reserve airfield defence squadron, active Reserve members generally are integrated designated as follow-on forces. In addition to these infantry brigades, the General with permanent Air Force units. Reserve provides the basis for the three Regional Force Surveillance Units in the 7.22 The Ready Reserve currently comprises airfield defence personnel and Pilbara, the Top End and Cape York, and is responsible for ground surveillance in aircrew. The possibility of employing Reserves in other skill categories is being northern Australia. The General Reserve also provides many logistic units and a special forces commando regiment. considered. Ready Reserve airfield defence guards are able to provide significant airfield security forAustralia's northern air bases. Ready Reserve aircrew, including pilots, navigators, flight engineers and load-masters fly missions, primarily in the ----- Air Lift Group, and maintain current operational flying qualifications. These aircrew 7.29 The Government recognises the need to increase experience levels of can provide an immediate surge capacity for Air Force operations during conflict. Reserve officers and senior non-commissioned officers within the limitations imposed by part-time service. As part of career development, selected individuals 7.23 The Active Reserve comprises personnel from all officer and other rank will develop experience through more intensive part-time service or by serving for professions and trades. Air Force is reviewing the role of the Active Reserve, periods on a full-time basis. Such service for Reserves also provides flexibility in following its recent extensive reviews of trade structures. During a conflict, personnel planning in the Regular component of the Australian Defence Force. individuals or teams of Reserves provide critical services such as air traffic control, Overall, career opportunities for Reserves will be maintained, including at the most intelligence, technical support for Force Element Groups and ground support for senior ranks. forward air base operations. 7.30 Many civilian occupational skills are important to the Australian Defence 7.24 The Specialist Reserve provides services, such as medical and legal Force. Equally, civilian employers of Reserves, and the community in general, services, for which the limited demand in peace does not require large numbers of benefit from training provided to Reserves. Greater military accreditation of civilian full-time staff. skills and civilian accreditation of military skills will be sought. This, in turn, will enable increased lateral recruitment of suitably qualified personnel. _7.25 In peace, the General Reserve does not have an active role, but it comprises_ former Regular Air Force personnel with skills that are especially important during conflict. General Reserve members are encouraged to volunteer for Active Reserve Army Reserve Training duty on a temporary full-time basis for periods of up to three months each year. 7.31 To enable the Army Reserve to fulfil its role in the Total Force and to achieve the training requirements set out above, both individual and collective RESERVE TRAINING training will change. The Government is investigating options to improve the availability of Reserves for training. Individual training for Regular and Reserve 7.26 All elements of the Total Force should have a similar standard of individual members will be conducted to a common core and to the same standard. training. Then, the distinction between Regulars and Reserves will relate to their level of military experience and availability. Common standards will enable the effective integration of Regular and Reserve elements. As much as possible, individual training for Reserves will be to the same standard as for Regular members, with employment determining the scope of training. Some resource allocations will be adjusted to ensure Reserves are able to undertake the tasks required of them. In particular, greater flexibility will be provided in the use of training resources. 7.27 In peace, part-time Reserve service generally precludes lengthy periods of continuous military training. Therefore it is not possible for Reserves to be proficient in the full range of military skills involved in modern warfare, especially those requiring large-scale collective training. Formed Reserve units carry out limited collective training in peace, but would require additional collective training after call-out to achieve full operational capabilities. 7.28 The twelve months of full-time training provided to Ready Reserves gives them a sound base of individual and collective skills. They then develop operational skills by further specialist and collective training. This relatively intensive training and exercising enables them to be ready for deployment at shorter notice than most other Reserves. ----- 7.32 Many of the current responsibilities of the General Reserve Training Call-Out Protection Groups will be transferred to centralised training establishments. The standard of Reserve basic officer training will be increased, and will be conducted under the 7.37 The Government is considering the protection of Reserves' interests on control of the Royal Military College Duntroon using either extended periods of call-out by guaranteeing a return to their place of employment, offering financial full-time training or a series of shorter modules, according to student availability. compensation for employers, deferring tertiary studies and other employment- related training or education, reinstating employment-related licences which may 7.33 Recruit training, which will also increase, will be the responsibility of have lapsed, assisting with the member's family home mortgage in defined the Recruit Training Battalion. Initial employment training will be in line with circumstances, providing assistance with the welfare of Reserve members' families, Regular training courses, but at a level consistent with likely operational tasks and and offering a call-out gratuity payment. set requirements. Mobile training teams from Army Schools will be used where this is cost-effective. Training Groups will conduct regional training where 7.38 The Government believes that addressing this issue is important. Some circumstances make it impractical for Reserve members to travel to centralised of the proposals require administrative action, while others require consultation training establishments. Reserves will be posted to Regular training establishments with other Departments and legislative action before they can be introduced. A as an important component of their career development. Defence implementation team is working on these measures. 7.34 The location of some Reserve depots reflects demographic characteristics which existed during and after the Second World War. Consistent with the review Employer Support of Army structure, Reserve depots across Australia will be consolidated to meet the demands of Reserve collective training, and to make better use of personnel, 7.39 Effective Reserve capacity depends critically on the support of civilian facilities and equipment. The Government will examine those Reserve depots no employers. The Government consistently supports Defence initiatives to encourage longer required by the Australian Defence Force to assess whether some of them employers to make their staff available for Reserve duty on a part-time basis. The can be made available for use by local community groups. Defence Reserves Support Committee provides valuable support in this respect. Given the increased requirements of Reserve training and the greater Reserve contribution to Defence capabilities, the Government will seek to increase its support AVAILABILITY OF RESERVES FOR DUTY to employers. To do this a better understanding is required of problems employers face in releasing Reserve members for training. Accordingly, research into employer _7.35 The Government expects Reserves to honour the form of Reserve service_ attitudes to Reserve service will be undertaken to determine the most cost-effective commitment they accept. Failure to do so disrupts Australian Defence Force means of providing incentives or other forms of recognition of the contribution activities and jeopardises the viability and utility of the Reserve. Therefore, all employers of Reserves make to Defence. members of the Reserve must recognise that voluntary peacetime service involves a legal obligation for military service on call-out for duty. Individuals should not undertake membership of the Reserve unless they are prepared to accept that Reserves in the Community obligation. 7.40 The facilities, equipment and skills in Reserve units across Australia have 7.36 The financial well-being of Reserves mostly depends on their civilian the potential to provide valuable emergency relief assistance to the civil community. occupation. In recognition of this, the Government will move to provide appropriate Such assistance also promotes closer contact and understanding between Defence conditions of service during part-time training and to encourage a supportive elements and local communities. As with other Defence support, Emergency employer environment. The Government will also safeguard the financial interests Management Australia coordinates this assistance which normally is provided only of Reserves in the event of call-out. in response to specific requests from State and Territory authorities. Current arrangements for requesting Defence Force assistance allow Reserves to volunteer their services, but their immediate availability, and the diversion of resources away from military training activities, are currently seen as impediments to using them. Participation and funding for such activities will be separated from normal Reserve training allocations. ----- ### PART III **International** **Defence Interests** ----- 8.1 Over the next fifteen years, the strategic environment in Asia and the Pacific is likely to be more demanding and to be determined, more than ever, by the policies and approaches of regional countries themselves. In these circumstances, Australia's engagement with regional countries as a partner in determining the strategic affairs of the region will be an increasingly important element in ensuring our security. We will develop our dialogue on strategic and defence issues with key countries of the region, and will aim to promote an environment which sustains a stable pattern of strategic relationships and avoids destabilising strategic competition. 8.2 The activities which we pursue with regional countries with these broad interests in mind will include bilateral programs aimed at cooperation in developing defence capabilities and professional standards appropriate to the legitimate defence needs of the countries concerned. We will continue to foster, through dialogue, an accurate understanding of Australia's strategic interests and security concerns and ensure that we in turn understand the perceptions, concerns and capabilities of neighbouring countries. This will reflect Australia's commitment, shared increasingly by our neighbours, to transparency in defence policy development and force planning. At the multilateral level, we will maintain our firm commitment to the Five Power Defence Arrangements. We will participate actively in processes which foster a sense of shared strategic interests and will encourage the continued evolution of cooperative security approaches in the region. We aim to ensure that these processes are inclusive and provide scope for the major powers of Asia and the Pacific to engage constructively with each other and with other countries of the region. 8.3 In the defence relationships we promote through these approaches, we will identify opportunities for defence materiel exports and for defence industry collaboration. This will help develop and support Australia's defence industry base, broaden our defence cooperation with regional countries and contribute to Australia's export and overseas investment performance. 8.4 Australia has maintained strong defence relationships since the Second World War with particular countries in Asia and the Pacific, especially the countries of ASEAN and the South-West Pacific. The scope, content and quality of our activities with these countries, particularly those in South-East Asia, will change substantially over the next fifteen years to reflect relationships based more on partnership and shared interests. As we train and exercise together, our relationships will develop new dimensions and depth, including new levels of strategic dialogue ----- _8.5 The activities we develop to support our increasing engagement with the_ 8.10 Indonesia's archipelago reaches across a large part of the northern sea region will focus carefully on specific objectives. In most cases, these activities and air approaches to Australia. Consequently, Australia looks for stability in will not involve substantially greater resources, especially as over time there will Indonesia and an Indonesian Government which continues to take a responsible be a greater emphasis on reciprocal benefits and cost sharing. We will need to set view of its role in South-East Asia and a constructive approach to its relationship priorities which accord with our strategic interests for each relationship and each with Australia. During the turbulent 1950s and early 1960s, Australia was concerned activity. about the direction Indonesia seemed to be taking. The stability, cohesion, economic growth and positive approach to the region which have characterised Indonesia since 1965 have contributed much to the stable and generally benign strategic 8.6 [Activities in support of our regional interests will not in themselves] determine the force structure of the Australian Defence Force, but our existing environment which has prevailed in South-East Asia since the end of the Vietnam capabilities will continue to provide us with the scope to undertake the full range War. This, in turn, has done much to ensure that the demands on Australia's defence of activities and projects necessary to support our regional objectives. planning have remained manageable. 8.11 Our defence relationship with Indonesia is our most important in the SOUTH-EAST ASIA region and a key element in Australia's approach to regional defence engagement. It is underpinned by an increasing awareness of our shared strategic interests and perceptions. The changes flowing from the end of the Cold War have expanded 8.7 We will continue to give highest priority in our regional defence approach the potential and the need for cooperation. A constructive relationship between to the pursuit of our interests with the countries of South-East Asia. A prosperous Indonesia and Australia, as two substantial military powers in the region, does South-East Asia free from conflict and external pressures and characterised by much to support the security of our nearer region in the more fluid and complex increasing interdependence between regional countries is very much in Australia's strategic environment we face in Asia and the Pacific. More broadly, close defence interests. The countries of the region, with their growing economic and links with Indonesia strengthen the wider bilateral relationship between Australia technological strength, their expanding military capabilities and their heightened self-reliance, will become increasingly valuable strategic partners for Australia and Indonesia. over the period covered by this White Paper. 8.12 The defence relationship between Australia and Indonesia has developed and diversified strongly in recent years. To further the relationship our respective 8.8 Our key defence relationships in South-East Asia will change significantly Defence Ministers will meet annually, a development which parallels the regular as our partners develop their economies and military capabilities. Already, our meetings of foreign and economic ministers provided for in the Australia-Indonesia relationships are diversifying from traditional Defence Cooperation programs to Ministerial Forum. give higher priority to strategic exchanges, combined exercising, logistics agreements, science and industry cooperation, cooperative equipment acquisition 8.13 It remains important to ensure that our cooperation continues to be based and training cooperation. Our broader relationships will reflect shared interests on a clear understanding of one another's strategic perceptions and priorities. The and responsibilities and meet the needs of both parties. Although we will continue relationship will therefore foster closer consultation on strategic and defence issues, to provide and fund training and other activities under Defence Cooperation including exchanges on strategic trends and senior level discussions on regional as programs, we expect that the costs of these activities increasingly will be shared. well as bilateral defence and strategic policy issues. Indeed, by 2010 traditional Defence Cooperation programs of the donor-recipient kind no longer will be a significant element in our defence relationships with most 8.14 Australia's security is enhanced as Indonesia develops its capacity to South-East Asian countries and will have been replaced by activities more defend its own territory, because this makes it less likely that in the future any appropriate to partnership-based relationships. hostile third power could mount attacks from or through the archipelago across our sea and air approaches. In strengthening the bilateral relationship, we also will Indonesia give attention to developing the capabilities of our respective forces. Combined exercises involving Indonesian and Australian forces are also likely to become more frequent, covering naval, land and air forces, including special forces. These 8.9 Indonesia is particularly important to the security of Australia and in the exercises, both in Australia and Indonesia, enhance the capabilities and professional strategic affairs of South-East Asia. As its economy grows, it will become standards of each country's forces and make it easier for us to operate together, for increasingly influential in Asia and the Pacific. ----- example in UN peacekeeping missions. Australia's training assistance will be an Malaysia and Singapore important element in this process. In recent years, the number of Indonesian service personnel participating in training with Australia has risen rapidly, and this is 8.17 Australia regards Malaysia and Singapore as important regional partners. expected to remain a prominent factor in our defence relationship. We have strong bilateral defence relationships with both countries, going back many years and drawing on long-standing, shared strategic interests. The geographic 8.15 Scope exists to cooperate in defence industry, and in the logistics and location of Malaysia and Singapore make their security and territorial integrity materiel areas. Closer cooperation with Indonesia's growing defence industry important to Australia and to the region as a whole. capability could offer important commercial and strategic advantages for our own defence sector. We will explore the prospects for cooperating in logistics, repair 8.18 Our interests in the security of Malaysia and Singapore are formally and support of equipment and, in the longer term, seek opportunities to develop reflected in our support for the Five Power Defence Arrangements, under which and produce jointly defence equipment. Such cooperation will be supported by we are committed to consult with these countries if either is attacked or threatened defence science links where these are clearly mutually beneficial. with attack. The Government believes this commitment continues to serve Australia's strategic interests. The Five Power Defence Arrangements remain 8.16 There are differences in the roles of our defence forces and in our political entirely compatible with the new approaches to multilateral security cooperation systems. Yet our defence relationship with Indonesia is underpinned by shared in the region. strategic interests and perceptions and mutual advantage in stronger cooperation. Both countries are clearly committed to developing a strong bilateral relationship 8.19 The Five Power Defence Arrangements provide important opportunities in which defence has an important part. to cooperate in developing the defence capabilities of all members. Regular and increasingly challenging combined and joint exercises in and around Malaysia and Singapore will continue to be valued by all partners in the Arrangements. 8.20 Some adjustments to the way the Five Power Defence Arrangements operate are being considered. Such adjustments would keep the Arrangements relevant to the changing needs of the partners. The strategic environment has changed markedly since they were established twenty three years ago, and Malaysia and Singapore have developed their defence capabilities significantly since then. In approaching these adjustments, we will place the highest priority on the wishes of Malaysia and Singapore, and preserve the essential basis of cooperation. 8.21 Our bilateral defence relationships with Malaysia and Singapore both are developing in important new directions. Our wide range of cooperative activities with Singapore is being supplemented by the development of substantial Singaporean training and exercising activities in Australia, mostly on a fee-for- service basis. By using Australia's abundant air and land space, Singapore can conduct activities which it cannot readily undertake in its own constrained territory. These activities reflect the strong sense of trust between Australia and Singapore, and serve our strategic interests by helping to enhance Singapore's defence capabilities. Singapore's armed forces are making substantial investments in the construction of facilities in Australia, and providing valuable opportunities for Australian companies to support their activities. 8.22 Our defence relationship with Malaysia is substantial and diverse. It will continue to develop strongly, with more emphasis on training, exchanges, exercises and materiel cooperation. We will seek to maintain our deployments of P3C ----- maritime patrol aircraft to the Royal Malaysian Air Force base at Butterworth in the distances involved, and the differences between our armed forces, mean that Malaysia to conduct surveillance missions in South-East Asian waters, and for we will seek primarily to develop exchanges which provide greater mutual Army Rifle Companies to rotate through Butterworth for three month deployments understanding of strategic perceptions and policies. In some cases this has already under the Five Power Defence Arrangements. begun. 8.23 Overall, the scope of cooperation with Malaysia and Singapore will 8.27 Japan will become more active in security issues in the region. It has a increase as the capabilities of their armed forces expand. The introduction of new, close interest in the emerging multilateral regional security approaches, and will advanced aircraft and ships will offer new opportunities for cooperation in training, continue to support them. We in turn will seek to develop our defence relationship logistics, science and technology and other support areas. We will also give high with Japan, primarily by expanding dialogue and exchanges on strategic issues priority to developing materiel cooperation, including cooperatively acquiring and policy directions. We aim to engage actively with Japan to develop our equipment, where appropriate. respective perceptions of security issues and priorities in Asia and the Pacific. We will develop further our dialogue on strategic planning issues and, over time, may develop more practical cooperation. Other South-East Asian Countries 8.28 Over the next decade, China is likely to be the most powerful new 8.24 We will also develop our defence relationships with Thailand, the influence on the strategic affairs of our wider region. As with other regional Philippines and Brunei, adding depth and resilience to our defence links with the countries, we seek a better understanding of China's strategic perceptions and region as a whole. Thailand's strategic location in mainland South-East Asia, and intentions, and a better understanding by China of regional perceptions of security its substantial and rapidly growing economy, mean that it will be increasingly issues and China's place in them. To this end, we will develop further our strategic important in regional strategic affairs. Already we have a substantial training and dialogue with China and encourage China to participate fully in regional and other defence science program with Thailand's armed forces, and we are seeking multilateral security discussions. opportunities for logistic and materiel cooperation. 8.29 Likewise, developments on the Korean Peninsula, including the North 8.25 In Indochina, we have encouraged Vietnam to participate in regional Korean nuclear issue and the prospects for a reunified Korea, have the potential to security dialogue processes, and will continue to do so, as a means of encouraging impact significantly on the wider region. Australia therefore will monitor them that country's constructive involvement in the security affairs of the region. The closely. We will remain alert to opportunities for practical cooperation with the same is true of Laos. In Cambodia, we will maintain a defence relationship with Republic of Korea, for example in defence industry. We could also see value in the new Government and, consistent with our wider policy interest in the North Korea participating in regional dialogue processes, although this is hard to rehabilitation of that country, will provide modest levels of assistance to help reform envisage while its existing international obligations remain unmet. In time, and modernise its armed forces. ASEAN has already affirmed its readiness to opportunities also may arise for constructive contact with Taiwan on defence and accept Vietnam as a member, and other Indochinese countries - as well as Myanmar security issues. - may follow in due course. In these circumstances scope for bilateral defence contacts with Australia will increase. 8.30 India will remain an important power in the Indian Ocean region, and it may become a key element of the wider strategic balance in Asia. We will develop our modest defence relationship with India to improve our understanding of its NORTH-EAST AND SOUTH ASIA strategic perceptions and priorities, and encourage India to understand our interests. Trends in the strategic affairs of the Indian Ocean region will be an important 8.26 Strategic trends in Asia and the Pacific, particularly the increasing power element of that agenda. Senior level visits, and naval visits, will continue on an and influence of key countries, require Australia over the next fifteen years to opportunity basis. As well, constructive contact with other countries of South accord more importance to defence contact with the major countries of North-East Asia, in particular Pakistan, will support a more thorough understanding of issues and South Asia. Increasingly, we will need to develop constructive defence that might affect Australia's interests. relationships with them which will help us understand their strategic policies and interests; make them aware of ours; and encourage them to use their power in ways consistent with the stability and security of the region. The nature of our interests, ----- Defence involvement to projects we can undertake more effectively than other SOUTH-WEST PACIFIC Government agencies. 8.31 The countries of the South-West Pacific are strategically important to Australia. In the unlikely event that a potentially hostile power acquired undue influence over one or more of the island states, the effect could be detrimental to MULTILATERAL SECURITY the region and to the security ofAustralia. Therefore, we will continue to cooperate with and assist these potentially vulnerable countries in securing their protection. 8.35 Just as a sense of community has emerged in relation to economic interests Our present defence activities with these countries reflect this commitment. We in Asia and the Pacific, reflected in the success of the APEC process, so too a sense will continue to build on these relationships, and further our efforts to promote the of shared strategic and security interests is emerging. It is in Australia's interests prosperity and well-being of our Pacific Island neighbours. to foster this trend, encouraging countries of the region to recognise the interests they share and ways they might cooperate to support them. The new multilateral 8.32 Our defence relationship with Papua New Guinea is the most substantial approaches to regional security are not intended to supplant our existing defence in the South-West Pacific. It is based now less on historical association, and more relationships, either bilateral or multilateral. The emerging cooperative security on the assessment of our enduring strategic interest in the stability and security of approaches build on the existing networks of relationships, including our alliance Papua New Guinea. Australia's interests continue to be served best by a stable, relationships with the United States and New Zealand, and the Five Power Defence self-reliant and cohesive Papua New Guinea, able to exclude hostile external powers Arrangements with Malaysia, Singapore, New Zealand and the United Kingdom. and well-disposed towards its neighbours. Under the Joint Declaration of Principles We do not envisage that the arrangements which develop from the present processes signed in 1987, Australia and Papua New Guinea are committed to consult if an will lead to formal multilateral alliances: the geographic reach and the wide external armed attack threatens the sovereignty of either country to decide what disparities within the region preclude that. What is important is that a new set of measures should be taken in response. Our Defence Cooperation program with dynamics is in train in the region, and countries now are addressing strategic Papua New Guinea, while reducing in scale, remains substantial. Consistent with concerns in a cooperative manner unprecedented in Asia and the Pacific. the Agreed Statement on Security Cooperation concluded in 1991, we will help the Papua New Guinea Defence Force and the Royal Papua New Guinea Constabulary 8.36 The Defence Organisation is a partner in Australia's broader policy to address the country's current and pressing problems more effectively, although approach. As such, Defence has encouraged the 'second track' - that is university primary responsibility for solving these problems of course remains with Papua or think-tank based activities - which carried forward these new approaches to New Guinea. regional security in their early stages. Defence also participated in the processes relating to the inaugural meeting of the ASEAN Regional Forum in 1994. Defence 8.33 In other South-West Pacific countries, we will give priority to developing will increasingly have a role in activities relating to that Forum as it directs its the capabilities of these nations to assert and protect their sovereignty in peace, attention to issues such as transparency and confidence building among defence often cooperating with police forces where regular military forces do not exist. We forces in the region. will continue to give high priority to helping develop capabilities to police maritime Exclusive Economic Zones through continuing support for maritime surveillance projects and activities, and consulting closely with the Forum Fisheries Agency. In particular, in the Pacific Patrol Boat program the Government will offer a half- life refit package for all vessels, at a total value of $19 million. The work will extend over eight years, beginning in 1995, and will involve the overhaul and upgrade of systems and equipment to overcome obsolescence and ensure all vessels reach their planned fifteen year life span. 8.34 In this and other activities, we aim to foster cooperative approaches within which the Pacific Island countries can help one another. We will continue to use the resources of our Defence Cooperation program to undertake projects aimed at supporting social and economic development. We will ensure that such projects have been accorded high priority by the governments concerned, and will limit ----- THE UNITED STATES ALLIANCE 9.1 Australia's defence alliance with the United States continues to be a key element of our defence policy, and will remain so over the period covered by this White Paper. The relationship formalised in the ANZUS Treaty reflects the close alignment of our enduring strategic interests. During the Cold War, activities under the alliance were shaped largely by our membership of the Western strategic community, which supported the ability of the United States to maintain a global strategic balance with the Soviet Union. The relationship, however, is founded on our shared interests in a stable and secure Asia-Pacific region and values and traditions which pre-date the Cold War and will endure long after it. 9.2 Throughout the period covered by this White Paper the United States will remain the strongest military power in the world with the most sophisticated military technology; it will be a key influence on the security ofAsia and the Pacific and it will have a central place in any multilateral security arrangements which emerge and in the negotiation and implementation of arms control and disarmament measures. 9.3 The alliance will continue to serve the interests of both countries. The United States will benefit from Australia's support: we are closely engaged in regional affairs and sympathetic to most American values and interests. More broadly, the alliance strongly supports the United States' continued strategic presence in the Western Pacific, which is of major strategic interest both for the United States and for Australia, and for others in the region. 9.4 The major trends shaping our strategic environment will affect the alliance. The United States will retain important interests in ou?region and strong forces to protect those interests. Yet the nature and perception of American interests and the capabilities of US forces will change. American expectations of the alliance will change with them, as the previous emphasis on alliance cohesion against the Soviet Bloc is replaced by a more complex and evolving US posture. Equally, Australia's requirements of the alliance will change as we develop our capabilities further, and become even more active in regional strategic affairs. Increasingly, as we seek security in and with Asia, we will value our alliance with the United States not just for the contribution it makes to Australia's own defence, but also for its broader contribution to regional security. ----- 9.5 These changing priorities and activities will invigorate the alliance and 9.9 Intelligence cooperation with the United States is fundamental to our ensure it remains relevant. Our defence relationship will require careful national effort, and this will continue over the next fifteen years. Without that management. With the passing of Cold War certainties, we will need to work hard help, Australia's national intelligence effort would need to be much bigger, and to make sure that the alliance continues to meet the needs of both parties. could not be as effective. In return, Australia's national intelligence resources, developed primarily to meet our own needs, contribute substantially to intelligence cooperation with the United States. We will ensure that we shoulder an appropriate Mutual Support share of the burden in return for the benefits we receive, and that we cover with our own intelligence resources, as much as possible, those areas of highest priority to 9.6 Australia's self-reliant defence policy requires that our defence capabilities Australia. enable us to defend Australia without depending on combat help from other countries. It follows that we do not rely for our defence on combat assistance from 9.10 Access to high technology from the United States will continue to be the United States. Nonetheless, the undertakings in the ANZUS Treaty, and the important in sustaining the leading edge capabilities which Defence will need to United States' strong record of standing by its allies, mean that we would expect meet the demands of our evolving strategic environment. Across the range of substantial and invaluable help in a crisis. That expectation would seriously platforms and systems, the United States provides Australia with access to the complicate the planning of any potential adversary. Our alliance with the United highest level of exportable weapons and technology. Maintaining that access will States thus remains a valuable additional deterrent to any country contemplating be important to sustaining our self-reliant defence posture. The United States hostile action against Australia. For our part, Australia stands by its obligations Government recognises the importance of this to Australia's defence posture. It under ANZUS to cooperate with the United States to meet common dangers in the has undertaken that, as a close ally of long standing and a major buyer of US Pacific area. defence equipment, Australia will continue to receive preferential access to US military technology. This will help Australia to maintain defence readiness and 9.7 Our alliance with the United States retains a more specific significance capability at the level of sophistication envisaged in our defence policy. in relation to the remote prospect of a nuclear threat to Australia. The end of the Cold War has reduced the danger of global nuclear war, and concern that US- 9.11 Defence science links with the United States support our access to high Australian Joint Defence Facilities in Australia might have become nuclear targets technology through partnerships in developing advanced technologies applicable in a global war has receded. Nevertheless, the use of nuclear weapons remains to our strategic environment. The United States will remain a major source of possible, especially if they continue to proliferate. Australia, therefore, will actively advanced technologies, and the links which the Defence Science and Technology pursue multilateral efforts to restrict the proliferation of nuclear weapons. The Organisation has with the United States will also help Australia to maintain an Government does not accept nuclear deterrence as a permanent condition. It is an indigenous defence capability for modifying and maintaining US-sourced systems. interim measure until a total ban on nuclear weapons, accompanied by substantial Australia, for its part, will continue to participate actively in defence-science verification provisions, can be achieved. In this interim period, although it is hard exchanges and contribute effectively across a range of research and development to envisage the circumstances in which Australia could be threatened by nuclear activities. weapons, we cannot rule out that possibility. We will continue to rely on the extended deterrence of the US nuclear capability to deter any nuclear threat or attack on 9.12 The maintenance of the Australian Defence Force's professional military Australia. Consequently, we will continue to support the maintenance by the United skills benefits from the breadth and depth of the military relationship with the States of a nuclear capability adequate to ensure that it can deter nuclear threats United States. Combined exercises, exchanges of military personnel, and training against allies like Australia. in each other's establishments expose both sides to new concepts, and help to cement the interoperabilty that is fundamental to combined operations. Australia enjoys excellent access in these areas. We will maintain the current arrangements and Practical Benefits to the Australian Defence Force review them to ensure their continuing relevance. As well, our logistics and support arrangements with the United States enable us to maintain lower stocks and to 9.8 The relationship supports the capabilities that Defence maintains for the reduce the costs of developing our equipment. self-reliant defence of Australia. Over the period covered by this White Paper, that support may become even more important to our efforts to enhance the capabilities of Defence to meet more demanding circumstances. ----- Joint Defence Facilities 9.15 Under arrangements agreed upon in 1991, the Harold E. Holt Naval Communication Station at North West Cape will remain a Joint Facility until May 9.13 Cooperation with the United States in our Joint Defence Facilities serves 1999, when it will become an Australian naval communications facility. The US both countries, and contributes to global security. At Pine Gap, we cooperate in Navy will continue to have access to the Station after the transition. Continuing intelligence collection, including monitoring arms control and disarmament cooperation in the operation of Harold E. Holt will ensure that Australia and the agreements and military developments in many areas of interest to Australia. The United States have access to a powerful communication station well into the next operations at Pine Gap provide us with intelligence which is valuable to our own century. security. The systems supported by Pine Gap will evolve to meet the new demands of the post Cold War era, and we expect that Pine Gap will remain a central element 9.16 All activities at the Joint Defence Facilities are managed to ensure they of our cooperation with the United States well into the next century. are consistent with Australian interests. The activities take place with the full knowledge and concurrence of the Australian Government, and Australia benefits 9.14 Nurrungar is a ground station for the United States Defense Support fully from them. Program which uses infra-red satellite detection to give early warning of ballistic missile launches. The Program provides residual reassurance against the possibility of major Inter-Continental Ballistic Missile attack, but increasingly it is being Regional Interests oriented towards detecting and defending against shorter range tactical missiles of the kind used in the Gulf War. Our participation in the Defense Support Program 9.17 US strategic engagement and military presence will continue to be contributes to global security against surprise or accidental nuclear attack. It also important to the security of Asia and the Pacific over the next fifteen years. Our helps to inhibit the proliferation of ballistic missiles, and provides information on alliance with the United States helps to sustain the US engagement in the region, ballistic missile launches of interest to Australia. US missile early warning programs which supports our interests and those of the region as a whole. The United States will evolve to meet post Cold War needs and take advantage of developing looks to its network of bilateral alliances to maintain its continuing presence in the technology. This may mean the Joint Facility at Nurrungar will not be needed in Western Pacific. Australian and US perspectives on regional issues will differ its present form after 2000. Nonetheless, we expect the United States will continue sometimes, but overall our approach to regional engagement and our alliance with to value Australian cooperation in supporting missile early warning, and such the United States work together to promote our regional security interests. We cooperation will continue to be in Australia's interests. therefore will encourage further cooperation between the United States and other regional countries. 9.18 We will facilitate, when we can, US activities and deployments in the region. We give the United States practical support by providing access to our ports, airfields and other facilities; providing maintenance; offering access to industry capabilities; providing training opportunities; and sharing intelligence on regional matters. We will also encourage US participation together with our own Z3 in regional multilateral exercises. - . . . .- .--- - ,_._'•• Global Security - . ## 9.19............................. Our alliance with the United States contributes to our efforts to promote a stable and peaceful international system through the UN and other multilateral 4 ----. regimes. The United States will remain a leader of such international efforts, and our close relationship helps Australia contribute substantially to coalitions established for UN and other multilateral activities. Our effectiveness in such operations is facilitated by our interoperability with US forces. Peace operations provide additional opportunities for the Australian Defence Force to work with US ----- forces, and have other positive benefits too for the alliance relationship and our 9.25 Our strong alliance means both Australia and New Zealand are interested overall standing in Washington. in the effective development of our respective defence forces and the enhancement of our capability to fight effectively alongside one another if needed. Increased cooperation in defence between Australia and New Zealand over the period of this THE NEW ZEALAND ALLIANCE White Paper will depend on sustaining modern capabilities and ensuring a high degree of interoperability between our defence forces. We have the highest regard 9.20 Both Australia and New Zealand expect that if either country were for the dedication and professionalism of the New Zealand Defence Force, and we threatened, the other would come to its aid. That expectation reflects both the will seek opportunities in areas of mutual interest for closer cooperation between it strong personal, economic, cultural and historical ties between us, and the shared and the Australian Defence Force. strategic interests which result from each country's security being bound closely to the other's. 9.26 This will require sustained effort so that necessary capabilities are maintained and developed in each country's defence force, consistent with national 9.21 These interests are expressed in our continuing defence alliance. The policies. New Zealand's smaller economic base imposes constraints on the total ANZUS Treaty embodies formal commitments and reciprocal obligations between size of its defence effort, but Australia will seek a continued commitment to Australia and New Zealand which endure despite the United States' suspension of sustaining defence capabilities in the New Zealand Defence Force which can security obligations to New Zealand. Despite changes in the global and regional contribute to our shared strategic interests, consistent with our mutual alliance environment over recent years, our defence alliance with New Zealand remains obligations. important to Australia's defence policy. Indeed, in the more demanding strategic environment of the next century, it may become even more important. Australia values the support which New Zealand could offer us in a conflict, and we will Closer Defence Relations continue to accept our ANZUS obligations to New Zealand. 9.27 Since 1991, under Closer Defence Relations, closer consultation on 9.22 Beyond these bilateral commitments under ANZUS, our defence defence planning and management issues has improved cooperation and relationship with New Zealand reflects the fact that as Asia-Pacific countries we coordination with New Zealand on the development of our respective defence forces. share a wide range of interests in the security and stability of that region, particularly Closer Defence Relations aims to ensure that we take full advantage of opportunities in South-East Asia and the South-West Pacific. New Zealand actively participates to enhance our respective capabilities through cooperative programs, including in regional security efforts and activities in pursuit of common goals. We welcome those which use our resources more efficiently, and that we develop habits and continued New Zealand engagement in South-East Asia. Australia and our partners procedures of cooperation which allow us to work together effectively in a crisis. benefit from New Zealand's participation in the Five Power Defence Arrangements. New Zealand also contributes significantly to the stability and well-being of the 9.28 We expect that Closer Defence Relations will continue to provide South-West Pacific. important benefits to both sides. With appropriate commitment, we see the potential to increase substantially the mutually supporting activities which both countries 9.23 Continuing cooperation in a wide range of activities throughout our region have undertaken in recent years. will become increasingly important in our defence relationship with New Zealand. We look forward to New Zealand playing a sustained, and if possible, enhanced 9.29 We will also continue with New Zealand to seek the military and economic role in regional security. This includes New Zealand participating in exercises benefits flowing from cooperative defence equipment projects. They have provided involving regional countries. substantial opportunities for both Australian and New Zealand industry, and offer significant operational and logistic advantages, the result of operating similar 9.24 Australia and New Zealand will also continue to work together in support equipment and realising savings through shared training and support activities. of our shared commitment to global security, especially through the United Nations. We have deployed combined detachments ofAustralian and New Zealand personnel 9.30 We continue to regret the dispute arising from New Zealand policy to major UN operations, including Namibia and Cambodia. These very successful between the United States and New Zealand over ship visits. We believe it is an examples of regional cooperation in support of the United Nations draw on the issue for the two nations themselves. The dispute has not prevented the development close and long-standing links between our defence forces, and serve as a model to of our defence relations with either party, but valuable additional opportunities for develop wider regional cooperation in support of UN operations. cooperation with New Zealand would arise from progress on the issue. ----- OTHER INTERNATIONAL INTERESTS 9.31 Australia's international defence relationships extend beyond our alliance and regional relationships to include valued historical ties and defence industry links with the United Kingdom, Canada and a number of European countries. The Government will continue to promote defence links with countries beyond Asia and the Pacific, and particularly with the United Kingdom and Canada, as well as 10.1 Australia's security is enhanced by the existence of multilateral institutions with France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and Sweden. These countries have and agreements which can mobilise international opinion and action to resist strong technical and industrial bases, and a record of supporting global security. In aggression and limit the destabilising proliferation of weapons, especially weapons an increasingly challenging strategic environment, we will seek to broaden and of mass destruction. Our national interests are served both by conflict prevention, diversify our sources of high technology and support. The focus in developing our management and resolution through UN mechanisms, and by the United Nations links with most countries outside our region therefore will be in logistic support, playing an active role in alleviating international humanitarian disasters caused by defence science and materiel collaboration. natural disasters, political turmoil and war. Australia welcomes the opportunity the United Nations has had, since the end of the Cold War, to function more in the 9.32 Australia's defence relationship with the United Kingdom is particularly manner its founders intended. important. It reflects deep historical ties between our defence forces, and these result in practical cooperation in areas of substantial benefit, especially in training 10.2 Australia's support for UN and other multilateral activities is a national and exercises. We benefit from strong intelligence links, and from defence science effort, involving many Government agencies and non-governmental organisations. cooperation through The Technical Cooperation Program, which also includes the Defence plays an important part by providing contingents and support to UN and United States, Canada and New Zealand. In our region, we cooperate through the other peace operations, and by supporting efforts to implement arms control and Five Power Defence Arrangements, to which the United Kingdom makes a valuable disarmament agreements. Australian Defence Force commitments to UN and other contribution. We also have long-standing links with Canada, with which we share multinational peace operations during 1994 are shown in Figure 10-1. an interest in F/A- 18 aircraft and other equipment. 9.33 France has interests in the Pacific. There is scope for some cooperation Figure 10-1: Australian Defence Participation in with French forces based in France's Pacific territories, especially in fisheries Multinational Operations, 1994 surveillance, search and rescue and disaster relief. France can also be a partner in defence technology, and the Government has concluded a bilateral arrangement for scientific cooperation in the defence arena. Close interaction with Sweden will continue, building on the links established through our cooperation on the Collins Class submarine project and airborne early warning studies. Some strengthening of our interaction with Germany is likely; Germany is the source of the design for our ANZAC frigates and of our Leopard tanks. Further cooperation with Italy also is likely following our decision to build Huon Class minehunters. Australia has concluded cooperative logistic support arrangements with France, Germany and **01*40** Italy to complement those we already have with the United States, the United **NW York** Kingdom and New Zealand. These arrangements reduce our need to hold expensive reserve stocks, and promote links which can help Australian industry to sell its defence-related products to appropriate recipients overseas. ----- PEACE OPERATIONS 10.7 In recent years as the role of the United Nations has expanded, the number, nature and scale of UN peace operations have grown. The experience of the last 10.3 In some cases, Defence's participation in multinational operations directly few years has shown the limits as well as the potential of peace operations. In supports Australia's strategic interests. In the Gulf War of 1990-91, Australia's particular, it has shown again that military forces should be deployed only where contribution of forces to coalition operations helped to reaffirm the principle that there is a clearly defined military task to perform. Nonetheless, the recent relatively outright aggression by one country against another is intolerable to the international high number of peace operations is likely to continue over the longer term. The community, and should not go unchallenged or unanswered. These activities experience of recent years has shown limits to the UN's capacity to manage complex reinforce the credibility of UN collective security provisions; help make international operations in many corners of the world. We are helping to improve UN planning aggression less likely; and increase international support for Australia if we ever capability, and have posted Defence personnel to UN headquarters in New York to face such aggression ourselves. In the Cambodian settlement process of 1991-93, help address these problems. the Australian Defence Force contingent played a major part in addressing a serious regional problem and offering hope to the Cambodian people. 10.8 Australia attaches high priority to providing Defence contingents to UN and other multinational peace operations. The number of Defence personnel serving 10.4 Participation in UN peace operations also complements Australia's on peace operations at any time will fluctuate because the number and scale of regional and alliance interests. Our participation in peace operations in Cambodia operations to which we contribute will vary. We prefer now not to set numerical provided a constructive basis to increase cooperation with regional countries. We targets for the level of forces committed to the United Nations. It would not be are making opportunities available to regional countries to undertake peacekeeping prudent to deploy Australian personnel to difficult and potentially dangerous training with Australia, and are seeking ways of expanding this type of cooperative operations simply to keep up our numbers, if those operations did not warrant such activity. By developing closer cooperation in peace operations with regional contributions on their merits. Equally, we would not wish to preclude participation countries we build confidence and contribute to cooperative regional security in worthwhile operations simply because we had already exceeded a target number. arrangements. For Australia to continue to play a leading role, we will need to We will seek every opportunity to participate in operations which meet our case- retain both the perception that we are committed to supporting peace operations, by-case criteria, contributing over time to a reasonable range and number of and the knowledge and standing flowing from first-hand experience of these operations, and striking a balance between the value of our commitments and their operations. number. The Australian Defence Force contributes valuable technical capabilities and high quality participation rather than raw numbers. Indeed, the United Nations 10.5 With New Zealand we have already cooperated in peace operations in often actively seeks specialised capabilities from Australia. Namibia and Cambodia, but we can increase this cooperation, perhaps by combining contributions. Such contingents would build on the existing high level of 10.9 We therefore will continue to examine each case on its merits, retaining interoperability of the respective forces; add to the flexibility of both countries to a broad commitment but evaluating our performance in support of the United participate in peace operations; and enhance defence cooperation in a practical Nations not just in terms of the number of operations we are in but, more importantly, way. By collaborating more with New Zealand, both the goals of our peace in terms of the quality of our contribution to the operation's success and to our operations and our defence relationship should benefit. Furthermore, our overall objectives. We must consider whether we are contributing sufficiently to a involvement in peace operations provides benefits in our relationship with the United positive and effective international response to security problems in a way which States. More generally, it benefits our international standing, including our influence strengthens cooperative security mechanisms, and whether we are maintaining our on efforts to reform the United Nations in its role in maintaining international standing globally, regionally, and with our allies, as a committed supporter of the peace and security. United Nations and a constructive contributor to responsible international security action. The Government also will take account of the community expectations 10.6 In some cases, such as in Somalia in 1993-4 and Rwanda in 1994, Defence that we should help in a major international crisis. has participated in operations which had little or no direct strategic significance for Australia, but which supported important international humanitarian objectives. 10.10 The criteria we apply to requests for Australian participation in UN The Government recognises that when circumstances require it, the deployment of operations continue to be refined. Australian Defence Force participation in peace Defence contingents, usually as part of a wider national response including aid operations takes into account whether the operation has clear and achievable goals operations and wherever possible non-governmental organisations, may be an and clearly defined termination or review points; what other resources are likely to appropriate response to help alleviate desperate humanitarian crises. be available for the operation; how much Australian interests are engaged, including ----- regional, alliance and humanitarian interests and community attitudes; what costs 10.12 So far, our contributions to UN and other multinational peace operations the contribution might incur, including the effect on the Australian Defence Force's have included engineers, communicators, medical teams, movement control capacity to undertake other tasks including national defence; what our commitment personnel, aviation and other specialised contingents, as well as self-contained to other operations is at the time, having regard among other things to our reputation units including infantry battalions and naval task groups. To help their planning as a supporter of the United Nations; what training and other benefits will accrue we provide the United Nations with regularly updated lists of the capabilities which to the Australian Defence Force; and what risk to personnel is involved. While we we can provide for peacekeeping operations. Our Permanent Mission to the United work to try to improve UN mechanisms for responding to crises, we also are Nations in New York will work actively with the United Nations in identifying examining our own decision-making process to ensure a timely response when an those of our capabilities which best meet UN needs for specific operations. We are Australian contribution is warranted. also examining other ways to ensure the United Nations maximises the benefit from Australian participation in peace operations, and that we maximise the training benefits for Defence. U -T!ETT. _I_ _--_ _-_ 10.13 The professional skills of Defence personnel deployed on peace operations are supplemented by specific training in peace operations. The Australian Defence Force Peacekeeping Centre draws on Australian and overseas experience to assist in developing our peacekeeping skills and those of our regional neighbours. The Peacekeeping Centre also contributes to the training of our own and other forces by preparing relevant doctrine for the Australian Defence Force and training material for the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations and the United Nations Institute for Training and Research. The Reinforcement Hooding Company at Randwick plays a specialised training role in preparing contingents for operations in the field by providing specific work-up periods. 10.14 Australia may be asked to participate in multinational peace operations or coalitions other than those under the United Nations. The Multinational Force and Observers in the Sinai is such an operation, to which we currently provide a contingent of 27 Australian Defence Force personnel and the Force Commander. The South Pacific Peace Keeping Force in Bougainville is another non-UN peace operation. Requests to participate in non-UN bodies will generally be considered 10.11 The requirements of the particular operation and the availability of units against the same criteria as UN requests, although funding arrangements will usually determine which elements we contribute to peace operations. We do not establish be different from UN arrangements and contingents on such operations may lack special units or earmark elements within the Australian Defence Force for peace the protective status of a UN mission. support. The United Nations requires different types of units for different operations. If we tried to predict UN needs we could restrict our flexibility to provide elements 10.15 Peace operations are costly and Australia only recovers a part of Defence from our wide range of capabilities to meet the requirements of specific operations. deployment costs from the United Nations. Furthermore, Defence participation in The Australian Defence Force's capabilities and readiness levels enable Australia peace operations is usually hard to predict and budget for. While Defence meets to make substantial contributions to a range of peace operations, sometimes at the costs of relatively minor UN deployments, the Government supplements the very short notice. Indeed, Defence is sufficiently versatile to allow contingents to Defence budget for the costs of larger peace operations. This practice has proved be assembled from a range of units to provide the right combination of skills and effective and will continue. experience for a particular operation and to meet UN levels of readiness for stand- by units. The Australian Defence Force is structured for defending Australia, but the versatility inherent in such a force ensures it can contribute to peace operations. The demands of these peace operations therefore need not, and will not, influence the force development process other than at the margins. ----- NON-PROLIFERATION AND ARMS CONTROL technology. Our involvement in international processes will be complemented by continued efforts to secure acceptance of, and adherence to, this Regime within the 10.16 Effective controls on the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction region. and ballistic missiles contribute significantly to Australia's security. Twenty years or more of sustained negotiation between the then superpowers and in multilateral 10.20 Australia is strongly committed to transparency as a way to build trust forums have led to the development of an unprecedented array of non-proliferation and reduce unfounded suspicion and dangerous misunderstandings in strategic and arms control regimes (particularly the Strategic Arms Limitations Agreement affairs, especially within our own region. We seek greater transparency in and the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, the Treaty banning Intermediate-Range conventional weapons through initiatives such as the United Nations Conventional Nuclear Forces, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Chemical and Biological Arms Transfer Register. Already, Australia publishes more of its defence planning Weapons Conventions, and the Partial and Threshold Nuclear Test Ban Treaties). processes, budget, acquisitions and order of battle than most countries in Asia and However, with the end of the Cold War, economic growth and strategic uncertainties the Pacific, although some encouraging trends are developing in this regard. have increased the potential for proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. As a result, non-proliferation issues are at the forefront of international security concerns. 10.21 We also strongly support the further development of global agreements to help ameliorate the horrors of war, especially agreements that reduce the risks to 10.17 Australia shares a global interest in reducing the risk of countries acquiring civilians, including the Inhumane Weapons Convention and the Geneva Conventions or using weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles. We have a strong and Protocols. Defence personnel are carefully trained in the laws of armed conflict direct interest in ensuring that such weapons are not acquired by countries or terrorist and respect for human rights. Australia is at the forefront internationally in this groups which could use them against Australia. While the mere acquisition of area. these weapons would not indicate a threat to Australia, their existence within reach of us would complicate and add to the cost of our defence. Furthermore, if one 10.22 Australia will maintain careful controls on its exports of military goods regional country acquires weapons of mass destruction or missile capabilities other to ensure that they do not conflict with our strategic interests, international regional countries may respond, possibly by developing matching capabilities. Such obligations and broader foreign policy objectives. Recent new arrangements a sequence would destabilise regional security and further complicate defence improve Defence and wider governmental coordination on defence export issues. planning. The best way to prevent proliferation is to establish effective global regimes, such as the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Chemical Weapons 10.23 In negotiating international agreements on these issues, we will protect Convention, and the Biological Weapons Convention. Australia will continue to our wider strategic interests and not impose restrictions on the Australian Defence support and if possible strengthen these regimes, and ensure they are fully Force which would disadvantage it in conflict. For these reasons, Australia will implemented and effectively verifiable. Defence will continue to promote and try to secure the widest possible compliance with and verification of international implement regional non-proliferation and arms control measures. agreements. 10.18 The Defence Organisation provides technical advice, supported by 10.24 Support for non-proliferation does not consume substantial Defence defensive expertise in the Defence Science and Technology Organisation on resources or impose any specific requirements in terms of force structure or chemical and biological weapons; provides intelligence on global and regional capabilities. The collection and analysis of intelligence on proliferation issues is proliferation activities, to which we give a high priority; and implements strict of course a high priority for our intelligence agencies. As described in Chapter controls over exports from Australia of materials, equipment and technology which Twelve, the Defence Science and Technology Organisation maintains a modest could be used to develop weapons of mass destruction. Drawing on the Defence but valuable level of expertise in chemical and biological weapons technology to Science and Technology Organisation's expertise and the Australian Defence Force's assist in developing defensive measures and to support non-proliferation activities. engineering skills, Australia has provided personnel for specific non-proliferation efforts in UN operations in Iraq. 10.19 A key priority is limiting the proliferation of ballistic missiles. The Government will continue its efforts to make the Missile Technology Control Regime an effective mechanism for this purpose, and will seek the broadest international commitment to controls on developing and exporting ballistic missile ----- #### PART IV **National** **Defence Support** ----- 11.1 An effective partnership between the Defence Organisation and Australian industry is essential to Australia's defence. The Government's defence policies for industry outlined in this Chapter will enhance Australia's capacity for defence and are consistent with those policies announced in the recent White Paper on Employment and Growth for the development of a strong national industrial base. Substantial contributions and commitment from both the Defence Organisation and Australian industry will he required to ensure an effective partnership for defence self-reliance into the future. AUSTRALIAN INDUSTRY 11.2 A strong Australian defence industry is important in sustaining the operational effectiveness of the Australian Defence Force, and ensuring that the Force is able to adapt to changing circumstances. Industry's contribution to our defence effort will become more important as our strategic environment becomes more demanding. Australia's defence industry capacity is supplemented by New Zealand's. Under the terms of the ANZAC Ship Treaty and in accord with closer economic and defence relations, New Zealand industry together with Australian industry are considered as a single defence industrial base. Australian and New Zealand firms are therefore treated equally in our Defence industry policies, except in regard to a small number of high-security or third country collaborative projects. 11.3 The capacity of Australian industry has changed significantly since the mid-1980s. Defence-related industries have benefited from measures the Government has taken to improve the international competitiveness of Australian industry generally. These have included lower tariff barriers, a more internationally competitive tax structure, deregulated transport and communications sectors, improved industrial relations, reinvigorated public sector research and development, and active pursuit of new export markets. 11.4 Defence policy for industry has furthered this process by encouraging efficient production and work practices and export-oriented Australian manufacturing and services. Major projects, such as the Collins Class submarines and ANZAC frigates, have transferred new technologies to Australia and enhanced important skills, including managing complex engineering development projects, systems integration and software engineering. Other projects, such as the Jindalee Operational Radar Network, have developed new technologies indigenous to ----- Australia. Industry's capabilities have also been strengthened as the Defence DEFENCE'S INDUSTRY NEEDS Organisation has set demanding standards for quality assurance, project cost and schedule control. At the same time, the Commercial Support Program has opened 11.8 The Government's priorities for defence industry reflect the need for ready significant areas of activity to Australian industry. and reliable support for the capabilities of the Australian Defence Force. We need to ensure that we have reliable suppliers of consumable items, such as fuel and 11.5 In 1994-95, some 80 per cent of Defence's expenditure on facilities, ammunition. We also need to ensure a capacity to repair and maintain equipment, equipment, goods and services will be spent in Australia. This percentage, which including the ability to handle the additional maintenance requirements which would represents a major increase over the last decade, results from the high levels of arise in conflict. These requirements underpin the Australian Defence Force's Australian industry involvement in major equipment projects. These projects sustainability. As well, Defence requires a capacity to modify and adapt equipment increased the share of capital equipment expenditure in Australia from 25 per cent to meet the demands of Australia's environment and strategic circumstances. This in 1984-85 to 64 per cent in 1994-95. includes a capacity for modifying equipment and systems acquired from overseas, optimising them for Australia's environment, and developing them throughout their 11.6 Through the 1990s, spending in Australia on Defence's requirements from service life to ensure they keep pace with developments in regional technology industry will remain high. Projects such as the coastal rninehunter,ANZAC frigates and systems. Local modification skills are most important in electronic warfare, and Collins Class submarines will sustain a high level of major capital investment sensors and precision weapons, communications, information systems and software. in defence industry. Overall, however, the proportion of capital investment expended in Australia is likely to decline slightly because of the priority accorded to acquiring 11.9 The Government also looks to Australian industry to produce major items and upgrading aircraft, an area which offers fewer opportunities for Australian of equipment for Defence. Major defence equipment will be produced in Australia involvement. Aircraft projects will, nevertheless, offer opportunities for the when it offers value for money, taking account of factors including the ability to development of important skills and capabilities in avionics and systems integration meet needs arising from our geographic and strategic environment, the development which are necessary for through-life maintenance support. of a capacity for through-life support and modification, and assurance of uninterrupted supply. 11.7 Defence's demand for specific defence goods and services will continue to remain uneven and often too small to sustain individual companies on a 11.10 Australian defence industry needs to possess excellence and flexibility competitive basis. Australian companies supplying Defence will have to continue in a range of areas based on our natural environment and geography, our strategic their diversification into other markets, both civil and defence export, for long- guidance and military concepts, and developments in defence technology. For terin sustainability. example, hot and wet conditions in northern Australia require specially constructed facilities, the use of rugged vehicles and long-range communication equipment. Likewise, our emphasis on maritime operations in our sea and air approaches requires very wide area surveillance systems and a variety of sea and air platforms able to sustain high rates of effort over long distances. Our dependence on a small, technology-based, mobile and integrated force requires us to keep abreast and in some cases to lead developments in some areas of defence technology, including software development and systems integration. 11.11 The Strategic Review, 1993 made explicit the Government's priorities for industry support. It identified the following industry capabilities as most important for Australia's self-reliance in defence: combat systems software and support; data management and signal processing, including for intelligence and surveillance; **t1-i** ----- command, control and communications systems; Linking Equipment Acquisition and Through-Life Support systems integration; and 11.16 To focus defence procurement on developing appropriate skills, generic capabilities and capacity in industry, the Government's major defence procurement repair and maintenance of major weapons and surveillance platforms. projects now will specify industry capacity needed to provide sustainable support for the Australian Defence Force. This approach recognises that through-life support 11.12 In all these areas, the important defence-related skills which Australian is integral to all stages of planning and decision making. Through-life support will companies develop will enable them to take advantage of wider commercial be considered in developing an acquisition strategy for each major project, and opportunities in Australia and in Asia and the Pacific, and to compete for niche industry will be advised of the level of support intended to be provided by Defence business in western Europe and North America. from internal resources. 11.17 To encourage greater Australian industry involvement in acquisition and ENHANCING AUSTRALIAN INDUSTRY'S CONTRIBUTION TO through-life support, the Defence Organisation will consider modifying the timing DEFENCE of its defence projects where this improves the continuity of work-flow, encourages the sustainability of high priority skills, and does not jeopardise the capability of 11.13 The Defence Organisation's relationship with industry has been the subject the Australian Defence Force. Where separate capital equipment projects share of review and improvement over the past three years. The 1992 Price Report on similar technologies, linkages will be established to achieve economies of scale, **Defence Policy and Industry emphasised that support from Australian industry** the benefits of commonality and a more sustainable flow of work to industry. was essential for our defence, while making it clear that supporting Australian industry was not a defence objective in its own right. It stressed the importance of 11.18 Defence will provide industry with the earliest possible advice of a long-term relationship between Defence and industry, focusing on Australia's capability requirements to allow Australian firms time to develop or contribute to strategic priorities. It also brought together various initiatives of recent years, equipment and through-life support solutions. Forward procurement plans will be including the growing contribution of the Defence Science and Technology released as one of the steps to enable this. Increasingly, in areas of rapid Organisation's research and development to Australian firms, and provided a technological advance such as complex command and control systems, Defence comprehensive overview of the future directions for defence policy for industry. will seek ways to involve industry more in identifying capability solutions. 11.14 The Report established a broad range of actions and directions to focus better each aspect of Defence industry policy. Many of these actions have been Improving Defence Purchasing implemented, including those providing for better directed export facilitation and the use of specialist trade commissioners in South-East Asia. 11.19 Defence purchasing practices have changed significantly in recent years, and in many areas now set the benchmark for public sector purchasing. These 11.15 Defence's procurement, especially in capital equipment and through practices will continue to evolve to ensure Defence gets value in the goods and substantial logistic support contracts, has a significant influence on specific defence- services it buys. While Defence purchasing cannot be as streamlined as commercial related industry capabilities and capacity. Recognising this, the Government will sector purchasing because of probity and public accountability requirements, and institute a number of changes in its acquisition processes and in the way it seeks to because many Defence projects are among the largest and most complex of all involve industry in supporting Australia's defence. The Government will be guided public sector procurements, the Government ensures that its purchasing practices also by the recommendations of the recent Industry Commission Inquiry into continue to improve through risk sharing, streamlined procedures and innovative Defence Procurement. contracting. The Defence Inspector-General will continue to have an important role in ensuring that these improved processes maintain the highest standards of probity. 11.20 The Government will encourage greater use of long-term relationships between Defence and industry. Defence already uses a variety of long-term supplier arrangements including preferred suppliers, Common Use Contracts, arrangements ----- with major service providers in the telecommunications industry, and strategic allowed Defence to draw more fully for its support on the strengths of the alliances between the Defence Science and Technology Organisation and local commercial sector and to establish links between Defence and the wider Australian firms. Moreover, plans for through-life support of major shipbuilding projects community. will involve construction-phase contractors over long periods. 11.28 So far, the Commercial Support Program has yielded net recurring savings 11.21 The Defence Organisation is at present determining a panel of preferred of about $98 million annually. Contracts with industry provide a variety of support suppliers for systems integration. Defence will consider establishing long-term services in areas such as repair and maintenance and base support. At the same supplier relationships in our other high priority areas which are subject to low time, the Program has opened many new opportunities to Australian industry. These commercial demand. These arrangements will be evaluated carefully to ensure will help make the companies involved more competitive in seeking further work best international practice and value for money. here and overseas. The Program has enhanced the effectiveness of the Australian Defence Force by freeing some 2,200 military and 980 civilian personnel from 11.22 In addition to long-term arrangements, the Defence Organisation will non-essential support activities and thereby making more resources available for reduce the costs of tendering by reducing requirements for information from industry operational capabilities. and improving its evaluation and decision-making timetables. Defence will make greater use of multi-stage tendering and more rapid short-listing. It will give more 11.29 Defence continues to identify activities for which commercial support is specific guidance to tenderers on the level of information required at each stage suitable. These activities (known as 'non-core') are in areas where in-house and the evaluation criteria to be used. operations do not have to be performed by uniformed personnel or by Defence civilians to meet policy advice or public sector accountability responsibilities. 11.23 Defence uses functional and performance standards in contracts wherever Proposals will continue to be sought from contractors to undertake these activities, possible to allow industry to propose the most cost-effective solutions to Defence which will generally fall in the area of support services. Contract proposals are requirements. This entails early involvement of industry in the design phase. evaluated against in-house bids on the basis of best value for money. 11.24 Defence will make greater use of commercial specifications. Any use of military specifications will need to be carefully justified, and decided at an early Improving Communication stage of the acquisition process. This will enable a wider range of companies to supply goods to Defence, and will reduce costs both for the supplier and for Defence. 11.30 Effective communication ensures that Australian industry and the Defence Organisation can work together to strengthen the national defence support base. 11.25 In recent years, Defence facility acquisition has improved significantly. Defence seeks from industry the information necessary for it to improve its Business arrangements, construction contracts and property services will continue understanding of Australian industrial capabilities and industry is generally to evolve, consistent with the Government's Construction Industry Reform Strategy. responsive to this need. Recent studies by the Defence Industry Committee provided very helpful data on naval shipbuilding and on the information technology, 11.26 Broader Government purchasing policy will be the sole guide for the electronics and communication areas of Australian industry. In turn, Defence procurement of goods and services if Defence is not a dominant customer or has provides information to industry on future procurement plans, and sponsors no significant strategic interests. Consequently, Defence will buy its goods and conferences and courses aimed at improving communication and understanding. services, particularly in the areas of minor capital equipment and logistics, from Working groups, workshops, briefings and informal contacts are also important. Australian firms providing good value products. In addition, the Defence Industry Committee and its sub-committees provide regular forums for Defence and industry to address the direction of local industry in supporting the Australian Defence Force. Commercial Support 11 .3 1 For Defence, the growing dialogue will focus on areas where defence 11.27 Following the report to Government in 1990 on The Defence Force and technology is developing rapidly. In many cases, the commercial sector is driving **the Community, Defence developed and implemented a Commercial Support** that development. Areas like computer graphics, for example, often lead Program aimed at achieving greater efficiency in its support services by increasing developments in defence simulation technology. Increasingly, the Defence the role of the commercial sector in providing these services. The Program has Organisation is looking to build on civil developments and is relying on civil standards and systems. ----- **PROMOTING INDUSTRY DEVELOPMENT** 11.34 Defence also uses a program of development contracts to promote specific capabilities in Australian industry. Defence will improve its Industry Development 11.32 To ensure long-term, sustained involvement in Defence support, Program to ensure it promotes those industrial processes which are critical to Australian firms must be strong and internationally competitive. This requires developing adaptable and versatile defence capabilities. Such contracts will better them to be able to manage intellectual property so they can modify and adapt position companies to compete for the provision of defence equipment and services. defence equipment to diversify their products and gain access to local and overseas civil and defence markets. 11.35 Australian industry undertakes only limited defence-related research and development. To broaden and strengthen industry's contribution, the Defence 11.33 Industry can acquire defence-related intellectual property by performing Science and Technology Organisation increasingly will interact with industry research and development, entering collaborative arrangements with the Defence through arrangements for long-term cooperation managed mainly by its new Science and Technology Organisation, Cooperative Research Centres or others, or Industry Support Office. The Defence Science and Technology Organisation's entering licensing or other arrangements with overseas sources. Defence will policies and activities will be coordinated closely with and complement defence promote these arrangements, including for technology transfer, by placing industry policies and programs (see Chapter Twelve). More generally, in its Requests appropriate conditions on its purchases of equipment from overseas. Following for Tender, Defence will seek greater local research and development in major recent policy changes, Defence will pay only for those intellectual property rights projects. that it actually needs, placing less emphasis on Defence ownership of intellectual property generated by industry under Defence contracts. Arrangements with Australian firms for using Defence's intellectual property include a general Materiel Cooperation and Defence Exports preference for the provision of exclusive rights to industry, much less emphasis on short-term revenue raising, and an expansion of the use of royalty arrangements. 11.36 The Government supports and encourages the export of defence products from Australia, within carefully enforced guidelines. These guidelines ensure that such exports are consistent with our wider national interests and obligations. Countries have the right to self-defence, and hence to buy and sell defence equipment. Australia itself is a substantial importer of defence equipment, and recognises that other countries have similar rights to purchase defence equipment for legitimate purposes. 11.37 The development of Australian materiel cooperation projects and defence exports offers significant benefits to Australia. Apart from the direct commercial benefits to industry and the wider economy, defence exports support Australia's strategic interests. They enhance the capability of Australian defence industry, thereby increasing the support available within Australia to the Defence Organisation. They also provide a valuable basis for enhancing our defence relationships with countries in the region as well as our traditional partners. 11.38 The Government strictly controls the export of defence and defence- related goods to ensure that our foreign policy and strategic interests are properly protected. It provides a predictable defence export policy framework. In considering applications for defence export licences, the Government takes account of a range of factors, including the implications of a potential sale for Australia's direct security interests and for global and regional security, our obligations under UN and other international agreements, and the domestic and international benefits of the sale proceeding. The Government does not permit export of defence goods to any country under a mandatory UN arms embargo, to countries whose policies are ----- hostile to our own, or to countries which seriously violate their citizens' human 11.44 The Government expects Australian firms to take the lead in marketing rights (unless there is no reasonable risk that the items concerned will be used and exporting defence products. Nonetheless, as there are clear benefits to against those citizens). Export proposals are not approved where they may Australia's defence interests from an expanded defence export market, the disadvantage Australia militarily, or more generally where foreign and strategic Government will maintain an active defence export facilitation program. The policy interests outweigh export benefits. development of export markets will require close cooperation between the Government and Australian industry. The Government will consult Australian 11.39 These strict controls have still allowed significant improvement in the industry to develop and refine an export and materiel cooperation strategy according time taken to process approvals for exports. In this way, the Government ensures to overall defence priorities and its export control framework. This strategy will that Australian industry has every opportunity to sell appropriate defence products focus on the longer term strategic benefits from defence exports, especially in our overseas. nearer region, rather than on short-term returns. Defence will disseminate information to industry and identify export opportunities in the region, and 11.40 Our present defence exports are modest. In 1993-94, sales of defence coordinate trials on products developed for export by Australian firms. and defence-related goods totalled $70.6 million. Australia is unlikely to become a major exporter of a wide range of defence goods; rather, we will tend to aim at niche markets. Nonetheless, defence industry export markets have grown substantially over recent years, both because Australian manufacturing industry has become more competitive and because the skills and capabilities of our defence industries have been boosted by Australian companies producing equipment under the Government's defence investment program. 11.41 South-East Asia offers particularly important opportunities for materiel cooperation and defence exports. Many countries in the region are undertaking substantial defence re-equipment programs, focusing on higher technology maritime and air capabilities. Australia has long-standing expertise and strong recent experience in these areas as a result of our acquisition programs in warship and submarine construction. We will continue to emphasise the development of cooperative materiel programs in which two or more countries work together to develop, build and maintain defence equipment. Such programs provide opportunities for all parties. Our long-standing defence relationships with many countries in the region provide a strong basis to develop such arrangements. 11.42 The Government will support opportunities for materiel cooperation on a case-by-case basis, and will judge them in the light of the benefits they offer for Australia's defence interests. Especially important will be the prospective benefits of any proposed project for selective interoperability and combined training, and the likely contribution of the project to the development of a sustainable capacity in Australian industry. In some circumstances, we will vary our own acquisition plans marginally to enable collaboration if our national security interests will benefit. 11.43 While we will give regional markets our highest priority for promoting exports and materiel cooperation, we will also support companies which seek defence export opportunities elsewhere, including in markets in Europe and North America. Australian collaboration with our traditional partners is well established, and includes cooperating with the United States in developing the NULKA anti- ship missile decoy and collaborating with New Zealand to build the ANZAC frigates. ----- 12.1 Australia relies for its defence on advanced technology and consequently needs a high level of scientific and technological advice and support. The Government has four broad objectives for this: to position Australia to exploit future developments in technology which show promise for defence applications; to ensure that Australia is an informed buyer of equipment; to develop new capabilities as required; and to support existing capabilities by increasing operational performance and reducing the costs of ownership, including through-life extension programs. 12.2 Priorities for Australian defence research and development reflect a wide range of factors. While Australia imports most of the technology embedded in its defence capabilities, some aspects of our environment are sufficiently different from those of other countries to demand unique equipment and technology. There is a need for Australia itself to be able to provide the technological support essential for Australian Defence Force operations and to understand comprehensively the technological strengths and weaknesses of our capabilities. Moreover, we must keep abreast of continuing advances in defence-relevant technology so that we will be able to defend Australia into the future. SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY AND NATIONAL DEFENCE 12.3 Managing defence science and technology to meet Australia's priorities for defence and national security presents a number of challenges. Defence must reconcile the demands of various customer groups in the Organisation, respond to changes in our strategic circumstances and strike a balance between shorter and longer term research. 12.4 Australia's move toward a more innovative and dynamic national support base, the increased availability of advanced weapon systems at a global level, continuing advances in defence technology and the continuing need to minimise costs will all increase the demands on defence science and technology. In this environment, priorities for Australian research and development will reflect the priorities for capability development described in Chapter Five. 12.5 In this respect, there will be several recurring themes. These will include support for intelligence, surveillance, electronic warfare, communications, information technology and exploitation of environmental information, including ----- on acoustics and electromagnetic propagation. They will also include signature about 2600 people, including between 1200 and 1300 scientists and engineers with management, operational research, combat modelling and simulation, an approach world-class expertise in a range of disciplines (outlined in Table 12-1). These which stresses the importance of overall systems and the human dimension, and a skills provide the basis that allows it also to support Australia's regional and global sufficient knowledge of advanced materials to provide through-life support to security interests, and to interact with industry. modern platforms. There will be a need to guard against the vulnerability of our own acoustic and electronic based systems while being able to exploit an adversary's vulnerabilities. Table 12-1 Areas of Expertise in the Defence Science and Technology Organisation 12.6 Just as force development is a long-term process, so too is the process for developing the high levels of skill and experience required for defence science. Our priorities for defence research and development need to look well ahead. Acoustics Human factors Sensor devices & components Forward looking enabling research must be adequately funded. Such research will Communication networks Image processing Signal processing & analysis Computational mechanics Information science Signal propagation focus on supporting the Government's priorities for capability development, and Computer modelling Information security Signals acquisition catering for our special national demands, including those of our unique Data fusion Infrared sensors Simulation & simulators environment. Data representation Materials science Sonar Decision-making aids Operational analysis Systems integration 12.7 Considerations of science and technology are integral to the formative Electromagnetics Platform signature measurement Target classification Electronic countermeasures Platform signature reduction Target detection & tracking stages of each major defence project and the concepts behind it. Authoritative Energy storage Platform structures Toxicology advice on science and technology will increasingly assist the Defence Organisation Environmental science Platform survivability Trials planning & analysis to specify its operational and technical needs, evaluate proposals, and identify the Exercise & mission analysis Radar Wargaming risks associated with particular acquisition strategies. The Government will continue Explosives & effects Radio communications Weapon propulsion & ballistics Gas turbine technology Satellite imagery Weapon effectiveness & safety to need a high level of scientific and technological advice to enable it to be a wise Health and food science buyer, user and maintainer of equipment. THE DEFENCE SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY ORGANISATION 12.10 The Government's policies for Defence emphasise the need for effective management of its research and development effort. The Defence Science and 12.8 Defence's demands for scientific and technological advice and support Technology Organisation's management processes are designed to facilitate are thus extensive and specialised. These specialist demands are met principally decisions on resource allocation, and to demonstrate the relevance of its activities by the Defence Science and Technology Organisation. The advice and support and the transparency of its use of resources. Research and development is this Organisation provides need to have many characteristics: professional, impartial coordinated across five broad customer areas: Maritime, Land, Air, Policy and and well informed about the specialised application of science and technology to Command, and self-sponsored enabling research. The mechanisms that exist to the defence arena; focused on Australia's unique needs; responsive both to Defence's ensure responsiveness to customer needs in each of these areas, and that facilitate longer term needs and to priority demands that might arise at short notice; and review at the Portfolio level, give confidence that the Organisation's activities will based on the coordination and integration of advice from the range of relevant evolve to meet future challenges. sources inAustralia and overseas. These characteristics require the Defence Science and Technology Organisation to be an integral part of our one Defence Organisation. Defence Science and the Australian Defence Force 12.9 The Organisation is Australia's second largest Government funded research and development body, and its budget represents just over 2 per cent of 12.11 The Defence Science and Technology Organisation has contributed Australia's annual defence expenditure. Its research and development activity is significantly to the development of some of our most important defence capabilities. now structured around two laboratories: Aeronautical and Maritime Research, and For example, research and development it performed over many years enabled the Electronics and Surveillance Research. When current structural changes are development of the Jindalee Operational Radar Network. Many aspects of the completed in 1996, the Defence Science and Technology Organisation will employ particular science and technology in this unique system were not available elsewhere ----- in the world, and the long lead-times for its development meant that no other source 12.14 The benefits of defence science and technology go well beyond the of science and technology could maintain the constancy of purpose and resources development of unique Australian defence capabilities. By undertaking research needed to develop it. Having acquired world class expertise in this area, the and development in Australia we acquire important knowledge in areas such as Organisation will be able to adapt the system to meet future challenges and to specialised software which enables us to adapt our key systems as Australia's investigate related surveillance technologies which also show promise. strategic circumstances change. By promoting the commercialisation of defence science and technology in a range of areas, the Government ensures that the Defence 12.12 The Defence Science and Technology Organisation has also developed Science and Technology Organisation makes a significant contribution to the and introduced specialised welding technology, and designed acoustic coatings international competitiveness of Australian industry. needed to optimise the performance of the Collins Class submarine in our unique operating environment. Thus the Organisation has assisted in constructing the world's most sophisticated conventional submarine. Moreover, just as the OTHER SOURCES OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY Organisation provided extensive through-life support for the Oberon Class submarines, so will it support the Collins Class once they enter operational service. 12.15 Within Defence each Service maintains a small group with expertise for specialist engineering development, test and evaluation. There are also areas within 12.13 Defence research and development has also been essential for the Defence that perform occupational health research. The work of these organisations development of towed acoustic arrays for surveillance, airborne lasers for complements that of the Defence Science and Technology Organisation, and their hydrographic survey and the NULKA expendable decoy. Moreover, its development control and tasking is vested in their respective single Services. of composite bonded aircraft repair (used on aircraft such as the Fill, C 130, Macchi MB326H and P3C), airframe fatigue testing (F/A-18 and PC9, and methods to 12.16 Defence shares a Memorandum of Understanding with the repair our guided-missile frigates (FFGs) have underpinned important Defence Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research Organisation, and draws upon equipment life extension programs. Further, the Defence Science and Technology its work in areas such as environmental data collection which are directly relevant Organisation's achievements in broad-band, robust and reliable communications, to the development and support of the Australian Defence Force. Australian assisted by its cooperation with other telecommunications bodies in Australia, have Universities undertake significant defence-relevant scientific research under guided the thrust of the Defence Communications Corporate Plan. technical support contracts and the Government plans to increase its funding for such contracts over the next three to five years. Defence is also a member of several of the Government's Cooperative Research Centres, which have been established to foster interaction between industry, public sector research and Australia's tertiary institutions. 12.17 Australian industry undertakes a limited amount of research and development for defence purposes, and some of this is funded directly by Defence through mechanisms such as the Defence Industry Development Program. Increasing the amount of defence-relevant research and development undertaken by Australian industry is an important long-term objective. 12.18 While the Government will increase its use of commercial and other Australian sources of science and technology these bodies have different objectives from Defence and a limited familiarity with our military environment. Defence industry, for example, will often have a more substantial role in the later stages of development and production. ----- **DEFENCE SCIENCE AND AUSTRALIAN INDUSTRY** and at times can constrain the extent of industry interaction. Every effort is made to minimise the effects of any such constraints. Industry is encouraged to become 12.19 Effective and efficient collaborative links between the Defence Science involved in defence research and development in its early phases so that commercial and Technology Organisation and Australian industry are essential to promote the opportunities can be identified and exploited as early as possible. Such involvement adaptability and versatility of the Australian Defence Force. Australian firms have is facilitated through industry alliances, which are formal long-term relationships access to new technologies developed locally and overseas, and business between Defence and external agencies to promote mutual objectives in technology opportunities in local and international defence and civil markets. These links also transfer, the exploitation of research and development and the promotion of defence enhance the depth and diversity of defence technological expertise in Australia, industries. These alliances promote Government policies which seek greater and improve the capacity of local sources to support Defence on an internationally national benefit from publicly funded research and development, and encourage competitive basis. The Defence Science and Technology Organisation's interaction industry to play a greater role in defence science and technology. with industry will grow, particularly as commercial markets drive technological developments in fields such as communications and information technology, and as Defence looks increasingly for technology transfer from these markets. INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION IN SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY 12.20 Defence expenditure on science and technology must primarily enhance the effectiveness of the national defence and security effort. Thus, the first broad 12.24 Australia benefits in many ways from the Government's interaction in objective of the Defence Science and Technology Organisation's interaction with defence science with Australia's friends and allies in North America and Europe. Australian industry is to help industry become better able to support the capabilities These connections comprise, in particular, The Technical Cooperation Program we need to defend Australia. Such interaction tends to focus on areas most strongly involving the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, New Zealand and related to Australian defence self-reliance and to the unique features of our operating Australia, and our separate bilateral arrangements with each of these countries. environment, as well as in support of major platforms. Additionally, the Government has negotiated formal bilateral arrangements with France and Sweden, and there are less formal arrangements with a number of other 12.21 A second objective is to contribute through industry to national wealth European countries. creation, including through the support of exports. Together, these objectives support the Government's aim of assisting the development of efficient, internationally 12.25 Collaborative arrangements will continue to concentrate on areas of competitive industries in Australia through technological innovation. It is also mutual priority and benefit. Although international cooperation in defence science important that industry recognises the part it has to play in this process. faces pressures from the move toward dual-use technologies for commercial benefit and the search for international competitiveness in high-technology products, it is 12.22 The Defence Science and Technology Organisation has a unique place important to recognise that our partners are increasingly focusing on conflict at the within the national support base, so Defence will take several factors into account regional level rather than the global level. Their priorities and those of Australia when pursuing interaction with industry in the area of research and development. are thus converging. Equally, pressures on defence budgets will encourage greater Specifically, commercial activity is secondary to support by defence science to the international cooperation in defence science through the sharing of associated costs. rest of the Defence Organisation; it is a by-product of, and does not drive, the Australia would be considerably disadvantaged if this international cooperation Defence Science and Technology Organisation's focus on support for defending were to diminish significantly, so we will continue to contribute to these Australia, in both the shorter and longer term. While the aim is not necessarily for arrangements and foster the trust and mutual respect on which they depend. the Defence Science and Technology Organisation to make a profit, it is important that, balanced over time and tasks, commercial activities should not be a significant net drain on allocated funds or scarce staff skills. National security considerations Defence Science and Regional Engagement and international defence data exchange agreements may also constrain the Organisation's commercial involvement. 12.26 Defence science and technology has an important role in regional defence cooperation, especially with the countries of South-East Asia. It provides a strong 12.23 The Defence Science and Technology Organisation's interaction with basis for closer contact on a wide range of defence issues and can be an important industry should not compromise its ability to provide an impartial evaluation of factor in defence industry collaboration. Australian and regional armed forces competitive tenders in future procurements. This requires careful management face comparable challenges in applying science and technology to their operating environments and this facilitates cooperation ----- 12.27 Many countries in the region are increasing their emphasis on technically 12.32 The Government will examine any special needs for scientific and advanced defence equipment, and there is also an increased commitment to regional technological support that multinational security operations might demand from security and shared strategic objectives. These factors, together with Australia's Australia, although it will be important to focus our contribution on areas which demonstrated achievements in applying research and development to local needs, also support our national defence needs. Thus, for example, work will continue on give us unique opportunities to pursue cooperative defence science activities with methods to counter land mines that are difficult to detect, as this is relevant to the our neighbours. The Agreement for Cooperation in Defence Science between defence of Australia and to multinational security and humanitarian operations. A Australia and Singapore is a good example of this. further consideration is that research and development in support of UN operations could be an important vehicle for international collaboration, including with our 12.28 Our ability to contribute to cooperative arrangements results from our regional neighbours. skills in supporting a high technology defence force designed largely for operations in the tropics. Many areas show promise for cooperation. Our contributions could 12.33 Finally, another area with potential for international scientific cooperation, include sharing our understanding of modern defence communications, including especially with the United States, concerns defence against ballistic missiles. Such electro-magnetic propagation in equatorial regions, the effect of tropical climates work would reflect the Government's policy of opposing the proliferation of such on degrading the materials used in modern defence equipment, and the fatigue weapons. management and life extension of military aircraft. The Government will continue to look for appropriate opportunities to cooperate in these and other areas. MANAGING CHANGE IN DEFENCE SCIENCE 12.29 In view of the importance of Australia's links with other nations, our commitments to various international agreements, and the need for a dynamic and 12.34 Over recent years there have been significant changes in our approach to innovative national support base, decisions on suitable areas for scientific defence science in Australia, and to the structure and management of the Defence cooperation will need to be made case by case. These decisions will take into Science and Technology Organisation. These include an increase in the number of account broad issues such as how important particular technologies are to the professional scientific staff in Defence, an enhanced level of interaction with industry effectiveness of Australia's and our prospective partners' forces; what benefits for and other Australian sources of research and development, the restructuring of the Defence and our wider national interests will accrue from cooperation in particular Organisation into a smaller number of laboratories and research and development areas; who the prospective partner in a cooperative venture is; whether the divisions, and significantly reduced expenditure on support areas, achieved in part technology in question has offensive or defensive applications; and whether the through the Commercial Support Program. These efficiency gains have been a technology is commercially sensitive. major achievement. 12.35 It is important that mechanisms be in place to facilitate further change, as **Support for Global Security** and when necessary, although not at such a pace as to discourage high-quality staff from seeking and maintaining their careers in defence science. The new 12.30 The Government's strong opposition to the proliferation of weapons of arrangements for setting research and development priorities will give confidence mass destruction, and its support for a range of multinational security operations, that defence science in Australia reflects our needs and is adapting to, and were affirmed in Chapter Ten. Defence science has an important contribution to anticipating, the changing environment, and that overall funding is appropriate. It make in both of these areas. will be important to embed and build on these mechanisms for setting and demonstrating priorities, relevance and productivity, including through improved 12.31 The Government has a modest program of research into defence against evaluative mechanisms for individual research tasks, assessing the expected benefits nuclear, biological and chemical weapons. The primary purpose of this work is to and outcomes within the framework of overall Defence policies and priorities. ensure a sufficient base of knowledge to allow the protection ofAustralian Defence Force personnel, including when they are deployed overseas in support of UN or 12.36 The Government expects the Defence Science and Technology other multinational operations. This work also allows the Defence Science and Organisation to continue to increase its involvement with industry and to seek Technology Organisation to support the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade overall improvements in productivity. The Organisation will also increase its on non-proliferation issues. interaction with the countries of our region, and sustain the benefits of interactions with our traditional friends and allies. ----- 12.37 To achieve these objectives, the Government will pay close attention to the needs of the Defence Science and Technology Organisation's staff, including their career and development needs. For its scientists and engineers in particular, it will aim to provide a professional and physical environment which is conducive to high personal performance, responsiveness, adaptability, scientific excellence and efficiency. In this way, the Government will ensure that defence science will be well positioned to provide the scientific and technological services on which 13.1 Successful management of our defence effort requires the closest possible our national security so critically depends, both now and for the future. engagement with the Australian community. It requires the support and commitment of the Australian people in peace, and even more in a time of emergency. That support takes many forms. First and foremost, our Australian Defence Force personnel are recruited from the Australian community and remain part of it. The Government therefore invests considerable effort in ensuring the community's awareness and understanding of the Australian Defence Force to ensure the continued availability of suitable recruits. Public understanding of and confidence in the Australian Defence Force in peace is also a means of ensuring the support of the community which would be essential for our defence effort in a time of conflict. 13.2 As outlined in the preceding Chapters, support from the industrial and commercial sectors is also essential to our defence efforts. This involves the manufacture and supply of essential goods and equipment by Australian industry; excellence in research and development skills which enable our defence effort to be adapted, possibly in significant ways, to respond to developments which could arise in the longer term; and the capacity to keep our force elements in the field with timely repair and maintenance. The Commercial Support Program initiated by the Government in 1992 aims to ensure greater involvement of commercial contractors in defence-related activities in peace and thus to strengthen the capacity to provide reliable and flexible logistic support in a time of conflict. 13.3 The Australian Defence Force is also dependent on civil infrastructure such as roads, airfields, ports and communications networks, and the people who manage and operate them. Civil communications bearers provide the backbone of the Defence network. Close interaction between Defence and key transport and communications organisations in peace provides the basis for a successful partnership in a time of conflict. To facilitate planning in this area, Memoranda of Agreement have been concluded with key transport organisations to ensure that important civil assets and infrastructure would be available in an emergency. 13.4 The management of our national effort during conflict would involve a range of Commonwealth and State agencies. The Government has mechanisms in place to ensure that this effort would be coordinated fully. Major defence exercises test and refine these arrangements by involving other agencies in planning and preparation. ----- _13.5 In the event of conflict, the Australian community could be a valuable_ source of assistance and information about developments in their local areas. Mechanisms are in place to ensure we can draw fully on the knowledge of local .. communities - for example, through the existence of the Regional Force Surveillance .,... ' .:'.. Units which have established close links with the people and organisations in **i** northern Australia. Navy's responsibility for control of shipping in a conflict and its use of Reserve personnel for this task establish important links in peace. Organisations such as Coastwatch are also an important source of surveillance information, and established links with Defence ensure it will be available in a time of emergency. As well, both Navy and Air Force have voluntary structures in place which enable members of the community to report items of interest to surveillance and intelligence authorities. SUPPORTING THE CIVIL COMMUNITY 13.6 The partnership between the Defence Organisation and the community not only ensures that vital support is available for our national defence effort in 13.9 Defence personnel also assist frequently with bushfire control measures peace and in times of need but also provides wider benefits to the Australian and flood relief in Australia. This type of assistance to the community is important community through activities such as emergency relief and counter-terrorist support. as it demonstrates the valuable contribution which the Defence Organisation can make in a time of national emergency. It also serves to establish important links with civil authorities which would be essential in the event of conflict. A further **Disaster Relief** benefit is the positive public image of the Organisation which is generated from such activity, aiding both recruitment and general support for Defence activities. 13.7 The Australian Defence Force is a body of well trained and disciplined people who can be deployed quickly to remote areas of the country - or overseas - and can sustain themselves for lengthy periods with integral logistic support. The Civil Defence Force possesses a substantial capacity to provide its own emergency accommodation, communications, transport by sea, air and road, and engineering 13.10 Within the Defence Organisation, Emergency Management Australia support. It thus has the capacity in peace to provide important backup to Australia's provides training and national policy coordination for the various State and Federal largely volunteer civil emergency organisations. bodies charged with responding to civil emergencies. It is currently developing a national policy for emergency management which emphasises coordinating 13.8 The Australian Defence Force has an impressive record of assisting the prevention and restoration rather than just the emergency response. Emergency civil community in major disaster relief. Military aircraft, ships and personnel are Management Australia is also responsible for coordinating Australia's approach to deployed to assist with the evacuation of civilians from devastated areas, to civil defence in times of conflict. It conducts exercises with the various agencies participate in critical clean-up operations and to provide emergency power, involved to maintain their levels of preparedness. communications and shelter. The Australian Defence Force has also frequently contributed to disaster relief efforts overseas and will continue to do so in the future, especially for areas in the South-West Pacific and South-East Asia which Search and Rescue are vulnerable to cyclones and earthquakes. 13.11 Defence capabilities are an important element of our national search and rescue effort. Defence has the capacity for sustained long-range sea and air patrols, surveillance and rescue activity in difficult and remote locations, and these resources are frequently committed to assist in civilian search and rescue, both in Australia and in our nearer region ----- Counter-Terrorism 13.15 Defence's surveillance capabilities also enable it to contribute in peace to the work of other Government agencies in the areas of fisheries, customs and 13.12 Australia has been affected less by terrorism than many other parts of the immigration. The Defence contribution in effect reduces the costs these agencies world. Nevertheless, significant isolated acts of terrorism have occurred here over would otherwise incur in undertaking these important national tasks. For example, the past two decades and, given the nature of terrorism, the speed of international the Jindalee Operational Radar Network is not only a valuable asset for defence travel and communication, and the burgeoning of activist movements around the tasks but can also make a significant contribution to customs detection of ships world, the possibility of terrorist acts on our territory can never be ruled out. High and aircraft approaching remote areas of our continent. While Defence assets are profile visitors, and events such as the Olympic Games in 2000, will require tasked effectively in particular fisheries, customs and immigration operations and heightened states of alert. in emergencies, the high operating and depreciation costs of Defence aircraft and ships makes them inappropriate for more routine tasking. 13.13 The Special Air Service Regiment maintains a highly respected capacity for counter-terrorist operations and works closely with State authorities in this area. Australia's training facilities for counter-terrorist operations are among the Other Support most sophisticated in the world. This enables us to offer some training opportunities to forces from neighbouring countries in areas such as responding to aircraft hijack. 13.16 The Defence Organisation provides valuable support to the Australian The Government would also consider offering counter-terrorist assistance to our community in a variety of other ways. Its provision of air traffic control and airfield neighbours in situations in which Australian nationals were involved. facilities at some airfields benefits civil air travellers. Mapping and charting work done by the Australian Defence Force is vital to merchant shipping, industry and the community at large. In its research and development of electronics, materials, Customs, Immigration and Fishing Zone Surveillance aeronautics, opto-electronics, oceanography and sensors, the Defence Science and Technology Organisation interacts strongly with the wider scientific community 13.14 While other Government agencies are responsible for customs, as well as with local industries. immigration and law enforcement in Australia's Fishing Zone, Defence provides significant support for these activities. For example, P3C aircraft and Fremantle 13.17 Should commercial transport be impracticable, the Australian Defence Class patrol boats carry out surveillance and interception of suspected illegal Force possesses the transport and other capabilities to assist in the evacuation of immigrants, fishing vessels and drug smugglers in support of other Government Australians caught up in natural disasters or civil disturbances overseas. agencies, and in close liaison with Coastwatch. 13.18 Defence Force bomb disposal experts are always available to assist civil authorities in dealing with suspected problems of unexploded ordnance. They have also provided assistance recently to dispose of Second World War ordnance in some Pacific Island nations. Funding Defence's Contribution to the Community 13.19 Elements of the Defence Organisation are frequently called upon to provide support for the civil community. Although Defence's record of responding is widely recognised and respected, the demands often involve significant costs, and at times risk diverting resources needed for defence tasks or for maintaining required levels of preparedness. Every effort will continue to be made to assist the community where practicable, though the Australian Defence Force is not able to meet all the requests it receives and those relating to non-emergency situations will often need to be declined. ----- 13.20 The Government will continue to commit significant defence resources munitions manufacture in Benalla, are some examples of the Government's efforts to high priority civil tasks where the Australian Defence Force's capabilities enable to encourage the geographic diversification of the national support base through it to make an important contribution, and where such contributions are not open- defence industry decisions. ended. Just as no financial reimbursement will be sought by Defence for this contribution, or for providing services such as customs surveillance, so the Defence 13.25 The Defence Organisation is also a leader in national training and Organisation will continue to be exempt generally from charges in relation to its education, providing not just specialist military capacities but a variety of skills use of infrastructure such as ports and roads. relevant in the wider community - including specialist technical training, pilots qualified for commercial airline operations, language skills and university education. Overall, the breadth of education and broadening of experience which the Defence CONTRIBUTING TO THE NATIONAL ECONOMY Organisation provides to many young people from all parts of Australia is an important source of trained people for the wider national economy. 13.21 The Defence Organisation provides many benefits to the community which go well beyond the direct employment of some 80,000 Australians and the indirect employment of many more. It provides an important contribution to local SUPPORTING WIDER INTERESTS IN THE REGION industry and to national training and development. 13.26 Defence links with Asia and the Pacific not only give us the capacity to 13.22 Over recent decades Defence has relied increasingly on Australian industry promote defence policy interests, but also to support many of Australia's wider for support. In 1994-95 the Government will spend some five billion dollars in national interests in the region. For example, Defence mapping and charting Australia on the purchase of defence goods and services, and major equipment and activities contribute to national and regional maritime trade interests, while facilities. As well as directly benefiting national industry, this investment provides assistance to neighbouring nations through disaster relief and the provision of opportunities for technology transfer from overseas and for the establishment of construction or other assistance contributes to Australia's standing as a responsible industries which are able to offer support for regional defence forces and the local nation. Defence can also bring material benefits to Australia including, for example, community (through spin-off applications). The major Naval projects for Collins by opening up substantial areas for cooperation in defence industry, and Class submarines, ANZAC frigates and patrol boats have been the backbone of opportunities for Australia to encourage international companies to regard Australia local ship-building, enabling that industry to compete for wider commercial and as a logical base for their regional activities. Economic links established in the defence opportunities in Australia and overseas. Major projects for trucks and defence sphere can also serve as a catalyst for wider engagement with our communications equipment have also been important for local industry, as have neighbours. various information systems projects. 13.23 Defence investment in facilities and housing provides over $850 million DEFENCE AND THE ENVIRONMENT annually to Australia's building industry, while continuous payments to major Australian transport, petroleum, aeronautical maintenance, marine maintenance, 13.27 Because of the nature of military operations, Australian Defence Force and telecommunications companies are also significant in national terms. activities can have an impact on Australia's natural environment. The Government is nevertheless strongly committed to Defence undertaking its operations and 13.24 The Government has indicated its intention to develop further Australia's activities in an ecologically responsible manner. As the Commonwealth's major industry and support base outside the traditional centres in the south-east of the land user, the Defence Organisation has specific responsibilities within the country, and Defence often leads this process of regional development. In north Commonwealth Decade of Landcare Plan. Environmental Management Plans are Queensland, the Northern Territory and Western Australia, the growing Defence developed for all Defence properties, with emphasis on sensitive training areas; presence is providing opportunities for growth in the local civil support bases. The Pollution Audits are performed at all Defence establishments; and each major major Army base near Palmerston and the Air Force base at Tindal in the Northern Defence facility project includes an environmental impact statement which also Territory, Jindalec Operational Radar Network installations in remote parts of identifies Aboriginal sacred sites and other heritage considerations. Australia, and major investment programs such as construction of submarines in Adelaide, patrol boats in Perth and minehunters in Newcastle, together with 13.28 Significant resources are devoted to controlling pollution from Australian Defence Force vessels at sea and to land management, particularly in the buffer ----- zones surrounding our training ranges and military bases. In feature areas such as around Sydney Harbour, Garden Island in Western Australia and the entrance to Port Phillip Bay, Defence has over several generations preserved a number of natural areas which might otherwise have been lost to the community. 13.29 The Defence record on the environment was endorsed in the recent report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Shoalwater Bay Training Area which concluded that natural and cultural heritage values in the area had been maintained overall. The Government has decided that the Australian Defence Force will have exclusive use of the area. At Stirling Naval Base, Defence works closely with the Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research Organisation and the Western Australian Department of Conservation and Land Management to manage an area of sensitive flora and fauna which is now being nominated for inclusion on the Register of the National Estate. At weapon firing ranges damage is unavoidable but is limited to small and carefully managed impact zones surrounded by large buffer areas which are carefully managed to protect flora and fauna in a natural environment. Defence also preserves a number of heritage buildings such as Victoria Barracks in Sydney and Melbourne. 13.30 The Defence Organisation also has a comprehensive Energy Management Plan which seeks to ensure efficient use of resources, elimination of waste and avoidance of damage to the environment. The plan seeks to implement Government policy for stabilising greenhouse gas emissions, in particular, by setting a goal of stabilising emissions of such gases by 2000 at the 1988 level, and of reducing emissions by a further 20 per cent by 2005. It is supported by corporate information management systems which maintain data on the level and nature of energy consumption, allowing progress to be monitored in achieving energy targets for buildings and commercial vehicles. 13.31 The equipment, organisational strength and personnel skills which Defence acquires and maintains to enable it to meet its responsibilities for defending Australia provide it with considerable capacity to respond to other national needs. These activities do not determine the force structure, but Defence's ability to undertake them demonstrates the versatility of its capabilities and its value to the community. ----- 14.1 A strong national defence force which can ensure the security of present and future generations ofAustralians must be paid for. Costs cannot be deferred in the false hope of making up ground if our situation deteriorates. The lead times to develop defence capabilities are far too long to permit us that luxury. Equally, the resources devoted to Defence must support a level of capability with which we could be confident of victory over aggression. The Government accepts this reality and the obligations which go with it. 14.2 Defence therefore represents a major financial commitment for the nation and the Government. The 1994-95 Defence Budget of $9,637 million constitutes about 8 per cent of Commonwealth outlays, and just over 2 per cent of Australia's Gross Domestic Product. Australians have a right to expect Defence to use this funding wisely. Defence recognises this expectation and has put in place a number of major reforms in recent years. These have involved major productivity increases throughout the Defence Organisation, including radical restructuring and substantial personnel reductions to minimise administrative and support overheads without reducing capabilities. With the savings generated it has been possible to continue the major defence investment program foreshadowed in **The Defence of Australia,** **1987, despite slightly reduced Defence spending in more recent years in response** to broader economic and budgetary pressures. 14.3 As strategic circumstances become more demanding, our Defence budget will come under increasing pressure. One indication of this is the trend in defence spending in our region. Defence spending has fallen sharply in many parts of the world and has been relatively constant in Australia, but in Asia it is growing in many countries by 5 per cent or more each year, and is likely to continue to do so. We will need to continue to develop our defence force structure to maintain the effectiveness of those capabilities which are vital to our security. 14.4 We will continue to seek further efficiencies, and expect they will cover some proportion of the additional demands on Defence, without additional funding. The scope for further efficiencies will decrease, however, as the more fruitful reforms are completed. Funding at present levels, even with further retained savings and efficiencies, will not support the program needed to maintain the effectiveness of our Defence capabilities. For the next few years defence expenditure at presently programmed levels will allow the plans and projects outlined in this White Paper to proceed. Beyond that, modest real increases in Defence expenditure will be ----- necessary to sustain the defence investment program needed to address obsolescence Figure 14-1: The Break-up of Defence Expenditure and to meet the technological demands of an increasingly sophisticated regional security environment. 100 90 _14.5 On present economic forecasts and strategic projections, the Defence_ 80 Personnel budget will not need to grow faster than the economy as a whole. Some modest real growth in Defence spending will, however, be needed later this decade and in 0 70 the following decade. Over this period, the Government plans that defence spending 60 will be sustained at approximately 2 per cent of Gross Domestic Product. @0>0 50 Operations .4- o2[C] 40 30 FUNDING DEFENCE CAPABILITIES 20 Investment 10 14.6 The types of capabilities Defence maintains are determined firstly, by our geography and secondly, by the types of capabilities which could credibly be 81/82 82/83 83/84 84/85 85/86 86/87 87/88 88/89 89/90 90j91 91/92 92/93 93/94 94/95 95/96 96/97 _9798_ used against us in our sea and air approaches and on our territory. As regional Financial Year force structures develop we will need to enhance our capabilities if we are to maintain the relative effectiveness of our Force. If we fail to make appropriate enhancements to the force structure, our capacity to defend Australia will be eroded. 14.10 The most significant element of investment is new major capital equipment, which absorbs about 20 per cent of the Defence budget. To the greatest 14.7 The major elements of any capability are our people, the training and extent possible, further real growth in the Defence budget will be devoted to this. preparedness achieved through operations, support and other activities, and our The costs of acquiring new high technology equipment are expected to continue to equipment and facilities. These give rise to the three principal categories of Defence increase. An important element of that increase will be the growing sophistication spending: investment, operations and personnel. In 1994-95, investment will of new equipment. account for about 28 per cent of Defence spending, personnel about 39 per cent, and operating costs about 33 per cent. These proportions are expected to remain 14.11 The force structure developments considered necessary for the defence broadly at these levels over the next five years. ofAustralia can be met with modest real growth in expenditure on major equipment over the next fifteen years. In the medium term, efficiency measures are unlikely to be adequate to fund such growth as staff remuneration will absorb most gains, Investment and hence some modest real growth in total Defence expenditure will be needed. 14.8 In the current strategic circumstances, the Government will continue to 14.12 In the longer term, investment pressures are expected to increase. By sustain a high level of investment in Defence equipment and facilities. This is about 2010, plans will need to be in place to maintain essential capabilities as a because these assets take many years to be acquired and brought into operational number of major Defence assets approach obsolescence, including the F/A-18, service, and hence we must continue to develop them even though conflict is unlikely Fill and P3 aircraft, and as other assets require upgrading, including the Jindalee in the short to medium term. Modest real growth will be needed to achieve the Operational Radar Network, Collins Class submarines and ANZAC frigates. Great program of investment set out in this White Paper. demands will be placed on Defence budgets at that time if essential capabilities are to be maintained. It is clearly not practicable to defer the investment proposed in 14.9 We need also to sustain a level of expenditure on personnel and operations this White Paper. On the contrary, we must continue to seek ways over the next which ensures we can maintain effective capabilities. For this reason, it is not fifteen years to reduce the investment bulge which is expected to emerge from practicable to sustain equipment and facility investment much above 28-30 per about 2010 - for example, by means such as the recent purchase ofFl 11G aircraft cent of the Defence budget without additional funding for specific initiatives. which will help to defer the need to replace the F 111 fleet. Investment spending has been sustained at around 28 per cent since 1987, having risen from below 20 per cent in the early 1980s (as shown in Figure 14-1). ----- 14.13 In recent years, investment in facilities has been given high priority to 14.16 In recent years, the Government has constrained administrative and develop defence infrastructure in northern and Western Australia, including support costs through initiatives such as the Commercial Support Program. We completing a network of northern airfields, relocating Army elements to the north will seek further savings through greater efficiency and productivity. These will and establishing two-ocean basing for the Navy, as well as improving housing for be directed towards off-setting the increasing costs of operations and personnel. Defence personnel. At present, facilities investment takes about _5 per cent of the_ Defence budget, but as projects are completed this level is expected to fall slightly later in the decade to around 4 per cent. Personnel 14.17 Personnel costs are and will remain the largest element of defence costs. To achieve cost-effective national defence, the Government implements measures to ensure the most efficient use of personnel. This has enabled personnel costs to be reduced from 60 per cent of the defence budget twenty years ago to under 40 per cent today. 14.18 On present estimates, efficiency measures in train since the **Force** **Structure Review, 1991 will reduce authorised average staffing levels, both** uniformed and civilian, by close to 12,000. Some $440 million in recurring annual expenditure will be freed by this process by 1997-98. 14.19 Further personnel related efficiencies will be sought, but the scope for significant funds to be redirected into capabilities will reduce as most substantial efficiency gains have already been made. Moreover, the demands of operating the new and more sophisticated equipment planned to enter service in coming years will increase the number of personnel needed in some areas and raise the per capita personnel costs as skill levels increase. Even where personnel numbers can be reduced further without detriment to capabilities, productivity-based pay increases are required to have first call on any such savings. Operations MANAGING DEFENCE RESOURCES 14.14 The operations element of the Defence budget covers all the costs of sustaining capabilities. This encompasses running costs for equipment and facilities, 14.20 Efficient and effective resource management is essential for a strong including fuel, repair and maintenance, ammunition and spare parts, as well as the national defence capacity. This is maintained through a rigorous process of review costs of administration, training and exercises, and increasing activities in support within the Defence Organisation's force development and materiel acquisition of alliances, regional relationships and other interests. processes and through the activities of the Defence Inspector-General, whose responsibilities include auditing defence financial processes, and the Australian 14.15 Operations, exercises and training are essential for maintaining effective National Audit Office. Efficiency is also achieved by careful forward planning. defence capabilities. The Australian Defence Force needs to sustain a sufficient This is necessary because the lead times to acquire major capabilities and integrate tempo of activity for it to operate effectively in peace and be prepared to defend them into the Force are long, and there is a need to commit funds to Australian Australia. Demands on operating funds will increase over coming years due to the industry well into the future for significant development projects such as submarines introduction of a range of new high technology assets - including submarines, and frigates. minehunters, ANZAC frigates, an airborne early warning and control capability and the Jindalee Operational Radar Network - and an increased Australian Defence 14.21 To assist Defence resource management, the Government has introduced Force presence in northern and Western Australia. carry-over provisions for Defence expenditure to recognise the fact that investment ----- projects do not always fall neatly within financial year boundaries. These provide CONCLUSION for carry-over of up to $100 million of planned expenditure on major capital equipment and facilities, and $30 million on other non-running cost activities, from 14.26 The Government recognises its obligation to protect Australians from one year to the next. Furthermore, if the Defence expenditure target is not achieved the threat or use of armed force, and is committed to paying the cost of such one year, this will no longer automatically result in a real reduction in the future protection. This cost is not high relative to our national wealth, and for as far Defence funding base. ahead as we can see with certainty it need not increase relative to that wealth. With only very modest real growth in Australia's Defence budget, we can maintain 14.22 As part of its budgetary arrangements, Defence receives supplementation the capabilities needed to protect our territory and direct interests in short-warning to meet a range of unforeseen or exceptional costs arising from Government conflicts. We can also maintain the adaptability to expand or redirect our efforts in decisions. In the last few years these have included participation in a number of future should more demanding circumstances emerge. The versatility inherent in peace operations, the construction of a Defence Signals Directorate facility at such a force will continue to provide adequate options for us to contribute to Geraldton, and the procurement of additional Fill aircraft. This supplementation important international interests. amounted to $116 million in 1991-92; $250 million in 1992-93; $86 million in 1993-94; and $46 million agreed to date in _1994-95._ Five Year Budget 14.23 The Government will provide Defence with a five year budget commitment, commencing in 1996-97. This will allow the Government to apply the required strategic vision, consideration of long-term trends and consistency to defence planning, and thus to optimise the value of its commitment to Defence expenditure of approximately 2 per cent of Gross Domestic Product. 14.24 The five year budget commitment will meet the need of Defence planning to be able to look well into the future and recommend long-term commitments with confidence. Major defence capabilities cannot be introduced quickly. It takes time to acquire equipment, to construct purpose-designed defence facilities and to train personnel. Time is essential also to develop and nurture our international relationships, and our national support base. By improving predictability of project timing and a more even flow of defence work, additional opportunities will be available for Australian industry to make the longer term investments to benefit from defence work. 14.25 The five year budget commitment will provide Defence with a more secure basis for long term planning of resource allocations. It will enable the programmed development of capabilities over the longer term in accordance with evolving strategic circumstances, the development of more cost-effective programs with industry, and more efficient personnel planning and management. ----- S.1 Defending Australia sets out the Government's approach to managing Australia's defence through the first decade of the next century. It explains how the Government's defence policy will respond to changes expected over the next fifteen years in our strategic environment, our national industrial and technological base, and our society. It reaffirms the Government's commitment to ensuring that in the decades ahead Australia will continue to be secure from military attack. S.2 Armed force will remain a significant factor in international affairs, and Australia must ensure that it cannot be successfully used against us. Ultimately, we must rely on our own armed forces to do this. While our strategic environment is not presently threatening, we must look now to our needs in 2010 and beyond because major defence capabilities take many years to develop. Moreover, maintaining a strong defence force helps to make conflict less likely, and contributes to Australia's international interests and standing. S.3 Our strategic environment will change over the next fifteen years under the influence of two major trends. One is the changing strategic postures and relationships of the major powers in Asia following the end of the Cold War. The other is economic change throughout Asia, which is increasing the military and strategic potential of countries in the region. As a result of these trends and of political change which can be expected in a number of countries, the strategic environment in Asia and the Pacific will become more fluid and complex, and military capabilities throughout our region will grow. Australia's strategic environment thus will become more demanding. S.4 The first priority of Australian defence policy is to build, maintain and support forces which are capable, without help from the combat forces of other countries, of defeating any attack which could credibly be mounted against Australia. This objective determines the way we structure and equip the Australian Defence Force. Our security from armed attack does not, however, depend on our defence capabilities alone. It depends also on maintaining a global and regional environment which makes the use of armed force against Australia less likely. Planning Defence Capabilities _S.5 Careful planning for the defence of Australia ensures that we have the_ level and mix of capabilities necessary for defence self-reliance. The posture and forces we require, now and in the future, are determined by our strategic geography and the nature and level of forces which could credibly be used against us. ----- S.6 Our planning focuses on capabilities rather than threats. We maintain Developing Defence Capabilities forces sufficient to ensure our defence against capabilities now in existence, or planned, which could credibly be brought to bear against us. The type of conflict S.12 The highly capable Collins Class submarines will enter service over the that could be sustained with these capabilities is called short-warning conflict. We next five years. Six submarines are considered appropriate to meet current and need to maintain forces to deal with short-warning conflict because we would not foreseeable needs. The priority for acquiring additional submarines will be reviewed have time to develop additional capabilities within the relatively short notice we after the commencement of the first five year Defence budget in 1996-97, taking would receive of the development of a motive or intention to attack Australia. into account Australia's strategic circumstances. Eight ANZAC frigates and the six coastal minehunters will also join the force. The Fremantle Class Patrol Boats S.7 The scale and intensity of short-warning conflict could range from small will be replaced and the FFG frigates upgraded. Additional maritime helicopters raids to larger and protracted operations. As sophisticated military equipment will be acquired. Consideration will be given to replacement early next century of becomes more widely available and the capacity of many countries to acquire and the capability provided by the DDGs. To accommodate these developments Navy operate military systems increases, the level of capability in the region and the regular personnel numbers will be increased marginally. potential demands of short-warning conflict will also increase. Our most important challenge over the next fifteen years will be to adapt our own forces to be able to S.13 An additional Regular infantry battalion will be raised over the next three meet these greater demands. to four years from within Army resources. It will have one Reserve company. The overall land force structure, including the Reserves, will be reviewed in _1995. An_ S.8 Our defence posture gives priority to making our sea and air approaches option to acquire surplus German tanks will not be taken up as it would not be an effective barrier to attack, and to ensuring that our forces are familiar with our cost-effective, but a range of additional ground vehicles will be acquired to increase northern operating environment and our equipment is optimised for conditions the mobility of infantry and reconnaissance units. The Kiowa helicopters will be there. We seek to exploit technology to monitor our territory and approaches and replaced and consideration will be given to acquiring additional helicopters to deny them to an adversary. We will continue to develop excellence in those enhance land force tactical mobility. capabilities which are needed most to give us the decisive edge in defending Australia. We will draw on every dimension of our defence effort, using our S.14 The CI3OE transport aircraft are being replaced now, and options will be geographical and technological advantages, our thorough understanding of the considered for replacing the airlift capability provided by the C130H. The P3C region and our diverse national support base, to provide a defence posture of great maritime patrol aircraft are about to undergo a major upgrade of their sensor suites, depth. and the F/A- 18 fighter fleet will be upgraded later this decade. The Macchi trainer will be replaced by 2000. The recent acquisition of F111G aircraft and major S.9 We give careful attention to the preparedness of our forces to undertake upgrade of the existing Fill fleet will ensure the strategic strike force remains and sustain operations. We hold sufficient forces at relatively high readiness levels effective well into the next century, although attention will be given to improving to deal with events that could arise with little warning. The force structured for the self-protection systems and precision weapons. An airborne early warning and defence of Australia has considerable versatility and provides options for control capability will be acquired after a project definition study is completed in undertaking a wide range of activities in support of wider defence and government _1995. Options for replacing the Caribou transport will be reviewed; both fixed and_ interests. rotary wing aircraft will be considered. S.10 While our planning focuses on short-warning conflict, it also considers S.15 Infrastructure development will continue over the next few years to those higher levels of conflict which could occur in the longer term. Our intelligence complete the air bases across north Australia; move Navy elements to Western capability provides us with timely warning of major developments in our region Australia; and move Army units to the Darwin area. A new field training area will and we maintain the adaptability to modify and expand our own forces relatively be acquired in northern Australia. rapidly if necessary. S.11 Constant improvement is required to maintain the relative level of Defence Personnel and Reserves capability of our forces. Priority areas for development include integrated command and control; reliable joint communications; effective broad area surveillance; and ## S.16 As differences in military technology narrow, the relative effectiveness enhancing the mobility, firepower and protection of our forces. of our capabilities will depend increasingly on the human factor - better ----- commanders, higher levels of skill, more individual initiative and more effective International Defence Interests teamwork. In developing the Australian Defence Force, the proficiency and expertise of all members of the Defence Organisation - military, civilians and S.21 Over the next fifteen years, the strategic environment in Asia and the contractors - will be a key to our effectiveness. Central to this is the melding of all Pacific is likely to be more demanding and to be determined, more than ever, by elements of the Australian Defence Force - Regular and Reserve; Navy, Army and the policies and approaches of regional countries themselves. Australia's Air Force; combat and support - into a Total Force. engagement with countries in Asia and the Pacific as a partner in shaping the strategic affairs of the region will thus become an increasingly important element in ensuring S.17 Service in the Defence Force imposes special demands on military our security. personnel and their families. The Government will continue to support housing, allowances and other conditions of service which recognise the special features of S.22 Australia will continue to foster a growing sense of shared strategic military service. Measures will also be pursued to ameliorate the disadvantages interests in the region. We will support actively the new multilateral and cooperative which frequent relocations impose on family life, particularly in relation to spouse approaches to security reflected in the ASEAN Regional Forum. Defence will employment and children's education. have an increasing role in these activities, particularly those related to transparency and confidence-building among defence forces in the region. S.18 With the emphasis given to broader national defence support, it is no longer appropriate to measure defence capacity by the number of uniformed S.23 The scope, content and quality of our activities with countries in South- personnel. The skills and professionalism of our personnel, however, are East Asia is changing to increase the emphasis on partnership and shared interests, fundamental to all our defence capabilities. In the longer term recruiting and including new levels of strategic dialogue. Australia's defence relationship with retaining enough high quality people for the Australian Defence Force will be a Indonesia is our most important in South-East Asia and a key element in Australia's major challenge as community attitudes to military service change. Consequently, approach to regional defence engagement. It is underpinned by a growing awareness a wide ranging review of personnel policies has been initiated to develop new of shared strategic interests and perceptions. Closer consultation on strategic and Defence Force personnel strategies for the future. defence issues will be increasingly important. Our defence relationships with Malaysia and Singapore continue to be valued highly, both bilaterally and in the S.19 Additional emphasis will be given to the role of Defence Reserve context of the Five Power Defence Arrangements. personnel. Reserves now have specific roles in defending Australia in short-warning conflict. To meet this need, individual training standards for Reserves will be S.24 Strategic trends in Asia and the Pacific will require Australia to attach similar to those of Regulars, and Reserve units will be better equipped and prepared. greater importance to defence contacts with the major countries in North-East Asia Arrangements for the transfer of personnel between Regular and Reserve elements and South Asia. We will aim to develop exchanges which provide greater mutual of the Force will be simplified, and more Regular personnel will be encouraged to knowledge of strategic perceptions and policies. We will seek a better understanding transfer to the Reserve rather than resign from the Australian Defence Force. of China's perceptions and intentions and an expanded dialogue with Japan on Reserve training depots and units will be consolidated to meet the demands of strategic issues and policy directions. Reserve collective training and to make better use of personnel, facilities and equipment. The Government will assess whether some depots which are no longer _S.25 The countries of the South-West Pacific are strategically important to_ required can be made available for use by community groups. Australia and we will continue to cooperate with them to help ensure their security. Australia's defence relationship with Papua New Guinea will continue to be our S.20 The Government will encourage a supportive employer environment and most substantial in the South-West Pacific. move to provide appropriate conditions of service during part-time training. The Government will also safeguard the financial interests of Reserves in the event of S.26 Our alliance with the United States remains a key element of our defence call-out. policy. We will continue to support US engagement in the Asia-Pacific region in ways which enhance long-term stability and security. We will further our collaboration with the United States in equipment, intelligence, science and technology, logistics and training. Each of these areas makes an important contribution to our defence posture. The Joint Defence Facilities will continue to serve the interests of both countries. ----- S.27 We value our alliance with New Zealand, and seek mutual benefits through S.32 A strong science and technology base relevant to our environment and Closer Defence Relations and a shared responsibility for the promotion of regional evolving military capabilities is also essential for national defence. The Defence security. We also continue to value and foster the links we have with other major Science and Technology Organisation provides a capacity to develop new systems countries, particularly traditional partners such as the United Kingdom and Canada. unique to our needs and to modify and maintain systems acquired overseas. Its own work program, and its strong links with other Australian scientific bodies, S.28 Australia supports and contributes to multinational peace operations. The Australian industry and overseas research and development organisations, will versatility of the Australian Defence Force will ensure that a sufficient range of ensure that Defence is well placed in the future to exploit developing technologies. options exists to enable us to contribute effectively to UN or other multinational operations. Decisions on our participation in such operations will be made on a S.33 Successful management of our defence effort requires the closest possible case-by-case basis against criteria which reflect our national interests. The Defence integration between Defence and the wider Australian community. The Australian Force contribution to those operations will lie mostly in our undertaking specialised Defence Force can undertake disaster relief and search and rescue for the civil tasks rather than in providing large forces. We will evaluate our contributions on community, and maintains specialist skills in counter-terrorist operations. It also qualitative grounds, including the adequacy of our overall national contribution to supports national efforts in areas such as customs, immigration and fisheries support of the United Nations. surveillance. S.29 Effective arms control measures contribute directly to our security. S.34 Defence also brings substantial benefits to the wider economy through Defence will play an important role in the development and monitoring of employment, training, the development of our national industry, science support arrangements which aim to limit the spread of weapons of mass destruction and and communications infrastructure, as well as the development of northern ballistic missiles. infrastructure. National Defence Support Funding Our Defence Effort S.30 Australia's national support base underpins all aspects of our national _S.35 A strong national defence force must be paid for. Lead times for the_ defence effort by developing defence equipment and facilities, training our people, development of defence capabilities are long and do not permit us to defer costs and sustaining our capabilities. A dynamic partnership between Defence and now in the hope of being able to make up ground when the situation deteriorates. Australian industry is essential to the continued strength of this base. Priority will be given to developing national capabilities to repair, maintain and modify defence S.36 Although the Defence budget has declined in recent years, Defence has systems - particularly in areas such as communications, software, sensors and sustained its investment program with savings generated from major reforms and electronic warfare - and to important technologies relevant to our environment and productivity increases. The scope for further savings is decreasing, however, and strategic circumstances. Defence expenditure on goods, services and major our strategic circumstances are becoming more demanding. Thus, while on present equipment will continue to be directed predominantly to Australian industry, and economic forecasts and strategic projections our Defence budget will not need to to securing reliable sources of through-life support. grow faster than our Gross Domestic Product, some modest real growth will be needed later this decade and in the following decade. Over this period, the S.31 Mechanisms will be introduced to encourage long-term relationships Government plans that defence spending will be sustained at approximately 2 per between Defence and industry, and to avoid unnecessary costs in tendering and cent of Australia's Gross Domestic Product. related acquisition processes. The Commercial Support Program will continue to increase the role of Australia's commercial sector in providing services to Defence, S.37 To be most efficient and effective, Defence planning must be able to look leading to greater efficiency in Defence support and freeing valuable military well into the future and make long-term commitments. Such planning depends personnel to work in combat-related areas. The Government will also promote the critically on confidence in future resource allocations. Commencing in 1996-97, export of defence goods by Australian industry, within clear export control the Government will therefore provide Defence with a five year budget commitment. guidelines. ----- 1. This Appendix describes each of the major elements of the Defence Organisation, which work together to ensure a one team approach to national defence under the joint leadership of the Chief of the Defence Force and the Secretary, Department of Defence. The major elements of the Organisation include the Force Executive Program, the Royal Australian Navy, the Australian Army, the Royal Australian Air Force, the Strategy and Intelligence Program, the Acquisition and Logistics Program, the Budget and Management Program and the Science and Technology Program. FORCES EXECUTIVE PROGRAM 2. The Forces Executive Program consists of the Headquarters Australian Defence Force, as well as senior Defence colleges, the Australian Defence Force Academy, Defence Recruiting and other organisations such as Emergency Management Australia. 3. The Chief of the Defence Force provides advice to the Government on military operational matters and exercises day-to-day strategic command of the Australian Defence Force. Some 560 civilians and on average, 2,090 military personnel from all three Services are employed in the Forces Executive Program. (These military personnel are included in the total numbers of their respective Services.) The Forces Executive Program includes key Headquarters functions such as the development of military strategy and concepts, force development, guidance and doctrine for the conduct of operations, and personnel policy and management. Within the Headquarters, the Vice Chief of the Defence Force, as the principal staff officer to the Chief of the Defence Force, is Chief of Staff of the Headquarters and has policy responsibility for the Forces Executive Program. 4. Operational forces are under the overall command of the Chief of the Defence Force, through the joint commanders based in the Sydney area - Maritime, Land and Air - or the Commander Joint Forces Australia or Lead Joint Forces Commander when appointed. Selected force elements also can be placed under the command of Northern Command located in Darwin or a deployable joint force headquarters based upon assets maintained by Headquarters I Division. ----- THE ROYAL AUSTRALIAN NAVY THE AUSTRALIAN ARMY 5. Under the command of the Chief of the Naval Staff, Navy is responsible 7. Under the command of the Chief of the General Staff, the Army is for providing naval elements of the Defence Force. The main fleet operating bases responsible for providing land elements of the Defence Force. The combat forces are located in Sydney and at HMAS Stirling, the Fleet Base West near Fremantle, of Army are located primarily in the Townsville, Brisbane and Sydney areas, though which will also be the base for the new submarines. Patrol and hydrographic ships the number in the Darwin area is increasing progressively. Large training are also based at Cairns, Darwin, Fremantle and Sydney. Most fleet support and establishments exist across Australia, and there is a strong Reserve presence in operational training facilities and the Naval Air Station are located in Sydney and many communities. The total personnel strength of Army at 30 June 1994 was in the Nowra-Jervis Bay area, though a major training base is at Western Port, 26,347 Regulars, 2,462 Ready Reserves, 26,450 General Reserves - including 3,608 Victoria. At 30 June 1994, Navy had a strength of 14,776 permanent service with no training obligation - and 5,671 civilian personnel. personnel, 4,957 Reserves - including 108 Ready Reserves and 3,528 Reserves with no training obligation - and 4,248 civilian staff. The main fleet elements as at 8. Major operational assets in Army at 30 June 1994 are listed in Figure A- 30 June 1994 are listed in Figure A- 1. 2. Major combat elements of Army are listed in Figure A-3. Many combat and logistic support elements are composite units employing both Regular and Reserve personnel. Developments in progress will add a fifth infantry battalion to Army's **Figure A-i: Major Navy Operational Elements** combat force, which will be an integrated Regular/Reserve unit. - 11 destroyers and frigates (3 DDGs, 6 FFGs and 2 River Class destroyer Figure A-2: Major Army Operational Assets escorts) - 4 Oberon Class conventional submarines - 15 Fremantle Class patrol craft - 103 Leopard 1A3 tanks - 7 mine countermeasures vessels (2 inshore minehunters and 5 - 771 M113 armoured vehicles minesweeper auxiliaries) - 15 LAV-25 armoured vehicles - I heavy landing ship and S heavy landing craft - 246 M2A2/L5 105mm Howitzers - 2 under-way replenishment ships - 104 Hamel 105mm Howitzers - 16 S70132 Seahawk multi-role helicopters - 33 M-198 155mm medium guns - 7 Sea King medium utility helicopters - 31 Rapier surface-to-air missile systems - 6 AS3 SOB Squirrel and 3 Bell 206B Kiowa light utility helicopters - 19 RBS-70 surface-to-air missiles - 2 HS748 electronic warfare training aircraft - 22 N22 and N24 Nomad light transport aircraft - 2 hydrographic survey ships, 4 survey motor launches and 1 F27 - 38 S70A-9 Blackhawk helicopters hydrographic survey aircraft - 45 Bell 206B-1 Kiowa helicopters - 2 clearance diving teams - 25 Bell UT-J-1H Iroquois helicopters - 18 AS-350B Squirrel helicopters - 4 CH47-D Chinook helicopters 6. Developments in progress will add a number of important assets, notably - 15 Medium Landing Craft eight ANZAC frigates, six Collins Class submarines, six Huon Class Coastal Minehunters and two heavy landing ships which are to be modified, while some older ships will be decommissioned. ----- Figure A-3: Major Army Operational Elements .3 Field Artillery Regiments with 105mm Howitzers .4 Independent Field Artillery Batteries with 105mm Howitzers .1 Medium Artillery Regiment with 155mm guns **Regular** - 1 Field Engineer Regiment and 1 Engineer Support Regiment **• I Divisional and 2 Brigade Headquarters** - 2 Construction Regiments - 1 Armoured Regiment Headquarters and I Leopard Tank Squadron .3 Field Engineer Squadrons and 1 Divisional Engineer Support Squadron - 1 Reconnaissance Regiment with M113 and LAV-25 armoured vehicles - 1 Signals Regiment - 1 Armoured Personnel Carrier Squadron with Ml 13 armoured vehicles Independent Signals Squadrons - 1 Field Artillery Regiment with 105mm Howitzers _.5_ 14 Infantry Battalions - 1 Medium Artillery Regiment with 155mm guns .3 Regional Force Surveillance Units - I Divisional Locating Battery (Integrated with General Reserves) .1 Commando Regiment - 1 Air Defence Regiment (Integrated with Ready Reserves) with Rapier surface-to-air missiles - I Air Defence Battery (Integrated with Ready Reserves) with RBS70 surface-to-air missiles - 2 Combat Engineer Regiments and Workshops THE ROYAL AUSTRALIAN AIR FORCE - 2 Construction Squadrons - 4 Signals Regiments 9. Under the command of the Chief of the Air Staff, Air Force is responsible - 8 Independent Signals Squadrons for providing major air elements of the Defence Force. Air Force operates from - 4 Infantry Battalions ten active air bases and two major ground training bases around Australia, and - 1 Special Air Service Regiment periodically from two otherwise unmanned northern air bases - three with the - I Aviation Regiment with Iroquois, Kiowa and Nomad aircraft completion later this decade of Scherger Air Base on Cape York. At 30 June 1994, - 1 Aviation Regiment with Blackhawk, Iroquois and Chinook aircraft the Air Force comprised 17,807 Regular personnel, 4,419 Reserves - including - I Army Survey Regiment 199 Ready Reserves and 2,967 with no training obligation - and 2,232 civilian staff. The major operational elements of Air Force at 30 June 1994 are listed in **Ready Reserve** Figure A-4. **• 1 Brigade Headquarters** - 2 Ground Reconnaissance Squadron with M113 armoured vehicles - 1 Tank Squadron with Leopard Tanks Figure A-4: Major Air Force Operational Elements * - I Field Artillery Regiment with 105mm Howitzers - 1 Combat Engineer Regiment and Workshop - I Independent Signals Squadron **Tactical Fighter Group** - 3 Infantry Battalions 3 Tactical Fighter Squadrons with 52 F/A-18 aircraft - 1 Tactical Fighter Operational Conversion Unit with 18 F/A- 18 aircraft **General Reserve** 1 Lead-in Fighter Training Squadron with 16 Macchi MB326H and 2 **• 1 Divisional and 7 Brigade Headquarters** PC9A aircraft - I Tank Squadron with Leopard Tanks - 1 Conversion Training Squadron with 14 Macchi aircraft - 2 Reconnaissance Regiments with Ml 13 armoured vehicles - I Air Defence Radar Wing - I Reconriaissance/APC Regiment with M113 armoured vehicles - 1 Aircraft Maintenance Wing - 1 APC Regiment with Ml 13 armoured vehicles - 1 Reconnaissance Squadron with Ml 13 armoured vehicles **Strike/Reconnaissance Group** - 2 APC Squadrons with M113 armoured vehicles **• 2 Strike/Reconnaissance Squadrons with 17 Fill C, 15 Fill G and 4** RF Iii C aircraft, including operational level maintenance. ----- THE ACQUISITION AND LOGISTICS PROGRAM **Maritime Patrol Group** **• 2 Maritime Patrol Squadrons and 1 Maritime Patrol Training Squadron** 12. This Program is responsible for procurement of major capital equipment with 19 P3C aircraft and facilities for Defence, and for logistic policy. It also provides policy advice to 1 Aircraft Maintenance Squadron Government on defence industry matters, including exports and materiel cooperation with other countries. **Airlift Group** **• 1 Long-range Transport/In-flight Refuelling Squadron with 5 Boeing 707** 13. The Acquisition and Logistics Program employs some 1,825 civilians aircraft and on average some 560 military personnel from all three Services, based primarily 2 Medium-range Transport Squadrons with 12 C130E and 12 C130H in Canberra, though including some representatives around Australia and overseas. Hercules aircraft (These military personnel are included in the total numbers of their respective - 2 Special Transport Squadrons with 5 Dassault 900 Falcon and 10 H5748 Services.) aircraft - 2 Tactical Transport Squadrons with 14 CCO8 Caribou aircraft - 1 Aircraft Maintenance Squadron THE BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT PROGRAM **Operational Support Group** 14. This Program is responsible for developing policies on financial and **• 2 Airfield Defence Squadrons** personnel management, program evaluation, audit, legal matters and security and - 1 Operational Support Unit providing related services, including the coordination of the Defence Budget and a - 1 Air Transportable Telecommunications Unit range of computing services. 15. The Program employs some 2,700 civilian and on average, some 320 - Note: One fighter squadron also has two Nomad aircraft for logistic support; one military staff from all three Services. Most are located in the Defence centres in B707 is for special transport while the other four are special transport/in-flight each capital city. (These military personnel are included in the total numbers of refuelling tanker aircraft. their respective Services.) THE STRATEGY AND INTELLIGENCE PROGRAM THE SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY PROGRAM 10. This Program employs some 1,005 civilians and on average, some 800 16. This Program is based on the Defence Science and Technology military personnel from all three Services. (These military personnel are included Organisation, which employs some 2700 civilians and on average some 20 military in the total personnel numbers of their respective Services.) It provides international personnel. (These military personnel are included in the total numbers of their and force development policy advice to Government, as well as managing the respective Services.) Staff are located in major laboratories headquartered in program of new major equipment investment. It also manages the Defence Melbourne (Aeronautical and Maritime Research), and Adelaide (Electronics and Cooperation Program with regional nations, including such activities as the provision Surveillance Research), with smaller research groups around Australia and a central of Pacific Patrol Boats to Pacific Island countries. office in Canberra. 11. The Strategy and Intelligence Program also includes the Defence 17. The Defence Science and Technology Organisation provides advice on Intelligence Organisation and the Defence Signals Directorate, both now based in the application of science and technology best suited to Australia's defence and Canberra, which provide intelligence to the Defence community and other security needs. It conducts research in a wide variety of defence-relevant fields, Government agencies, and participate in Government national intelligence focusing on areas which are unique or otherwise central to national self-reliance. assessment processes. ----- ----- ----- **12OE I 400** **lOSSIAH16OE** _I_ _A :._ _\_ **40N 7** _I_ _I_ NOR TH KOREA _\_ **40N** **18O** E AN CA H **NEPAL .** **ilTAN** _NMN3HLIN4_ `- - TAIWAN` **NA** **ID K** TFil4 **2O N** **HIAAFIANA** 2ON LAOSPAHATEL **THE** maineISLANDS **PHILIPPINES** **-.** **VETNAJ.** H **A11AMAH** ``` ISLANDS ``` `WOBARA1il` -. `SFRATLYISLANDS` **.'I** FEDERATED STATES `ISLANDS` SHIP LAHI(A `VIM` `p"` `KWAONESA` ,M A1 A YS I A PACIFIC OCEAN - KINiAIS SIk 's ' [P] **NA** `0.` **I N A AN E A I A** **'PAPUA"NEW** `0.` **-GUINEA** **SOLOWN** .A-ilTMAS ISIAND CQS ISIHAil.LAUSTI (1551) T55ELAA. ['DWPA] - , TUVALU VANUATU INDIAN OCEAN WESTERN - **SASA A15** AUSTRALIA **H,** **NiW-:-** **TOW** CAJAWIiA Nil Brisbane **2OS** Perth 7,1 [Syy] **L** ___ `NNORMf` `amus` **20 S** **-** **T7 AIaide** CAHbeera **IAWTI** ,T4bart 7 SEW USALAHI'' SOUTHERN OCEAN **4OS** **4O S** KAN `\` ^ **f^USTJRAND** ``` HEARD ISLAND ``` 11551) **60** ***S** - **'II'** **18CC** **1OE** **14OE** Directorate of Publishing Defence Centre - Canberra DPUBS: 12065/94 ``` ILA ``` -----