**j)** **information**
**paper**

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENCE

**THE DEFENCE OF**
## AUSTRALIA
E --

**1987**


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Department of Defence

**THE DEFENCE OF**
**AUSTRALIA**
1987

Presented to Parliament by the Minister for Defence
the Honourable Kim C. Beazley, M.P.

March 1987

Australian Government Publishing Service
Canberra 1987


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450 Submarine force 44 6.9 Low level conflict 76
4.52 Maritime air operations 45 6.11 Higher level conflict 76
4.55 Mine countermeasures force 45 6.15 Reviews 77
4.59 Amphibious forces 46 6.16 Priorities for local sourcing 77
4.60 Afloat support 46 6.23 Defence assistance to industry 78
4.63 Naval infrastructure 47 6.26 Defence purchasing 79
4.68 Air Warfare 49 6.34 Australian industry involvement 80
4.69 Air defence and the tactical fighter force 49 6.39 Exports 81
4.75 Land based surface-to-air missiles 50 6.42 International collaboration 81
4.78 Strategic transport 51 6.45 Defence industry structure policies 82
4.79 Northern airfield infrastructure 51 6.46 Competition for defence contracts 82
4.82 Land Warfare 53 6.48 Ownership of machinery and facilities 82
4.85 1 Division 53 6.50 Australian ownership control and influence 82
4.91 Protection of vital assets 55 6.52 Government factories and dockyards 83
4.92 Regional Force Surveillance Units 55 6.58 Industry and some major procurements 84
4.93 Northern basing 56 6.60 Indigenious design and development projects 84
4.97 Offensive air support 57 6.67 Local development and production programs 86
4.98 Battlefield helicopters 57 6.76 Local production of overseas designs 87
4.100 Army aviation 57

6.85 Defence work in Australian industry 89

4.101 M113 light armoured fighting vehicles 59
4.102 Mechanisation 59 **Chapter seven-Defence personnel** 90
4.103 Tanks 59 7.3 The regular component of the ADF 91
4.104 Artillery 59 7.5 Women in the ADF 91
4.106 Rationalisation of the Reserve structure 59 7.8 Reserve Forces 92
4.108 Tactical air transport 60 7.10 Civilians in defence 93
4.109 Command, control and communications 60 7.12 Pressures on the defence personnel resource 93
4.116 Summary-The ADF and its development 62 7.14 A personnel resource strategy 94
Command, control and communications 62 7.17 Retention 94
Navy 62 7.21 Conditions of service 96
Army 63 7.21 Defence Force Remuneration Tribunal 96
Air Force 64 7.24 Defence Force Advocate 96

7.25 Superannuation and Defence Force Retirement and Death Benefits 97

**Chapter five-Supporting the Defence Force-infrastructure, logistics,** 7.27 Defence housing 97
**science and technology** 65 7.29 Supporting service families 97
5.2 Infrastructure and logistics 65

**Chapter eight-Resources and programming** 99

5.3 Infrastructure planning 65

8.4 Wider economic consideration in defence funding 99

5.9 Defence infrastructure and the community 67

8.8 Defence spending overseas 102

5.13 Logistics 67

8.12 The Five Year Defence Program 102

5.19 External logistic support 68

8.15 Recent trends in Defence expenditure 103

5.22 Science and technology 69

8.19 The years ahead 105

5.24 Technology and the Defence Force 69

8.20 Capital equipment 105

5.32 The Defence Science and Technology Organisation 70

8.22 Capital facilities 105

5.36 The technology base 71

8.24 Personnel 105

5.38 DSTO program 71

8.27 Operating costs 109

5.42 Technology transfer to industry 73
5.44 International collaboration 73 **Chapter nine-Conclusions**
5.46 Government review of DSTO 73
5.50 Self-reliance and support of the ADF 74

**Chapter six-Defence and Australian industry** 75
6.2 Industry and defence 75
6.8 Industry involvement and levels of conflict 76

iv V


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**Preface**

The Australian people expect that Australia shall be able to defend itself. The
Australian Government accepts its duty to provide Australia with defence forces
able to meet that expectation. This Paper sets the course for a decade of
development towards self-reliance in the defence and security of Australia.

For Australia, defence self-reliance must be set firmly within the framework of
our alliances and regional associations. The support they give us makes self-
reliance achievable. They, in turn, will draw added support from a self-reliant
Australia, which will be better able to discharge its responsibilities in the vast
strategic region to which we belong.

Beyond our strategic region—itself an area covering one-quarter of the
Earth's surface—defence self-reliance is based firmly upon Australia's place as a
respected and self-respecting member of the Western community.

Self-reliance as a goal is based on a realistic assessment of our strengths,
as well as on a rigorous appraisal of our weaknesses and deficiencies. It draws
on the skilful mobilisation of Australia's resources—physical, financial
and human.

The Australian Government's policy of self-reliance in defence requires both a
coherent defence strategy and an enhanced defence capacity. This Paper defines
the strategy and details the program to increase our capacity.

This program is the largest defence capital investment in Australia's
peacetime history. Over 33 per cent of the defence budget is now devoted to
long term investment—a major increase since the early 1980s. This share will
continue to be high throughout the decade.

The first aim of defence self-reliance is to give Australia the military capability
to prevent an aggressor attacking us successfully in our sea and air approaches,
gaining a foothold on any part of our territory, or extracting concessions from
Australia through the use or threat of military force.

This wider concept of self-reliance rejects the narrow concept of 'continental'
defence. The strategy on which self-reliance is based establishes an extensive
zone of direct military interest.

Self-reliance means defence in depth. It gives priority to meeting any credible
level of threat in Australia's area of direct military interest. It means that any
potential adversaries know that they will be faced with a comprehensive array of
military capabilities, both defensive and offensive.

To be self-reliant the Australian Defence Force must be able to mount
operations to defeat hostile forces in our area of direct military interest. To do
that we must have forces able to track and target an adversary and able to
mount sea and air operations throughout the area. It means having a

VI


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p g p , g , Our formidable long range detection and strike capabilities would make it
countermeasures and the protection of coastal trade. We must have mobile land difficult to land major forces on Australia's shores. But should any hostile forces
forces able to meet and defeat armed incursions at remote locations. land on Australian territory they would be met by a highly mobile army.

Clearly, any hostile force must attempt to advance in ships or aircraft. The Army's Operational Deployment Force, based at Townsville, can deploy
Accordingly, the program gives priority to the air and sea defences in our area rapidly across northern Australia to meet any land incursion. Its mobility and
of direct military interest. Australia is now establishing a multilayered detection capability will be greatly enhanced by large numbers of state-of-the-art
system which will transform our defence strategy. Blackhawk helicopters.

We have developed in Australia the world's most advanced long range radar, Even more importantly, the Government has decided—for the first time in
the Jindalee Over–the–Horizon Radar. A system of up to three new stations is peacetime—to strengthen our northern defences by basing major elements of
being planned to allow around the clock surveillance of Australia's vast northern the Australian Army permanently in northern Australia. A fast-moving cavalry
approaches. regiment of 340 men and associated vehicles is being based in the Darwin area,

and eventually the Army presence may grow to a full brigade.

Early detection of threats allows an early response. Australia's long range
strike capabilities are being developed to respond—quickly and lethally—to early The Army is studying innovative solutions to the military challenges which
warnings far from Australia's shores. These include both air and naval forces. these units will face in our north, including new-generation armoured fighting

vehicles suited to Australia's huge distances and harsh conditions.

Australia's surface and submarine naval forces are undergoing the most
dramatic expansion in peacetime history. The Army will be deployed to meet any landing in the north, wherever it

should occur. Other forces will secure key military, economic and civilian areas

The Navy's fleet of major surface combat ships will be expanded from twelve

with Reserves playing a major role.

to sixteen or seventeen by developing and building a new class of warship with
the range and armament to operate throughout our area of direct military Development of the Defence Force to include all these capabilities is planned
interest and beyond. Eight of these ships will be built over the next ten years, for the next ten to twenty years. It will significantly enhance our ability to meet
to serve with the destroyers and frigates now with the fleet or being built. any threat capable of being mounted with little warning in our region.
Australia will also acquire six new submarines, with the most advanced

In this way, Australia's combined air, land and sea forces can secure our

underwater combat systems in the world.

continent against any possible aggressor. Equally, those forces will have the

The Royal Australian Navy will be established as a two ocean Navy. For the capacity to support regional security too. They will be well-suited to supporting
first time in peacetime a major portion of the Navy's surface and submarine Australia's regional role. Long range ships, submarines and aircraft, and highly
fleet will be based in Western Australia. mobile ground forces, will enable us to play our proper role in the region, and, if

necessary, beyond it.

In the air our long range strike forces will comprise squadrons of F-1 11 long
range bombers and F/A-118 multirole aircraft, and our P3C Orions. In all, over Thus self-reliance achieves the four fundamental objectives of Australia's
one hundred of these aircraft will be armed with the Harpoon anti-ship missile, national and international defence policy.
and our multirole F/A-118 aircraft will carry the Sidewinder and Sparrow air-to-air

It maintains and develops our capacity for the independent defence of

missile and a range of other smart weapons.

Australia and its interests. It promotes strategic stability and security in our

The effectiveness of the F/A-118s for long range missions is being greatly region. It strengthens our ability to meet the mutual obligations we share with
enhanced by the Government's decision to provide aerial refuelling. We are also our chief allies, the United States and New Zealand. It enhances our ability, as a
completing a comprehensive network of air bases in the north to support these member of the Western association of nations, to contribute to strategic
operations. stability at the global level.

One squadron of F/A-118s will be based permanently at a major airbase being Self-reliance is a task involving the whole nation. Australia's greatest resource
built at Tindal, inland from Darwin. A bare airbase exists at Learmonth, Western is the skill of its people.
Australia, another is being built at Derby in north-west Western Australia, and a

Recognising the vital role played by the men and women in Australia's

third is planned on the Cape York Peninsula.

Defence Force, increasing attention is being given to improving personnel

Australia's long range forces are also capable of striking land targets such as management practices, recruitment and training policies, living and working
enemy bases and force concentrations. The F-11 1s are a central element of our conditions, and to sustaining conditions of service and superannuation benefits
Iandstrike forces, and the Government is examining a major upgrade of these in keeping with community standards.
aircraft to improve their capabilities. Submarines, F/A-118s and surface ships also

As part of the new relationship with industry, information on defence

have the potential to mount long range strikes.

viii ix


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Australian firms will be prime contractors on major projects and Australianrequirements will be provided to industry at an early stage. Wherever possible Chapter one
industry involvement will be a major factor in selecting new equipment.

**Australia's defence policy**

Australian industry will be called upon to involve itself more intensively in the
support, maintenance and development of Australia's Defence Force. Benefits to
industry in peace will be returned as increased capability in time of hostility.

One major beneficiary will be the shipbuilding industry. Over the next ten **1.1** This Government's policy of defence self-reliance gives priority to the
years, Australian companies will be offered leading roles in the largest naval ability to defend ourselves with our own resources. Australia must have the
shipbuilding program in Australia's peacetime history, valued at over $7 billion. military capability to prevent an enemy from attacking us successfully in our sea
Beyond the shipbuilding industry, all Australians will benefit from the balance of and air approaches, gaining a foothold on our territory, or extracting political
payment gains of building our own ships rather than importing them. concessions from us through the use of military force. These are uniquely

Australian interests and Australia must have the independent military capability

It must be emphasised that self-reliance does not mean self-sufficiency.

to defend them.

Australia's access to the highest level of technology remains one of the most
important benefits of our alliance with the United States. Nevertheless, this **1.2** This policy of defence self-reliance is pursued within a framework of
Paper sets out a comprehensive program to enable Australian industry to make alliances and agreements. The most significant of these is with the United
a direct contribution to our defence self-reliance. States. We share a defence relationship with New Zealand which is of basic

importance. We have other important arrangements with Papua New Guinea and

Self-reliance was foreshadowed in the last policy information paper on

with the United Kingdom, New Zealand, Malaysia and Singapore in the Five

defence published ten years ago. The 1976 White Paper, however, failed to give

Power Defence Arrangements. Whilst not the subject of any specific security

substance or direction to the concept. This Policy Information Paper does so. It

undertakings, important defence activities take place with other nations in the

sets clear goals for the Australian Government, its defence advisers and

South-West Pacific and South-East Asia.

planners and for the Australian Defence Force itself.

**1.3** These arrangements, particularly those with the United States, enhance

This Paper provides the comprehensive overall approach to Australian security

self-reliance by improving our technological capabilities, by providing training

that will be the basis for responsible defence planning in future years. It sets

opportunities for our armed services, and by giving Australia access to vital

out, step by step, how this self-reliance will be achieved. The concept of self-
reliance can now become a reality. military and political intelligence. The security provisions of our alliance

agreements also oblige a potential enemy to contemplate the prospect of an
allied effort against it should it choose to attack Australia. These arrangements
emphasise Australia's membership of the Western strategic community, and
they enhance regional stability. The interests of Australia's allies and regional
associates are advanced by Australia's ability to provide for its own defence.

1.4 That aspect of Government defence policy which establishes a
relationship between defence self-reliance, alliance obligations and regional
commitments is set out in this chapter.

**Self-reliance**

1.5 Australians have a right to expect that their nation is able to defend

#### I (14
_Z-_ itself. That is at the core of nationhood, and has long been an Australian

aspiration. The exercise of authority over our continent and off-shore territories,
our territorial sea and resource zones, and airspace, and the ability to protect

KIM C. BEAZLEY our maritime and air approaches, is fundamental to our sovereignty and security.
March 1987 **1.6** In Australia's case this is a daunting task, considering the vastness and

harshness of our territory, the length of our coastline, the size of our fishing
and resource zones, the distance from the mainland of our off-shore territories,

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the great expanses of water that surround us, and the disproportionately small developments in these areas, and our broader defence policy must be responsive
size of our population. to such developments.

1.7 The Governments defence policy is to develop self-reliant solutions to 1.12 The physical characteristics of our area of direct military interest
our unique strategic circumstances. These are set out in this Paper. They are demand a defence force with range, endurance, and mobility, and independent
the product of rigorous and disciplined analysis of the force structure logistic support. The Government gives priority to this area in contingency
requirements needed to defend ourselves from direct threats to our sovereignty planning for the Australian Defence Force (ADF). The activities of the ADF will
and vital national interests. continue to focus on this area to develop its familiarity with potential areas for

1.8 Self-reliance is not a new theme in Australian defence planning. It has military operations.
been a central tenet of our defence posture since the end of our Vietnam
commitment. And it was identified as a primary requirement in the last policy
information paper on defence, the 1976 White Paper, where it was stated that:

**Alliances and regional commitments**

In our contemporary circumstances we no longer base our policy on the
expectation that Australia's Navy or Army or Air Force will be sent abroad to fight
as part of some other nation's force, supported by it. We do not rule out an Australia and the United States
Australian contribution to operations elsewhere if the requirement arose and we

1.13 Australia is part of the Western community of nations. Australia

felt that our presence would be effective, and if our forces could be spared from

therefore supports the ability of the United States to retain an effective

their national tasks. But we believe that any operations are much more likely to be

strategic balance with the Soviet Union. A redistribution of power in favour of

in our own neighbourhood than in some distant or forward theatre, and that our

the Soviet Union in the central balance, or an extension of Soviet influence in

Armed Services would be conducting Joint operations together as the Australian
Defence Force our region at the expense of the United States, would be a matter of

fundamental concern to Australia, and would be contrary to our national

**1.9** These judgements remain valid. But despite agreement on these basic

interests.

issues over the last decade, a clear definition of Australia's real defence needs
in an era of self-reliance did not emerge. Therefore this Government 1.14 Australia's alliances with the United States and other nations impose
_commissioned the Review of Australia's defence capabilities_ in 1985. The review upon us the obligation to provide for our own defence. This obligation is spelled
established the comprehensive approach needed to implement the principle of out in Article II of the ANZUS Treaty, and American expectations in this regard
defence self-reliance. It drew together all the separate considerations of self- have been stressed by US administrations since the late `1960s.`
reliance over the last decade or more and proposed an achievable and cost-

1.15 This Government considers that basic self-reliance is the minimum that

effective approach to force structure planning. Its main recommendations for

any self-respecting country should contribute to an alliance. Australia can

developing a self-reliant force structure form the basis of this Policy Information

scarcely pretend to contribute to the defence of broader Western interests if it

Paper and the Government's defence policy.

cannot defend itself.

1.10 In developing a defence force capable of maintaining a self-reliant

1.16 In the remote contingency of global conflict Australia would have

defence posture, priority is given to those capabilities which are needed for the

regard in the first instance to the situation in our immediate region. Our

defence of Australia and its direct interests. This requires a force-in-being to

responsibilities would include those associated with the Radford—Collins

defeat any challenge to our sovereignty and specific capabilities designed to

Agreement for the protection and control of shipping (see Chapter 3). Subject to

respond effectively to attacks within our area of direct military interest.'

priority requirements in our own area the Australian Government would then

1.11 This area stretches over 7000 kilometres from the Cocos Islands to consider contributions further afield.
New Zealand and the islands of the South-West Pacific, and over `5 000` 1.17 Options will always be available to Australian governments for
kilometres from the archipelago and island chain in the north to the Southern

assistance to allies, even though such assistance of itself will not be a force

Ocean. It constitutes about 10 per cent of the earth's surface.

structure determinant. The type of Australian force structure required to protect

The area of direct military interest is of fundamental importance in defining

our interests in our area of military interest entails substantial capabilities for

and developing a self-reliant defence force. It does not, however, mark the limits

operations further afield. For example, our guided missile frigates (FFGs)

of our strategic interests nor of our military capabilities.

equipped with Seahawk helicopters are capable of effective participation in a US

Our broader strategic interests extend beyond the area of direct military

carrier battle group well distant from Australia's shores.

interest to include South-East Asia, Indochina, the eastern Indian Ocean and the
South-West Pacific, Australia's security could be directly affected by **1.18** Defence co-operation will continue to be sustained with the United

1 States in peacetime. There is already an extensive system of regular high level
The area of direct military interest includes Australia, its territories and proximate ocean areas.
Indonesia. Papua New Guinea, New Zealand and other nearby countries of the South-West Pacific. consultations on defence and security issues, including the annual Australia/US

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Ministerial Talks, the Australian/US Military Representatives Meeting comprising would be forthcoming. Short of this major, and less likely situation, we could
the defence force chiefs of each country, and the Defence/Defense talks face a range of other threats that we should expect to handle independently. It
between senior officials, and annual political/military discussions and arms is not this Government's policy to rely on combat assistance from the United
control talks. The web of regular formal meetings is buttressed by direct States in all circumstances. Our alliance with the United States does not free us
consultations between the Australian Minister for Defence and the US Secretary from the responsibility to make appropriate provision for our own security.
of Defense, and by a very wide range of working level discussions, as well as

1.25 While it is prudent for our planning to assume that the threshold for

military-to-military links and combined exercises. Consultations between the two

direct United States combat aid to Australia could be quite high in some

countries facilitate extensive co-operative activities including military training and

circumstances, it would be unwise for an adversary to base its planning on the

exercises, intelligence exchanges, defence science and technology,

same assumption. Allowing for the possibility that the threshold for direct

communications and logistics co-operation.

combat assistance could be relatively high does not, in any case, preclude the

**1.19** The practical benefits Australia and the United States gain from our possibility of other forms of assistance. US intelligence and logistic support
alliance during peacetime need to be clearly understood. This Government's would markedly enhance our operational effectiveness, while political and
review of the ANZUS Treaty in 1983 confirmed the substantial day-to-day economic pressures could weaken an opponent's resolve.
benefits of the alliance, as well as identifying its deterrent value. For example,

1.26 Australia's alliance with the United States is and should remain a

port visits by US warships provide opportunities for ADF combined exercises

genuinely equal partnership. Benefits accrue to both of us from our

with advanced technology vessels while at the same time providing rest and

enhancement of the general Western security position. Australia benefits from

recreation facilities for US naval deployments in our region. Similarly,

the deterrent effect of the alliance and our enhanced self-reliant military

arrangements permitting USAF B-52 and KC-135 aircraft to operate over

capability. The United States benefits from the value of the joint facilities to the

northern Australia enable the RAAF to exercise and train with these aircraft.

central balance, the intelligence exchange, and Australia's support for American

**1.20** The United States gains information important to its global maritime military activities in our area. The development of our independent military

capabilities and our defence activities in the region are also beneficial to US

intelligence system from Australian surveillance and intelligence gathering

security concerns.

activities in an area extending from the eastern Indian Ocean to the South-West
Pacific. At the same time Australia has access to the extensive US intelligence
resources. This information is not confined to global superpower competition; it **Australia and New Zealand**
also complements Australia's information on political and military developments
in our own region. 1.27 Australia and New Zealand share a defence relationship which is of

basic importance to the security of both countries, because of our common

1.21 Australia also receives preferred status in military equipment

history and traditions, our proximity, and our shared strategic concerns.

purchasing, access to US training courses and doctrine and operational
procedures, and opportunities for honing skills in combined exercises. Our 1.28 New Zealand has an important role in the South-West Pacific, where it
agreements with the United States also provide for the supply of munitions and has strong political, economic and military ties—in some cases more substantial
equipment in an emergency, alleviating the need for large-scale stockpiling by than our own. Defence co-operation with New Zealand covers a very wide
the ADF. To this end and to facilitate mutual assistance in war or emergency, range, including assistance to the island states, maritime surveillance, combined
our forces will continue to develop their interoperability with those of the United exercises and training programs, exchanges of technical and operational
States. information, and co-operation in intelligence, defence science and logistics.

1.22 Privileged access to the highest level of US defence technology helps **1.29** It is important that Australian and New Zealand forces maintain and
us develop our own technical capabilities for control of the approaches to our develop their ability to operate together. We will continue to promote defence
continent. The value of this co-operation is demonstrated by Australia's co-operation and operational compatibility with New Zealand, reflecting the
development of over-the-horizon radar. Australia's scientists have built on considerable potential for strengthening our defence relationship.
access to US technology to produce a radar system which, for the first time in

**1.30 The extent to which this potential can be realised will depend, among**

our history, holds out the prospect of broad area surveillance of our approaches

other things, on the compatibility of the equipment and capabilities of the two

**1.23** This Government is developing a more mature working relationship with forces. Priority must therefore be given to co-ordinating our policies on these
the United States in technology transfer. One example is Project Nulka, an matters.
agreement concerning a defensive system for warships.

**1.31** The dispute between New Zealand and the United States over visits by

**1.24** The defence relationship with the United States gives confidence that ships and aircraft has seriously damaged the defence relationship between our
in the event of a fundamental threat to Australia's security, US military support two allies. Australia is not a party to the dispute. It accepts, however, that

4 5


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access within reasonable environmental constraints for ships and aircraft is a

**1.38** Under the FPDA, Australia, New Zealand and the United Kingdom co-

normal part of an alliance relationship. Australia regrets that New Zealand policy

operate to support the security of Singapore and Malaysia. A squadron of RAAF

detracts from that relationship.

Mirage fighters stationed at Butterworth in Malaysia is our primary contribution

**1.32** This Government's policy has been directed to preserving our important to the Integrated Air Defence System which operates under the FPDA. This

contribution will be maintained after the F/A-18s replace the Mirages by

bilateral defence relationships with both the United States and New Zealand,

rotational deployments of F/A-18s to Butterworth and Singapore, supplemented

and ensuring as much as possible that the underlying framework of the trilateral

by F-ills.

relationship under ANZUS is maintained so that full co-operation can be
resumed should current New Zealand policies on warship visits change.

**1.33** These goals have been achieved. The ANZUS Treaty remains in place,
and the mutual obligations under it between Australia and the United States and
between Australia and New Zealand are preserved. This includes the security
commitments embodied in the treaty.

**Australia and the region**

1.34 This Government believes that an Australian defence force able to deal
effectively with the most credible challenges to the nation's sovereignty is the
best contribution we can make to the continued stability of our region. Meeting
our requirements for the defence of Australia will provide the Government with
practical options for use of elements of the Defence Force in tasks beyond our
area of direct military interest in support of regional friends and allies. It is
therefore not necessary that such contingencies should themselves constitute
force structure determinants.

**1.35** This Government has sought to strengthen the commonality of
strategic interests between Australia and the countries of South-East Asia and
the South-West Pacific. We share a common concern with these countries to
strengthen regional stability and to limit the potential for external powers to
introduce tension or conflict. This Government is concerned to sustain a
favourable regional strategic environment for Australia. In the years ahead, our
capacity for security co-operation in the South-West Pacific and South-East Asia
will expand because the numbers of major naval vessels in our fleet will

**_One of Australia's new front line aircraft the F/A- 18 pictured over Malaysia during a goodwill_**

increase, our Air Force will have an in-flight refuelling capability, our Army will **_tour to Indonesia, Singapore and Malaysia to demonstrate its capabilities._**
be more mobile and deployable, and the Defence Force generally will have a
better surveillance and patrol capacity.

1.39 Australia will also continue to deploy an Army rifle company to

1.36 Australia is a major power in the South-West Pacific. We have the

Malaysia under the FPDA, and to operate Orion long range maritime patrol

capability now to deploy significant forces there. The current substantial

aircraft from Butterworth to maintain surveillance over the South China Sea and

capacity of Australian forces to contribute to security in the South-West Pacific

north-east Indian Ocean. Consistent with developing policies of Malaysia and

will be further enhanced by the Government's decision to increase our air and

Singapore, our South-East Asian FPDA partners, the Government believes that

naval deployments to the region and to provide practical assistance in such

there is a scope for increased emphasis on logistic arrangements in regional

fields as maritime surveillance and patrol and hydrography. In the event of a

military co-operation. Regional countries are increasingly providing for their own

regional conflict, the forces we are developing for our own defence would have

combat capabilities.

direct utility in the South-West Pacific.

1.40 Our close defence relationship with Papua New Guinea is formalised by

1.37 Our regional responsibilities have been formalised in the Five Power

an agreement which commits us to consultation and co-operation on the full

Defence Arrangements (FPDA) in South-East Asia and in our Defence

range of defence issues. Our historical ties give Australia a strong interest in

Arrangements with Papua New Guinea.

the security of Papua New Guinea, and this is reinforced by Papua New Guinea's

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geographic location which makes its security a major factor in our own

allow Australia to contribute to wider Western interests on a scale appropriate

strategic outlook.

to our circumstances. Development of the Defence Force for national security

1.41 Beyond these formal obligations, Australia recognises its responsibility provides the Government with the capability for such contributions. It is not
to contribute to regional security through bilateral defence relationships with all necessary to develop forces especially for peacekeeping. Like contributions to
the countries in our region. These relationships are described in detail in Chapter allied efforts, such contributions can be mounted from the force-in-being.
2.

**1.48** It is, however, in our own region where we have the most realistic

**1.42** All of our defence relationships, formal and informal, impose prospect of substantial defence influence and involvement. Australia is the
responsibilities on Australia. Our self-reliant defence posture encompasses the largest military power in the South-West Pacific. And in South-East Asia
capability to meet these responsibilities for regional security. Australia's power projection capabilities, especially for strike and interdiction, are

considerable by regional standards. It is these considerations that have an
important bearing on the Government's decisions about the day-to-day activities
and operations of the Defence Force. They relate to Australia's military posture
in its own region and to its political standing there.

**Australia's defence capacity**
**and influence**

1.43 We have dealt with the need for Australia's defence capabilities to
give priority to our own national security tasks. A requirement has also been
identified for Australia's defence policy to take account both of developments in
the South-West Pacific and South-East Asia—our region of primary strategic
interest—and to be capable of reacting positively to calls for military support
further afield from our allies and friends, should we judge that our interests
require it. The Government believes that Australia can deal with both, but to do
so we must be alert to priorities, for the range of potential circumstances which
bear on our security is very wide.

1.44 There are limits to our defence capacity and influence. As a nation of
only 16 million people, Australia's ability to influence the state of world security
is limited. We are remote from traditional allies and from situations important to
them. These factors, on balance, favour our security. But they also impose
considerable constraints on our ability to influence distant events through our
defence activity. Even if Australia were prepared to spend much more on
defence, we could not aspire to match the military power or influence of major
powers.

**1.45** There must be a realistic attitude to our defence capacity and
influence. Our international political concerns and interests will always be more
far reaching than our defence capabilities. There are no current or prospective
situations beyond our own region where Australia's direct strategic interests
require a significant defence role or local circumstances offer scope for one.
Proposals for Australian defence involvement beyond our region of primary
strategic concern will be considered on their merits.

**1.46** Clearly the possibility of deployments beyond our region should not
determine the structure and capabilities of the ADF. Should the Government
wish to respond to developments in areas other than our own, the capabilities
being developed for our national defence will, subject to national requirements
at the time, give a range of practical options.

1.47 Australia can also usefully contribute to peacekeeping operations. They

8 9


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important role in helping to maintain stability in the strategic relationship

Chapter two

between the superpowers and in helping to deter war. While Australia might

**Australia's strategic environment** appear remote from the areas of the globe where any nuclear war would be
**and defence interests** fought, it would inevitably be profoundly affected by such a conflict. The NorthWest Cape Naval Communication Station supports our interest in the avoidance

of nuclear conflict by contributing to United States confidence, and Soviet
awareness, that in the event of the United States being attacked, it would still
be able to communicate with its ships and submarines in the Indian Ocean and
Western Pacific, and make use of their retaliatory capabilities.

**2.1** The Governments approach to defence is to seek to reinforce the
positive aspects of Australia's strategic environment and to provide an 2.6 United States strategy is to deter war. Australia supports the concept
appropriate measure of insurance against future uncertainty. The fundamental of deterrence. The United States considers that deterrence of the Soviet Union
elements of that approach are based on: depends, in part, upon the credibility of the US capability for nuclear retaliation

in the event of major Soviet attack upon the United States or its allies. The

—maintaining and developing capabilities for the independent defence of
Australia and its interests; United States maintains a range of nuclear forces for this purpose. But

ultimately deterrence rests on the possession by the United States of strategic

—promoting strategic stability and security in our region; and

nuclear forces which would be secure from destruction in any Soviet first strike

—as a member of the Western strategic community working for a reduction in

and in these circumstances be able to inflict massive retaliatory damage.

the level of tension between the superpowers and limiting the spread of

Relative to other elements of US strategic nuclear forces, the US ballistic

influences in our region inimical to Western interests.

missile submarines are the most survivable and for this reason among others

2.2 Australia's defence policy has regard to an area of primary strategic will remain second strike retaliatory weapons. In view of the strategic
interest, covering South-East Asia, the eastern Indian Ocean, and the South- importance of the security of the US submarine force and the advantages of
West Pacific. Our defence policy in this area is supported by high level visits very low frequency (VLF) communications for security, such vessels will continue
and consultations on strategic matters, military exercises and naval visits, to rely on the US VLF network of which North West Cape is a part.
maintenance of effective defence co-operation programs, and by showing our

2.7 There is now greater duplication in the US VLF communications

competence and capability in the operation of modern military equipment.

network, and in other systems used to communicate with submarines such as
the TACAMO airborne VLF relay system, than when the station at North West
Cape was established. As a consequence of this redundancy no one component

**Australia and the global balance** of the US VLF network is vital, but North West Cape remains an important

element in the US military communications network, and so continues to

**2.3** The Government reaffirms Australia's natural association with the support deterrence of war.
Western community of nations and our attendant defence interests and

**2.8** North West Cape is also available to relay VLF or HF (high frequency)

obligations.

communications to United States and Australian surface ships and submarines

2.4 Australia's security, like that of all nations, ultimately depends on whenever they are operating in its area of reliable coverage. The support
preserving stability in the superpower relationship and avoiding war between available from North West Cape to conventional forces in our region further
them, above all nuclear war. The continuing expansion and refinement of nuclear supports deterrence of war by assisting the United States to counter Soviet
arsenals poses a challenge to the maintenance of stable deterrence. Thus, the conventional capabilities. Enhancement of US conventional capabilities, by
Government attaches importance to the achievement in both the nuclear and increasing the range of US conventional options, can reduce the risks of
conventional fields of verifiable arms control agreements that provide for more escalation to the nuclear level should conflict occur. It thus represents a
stable deterrence at the lowest possible level of armaments, particularly nuclear disincentive to the initiation of conventional or nuclear war by the Soviet Union
armaments. Australia is actively engaged in international efforts to enhance against Australia, the United States, or other US allies.
global and regional security through such agreements. We recognise that

**2.9** The facilities at Pine Gap and Nurrungar enhance stability by

progress in achieving agreements is slow. In the interim the Government

contributing to verification of arms limitation measures of the United States and

considers it important to maintain a stable strategic balance to support mutual

the Soviet Union and to timely United States and Australian knowledge of

deterrence and as a basis for substantive arms control and disarmament

developments that have military significance—including early warning of ballistic

negotiations.

missile attack on the United States or its allies. New communications links are

**2.5** The joint Australia/United States defence facilities each have an being established with the headquarters of the ADF in Canberra to give the

Government and its advisers access to data from the facilities immediately.

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**2.10 The most important part of the US early warning system with which we** by diplomatic and economic activity a security component in Australia s
are involved is known as the Defense Support Program. This program would relationship is appropriate. This conforms to local expectations, advances
provide the United States with its earliest warning of intercontinental ballistic Australia's other interests and enhances the mutual interest of Australia and the
missile attack. The additional warning time assists in minimising the risk of countries in the region in regional strategic stability.
nuclear conflict arising through accident or miscalculation, and so supports
stability in the superpower strategic relationship. It complements the warning 2.16 Australia's military co-operation with South-East Asia is modest. Local
provided by ground radars, and contributes to the reliability of the US early defence capabilities have increased over recent decades as regional countries
warning function. The Soviet Union also operates a system comparable to the meet the objective of ensuring that threats to their own security can be met
Defence Support Program. from their own resources. In the South-West Pacific our defence influence is

much more substantial.

**2.11** The benefits and costs for Australia in co-operating with the United
States in the joint defence facilities have been carefully evaluated by the 2.17 In general, Australia's strategic environment is favourable. The
Government. The operations of the joint facilities do not involve derogation from development of regional armed forces is oriented toward capabilities appropriate
our sovereignty. They serve Australian and US interests. They are jointly to national defence and internal security. The Government acknowledges
managed and operated by the Australian and United States Governments and nevertheless that, as with the capabilities being introduced for our national
their operation is governed by a set of principles designed to protect Australian defence, contemporary weapons systems are likely to provide modest force
sovereignty and interests. All their functions and activities require, and have, the projection capabilities particularly in maritime and air assets. Such developments
full knowledge and concurrence of the Australian Government. Australian in the region must always be a matter for careful consideration by the
personnel are fully involved in all aspects of the operations of Pine Gap and Government.
Nurrungar, and they have access to all of the product. The presence in Australia

**2.18** Without affecting the relatively favourable nature of the regions

of these facilities carries with it a risk that, in the event of superpower conflict,

strategic environment, there have been a number of political and econorn c

the facilities might be attacked by the Soviet Union. However, the risk that such

developments with the potential to affect regional stability and security. Of

conflict might occur, either deliberately or as a result of some accident, is very

particular concern is the possibility for interference by external powers or

low and the functions carried out by the joint defence facilities help to ensure

regional affairs

that this remains the case. Were Australia to cease our co-operation in the joint
defence facilities there would only be adverse consequences for international

**2.19** Whilst the remainder of th1s chap [t] er focuses en AusraHa s area of

security and higher risk of global war. This would neither serve Australia's

primary strategic interest and area of direct military interest it should not be

interests nor those of the international community generally.

thought that the Government is indifferent to military developments elsewhere in

**2.12 The ability of the Defence Force to provide security for Australia in a** the Indian Ocean and Pacific areas. The situation of major trading partners such
nuclear war would be very limited and cannot be a determinant of our planning as Japan, an understanding of all the interests pursued by the United States in
However, we should maintain an ability to follow developments in and provide the Pacific, and our own developing relations with China are all matters of
basic training for defensive and protective measures against nuclear attack. substantial interest to the Government. The ADF participates in exercise

activities and goodwill visits in this broader area. It is, however, well beyona our

2.13 Nuclear conflict between the superpowers is a remote possibility but if

capacity to extend to this area the defence co-operation programs that are

such a conflict were nevertheless to occur, the joint defence facilities could

maintained in our region of primary strategic interest. Support for the positions

come under attack. Accordingly, there is a need for the appropriate government

of allies and friends in this region must be predominantly diplomatic.

bodies at various levels to undertake basic civil defence planning for the
protection of the population in the areas concerned.

**South-East Asia**

2.20 Major changes in regional relationships or internal instability in
individual countries in South-East Asia could introduce or expand uncertainties in

**Australia and the region**

Australia's strategic prospects, even though developments may not be directly
threatening to us. Tensions between nations in South-East Asia could provide

**2.14** As already mentioned Australia's region of primary strategic interest

opportunities for increased involvement in the region by unfriendly or contending

lies in South-East Asia, the South-West Pacific and the East Indian Ocean.

powers.

Political, economic and military developments in this area are of fundamental
concern to Australia.

2.21 There is a need for continuous review and evaluation of strategic

2.15 Successive Australian governments have underscored the region's developments affecting the region. It is in respect of the potential impact of
importance to us. Whilst Australia's interests in the area are primarily advanced developments in the region upon Australia's area of direct military interest, that

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Australia's defence interests are primarily engaged. Vietnam, and the development of new support facilities there, is a significant

concern for Australian defence policy. Cam Ranh Bay is now the largest Soviet

2.22 The development of our role in support of regional security is

military base outside the Warsaw Pact

sustained by the history of our co-operation with the nations of South-East Asia
since the Second World War. Over that period our strategic perspectives in 2.30 In peacetime, access to ports and airfields in Vietnam is a useful
relation to the region have undergone a marked change. In the 1950s and 1960s, military asset for the Soviet Union. From Vietnam, the Soviet Union undertakes
Australia's defence policy was influenced by strong anxiety about the ability of regular intelligence and maritime surveillance missions against US naval units
the newly independent countries of South-East Asia to withstand domestic operating in or passing through the South China Sea, it operates against
insurgencies and external pressures. Our assessments now depict a regional Chinese military forces in the area, and can depoy .Ts -,- ,,,, n fcrces mom
situation with underlying strengths, albeit with many uncertainties. flexibly to the Indian Ocean

**2.23** The formation and consolidation of the Association of South-East **2.31** The Soviet military presence is nor, hovvever, :n a respecTs a po :,:cal
Asian Nations (ASEAN) 1 has not only benefited those nations but has also been asset to the Soviet Union. There is a central contradiction in Soviet strategy
of strategic benefit to Australia. It has reinforced the ability of each member to the Pacific. On the one hand the Soviet Union aspires to pursue legitimate
withstand external pressure and has fostered the development of a broad economic interests in the area and to seek friendly relations. On the other hand
political and strategic consensus which supports Australia's long-term security it is difficult for nations in the region to accept the sincerity of such gestures of
prospects. co-operation whilst the Soviets engage in a substantial build-up of their Far East

Fleet and use their relationship with Vietnam to expand their military presence in

**Prospects for change** the region through Cam Rahn Bay.

2.24 Uncertainties in South-East Asia relate principally to:

**2.32** The Soviet Union does not enjoy naval or air dominance in the region

—economic and political problems in the Philippines; and in the event of global conflict its military assets in Vietnam would be ver,
—the unresolved question of the political future of Cambodia and the pressures vulnerable. Nevertheless, the continuous presence of Soviet warships and
that arise out of the military and political situation there on Thailand and on military airc r aft, based m Vietnam a [an ]adverse element [in ][mnc].n a F ecor't';
relations between Vietnam and ASEAN members; perspectives

—the establishment of the Soviet military presence at Cam Ranh Bay.

**Australia's defence activities**

**2.25** The Philippines continues to face serious economic and political

**2.33** This Government's opposc: :co':e svpp...rr..'

problems. Much remains to be done before the Philippines can be confident of

Asia concentrates on practical co-operation with the countries of ASEAN

stability and prosperity.

activities of common defence interest. This approach is consistent with the

**2.26** Two issues in the Philippines are directly relevant to Australia's significant steps each ASEAN country is making to strengthen its own abiHrs
strategic outlook. The first is the insurgency of the New People's Army, which resist external strategic pressures.
not only threatens the long-term prospects for moderate reforming governments,

2.34 Australia has encouraged the development of a pattern of

but also raises the possibility that unwelcome external powers could become

consultations with regional countries on security prospects and policies;

involved.

reciprocal visits by defence representatives and military units; combined

2.27 Secondly, the Philippines makes a significant contribution to regional exercises; specialist consultancy arrangements to examine common problem
security by hosting the major US military presence at the Subic Bay and Clarke areas; training; and joint projects concerned with the development and support
Field bases which support the US presence throughout our region. of specific defence capabilities.

**2.28** The situation in Cambodia remains unresolved. Whilst the Vietnamese 2.35 Developments in the archipelagic states, and especially Indonesia, are
military presence persists and armed resistance continues in Cambodia the of great strategic significance to us. Australia sees a stable Indonesia as an
potential for military clashes between Thailand and Vietnam remains. An important factor in its own security. Not only does Indonesia cover the majority
additional significant element of the conflict is the close interest of China and of the northern archipelagic chain, which is the most likely route through which
the Soviet Union. Although a major extension of the conflict is unlikely, its any major assault could be launched against Australia, it also lies across
continuation is of concern to the Australian Government, not least because of important air and sea routes to Europe and the North Pacific.
the potential for more extensive involvement by external powers as the conflict

2.36 Indonesia forms a protective barrier to Australia's northern approaches.

persists.

It possesses the largest military capability among the ASEAN nations, but this

The ASEAN members are Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, the Philippines, and Brunei. ASEAN capability has been designed primarily to ensure internal security and to protect
is based on political, economic and social links and is not a defence pact However its success as a its very large and geographically diverse island chain.
cohesive grouping has added substantially to the strategic stability of our region.

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2.37 Australia seeks to maintain a sound and constructive defence p y p j
relationship with Indonesia. The Australian Government considers that such a trading partner, Japan, and with our major ally, the United States, run through
relationship should recognise fundamental features of our respective political the region. The countries in the region lie across important trade routes and
and social systems. approaches to Australia's east coast, where most of our major population

centres are located. An unfriendly maritime power in the area could inhibit our

**2.38** A practical approach is also being followed in our defence activities

freedom of movement through these approaches and could place in doubt the

with the other countries of ASEAN. Combined land exercises in Australia with

security of Australia's supply of military equipment and other strategic materiel

Malaysia and Thailand are well established. Scientific and industrial co-operation

from the United States.

with Malaysia and Thailand has opened up promising areas for further
development, including commercial opportunities for Australian defence industry. 2.42 During the 1970s, Australia's strategic focus in the South-West Pa: f:c
Similarly, technical co-operation, for example in the area of aircraft maintenance widened as a number of the island states attained independe n ce and as Tne
with Thailand, is providing mutual strategic and economic benefits. Singaporean region received increased attention from external powers
forces train in Australia and exchanges are maintained in a number of specialist

**2.43** The small size of the national economies and the m TO: de t er Ce

areas. Normal defence contacts with the Philippines have been resumed since

forces in the South-West Pacific fundamentally affect the ability of these

the accession to power of President Aquino. Since Brunei achieved

countries to protect their interests. In view of significant regional concerns o. or

independence bilateral defence contacts have expanded, and include training in

sovereignty protection and economic vulnerability, bilateral Australian defence

Australia, joint maritime exercises, and the sale of Australian manufactured

co-operation has been mainly directed toward those areas. Emphasis is being

defence equipment. The Government will continue to provide, where appropriate,

given to activities that benefit the island nations in the development and

financial resources to facilitate these co-operative activities and seeks to

protection of maritime and other resources. Assistance is also continuing to

develop our defence relationships with the countries of ASEAN along these

provide technical and infrastructure support. Defence activities in the South-

general lines.

West Pacific thus support and complement Australia's development assistance

2.39 Australia's longstanding defence interests in South-East Asia are also

**2.44** The entry into force of the Treaty of Rarotonga instituting the Soutr

reflected in our participation in the Integrated Air Defence System (lADS) and

Pacific Nuclear Free Zone is a gain for Australian and regional security. The

other co-operative activities under the FPDA with Malaysia, Singapore, New

Treaty also protects Western strategic interests in the region.

Zealand and the United Kingdom. The Government has previously announced
that the RAAF presence at Butterworth Air Base in Malaysia is to be maintained
after the withdrawal of our Mirage fighters from service by rotational **Prospects for change**
deployments of the new F/A-18 Hornet tactical fighter to Malaysia and

**2.45** A number of recent developments affecting the South-West Pacific

Singapore, supplemented on some occasions by F-111 aircraft. The pattern of

have increased the region's potential to pose strategic problems for Australia.

deployments will enable continued RAAF participation in the series of air

While not directly threatening, they raise questions about the changing political

defence exercises conducted each year under the auspices of lADS. Through

and strategic patterns of the region.

those exercises, Australia will continue to make a significant contribution to the
enhancement of Malaysia's and Singapore's air defence capability. The 2.46 Amongst these developments is the establishment of links between
Government has also announced its commitment to continue to deploy an some regional states and external powers with strategic interests potentially
Australian Army rifle company in Malaysia under the auspices of the FPDA. inimical to Australia's. The Soviet Union has had a fisheries agreement with

Kiribati and now has an agreement with Vanuatu. Further access by the Soviet

2.40 Surveillance patrols by RAAF aircraft over the South China Sea and the

Union, especially the establishment of a presence ashore, would be an

north-east Indian Ocean will also continue. These patrols are conducted from

unwelcome development because of its potential to enhance Soviet influence in

Butterworth by a continuous detachment of P3C Orions. They enable Australia

the region. Soviet involvement in the region is at a low level at this stage.

to monitor naval movements in an area of increased strategic interest for us

However, its existence imposes an obligation on Australia and its allies to

since the establishment of the Soviet presence at Cam Ranh Bay. The

properly develop and co-ordinate their security policies.

information from these flights represents a valuable contribution to Australia's
intelligence data base. They also represent an effective and practical contribution 2.47 There has been continuing tension between the United States and the
to shared regional strategic interests. South-West Pacific countries over the negotiation of fees for access by US

commercial fishing fleets. An agreement has now been reached and the island

**South-West Pacific** states will receive substantial payments from the United States. More serious

damage to Western interests in the South-West Pacific has been inflicted by the

2.41 Although remote from areas of major contention, the South-West continuing French nuclear testing program and tension over the future of New
Pacific is important for Australian defence planning because of its geographic Caledonia.

16 17


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ese de e op e ts da age este sta d g t e Sout est
Pacific and contribute to an increasingly complex political and strategic **Papua New Guinea**
situation. The fragile and narrowly based economies of the South West Pacific **2.53** Apart from traditional ties, Papua New Guinea is by virtue of its
countries will continue to present opportunities for exploitation by external geographic location an important factor in Australia's security. Because of the
powers. potential strategic implications, Australia would be understandably concerned

should a hostile power gain lodgement or control in Papua New Guinea.

**Australia's defence activities**

**2.54** The relationship of Papua New Guinea with its neighbours will always

2.49 As with the ASEAN countries, in the South-West Pacific Australia has be a matter of interest to Australia. Although there have been minor incidents
sought to emphasise co-operative activities centred on practical matters of along the border with Indonesia, mainly as a result of the activities of the Free
common concern. Papua Movement, both Papua New Guinea and Indonesia have demonstrated a

co-operative approach to management of their common border. The Government

2.50 In accordance with the concern of island governments to protect

welcomes the signing of the Treaty of Mutual Respect, Friendship, and Co-

national sovereignty and exercise control over their maritime resources, a

operation between Papua New Guinea and Indonesia in October 1986.

considerable proportion of our current defence activities in the South-West
Pacific is directed towards the development of national maritime surveillance and 2.55 Australia has a continuing close relationship with Papua New Guinea in
enforcement capabilities. A result of these activities will be the development of defence matters. Defence relations include Australian support in the
a set of inter-related surveillance systems that will contribute to the development of the Papua New Guinea Defence Force and, at the working level,
development of regional co-operation and provide information on ship continuing close contacts between our two Defence organisations. This support
movements in the Pacific. increasingly comprises provision of specialist advice and exchanges of views on

**2.51** To support this, a program of P-3C Orion long range maritime patrol areas of defence policy and capabilities. The relationship also provides for

formal consultation on matters affecting common security interests should either

(LRMP) deployments was instituted in 1983. The same year Australia announced

Government consider this necessary.

the Pacific Patrol Boat project, which will now provide a total of twelve 31.5
metre boats and training and advisory assistance to six South-West Pacific
states. 2 These activities have been complemented by naval visits and bilateral **Antarctica**
activities aimed at establishing and improving communications facilities and

**2.56** The Government strongly supports the provisions of the Antarctic

hydrographic skills, as well as the accurate delineation ot 200 mile maritime

Treaty, which prohibit military use of the territory. The national interest of

zones.

Australia lies in ensuring that Antarctica remains demilitarised and free from
political and strategic competition. So long as Antarctica remains demilitarized,

2.52 In order to build upon and reinforce the defence co-operative activities

no threat to the security of Australia itself is in prospect from or through that

already in progress in the South-West Pacific and to meet the challenge posed
by recent strategic developments, the Government has decided on a number of region. There is no requirement for defence activities to support our territorial or
important initiatives, including: economic interests in Antarctica or for defence involvement beyond the present

limited logistic support for Australia's national effort there.

—increasing the number of RAAF LRMP deployments to the region
(arrangements will be made for co-ordination with deployments undertaken by **2.57** The Government's policy is to pursue political, as distinct from military,
New Zealand); solutions to any disputes. Growing international interest in the exploitation of

—increasing RAN ship visits to the South-West Pacific (a policy decision has continental and off-shore resources in Antarctica is stimulating pressures for
been taken to emphasise the South-West Pacific at the expense of some of challenges to the Treaty. With the other Treaty consultative parties, we are
our more distant deployments); working on means to preserve the Treaty.

—continued assistance in the fields of hydrography and survey and mapping;

—further assistance to help South-West Pacific countries consolidate their

—the provision of training and advisory assistance to assist in fisheriesmaritime surveillance centres; and **The national strategic setting**
surveillance and enforcement.

**2.58** The fundamental conclusion arising from the preceding sections is that
Australia's bilateral relations with its major allies and with neighbouring

2 countries are basically sound, notwithstanding the political fluctuations which
Countries participating in the project are Papua New Guinea (four boats), Fiji (four boats), Solomon
Islands, Vanuatu, Western Samoa, Cook islands lone boat each) Tuvalu is presently considering inevitably occur from time to time. No neighbouring country harbours aggressive
participation in the project designs on Australia, and no country has embarked on the development of the

18
19


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the Australian mainland, and Indonesia is some 250 kilometres away at Its

extensive capabilities to project maritime power which would be necessary to

nearest point. The Asian mainland is almost 3 000 kilometres away.

sustain intensive military operations against us.

**2.59** This is not to argue that we have no need for defence, or for alliance. **2.65** These basic facts of our geographic location indicate that conventional

military attack against Australia would most likely be directed against the

On the contrary, strategic developments in the superpower relationship have the

northern part of the mainland, its maritime approaches or off-shore territories

potential to undermine our security. Moreover, uncertainties inherent in

The corollary is that those basic facts of geography highlight the fundamenta

relationships in our region could pose serious problems for Australia's defence

importance for Australia of maritime force [S3 ]capable of preventing an enemy

were political relationships to deteriorate.

from substantial success or control in those areas

2.60 Australia's defence interest is not confined to the presence or absence

**2.66** The military capabilities required for a large-scale conventonal attack

of military threat itself. We are concerned with developments that could either

on Australia, in particular the naval and air power to project and sustain

support Australia's security or have the potential to lead to a military threat.

substantial operations against Australian forces, are beyond those currently

Prudent defence policy must insure against uncertainties and the risk that they

possessed by any regional power. Given the long lead times and large costs

might resolve unfavourably to our interests.

involved in establishing the kind of major military capabilities which would oe

2.61 Defence planning has to contemplate the possibility that developments required, this is likely to remain so for many years. And if a regional countr'7
in our region could lead to direct military pressure or attack upon Australia. were to develop the motivation and capability, the features of our northern
Such a development could generate requirements for defence effort fully environment would complicate large scale conventional military operations.
committing the level of resources currently or prospectively allocated. In keeping Shallow waters and large tidal variations make navigation difficult and generally
with these judgements, provision for self-reliant national defence commands hinder maritime operations. Any land forces that were to elude Australian
priority in this Government's defence planning. It guides the structure of the opposition and overcome the maritime obstacles would find themselves in a
Defence Force and development of supporting infrastructure (see Chapter 4). harsh and inhospitable continent.

2.62 Our military capabilities and competence must command respect. This **2.67** The paucity of population and of transport and other infrastructure in
basic competence and preparedness in matters of our national defence are the northern Australia, and the nature of the land, would tend to focus military
necessary foundation for our defence influence further afield. operations of substance on a few areas, for example, airfields, off-shore

resource projects, shipping in coastal waters, port facilities, and communicaton
and transport links. Australia would be dependent on many of these facilities fc
logistic support of forces deployed along the northern coast, and an attacker

**Australia's physical environment**

would want to take them if he were to sustain a lodgement or make progress

2.63 Australia's national strategic setting is shaped in a unique and
enduring way by basic facts of geography and location, population size and **2.68** While all of these factors limit the potential for major military
distribution, and our national economic resources and infrastructure. Australia is operations against Australia, many of the same factors introduce potential
distant from the main centres of superpower rivalry and the major areas of vulnerabilities which could be exploited by alternative, and less costly, military
instability in the world. The great majority of our population and industrial operations. The use of limited military force to harass, for example, remote
centres are in the south-east and south of the continent, naturally protected by settlements and other targets around northern Australia, our off-shore territories,
vast ocean surrounds and the inhospitable tracts of our own country to the or shipping in proximate areas, would pose significant problems for us. The
north and north-west. While our manpower base is small, we have a relatively physical characteristics of northern Australia and its distance from the major
large and sophisticated economic, scientific, technological and industrial support bases in the south and south-east would also complicate our
expansion base. By regional standards, this gives us a substantial capacity to operations. In those circumstances, our vast coastline, the rugged terrain, the
repair, support and develop our own defence equipment. Our research base and distances between population centres or settlements, the remoteness of our
industrial infrastructure, however, cannot develop and manufacture at an island territories, the location of our northern resource zones, and the
economic cost the full range of high technology equipment which characterise requirement to protect focal areas and the approaches to our major ports, could
contemporary defence forces (see Chapters 5 and 6). be exploited to our disadvantage.

2.64 More fundamentally, our geographic location and the lack of land
borders, combine to provide us with natural defences against conventional
attack. To minimise the problems involved in conducting combat operations at
great distance from main support areas, it is most likely that any adversary
would first seek to secure bases in the archipelago to our north. Even so, the
mainland of our nearest neighbour, Papua New Guinea, is 160 kilometres from The term maritime forces means naval and air forces

21
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Chapter three

**National defence interests**

**Priorities for force development**

2.69 Arising out of the foregoing discussion, Australia's principal national
defence interests can be summarised as:
—the defence of Australian territory and society from threat of military attack;
—the protection of Australian interests in the surrounding maritime areas, our

##### 3.1island territories, and our proximate ocean areas and focal points; The defence interests outlined in the preceding chapters of this Policy
Information Paper place considerable demands on Australia's resources. To use

—the avoidance of global conflict;

those resources most effectively, priorities for force development have to he

—the maintenance of a strong defence relationship with the United States;

determined and applied rigorously

—the maintenance of a strong defence relationship with New Zealand;

3.2 While it is not possible to predict the future, it is possible to indicate

—the furtherance of a favourable strategic situation in South-East Asia and the

the principal contingencies that must shape Australia's defence planning. This

South-West Pacific;

Government believes that Australia must be able to provide its own defence in

—the promotion of a sense of strategic community between Australia and its

circumstances, presently quite unlikely but still credible as a future possibility, of

neighbours in our area of primary strategic interest;

a threat posed to Australia by a nation operating within our own region. Such

—the maintenance of the provisions of the Antarctic Treaty, which ensure that

developments would place great demands on our defence capacity. Our force

continent remains demilitarised. structure planning will ensure that we have, and can be seen to have, the

noacity to respond effective to tbem

**Possible forms of military pressure**
**against Australia**

##### 3.3 While a principal objective of our defence policy is to reinforce the
positive aspects of our strategic setting, prudent defence policy must also
insure against the uncertainties we have noted in our strategic circumstances
and the risk that they could result in direct military pressure or attack on
Australia. In considering possible forms of military pressure against Australia,
account has to be taken of the enduring features of our national strategic
setting described in Chapter 2 and the consequent military capabilities an
opponent would require to mount and sustain hostilities. We must also compare
the military capability required for this task with the existing and projected
military capabilities of regional countries. And we have to consider the political
and military rationale attaching to different forms of military pressure against
Australia.

3.4 Chapter 2 described how basic facts of our geographic location, the
lack of any shared land borders, and the difficulties of our northern environment,
combine to provide Australia with substantial natural defences against major,
conventional military attack. Equally, it noted that many of the same factors
introduce potential vulnerabilities for Australia which could be exploited by an
adversary using alternative, and less costly military options. Even the use of
limited military force against Australia would pose significant problems for us
and would have the potential—given the vast expanse of our territory and
maritime approaches—to require a defence effort heavily committing our
defence resources.

. 23
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Low level conflict un]ts prepared to confront our forces cereco True 'souid carr rsks for the

**attacker. His calculations would need to take account of our force structure and**

3.5 Successive reviews of the strategic basis of Australian defence policy

the probability of his forces suffering heavy attrition through clashes with the

have noted the advantages an opponent might see in a campaign of sustained

ADF and the expectation that escalation would allow Australia greater freedom

low level military pressure against Australia. The use of military force to harass

in the use of its strike assets. He would also need to assess the risks of

remote settlements and other targets in northern Australia, our off-shore

international repercussions and, most significantly, the reaction of Australia

territories and resource assets, and shipping in proximate areas' could be

ANZUS allies.

decided upon as an attempt to demonstrate Australia's vulnerability and thereby
force political concessions over some disputed issue. In these circumstances, **3.11** The limits of escalated low level conflict would be set at any one time
the attacker could hold the operational initiative. Attacks could be widely by the military capabilities that could practically be brought to bear against
dispersed and unpredictable. Relatively modest military pressure could oblige Australia's interests. In determining the forms of military activity that could be
Australia to respond with quite disproportionate effort. credible, account needs to be taken not simply of the existing and prospective

capabilities of other countries, but also the extent to which they could

**3.6** The adversary could, if he wished, sustain low level activity virtually

realistically be applied. Without the development of a significant operational

indefinitely. For Australia, there would be the cost of undertaking a wide variety

support capability, which would require the commitment of resources over

of operations and of maintaining forces at a high state of readiness. Our

several years, an attacker's ability to conduct escalated operations over a wide

operations would require highly effective intelligence and surveillance capabilities

area or for an extended period would be limited.

and forces with significant range, endurance and mobility.

**3.12** To have significance for our planning, potentially opposing capabilities

3.7 Within the capacity of its forces, the adversary would seek to hold the

must be assessed in terms of their ability to project military force against

initiative in relation to escalation. Australia's need to counter this and to provide

Australia in the face of our offensive and defensive capabilities, and in terms of

against localised escalation would add significantly to the scale of our military

the rationale that would underlie possible forms of military action, including their

effort. In such circumstances there would be arguments for retaliation against

potential to trigger the direct involvement of our ANZUS allies in the conflict.

the attacker. A potential aggressor would recognise this and may seek to
constrain Australia's options through careful control of the scale and intensity

**Summary judgements**

of the military harassment and possibly through the use of covert, and therefore

**3.13** The possible time-scale attaching to the development of low level and

ostensibly disavowable, operations. While broader political considerations might

escalated low level conflicts dictate that the ADF should be capable of

caution against a policy of retaliation, its prospective advantages, both as a

countering them essentially from the force-in-being. The ADF should therefore

means of deterring attack, or if that fails deterring escalation, reinforce the need

be able to conduct such operations as maritime surveillance, interdiction and

for capabilities providing the option for a retaliatory response.

protection tasks, including mine countermeasures. There may be a need for

**3.8** The capability required to mount and sustain low level military pressure offensive strike, especially against maritime targets. As noted previously,
against our nation already exists in the region of primary strategic interest to although constraints would apply to strike against land targets in the
Australia, This is not to identify any country as a potential threat, It is merely to adversary's own territory, the ability to conduct such operations would allow an
address the factors which shape assessments of the possible time-scale over important option.
which threats could emerge. The existence of capability necessarily implies that

3.14 Ground and other forces (such as air defence) would be needed to

threats could emerge over a shorter time-scale.

protect the bases from which our forces were operating, to conduct offensive
action against such enemy forces that had crossed the sea and air gap, and to

**Escalated low level conflict** protect the military and civilian infrastructure and the population. Operations

**3.9** Within Australia's region of primary strategic interest the capability also would usually be joint, and their conduct may require naval, air and land forces
exists to mount more conventional but still limited military operations against to deploy at short notice for sustained operations at a considerable distance
Australia. These could take the form of increased levels of air and sea from their main bases. ADF operations can be expected to be conducted
harassment, extending to air attacks on northern settlements and off-shore concurrently over widely dispersed geographic areas.
installations and territories, attacks on shipping in proximate areas, mining of
northern ports, and more frequent and more intensive raids by land forces,

**More substantial conflict**
###### 3.153.10 Essentially this level of conflict would be characterised by the attacker No regional country now has the capability—nor the motivation—to

supplementing or substituting unconventional tactics and forces with military sustain high level intensive military operations against Australia. Military

1 The issue of threat to Australian trade is discussed in more detail in a separate section later in this attempts to take control of the maritime approaches to Australia and secure
chapter. lines of approach for major ground forces would require substantial military

24 25


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expansion with external support or assistance. Such an expansion would involve g g y p p
long lead times and be clearly evident to us. Meanwhile, the adversary would considerations have led Governments to acquire and develop highly capable
have to assume that Australia would expand its military capability to maintain a maritime and other forces.
relative advantage. **3.22** With our present force structure and its development already approved

**3.16** The invasion and subjugation of Australia would involve exceptional by this Government, we have considerable military capabilities by regional

standards. During the period that an adversary would need to develop the

difficulties. Huge distances, determined military opposition, and a harsh
environment would have to be overcome in successfully transporting and motivation, forces and skills needed for a major assault, we would be able to

develop our surveillance, maritime and other forces still further. In this, we

protecting an invasion force. And unless an adversary gained control of our

would be assisted by the relative advantage that is latent in our mlitary and

major population and industrial centres in the south-east, enemy forces lodged
on the mainland would face eventual defeat as we mobilised our national effort, industrial base and our alliance relationship with the Unded States
with allied support, to cut off their lines of communication and support.

**Summary judgements**

3.17 Short of invasion of the continent, the forces that any adversary would

###### 3.23 In summary, the need to recognise that at some time in the future

need to attempt and sustain a major assault on Australia would also be

there could be a serious deterioration in our strategic circumstances means the

substantial. The skills and equipment required for an opposed amphibious landing

ADF should contain a level of skills from which expansion to meet the

are specialised and extensive. Very few nations have this capability and there is

developing threat could occur. As with lower levels of conflict, a priority

no evidence that regional countries are developing or intend to develop their

concern would be to deny the adversary effective use of the sea and air gap.

force structure in this way. The assets required to transport and resupply a

There would be a greater need for strike and other offensive measures against

lodgement force, and to protect it against our determined attack, would be

the adversary's military bases and infrastructure, and there would be an

large. They would be at risk to pre-emptive attack as they assembled prior to

increased need for such protective capabilities as mine countermeasures, anti-

transit, and vulnerable during transit and when coming ashore.

submarine warfare, and air defence, especially around the bases from which our

**3.18** The development of military capabilities to the stage where such maritime operations were being conducted.
operations could be seriously contemplated would imply dramatic change, not

3.24 Specific implications for ground force development follow from the

now in prospect, to a belligerent and provocative external policy on the part of

constraints the sea and air gap imposes on the range and type of ground forces

a neighbouring country. Alternatively it would require major strategic lodgement

that an opponent could land and sustain against Australia. This has implications

in the northern archipelago by an external power, also now a remote prospect

for the priority to be given in our force development planning to preparing for

given the increased strategic resilience of our ASEAN neighbours. The interests

large scale conventional ground force operations. The primary function of our

of nations other than Australia would be threatened by the arrival in the region

ground forces in more substantial levels of conflict would be to defeat those

of such a power.

enemy forces that had been able to land on Australian territory. Our ground

**3.19** The maintenance of the vitality of our alliance relationship with the forces would be required to conduct offensive action against the enemy's
United States is obviously important as an insurance against higher levels of forces, to contribute to the defence of maritime and other military bases, and to
conflict. It provides us with confidence that assistance would be forthcoming in protect the civil population and infrastructure.
the event of substantial military attack on Australia or its direct interests.

3.25 Against the prospect that the adversary had been able to land and

Moreover, United States action would be most unlikely to await the emergence

sustain more substantial forces, we need expansion base elements for

of a major threat. The dramatic strategic changes that would precede such a

conventional ground force conflict, but not at a high level of preparedness. The

threat would inevitably impinge on important interests the United States has in

Government considers it is appropriate to make greater use of the Reserves in

the region. Major strategic lodgement in the archipelago by an external power

the expansion base for these tasks, in association as necessary with Regular

would affect such interests and would provide strong impetus for the United

personnel.

States to institute countermeasures.

3.20 These considerations provide considerable reassurance against the
possibility of major attack. Nevertheless, because of the severe consequences if **Threats to Australian trade**
such threats emerged over a longer time-scale, Australian defence policy and 3.26 Ranging across the levels of conflict addressed in Australian defence
force structure planning cannot ignore them. planning is the issue of threat to Australian trade by attempted interdiction of

shipping on our trade routes and in proximate ocean areas.

**3.21 The maintenance of a range of capabilities in the ADF applicable to**
higher levels of conflict, sufficient to provide a basis for timely expansion, has 3.27 Australia's overseas trade routes are diverse and their comprehensive
been endorsed by successive Governments as an appropriate measure of interdiction would be credible only in the unlikely circumstances of protracted

27
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affect many countries. Countries which have important interests in the free flow contingency, which would be very demanding for our maritime forces beceuse of
of trade would seek to protect international shipping. Australia would then the distances involved and the dispersion of our focal areas. Such forces cocd
contribute to wider efforts to protect international trade, operating in our own contribute to protecting shipping in the unlikely event of global conflict.
area in accordance with the procedures of the Radford-Collins Agreement.

3.28 Australia enjoys a high degree of economic self-sufficiency. We are a
net exporter of energy and self-sufficient in food. The economy has basic
features which have enabled previous short-term or sporadic interruptions to
trade—through industrial action—to be accommodated, though with **Warning and defence preparation**
inconvenience and economic cost. While our long term prosperity certainly

##### 3.33requires a healthy level of commodity exports (exports now account for some Our force development planning reflects an acceptance that higher

12 per cent of GDP—down from 20 per cent of GDP in the early [1950s),] levels of threat could emerge only after a longer period of time. Our force
Australia could survive significant disruption of overseas trade in the event of capability priorities are structured to take account of existing and projected
global war, though at a cost to our standard of living. Most of the essential capabilities in regional forces and the possibility that ow levels of m [i][ l] i tary threat
needs of the civil community could be met without external supply if appropriate could emerge over shorter timescales
measures of conservation and rationing were introduced. Those essential items

3.34 An important objective of defence piannng s to pro'cde maxooum

that are imported (including defence equipment and spare parts, industrial

time for defence preparations. As some of the responses that could be required

machinery, transport equipment, lubricants and rubber) could be stockpiled or

involve long lead times, the Government requires a constant monitoring of

alternative sources arranged—even if at higher cost—if there is any change in

international circumstances, and particularly of foreign military capabilities, to

our current judgement about the remote prospect of global conflict.

ensure that Australia makes the appropriate military preparations in good time

3.29 Disruption to Australia's trade could occur in a range of other

3.35 Defence policy depends heavily on a high level of performance of

circumstances, and in particular in those contingencies assessed as credible in

intelligence monitoring and assessment of international events to detect

the shorter term. Important Australian trade passes through choke points in the

changes in adequate time. Our intelligence organisations have the responsibility

archipelago to our north and these passages could be denied to us even during

for monitoring developments which could produce pressures or threats against

lower levels of conflict. In those circumstances, there would be options for re-

Australia's interests and to which a defence response may be needed.

routing shipping clear of the archipelago. Economic costs would be involved

Competent intelligence capabilities are an accepted and recognised component

which, without Government subsidy, could adversely affect the competitiveness

of the structure of modern government.

of our exports that normally pass through the archipelago. Again, the cost to
Australia would reflect itself in reduced living standards and economic impact on **3.36** The concept of warning, and its application to Australian defence
some regions of the country, rather than a threat to national survival. planning, has been given careful attention by successive Governments. The

3.30 Effective interdiction of our trade in open ocean areas would require concept had its origins in the Strategic Basis documents of the early `[1970s,]`

which noted that it would take many years for any regional country to develop

wide area surveillance capabilities such as satellites or over-the-horizon radar

the substantial military capabilities required to sustain major operations against

with real-time communications links to attacking forces. No regional country

Australia. In 1976, [the Defence Committee, in its document ][Australia's Strategic]

now has such capabilities and their development is not in prospect. Surveillance
and intelligence information of this kind is unlikely to be made available to a `Analysis and Defence Policy` _Objectives, [expanded on this point, noting that:]_

the emergence of a threat would be a late stage in a series of developments and

regional adversary.

Governments would need to act well in advance of it. Defence planning and

3.31 Interference with or interdiction of shipping in coastal waters and in preparations over the preceding years should therefore be responsive to any
our focal areas and ports might be seen as a more practical option for an strategic change perceived as having potential for harming Australia's interests
adversary. The movement of cargo by coastal shipping contributes substantially

3.37 This definition was reflected in the `[1976 ][White Paper, which observed]`

to the national economy. Its disruption would have a serious effect on such

that defence preparations could not be delayed until a definite threat finally

industries as oil and petroleum, mineral ores, fertilizer and chemicals, coal, and

emerged. Preparatory planning and practical measures taken in advance and

iron and steel. Some parts of Australia and some of our remote northern

based on a capable and versatile defence force would substantially reduce the

settlements are heavily dependent on supply by coastal shipping. Protecting

time necessary to organise an effective defence response. The concept of

shipping in our coastal waters is an important priority for our maritime forces.

warning does not imply a defence force which is static until a threat has

3.32 Our force structure priorities are guided by these more credible materialised, but one responsive to any significant strategic change with the
situations requiring the protection of shipping in coastal waters and in our focal potential to weaken Australia's security.
```
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e de e op e t o t e co cept o a g as bee pa t o t e
process by which Australia has distinguished its unique strategic circumstances **Australia s defence strategy**
from those of its traditional friends and allies in the northern hemisphere. Our

##### 3.44 Australia's defence strategy is based on the concept of defence in

allies face direct and identifiable military threats from nearby forces to which

depth. This strategy and our force structure planning give priority to meeting

they may have to respond in timescales measured in days and weeks. Australia

credible levels of threat in Australia's area of direct military interest. An

faces no presently identifiable major military threat, except for the remote

adversary would be faced with a comprehensive array of military capabilities,

possibility of global war. All conceivable such threats from a regional power

having both defensive and offensive components. Australia is not an aggressive

would be preceded by a build-up of forces. The two superpowers alone possess

or expansionist nation, but an adversary must be left in no doubt about our

the military capabilities that could threaten Australia with invasion. The United

ability to counter the escalation of his military operations against us, including

States is a close ally of Australia and it is impossible to see, in that context,

by use of our strike and interdiction capabilities.

what purpose would be served by a major military threat to Australia from the
Soviet Union short of global war. 3.45 Defence in depth gives priority to the ability of the ADF to mount

**3.39** Any decision to embark upon hostilities as a deliberate act of state operations capable of defeating enemy forces in our area of direct military
policy is a major one for any government to make. There would need to be interest. This means that we must have forces capable of tracking and targeting
some matter of sufficient weight in dispute. Tensions would need to develop to the adversary, mounting maritime and air operations in the sea and air gap to
the point where one side decides to use force. Australia does not have that kind our north, capable of offensive strike and interdiction missions, having a
of dispute with any nation. Much would need to change, therefore, in our comprehensive range of defensive capabilities—including air defence, mine
international position for the possibility of such conflict to arise. These changes countermeasures, and protection of coastal trade—and embodying mobile land
would be evident to us and to our friends. forces able to defeat hostile incursions at remote locations.

3.40 There would also be indicators of major physical preparation. Within **3.46** The fundamental importance of the sea and air gap to our security
our region no nation has the ships, aircraft and transportable forces that would gives high priority to maritime (naval and air) forces capable of preventing an
be necessary to launch and sustain an effective assault upon Australia. These adversary from substantial operations in that area. There could be a need to be
are among the most expensive and sophisticated forms of defence technology able to conduct operations against the bases that an adversary was using for
for any country to acquire. Their acquisition and introduction into full operational his attacks on us, and against his infrastructure. As our maritime forces would
service could not be concealed and the development of the operational expertise not be able to prevent an adversary from at least limited use of the sea and air
to use this technology effectively in an assault on Australia would take many gap, a primary task for us would be the protection of the bases from which our
years. maritime forces operated. Ground forces would also be needed to take offensive

action against the forces the adversary had landed, and, with other force

**3.41** Our considerations are also influenced by the preparation necessary for

elements, to protect other areas of the military and civil infrastructure and

military expansion. Comparison of the expansion times for other countries and

population.

Australia to become effective in the use of important military capabilities
includes a careful weighing of combat training skills, the ability to operate and 3.47 For successful operations in all levels of conflict our forces need to
maintain advanced equipment, the size and scope of the economic, industrial, have effective capabilities with good range, endurance and mobility and be
and scientific and technical base, and the prospects for assured external trained to operate in a harsh environment. The communications needed for
support. command and control, and the logistics organisation needed for resupply, have

3.42 Different considerations apply when low level threats are contemplated. to be designed to operate effectively over great distances. In the event of
As already pointed out these threats could range from harassment of our conflict, logistics would be particularly demanding and there would be a need to
maritime zone and offshore rigs or mining of ports at the lower level, through to make best use of our civil assets.
substantial raids of short term duration on important northern targets or our

3.48 In developing forces with the required characteristics, the prudent

offshore islands. For such activity, which could heavily consume Australian

application of advanced technology plays an important role. In many cases the

defence resources, the range of indications is much smaller. The capabilities

ability to apply advanced technology effectively provides the only real solution to

required are much less and already exist in a number of countries.

many aspects of defending our vast continent and our interests in surrounding

**3.43** The political problems which might lead to low level threats are more maritime areas. This reinforces the need for continuing national and defence
diverse in nature than those which might invite more substantial attack. Less expertise in selected areas of science and technology (see Chapter 5).
time would be needed for an adversary to prepare and Australia would also have Nevertheless, high technology equipment is very costly. Assessments of the
less time to mount a military response. Thus the Government has directed that value of constructing weapon platforms in Australia must involve a careful
priority be given in defence planning to ensuring adequate and appropriate evaluation of the strategic requirement for maintaining or developing local
capabilities exist within the Defence Force to deal with such pressures. capabilities. The important requirements are to be capable of sustaining and

30 31


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west Australia;

capabilities that can be efficiently produced from our own resources, and to

—a capability to sustain operations in areas of Australia and its territories

adapt and maintain equipment in the Australian operational environment.

remote from our industrial and logistic support centres; and

3.49 In relation to the question of operational readiness, the forces we —command, control and communications systems commensurate with these
would require to deal effectively with the types of military threats that could tasks
arise in the shorter term need to be maintained at a high state of readiness.

**3.53** These basic requirements determine our force structure. The

This does not mean that all such units should be at uniformly high readiness but

characteristics of range, endurance and mobility that we plan for the ADF

we need to be confident that they could become effective, deploy, and sustain

provide the Government with practical options for sustaining our defence

operations in an appropriate timescale.

activities further afield should the need arise

3.50 Readiness will be enhanced by increased training and basing in those
areas of the continent most likely to be involved in credible situations. Training
in northern areas fosters familiarity with likely areas of operation and thus
allows an immediate advantage over an adversary. It allows us to determine
more accurately the substantial demands on defence and other infrastructure of
this harsh operating environment—for example, the requirements for
surveillance, command, control and communications, mobile strike forces and
the necessary logistic capacity in remote areas.

**Requirements for force development**

**3.51** The broad requirements which result from the application of the
priorities discussed in this chapter can be summarised as:

—intelligence collection, assessment and regular review processes to detect
changes in strategic circumstances;
—planning processes which regularly test the consequences for our force
structure of the types of military pressure that could arise over shorter time-
scales; and
—a defence force able to:
–undertake current and foreseeable peacetime operational tasks;
–deal effectively with the kinds of military pressure that could arise over
shorter time-scales; and
–provide a suitable basis for timely expansion to meet higher levels of
threat if our strategic circumstances deteriorate over the longer term

**3.52** Within this planning framework, priority capability areas include:
—surveillance and patrol operations in our maritime resources zone and
proximate ocean areas;
—maritime forces (including mine countermeasure forces) able to protect
shipping in coastal waters and in our focal areas and ports;
—ground reconnaissance and surveillance forces;
—mobile ground forces able to defeat hostile incursions at remote localities and
protect military and infrastructure assets that support the projection of our
maritime power
—air defence within our maritime areas and northern approaches;
—maritime and land interdiction and strike capabilities, particularly the ability to

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4.7 This national requirement for broad area surveillance poses formidable

Chapter four

problems. Ground based or ship based microwave radars lack coverage beyond

**The Australian Defence Force and** about 250 nautical miles for high flying aircraft; for detection of low flying
**its development** early warning and control (AEW&C) aircraft can provide greater coverage, aaircraft and surface ships, the range is much more limited. Although airborne

solution based on the sole use of AEW&C aircraft would be prohibitively
expensive.

**4.8** Recent technological developments in over-the-horizon radar (OTHR)

**4.1** The preceding chapters have drawn conclusions from our strategic have led to practicable broad area surveillance at an affordable cost. For
circumstances about priorities for the capabilities we need in the Australian Australia. OTHR with its ability to sweep large volumes of air and sea space
Defence Force (ADF). This chapter describes the capabilities of the ADF and from a single location offers the only affordable solution. With an OTHR
outlines the directions in which Government will develop the ADF in the light of network, we expect to be able to monitor the great expanses of our sea and air
these priorities. approaches and provide long range detection and tracking of aircraft and

surface ships. Without an OTHR network, we would remain essentially unaware
of movements of interest in our vast maritime approaches.
**4.9 The Government has given high priority to the design and development**
of this network, based on the Australian designed Jindalee experimental radar.

**Intelligence and surveillance**

The OTHR network will be a basic element of a national system for air defence

**Intelligence** and airspace control.

**4.2** A high level of capability in strategic intelligence is fundamental. This
allows us to review developments in the defence capabilities and political
positions of other countries and to monitor them for changes that could affect
our security. Our intelligence priorities focus on those potential changes that
affect us directly. We must also, however, be able to assess developments
beyond our region of primary strategic interest.

4.3 By continuing to develop our own capabilities and by supporting existing
arrangements for intelligence sharing with allied countries, the Government will
ensure that our needs for strategic intelligence of high quality will continue to
be met.

4.4 The Government plans to enhance our independent intelligence
capabilities by establishing a large satellite communications station in Western
Australia. This will contribute to Australia's security in our area of strategic
interest. The station will be totally Australian owned and will be manned and
operated by the Defence Signals Directorate.
**4.5 With the operational emphasis of the ADF being focused on lower levels**
of conflict, our priorities for operational intelligence should be similarly directed.
The Government will ensure that, through our own capabilities and co-operation
with allies, we shall continue to meet our needs for operational intelligence.

**Broad area surveillance**
**4.6 The ADF requires a manifest capability to conduct surveillance of our**
vast sea and air approaches. The capability must provide the means to detect,
identify and, if necessary, respond to sea and air activity in our sovereign air **_The aerial array of the Jindalee over-the-horizon radar. A Jindalee network of up to three_**
and sea space. **_radars will be a basic element of a national air defence and control system._**

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**4.10** Up to three new radars have been identified as required and studies 4.18 Until the capability of OTHR for the detection of surface ships
are underway on their precise locations. Current planning is for one or two to better developed, maritime surveillance will continue to be undertaken by ong
be sited in north-eastern Australia and one sited in the west or south-west. The range maritime patrol aircraft, and surface ships. Embarked helicopters
system will be developed to improve tracking of surface ship movements. significantly increase the surveillance capability of surface ships. The guided

missile frigates (FFGs) of our current fleet have this capability, as will future

4.11 The ability of OTHA to control air intercepts will continue to be

major surface combatants.

investigated; however, the precision required for such a task is probably only
consistently achievable in the foreseeable future by use of microwave radars, **4.19** The ADF's fleet of 20 P-3C Orion long range maritime patrol (LAMP)
either in the intercepting aircraft or ship or in an AEW&C aircraft. aircraft is expected to remain in service for at least the next 20 years. This

aircraft has long range and endurance and can operate from the major airfields

**4.12** The Government has decided to upgrade the existing Jindalee radar at

across the north, including those on Cocos and Christmas islands. This number

Alice Springs to provide a test bed for scientific, engineering and operational

of aircraft is adequate for our present and foreseen needs. The Government will

development. This will allow the testing of important new features including

improve the capabilities of these aircraft through the acquisition of modern

specialised transmitters, greater computing capacity and further development of

electronic support measures which facilitate the detection and classification of

the computer software. The upgrade will also enable Service operators to gain

electronic emissions. An update to the radar is also being considered.

valuable operational experience on OTHR in preparation for the new network.

**Air surveillance**

**4.13** The Government will develop a national system of air defence and
airspace control which will integrate the information available from a variety of
sources (eg, OTHR, civil and military microwave radars, intelligence sources),
collate and analyse that information, and present the results to commanders.
Other major elements of the system include the Tactical Fighter Force, an
infrastructure of air bases, command and control, and the supporting
communications system.

**4.14** The RAAF operates three ground based microwave air defence radars,
and the acquisition of further radars is under consideration. These can provide
greater definition and control in the vicinity of airfields and other important
areas. All RAN major combatants have early warning radars for monitoring and
controlling their respective environments, which includes the control of aircraft.
These radars can also assist in the protection of important coastal installations.

**4.15** The combination of an OTHR network and AEW&C aircraft offers
considerable potential for airspace surveillance. AEW&C aircraft have the
flexibility and speed to respond quickly to targets detected by OTHR. The
microwave radar of the AEW&C aircraft has the precision to monitor with great
accuracy the movements of a target and, if required, direct an interception.

**4.16** The Government has requested and the Department of Defence is now
evaluating proposals from industry for AEW&C systems. The Government
accepts in principle the need for such systems and will include provision in the

_Two [elements of Australia's maritime surveillance capability. P3C Orion long range maritime]_

Five Year Defence Program. The Department is also conducting a major study

**_patrol aircraft and Oberon class submarine._**

into air defence surveillance elements.

**Maritime surveillance**

4.17 The planned OTHR network will form the basis for our system of
maritime surveillance. However, even if a ship has been detected by OTHR, it
may still need to be intercepted and identified by ship or aircraft. In the vast
expanses to our north, this is a formidable task.

36 37


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**Anti-submarine surveillance and anti-submarine-** considerable capacity for mobile reconnaissance over a wide area. Specialised
**warfare** equipment will be acquired to expand further our capabilities for surveillance and

mobility.

**4.20** The threat to Australia from submarines is low. Nevertheless, because
the necessary skills are difficult to acquire and the lead times for adapting and
developing anti-submarine warfare (ASW) technology for the Australian
environment are long, we need to maintain our expertise in anti-submarine
warfare. **0**

4.21 Our first priority for surveillance against submarines is the protection
of our major focal areas and their approaches. Although shipping using our

**)**

southern ports and waters gains some protection from submarine attack by
virtue of the distances that an attacker would need to cover to operate in those

**lc,**

areas, no such protection is afforded to shipping using northern ports and
waters.

4.22 Anti-submarine surveillance and ASW are conducted by units of the
Fleet and the LRMP force. The guided missile destroyers (DDG) and destroyer _1•_

4'

escorts (DE) of the RAN are equipped for ASW with the Ikara ASW missile and
anti-submarine torpedoes. The submarines and the FFGs are also equipped with
the latter.

**4.23** The anti-submarine surveillance capabilities of the Fleet will be
considerably enhanced as a result of the Government's decision to purchase
Seahawk helicopters for the FFGs. The Sea King helicopters already in service
can provide a further land based ASW capability in our major focal areas. In
anti-submarine operations, the P-3C aircraft has the ability to lay and monitor
sonobuoys, including the Australian designed and produced Barra sonobuoy, to
attack submarines with torpedoes, and to lay mines.

4.24 Another important development in anti-submarine surveillance is the
surface-towed acoustic array. This new technology, coupled with advanced **1z**

**_Soldiers of the Special Air Service Regiment during a training exercise near Northam, WA._**

computer processing, offers prospects of long range detection of modern

**_The Regiment can complement the Regional Force Surveillance units in its surveillance role._**

submarines in some nationally important sea areas, including those of our south.
Our investigations of the potential of this new approach will proceed, as a
matter of priority, to at least the trials and evaluation stage. Similarly, acoustic
arrays towed by submarines will contribute to anti-submarine warfare.

**Electronic warfare**
##### 4.27Ground surveillance and reconnaissance The incorporation of modern technology into defence equipment has
led to a greater and more complex use of the electromagnetic spectrum by

4.25 There is a need for ground force surveillance of our northern areas sensors and weapons. This has increased the importance of being able to
against the prospect of an adversary's raiding forces crossing the sea and air exploit an adversary's use of electromagnetic radiation and to restrain his
gap and conducting operations on the Australian continent. To meet this exploitation of ours.
requirement, three Regional Force Surveillance Units manned largely by the Army

**4.28** Our priorities in electronic warfare (EW) reflect the operational needs

Reserve have been established to cover the Pilbara, the Kimberleys and Northern

of lower level contingencies. This gives emphasis to electronic support measures

Territory, and Northern Queensland.

as an aid to surveillance and identification, and to communications EW to

**4.26** To complement the surveillance role of Regional Force Surveillance support ADF operations. We need to know the transmission characteristics of
Units the Special Air Service Regiment can undertake ground reconnaissance to the friendly, neutral and hostile forces that would be most relevant in such
locate and identify any raiding forces operating on Australian territory. In contingencies. The establishing and development of the Defence EW Data Base
addition, 2nd Cavalry Regiment, which is to be relocated to Darwin, has a will be important in this regard.

38 39


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4.29 In other areas of EW, our priorities concentrate on the need for **4.36** The ADF undertakes some basic training in NBC defensive and
scientific and technological understanding of EW and its developments rather protective measures, but such training does not command a high priority. A
than on acquiring a high level of operational capability. scientific competence in NBCD matters is maintained to advise on policy and to
give direction to ADF training.
**Mapping, charting and infrastructure knowledge**
4.30 The availability of comprehensive and up to date military maps and **Strike and interdiction**
charts, together with a detailed knowledge of the environment and its

##### 4.37infrastructure, is fundamental to the effective conduct of military operations. The Earlier chapters have noted that although political constraints could

size of Australian sovereign territory and our area of direct military interest limit the use of our strike capabilities in lower levels of conflict, they represent
makes this an imposing task. Priority in this work is being given to operationally a useful option that a Government would wish to have available. They are also
important geographic areas. part of the expansion base we need for higher levels of conflict. Two force

elements have a primary strike and interdiction function—the F-111 strike and

**4.31** Productivity increases arising from new technology will speed up the

reconnaissance force and the submarine force. Other elements such as the

production of military maps and related data required by the ADF for military

Tactical Fighter Force, LRMP aircraft, surface ships and special action forces

operations. Nevertheless, the mapping of the priority areas of the north will still

can also contribute to this capability.

take many years. Further advances may be possible in the context of
Government's consideration of the rationalisation of Commonwealth mapping.
Aerial photography for mapping purposes will continue to be conducted using **Strike aircraft**
leased aircraft. **4.38** Our 23 F-ill aircraft represent a unique force in regional terms. They

are long range aircraft with the ability to strike sea and land targets with

4.32 Detailed knowledge of Australia's marine environment is fundamental

substantial immunity. Four F-i i is are fitted to conduct all-weather, long range

not only to Australia's commercial interests and purposes but also to the safe

reconnaissance. Since their acquisition, the F-i i is have been updated

and effective conduct of maritime operations, especially for navigation, mine and

progressively and their effectiveness enhanced. They have been fitted to fire

counter-mine warfare, and submarine and anti-submarine operations. The task is

Harpoon for maritime strike. The Pave Tack precision weapon delivery system,

formidable and there are few specialised ships available. Measures are being

which significantly enhances target identification and weapon delivery, is being

taken to redress this.

fitted. It increases the accuracy with which conventional bombs can be

**4.33** Two heavy landing craft have been allocated as interim survey ships to delivered, it can designate targets for the delivery of the laser guided bombs
assist in the national charting effort undertaken by HMA Ships MORESBY and which have been acquired for the F-111, and it could be used with other
FLINDERS. The Government is acquiring four survey motor launches. In addition, precision weapons that might be acquired.
an Australian designed laser airborne depth sounder is under development. This
promises accurate surveying of coastal waters at a faster rate than conventional **4.39** The effectiveness of the F- 111 will decline unless some of its avionics
means. Other options under consideration include the acquisition of more survey and support systems, which are becoming increasingly difficult to maintain, are
ships. updated. The introduction of the F/A-18 Hornet raises the possibility that

Hornets could be used to replace F-i i is lost from the strike force through

4.34 Oceanographic research is conducted by HMAS COOK. Another vessel

attrition. A submarine launched missile is another strike option for the longer

will be acquired particularly to assist in the development of towed acoustic

term.

arrays.

4.40 The lead times for taking up these options are substantial. Meanwhile,
separate options are being developed to refurbish the F-i ii fleet at minimum
cost to maintain the aircraft in service and to reduce significantly its operating

**Nuclear, Biological and Chemical** costs.
**Defence (NBCD)**

**Submarines**
##### 4.414.35 No neighbouring country now has nuclear weapons, and their Our six Oberon class submarines were commissioned into service from

development or acquisition is not in prospect. Similarly, no neighbouring country the late 1960s. With their updated sensors and weapons they represent the
maintains chemical or biological weapons although, by their very nature, the most formidable sub-surface strike force in the region. Their weapons include
time-scale for the development of chemical or biological weapons would be the Mk48 torpedo, effective against both ships and submarines, and the anti-ship
much shorter. Harpoon missile.

40 41


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**Maritime warfare**

##### 4.45 By its very nature, the defence of Australia and its territories
emphasises maritime warfare capabilities. The ADF must be able to conduct
maritime operations to prevent an adversary from substantial use or exploitation
of our maritime approaches. The maritime force structure reflects the
requirements for both coastal operations—particularly for mine countermeasures
and to counter harassment and infiltration—and ocean operations, which require
a higher level of offensive and defensive capabilities.

Surface combatant force

**4.46** The present surface combatant force consists of 12 destroyers (three
DDGs, four FFGs, five DEs) and 20 patrol boats (15 Fremantle Class and five
Attack Class). Two further FFGs are being built at Williamstown Naval Dockyard,
and will enter service in the early 1990s, when two of the older DEs pay off.
The Government will expand the Navy to a force operating 16 to 17 major
surface combatants.

**_The long range Fill aircraft have a highly effective maritime strike capability. Four are being_**
**_fitted for all-weather, long range reconnaissance._**

4.42 The characteristics of the Oberons (and their replacements) include
long range and endurance and the ability to operate independently and

lT

effectively in areas where an adversary might have air superiority.

**4.43** The Oberon submarines are expected to be paid off during the 1990s
as they become more difficult to maintain and suffer operational degradation.
The Government is introducing a new class of submarine which will be
constructed in Australia. We will acquire six new submarines which, with their
modern equipment, high performance and greater availability, will enhance the
capability of our submarine force.

**4.44** To ensure that the Commonwealth gets value for money in this costly
project and to reduce risk, the Government has funded competitive tenders
between two different submarine designers and two different designers of
submarine combat systems. These tenders have been submitted and are being
evaluated. The Government will announce its decision in 1987.

**_HMAS DARWIN, one of the RAN's fleet of 12 destroyers. Two further guided missile frigates_**
**_are being built to enter service early next decade._**

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4.47 Present planning for the development of the surface combatant force **Maritime air operations**
envisages three broad levels of capability. At the first level are high capability

###### 4.52 Land based aircraft capable of maritime operations are P-3C Orions for

surface combatants able to contribute to a wide range of operations in both low

surveillance, strike and ASW, and F-ills and F/A-18 Hornets for strike,

level and more substantial contingencies. They have sensors and weapons able

interdiction and maritime air defence. Ships' systems, such as radars, air

to provide a wide range of capabilities and a high degree of survivability, and

defence missiles and guns also contribute to air defence.

are capable of integrating with allied forces if required. At present, the DDGs
and FFGs comprise the first level. The DDGs are being progressively modernised **4.53** The P-3C LRMP aircraft provide maritime surveillance against surface
at Garden Island Dockyard, with the last to be completed by 1990. They are ships and are able to conduct anti-surface warfare operations using the Harpoon
expected to remain in service for at least ten years after modernisation. The anti-ship missile. The P-3C can also lay mines. F-11 1C and Hornet aircraft armed
FFGs are expected to be in service for 30 years. with Harpoon missiles perform a valuable role in anti-surface warfare operations.

This capability—indeed maritime operations generally—would be enhanced if

**4.48** The second level comprises ships of lesser capability, suitable for

AEW&C aircraft are acquired.

dealing with lesser forms of military pressure which could arise in Australia's
resource zones and proximate waters or in Australia's area of direct military 4.54 The Government decided in 1985 to acquire Seahawk helicopters to
interest. A new class of vessel—a light patrol frigate—has been proposed for operate from our six FFGs. The Seahawks will provide surveillance and weapon
this level of capability. Eight ships will be constructed in Australia. They will be targeting, and will conduct ASW operations. The eight light patrol frigates will
designed so that their sensors and weapons can be enhanced to enable them to be able to operate these helicopters. Our Sea King helicopters can undertake
contribute to operations in more substantial contingencies and to complement coastal and focal area ASW operations from land bases. Navy's helicopter needs
the first level of capability in operations in the direct defence of Australia. They for HMA Ships SUCCESS, STALWART and TOBRUK after the Wessex utility
will need endurance, sea-keeping and combat capabilities commensurate with helicopters reach their end of life are presently under study.
these tasks, and will be able to embark Seahawk helicopters. A significant
influence on their selection will be the need to achieve the required numbers
within reasonable cost. The ship will be of a type that will allow the
Government to select from a number of Australian yards for construction.

**4.49** At the third level are the patrol boats, which are suitable for coastal **Mine countermeasures force**
operations. Their capabilities are primarily defensive. They can undertake national
peacetime tasks including fisheries patrol and law enforcement and are also **4.55** The Government gives a high priority to the development of a capable
capable of contributing to coastal, port and harbour defence if the occasion mine countermeasures force. The present force consists of a single minehunting
demands. The present Fremantle boats will remain in service well into the ship. This is inadequate. A mine countermeasures force will be developed that
1990s. The number of third level vessels required in the longer term will depend will ensure that our major ports can be kept open.
on the numbers, capabilities, and cost of the ships acquired for the second

**4.56** A new class of glass reinforced plastic inshore minehunter (MHI)

level.

catamaran has been developed in Australia for hunting mines in inshore waters.
The first of two prototype MHIs has been delivered and the second is expected
in mid-1987. Subject to successful evaluation and further review of our priority
needs, it is planned to acquire at least four additional MHls.

**Submarine force** 4.57their characteristics, we need minesweepers to complement the minehunters.Because the waters in which we could need to counter mines vary in

**4.50** As well as being able to conduct strike operations against surface The RAN is developing an innovative Australian concept for acoustic and
ships and other submarines, the submarine force can conduct reconnaissance magnetic sweeps, and will acquire craft-of-opportunity, such as fishing boats
and patrol, and operate in conjunction with the Army's special action forces. and tugs, for the rapid expansion of our mine countermeasures force. This

concept involves the use of members of the Naval Reserve whose knowledge of

**4.51** The Government has recognised that the effectiveness of the

local waters would be of great advantage in mine warfare.

submarine force would be enhanced by basing some of the submarines in the
west closer to priority operating areas. HMAS Stirling is being developed as a **4.58 [The mine countermeasures force also needs the capability to counter]**
major submarine facility. Oberon class submarines will be home-ported there, as mines specifically targeted against mine countermeasure vessels themselves. A
will some of the new submarines. The Government has authorised the mine warfare systems centre will be developed in Sydney to support the mine
construction of a substantial submarine training facility in Stirling and has more warfare force. This support will include the collation of extensive environmental
facilities under consideration. data on the mining characteristics of our ports.

45
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**_&_**

--

. .
r JA

.1 _TT;j9_

**_HMAS RUSHCU1TER, a 31 metre glass reinforced plastic catamaran designed to hunt mines_**
**_in harbours estuaries, channels and other shallow waters which abound along Australia's_**
**_coastline._** **_HMAS TOBRUK, a heavy landing ship of the amphibious force which provides sea transport_**

**_capability for the Australian Defence Force._**

**4.62** With major Fleet units homeported on the west coast and to cater for

**Amphibious forces** possible expansion, there are advantages in acquiring a second underway

**4.59** The Fleet currently includes seven amphibious ships—a heavy landing replenishment ship. Various options are being examined including the acquisition
ship (LSH) and six heavy landing craft. In peacetime and in low level and conversion of a merchant tanker or the acquisition of a low cost naval

vessel.

contingencies they provide the sea transport capability of the ADF. An
advantage of these ships is their ability to discharge cargo and personnel across
a beach or through non-operational ports by beaching and, in the case of the **Naval infrastructure**
LSH, HMAS TOBRUK, by using helicopters or small vessels.

**4.63** The need for the Navy to operate from both the east and the west
coasts has been recognised for many years. However, for historic, strategic and

**Afloat support** economic reasons the RAN has operated primarily from the east coast.

**4.60** Underway replenishment has advantages particularly where naval units **4.64** The homeporting of major fleet units at HMAS Stirling recognises the
are required to undertake sustained operations at long ranges from bases and need for the Navy to be able to operate effectively from both coasts for the
logistic support. There are similar advantages with afloat maintenance support direct defence of Australia. Two DEs, two Fremantle class patrol boats, one
where ships are operating in areas away from major Naval bases. Attack class patrol boat (operated by the Naval Reserve) and a survey ship are

**4.61** HMAS SUCCESS provides underway replenishment. This vessel was based at Stirling. They will be joined shortly by an Oberon class submarine.
commissioned in 1986 and will join the Fleet as a fully operational unit in 1987 **4.65** To inform judgements on options for the future disposition of naval
Afloat maintenance support is provided by HMAS STALWART which is due to units and the location of infrastructure, the Department of Defence has
reach its end of life in the later 1990.

conducted the Fleet Base Relocation Study. This study reported on all significant

46

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4.67 Rationalisation of shore training and support establishments to enable
more efficient use of resources is being examined. Relocation of substantial
functions to Jervis Bay and HMAS Stirling is probable.

**Air warfare**

**4.68** By the very nature of the medium in which it takes place, air warfare
is part of all forms of warfare—maritime, land and air. Consequently, some

**Jy** aspects of air warfare have been covered earlier in this chapter in the sections

describing air and maritime surveillance, strike and interdiction, maritime air
support, anti-submarine surveillance and anti-submarine warfare. Air support of
the land battle is covered later in this chapter. This section covers air defence
and the Tactical Fighter Force, ground based surface to air missiles, strategic
transport, and northern airfield infrastructure.

**_a'_**

Air defence and the Tactical Fighter Force (TFF)

**_4.69_** Airspace surveillance, including the need for a national system for air
defence and airspace control, has been discussed earlier. The developments
planned for OTHR, the Tactical Fighter Force (TIFF), defence communications and
defence command systems should result in such a system for northern Australia

**_HMAS SUCCESS, the Fleet's underway replenishment ship permits naval units to undertake_** by the late 1990s. It is a primary requirement for effective air defence.
**_long range and sustained operations without reliance on shore-based logistic support._**

4.70 Doctrine and operating procedures which effectively integrate all air
defence elements, including naval elements, will be developed for the defence of
vital assets. This will become increasingly important if the potentials of OTHR

issues and options associated with the relocation of Fleet elements from and AEW&C aircraft are to be fully realised.
Sydney to Jervis Bay (NSW) and prospects for increasing ship basing at HMAS

4.71 Within the TIFF, the replacement of the Mirage fighter aircraft by the

Stirling. Issues considered included strategic, operational and cost factors as

F/A-18 Hornet is proceeding smoothly and, with the associated upgrading of the

well as implications for the community. The study noted the advantages of

TFF's air-to-air missiles, represents a major upgrading of capability. Two

Jervis Bay over other locations on the east coast for a new Fleet base. The

squadrons and the operational conversion unit will be based at Williamtown

Government is committed to examining fully the environmental considerations of

(NSW) and the third squadron will be based at the major airfield being developed

what is clearly the most suitable alternative location for the major fleet base in

at Tindal (NT). The last of the 75 Hornet aircraft that have been ordered is

the east, before reaching any decision.

planned to be delivered by the Government Aircraft Factories in 1991.

**4.66** The Fleet Base Relocation Study reported that the development of

4.72 The Government's decision to modify the four Boeing 707 aircraft of

HMAS Stirling for up to half the fleet would be a sensible planning objective to

the RAAF will allow the Hornet aircraft to increase its effective range and

be achieved progressively. It is now the Governments intention to move half the

payload. This number of aircraft is sufficient to provide a training capability, a

fleet to HMAS Stirling. This will enable the Navy more readily to develop

limited operational capability and a base for expansion. It facilitates the

expertise in areas in which it would need to operate in contingencies that could

development and acquisition of the complex skills needed for effective refuelling

arise in shorter timescales. Ships operating in the strategically important areas

Operations.

of the north and north-west and supported from HMAS Stirling will gain a
substantial increase in their effective operating time. In this further development **4.73** The Hornet has capabilities for strike and interdiction as well as air
at Stirling, there will be an emphasis on avoiding duplication of specialised defence. Its existing capabilities include precision weapons such as the Harpoon
support facilities already available on the east coast. anti-ship missile and laser guided bombs.

48 49


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y p y

4.74 Modern munitions have greater accuracy and effectiveness and can

in present strategic circumstances. In more substantial conflict they could be

lead to enhanced survivability of the delivering aircraft. They are costly,

required for the protection of vital areas and points. However, they can be

however, and the priority for their acquisition needs to be based on a clear

readily integrated into the nation's air defence system if a change in

understanding of their use in different levels of contingency. Also important are

circumstances leads to their acquisition.

lead times for acquisition, the development of necessary doctrine and skills, and
ascertaining performance in our areas of interest. These considerations lead to a
policy of acquiring limited stocks of selected types of munition to gain a basic **Strategic transport**
level of familiarity in weapon performance and procedures and to maintain a

**4.78** The strategic transport needs of the ADE are met by the Boeing 707

contingency reserve.

and C-130E aircraft of the RAAF. These can be augmented by aircraft of the
civil air fleet. That augmentation is of special significance in the event of

**Land based surface-to-air missiles** conflict as it offers a major reserve capacity.

**4.75** The Rapier low level air defence weapon system and the RBS-70 very
low level air defence weapon system, which will replace Redeye in 1987, provide
close-in protection to airfields, important installations and vulnerable points.

/ -.----'
,-'.-

**_The Boeing 707 aircraft, above, together with C 130E aircraft meets the strategic transport_**
**_needs of the Australian Defence Force. It is planned to modify the 707 aircraft for in-flight_**
**_refuelling._**

**_The Rapier (pictured) and the RBS-70, two air defence weapon systems which provide close-_**
**_in protection to airfields and other important facilities._**

**Northern airfield infrastructure**

**4.76** The current capability is one battery of each system. This is a

**4.79** A chain of northern air bases is needed for the RAAF to react

minimum but adequate structure to establish command and control procedures

effectively to possible contingencies and to support ADF operations across the

appropriate to more substantial conflict, and to meet the needs of low level

vast expanses of the north. There are already major manned bases at Darwin

conflict.

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and Townsville, and unmanned bases at Learmonth and Tindal. Stage one of the **80** The Government will build an airfield on Cape York Peninsula. A
construction of Derby airfield is due for completion in 1987, and the current number of issues, however, have yet to be resolved. For example, site options
development of Tindal will allow the basing of a Hornet squadron there from must be developed, environmental impact studies must be completed, land
late 1988. acquisition resolved, and extensive engineering and design effort conducted after

the selection of an appropriate site. The aim is to have the airfield operational
as early as possible in the 1990s.

**4.81** Civil airfields in the north are also available for military use. They
include Port Hedland, Broome, Kununurra, Gave, Mt Isa, Weipa and Cairns. Some
can sustain regular military movements while others are suitable only for

; . _4'._ emergency use of limited duration.

AL

**Land Warfare**

**4.82** The Government's policy is that, in response to the wide range of
credible northern contingencies, the Army's structure must include highly mobile
forces capable of rapid deployment anywhere within Australia and its territories.
The ground force must be able to conduct protracted and dispersed operations
in harsh terrain where the existing infrastructure and resources are sparse, and
be logistically supportable within Australia's resources. An expansion base is
required at a lower priority to maintain the essential skills and capabilities
needed for more substantial conflict, together with sufficient units on which to
base timely expansion. Elements for lesser contingencies also form a large part
of the expansion base. The command, training and logistic framework to support
the development, operation and maintenance of the total force is also required.

4.83 These requirements indicate changes of emphasis rather than a
significant departure from existing organisation. We need a force structure that
includes a light air portable force, capable of rapid deployment; forces capable
of following up an initial deployment; and the availability of greater combat
power to reinforce deployed formations if necessary. In addition, elements
capable of deploying to defend vital defence installations and national
infrastructure, and a logistic organisation capable of supporting the deployment
and subsequent operations of these forces, need to be given priority.

**4.84** This force structure requires no major changes from the current Army
organisation based on the 1st Division (essentially Regular), two Reserve
divisions (2nd and 3rd), and Training and Logistic Commands. However, some
changes are needed to meet requirements for readiness, sustainability, and
strategic and tactical mobility.

**1 Division**

_'.44_ **4.85** 1 Division will become more readily deployable, with a priority task

being to provide the tactical headquarters, formations and units required for

1

credible contingencies. All elements will be required to achieve specific degrees

_Tind41 al airstrip.airstrip. Construction of RAAF Tindal is proceeding to permit the basing_ _of an F/A- 18_ of operational readiness. As a secondary priority, 1 Division will continue to

_squadron there in 1988._ develop and maintain doctrine and skills for the broad range of conventional

operations required in more substantial conflict.

52 53


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4.86 1 Division will remain structured as an infantry division, with 3 Brigade, **Protection of vital assets**
6 Brigade, and 7 Brigade (a Reserve formation) providing the formations likely to

###### 4.91 In the event of military conflict, military bases and the civilian

be deployed to meet shorter term contingencies. 1 Brigade and 11 Field Force
Group (a Reserve formation) will also remain with 1 Division, but in different infrastructure and population in the north must be protected. Plans will be

developed to use both Regular and Reserve forces for this vital task. Planning

readiness categories from the other formations. This grouping will give flexibility
within the division to assign units according to the particular requirements of a will proceed on the basis of a possible initial need to use Regular units deployed
contingency. at short notice, followed by their relief by designated Reserve elements to

release the Regular units for mobile offensive operations.

**3 Brigade (Townsville)** **Regional Force Surveillance Units**

4.87 3 Brigade, comprising two infantry battalions, will continue to provide **4.92** The development of three Regional Force Surveillance Units covering
the bulk of the Operational Deployment Force (ODF) and short degrees of

the north of the continent is well advanced. These units are North West Mobile

readiness will continue to apply. The ODF will remain a lightly equipped air

Force (Norforce, headquartered in Darwin), Far North Queensland Regiment, and

portable force. In addition, to broaden the scope of its employability, Regular the Pilbara Regiment. Further expansion of these units is constrained by the
units including an armoured personnel carrier squadron and the parachute limited availability of manpower in these regions.
battalion (from 1 Brigade) have been earmarked to augment the ODF should they
be required. Other units that might be required are currently under review, and
could include ground mobility, surveillance, reconnaissance, communications and
logistics elements. Such units would also be placed on appropriate degrees of
notice.

_6 and 7 Brigades (Brisbane)_

**4.88** These brigades are manned and equipped at a level that is adequate
for training but not for operations. Consideration is being given to placing the
regular elements of 6 Brigade on 90 days notice to move and the Reserve
elements of 6 and 7 Brigades on six months notice from callout. Both brigades
will be 'rounded out' from other Reserve elements in the event of operational
deployment.

X On

1 Brigade (Sydney)

**4.89** 1 Brigade currently provides the structure for the development of a
parachute capability (3 RAR), the mechanised capability (5/7 RAR), and the
armoured capability (1 Armoured Regiment in association with 5/7 RAR). A
battalion group parachute capability is being developed to secure a point-of-
entry for the ODF or alternatively to augment the ODF should a third battalion
be required. The parachute group will be placed on similar readiness to other
ODF elements. The other battalion of the brigade, together with the armoured
regiment, provides the expansion base for mechanised and armoured capabilities.

**Logistic support**

**4.90** To support 1 Division if deployed, a Logistic Support Force will be **_Versatility in operations is needed for Regional Force Reconnaissance Units. Pictured are_**
formed. The force will provide essential third line logistic support. It will be built **_members of Norforce patrolling the Walker River, NT._**
on the current structure of the existing but smaller Logistic Support Group that
is part of the ODF, with additional elements being provided by the Reserve.

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**Northern basing** **4.96** The Government has directed that detailed studies commence on the

possible relocation of a brigade to the north. Together with support elements

4.93 Focusing attention on the needs of credible northern contingencies

and accompanying families, such a deployment would involve some 6 000 to

raises the issue of basing Regular Army units in the north. The 2nd Cavalry

7 000 personnel. Detailed analysis of the implications of relocating a brigade is

Regiment, a reconnaissance unit currently based at Holsworthy, will be relocated

required, including careful consideration of possible alternatives. The

to Darwin.

Government's decision will be influenced by experience with the move of the
2nd Cavalry Regiment.

4.94 2nd Cavalry Regiment will provide a considerable capability for mobile
reconnaissance over a wide area, and a modest capacity to deal with incursions.
The unit is capable of independent operations in low level contingencies and,
with its mobility and communications, can react to sightings by Regional Force **Offensive air support**
Surveillance Units.

4.97 Offensive air support in land warfare can be provided by both the TFF

**Im** and F-i I is. This support can be given in the form of interdiction of the

battlefield or close air support for our troops. Close air support is important in

**/** **-** all levels of conflict; however, in operations against small units of dispersedforces, restricted and limited battlefield interdiction and close air support could

also be conducted by less capable aircraft such as advanced fixed wing trainer
aircraft or armed utility helicopters.

**Battlefield helicopters**

**4.98** Helicopters integral to the land force contribute importantly to its
combat power, providing reconnaissance, tactical mobility, fire support and
logistic support within the area of operations. As battlefield helicopters are an
important element of the Army's combat team, the Government has decided to
transfer full command and ownership of battlefield helicopters from the Air
Force to the Army. This will enhance the ADF's capability at all levels of conflict
and, in particular, will improve its ability to bring its combat power swiftly to
bear on enemy forces in the dispersed operations which would be typical of the
more credible contingencies we face.

**4.99** The Government has already decided to acquire 14 Blackhawk
helicopters to supplement the 30 UH-1H helicopters already in service. A further
22 Blackhawks will be acquired to complete a company group lift. More
Blackhawks will be acquired for a second company group lift and further
helicopters for a third company group lift will be considered in examining force

**_Armoured Personnel Carriers provide the capability for highly mobile reconnaissance, a task_**

development priorities.

**_to be undertaken by the 2nd Cavalry Regiment._**

**Army aviation**

**4.95** Northern basing will allow the unit to gain valuable experience in
northern operations which, in turn, will inform decisions on the acquisition of 4.100 The Army's surveillance, reconnaissance and communications aircraft
future light armoured vehicles. On present planning, the unit's existing tracked (44 Kiowa light observation helicopters, and 14 Porter and ii Nomad fixed wing
Mi 13 vehicles will be replaced with wheeled armoured vehicles carrying aircraft) are expected to remain in service until the 1990s. Experience from
weapons and surveillance equipment suitable for credible northern contingencies. training in the north will be important to inform judgements on the capabilities
A selected range of vehicles will be evaluated under northern conditions. needed in the replacements for these aircraft.

56 57


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**M 113 light armoured fighting vehicles**

**4.101** Light armoured fighting vehicles are essential for mobility, protection
and firepower in credible northern contingencies. The Government has decided
that the present fleet of 773 Ml 13s, of which 700 are currently on issue, can
be reduced to 600 or fewer under current circumstances. Some of the fleet will
be upgraded, others placed in storage.

**Mechanisation**

**4.102** With greater priority being given to dispersed low level operations,
the present level of mechanisation of 1 Brigade will be restricted to battalion
group level. This will provide a suitable level of mechanisation to meet
expansion base needs and to contribute to credible contingencies. There will be
increased emphasis on training in northern Australia.

**Tanks**
##### 4.103 1 Armoured Regiment is to become an integrated Regular and
Reserve unit, with initially one of its three Regular tank squadrons being
converted to Army Reserve. In the light of experience, the composition of the

**_The Army's battlefield mobility will be enhanced by the introduction of the Blackhawk_** Regiment will be further reviewed.
**_helicopter (top) to supplement the capability provided by the in-service Iroquois (lower)._**

**Artillery**
##### 4.104 Acquisition of 59 new field guns (105mm) for the Regular Army will

**_I_** continue, including 36 guns for the Regular component of the Field Force. This

Government has approved 46 new guns for the Army Reserve. Acquisition of
further new guns for the Reserves will be considered in the light of the current
review of the structure of the Army Reserve

**4.105** The Regular 8th/12th Medium Regiment consists of two medium
batteries and one field battery, with one of the medium batteries also equipped
with field guns. The Reserve 10th Medium Regiment provides general support
medium artillery. The balance between Regular and Reserve medium batteries
will be reviewed.

**Rationalisation of the Reserve structure**

**4.106** Our requirements for land warfare cannot be achieved without
extensive Reserve participation. Accordingly, the Army Reserve structure is being
reviewed and changes will be implemented progressively. Since World War Two

:. .:. .... the Reserve has provided the expansion base for the Army. It will now, in

addition, be required to contribute to operations which might arise in the shorter
term as part of the total Army, at a level commensurate with achievable
degrees of training and readiness. The Government will soon legislate for
restricted call-out of Reservists, thus ensuring their availability in credible
contingencies.

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4.107 New areas of Reserve activity will include integration with Regular
forces, particularly in 1 Division and the Logistic Support Force, augmentation of
high priority elements of the Regular force, defence of vital assets across the
north, and participation in some higher level capabilities in the expansion base
such as tanks. These challenging tasks will provide a new focus for the Army
Reserve. With some restructuring and changes to roles it will be achieved within
a ceiling of 26 000.

.
**Tactical air transport**

**4.108** Tactical air transport in support of land forces is provided by the
C130H Hercules, Caribou, Chinook medium helicopters, and utility helicopters.
The Caribou short range transport aircraft will reach the end of its planned life
of type in the 1990s. In considering its replacement we will take regard of the
potential of our northern airfields (military and civil) to support movements by
different aircraft types and the potential benefits of aircraft commonality—such
as an expanded fleet of C-130 Hercules. Our studies on how best to meet the
ADF's needs for tactical air transport will also consider the future of the
Chinook helicopters, newer technologies such as the tilt-rotor and X-wing
concepts, and the need for air transport support in dispersed northern
operations.

**_Russell Offices, Canberra the location of Headquarters, Australian Defence Force and part of_**
**_the Central Office of the Department of Defence._**

**Command, control and**
**communications**

**4.112** These new command arrangements enhance the ADFs operational
ability—they facilitate the development of staff procedures and the conduct of

4.109 Since the re-designation in 1984 by this Government of the Chief of

Joint exercises; and they are expandable if strategic circumstances deteriorate.

the Defence Force Staff as the Chief of the Defence Force (CDF), and the

In a transition to operations, HO ADF would expand to support the CDF in

creation of Headquarters, Australian Defence Force (HO ADF), the CDF now

furnishing military advice to Government and in operational planning.

commands the ADF with direct staff support being provided by HQ ADF. In
conjunction with the Service Offices, HO ADF undertakes operational military **4.113** The Government has given a high priority to the development of an
planning for the CDF. automated system to support the new command arrangements. This system will

be capable of displaying, recalling and transmitting a wide variety of data. The

4.110 Under these arrangements, the single Service Chiefs of Staff retain

progressive introduction of the Defence Secure Communications Network will

command responsibilities. They remain responsible to the Minister, under the

overcome the limitations of the present communications system.

CDF, for commanding their individual Services. In addition, they are responsible
for advising the CDF on all matters relating to their Service, including **4.114** With increased ADF activity and basing in northern Australia, the
operations, and in raising, training, supplying and maintaining combat ready Government believes there could be value in developing Joint administrative and
forces. Under command arrangements approved by the Government in 1986, command arrangements in northern Australia. This will be further examined after
they are also responsible for providing combat ready force elements to joint the new joint operational command system is established and working
force commanders. effectively.

4.111 In 1986, Maritime, Land Force and Air commanders were appointed.
Supporting operational headquarters are being developed. The joint force
commanders report directly to CDF and have responsibility for the conduct of
designated joint ADF operations and exercises.

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**4.115** Further changes will also be made to the organisation of HO ADF, In -  The six new submarines to be brought into service in the 1990s will
1986, the Government created the appointment of Vice Chief of the Defence enhance substantially the capability of our submarine force with their
Force (VCDF), whose initial task has been to study how force development greater availability, higher performance and more modern equipment.
planning can be co-ordinated better between HO ADF and the single Service -  The high priority given by the Government to the development of mine
offices. The results of the VCDF's study are being examined. Some initiatives, countermeasures (MCM) will result in an MCM force of at least six inshore
including a greater centralisation of force development planning under the CDF, minehunter catamarans, minesweepers (probably using innovative Australian
have already been taken.

technology), and a mine warfare centre. Naval reserves will be expanded to
undertake minesweeping operations in key geographical areas.

-  A second underway replenishment ship will be acquired, as will

**Summary—The ADF and its** charting will be improved.hydrographic survey vessels and a trials and research ship. Capabilities for

-  The Government has recognised the need for our Navy to operate

**development**

effectively from both coasts. HMAS Stirling will be developed as a main
naval base for half the Fleet—both surface and submarine forces.

**4.116** As a result of this Government's decisions, the ADF in the late 1990s
will be a highly capable force better matched to our strategic needs. Through its -  The anti-submarine capabilities of the Fleet will be considerably enhanced
training and exercising it will be skilled in operating in our unique geographic by the purchase of Seahawk helicopters and the development of an
environment. The Defence Force will have modern weapons, greater mobility and Australian surface-towed acoustic array.
endurance, and better logistic support. A chain of forward bases and facilities in
the north and west of the continent will be complete. Our surveillance
capabilities, especially for air defence, will be greatly improved. And we will have **Army**
an effective system for the command and control of the ADF in joint operations.

**- More emphasis will be given to highly mobile forces capable of rapid**

4.117 Some of the more important developments in the ADFs capabilities

deployment.

achieved and planned for the years ahead are summarised below:

-  1 Division (an infantry division) will be more readily deployable. The ODE
will be augmented when necessary by a parachute battalion group, an

**Command, control and communications** armoured personnel carrier squadron and other capabilities. The other

**- The ADF's command arrangements have been improved by the** brigades of the Division will be rounded out and made more ready for
redesignation of the Chief of the Defence Force Staff as the Chief of the operations. A Logistic Support Force will be formed to support 1 Division.
Defence Force, the formation of Headquarters ADF, and the creation of a -  Responsibility for command and operation of battlefield helicopters is being
Vice Chief of the Defence Force at equal rank to the Chiefs of each transferred to Army.
Service. -  Blackhawk helicopters will be acquired to provide a company group lift.

-  A joint operational command system has been created through the More Blackhawks will be acquired for a second company group lift. A
appointment of Maritime, Land Force and Air commanders who report further purchase for a third company group lift will be considered.
directly to CDF. -  Studies on the relocation of a brigade to the north have begun. Initially, a

-  Computer based information systems are being developed to support the reconnaissance unit (the 2nd Cavalry Regiment) will be based in Darwin.
decision making of operational and higher level commanders. -  The Army Reserves will have a greater role, including specific duties to

-  New communication systems to support operations and administration will protect vital defence installations and infrastructure, especially in the north.
be introduced, making use of modern technological developments including They will also participate to a greater extent in expansion base activities.
satellites. The use of cryptographic security will be considerably extended. -  Legislation will be introduced to enable restricted call-out of Reservists.

-  New and more capable small arms will enter service throughout the ADF.

**Navy** -  New field artillery with increased range and mobility will be introduced to

**- The number of major surface combatants will increase from the present 12** both the Regular and Reserve components of the Army.
to 16 or 17 with the introduction of the light patrol frigate. This warship -  The entire fleet of general service off-road vehicles is being replaced by
will be built in Australia. It will have the sensors and weapons, the new 1,2,4 and 8 tonne vehicles manufactured in Australia.
endurance, and the sea-keeping capabilities required for the ADF's operating -  Modern surveillance devices and electronic warfare systems will be
environment. introduced for land warfare.

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improved. Some Ml 13s will be upgraded, others will be placed in storage. Chapter five
Faster, more mobile wheeled light armoured fighting vehicles, carrying

**Supporting the Defence Force**

weapons and surveillance equipment suitable for northern contingencies,
will be introduced into service.

**infrastructure, logistics, science**

1 Armoured Regiment will become an integrated Regular and Reserve unit. **and technology**
An expansion base including mechanised and armoured capabilities, will be
retained to allow timely expansion if our strategic circumstances
deteriorate. 1 Brigade will develop mechanisation at the battalion group
level.

**5.1** This chapter outlines the Governments policies for defence

**Air Force** infrastructure and logistic support, and our need for indigenous scientific and

technological achievements in meeting the challenges inherent in Australia's

A national system of air defence and airspace control will be developed.

defence.

A combination of an OTHR network and AEW&C aircraft will form the basis
of the national system. Up to three OTHR radars will be built. The number
of AEW&C aircraft is to be determined; provision has been made in the
Five Year Defence Program.

**Infrastructure and logistics**

The capabilities of the P-3C Orion long range maritime patrol aircraft will be
improved through the acquisition of modern sensors.

**5.2** The vast area of Australia, its territories, and its maritime approaches,

The introduction of the F/A-18 Hornet into service represents a major and our relatively small population, strongly influence our requirements for
upgrading of our air defence, maritime strike, and ground support capability. infrastructure and logistic support. For strategic reasons, some operational
The F-ill strike aircraft will be refurbished, at minimum cost, to reduce bases should be located in forward areas in the north and west of the
significantly operating costs and to maintain them in service. The need for continent. But the separation of our main support bases in the south of
F/A-18 Hornet aircraft to supplement the F- l 11 fleet as it reduces through Australia from likely operational areas in the north, the likely dispersal of forces
attrition, will be considered. across a number of areas, and the limited northern industrial and transport

The four Boeing 707 aircraft will be modified for in-flight refuelling to allow infrastructure, would place heavy demands in a contingency on military
the Hornet to increase its effective range and payload. transport, supply and maintenance. Civil assets would help relieve the support

burden, but the ADF must be prepared to operate from austere forward

The construction of Tindal and Derby airfields will be completed and an

locations under circumstances where local support would not always be

airfield built on Cape York Peninsula.

available.

A Hornet squadron will be based at Tindal from late 1988
Pilot training will be improved by the introduction into service of the PC-9 **Infrastructure planning**
turboprop aircraft, assembled in Australia

**5.3** We need an extensive infrastructure of bases, airfields, communications

**4.118 With these improvements the Government will ensure that the nation**

stations, training and other facilities to support the ADF and its operations. The

has a Defence Force structured, equipped, supported and trained to assure our

Government's policies for the development of this infrastructure reflect the

security into the 21st century.

increasing emphasis on operations in the north and north-west of Australia, but
also acknowledge the concentration of population and industry in the south and
south-east. Defence infrastructure development also has regard to wider
concerns, including the ability of civil infrastructure to meet defence needs, and
the impact of defence activities on the community.

5.4 There is already a defence infrastructure of bases, airfields and other
facilities in Australia's north and north- west. These include: patrol boat bases
at Cairns and Darwin, the major development at Tindal airfield where an F/A-18
squadron will be based from late 1988, the new bare-base airfield at Derby, due
for completion in 1987 and suitable for all types of RAAF aircraft, the airbase at
Darwin. and the bare-base airfield at Learmonth.

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**5.5** The Government has a range of initiatives for the further support of

options for developing, rationalising and in some cases relocating defence

northern operations:

facilities throughout Australia, and the greater use of civil infrastructure.

-  An airfield will be built on Cape York Peninsula to complete a band of
airfields across northern Australia. The Government will proceed shortly to

**5.8** While Defence needs to be aware of major civil infrastructure

identify a site and commence construction.

developments from their earliest stages, there is no need for Defence to

-  Naval facilities will be progressively developed in the north-west to enhance subsidise such developments, unless defence requirements would add
patrol operations in that region. significantly to their cost and if they were not justified on normal civil criteria.

There will be further development of the naval base at HMAS Stirling to Generally neither will be the case.
allow more surface vessels and submarines to be based there. One
submarine will be based at HMAS Stirling from 1987 and others, including
some of the new submarines, in later years. **Defence infrastructure and the community**

The 2nd Cavalry Regiment will move from Holsworthy to Darwin **5.9** Defence is by far the largest Commonwealth owner or user of land in

Australia, and most Defence establishments are in or near the more populated
areas of the continent. The Government will review its use of Defence
properties. It will release those not required for efficient operations and as
necessary acquire new facilities including training areas.

**5.10** Concern for wider social issues is important in Defence infrastructure
planning. Local problems sometimes arise when areas currently used by
Defence, or sought for future use, are also wanted for civil purposes. The
economies of many local communities depend on employment provided by
Defence establishments and the local expenditure they generate.

5.11 Urban growth and increasing constraints on the Army's artillery
training in the Sydney area will require the establishment of new training areas.
Similar urban pressure has led to Government plans for the movement of the
Navy's major armament depot from Newington. The transfer of the armament
depot to Jervis Bay will free some 250 hectares for development close to
Parramatta and remove the need for lengthy transits of high explosives through
urban areas. Development of the Newington site is being discussed by the
Commonwealth and NSW Governments.

5.12 Strong arguments exist for moving the main Fleet Base from Sydney
(see Chapter 4). Studies indicate that Jervis Bay is the best alternative location.
The Government has directed that an environmental impact study be completed
as a matter of priority. This study will also embrace the projected move of the
Newington Armament Depot.

**_HMAS Stirling is to be further developed to accommodate the additional vessels to be based_**
**_there following the decision to relocate half of the RAN fleet from Sydney to Cockburn Sound._**

**Logistics**

**5.6** Mining and other civil developments have provided civil infrastructure in
the north on which Defence can draw. Civil airfields available for military use **5.13 Defence manages inventories worth several billion dollars, and employs**
include those at Port Hedland, Broome, Kununurra, Mt isa, Gove, Weipa and more than 30 000 military and civilian personnel in support functions. There are
Cairns, though not all are suited to the full range of possible defence use. Port over 1.4 million line items stocked in defence warehouses and stores, and about
facilities at Dampier and Port Hedland, heavy engineering repair and maintenance 17 million transactions annually in supply computer systems alone.
facilities at mining towns such as Mt Newman, and local communications
facilities are other examples of civil assets with defence utility. Nevertheless,
specialised maintenance services, and military demands beyond the civil capacity
in remote areas, would largely need to be provided from Service resources.

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514 This large logistic system is required to support combat operations **5.20** The continued vitality of our defence relationship with the United
There may be less costly ways of providing peacetime support—with smaller States is an important element in these judgements. The United States is the
inventories, more centralised services, and minimal redundancies. However, such major source for much of our advanced defence technology and equipment, and
measures, important in commercial enterprises, are not always appropriate for in some cases it is the only source. The alliance relationship, supported
an effective response to military threats. specifically by a Memorandum of Understanding on Logistic Support,

renegotiated by this Government in 1985, makes a substantial contribution to

**5.15 In logistics development as in force development, priority will continue**

our defence support capabilities.

to be given to our needs in the types of military conflict that could arise in the
shorter term. Within this context, a central policy need is to identify the logistic **5.21** The need for weapon systems appropriate to our particular
capabilities important in such contingencies, to determine which capabilities requirements has led to Australia's acquisition of defence equipment from a
would be readily available to the ADF through national economic development, range of overseas suppliers. Our selection is influenced by whether suppliers are
and to decide which require special fostering in civil infrastructure or which able and willing to provide assurances of timely and appropriate support in all
should be integral to the ADF. circumstances, and the willingness of the supplier to provide technical detail

required for maintenance and possible modification. Difficulties have been

5.16 The Government will extend the use of common logistics support,

experienced with some suppliers being unwilling to provide detail of the

eliminating unnecessary duplication between elements of the ADF and also

computer software that much modern equipment relies on for operation. This is

between Defence and the civil community. For example, quality assurance

unacceptable and the matter is being pursued. We have obtained Government

activities in the munitions factories will be managed by Army on behalf of the

undertakings from several European countries to ensure their continuing support

other Services; there will be common support services for the Seahawk and

for defence materiel and intellectual property sourced in those countries.

Blackhawk helicopters; Army will be responsible for long distance road freight

Negotiations are proceeding with others.

for all three Services, drawing also on other Government and private operators;
and a substantially common computer-based supply system will be developed
and introduced for Navy, Army and Air Force.

**Science and technology**

5.17 Australia's civil transport assets will complement ADF resources in
defence emergencies. Ground force operations would draw on the civil air **5.22** The effectiveness of the ADF depends to a significant extent on the
transport fleet, with heavier items and replenishment stores being moved by

maintenance of a high level of technology. Australia should favour advanced

road, rail, pipeline or sea. While sea transport is more efficient for bulk cargoes,

technology where it confers an operational advantage, reduces manpower or

improvements to the road system will reduce reliance on coastal shipping for life-cycle cost, avoids early obsolescence or the need for additional equipment,
many military stores.

simplifies operation and support, or where it is otherwise particularly suited to

**5.18** The ADF must have the ability to draw on appropriate resources in the Australia's strategic circumstances.
civil community should the need arise. The task of co-ordinating civil transport 5.23 Australia's large area and small population often call for the selection
resources for defence needs involves complex legislative, administrative and of advanced technology to meet defence needs. This does not always imply the
operational aspects. This Government has completed a study on the co-

most advanced 'state-of-the-art' equipment. The cost-effective use of technology

ordination of civil maritime resources, the first major interdepartmental transport

requires specialist scientific expertise to discriminate between alternative

planning for credible contingencies for many years. Further planning for co-

technological options, to modify equipment and in some circumstances to

ordination of defence needs with civil assets will continue, including a response

develop indigenous equipment.

by Defence to the Government's recent direction to the Inter-State Commission
to examine the efficiency of interstate transport arrangements. **Technology and the Defence Force**

**External logistic support** **5.24** This Government's policy of self-reliance in defence calls particularly

for the enhancement of our own capabilities for technological support,

**5.19** The threshold for direct combat assistance from the United States in modification and development. We cannot rely completely on imported
some circumstances could be quite high, but logistic support from overseas is a

technology and offshore technological support. Australia's strategic

different matter. In low level conflict we could expect that overseas resupply circumstances pose challenges that sometimes call for unique and therefore
would continue. Military action to deny resupply to Australia is well beyond the

local solutions.

existing or potential capacity of regional countries.

**5.25 While we procure major defence systems off the shelf from foreign**
suppliers, there are also some important Australian defence requirements not
readily met by systems available overseas. In these cases there is a need for

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indigenous Australian development. This applies in particular to intelligence,

policy by the direct application of science and technology. DSTO provides

surveillance and sensor equipment, together with associated command and

assistance to the ADF, the Department of Defence, other defence agencies and,

control systems, which need to be tailored to Australia's specific environment

as necessary for defence purposes, Australian industry.

Such capabilities have priority when local technological development is under
consideration. **5.33** DSTO employs scientists, engineers and technologists in five major

laboratories, with divisions sited in South Australia, Victoria and New South

5.26 Australia will continue to rely, nevertheless, on substantial overseas

Wales and smaller branches in Queensland and Tasmania. It has a total staff of

supply of equipment. This calls for a well-informed understanding of how to 4300 and an annual budget of $180m.
specify operational and technical requirements, how to evaluate proposals, and
how to be alert for possible technical problems as equipment ages. Specialist **5.34** DSTO contributes scientific advice for defence decision making and
technical advice and support are essential in the equipment selection process policy formulation. It provides a specialist technical service to the ADF, helping
and in its modification or adaptation following the emergence of problems or it to make the best use of science and technology in choosing, using,
shortcomings. maintaining and extending the life of its equipment. DSTO maintains a base of

skills and knowledge in defence science and technology and develops selected

5.27 We need to be able to determine the performance in our own

equipment concepts to meet Australian requirements

environment of equipment of both overseas and local origin and to modify and
adapt overseas equipment as necessary to improve its performance in our likely **5.35** DSTO's research and development effort will continue to concentrate
theatres of military operations. For this we need a detailed knowledge of our on problems unique to the Australian strategic and natural environment, and on
physical environment (climate and meteorology, terrain characteristics, optical, other areas where research and development information is not available to us
infra-red and radio propagation, oceanography and ionospheric phenomena) so or where we need to ensure our access to appropriate overseas military

technology.

that we can understand its influence on the conduct and effectiveness of
operations and the performance of equipment and systems.

The technology base

**5.28** Our defence planning recognises that in some circumstances our
forces could face an adversary using materiel of Western origin. This would **5.36** The provision of expert and up to date scientific advice depends on the
demand the development of specific capabilities for our own equipment. maintenance of an adequate technology base. So too does the ability to solve

the various technical problems which arise in defence equipment. The defence

**5.29** These technological needs arising from Australia's geo-strategic

technology base encompasses a wide range of technologies which are important

circumstances emphasise the importance of defence science and technology in

to defence interests, but which may have little or no priority for non-defence

effective Australian defence. A highly proficient defence science and technology

research organisations. While DSTO draws to the maximum extent possible on

capability is essential for proper defence decision making and policy formulation,

research and development in the wider Australian community, it is necessary to

to provide specialist technical support to the ADF so that the leverage of its

maintain a substantial in-house research and development program to secure the

advanced technology may best be exploited, and to advise and support industry.

medium to long term technological interests of Australian defence.

5.30 Defence scientists need to be aware of developments in defence

**5.37** The technology base can never be static. It needs to be continually

policy, strategic assessments, and operational and tactical concepts. This

maintained and enhanced by a program of strategically oriented scientific

requires close, continual contacts between defence scientists, the Department

research, development and other activities, anticipating future trends in defence

and the ADF.

science and technology. This establishes the knowledge and understanding
essential for a timely response to defence technological needs. The maintenance
of an up to date technology base in many areas of defence related research has

**The Defence Science and Technology Organisation** enabled DSTO to initiate the wide range of projects listed in the DSTO program

below.

**5.31** While parts of the wider Australian scientific community and defence
industry make useful contributions to defence science and technology, the
required capability does not, in general, currently exist outside the Department **DSTO program**
of Defence. The different objectives of non-defence research and development

**5.38** DSTO's current and future program includes many activities specifically

organisations limit them to a contributory role, while defence industry has a

designed to increase Australia's self-reliance in defence. Examples of DSTO's

more substantial part to play in the later stages of development and production

capacity for indigenous development of military equipment for the ADF include:

**5.32** The Defence organisation's science and technology capability is —over-the-horizon radar—following a decade of research and trials by DSTO in
concentrated in the Defence Science and Technology Organisation (DSTO). Project Jindalee, this Government has accorded high priority to the design and
DSTO contributes to the development and implementation of Australian defence development of an Australian OTHR network. This recognises its great

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potential for effective wide area surveillance. Jindalee is a good example of investigation of ballistic and terminal performance of ammunition and weapon
how forward looking research on the technology base can lead to the systems
development of important Australian defence capabilities;

**5.41** The indigenous Australian expertise developed by DSTO in its program

—towed acoustic arrays—DSTO's development of a unique slim-line hydrophone will continue to add greatly to our national defence capacity.
array will enable our new submarines and ships to be fitted with a long,
reelable array, adding significantly to our capability for surface and sub- Technology transfer to industry
surface surveillance of our maritime approaches;

**5.42** DSTO has an impressive record of technology transfer to industry in

—anti-ship missile defence—DSTO's research on novel concepts for ship

Australia. Generally, much of this achievement has been through contracts let to

defence has enabled Australia to enter into a unique co-operation with the

industry for technical support and the later stages of equipment development.

United States in all stages of design and development in Project Nulka;

Technology transfer has been most efficient and effective when scientists and

—hydrography—the laser airborne depth sounder conceived and developed in

engineers from DSTO and industry work side by side.

DSTO will greatly increase the productivity of the RAN's charting of
Australian continental waters **5.43** This Government is resolved to improve on this good record. The

—military survey—the graphic superimposition ocular developed by DSTO Government is taking steps to expand the role of defence industry in research
increases the Army's efficiency in producing maps from stereophotographs; and in the early stages of defence system development. This will result in a
and marked enhancement of relevant industry capabilities. Another initiative to be

explored is the formation of companies to promote technology transfer from

—camouflage—research in DSTO has led to its development of camouflage

DSTO to Australian industry.

schemes for a variety of Army applications (including newly developed combat
clothing) which are especially effective in the Australian environment

International collaboration

5.39 Examples of DSTO's scientific and technical advice and support for the **5.44** Technology transfer with our allies enables us to maintain a current
acquisition of new equipment for the ADF include: technology base and to support the acquisition and operation of equipment of

—the mine countermeasures force (both minesweeping and minehunting); high technological content.

—the new submarine;

**5.45** Technology transfer is achieved through bilateral agreements and

—the new surface combatant ship; programs such as The Technical Co-operation Program between Australia,
—the strike and reconnaissance force—the future of the F-i ii aircraft, its United Kingdom, Canada, New Zealand and the United States. DSTO has
equipment and systems; collaborated effectively internationally for many years. This has been facilitated
—national air defence and airspace control; and by DSTO's unique contributions derived from work done to meet Australian

—electronic warfare, including its tactical command and control needs and at a quality comparable with world standards

**5.40 [DSTO solves a very wide range of technical problems arising in the use of]** Government review of DSTO
defence equipment. Without this service, the effectiveness and self-reliance of

**5.46** This Government recognises the need for special working arrangements

the ADF would be greatly reduced. Examples include:

within a research organisation such as DSTO. Following earlier Government

—investigation of material damage and failure in defence equipment, e.g. reviews of DSTO, several reforms have been put in train, including the
cracking in ships' hulls, failures in aircraft and ship turbine engines, cracking promotion of research scientists to reward distinguished research performance.
in guns; In line with the public service reforms being implemented by the Government,
—development of protective schemes against fatigue and corrosion; management of the DSTO has been modified to provide greater flexibility,

increased devolution of authority and improved accountability.

—development of crack repair schemes for aircraft and other equipment;

—investigation of performance of a wide range of sensors and warning systems 5.47 This Government has noted that short term priorities have caused
such as thermal imagers, radars (e.g. in the F/A-18 aircraft) and visual research for the technology base to fall below a desirable level and seeks
systems; improvement in the balance between DSTO's longer term and short term

—investigation and development of electronic warfare systems; support for Defence.

—quantitative analysis of ADF exercises;

—investigations in radio (including satellite) communication;

—battlefield communication frequency management techniques; and

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**5.48** The review of public investment in research and development in

Chapter six

Australia, released by the Australian Science and Technology Council (ASTEC) in
November 1986, stated that DSTO was an efficient, well directed and well **Defence and Australian industry**
managed organisation, and that with increased autonomy and flexibility, it could
make an even greater contribution to national goals.

**5.49** This Government emphasises the importance of a sound indigenous
capacity in science and technology for Australian defence capability. The

**6.1** This chapter explains the role of industry in meeting the Government's

Government's defence policy will ensure that Australian scientific expertise

requirement for defence self-reliance. It outlines policies for Australian industry

effectively supports defence decision making, allows the ADF to make best use

to support self-reliance and lists some major defence projects currently

of advanced technology, and supports industry planning and development.

underway or planned for the future that heavily involve local expertise.

**Self-reliance and support of the ADF**

**Industry and defence**

5.50 Defence self-reliance demands a defence force capable of independent

**6.2** Since taking office, this Government has implemented a wide range of

operations. Fundamental to this capability are appropriately sited bases, effective

policy changes to make Australian industry more internationally competitive and

logistic arrangements, and the scientific and industrial ability to select, adapt,

export oriented. The new policies are designed to enable industry to adapt to

repair, maintain and develop defence equipment. The Government will continue

changing market conditions and to take advantage of opportunities presented by

to give priority to these essential elements of defence support, recognising that

technological developments. To meet these objectives, industry needs to be able

defence self-reliance demands increased indigenous capabilities in areas where

to design world class products, manufacture and market them competitively, and

we previously depended on our allies.

be less reliant on Government assistance. Changes have included economic

**5.51 This Government's policies emphasise that defence infrastructure,** policies, such as deregulation of the exchange rate and of the financial sector,
logistic and industry support, and defence science and technology are now general industry policies, for example those applying to research and
fundamental for the self-reliant defence of Australia. development, technology development and exports, and industry specific policies

for many areas important for defence, such as aerospace, telecommunications,

**5.52** Government policy recognises the need for maximum efficiency,

electronics, machine tools, steel, heavy engineering, shipbuilding and ship repair.

elimination of unnecessary duplication, and judicious use of supporting services
available in the national infrastructure, to complement the specialist logistic **6.3** Efficient and successful industry can use the strengths derived from
services and capabilities maintained in the Defence organisation. It recognises commercial activities to participate more competitively in the relatively small
the advantages available to Australian defence through the wise exploitation of scale production required by the ADF in times of peace. It would also require
advanced technology and the need to foster an effective, highly skilled defence less of the nation's resources when undertaking larger scale defence production
science and technology capability directed towards uniquely Australian in times of war.
requirements.

**6.4** While a substantial commercial workload can provide a base from which

**5.53** This Government's policy for the industrial, logistic, and scientific to bid for defence orders, the inverse is rarely true. The peacetime requirements
support of the ADF will ensure its ability to conduct independent military of the ADF are usually too small and, particularly for the acquisition of new
operations over the vast expanse of our area of direct military interest. equipment, too infrequent and too limited in duration, to provide a viable long

term base workload for individual firms or industry sectors.

**6.5** Participation in defence projects can, however, bring to industry
important technology, introduce new equipment and skills, and develop expertise
in aspects of project management and quality control. This can lead to ongoing
work in repair, maintenance and adaptation, as well as to participation in other
defence projects, and to work on related civil production or for export. The
Offsets obligations generated by overseas suppliers can be exploited by
Australian industry to supplement Australian defence orders, providing a longer
production run, a more viable production base, and access to new technology
and markets.

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**6.6** Defence forces require substantial support from industry for essential

would need replacement. The particular requirements would depend on the

equipment, goods and services. Frontline equipment (eg. aircraft, submarines and

nature of the conflict.

ships) embodies the leading edge of world technology. Rations, clothing,
ammunition and fuel are often technologically ahead of their civil counterparts **6.12** Production facilities appropriate only for a major expansion of the ADF
and employ advanced production processes. Services such as repair, take a low priority because of the speculative nature of the requirement, the
maintenance, transport and communications draw upon civil industrial high cost, and the lack of a peacetime workload to maintain skills so
capabilities and advanced civil technology. expensively acquired. Moreover, the time required for a substantial threat to

develop would allow development of some additional capabilities, as well as

6.7 Australian industry has the potential to participate in a wide range of

redirection of civil industrial capacity for defence work. Substantial industrial

defence activities in times of peace and would provide an essential underpinning

sectors in Australia could, if the need arose, undertake defence work, including

of ADF operations in times of tension or hostilities.

the heavy and light engineering, motor vehicle, telecommunications, and
manufacturing industries.

**6.13** Under past policies only some 30 per cent of expenditure on new

**Industry involvement and levels** capital equipment has been incurred locally. Most of the Australian content, has
**of conflict** often involved substantial subsidies. This reflected the nature of equipment thenbeen directed towards capabilities for subsequent through-life support and has

being procured and the poor competitiveness of Australian industry at the time

**6.8** The capacity to maintain, repair, modify and adapt defence equipment to
the Australian environment, independently of overseas sources, is of **6.14** It is the policy of this Government to encourage the widest possible

cost-effective involvement of Australian industry in defence work. Such

fundamental importance for our combat effectiveness in all levels of conflict.

involvement in peacetime can establish the involvement and familiarity with

This requires Australian involvement in design, development and production to

defence requirements essential to timely escalation in contingencies.

acquire the necessary detailed knowledge, skills and facilities. Through such
work local industry can make an important contribution to the sustained
operational effectiveness of our forces in combat. **Reviews**

**6.15** The need for special industrial capabilities and the capacity of key

**Low level conflict** sectors of Australian industry to support defence is kept under review by the

Government's principal defence industrial advisers through the Defence Industry

**6.9** In low level conflict equipment would be used more intensively than in

Committee,

peacetime, especially for surveillance and response tasks. Harsh operating
conditions would be demanding of maintenance capacity and spare parts.
Requirements for other consumable items, such as ammunition, would be
relatively modest. Nevertheless, there would be a need to build up stocks and to
ensure adequate supplies of items little used in peacetime.

**Priorities for local sourcing**

**6.10** Reflecting this priority, over 90 per cent of defence repair and
maintenance work is done in Australia and some 70 per cent of replacement **6.16** It would benefit our self-reliance and our industry if all of our defence
equipment and spares are supplied locally. We are largely self-sufficient in requirements could be developed and supplied locally. Such a course is simply
military consumables, such as food and the more common ammunition types, not feasible for a country of Australia's size, nor indeed for any country other
and could provide defence needs for petroleum fuels and lubricants other than a than, perhaps, the two superpowers. Despite such difference in size (US
few special items required in small quantities. We are self-sufficient in, or have expenditure on defence research and development, for example, is several times
substantial reserves of, industrially important minerals and strategically the total Australian defence budget) Australian research agencies and industry
important chemicals. The capabilities of the manufacturing sector to meet have a commendable record of developing world class products. It is in "niche
priority defence needs are also adequate, apart from some specialist areas. areas, rather than in competing across the board, that Australian industry can

expect most opportunities to arise.

**Higher level conflict** **6.17** The ADF requires equipment embodying sufficiently advanced

**6.11** Higher level conflict would involve maintenance, repair and adaptation technological capabilities to be credible. A careful balancing of indigenous and
of a wider range of equipment and higher usage of consumables, such as overseas sources, complemented, where appropriate, by stockpiling is necessary
ammunition. The Defence Force would need to be expanded by the acquisition to meet this requirement. In defence equipment development, the Governments

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e e a e, o e e , d e e ces bet ee t e de e ce a d c a ets

special operational requirements and to draw on developments in other countries

There is only one substantial domestic customer, the ADF, providing a small and

where they are clearly ahead.

intermittent peacetime market. There are constraints, resulting mainly from

**6.18** In practice, there are many suppliers in Australia who can meet the security considerations, on the transfer of international and domestic
requirements of the ADF for goods and services and who can compete technology. There are strategic, security and foreign policy constraints on sales
successfully with overseas suppliers on performance, quality, timeliness and of Australian defence and defence-related products to other countries. Potential
price grounds. The Governments policies are intended to increase the number customers foster national self-reliance and other barriers to their markets,
and scope of such suppliers. similar, often, to those we apply in our own procurements.
**6.19 Recognising, however, that Australian industry cannot be expected to** **6.25** These differences, and the strategic importance of selected industrial
be competitive across the full range of defence requirements, the Government in capabilities, provide the only justification for assistance to defence and defence-
June 1984 agreed that defence policy for industry is an integral part of defence related industrial activities in Australia additional to that provided for civil

industrial activities.

policy and set priorities for the use of defence resources for the development of
local industrial capability. The priority requirements are:

-  the repair, overhaul and adaptation of military equipment fundamental toAustralia's defence in circumstances to which the Government has given **Defence purchasing**
priority, and the provision of munitions, spares and other consumable **6.26** Defence projects can foster the development of managerial and other
stores for which we could least rely on overseas supply (including expertise in Australian industry which can then facilitate growth in related civil
stockpiling and other actions for greater assurance of supply); and or export markets. Policies and procedures have been developed to encourage

local firms to bid for Defence contracts and to improve their chances of

-  the range of technology and supply and support capabilities (including

success. Australian organisations are encouraged to take on the responsibilities

design, development and manufacture) that meet the longer term needs of

of prime contractors to maximise the benefits they can receive

the ADF in accord with Government policy and Defence guidance as to an
acceptable balance of strategic benefits and costs 6.27 Forward equipment plans covering the next five years have been issued

for projects in the range $1-1 m. These will be updated annually. There will be

6.20 These priorities, and the assessments underlying them, determine the

similar releases of plans for acquisitions worth more than $lOm and for repair

acceptability of cost, time and performance penalties in achieving higher local

and maintenance work. Published procurement plans are supplemented by

content in procurements. Such judgements are necessarily made on a case-by-

seminars and briefings by Defence officials and direct contact between firms

case basis.

and the staff of the procurement projects. Australian firms must realise however

**6.21** In many cases, other countries are the only practicable source for that the plans, particularly for later years, may vary as a result of changes in
additional defence items. Australia is dependent on overseas sources for many technology, strategic and operational requirements or budgetary circumstances
special materials, components, production equipment and know-how. For

**6.28** Briefings will also be provided on the forward program of the Defence

example, there is no Australian manufacturer of ball bearings, aircraft grade

Science and Technology Organisation to encourage industry to enter projects at

aluminium or very high performance integrated circuits. In the peacetime

an earlier stage and to seek to exploit, for commercial as well as defence-

economy, manufacturing such items has so far not been viable. Judicious

related uses, the research work being done for the Services and that undertaken

stockpiling is required to reduce the risk of an inadequate response, or even

to maintain the technology base.

denial of Australian requests for supply.

**6.29** When seeking Defence business, Australian organisations can register

6.22 Even in times of serious tension or hostilities, when cost and

to be advised automatically of Invitations to Register Interest, Requests for

performance penalties for local production would be more acceptable, it will still

Proposals and Requests for Tenders.

not be practicable to aim at self-sufficiency, particularly in major weapon
platforms and systems. Lead times for establishing local production will also **6.30** When tender responses are considered, local firms benefit from the
limit the level of self-reliance attainable. Government's Purchasing Preference Policy, which provides a notional discouni

to the tendered price equivalent to 20 per cent of the value of the local content.
This is in addition to notional application of relevant tariffs, bounties, and other
forms of general industry assistance.

**Defence assistance to industry**

**6.31** Where there are sufficient strategic benefits to justify the additional

6.23 Defence and defence-related industrial activities in Australia are eligible cost, the Minister for Defence may provide a price advantage in excess of the
for the same Government assistance as industry generally. 20 per cent preference. This measure is used rarely because of the high cost

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will have high levels of local content. It will be important for Australian industry

later become competitive in local or export markets.

to use the linkages established in achieving higher local content to build longer

**6.32** Where there are special Australian requirements for equipment, term relationships with overseas principals. These will be essential if
development contracts are let. These involve higher risks in terms of opportunities for competitive sub-contracting and exports, previously provided
performance, time and cost than purchasing products already in production and under the Defence Offsets program, are to continue
proven in operational use. Hence they are restricted to items not available in
acceptable commercial variants or from overseas inventories. The number of
such contracts, often for adaptation of equipment for local requirements, is Exports
quite high. **6.39 [The export of defence and defence-related products can foster skills]**

and capacity in Australian industry and reduce the costs of indigenous supply

**6.33** Firms that take advantage of early advice of Defence projects and

and support for the ADF. Successful competition in overseas defence markets

prospective work will be better placed to develop competitive new products on a

benefits our overall trade interests as well as the firms involved.

commercial risk basis where there are proven overseas products. Such
developments are eligible for assistance under general Commonwealth policies, 6.40 In October 1986 this Government announced a package of measures
eg the taxation provision for 150 per cent write-off of expenditure on research designed to assist Australian firms to gain overseas acceptance of their defence
and development in Australia, and would not usually receive additional and defence-related products, penetrate markets and provide follow-on support.
assistance from Defence. Important elements of the package include product trialling by the Army, Navy,

or Air Force, support in management of acquisitions and spares, and the use of
Defence Offsets commitments to assist initial exports and collaborative ventures

**Australian industry involvement**

culminating in exports.

6.34 When defence equipment is purchased overseas, or where there is
substantial imported content in a local product, high strategic priority is given to **6.41** Successive Australian Governments have, of course, controlled the
independent local repair, maintenance and adaptation capabilities. To assist export of defence materiel. Defence exports must take into account Australian
Australian industry to acquire the necessary technology, equipment and strategic and security interests and the operational concerns of the ADF. As an
expertise, Defence procurements have a requirement for Australian Industry aligned nation and a responsible member of the international community,
Involvement. Australia opposes private traffic in arms, abides by its international commitments

to limit the arms trade and circumscribes the export of defence materiel to

**6.35** Australian Industry Involvement comprises, firstly, 'Defence Designated

countries engaged, or likely to be engaged, in hostilities. Australian controls on

and Assisted Work' (DDAW), under which elements of the item being procured

defence exports will be administered with a view to achieving a balance of

are required to be manufactured, assembled, tested or set-to-work in Australia.

Australian defence, international and commercial interests.

DDAW often incurs cost and delivery time penalties. Such penalties must be
justified for each item in terms of their contribution to independent supply and
support compared with alternatives such as spare parts stockpiling. **International collaboration**

**6.36** The second element of Australian Industry Involvement is Defence **6.42** As military equipment has become more capable and complex, it has
Offsets. This Government revised the Offsets policy in January 1986. Under the also become much more expensive. As a result, international collaboration is
new policy, technology transfer and work to the value of 30 per cent of the now becoming increasingly common as a means of sharing risks, spreading
imported content of a project valued at $2.5m or more must be placed with costs, increasing market size, and exploiting specialization and economies of
Australian industry. The Offset activities are to lead to internationally scale. The European nations have been particularly active in collaborative
competitive industry in Australia and in the Defence area, to the support of self- defence equipment development programs and the United States has recently
reliance. enacted legislation to facilitate participation by its agencies and firms.

6.37 Defence Offsets often relate to capabilities established in local industry 6.43 Opposition is growing to the traditional Offsets mechanism used by
under DDAW. This ensures that a longer product run is provided and the Australia. Governments are seeking to further restrict foreign access to their
expertise acquired at a cost premium is retained for a longer period. It can defence purchases on security and self-reliance grounds. Hence collaborative
reduce the costs attributed to each item associated with setting up capabilities projects are likely to become increasingly important for Australia.
and becoming proficient in their operation.

**6.44** The Government has used the Offsets program and the leverage

**6.38 Projects initiated in the past, such as the F/A-18 Hornet aircraft, had** afforded by major Defence procurements to provide opportunities for Australian
relatively low local content with correspondingly high requirements for Defence industry to collaborate in future developments with major overseas defence
offsets. New projects, such as the submarines, light patrol frigates and OTHR equipment manuafacturers. Recognising the inherent difficulties in matching

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p q g g p **6.51** Australia is now developing a number of sensitive indigenous
other countries, we have commenced negotiations of government-to- technologies, of which OTHR and the Nulka anti-ship missile defence system are
government agreements to facilitate this process. examples. These require similar protection to that previously afforded overseas

technology. Measures are being developed to restrict access to Australian
nationals and to enterprises that can demonstrate a very high level of Australian
control of their local operations.
**Defence industry structure policies**

**6.45** The Government's policy for industry seeks to provide an environment **Government factories and dockyards**
where industry itself, in consultation with unions and Government, can move

**6.52** The Government has recognised that, despite significant past

towards more efficient and internationally competitive activities. In the defence

expenditure, the capabilities and capacities of its defence factories and

industry area, belated recognition of fundamental economic, industry and

dockyards are ill-matched to our strategic needs. Since the incorporation of the

defence factors has caused some severe structural problems. These must be

Defence Production Establishments into the Department of Defence in 1984,

rectified to enable defence industry to conform with the Government's general

reform has proceeded on three levels—revision of the relationship between

industry policies.

customer elements of the Department and the supplying establishments,

**Competition for defence contracts** restructuring of factories, and reassessment of the work they undertake.

**6.53** The Office of Defence Production, is now responsible for the efficient

**6.46** Previous policies have tended to establish important defence

and effective operation of the Government's defence factories and dockyards. As

capabilities in industry and then allocate them work exclusively. This has

far as possible, those establishments are treated by the 'customer' elements of

established sole sources, which have subsequently lapsed into the poor

the Department as simply another source of goods and services Their

performance and high costs that often characterise monopolies.

maintenance of important, dedicated and exclusive defence capabilities can,

6.47 It is this Government's intention that, unless there are compelling however, lead to closer relationships with Defence customers than usually occur
reasons to the contrary, defence work will be allocated on a competitive basis with commercial organisations. In place of the contracts that Defence places
using fixed price (as opposed to cost-plus) contracts, with payments against with commercial firms, work is now sought from Office of Defence Production
milestones (rather than elapsed time) and with other incentives for improved establishments under Production Management Agreements (PMAs). As far as
performance where appropriate. Wherever possible, opportunities are to be possible, PMAs are the equivalent of commercial contracts. They include
provided for Australian organisations to bid as prime contractors. damages for failure to perform to 'contract', in the form of authority to

withdraw work rather than as monetary damages. Progressively, the Government

**Ownership of machinery and facilities** expects that the establishments will enter collaborative arrangements with local

**6.48** Consistent with our emphasis on normal commercial practice in our and overseas industry and will compete against local commercial enterprises for
dealings with industry, and to facilitate the commercial exploitation of defence and other work.
capabilities built up for defence work, the Government has begun selling much

6.54 In December 1985 the closure of the Albion Explosives Factory in

of the Commonwealth-owned machinery and plant now located in industry.

Victoria was announced with the transfer of important capabilities for

6.49 In future, wherever practicable, industry will own the machinery, plant, manufacture of military high explosives and propellants to the Mulwala
licences and other items required to undertake defence work in Australia. The Explosives Factory in NSW. Sale of the Pooraka Aircraft Engineering Workshops
Commonwealth's interest in the ongoing provision of the capability in Australia in South Australia was announced concurrently. In July 1986, the Government
will be protected by contractual clauses that have such items revert to it, announced its decision to convert the Government Aircraft Factories (GAF) in
perhaps with some payment, on failure of the company to meet contracted Victoria to a Government owned company, Aerospace Technologies of Australia.
performance or maintain agreed strategic capabilities. Membership of the board of the new company was announced in December

1986 and its "takeover" of GAF is planned for 1 July 1987.

**Australian ownership, control and influence** **6.55** All of the Government factories and dockyards will use commercial

**6.50** Australia protects sensitive international defence technology not only costing and pricing procedures from 1 July 1987. Williamstown Dockyard

adopted these arrangements when it undertook construction of the Australian

by physical security but also by requiring local branches of multi-national firms

frigates.

to isolate themselves from parents of other than approved nationalities. Such
policies and procedures are common to our main allies, including the United
States, and can be a precondition to Australian access to some overseas
technology.

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g g g gy , y **Over the horizon radar**
substantial subsidies of their operations, substantial workforce reductions have

**6.61** Following a decade of research and trials by the DSTO, the principles

been made at individual establishments and at the central office of the Office of

of OTHR using reflections from the ionosphere have been largely established,

Defence Production.

the basic hardware and software elements have been demonstrated in an

**6.57** The highly specialised and excess capacity of some factories is costly experimental system, and the Government has authorised the first stage in the
and detracts from their ability to compete effectively in wider markets. Wherever establishment of an operational system.
possible, such capacity is being minimised or avoided by techniques that reduce

**6.62** The Australian OTHR system is adapted to the ionospheric, geographic

the lead time for its establishment to within likely warning times for its use. It

and strategic circumstances of Australia. Other countries have sought different

will be retained only where it can be shown that difficulties could be expected

technical solutions. There is high security attached to the details of such

with overseas supply (eg where sources are limited and likely to be

systems, particularly their performance and susceptibility to countermeasures.

unsympathetic, or where transport to Australia would be difficult), stockpiling is

As a result, there is likely to be scope for exchange of research and technical

difficult or prohibitively expensive (eg where shelf life is short), and where local

information with close allies, but, at least at this stage, little scope for exports

commercial production capacity could not be redirected.

of complete systems. Australian industry will benefit by acquiring expertise in a
number of high technology aspects of the system, applicable in other defence
projects, and may be able to develop commercial products based on some

**Industry and some major** elements.
**procurements** **6.63** Australian electronic, software and other companies have been involved

in the development of the experimental system and will have an increasing role

**6.58** The procedures for acquisition of major capital equipment have been as the system develops. The importance and sensitivity of the OTHA project will
streamlined and the responsibility of project managers strengthened by the restrict access to Australian nationals and to organisations complying with the
creation, in July 1984, of the Capital Procurement Organisation (CPO) within the Australian Ownership Control and Influence provisions. Within these restrictions,
Department of Defence. The CPO has placed greater priority on project it is the Government's intention that the project be structured to maximise
management training and procedures, and has sought more responsible competition in industry involvement
involvement of Australian industry in defence work in accordance with the
Government's defence policies for industry.

**Anti-ship missile defence system**

**6.59** Major defence acquisitions vary widely in the nature of the equipment,

**6.64** Innovative techniques for the protection of ships from some of the

the likely sources, the potential for local activities in design, development,

more recent anti-ship weapons have been developed by DSTO in co-operation

production and Australian Industry Involvement, and, hence, the strategy for

with Australian industry, including the Government's defence factories. Unlike

acquisition. While no two projects are the same, there are some common

OTHA, Australian needs for such a system are neither unique nor substantial

policies and principles that can be applied. Some examples follow illustrating the

and would command most priority in higher levels of conflict considered more

application of this Government's policies to procurements with substantial

remote in time and less likely. Such a system could, however, be expected to be

potential for local industry involvement.

of considerable interest in other theatres. This raises the prospect of substantial
exports.

**Indigenous design and development projects**

**6.65** There are high costs and risks in taking the experimental results

**6.60** The impetus for local design and development projects can come from obtained by DSTO through full-scale engineering to an operational system which
local research and development undertaken to meet special local requirements

can be shared by collaboration. A joint project can also bring access to

leg OTHR and sonar systems) or as a consequence of research undertaken to

technology and markets which would otherwise be restricted. Such a joint

maintain the technology base (eg Project Nulka and minehunter systems). The

project, known as Nulka, has been established with the US Navy. It will draw on

main difficulty in such projects is to manage the cost, schedule and technical

the technology developed in both countries, and their industrial bases.

risks to produce an acceptable final product. An important consideration is to
set up projects in ways that encourage industry to exploit the results in wider **6.66** Nulka is our first major collaborative equipment project with the United
markets. States. It will be managed in both countries through competitive fixed price

contracts for defined tasks. This contrasts with previous Australian development
projects, such as the Basic Pilot Training Aircraft, which have been run and
'cost-plus' basis with work directed to designated establishments. The approach
used in Nulka will place much more responsibility for performance on Australian

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industry. That performance will, of course, be an important influence on both **New surface combatant (light patrol frigate)**
future production work on Nulka and prospects for further collaborative projects

##### 6.72 This project aims to acquire eight ships at a cost of some $3.5 billion.

with the United States.

The Government intends to select an established overseas design for
construction in one or more Australian shipyards under 'local prime', 'fixed price

**Local development and production programs** contracting arrangements. Some modifications to the design will be necessary

to meet Australian requirements and to facilitate construction in Australia.

6.67 In some cases, equipment with the fundamental capabilities required by
the ADF may be available overseas, but it must be developed, adapted or 6.73 Construction of civil and naval surface vessels has a long history in
integrated into a system tailored to our specific requirements. Many defence Australia. Recent defence projects include patrol craft at Cairns and Fremantle,
systems require only minimal local adaptation (eg in their communications fit to large support vessels at Newcastle and Sydney, and frigates at Williamstown,
major platforms), while others are more extensive (eg submarines, new surface Victoria. The ability to perform the projects to cost and on time has been
combatants). Such prPjects require close technical and managerial control to varied.
ensure that performance, time and cost goals are met. Local capabilities are

6.74 The procurement strategy aims to keep overseas designers and

required for independent through-life support and subsequent mid-life

qualified Australian shipyards in competition until production contracts are

modernisation and adaptation. Involvement of Australian enterprises in detailed

signed. It allows for early and substantial involvement of Australian shipyards,

design can ease production difficulties and facilitate incorporation of local

early introduction of the vessels into service, and a high level of local content.

components.

The latter is important for independent through-life support and will confer a
capability, should the need ever arise, for a high degree of self-reliance in

**Submarines**

construction of additional vessels to expand the Fleet. Risk is low in the design,

**6.68** It was recognised from the outset that Australian industry had little of but Australian shipbuilders will be expected to carry the construction risk in
the specialised knowledge and experience needed to design and build arrangements with the overseas designer. Planning provision is being made for
submarines to replace the present fleet of Oberon class vessels. Industry had, possible joint procurement involving the industries of other countries.
however, many of the basic industrial capabilities and the existing submarine

**6.75** The project is seen as important for the local shipbuilding industry,

designs needed substantial modification to meet Australian operational

which, in common with the industry world wide, has substantial excess

requirements. The vessels require a large and complex infrastructure for their

capacity, which is being further exacerbated by changing technology reducing

through-life support, independently of the overseas source, which would be

ship docking and repair work.

assisted by local construction.

**6.69** This Government decided that the vessels would be built in Australia. It
judged that the cost premium for local construction could be justified in terms
of the self-reliance gained in the local capabilities established for subsequent **Local production of overseas designs**

##### 6.76set-to-work, repair, maintenance, modification, refit and, probably, mid-life In some cases, the requirements of the ADF can be met most cheaply

modernisation.

and expeditiously by existing overseas products where there is no economic or

6.70 The Government also agreed that Australian industry should be technical prospect of a local competitor. Local industry involvement in such

projects is through Designated Work and Offsets. This can involve a substantial

encouraged to take a major role in the project, including sharing the risks, and

element of local production and may include opportunities for follow-on work

consortia were formed between local organisations and the overseas tenderers

and exports. Examples include battlefield helicopters, rifles and missiles.

for the platform and combat systems to undertake Project Definition Studies
and to bid for production. A substantial portion of the work will be sub-
contracted by the prime contractors to Australian enterprises, which will have to **Battlefield helicopters**

##### 6.77comply with strict quality standards within delivery schedules and to cost. Extremes of temperature, areas of higher elevation, and rugged

**6.71** This model for Australian industry participation in a major defence operating conditions in northern Australia place severe demands on a battlefield

helicopter. The ADF requires a helicopter with a radius of action including

development and production project offers the prospect of substantial industrial

tactical flying of over 160 km, and able to carry an infantry section of ten

and defence self-reliance benefits. It is demanding on the resources of industry
and Defence project management. troops with sufficient personal equipment to enable sustained independent

operations. Exercises have shown the existing fleet of Bell Iroquois UH1H
aircraft to be deficient in these conditions. The French Aerospatiale Super Puma
M and the US Sikorsky Blackhawk were found to be acceptable aircraft after
competitive evaluation.

86 87


-----

**6.78** Following the formal tendering process, the two companies were 6.82 Initial production of some 70 000 rifles for the ADF is to be undertaken
invited to negotiate contracts with the Commonwealth. Considerabl' emphasis at the Small Arms Factory at Lithgow, NSW, which is the sole local mass
was placed on warranties of performance, particularly in the conditions likely to producer of small arms with a long history of weapons production.
be found in northern Australia, price, and the involvement of Australian industry

**6.83** To avoid the need to establish substantial facilities duplicating those

in the project.

available in civil industry, and to exercise the relationships with private firms

**6.79** This competitive procedure resulted in selection of the Blackhawk and that would be necessary should strategic circumstances require greatly
yielded better warranties than had been achieved previously in helicopter increased production rates, a large proportion of the weapon components are
purchases, a significant price reduction, and Australian Industry Involvement of being sub-contracted. The new technology of the AUG 1 has facilitated this
over 40 per cent of the contract value, including items of considerable strategic approach. Costs and subsidies will be reduced and the problems of workforce
and industrial importance. There is also provision for Australian collaboration in rundown at the conclusion of the production program minimised. This is a break
future design and development projects. with the past practice where the factory produced the entire weapon

**6.80** While not universally applicable as a p rchasing strategy, the approach **6.84** Other features of this project have been the full cost 'contractual
used in this case demonstrated clearly the bene: of competition being held agreement between the factory and the Army, the scope the industry strategy
open as long as possible. provides for other countries seeking to purchase weapons from Australia to

provide work for their own industries, and the export agreement with the
principals, Steyr of Austria. New Zealand has agreed to purchase the rifle from
the Small Arms Factory under these arrangements.

**Defence work in Australian industry**

**6.85** In 1985-86, the Australian Defence Budget was some $7 000 million of
which some $2 800 million was spent on activities directly relevant to industry
(new capital equipment, replacement equipment and spares, repair and
maintenance, and direct subsidies to industry, including the Governments
factories and dockyards). Of the latter, some $1 300 million was spent in
Australia. Over one quarter of the Defence outlay was spent on new capital
equipment, which reflects the high technology nature of modern warfare and the
need to acquire and maintain important operational capabilities. Australian
industry also benefits from the Defence Offset obligations generated by defence
purchases, which provide technology transfer and workload to the value of over
```
                                                                       $200 million per year. Exports of defence products, unrelated to offsets, are

```
estimated at some $40 million per year.

**6.86** While such funds seem substantial in the Australian context, they will
be adequate only if utmost economy is pursued in meeting ADF requirements.
Inefficiency, unnecessary subsidies, cost and schedule over-runs and other poor
policies and management practices will cause important projects to be deferred

**_The new individual weapon for the Australian Defence Force is the Steyr rifle. 70,000 will be_**

or deleted from the program, including projects that would have been of

**_manufactured at the Small Arms Factory, Lithgow, NSW._**

importance to industry.

**6.87** The Government is providing opportunities for industry to increase
substantially its share of the Defence new capital equipment program and to

**Rifles**

improve its export prospects. The efficiency and competitiveness of industry will

**6.81** In 1982 the Government approved the replacement of the Belgian largely determine the extent to which the opportunities are exploited and result
designed FN L1A1 individual weapons with new, smaller calibre, lighter weight, in more defence work being undertaken in Australia with enhanced self-reliance
automatic weapons. In October 1985, after exhaustive competitive trials, the for this country.
Austrian Steyr AUG 1 was selected.

88
89


-----

Chapter seven and women for combat and support roles, including the operation and7.2 The Defence organisation needs to attract, train, and retain skilled men

maintenance of increasingly complex equipment and support facilities. In

**Defence personnel**

addition, initiatives detailed earlier in this Paper designed to enhance our
defence self-reliance will increase the Defence organisation's demand for highly
qualified professional, technical and tradespeople already the subject of strong
competition in the market place. Competition for manpower will increase in
future years as the changing age distribution of Australia's population reduces

7.1 Our people—the men and women of our fighting forces and our defence

the number of people available for recruitment into the ADF. To be successful in

civilian staff—are our most valuable asset and a vital resource in the security of

attracting sufficient people of the right calibre, the Government must offer

Australia. In total some 137 000 men and women apply their professional

rewarding and challenging careers, and competitive pay, allowances, and

knowledge, skills and commitment to maintain and improve our defence

conditions of service

capabilities. There are some 70 000 Regular and 27 000 Reserve members of the
Australian Defence Force (ADF) and 40 000 civilians within the Defence
organisation (Figure 1 shows the allocation of Defence personnel).

**DEFENCE PERSONNEL— PLANNED STRENGTHS**

**The regular component of the ADF**
##### 7.3 1986-87 The planned strength of the ADF for 30 June 1987 is. Navy 15 732,
Army 32 000 and Air Force 22 797; a total strength of 70 529 (see Figure 2) The
reduction from a peak in 1981-82 reflects the Government's decisions on the

**REGULARS** **RESERVES** **CIVILIANSF**

aircraft carrier and naval fixed-wing aviation, and a reduction of 677 in the

**fflmff — —** authorised terminal strength of the Army in the 1985-86 Budget.

**7.4** A broad range of employment opportunities is offered, with periods of

Numbers of Personnel

service available from as little as two years to careers of 20 years or more A
wide variety of skills is developed and practised in the ADF, providing

60000 demanding and rewarding employment. Some 7 000-8 000 personnel annually

leave the Regular component of the ADF on retirement or to pursue their
careers in the civilian workforce. This group is encouraged to Join the Reserve
force.

50000

40000

**Women in the ADF**

**7.5** The Australian Government's strong commitment to eliminating

30000 discrimination against women was evidenced by its ratification of the UN

Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women in
1983 and passage of the Sex Discrimination Act in 1984. A major focus of the

20000 Sex Discrimination Act is the elimination of discrimination in employment. In this

context the Government agreed to exemptions for combat and combat-related
duties in the ADF on the understanding that as many positions as possible
would be open to women consistent with maintaining combat preparedness.

**7.6** Prior to the implementation of the Sex Discrimination Act and new
Defence Force employment policies in 1984, the proportion of women in the
Defence Force was 6.5 per cent. Although there was no common policy among

NAVY ARMY RAAF ODP DSTO CENTRAL the Services on employment areas for women, they were generally allocated to

the traditional areas of female employment.

Figure 1

90 91


-----

**AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE FORCE PERSONNEL— 1965-87** y p g

will also be introduced to allow Australia's Reserve Forces to be called out for

**REGULAR (or Full Time Duty)** service in situations short of a full scale war or defence emergency. The

legislation will allow Reserves to play the fullest possible role in the defence of

VOLUNTEERS VOLUNTEERS AND NATIONAL SERVICEMEN Australia by enabling them to be used in the sort of low level threat which

could emerge with relatively little warning.

Numbers of Personnel 7.9 The defence program provides for an Army Reserve of 26 000 and for

85000

modest increases in the smaller Reserve components of the Navy and Air Force

_I_ to bring the total Reserve strength to over 30000.

80000

_/_ **Civilians in defence**

###### 7.10I Civilians not only provide administration and support for the Navy,

75000 **_I_** **'II** Army, and Air Force, but are also employed in policy and management areas andin such non-military bodies as the Defence Science and Technology Organisation

(DSTO).

70000

**7.11** Of the 40000 civilians in the Defence organisation, 39 per cent are
employed at ADF bases, workshops and depots, 34 per cent support the ADF in
Defence factories and dockyards, 11 per cent work for DSTO, 14 per cent

65000 provide administrative support and management services, and 2 per cent provide

policy support to the Department.

**Pressures on the defence personnel resource**
###### 7.12 The Government will continue to allocate the largest share of the

55000 Defence budget to defence personnel. However, the need to acquire new
65 66 67 68 6970 71 72 7374 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86
(EST) equipment and facilities to ensure an efficient, self-reliant defence force means

that overall expenditure on personnel will continue to be restrained. The number

Financial Year Beginning of Service personnel has actually declined in recent years (see paragraph 7.3).

Tight control of civilian numbers has continued, resulting in reductions in total

F-!gure 2

numbers. The recent restructuring and rationalising of the Government's defence
factories and dockyards have also produced considerable manpower savings

7.7 Since the introduction of the Sex Discrimination Act and Government
reviews of ADF employment policies, the number of women in the ADF has 7.13 This constraint on the numbers of Defence personnel is consistent
increased steadily under the present Government, with some 5 760 (or 8.4 per with the Government's policy of limiting the size of the Commonwealth's
cent) serving as at 31 December 1986—a 30 percent increase over the 1984 employment force. Nevertheless, some measure of personnel relief is necessary
figure. About 21 750 (35 per cent) of the positions in the Regular component of to maintain adequate combat capabilities, and to support and operate the new
the ADF are now open to women in competition with men. A further review is equipment required for a modern and effective fighting force.
underway to expand employment opportunities available to women in the ADF.
The Government will continue to make available as many positions as possible
on merit.

**Reserve Forces**

**7.8** The Government will continue to give priority to our increasingly
effective Reserve Forces. Additional tasks for the Reserves have already been
announced. These include major roles in northern defence, logistic support,
surveillance, protection of key installations, and maintenance of expansion base

93
92


-----

**A personnel resource strategy** **ADF SEPARATION RATES**
7.14 Australia's reliance on a volunteer ADF means that its operational
this Government will introduce a more flexible personnel resource policy basedstrength will fluctuate. To manage the complex ADF personnel resource better, **%**

14

on identifying two separate components within the ADF—an operational force
of trained personnel and a training force comprising personnel undergoing pre-
employment training. This important initiative permits the strength of the
training force to be varied with rises and falls in separation rates' while
maintaining the trained force at the strength necessary to meet the objectives

12

set for it by Government. Given that higher than normal separation rates might
continue in the short term, some supplementation of the training component
through increased manpower ceilings will be necessary to maintain the trained
force at its present level and capability.

**7.15** A program of management reviews will enable the Government to 10
make more efficient use of Defence manpower, providing trained personnel for
the acquisition and operation of new equipment and facilities, and for the
maintenance of essential combat skills. The rationalisation of Defence factories
and dockyards will continue. Better management and more efficient work
practices will be introduced under the Defence Management Improvement Plan

8

to reduce current demands on ADF and civilian personnel. Tasks now performed
by Service personnel that could be performed at less cost by civilians will be
identified; the review of Defence warehousing by the Efficiency Scrutiny Unit is
a first step. A greater proportion of defence work will be contracted out to
private industry.

6

7.16 These measures, along with the return of a fighter squadron and
support staff from Butterworth, will help reduce some of the pressure on
defence personnel from the new capital investment programs. This should also
allow Defence to achieve a minimum saving of 3 per cent in civilian staff over
the next three years (a reduction of at least 1176) thus meeting the 4

76 77 77 73 78 79 7980 8081 81 82 8283 8384 84 85 8586

Government's efficiency dividend target.

**Retention** Financial Year
7.17 The Government is concerned at the present rate of separation from
the ADF and positive action is planned to reduce the numbers leaving. While a Ficjure 3
reasonable turnover of personnel in the ADF is necessary to exercise the
training infrastructure and maintain a young fit force, the present level is higher

###### 7.18than desired. There are a number of reasons for this. One is the below average One particular factor that the Government is addressing relates to the

separation rates of the recent past. Figure 3 shows that the average annual impact of changing socio-economic patterns, including the increase in two
separation rate over the last ten years was about 11.1 per cent; the lowest rate income families. Dependence on the spouse's income and the spouse's own
was 9.4 per cent in 1983-84, the highest 12.3 per cent in 1985-86. Varying age desire for employment may influence the decision of some serving members to
and length of service distributions in the ADF, resulting in part from its growth leave the Services to avoid the adverse Impact that frequent postings may have
in the 1960s, are also factors. The state of the national economy, conditions of on their families.
ADF service, and family aspirations, also influence separations. And the lack of

**7.19** Recognising that mobility of ADF personnel is necessary to maintain

skilled manpower being produced by the wider community for civil purposes

an effective operational force, the Government is working towards implementing

adds to the demand for personnel trained by the Defence Force

the recommendations of the Hamilton Report to minimise the adverse aspects of

1 Figure 3 shows separation rates over recent years. This matter is addressed further later in this essential changes of location. Standards of Defence housing are being improved
chapter.

94 1 95


-----

g p g **Superannuation and Defence Force Retirement**
Housing Authority is being established. These initiatives are explained in more **and Death Benefits**
detail later in this chapter.

7.25 The Government has supported Improvements in superannuation,

7.20 Additional initiatives being considered to reduce the present rate of

industry by industry or occupation by occupation. These are to be offset against

separation include improvements in conditions of service, financial incentives for

national productivity and based on a 3 per cent wage equivalent. The Australian

selected categories, and changes to periods of engagement.

Conciliation and Arbitration Commission has accepted this broad proposal but
has left it to individual parties to negotiate the terms of such agreements,
subject to certain guidelines. Noting that the public sector is already well served
in the area of superannuation, the Government has indicated that it will not be
at the forefront in concluding productivity arrangements in respect of its own
employees.

**Conditions of service**

7.26 In the light of the overall trend, supported by the Government, to

**Defence Force Remuneration Tribunal** improve and extend occupational superannuation in the community, the
7.21 The Government has changed the system of salary fixation for the Government has no intention of reducing the basic Defence Force Retirement
ADF by establishing the Defence Force Remuneration Tribunal (DFRT). The DFRT and Death Benefits entitlements as some speculation has suggested. It will also
is a totally independent and expert body with power in its own right to ensure that improvements in superannuation in the wider community flow
determine Defence Force pay and allowances. The Defence Force's 'employer'— appropriately to the Defence Force
the Government— is now no longer the final wage fixing authority. This
initiative gives Service personnel access to a pay fixing system broadly
comparable to that available to the general community. **Defence housing**

7.22 The establishment of a special tribunal for the Defence Force both

7.27 This Government will continue to rectify the poor living conditions

recognises the special aspects of military service and acknowledges the

many Defence Force families have had to face through neglect and underfunding

convergence that has occurred between military and civilian employment. These

in previous years. The 1986-87 Budget provided a real increase of 17 per cent

arrangements better integrate the Defence Force into the industrial framework

for Defence housing and some $750 million will be spent on new housing over

applying to the community at large. Underlying this reform is the Government's

the next ten years.

fundamental recognition of the right of servicemen and women to equitable pay
and allowances and to an independent and impartial wage fixing system. In **7.28** A new Defence Housing Authority will commence operations on 1 July
September 1985 a 5.9 per cent increase in Service pay was granted by the 1987 providing the flexibility and efficiency of management needed to ensure
DFRT under the anomalies provisions of the wage fixing principles. This award better accommodation. The Authority is already operating in interim form
was subsequently back-dated to 30 May 1985. pending the passage of legislation. The management board comprises a mix of

Service personnel and civilians selected for their knowledge of real estate and

7.23 The establishment of the DFRT and the Defence Force's participation

management expertise. In addition, the Government will continue to improve

in the centralised wage fixing system have also provided regular National Wage

living conditions for single personnel. These new arrangements are a major step

increases. These increases reflect movements in prices in return for restraint in

forward in the management of living conditions for the Defence Force.

seeking increases for other reasons. The commitments involved in National
Wage decisions have been accepted in both the Defence Force and the wider
community.

**Supporting service families**

**7.29** A major initiative taken by this Government was the commissioning of
a survey by Mrs Sue Hamilton from the Office of the Status of Women on the

**Defence Force Advocate** problems faced by ADF families. Her report pointed out deficiencies and
7.24 As an integral part of the revised arrangements for determining problems in the support available to Service families and made recommendations
Defence Force pay, the Government created the position of Defence Force as to how these might be redressed.
Advocate, a publicly funded office, to ensure that the Defence Force is not
disadvantaged by not having an industrial organisation to represent it in
proceedings before the DFRT.

96 1 97


-----

p p , p

Chapter eight

Spouses was established in 1986 and a Defence Families Information and
Liaison Service will commence operations in 1987 The implementation of the

**Resources and programming**

report's conditions of service recommendations (including a review of the length
of postings, disturbance allowances and removal for separated spouses) is under
consideration by the Government.

**8.1** Governments have a fundamental responsibility to allocate resources for
the security of the nation. But national resources are finite and subject to many
competing demands. Thus governments must also set out Defence policies and
objectives, define priorities for their attainment, and ensure that the allocation
of resources is consistent with these priorities.

**8.2** Our demands for defence resources must not be so high during times of
peace as to distort and thus weaken our economy. Our defence development
must be based on a rigorous consideration of what is essential for our security
and how to achieve this in the most effective and efficient way.
**8.3 While all defence activity is constrained by annual financial allocations**
appropriated by Government for defence, money is not the sole constraint. Our
defence plans must also take into account such other factors as the scientific
and industrial resources of the nation, the personnel available, and their range
and level of skills.

**Wider economic considerations**
**in defence fundinu**

**8.4** The provision of resources for the defence of Australia cannot be
determined in isolation from other national priorities and our economic
circumstances.

**8.5** The proportion of the nation's resources that are directed towards
defence is commonly measured by relating defence outlay to gross domestic
product (GDP). Figure 1 (see overleaf) shows that defence outlay peaked at well
over 4 per cent of GDP during the Vietnam War. Since the end of our
involvement in Vietnam, defence outlay has been around 2.6 to 2.9 per cent at
GDP. Naturally, as GDP may fluctuate from year to year there can be no rule
that defence spending should, in every year, bear a precise mathematical
relationship to GDP. But, broadly speaking, a share of GDP similar to that
devoted to defence in recent years will need to be retained if future
governments are to achieve the levels of defence capability identified in this
Paper.

**8.6** In the Government's annual Budget, Defence competes directly with
other pressing national priorities such as health, education and social security.
Figure 2 shows that Defence outlays have, on average, risen from a low of
about 8.4 per cent in the mid1970s, following the end of Australia's

98 1 99


-----

**DEFENCE OUTLAY AS PERCENTAGE OF GDP** **DEFENCE OUTLAY AS PERCENTAGE**

**OF COMMONWEALTH BUDGET OUTLAYS**

**%**
5 Social

Defence Education Health [Security]

4 %

30

S

**$ NM I am Ir 00** **[$00]** **41v* 00**

**'S**

3

_I,_
_/_
I _/_

20

/

2 .4

**on** **0 0000**

**•,..ssSS•f..S** **— F4** - '

0 - ...........S...

/

64 65 6667 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86
(EST)

- 
--.-

Financial Year Beginning

Figure 1 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86
(EST)

Financial Year Beginning

commitment in Vietnam, to around 9.5 per cent at the start of the 1980s and

Figure 2

9.9 per cent in the Budget of 1986-87. The rise in the past ten years or so has
occurred despite the greatly increased pressure on governments to increase
spending on social security.

8.7 Given competing national demands, any sustained increase in the overall
share of resources going to defence, measured in terms of GDP, could be
justified only in the event of marked deterioration in our strategic
circumstances.

101
100


-----

**Defence spending overseas** **8.13** The FYDP is necessarily dynamic, being subject to continuing

assessments and change resulting from continued analysis of our defence

**8.8** One particular element of defence outlays has come under notice in

needs, technological and strategic developments, and management

relation to wider economic considerations: a significant proportion of the

improvements. It takes account of Government decisions on the annual Defence

defence budget (around 25 per cent) is spent overseas and, looked at in

Budget (with the program's consequent rolling forward by one year) and also

isolation, adds to pressures on Australia's external account. But this should not

indicates for Government the longer term implications of those decisions.

be exaggerated. Direct defence spending overseas in 1985-86 equalled about 5
per cent of imports. **8.14** The FYDP must take account of changes in the level of Government's

financial guidance to Defence, and differences between this guidance and actual

**8.9** As outlined in earlier chapters, it is essential that Australia maintain a

Budget allocations. This Government recognises that considerable waste and

technological edge in the region; this is practicable only through significant

inefficiency in defence planning is inevitable when unrealistic guidance is given

purchases from overseas. Were Australia to direct more funds into domestic

as a planning basis for defence spending. The Government is committed to more

procurement than could be justified under our Defence Policy for Industry, our

realistic financial guidance for defence planning, although some adjustments will

defence capabilities would be reduced and the resulting inefficient use of

still need to be made when settling annual Budgets.

resources would affect the national economy adversely.
**8.10 Economic as well as national security reasons point to the need for a**
continued significant reliance on overseas procurement. The Budget Statementsfor 1986-87, tabled by the Treasurer, included the following pertinent comments **Recent trends in Defence expenditure**
in analysing the external accounts problem:

**8.15** Figure 3 shows the broad shifts that have occurred over the last

While the size and urgency of the imbalance might be seen as justifying almost

decade on the balance of expenditure between the major components of the

any means to increase exports and reduce imports, efficiency criteria cannot be

FYDP: capital equipment, capital facilities, personnel costs and operating costs.

overlooked. If resources are directed into import replacement or export activities
which need to be highly protected or subsidised, living standards in the economy
as a whole would necessarily be lower than if the same adjustment to the balance **8.16** By the mid-1970s, investment in new equipment and facilities had
of payments were achieved by the expansion of export and import-competing fallen to little more than 10 per cent of defence expenditure. It became evident
industries that are internationally competitive then that given the high cost and long lead times involved in acquiring new

equipment and facilities, defence capabilities would decline in the decades ahead

**8.11** Nevertheless, the Defence Policy for Industry announced by this

unless this trend was reversed. It has therefore been the policy of this

Government in 1984 and the initiatives outlined in this Paper (see Chapter 6),

Government to increase the proportion of defence expenditure on investment.

should see a reduction in overseas expenditure on capital equipment in the

Over the past four years this has risen from less than 22 per cent to over 33

years ahead. The F/A-18 Hornet currently dominates our acquisition program and

per cent planned for 1986-87. In the same period, expenditure on capital

the bulk of the expenditure is in the United States. These aircraft are now being

equipment has risen from 17 per cent to over 28 per cent of total defence

delivered. Hence overseas expenditure on this project will start to reduce

spending.

significantly from 1987-88 and will be virtually completed by the early 1990s. In
the Hornet's place there will be OTHR, new submarines, and the new light patrol **8.17** Associated with increased expenditure on investment has been
frigates, which will all have a substantially higher local expenditure. restraint on operating costs and personnel. Some reductions in this regard were

the result of specific force structure decisions by this Government with regard

**The Five Year Defence Program** efficiencies in production establishments and civilian supportto naval air power and the Fleet Air Arm. There have also been economies and

**8.12** The rolling Five Year Defence Program (FYDP) provides the framework **8.18** In 1986-87 about 28 per cent of estimated expenditure will be on

capital equipment, 5 per cent on capital facilities, 40 per cent on personnel and

within which policies and priorities, their timescales for implementation, and the

27 per cent on operating costs.

anticipated resources that Governments provide as a basis for forward planning,
are reconciled and brought into balance. Such an approach is necessary because
of the long timescales involved in defence planning. It takes many years to train
for military operations and to learn to operate modern complex equipment.
Equipment acquisition times can spread out over many years, for example,
expenditure on the construction of the new submarines will extend over at least
ten years. Forward commitments on personnel and equipment generally allow
only limited flexibility for change in any particular Defence Budget.

102
103


-----

**ACTUAL DEFENCE EXPENDITURE** **The years ahead**

**BY MAJOR CATEGORY AS A PERCENTAGE** **8.19** The continuing re-equipment program, and the need to continue to pay

attention to facilities and infrastructure, indicate a requirement to direct the

Personnel Operating Capital Capital same broad share of defence expenditure to investment in the immediate years
Costs Costs Facilities Equipment ahead. This will require continuing constraints on personnel levels and only
" \ \\ limited expansion of current training and exercise activities. Figure 4 shows the
', \ planned percentage allocation of defence expenditure for the period 1986-87 to

1991-92, reflecting these broad principles.

%

**Capital equipment**

**8.20** Commitments on major equipment projects already approved by

**I,**

Government account for 40 per cent of the funds programmed for major capital
equipment over the next five years. Expenditure on approved projects such as
the Hornet, and the FFG-7 class frigates will wind down, while new major
commitments will be entered into, for example, new submarines, mine
countermeasure vessels, more helicopters, and OTHR.

8.21 Figures 5 and 6 show the expected wind-down in expenditure in
percentage terms on projects already committed and the planned increase on
new proposals yet to be approved by Government. Expenditure is shown in
broad capabilities, e.g. maritime warfare and airspace surveillance. Figure 7
shows the aggregate of all major capital equipment, both approved and not yet
approved.

50

**Capital facilities**

**8.22** Expenditure on capital facilities is planned to increase significantly in
the years ahead with this Government's emphasis on strategic initiatives and
improved living accommodation for Service personnel. New strategic initiatives
will include the continued development of defence facilities to support
operations across the north, such as airfields and the northern basing of the
2nd Cavalry Regiment, further development of HMAS Stirling in the west and a
possible new fleet base at Jervis Bay. Expenditure on these initiatives will
extend well beyond the five years of the current defence program.

**Ell**

**8.23** An important area of Government expenditure will involve the

77-78 78-79 79-80 80-81 81-82 82-83 83-84 84-85 85-86 86-87
(EST) substantial improvement of living accommodation for Defence Force members

and their families (see Chapter 7). Other facilities initiatives will include the
rationalisation and modernisation of defence training and production

Financial Year

establishments and office accommodation.

Figure 3
**Personnel**

8.24 Personnel constraints will demand a more efficient use of Regular and
Reserve forces and civilians. As outlined in Chapter 7, the Government is
introducing new policies for the management of the personnel resource. The
strength of the ADF's trained force will be directly related to objectives set for

104 105


-----

**PROJECTED DEFENCE EXPENDITURE** **APPROVED MAJOR EQUIPMENT**

**Expenditure by Major Components**

**BY MAJOR CATEGORY AS A PERCENTAGE**

**%**
100

80

Personnel Capital Approved Proposed
Costs Facilities Equipment Equipment

60

% 40

20

EN

0
1986-87 1987-88 1988-89 1989-90 1990-91 1991-92
(BUDGET) (FYDP 1987-92)

Figure 5

**PROPOSED MAJOR EQUIPMENT**
**Expenditure by Major Components**

50 **%**

100

80

60

40

LøI

1986-87 1987-88 1988-89 1989-90 1990-91 1991-92 20
(BUDGET) (FYDP 1987-92)

Financial Year 0

1986-87 1987-88 1988-89 1989-90 199091 1991-92

Figure 4 (BUDGET) (EYDP 1987-92)

Figure 6

106 107


-----

t by t e Go e e t, e t e st e gt o t e t a g co po e t be

**TOTAL MAJOR EQUIPMENT**

related to separation rates. A program of management reviews will identify
areas in which ADF personnel can be replaced at less cost by the use of

**Expenditure by Major Components**

**%** civilians and private industry. Better management and more effective work

practices will be introduced.

**8.25** Civilian numbers will be reduced with the restructuring and
rationalisation of the Government's defence factories and dockyards, and with
the return of the fighter squadron from Butterworth, Malaysia. Other reductions
will follow from the Government's program to increase efficiency in the public
sector.

**8.26** With the increased roles planned for the Reserves, the defence
program has provision for the Army Reserve to increase to a strength of 26000,
and for modest increases in the Reserve components of the Navy and Air Force,

50 to bring the total strength to over 30000.

Operating costs
##### 8.27 Operating costs cover broad areas of defence spending, for example
training and exercises, recruitment, repair and maintenance of equipment and
facilities, DSTO, the Government factories, and central and regional
administration. The Government's defence planning will continue to provide for
modest annual real increases in operating costs, recognising that it generally

Eel

costs more to operate modern and more capable equipment than it did to

1986-87 1987-88 1988-89 1989-90 1990-91 1991-92 operate older designs of equipment.
(BUDGET) (FYDP 1987-92)

**8.28** The level of some defence activities will also increase as resources are

Figure 7 directed to training and exercise programs necessary for a better understanding

of operations in our north. But training programs must be selective, recognising

LEGEND FOR FIGURES 5, 6 AND 7 that not all elements of our defence force need to be at high states of

readiness.

EM MARITIME WARFARE - Includes Submarines, New Surface
Combatants and MCM Vessels **8.29** There will also be continued provision for the acquisition of increased

stocks to support higher rates of effort in the lower level contingencies that

TACTICAL AND STRIKE AIRCRAFT - Includes F/A-18 aircraft
and F-111 improvements could arise in the shorter term. Again, this does not apply to all elements of the

Defence Force but to such elements as the P3C Orion maritime surveillance

MOBILITY AND TACTICAL SURVEILLANCE - Includes Blackhawk

aircraft that would need to increase their rates of effort early in a time of

Helicopters, Light and Medium Trucks and AFVs
1 [WEAPONS AND AMMUNITION - Includes Missiles for Ships and] tension.
Aircraft, and Artillery Weapons and Ammunition 8.30 Economies will continue to be pursued, particularly in relation to the

SUPPORT SYSTEMS - Includes Computer systems for supply and operation of the Government's factories, running costs at bases and
manpower and major training systems administration generally. These economies will also have regard to the

COMMAND, CONTROL AND COMMUNICATIONS Government's recently announced reforms aimed at improving public sector

efficiency.

AIRSPACE SURVEILLANCE - Includes OTHR, AEW&C Systems
and Tactical Air Defence Radars

108 109


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p p p

**Chapter nine** basis for our security into the next century. This Government has given
**Conclusions** considerable attention to identifying deficiencies and gaps in areas of our forcestructure which would be important for the defence of Australia. These

deficiencies include the lack of a credible mine countermeasures force, the
requirement to provide our Army with greater battlefield mobility for operations
in the north of the continent, the need to develop an integrated air defence
capability, and the need to develop further the command and control

**9.1** This Paper has set out the Government's policy for the defence of

arrangements for the ADF.

Australia. It has explained our alliance and regional associations; the capabilities
required for an effective Australian defence force, including proper logistic, **9.7** The characteristics of range, endurance and mobility that we plan for
technical, and industrial support; our need for skilled and properly trained the Defence Force provide practical options for sustaining our defence activities
personnel; and the appropriate level of resources to be allocated for our defence further afield. In particular, they enable Australia to play a significant role in its
effort. own region and, by so doing, to contribute to the security of that region and

the protection of Western interests.

**9.2** This Government believes that Australia must be able to provide its own **9.8** This Paper has stressed the importance for self-reliance of properly
defence in circumstances of military threat posed to Australia from within or sited defence infrastructure and effective logistic support. And it has
through our own region. Although such contingencies are now considered emphasised the necessity of indigenous scientific and industrial capabilities.
remote, we have explained that they would place great demands on our defence

**9.9 The Government is developing policies for the rationalisation and greater**

capacity. Our practical defence development over the coming years must ensure

efficiency of its defence factories and dockyards. Australian industry can make a

that we have, and can be seen to have, the capacity to respond effectively to
them. greater contribution to the defence effort. Programs such as the new submarine

and the light patrol frigate will provide the most exciting opportunities for local
industry involvement since World War Two. The Government will also emphasise

**9.3** The Government has surveyed Australia's strategic circumstances and

greater transfer of technology and expertise to the industrial base so that it can

the interests and policies that relate to our defence and has found a substantial

more readily support the Defence Force.

measure of continuity with the recent past. The generally favourable prospects
for security in Australia's own geo-political environment have been noted, 9.10 Australia's defence personnel are the most valuable resource in our
although there are some situations that require close monitoring for their longer nation's security. The Government will introduce a more flexible personnel
term implications. Our national effort in the defence field, the alliance resource policy to enable the Defence Force to be more readily maintained at
relationships we have with the United States and New Zealand, and the the necessary operational level. The need to give priority to our equipment
enhancement of our defence relationships with friendly countries in the region requirements, and the development of defence bases in the north, will involve
all help to sustain our favourable strategic situation. overall constraints on manpower levels. However the Government will continue

to allocate the largest share of the defence budget to defence personnel. A

**9.4** This Paper has stressed that the priority need for the Defence Force is program of management reviews will result in more efficient use of this vital
to fulfil the national task of defending the nation. It has also dealt with the resource, providing trained defence personnel for the acquisition and operation
need for Australia's defence effort to take account of developments in our of new equipment and facilities and for the maintenance of essential combat
region of primary strategic interest, and to be capable of reacting positively to skills.
calls for military support elsewhere, should we judge that our interests require

9.11 This Government recognises the right of servicemen and women to

it. The Government considers that Australia can deal with both, but to do so we

equitable pay and allowances. It has established an independent and impartial

must be alert to priorities.

wage fixing system for the Defence Force. It will ensure that improvements in
superannuation in the wider community flow appropriately to the Services.

**9.5** The Government considers that its planned defence development will
meet Australia's needs. It builds on the programs approved by successive **9.12** The Government will provide $750 million over the next ten years for
governments for over ten years to develop a more self-reliant defence force. new housing for the Defence Force, a substantial increase over previous years.
More advantage will be taken of present favourable circumstances to develop As part of a major improvement in the management of living conditions for the
and consolidate the ADF, its infrastructure, bases and logistics, and, most Services, a new Defence Housing Authority has been created. The problems
importantly, the personnel policies that provide the well-trained and motivated faced by Service families are being addressed with the progressive
men and women on whom operations in a defence emergency and defence implementation of the Hamilton Report. These initiatives by the Government will
expansion would critically depend. help counter the current above average separation rate from the Defence Force.

111
110


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**9.13** A priority task for the Government is greater use of our increasingly
effective Reserve personnel. A range of additional tasks are being introduced for
the Reserves of significant importance for our immediate defence needs.
Combined with legislative changes proposed by this Government, these new
roles will make our Reserves a much more effective element in a self-reliant
Australian defence force.

**9.14** We have also explained the major resource considerations shaping our
defence posture. A disciplined relationship between strategy, force structure,
and financial constraints must be maintained. In our current and prospective
strategic and economic circumstances these resources need to be spent wisely.

**9.15** There is a need for realism in expectations of the resources that
governments will be able to allocate to Defence. If we are to achieve the levels
of defence capability and the priorities reflected in this Paper, there is a need,
over the life of the program, for an allocation of resources generally within the
order of 2.6 per cent to 3.0 per cent of GDP. Annual allocation to Defence will
of course continue to be subject to the normal reviews of our economic
circumstances and other policy imperatives, as well as changes in our strategic
outlook.

**9.16** Our basic competence and preparedness in matters of national defence
are the necessary foundation for our own security and for our defence activities
and influence further afield. The Government believes that the planned
development of the Defence Force is attuned to Australia's national security
needs. It accomplishes the priority task of defending the nation, ensures that we
would be a most difficult country against which to use force, and allows for a
realistic contribution to regional security and alliance activities.

112


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